PM hoping for improved relations and ‘model of deeper devolution in Scotland and Wales’

Downing Street has paid tribute to Patrick Stewart following the actor’s death. At the daily lobby briefing, the PM’s spokesperson gave a comment that was a bit more extensive than the usual No 10 contribution when a great British celebrity dies. The spokesperson said that was because Andy Burnham feels strongly about the importance of actors.

The spokesperson said:

The prime minister was very sad to hear of the passing of Sir Patrick Stewart.

As a former culture secretary he knows how much Britain’s greatest actors mean to the country, and Sir Patrick was one of the very best.

Just a reminder that when it comes to Wales, we are not comparing like with like. The term ‘region’ in an English context typically refers to an area covering between 1.5 and 3 million people. In Wales, regions cover much less dense areas. The Swansea Bay city region captures some 700,000 people, and similarly North Wales around 690,000 people. In Mid-Wales sheep outnumber people by 7:1. Only the Cardiff city region is comparable to English tiers, and even then at the lower end: around 1.5 million people.

Transposing an English mayoral worldview onto a very different political geography just doesn’t work. Wales may be a similar population size to the PM’s old manor but that’s where the parallel ends.

Andy Burnham talks about the regions of England and Wales interchangeably but the role the new prime minister champions for metro mayors is, in many respects, already performed by the Welsh government. Powers over skills, employment support, economic development, housing investment and major spending programmes sit at an all-Wales strategic level (covering a similar population size to Greater Manchester.)

His argument for England is that powers should flow from Westminster to city regions because they operate at an economically meaningful scale. Yet when the PM turns to Wales, he seems to suggest that powers already devolved to Cardiff Bay should be dispersed further down the system.

But notably he is not calling on his successor as the mayor of Greater Manchester, Bev Craig, to fragment the powers of the Greater Manchester combined authority and redistribute them amongst its ten constituent councils. On the contrary, the whole logic of the Greater Manchester model rests on concentrating strategic authority at a regional level.

Yet the implication of his comments is that Wales should move in the opposite direction.

Speaking at a briefing in Brussels attended by EU Today, Azerbaijani presidential envoy Elchin Amirbayov said his country was prepared to increase natural gas exports to Europe, but warned that insufficient pipeline capacity, investment restrictions and uncertainty over long-term contracts were preventing further expansion.

Azerbaijan is prepared to increase natural gas supplies to the European Union, but further expansion will require investment in transport infrastructure and long-term commitments from European buyers, according to Elchin Amirbayov, Representative of the President of Azerbaijan on Special Assignments.

Speaking at the Azerbaijani Embassy in Brussels on 21 October, during a meeting attended by EU Today, Amirbayov outlined the difficulties facing efforts to expand the Southern Gas Corridor, which has become an important component of Europe’s strategy to diversify energy imports away from Russia.

“Today it’s fully booked already by all those contracts which we have concluded with all recipients of our gas,” Amirbayov said, referring to existing pipeline capacity.

He stressed that Azerbaijan possessed additional natural gas resources but that increasing deliveries depended on the availability of transportation infrastructure and commercially viable investment arrangements.

“As far as our capacity to provide them with gas is concerned, it is there because we have necessary resources. But what we need to be able to do that is also transportation infrastructure,” he explained.

Europe’s 2027 gas target faces infrastructure constraints

In July 2022, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a strategic energy partnership envisaging an expansion of the Southern Gas Corridor to deliver at least 20 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas annually to the EU by 2027.

The agreement formed part of Europe’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent restructuring of European energy supplies.

According to the European Commission, Azerbaijan and its state energy company SOCAR supplied 12.5 bcm to EU member states in 2025, an increase of more than 50 per cent compared with 2021.

However, the latest figures published by Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Energy show that during the first nine months of 2026, the country exported 18.4 bcm worldwide, including 8.6 bcm to European destinations.

The figures underline the challenge of achieving the planned increase in deliveries without additional investment.

The Southern Gas Corridor includes the South Caucasus Pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), connecting Azerbaijani production with European markets.

TAP completed an initial capacity expansion in early 2026, adding 1.2 bcm annually. Further expansion will depend on additional infrastructure and sufficient contractual demand.

