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Un modelo que desfiló en Milán y un triple medallista paralímpico, la fórmula demócrata para tumbar el muro conservador de Iowa

30 October 2026 at 09:30

Una decena de enfermos de cáncer se ha reunido en la cafetería Smokey Row, en Ankeny, un próspero suburbio al norte de Des Moines. Han acudido para relatar su experiencia a Rob Sand, el carismático candidato demócrata para gobernador de Iowa, un estado del Medio Oeste conocido por sus interminables campos de maíz. Es uno de los territorios representativos del llamado Corn Belt, el corazón agrícola del país, que apoyó abrumadoramente a Donald Trump en las pasadas elecciones de 2024. Sand es la gran esperanza de su partido. Lidera las encuestas con cierto margen sobre su rival conservador, Zach Lahn. Está a punto de convertirse en el primer demócrata en ganar una gran elección en este territorio en casi dos décadas.

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Imagen de una campaña publicitaria en la que participó Rob Sands, el candidato demócrata a gobernador de Iowa.Imagen del video de apoyo de Barack Obama a Josh Tureck como candidato al Senado por Iowa.

© Bryon Houlgrave (AP Photo)

Josh Turek en Des Moines, Iowa, el 2 de junio.

Musk o Trump? Chi decide su Starlink all’Ucraina

By: A A
30 October 2026 at 09:10

Il 24 ottobre, l’Ucraina ha annunciato che i suoi sistemi Starlink e Starshield erano di nuovo pienamente operativi dopo oltre una settimana di restrizioni. Nello specifico, il Ministero della Difesa ucraino ha rilevato che la connessione è tornata stabilmente a velocità superiori a 400 km/h, a fronte dei 160 km/h a cui era precipitata giorni prima.
La limitazione, hanno spiegato diversi funzionari ucraini, aveva compromesso la capacità ucraina di intercettare i droni russi in fase di attacco, costringendo le forze armate di Kiev ad annullare alcune operazioni già pianificate.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Tuttavia, a brevissima distanza dal ripristino della piena operatività dei sistemi Starlink a disposizione di Kiev, Elon Musk, amministratore delegato di Space-X, ha accusato l’esercito ucraino di aver violato i termini di servizio.

In un post sul suo profilo X, il magnate di origini sudafricane ha affermato che: «l’uso di Starlink, un servizio commerciale civile, per attacchi con droni offensivi volti a uccidere persone non è mai stato consentito, né dovrebbe esserlo. Starshield è un sistema diverso ed è controllato dal governo degli Stati Uniti. Ciò che decidono di fare spetta a loro».

L’esercito ucraino «ha violato i termini di servizio di Starlink e lo ha utilizzato per attacchi con droni offensivi volti a uccidere persone. Quella falla è stata chiusa la settimana scorsa».

Starlink «rimane cruciale per la difesa dell’Ucraina, poiché è l’unico sistema che non può essere disturbato o distrutto, almeno per ora. Se Starlink venisse spento, il fronte ucraino collasserebbe immediatamente. Questa non è una minaccia, è semplicemente un dato di fatto.

Il sistema si è rivelato cruciale per «impedire alla Russia di sopraffare l’Ucraina nei primi giorni della guerra, poiché tutti gli altri mezzi di comunicazione erano stati distrutti o disturbati dalla Russia».

Space-X «ha fatto molto di più per difendere l’Ucraina di qualsiasi altra azienda privata sulla Terra. Detto questo, non provo che disprezzo assoluto per i guerrafondai che fanno la morale e spingono per un massacro senza fine, senza offrire alcuna soluzione realistica al conflitto. Che possano bruciare all’inferno. Fine della storia».

Starlink è un sistema internet satellitare gestito da Space-X, mentre Starshield è una versione che si avvale della tecnologia Starlink per scopi militari gestita dal governo degli Stati Uniti.

Questa integrazione rende quantomeno ambigua la posizione di Starlink, mettendo in seria discussione la natura privata della casa madre Space-X.

Quella del connubio pubblico-privato negli Stati Uniti è una storia vecchissima, ma che trova negli anni Cinquanta uno dei suoi momenti decisivi.

All’epoca, in piena Guerra Fredda, lo spauracchio sovietico, agitato con cieca ossessività specialmente in seguito allo shock generato dal lancio dello Sputnik (1957) e all’entrata in servizio del bombardiere strategico Tupolev-95, si rivelò determinante a costruire un robusto consenso politico attorno alla decisione dell’amministrazione Eisenhower di destinare una quota crescente di risorse al rafforzamento della marina e al potenziamento dei settori di ricerca e sviluppo.

L’onere di gestire le risorse e coordinare gli sforzi in questo senso ricadde sulla Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Darpa), un organismo facente capo al Pentagono fondato, al pari della National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Nasa), nel 1958 in conformità all’esigenza di colmare il divario tecnico-scientifico con l’Unione Sovietica.

Mentre il governo moltiplicava le misure di stimolo alle imprese (assegnazione di commesse pubbliche agli atenei, concessione di agevolazioni fiscali, ecc.), la Darpa elaborava una rete di ricerca e condivisione a maglie strettissime, in grado di interconnettere decine di università, start-up e laboratori di ricerca e portare gli Stati Uniti all’avanguardia nel campo cruciale della scienza. Il lancio dei programmi Gemini e Apollo, lo sviluppo dei missili balistici a medio e lungo raggio, la realizzazione dei sottomarini e delle portaerei a propulsione nucleare si devono al contributo determinante apportato dalla Darpa.

Nel 1982, il Congresso approvò il programma di sostegno alle start-up Small Business Innovation Research (Sbir), affidandone la gestione alla Small Business Administration, predisponendo parallelamente la trasformazione della Darpa nel fondamentale canale di collegamento tra imprese e dipartimenti universitari, in grado di assolvere ai compiti di mediazione tecnologica e imprenditoriale necessari alla commercializzazione delle innovazioni che venivano realizzate nei settori di punta (informatica, telecomunicazioni, biotecnologia, semiconduttori, ecc.) dalle società hi-tech a cui il complesso militar-industriale aveva subappaltato parte delle mansioni legate ai comparti di ricerca e sviluppo, nell’ambito della celeberrima Strategic Defense Initiative (Sdi).

Il progetto, concepito dall’amministrazione Reagan e annunciato urbi et orbi nel marzo 1983, puntava alla creazione di un sistema di difesa aerea multistratificato basato su intercettori spaziali in grado di colpire i missili balistici nemici prima che colpissero il suolo statunitense, “superando” così il principio della mutua distruzione assicurata su cui si era imperniata la Guerra Fredda fino a quel momento.

La Sdi, recita un documento del dipartimento di Stato, «si basava su tecnologie avveniristiche, inclusi sistemi laser spaziali non ancora realizzati», il cui sviluppo assorbì enormi risorse pubbliche in larga parte ridistribuite a beneficio delle aziende private sotto il coordinamento della Darpa.

Una volta convertite all’uso civile, le nuove tecnologie ad elevata intensità di capitale messe a punto contestualmente alla Sdi assunsero rapidamente un grado di pervasività – inteso come capacità di trovare applicazione in un numero sbalorditivo di campi sconvolgendone il funzionamento e i rendimenti – tale da scompaginare il vecchio sistema di produzione fordista ad elevata intensità di manodopera riducendo drasticamente la presenza umana sia nella manifattura che nel settore di servizi.

«Non si tralasciò occasione – osserva Giuseppe Guarino – che si prestasse per la stimolazione e la promozione della Information Technology per finalità militari. Ognuna delle sue fasi essenziali, con successiva trasformazione e utilizzazione dei prodotti a fini commerciali, è stata in pratica resa possibile dal sostegno del Dipartimento della Difesa, dalla Nasa e degli altri dipartimenti militari, compresa la Cia […]. Il merito dell’intervento pubblico non è di aver assorbito l’intera produzione della Information Technology, ma di aver contribuito in maniera determinante con i propri acquisti iniziali a far scendere i prezzi a livelli che avrebbero consentito la diffusione civile e commerciale delle innovazioni, nonché con quelli successivi che hanno favorito l’utilizzazione delle nuove tecnologie nell’organizzazione pubblica, anche civile, e la diffusione delle stesse» (1).

La progressiva affermazione del nuovo modello in tutti i comparti dell’economia ha accelerato il processo di “terziarizzazione” dell’economia statunitense, e palesato il ruolo cruciale giocato dallo Stato rispetto al finanziamento dello sviluppo tecnologico realizzato da aziende private.

Negli anni ’90, sotto la direzione del direttore George Tenet, la Cia iniziò a finanziare generosamente le piccole aziende intente a sviluppare tecnologie applicabili a fini di intelligence aggirando le lungaggini che caratterizzano la mastodontica macchina burocratica statunitense. A questo scopo, la Casa Bianca e il Congresso approvarono la creazione di In-Q-Tel, oscura società di venture capital senza scopo di lucro incaricata di finanziare la messa a punto di tecnologie d’avanguardia per conto – o quasi – della Cia. Come riporta il «Wall Street Journal»:  «i vertici In-Q-Tel considerano l’azienda come indipendente, nonostante i legami molto stretti con la Cia e il fatto che quasi tutte le decisioni di investimento sono gestite dall’agenzia di spionaggio […].La presenza di intricati legami è endemica nel venture capital, in cui la conoscenza intima del settore è essenziale per il successo. Le altre società, tuttavia, giocano con il proprio denaro, o quello di privati».

In-Q-Tel «utilizza denaro pubblico, soggetto a severe norme sul conflitto di interessi e, secondo fonti vicine, si tratta di almeno 120 milioni di dollari all’anno. A volte impegna questo capitale secondo modalità che, anche se non intenzionalmente, avvantaggiano gli stessi amministratori dell’azienda in virtù di altre cariche nel settore hi-tech».

Quasi sempre, le scelte di In-Q-Tel «attraggono altri finanziamenti. Ogni dollaro investito in una piccola impresa in genere è accompagnato da 15 dollari provenienti da altre fonti. Questo aumenta le probabilità di successo del piccolo business in questione e rende le sue stock option più preziose».

Nel 2000, In-Q-Tel ha investito somme piuttosto rilevanti in alcune imprese che producevano satelliti e che si occupavano di raccogliere, classificare e analizzare dati sensibili. In breve tempo, la società ha accumulato quote azionarie di maggioranza di decine compagnie hi-tech, così da dettarne gli indirizzi e allinearle alle esigenze di Washington. Opportunamente orientata dai fondi di In-Q-Tel, una compagnia specializzata nell’elaborazione di soluzioni chimiche adatte alla fabbricazione di tappeti sviluppò in breve tempo una specie di sonda in grado di rilevare la presenza di veleni ed altre sostanze chimiche letali in ambienti chiusi, poi sistematicamente impiegata nei teatri di guerra afghano e iracheno.

Parallelamente, In-Q-Tel investì in un’azienda operante nel settore delle antenne satellitari, ricavando sistemi di localizzazione portatili di cui le truppe e le forze speciali Usa si sono servite per segnalare la propria posizione ai centri di comando.

Più recentemente, i capitali di In-Q-Tel hanno finanziato aziende cruciali come Anduril e, soprattutto, Palantir, saldamente integrata nelle macchine militari statunitense, israeliana e ucraina oltre che nella pubblica amministrazione britannica e in molti altri comparti critici.

L’altissimo livello di “collaborazione pubblico-privato” raggiunto negli Stati Uniti grazie a entità come In-Q-Tel è emblematizzato dal cosiddetto “scandalo Datagate”, scoperchiato nel 2013 grazie alle rivelazioni dello “spifferatore” Edward Snowden. In qualità di tecnico impiegato per una società appaltatrice della National Security Agency, Snowden ha documentato con dovizia di particolari l’esistenza di una rete di sorveglianza capillare e massiccia sui miliardi di comunicazioni sia interne che esterne agli Stati Uniti gestita dalla Nsa stessa attraverso Prism. Vale a dire un sistema in grado di assicurare all’intelligence nazionale la possibilità di accedere in maniera diretta ai server di cui si servivano le aziende operanti nel settore dell’alta tecnologia per ottenere qualsiasi tipo di informazione (messaggi, fotografie, e-mail, ecc.).

Entrato in vigore nel 2007 e beneficiando nel corso degli anni della collaborazione di colossi del calibro di Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, Skype, AoL, YouTube e Apple, Prism ha posto la Nsc e anche il Gchq britannico nelle condizioni di acquisire i metadati in transito attraverso i cavi in fibra ottica collegati ai server centrali di Yahoo e Google.

Space-X non ha beneficiato dei fondi di In-Q-Tel, ma del subappalto sistematico ad opera di agenzie statali come la Nasa o dello stesso Pentagono, che come contropartita gode di libero e completo accesso alla tecnologia  Starlink. Al punto da garantirlo a Paesi alleati come l’Ucraina.

La decisione di ridurre prima e ripristinare poi il servizio Starlink a Kiev non fa quindi capo a Elon Musk, ma sui vertici del potere pubblico statunitense a cui Space-X – così come le altre grandi aziende hi-tech statunitensi – rispondono più o meno indirettamente.

NOTE

1) Guarino, Giuseppe, I soldi della guerra. Gli Stati Uniti: spesa militare, innovazione, economia globale, Mondadori, Milano 2003, pp. 67-80.

VIDEO. Donald Trump : "Vous êtes répugnant"... questionné sur son état de forme avant les mid-terms, le président américain s'emporte violemment contre un journaliste

30 October 2026 at 09:03
Acculé par des sondages qui prédisent une poussée démocrate aux élections de mi-mandat, Donald Trump a laissé éclater sa colère face aux médias. Entre meetings annulés et tension maximale sur le tarmac, le président...

Fire Point says its drones hit a Russian refinery’s diesel unit hours after WSJ reported Ukraine had paused such strikes under Trump’s pressure

30 October 2026 at 08:55

Smoke rising from the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery in Samara Oblast, Russia, 30 October 2026

Ukraine's Defense Forces hit the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery in Russia's Samara Oblast with FP-1 drones early on 30 October, Ukrainian drone maker Fire Point said, adding that one of the units hit hydrotreats diesel fuel. The strike came hours after WSJ reported that Ukraine had paused strikes on Russian refineries under pressure from US President Donald Trump until after the US midterm elections on 3 November.