As EU Today previously reported, Azerbaijan began supplying natural gas to Germany and Austria in January 2026, extending its presence in central European markets.

Long-term contracts and investment financing

Amirbayov emphasised that additional gas infrastructure could not be developed without long-term commercial arrangements.

“Gas being different from oil, it has to be based on long-term contracts, on long-term expressed willingness,” he said.

He also raised the difficulties created by European restrictions on financing fossil-fuel infrastructure, suggesting that EU institutions and member states needed to reconcile their energy security requirements with existing investment policies.

The regulatory situation is complex. The European Investment Bank no longer finances new unabated fossil-fuel energy projects, including conventional gas infrastructure. However, the EU taxonomy framework permits certain gas-related activities under specific conditions.

Amirbayov said European countries had differing energy requirements and were at different stages of the transition away from fossil fuels. Those differences complicated agreement on the financing of additional gas supplies.

He also explained that Azerbaijan’s own investment resources were heavily committed to reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in territories recovered following the conflict with Armenia.

“We cannot do that job ourselves for the reasons I just explained,” he said, referring to the financial requirements of expanding export infrastructure.

Natural gas and Europe’s energy transition

Amirbayov acknowledged Azerbaijan’s own investment in renewable energy, including wind, solar and hydropower. He highlighted the Caspian Sea’s potential for offshore wind generation and described the country’s efforts to increase renewables in its domestic energy system.

Nevertheless, he questioned whether natural gas could be replaced by renewable sources within a short period.

“I don’t think it’s realistic,” he said when discussing the prospect of replacing natural gas within the next year or two.

His comments come as Brussels continues to balance its climate objectives with energy security requirements and the planned reduction of Russian gas imports.

Azerbaijan has increasingly positioned itself as an alternative supplier to European countries seeking to diversify their energy sources. However, Amirbayov made clear that further expansion would depend on decisions taken by European governments, financial institutions and energy companies.

“We are there, ready to assist,” he said, adding that further progress would require clear intentions and decisions from the European side.

The immediate question is whether European buyers and policymakers can establish sufficient contractual certainty and investment arrangements to support the additional pipeline capacity envisaged in the 2022 partnership.

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PM hoping for improved relations and ‘model of deeper devolution in Scotland and Wales’

Downing Street has paid tribute to Patrick Stewart following the actor’s death. At the daily lobby briefing, the PM’s spokesperson gave a comment that was a bit more extensive than the usual No 10 contribution when a great British celebrity dies. The spokesperson said that was because Andy Burnham feels strongly about the importance of actors.

The spokesperson said:

The prime minister was very sad to hear of the passing of Sir Patrick Stewart.

As a former culture secretary he knows how much Britain’s greatest actors mean to the country, and Sir Patrick was one of the very best.

Just a reminder that when it comes to Wales, we are not comparing like with like. The term ‘region’ in an English context typically refers to an area covering between 1.5 and 3 million people. In Wales, regions cover much less dense areas. The Swansea Bay city region captures some 700,000 people, and similarly North Wales around 690,000 people. In Mid-Wales sheep outnumber people by 7:1. Only the Cardiff city region is comparable to English tiers, and even then at the lower end: around 1.5 million people.

Transposing an English mayoral worldview onto a very different political geography just doesn’t work. Wales may be a similar population size to the PM’s old manor but that’s where the parallel ends.

Andy Burnham talks about the regions of England and Wales interchangeably but the role the new prime minister champions for metro mayors is, in many respects, already performed by the Welsh government. Powers over skills, employment support, economic development, housing investment and major spending programmes sit at an all-Wales strategic level (covering a similar population size to Greater Manchester.)

His argument for England is that powers should flow from Westminster to city regions because they operate at an economically meaningful scale. Yet when the PM turns to Wales, he seems to suggest that powers already devolved to Cardiff Bay should be dispersed further down the system.

But notably he is not calling on his successor as the mayor of Greater Manchester, Bev Craig, to fragment the powers of the Greater Manchester combined authority and redistribute them amongst its ten constituent councils. On the contrary, the whole logic of the Greater Manchester model rests on concentrating strategic authority at a regional level.

Yet the implication of his comments is that Wales should move in the opposite direction.

Brussels, 30 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – European lawmakers are seeking stronger commercial safeguards and more balanced economic cooperation with China as concerns continue over industrial subsidies, market access and Europe’s economic security. The debate surrounding China Trade … Read more

The war in Ukraine is one of several violent attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to shore up crumbling Western hegemony.

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The war in Ukraine is not an isolated conflict. It is one of several violent attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to shore up crumbling Western hegemony.

Former U.S. Army Lt. Col. Earl Rasmussen says the war in Ukraine is one front in a broader international conflict that is aimed at preserving a world order once dominated by a global minority of Western powers, primarily the United States.

Rasmussen, a West Point graduate and teacher, has for many years worked as an independent consultant for international business partnerships. Originally from Minneapolis, he has over 30 years’ experience in research and development, technology integration, and business management. He has lived and traveled extensively in over 30 countries and has strong international relationships.

His special interests include Eurasian economic development and the prospects for the BRICS group of nations led by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which now includes Iran as a member along with several others. The BRICS+ comprises about half of the globe’s population and economy.

Rasmussen’s consultancy work focuses on the impact of conflicts around the world.

He contends that the U.S. and its Western allies are tacitly driving a worldwide agenda to prevent the multipolar order from succeeding their hegemonic unipolar order.

Rasmussen says it is not a coincidence that the U.S. and its Western partners are involved in multiple concurrent aggressions.

Ukraine, Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Cuba and Venezuela, together with tensions in Latin America, for example from the Trump administration’s interference in Brazil’s presidential elections, and in East Asia with China, are all stemming from a desperate attempt to prop up the Western order. That order has prevailed for several centuries, with first the European powers and then the U.S. taking over as the lead hegemon since the Second World War.

But that old order is failing and falling as a new multipolar order emerges, as illustrated by the growing importance of the BRICS, Eurasia, Africa, and, in general, the Global South. A world majority is more assuredly asserting itself, demanding equitable development based on win-win partnerships and mutual co-development in contrast to the exploitative Western order.

Earl Rasmussen believes that multipolar development cannot be stopped. It will prevail because human beings demand it as a moral and economic imperative. But he warns that the world is undergoing violent resistance by the U.S.-led Western powers.

He also contends that the Western nations, as presently seen in France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and other European states, are themselves undergoing popular revolts against their elitist ruling classes who are invested in the old order. The political crises in Western nations are due to the loss of moral authority of establishment parties. People can see their corruption and duplicity and how these parties are servants of corporate power, the Zionist lobby, the military-industrial complex, and so on.

The end of the Ukraine war will mark the end of Western hegemony. The U.S.-led NATO proxy war is facing a historic defeat by Russia. Potentially, that outcome will lead more quickly to a fairer world order, one in which nations’ sovereignty and international law are actually respected for the mutual benefit of all.

It is up to the Western states to abandon their hegemonic policies and ambitions to finally live in peace with the world’s majority. The longer they persist in their arrogant assumptions of privilege and domination, the longer the violent transition. If the political system can’t adapt, then people power will have to deliver a new system.

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Russia’s foreign minister arrives at the G20 meeting in Atlanta without Moscow having made significant concessions over Ukraine. His presence offers a reminder that diplomatic access can be valuable even when negotiations produce little progress.

Sergei Lavrov’s arrival in the United States for the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting is unlikely to transform the prospects for peace in Ukraine. For Moscow, however, the visit offers opportunities extending well beyond the formal agenda.

Russia’s veteran foreign minister will participate in discussions alongside representatives of the world’s major economies, including governments that have imposed extensive sanctions on Moscow and others that have maintained profitable commercial relationships with it.

The meeting, chaired by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 30–31 October, takes place as Washington pursues another diplomatic initiative concerning Ukraine.

Lavrov’s presence has attracted criticism from American lawmakers, including Republican Congressman Don Bacon, who has questioned why a senior representative of a government conducting military operations against Ukrainian cities should be welcomed in the United States.

Yet the more consequential issue is not whether Lavrov should attend. It is what Moscow hopes to achieve through renewed access to Western diplomatic forums, and what the United States expects to obtain in return.