Russia is pounding Ukraine's power grid and cities ahead of winter, with a mounting civilian toll, including 14 people killed on a Dnipro railway platform on 29 October. Ukraine's long-range drone strikes on Russian refineries, one of its most effective operations against Moscow, target the oil money that pays for that war. Trump has pressed Kyiv for weeks to stop them, blaming them for high global fuel prices, and Ukraine went quiet without saying so and without getting what it asked for in return, WSJ reported. The Samara strike is the first on Russian oil since then. Kyiv has not said whether the pause is over.

Fires spread across a refinery that makes jet fuel for Russia's military

Residents of Novokuibyshevsk reported drones, explosions, and a fire before dawn. Ukrainian Telegram channel Exilenova+ posted the first photos on Telegram at 05:24 Kyiv time, and Russian Telegram channel Astra geolocated the fire to the refinery, citing its open-source analysis of residents' photos.

Novokuybyshevsk, Samara region: locals report an attack and a fire. pic.twitter.com/9UEgqmkAOU

— Exilenova+ (@Exilenova_plus) October 30, 2026

By morning, Exilenova+ counted at least 11 separate fires at the refinery. Samara Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev said air defense and mobile fire groups were repelling an attack, Astra reported. The region had declared a drone alert and closed its airport.

Smoke rising from the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery in Samara Oblast, Russia, 30 October 2026
Smoke rising from the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery in Samara Oblast, Russia, 30 October 2026. Photo: Exilenova+

Fire Point said its FP-1 drones scored numerous hits on the refinery grounds, and that one of the units hit hydrotreats diesel fuel. The footage published so far shows several smoke columns over the plant but does not show which units burned. The Rosneft-owned refinery has a design capacity of 8.8 million tons of oil a year and is one of the main producers of jet fuel, according to its website. Astra says it supplies jet fuel to Russia's military. The plant lies about 910 km from the front line. Ukraine's General Staff has not commented.

pic.twitter.com/Ku6KRCKJ6v

— Exilenova+ (@Exilenova_plus) October 30, 2026

Ukrainian drones have hit the plant before. Ukraine's military said its forces hit it in August and caused a fire.

Map showing the Novokuibyshevsk refinery in Samara Oblast, about 910 km from the front line, and Starodub in Bryansk Oblast

It is the first fire at a Russian refinery since 15 October, when Ryazan's governor reported one at the city's refinery. It is also the first reported strike on Russia's oil industry since 20 October, when Ukrainian drones hit a Druzhba pipeline pumping station in Tambov Oblast. WSJ called that strike the last before the pause.

rosneft's kuibyshev refinery joins syzran novokuibyshevsk offline after ukrainian drone strike yesterday · post fires raging kuybyshevsky oil samara russia 10 2026 fires-rage-at-samara-kuybyshevsky-oil-refinery ukraine news reports
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All three Rosneft Samara refineries now offline or reduced as drones halt Kuibyshevsky operations yesterday

WSJ claims: Ukraine paused refinery strikes until after the US midterms

Ukraine's military paused its strikes on Russian refineries after weeks of pressure from Trump shook Kyiv's confidence in US support, people with knowledge of the operations told WSJ. The unofficial pause began early last week and is expected to last until after the midterms, and possibly deeper into November. Units carrying out long-range strikes were told in mid-October that the refinery campaign was effectively on hold once missions already under way were completed, two military officials said. Hours after the report, the Novokuibyshevsk strike called that account into question.

Smoke columns rise over residential buildings in Novokuibyshevsk, Samara Oblast, Russia, at dawn on 30 October 2026
Smoke columns rise over residential buildings in Novokuibyshevsk, Samara Oblast, Russia, at dawn on 30 October 2026. Photo: Astra

Ukraine's government has not announced a pause. Zelenskyy told reporters in Kyiv on 27 October that “our guys tried to be a little more careful during these days. But they do not have an order” not to hit refineries, according to WSJ. He said drone units were hitting other kinds of targets in Russia.

Trump's envoy Jared Kushner repeated the demand to stop the strikes at a meeting with Zelenskyy in Oslo on 20 October, two US officials told WSJ. One of them called the conversation “very tough.” Kushner, who joined remotely, said he and envoy Steve Witkoff were spending a lot of time, energy, and jet fuel on mediating with Moscow, and that a 30-day pause on refineries would be a way for Ukraine to show gratitude, the official said.

again trump presses zelenskyy stop russian refinery strikes · post ukrainian president volodymyr meets donald ankara türkiye 8 2026 presidentgovua ukraine news reports
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Energy truce with strings attached: Kyiv reportedly told to spare Russian refineries or lose US intelligence and arms

Zelenskyy had asked for something in return, WSJ reported: a mutual energy ceasefire with Russia, Patriot missiles for Ukraine's grid, or permission to use Starlink inside Russia so drones could destroy Russian missile launchers. None of those ideas got far. Some of Kyiv's European backers also nudged Zelenskyy to pause until after the midterms, a senior European official said.

The pause showed in Russia's oil industry. Russian refinery utilization at the end of October was 25% higher than at the start of the month as drone attacks subsided, Reuters reported, according to The Moscow Times.

Russia claims over 1,000 drones for a second night as Moscow's airports close again

Russia's Defense Ministry claimed it downed 1,043 Ukrainian drones overnight over 19 regions, including Samara Oblast, the Moscow region, and Tatarstan. The night before, it claimed 1,214.

Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed that 862 drones flew toward the Moscow region between 20:30 on 29 October and 07:30 on 30 October, that most were downed on the far approaches, and that 170 were downed on approach to the capital. Russia's aviation agency restricted flights at all four Moscow airports, Astra reported. A day earlier, more than 460 flights were delayed or canceled at Moscow and St. Petersburg airports, Astra counted.

A building on fire at night in Starodub, Bryansk Oblast, Russia, 30 October 2026
A building on fire at night in Starodub, Bryansk Oblast, Russia, 30 October 2026. Readers who sent the footage to Astra identified it as the Konservsushprod food plant. Photo: Astra

In Starodub, in Russia's Bryansk Oblast, about 35 km from the Ukrainian border, a building of the Konservsushprod plant, which makes canned food for the Russian army, appeared to be on fire in readers' photos and videos, Astra reported, saying the plant was presumably attacked and that its open-source analyst had not verified the footage. The Atesh partisan movement reported a blast in Aleksandrovka in Rostov Oblast, and air defense fire and an explosion in Orel.

Lula tenta evitar que caso Bolsonaro vire crise diplomática com Trump

30 October 2026 at 08:52

O presidente Lula (PT) decidiu não se envolver no enredo político da fuga de Flávio Bolsonaro (PL), senador e candidato derrotado ao Planalto, para os Estados Unidos.

A avaliação no Planalto é de que uma intervenção do petista seria despropositada, porque Flávio está a desgastar-se com a história e, por isso, não haveria sentido em arriscar uma crise diplomática com o presidente americano, Donald Trump, por causa do adversário político.

A determinação foi mantida mesmo depois de os jornais americanos The Wall Street Journal e The New York Times afirmarem que Trump ajudou Flávio a fugir para os EUA.

O jato particular em que Flávio viajou foi providenciado, segundo as duas publicações, por Jason Miller, funcionário de comunicação da Casa Branca —informação também sustentada por um aliado de Flávio à Folha.

Miller estreitou laços com a família Bolsonaro quando esteve no comando da Gettr, rede social conservadora. Em setembro de 2021, chegou a ser interrogado pela Polícia Federal no aeroporto de Brasília, em investigação sobre atos golpistas conduzida pelo ministro Alexandre de Moraes, do STF, após participar de conferência organizada por Eduardo Bolsonaro, na qual também se encontrou com Jair Bolsonaro, então presidente da República.

Flávio partiu rumo aos Estados Unidos após ser intimado pela Polícia Federal na segunda-feira (26) a entregar seus passaportes —ele é alvo de inquérito que apura seu envolvimento em esquema de lavagem de dinheiro com bets. O senador passou pela Argentina e Equador antes de chegar ao território norte-americano.

Auxiliares de Lula têm repetido que eventuais providências relacionadas à fuga de Flávio cabem ao poder judicial, não à Presidência da República. O chefe do governo tem demonstrado, em conversas internas, que prefere dedicar o seu tempo a outros assuntos –ele acaba de ser reeleito e precisa apurar a sua nova gestão. Também tenta evitar que as negociações sobre o tarifaço fiquem ainda mais difíceis.

Um integrante do alto escalão diz que a fuga foi tão absurda que não deveria ser elemento com potencial de desencadear qualquer crise para Lula.

O governo brasileiro pretende preservar a relação comercial com os Estados Unidos e manter as negociações em curso, mesmo com as notícias que ligam o governo americano à fuga de Flávio. A avaliação interna é de que não convém colocar o episódio no centro da relação entre os dois governos.

Como mostrou a Folha, aliados do petista avaliam que Flávio Bolsonaro tenta atrair Lula para uma armadilha para sabotar a relação entre o petista e Trump, descrita como boa por ambos. Por esse raciocínio, o candidato derrotado busca provocar o presidente brasileiro para que ele tome uma atitude ou dê uma declaração que estresse sua relação com o presidente americano.

Na quarta-feira (28), o senador do PL divulgou uma carta em que se proclamava “verdadeiro presidente do Brasil”. Depois, atualizou o documento e referiu-se a si mesmo como “líder do Brasil”. Ele afirma, sem apresentar prova nenhuma, que a eleição brasileira foi fraudada. Na segunda (26), Flávio havia dito que desistiria de anular a eleição na Justiça e declarou que não fugiria do país.

Trump até o momento não reconheceu explicitamente a vitória de Lula e disse que a eleição brasileira foi uma vergonha. Apesar disso, ele afirma que conversará com o brasileiro. De acordo com Trump, o próprio Lula pediu que ele não tomasse lado na disputa.

A orientação dada aos auxiliares de Lula é não alimentar uma polêmica em torno da fuga de Flávio e manter uma postura pragmática. Integrantes do governo avaliam que Lula saiu fortalecido da reeleição e não precisa cobrar de Trump o reconhecimento da vitória, ainda não expressado pelo presidente americano.

Na avaliação de um auxiliar do Planalto, cobrar publicamente o reconhecimento poderia transmitir uma imagem de fragilidade que o Brasil não precisa assumir. Um diplomata do Itamaraty afirma que, neste momento, as providências relacionadas à saída de Flávio do país cabem ao Judiciário, e não ao presidente da República.

O governo também considera relevante o fato de partidos de diferentes espectros políticos, inclusive o PL, terem reconhecido a vitória de Lula. Outro reconhecimento considerado importante pelo governo foi o do presidente do TSE (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral), Kassio Nunes Marques, indicado ao STF por Jair Bolsonaro.

O grupo político do chefe do governo brasileiro diz acreditar que a ida do adversário para o exterior tende a dispersar seu eleitorado. No domingo (25), Flávio Bolsonaro teve 59,8 milhões de votos para presidente da República e perdeu para Lula por 3,6 pontos percentuais.

Diversos aliados de Lula relataram à Folha a avaliação de que a fuga de Flávio Bolsonaro é benéfica para o presidente reeleito. Em seu aniversário de 81 anos, o petista citou o episódio como um dos mais vergonhosos da história do Brasil.

A análise é de que o senador abandonou um património eleitoral imenso e desorganizou a oposição, que agora precisará construir uma nova opção de poder –ou seja, um nome forte e incontestável no seu campo político para disputar a próxima eleição presidencial contra o grupo de Lula.

Newsom Deploys Election Lawyers to Protect California Vote

30 October 2026 at 08:36
Gavin Newsom announces California election protection measures amid dispute with Donald Trump over federal agents at polling places.

The move comes amid a federal dispute over election oversight and a court ruling blocking efforts to set aside more than 20,000 mail-in ballots.


California Gov. Gavin Newsom announced Thursday that he would deploy election lawyers and observers across the state to protect voters’ rights, escalating a confrontation with President Donald Trump’s administration over federal involvement in polling places ahead of the elections.

RELATED: More Than 26.6 Million Have Voted Early in U.S. Midterms

The legal teams will be sent to key districts with closely contested races, Newsom said, warning against unauthorized interference in the electoral process.

“A warning to Donald Trump: I’m deploying election lawyers to key battleground districts in California to protect every vote. And I just made it a FELONY to illegally seize ballots,” the Democratic governor wrote on social media platform X.

Newsom also approved legislation making the unlawful seizure of election ballots a felony, establishing criminal penalties for unauthorized interference with ballots.

A warning to Donald Trump:

I’m deploying election lawyers to key battleground districts in California to protect every vote.

And I just made it a FELONY to illegally seize ballots.

— Gavin Newsom (@GavinNewsom) October 29, 2026

The measures follow the Trump administration’s announcement that it would deploy federal agents to polling places to prevent potential electoral irregularities. Trump has repeatedly accused California of failing to address alleged voter fraud.

Speaking Wednesday night on Jimmy Kimmel Live, Newsom criticized the administration’s approach, accusing the White House of trying to suppress votes and create grounds to challenge the election results.

He argued that the administration was seeking to create conditions that could later be used to question the outcome and allege fraud.

The dispute has also reached the courts. On Wednesday, a federal judge rejected a Justice Department request to set aside more than 20,000 mail-in ballots cast in California while authorities verified voters’ citizenship.

The judge warned that withholding the ballots would cause widespread disruption and interfere with an electoral process already underway.

California officials had also questioned the reliability of the voter list submitted by the federal government and rejected its request to verify voters’ citizenship before ballots were counted.

The Justice Department confirmed it would appeal the ruling, setting the stage for further legal disputes between federal and state authorities before the election process concludes.

Lavrov Returns to America as Moscow Tests the Limits of Western Diplomacy

30 October 2026 at 08:18

Russia’s foreign minister arrives at the G20 meeting in Atlanta without Moscow having made significant concessions over Ukraine. His presence offers a reminder that diplomatic access can be valuable even when negotiations produce little progress.

Sergei Lavrov’s arrival in the United States for the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting is unlikely to transform the prospects for peace in Ukraine. For Moscow, however, the visit offers opportunities extending well beyond the formal agenda.

Russia’s veteran foreign minister will participate in discussions alongside representatives of the world’s major economies, including governments that have imposed extensive sanctions on Moscow and others that have maintained profitable commercial relationships with it.