Russia’s Diplomatic Opportunities

The Kremlin has spent much of the war arguing that Western attempts to isolate Russia have failed.

There is some substance to that argument, although it requires qualification.

Russia has suffered extensive restrictions on access to Western finance, technology and markets. Its economic relationships with Europe have been severely reduced, and its dependence on alternative trading partners has increased.

Nevertheless, Moscow has preserved important commercial and diplomatic connections with China, India and other countries unwilling to participate fully in Western sanctions.

For these governments, relations with Russia are often determined by energy requirements, commercial opportunities and their own strategic calculations rather than European security priorities.

The G20 provides Moscow with an opportunity to exploit those differences.

Lavrov can challenge Western sanctions, defend Russia’s diplomatic positions and hold bilateral discussions without demonstrating any willingness to compromise over occupied Ukrainian territory.

That does not make the meeting a Russian victory. Attendance at a multilateral gathering is not equivalent to the removal of sanctions or recognition of territorial claims.

But it offers Moscow something useful: opportunities for engagement without the conditions that would normally accompany substantive negotiations.

The limitations of such diplomacy were illustrated recently when German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul met Lavrov in New York.

As EU Today examined in its analysis of that encounter, the meeting reopened a channel of communication but produced no visible movement in Russia’s position.

Germany restated its support for Ukraine. Moscow reiterated its established arguments.

The encounter demonstrated that diplomatic access and diplomatic progress are not necessarily the same thing.

Washington’s Negotiating Problem

The Trump administration approaches Russia from a different perspective.

Washington appears increasingly interested in identifying economic and political incentives that could make a negotiated settlement possible.

The calculation is understandable. Sanctions alone have not ended the war, and continued fighting imposes enormous costs on Ukraine while consuming Western military resources.

However, negotiations depend on more than establishing contact.

A settlement requires agreement over territory, security arrangements, enforcement mechanisms and the consequences of renewed hostilities.

Russia’s willingness to participate in discussions does not establish its willingness to accept terms compatible with Ukrainian sovereignty.

Nor does the prospect of economic cooperation necessarily create sufficient leverage to change Moscow’s calculations.

The administration must also consider how concessions offered to Russia would affect Ukraine’s ability to negotiate.

If Moscow expects economic benefits merely for remaining at the negotiating table, it has an incentive to prolong discussions while preserving its military position.

Conversely, a credible offer tied to verifiable Russian actions could provide a basis for substantive bargaining.

The difference lies in the conditions attached to any concessions and the mechanisms available to enforce them.

Europe’s Place at the Table

For European governments, the Atlanta meeting exposes a familiar weakness.

The EU is a major provider of financial assistance to Ukraine, maintains extensive sanctions against Russia and would face the consequences of any settlement that failed to establish lasting security arrangements.

Yet European influence over direct American-Russian negotiations remains limited.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas is attending the meeting and will conduct bilateral discussions, according to the European External Action Service’s official announcement.

Her participation gives Brussels an opportunity to communicate its position. It does not guarantee a role in determining the terms of any eventual agreement.

Ukraine itself is not participating in the gathering, although the G20 meeting is not formally a peace negotiation.

The danger for Europe is not simply exclusion from particular meetings. It is the possibility that decisions affecting European security will emerge from negotiations in which European governments possess limited influence over the agenda.

The EU retains important instruments of leverage, particularly sanctions, financial assistance and access to its markets.

But those instruments are less effective when member states disagree over their use or when Washington pursues a separate diplomatic strategy.

The Wider G20 Agenda

The meeting also takes place amid serious tensions over Iran, maritime security and international trade.

Washington wants greater cooperation over freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Black Sea and South China Sea.

These priorities intersect with European interests, particularly energy security and the protection of commercial shipping.

Yet the participating governments approach these disputes from markedly different positions.

China has little interest in endorsing an American interpretation of maritime security that could constrain its own regional ambitions.

Russia is unlikely to support arrangements that weaken its position in the Black Sea.

Meanwhile, disagreements over American tariffs complicate Washington’s efforts to secure cooperation from traditional economic partners.

The G20 remains useful precisely because governments with conflicting interests can communicate through it.