The meeting, chaired by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 30–31 October, takes place as Washington pursues another diplomatic initiative concerning Ukraine.

Lavrov’s presence has attracted criticism from American lawmakers, including Republican Congressman Don Bacon, who has questioned why a senior representative of a government conducting military operations against Ukrainian cities should be welcomed in the United States.

Yet the more consequential issue is not whether Lavrov should attend. It is what Moscow hopes to achieve through renewed access to Western diplomatic forums, and what the United States expects to obtain in return.

Russia’s Diplomatic Opportunities

The Kremlin has spent much of the war arguing that Western attempts to isolate Russia have failed.

There is some substance to that argument, although it requires qualification.

Russia has suffered extensive restrictions on access to Western finance, technology and markets. Its economic relationships with Europe have been severely reduced, and its dependence on alternative trading partners has increased.

Nevertheless, Moscow has preserved important commercial and diplomatic connections with China, India and other countries unwilling to participate fully in Western sanctions.

For these governments, relations with Russia are often determined by energy requirements, commercial opportunities and their own strategic calculations rather than European security priorities.

The G20 provides Moscow with an opportunity to exploit those differences.

Lavrov can challenge Western sanctions, defend Russia’s diplomatic positions and hold bilateral discussions without demonstrating any willingness to compromise over occupied Ukrainian territory.

That does not make the meeting a Russian victory. Attendance at a multilateral gathering is not equivalent to the removal of sanctions or recognition of territorial claims.

But it offers Moscow something useful: opportunities for engagement without the conditions that would normally accompany substantive negotiations.

The limitations of such diplomacy were illustrated recently when German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul met Lavrov in New York.

As EU Today examined in its analysis of that encounter, the meeting reopened a channel of communication but produced no visible movement in Russia’s position.

Germany restated its support for Ukraine. Moscow reiterated its established arguments.

The encounter demonstrated that diplomatic access and diplomatic progress are not necessarily the same thing.

Washington’s Negotiating Problem

The Trump administration approaches Russia from a different perspective.

Washington appears increasingly interested in identifying economic and political incentives that could make a negotiated settlement possible.

The calculation is understandable. Sanctions alone have not ended the war, and continued fighting imposes enormous costs on Ukraine while consuming Western military resources.

However, negotiations depend on more than establishing contact.

A settlement requires agreement over territory, security arrangements, enforcement mechanisms and the consequences of renewed hostilities.

Russia’s willingness to participate in discussions does not establish its willingness to accept terms compatible with Ukrainian sovereignty.

Nor does the prospect of economic cooperation necessarily create sufficient leverage to change Moscow’s calculations.

The administration must also consider how concessions offered to Russia would affect Ukraine’s ability to negotiate.

If Moscow expects economic benefits merely for remaining at the negotiating table, it has an incentive to prolong discussions while preserving its military position.

Conversely, a credible offer tied to verifiable Russian actions could provide a basis for substantive bargaining.

The difference lies in the conditions attached to any concessions and the mechanisms available to enforce them.

Europe’s Place at the Table

For European governments, the Atlanta meeting exposes a familiar weakness.

The EU is a major provider of financial assistance to Ukraine, maintains extensive sanctions against Russia and would face the consequences of any settlement that failed to establish lasting security arrangements.

Yet European influence over direct American-Russian negotiations remains limited.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas is attending the meeting and will conduct bilateral discussions, according to the European External Action Service’s official announcement.

Her participation gives Brussels an opportunity to communicate its position. It does not guarantee a role in determining the terms of any eventual agreement.

Ukraine itself is not participating in the gathering, although the G20 meeting is not formally a peace negotiation.

The danger for Europe is not simply exclusion from particular meetings. It is the possibility that decisions affecting European security will emerge from negotiations in which European governments possess limited influence over the agenda.

The EU retains important instruments of leverage, particularly sanctions, financial assistance and access to its markets.

But those instruments are less effective when member states disagree over their use or when Washington pursues a separate diplomatic strategy.

The Wider G20 Agenda

The meeting also takes place amid serious tensions over Iran, maritime security and international trade.

Washington wants greater cooperation over freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Black Sea and South China Sea.

These priorities intersect with European interests, particularly energy security and the protection of commercial shipping.

Yet the participating governments approach these disputes from markedly different positions.

China has little interest in endorsing an American interpretation of maritime security that could constrain its own regional ambitions.

Russia is unlikely to support arrangements that weaken its position in the Black Sea.

Meanwhile, disagreements over American tariffs complicate Washington’s efforts to secure cooperation from traditional economic partners.

The G20 remains useful precisely because governments with conflicting interests can communicate through it.

But communication should not be mistaken for agreement.

For Moscow, Lavrov’s visit offers another opportunity to demonstrate that Russia remains engaged in international diplomacy despite its war against Ukraine.

For Washington, the challenge is to show that renewed engagement can produce something more substantial than another meeting.

Europe’s concern is more immediate: any settlement negotiated with Moscow will have to be sustainable on European territory, with European resources and against the possibility of renewed Russian aggression.

Diplomatic access may be relatively easy to restore. Establishing credible security arrangements will be considerably harder.

Europe Keeps Tightening Sanctions on Russia. But What Happens if Washington Changes the Rules?

30 October 2026 at 08:14

Brussels is preparing another round of restrictions against Moscow while Washington explores the possibility of economic concessions. The disagreement exposes a weakness in Europe’s sanctions strategy: its effectiveness still depends heavily on decisions taken outside the European Union.

The European Union has imposed sanctions on almost 1,600 additional individuals and companies connected with Russia’s military-industrial complex. It is preparing a 22nd sanctions package, expanding restrictions on the networks that supply Moscow’s armed forces.

Washington, meanwhile, is considering whether economic incentives could help persuade the Kremlin to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.

The two approaches are not necessarily incompatible. Sanctions can be used both to constrain an adversary and as bargaining instruments in negotiations.

But they become considerably less effective when the governments imposing them disagree about the conditions under which they should be lifted.

For Europe, the problem extends beyond transatlantic diplomacy. After more than four years of war, Brussels has developed an extensive sanctions regime but still faces difficulties preventing restricted technologies from reaching Russia, limiting its energy revenues and enforcing measures against companies operating through third countries.

A change in American policy could expose those weaknesses more sharply.

Targeting the Machinery of War

On 12 October, the Council of the European Union imposed restrictions on 1,569 individuals and entities.

The measures targeted 826 companies and 743 executives associated with Russia’s defence industry.

Unlike earlier restrictions concentrated on prominent political figures and major financial institutions, the latest designations reach into the industrial supply chains supporting Russian weapons production.

According to the Council, the companies concerned employ more than 250,000 people and generate annual turnover of at least €20 billion.

Their activities include the production and supply of electronics, semiconductors, communications equipment, navigation systems, explosives and components used in missiles, drones and military aircraft.

More than half the listings concern supply chains associated with ballistic missile production.

The approach reflects an increasingly detailed understanding of how Russia sustains its military operations.

Modern weapons depend on complex manufacturing networks. A missile producer may be able to replace a sanctioned supplier, but obtaining specialised components through alternative channels can increase costs, delay production and complicate quality control.

Targeting those networks can therefore be more consequential than imposing restrictions on another senior official whose assets in Europe have already been frozen.

Nevertheless, the number of sanctioned entities is an imperfect measure of effectiveness.

A designation has limited practical value if the targeted company has no assets within European jurisdiction, does not require Western financing and can obtain equivalent components elsewhere.

The more useful questions concern production delays, procurement costs, component availability and the extent to which Russian manufacturers can replace restricted technology.

Sanctions Evasion Has Become an Industry

European restrictions have encouraged the development of increasingly elaborate procurement networks involving intermediaries, logistics companies and financial service providers.

On 15 October, the Council announced additional measures against companies and individuals involved in circumventing sanctions.

The cases illustrate the geographical complexity of enforcement.

Among those targeted were trading and logistics businesses associated with Türkiye, financial intermediaries operating in Russia and companies linked to oil transactions involving the United Arab Emirates, India and the Seychelles.

The EU also identified entities associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.

These networks exploit differences between national legal systems, commercial practices and the willingness of third-country authorities to cooperate with European restrictions.

Brussels can prohibit European companies from supplying particular goods. Preventing those products from being resold through several intermediaries is substantially more difficult.

Enforcement requires customs intelligence, banking supervision, corporate ownership information and cooperation with governments that may have little interest in restricting profitable trade with Russia.

The EU’s 21st sanctions package, adopted in July, extended restrictions to additional shadow-fleet vessels, financial institutions and cryptocurrency service providers.

Such measures increase the cost of evasion. They do not automatically eliminate the commercial incentives sustaining it.

Washington Holds Cards Brussels Cannot Replace

The Trump administration’s exploration of possible economic arrangements with Moscow introduces another complication.

American sanctions possess particular influence because of the dollar’s international role, the importance of US financial institutions and Washington’s capacity to restrict access to American markets.

European sanctions operate independently, but their effectiveness can be reinforced substantially by corresponding American measures.

If Washington relaxes restrictions on selected Russian institutions or commercial activities while Brussels maintains its prohibitions, companies could encounter two increasingly different regulatory environments.

European businesses would remain subject to EU law. American companies might gain access to transactions unavailable to their European competitors.

More importantly, Moscow could recover access to certain financial or commercial channels without obtaining equivalent relief from Brussels.

The scale of the consequences would depend on which restrictions Washington changed. Limited exemptions would not have the same effect as broader measures involving Russian banks, energy companies or international payments.

No comprehensive American sanctions rollback has been agreed.

Nevertheless, the prospect creates uncertainty for European policymakers.

As EU Today previously reported on the disagreement over sanctions relief, European leaders have resisted proposals to reduce economic pressure before Russia makes substantive concessions over Ukraine.

Their position is strategically coherent. Sanctions represent one of Europe’s principal instruments of leverage in negotiations.

But preserving that leverage requires more than refusing to lift existing restrictions.

It requires ensuring that those restrictions remain effective even if American priorities change.

Europe’s Unfinished Economic Strategy

The European Union has considerable economic weight. Its single market, regulatory powers and financial institutions provide instruments that Russia cannot simply disregard.

Yet Europe has often been more effective at adopting sanctions than at enforcing them consistently.

Implementation remains dispersed among national authorities with different resources, investigative capacities and political priorities.

Companies operating across multiple jurisdictions encounter uneven enforcement, while intermediaries outside the EU can exploit gaps in information-sharing.

Brussels has attempted to address these weaknesses through expanded reporting obligations, restrictions on third-country entities and closer coordination among national authorities.

The forthcoming 22nd package will provide another indication of whether the EU intends to deepen that approach.

Its precise contents have not yet been announced.

A credible European strategy would also require greater attention to the relationship between sanctions and defence production.

Restricting Russian access to components is valuable. Expanding Europe’s own capacity to manufacture ammunition, missiles and air-defence systems is equally important.

Economic pressure cannot substitute indefinitely for military capability, particularly when the country being sanctioned remains engaged in a prolonged war.

Europe also needs to consider the conditions under which sanctions might eventually be modified.

A negotiated settlement could require carefully defined economic incentives. But those incentives would need to be linked to verifiable Russian obligations and mechanisms for restoring restrictions if agreements were violated.

Otherwise, sanctions relief could become an irreversible concession in exchange for commitments that prove difficult to enforce.

The immediate challenge for Brussels is therefore not simply to produce another package.

It is to establish whether Europe can sustain an independent economic strategy towards Russia if Washington decides that its diplomatic objectives require a different approach.

The EU has accumulated considerable sanctions authority since 2022. The next test is whether it can turn that authority into durable strategic leverage without relying on American policy remaining unchanged.

Washington Wants the Baltics to Soften Their Warnings About Russia. What Is the Pentagon Trying to Achieve?

30 October 2026 at 08:09

The Pentagon’s reported attempts to restrain Baltic criticism of Moscow reveal a more consequential disagreement within NATO: whether Europe’s assessment of the Russian threat is becoming inconvenient for Washington’s diplomatic ambitions.

The Trump administration wants European allies to assume greater responsibility for their defence. It also appears to want some of those allies to be rather less outspoken about the country against which much of that defence is being organised.

American defence officials have privately urged Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to moderate their public warnings about Russia, according to accounts of recent Pentagon discussions.

The requests reportedly came from senior officials, including Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, who is involved in reviewing America’s military commitments in Europe.

The conversations were described as cordial. There is no evidence that Washington demanded changes to Baltic defence policies. Nevertheless, their timing is revealing.

The United States is pursuing renewed negotiations with Moscow, examining potential economic incentives and pressing Ukraine to restrict attacks on Russian energy infrastructure. Simultaneously, American defence planners are considering reducing their military presence in Europe.

The Baltic governments are therefore being asked to assume greater responsibility for their security while exercising greater restraint in describing the threat they believe makes that responsibility necessary.

The Pentagon’s Strategic Calculation

Colby’s involvement gives the episode significance beyond an argument over diplomatic etiquette.

He has long advocated concentrating American military resources on the Indo-Pacific, where China represents the principal long-term challenge to US strategic predominance.

His argument is not inherently unreasonable. American military resources are finite, European NATO members possess substantial economic capacity, and Washington cannot indefinitely remain the principal provider of conventional security across several continents.

Indeed, Europe’s excessive dependence on American military capabilities has been recognised in European capitals for years.

The difficulty lies in reconciling this strategic redistribution with Washington’s approach towards Russia.

If the United States intends to reduce its European military commitments, European governments will require more accurate threat assessments, greater investment in intelligence and defence, and clearer public explanations of the expenditure involved.

Discouraging those governments from discussing Russian threats could make that transition politically harder.

One justification reportedly offered by American officials is that confrontational language risks provoking Moscow or reinforcing the Kremlin’s attempts to spread fear.

There is a legitimate argument for avoiding theatrical warnings unsupported by intelligence. Governments can undermine their credibility by repeatedly presenting hypothetical threats as imminent.

But Baltic intelligence assessments have often been more measured than the public debate suggests.

Estonian and Latvian security officials have distinguished between Russia’s current military limitations, caused partly by its war in Ukraine, and the longer-term danger of Moscow rebuilding its forces.