But communication should not be mistaken for agreement.

For Moscow, Lavrov’s visit offers another opportunity to demonstrate that Russia remains engaged in international diplomacy despite its war against Ukraine.

For Washington, the challenge is to show that renewed engagement can produce something more substantial than another meeting.

Europe’s concern is more immediate: any settlement negotiated with Moscow will have to be sustainable on European territory, with European resources and against the possibility of renewed Russian aggression.

Diplomatic access may be relatively easy to restore. Establishing credible security arrangements will be considerably harder.

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Brussels is preparing another round of restrictions against Moscow while Washington explores the possibility of economic concessions. The disagreement exposes a weakness in Europe’s sanctions strategy: its effectiveness still depends heavily on decisions taken outside the European Union.

The European Union has imposed sanctions on almost 1,600 additional individuals and companies connected with Russia’s military-industrial complex. It is preparing a 22nd sanctions package, expanding restrictions on the networks that supply Moscow’s armed forces.

Washington, meanwhile, is considering whether economic incentives could help persuade the Kremlin to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.

The two approaches are not necessarily incompatible. Sanctions can be used both to constrain an adversary and as bargaining instruments in negotiations.

But they become considerably less effective when the governments imposing them disagree about the conditions under which they should be lifted.

For Europe, the problem extends beyond transatlantic diplomacy. After more than four years of war, Brussels has developed an extensive sanctions regime but still faces difficulties preventing restricted technologies from reaching Russia, limiting its energy revenues and enforcing measures against companies operating through third countries.

A change in American policy could expose those weaknesses more sharply.

Targeting the Machinery of War

On 12 October, the Council of the European Union imposed restrictions on 1,569 individuals and entities.

The measures targeted 826 companies and 743 executives associated with Russia’s defence industry.

Unlike earlier restrictions concentrated on prominent political figures and major financial institutions, the latest designations reach into the industrial supply chains supporting Russian weapons production.

According to the Council, the companies concerned employ more than 250,000 people and generate annual turnover of at least €20 billion.

Their activities include the production and supply of electronics, semiconductors, communications equipment, navigation systems, explosives and components used in missiles, drones and military aircraft.

More than half the listings concern supply chains associated with ballistic missile production.

The approach reflects an increasingly detailed understanding of how Russia sustains its military operations.

Modern weapons depend on complex manufacturing networks. A missile producer may be able to replace a sanctioned supplier, but obtaining specialised components through alternative channels can increase costs, delay production and complicate quality control.

Targeting those networks can therefore be more consequential than imposing restrictions on another senior official whose assets in Europe have already been frozen.

Nevertheless, the number of sanctioned entities is an imperfect measure of effectiveness.

A designation has limited practical value if the targeted company has no assets within European jurisdiction, does not require Western financing and can obtain equivalent components elsewhere.

The more useful questions concern production delays, procurement costs, component availability and the extent to which Russian manufacturers can replace restricted technology.

Sanctions Evasion Has Become an Industry

European restrictions have encouraged the development of increasingly elaborate procurement networks involving intermediaries, logistics companies and financial service providers.

On 15 October, the Council announced additional measures against companies and individuals involved in circumventing sanctions.

The cases illustrate the geographical complexity of enforcement.

Among those targeted were trading and logistics businesses associated with Türkiye, financial intermediaries operating in Russia and companies linked to oil transactions involving the United Arab Emirates, India and the Seychelles.

The EU also identified entities associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.

These networks exploit differences between national legal systems, commercial practices and the willingness of third-country authorities to cooperate with European restrictions.

Brussels can prohibit European companies from supplying particular goods. Preventing those products from being resold through several intermediaries is substantially more difficult.

Enforcement requires customs intelligence, banking supervision, corporate ownership information and cooperation with governments that may have little interest in restricting profitable trade with Russia.

The EU’s 21st sanctions package, adopted in July, extended restrictions to additional shadow-fleet vessels, financial institutions and cryptocurrency service providers.

Such measures increase the cost of evasion. They do not automatically eliminate the commercial incentives sustaining it.

Washington Holds Cards Brussels Cannot Replace

The Trump administration’s exploration of possible economic arrangements with Moscow introduces another complication.