Such assessments are not evidence of an intention to provoke Russia. They are part of the ordinary work of national security institutions.

The Problem with Reassuring Moscow

The reported exchanges also expose an uncomfortable contradiction in Washington’s negotiating strategy.

The administration is considering incentives intended to encourage Moscow towards a settlement while asking European allies to avoid language that might complicate those negotiations.

Yet Russia’s conduct towards NATO members has not been confined to diplomatic disagreements.

European governments have reported suspected sabotage, cyber operations, intelligence activity and interference involving critical infrastructure.

German authorities recently announced arrests connected with a suspected arson plot in the Nuremberg area. Berlin has also accused Moscow of involvement in a drone incident at Leipzig/Halle Airport, an allegation Russia denies.

These activities form part of the wider security environment that European governments must address, irrespective of Washington’s diplomatic timetable.

The question is whether restraint by NATO members would encourage reciprocal restraint from Moscow.

There is little publicly available evidence that Russia has made such a commitment.

Nor has Moscow demonstrated that its objectives concerning Ukraine have fundamentally changed.

A diplomatic strategy based on reducing tensions can be sensible. A strategy that asks one side to moderate its conduct without establishing corresponding obligations for the other risks creating an imbalance.

For the Baltic states, that imbalance is especially difficult to accept.

Their geographical position, historical experience and exposure to Russian intelligence operations give them reasons to approach Moscow differently from governments separated from Russia by several countries.

That does not make every Baltic political statement wise. It does mean that their security concerns cannot reasonably be dismissed as a communications problem.

Europe’s Security Cannot Depend on Diplomatic Convenience

The larger issue is not whether an Estonian prime minister should describe Vladimir Putin as a cornered rat.

It is whether European governments can continue to define their security requirements independently when those assessments complicate American foreign policy.

NATO’s collective defence arrangements depend on credible military capabilities, political cohesion and the willingness of member states to act.

They also depend on governments being able to explain why those capabilities are necessary.

Europe’s defence spending increases will require difficult budgetary choices, industrial investment and sustained public support. Governments cannot make those decisions convincingly while treating the underlying security threat as something best discussed discreetly.

Washington is entitled to pursue negotiations with Moscow. European governments are equally entitled to assess the consequences for their own security.

The United States may ultimately conclude that a reduced military presence in Europe serves its wider strategic interests. European allies will then have to adjust, whether or not they welcome that decision.

What they cannot afford is to confuse American diplomatic preferences with an objective assessment of Russian capabilities and intentions.

The Pentagon’s reported advice may have been intended to reduce unnecessary friction. But if Washington expects Europe to carry more of the burden of deterrence, it will also have to accept that Europeans will increasingly make their own judgements about the threats they face.

Are Trump’s global actions, from Ukraine to Iran, going to hurt him in elections?

Voters who backed the US president in the last election are saying they can’t vote for him today: ‘This is an abomination’

Outside the Ukrainian educational and cultural center in a quiet Pennsylvania suburb of Jenkintown, on the outskirts of Philadelphia, a banner expressed unqualified gratitude: “Thank you USA for supporting Ukraine.”

Inside, however, the sentiment was altogether different. Irene Skulsky, a retired teacher in her late 70s, voiced indignation at Donald Trump’s sudden turn against her ancestral homeland, which she believed had come close to killing her son, Darko, and a desire to punish his fellow Republicans at next week’s midterm elections.

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© Composite: Rita Liu/The Guardian/Getty Images

© Composite: Rita Liu/The Guardian/Getty Images

© Composite: Rita Liu/The Guardian/Getty Images

California refuerza vigilancia electoral para contrarrestar las medidas de Trump

30 October 2026 at 07:16
"Una advertencia para Donald Trump: estoy desplegando abogados electorales en distritos clave de California —donde la contienda está muy reñida— para proteger cada voto", escribió Newsom a través de su cuenta en la red social X.

Americano está menos suscetível a temas fora da economia, diz especialista

30 October 2026 at 06:21

O eleitor americano médio está cada vez menos receptivo a pautas que fujam do campo econômico, como questões morais, migração e conflitos internacionais. Essa é a avaliação de Vinícius Rodrigues Vieira, professor de Relações Internacionais da FAAP, FGV e IDP, em entrevista ao WW, sobre a disputa das midterms, eleições de meio de mandato nos Estados Unidos previstas para o dia 3 de novembro.

Para Vieira, o tema central da eleição deve ser o custo de vida crescente dos estadunidenses. Segundo o especialista, Trump tenta enfatizar que, antes de seu governo, as condições econômicas seriam ainda piores — mas quem vai arbitrar essa disputa é o eleitor comum, que hoje demonstra menor suscetibilidade a argumentos de cunho não econômico.

Foco no cotidiano e desgaste com pautas amplas

Vieira destacou uma tendência observada ao redor do mundo: a de trazer as disputas eleitorais para o foco do dia a dia das pessoas, em vez de abordar temas mais amplos. “O que Trump fez, de fato, que afeta a vida sua?”, exemplificou o especialista, reproduzindo o tipo de questionamento que figuras como Barack Obama estariam utilizando para convencer eleitores mais centristas a migrar para o lado democrata.

O conflito no Oriente Médio, por exemplo, tem impacto indireto na vida da população — principalmente pelo preço do petróleo —, mas não mobiliza o eleitorado da mesma forma que questões econômicas imediatas.

Latinos podem ser fator decisivo no Texas

Vieira também apontou que o voto latino pode representar uma grande barreira para Trump e seus aliados no Texas — não apenas na disputa para governador, mas também nas eleições para a Câmara e o Senado.

De acordo com o especialista, os latinos foram fundamentais para o retorno de Trump à Casa Branca, especialmente nos chamados swing states (Estado-pêndulo). No entanto, mesmo em estados de maioria republicana consolidada nas últimas três décadas, observa-se um movimento de abertura ao voto democrata.

O especialista explicou que, no caso dos latinos especificamente, a questão econômica cede espaço a outro fator: a atuação do ICE (agência de imigração e controle de fronteiras dos EUA), cujas ações afetaram a comunidade de maneira que muitos não esperavam. “Era algo que a comunidade não esperava que iria afetá-los”, afirmou Vieira, sugerindo que esse descontentamento pode influenciar diretamente o comportamento eleitoral desse grupo nas midterms.

Os textos gerados por inteligência artificial na CNN Brasil são feitos com base nos cortes de vídeos dos jornais de sua programação. Todas as informações são apuradas e checadas por jornalistas. O texto final também passa pela revisão da equipe de jornalismo da CNN. Clique aqui para saber mais.

Trump administration seeks to block Alaska Senate result if Republican loses

30 October 2026 at 06:17

President Donald Trump’s administration filed a revised lawsuit on Thursday seeking to block Alaska’s election results if Republican incumbent Dan Sullivan narrowly loses and, according to a person familiar with the matter, issued more than 40 subpoenas and document requests in its probe.

The revised complaint by the US Justice Department cited a New York Times report that Democratic operatives recruited another candidate named Sullivan who could siphon votes from the incumbent. The Justice Department said the effort was intended to mislead voters and help elect Democratic candidate Mary Peltola.

The suit raises the prospect of a messy fight over a contest that could determine US Senate control in next Tuesday’s midterm elections. Republicans hold a 53-47 majority, while Democrats need a net gain of four seats.

“They orchestrated his sham campaign for the purpose of misleading Alaskan voters and getting Peltola elected,” lawyers for the Justice Department wrote in their amended complaint, referring to a retired teacher named Daniel J. Sullivan Jr., who is on the ballot without a party affiliation.

Alaska Governor Mike Dunleavy also called for a state investigation into the allegation and said in an interview with News Nation that any finding of illegality “may in fact impact whether someone is seated in the US Senate.”

Peltola’s campaign did not immediately respond to the amended complaint but has previously said it had “no involvement with either Sullivan campaign.”

Dispute over candidates sharing Sullivan surname

The Times reported on Wednesday that Peltola aides worked with campaign lawyers and staff at the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee to recruit two candidates who could siphon votes from the incumbent Republican Sullivan, including Daniel J. Sullivan Jr.

Peltola’s former campaign manager, Elisa Rios, who was fired in August, told the Times that Peltola was aware of the effort.

The DSCC has denied involvement and accused Republicans of propping up candidates of their own in other races. Reuters was unable to independently verify the Times report.

Daniel J. Sullivan has previously denied in interviews with US news outlets that his aim is to cause confusion or divert votes from Dan S. Sullivan.

Trump presses legal challenge ahead of vote

Trump, who for years has sowed doubts about the fairness of US elections, had pushed the Justice Department to bring the Alaska case even before the Times report, seeking to preemptively block Alaska from certifying Peltola, a former congresswoman, if she were to win the election.

Trump told reporters earlier on Thursday: “It’s hard to believe that she could even be allowed to run. Frankly, I don’t know how you can allow somebody like that to run. It’s so unfair.”

Jessica Levinson, a professor who specializes in election law at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, said that as long as Daniel J. Sullivan, the challenger to the incumbent, didn’t conceal financial support, his campaign likely didn’t break any laws and political parties are allowed to mislead the public.

Policing such behavior would open the door to the government investigating why candidates choose to run and why voters support them, she said. “To the extent that people are uncomfortable with two Sullivans, I would offer you’re probably going to be uncomfortable with a really high level of government intrusion into our elections as well.”

Justice Department also investigates California voting

The Department of Justice has also escalated another legal campaign in California, where it has been investigating alleged voting by noncitizens.

The Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder’s office received grand jury subpoenas as part of the probe, according to copies of subpoenas seen by Reuters on Thursday.

The subpoenas, dated last week, seek records related to the county’s response to prior letters from the Trump administration warning of evidence that noncitizens are on the state’s voter roll. They also seek documents about the county’s efforts to prevent noncitizens from voting.

California has previously said the state’s safeguards against noncitizen voting are robust.

A Justice Department spokesperson declined to comment.

Trump and Democrats intensify final campaign push

As campaigning enters its final few days, the White House has shelved plans for Trump to appear on Saturday in Kansas, the site of an unexpectedly competitive Senate campaign, a Republican campaign official said.

“I don’t feel like I have to go to Kansas,” Trump told reporters.

Instead, the president will participate in more than 20 virtual campaign appearances before Tuesday, a White House official said.

Trump held a rally in Rock Hill, South Carolina, on Thursday, his second visit in two weeks to a state where opinion polls show an unexpectedly close Senate race between Republican Darline Graham and Democrat Annie Andrews.

Speaking about the hotly contested Michigan Senate race, where progressive Democratic nominee Abdul El-Sayed holds a small lead in most polls over Republican Mike Rogers, Trump continued his identity-based attacks on El-Sayed, a Muslim, by saying at the rally that “if you’re Black or if you’re Jewish, and if you vote for Abdul, you’re crazy.”

With control of the Senate at stake, both parties are deploying their biggest names in the closing days of the campaign, with Trump stumping for Republicans and former President Barack Obama and former Vice President Kamala Harris campaigning for Democrats in competitive races.

Harris stumped in Macon, Georgia, at a get-out-the-vote effort. Democrats are aiming to reelect Senator Jon Ossoff, who leads in polling, and hope that Keisha Lance Bottoms, locked in a tight race, can become the first woman elected as governor in the state.

Trump’s approval rating stood at 32% in a Reuters/Ipsos poll completed on Monday, near a record low, as Americans sour on the high cost of living and the war with Iran.

More than 44 million Americans had already voted as of Thursday evening, according to the University of Florida’s Election Lab. A total of 45.9 million voted early in the 2022 midterms.

Las elecciones de mitad de mandato en Estados Unidos no son la panacea que los europeos esperan

30 October 2026 at 04:30
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Cuando los estadounidenses voten en las elecciones de mitad de mandato del 3 de noviembre, los europeos esperarán con inquietud los resultados. Es comprensible que, después de casi dos años de abusos del Gobierno de Trump, estén ansiosos por un cambio de rumbo. Un buen resultado de los demócratas transmitirá una señal política importante, incluido el deseo de mejorar las relaciones con los aliados hoy menospreciados. Sin embargo, los europeos harían bien en moderar sus expectativas sobre los cambios que va a haber en la práctica, porque se tardará tiempo en reparar el daño causado.

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Trump planning a major Iran escalation soon after midterms

30 October 2026 at 04:10

US Senator Chris Murphy disclosed on October 28 that he was among the members of Congress recently briefed behind closed doors on the Trump administration’s discussions of a possible post-midterm assault on Iran, and he came away with a startling assessment: “Their plan is insane.” Murphy (D-Conn.), who recently traveled to Gulf countries to survey […]

The post Trump planning a major Iran escalation soon after midterms appeared first on Asia Times.

Jeffries on Impeachment: We 'Haven't Ruled Anything Out'

30 October 2026 at 03:31

Thursday on “ABC News Live,” House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) spoke with ABC News correspondent Jay O’Brien regarding the possible impeachment of President Donald Trump. Jeffries said, “The American people are clearly poised to give House and Senate Democrats

The post Jeffries on Impeachment: We ‘Haven’t Ruled Anything Out’ appeared first on Breitbart.

MAHA Rally Speakers Call Out ‘Fake News,’ Establishment Media: ‘Likes to Help Us Have Amnesia’

30 October 2026 at 02:56

CLIVE, Iowa–Republican Iowa gubernatorial candidate Zach Lahn took aim at the establishment media during a Make Iowa Healthy Again rally on Wednesday, accusing the press of contributing to public forgetfulness about the past and what is at stake ahead of the midterm elections, while Steak 'n Shake Chief MAHA Officer Michael Boes challenged media portrayals of the Trump administration's efforts to improve Americans' health.

The post MAHA Rally Speakers Call Out ‘Fake News,’ Establishment Media: ‘Likes to Help Us Have Amnesia’ appeared first on Breitbart.

Ossoff: It's 'Deeply Dangerous to Have a President So Delusional'

30 October 2026 at 01:55

Thursday, during an appearance on MS NOW’s “The Briefing,” Sen. Jon Ossoff (D-GA) said President Donald Trump is “deeply dangerous” because he is “delusional.” Ossoff said, “The West Wing staff right now is mostly doing childcare. I mean, they’re having

The post Ossoff: It’s ‘Deeply Dangerous to Have a President So Delusional’ appeared first on Breitbart.

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