American sanctions possess particular influence because of the dollar’s international role, the importance of US financial institutions and Washington’s capacity to restrict access to American markets.

European sanctions operate independently, but their effectiveness can be reinforced substantially by corresponding American measures.

If Washington relaxes restrictions on selected Russian institutions or commercial activities while Brussels maintains its prohibitions, companies could encounter two increasingly different regulatory environments.

European businesses would remain subject to EU law. American companies might gain access to transactions unavailable to their European competitors.

More importantly, Moscow could recover access to certain financial or commercial channels without obtaining equivalent relief from Brussels.

The scale of the consequences would depend on which restrictions Washington changed. Limited exemptions would not have the same effect as broader measures involving Russian banks, energy companies or international payments.

No comprehensive American sanctions rollback has been agreed.

Nevertheless, the prospect creates uncertainty for European policymakers.

As EU Today previously reported on the disagreement over sanctions relief, European leaders have resisted proposals to reduce economic pressure before Russia makes substantive concessions over Ukraine.

Their position is strategically coherent. Sanctions represent one of Europe’s principal instruments of leverage in negotiations.

But preserving that leverage requires more than refusing to lift existing restrictions.

It requires ensuring that those restrictions remain effective even if American priorities change.

Europe’s Unfinished Economic Strategy

The European Union has considerable economic weight. Its single market, regulatory powers and financial institutions provide instruments that Russia cannot simply disregard.

Yet Europe has often been more effective at adopting sanctions than at enforcing them consistently.

Implementation remains dispersed among national authorities with different resources, investigative capacities and political priorities.

Companies operating across multiple jurisdictions encounter uneven enforcement, while intermediaries outside the EU can exploit gaps in information-sharing.

Brussels has attempted to address these weaknesses through expanded reporting obligations, restrictions on third-country entities and closer coordination among national authorities.

The forthcoming 22nd package will provide another indication of whether the EU intends to deepen that approach.

Its precise contents have not yet been announced.

A credible European strategy would also require greater attention to the relationship between sanctions and defence production.

Restricting Russian access to components is valuable. Expanding Europe’s own capacity to manufacture ammunition, missiles and air-defence systems is equally important.

Economic pressure cannot substitute indefinitely for military capability, particularly when the country being sanctioned remains engaged in a prolonged war.

Europe also needs to consider the conditions under which sanctions might eventually be modified.

A negotiated settlement could require carefully defined economic incentives. But those incentives would need to be linked to verifiable Russian obligations and mechanisms for restoring restrictions if agreements were violated.

Otherwise, sanctions relief could become an irreversible concession in exchange for commitments that prove difficult to enforce.

The immediate challenge for Brussels is therefore not simply to produce another package.

It is to establish whether Europe can sustain an independent economic strategy towards Russia if Washington decides that its diplomatic objectives require a different approach.

The EU has accumulated considerable sanctions authority since 2022. The next test is whether it can turn that authority into durable strategic leverage without relying on American policy remaining unchanged.

Andy Burnham must tread cautiously, but Brexit was a very grave act of self-harm – and he is right to address it

Andy Burnham’s opening debate on whether Britain should rejoin the EU is divisive, painful and politically risky. That is why it should be welcomed. To jeopardise his popularity so soon after coming to office might seem reckless, but the issue is urgent and not going away. Brexit is continuing to damage the nation’s economy. The prime minister’s job is to challenge, if not reform it.

The Brexit decade has evoked a bizarre sense of guilt among Britons. Opinion polls show nearly 60% regard it as a mistake, with just a third still in favour. Almost a quarter of those who voted for Brexit now regret it. While early forecasts of economic disaster were proved wrong, the accumulated cost of cutting links with Britain’s biggest trading partner is estimated at 6-8% of GDP.

Simon Jenkins is a Guardian columnist

The United States has privately warned Middle Eastern allies to prepare for renewed military operations against Iran following the 3 November congressional elections, according to diplomatic sources. Although President Donald Trump has not authorised further strikes, the warnings have heightened concerns about regional escalation, energy infrastructure and the consequences for European economies already facing rising fuel costs.

American officials have advised several governments in the Middle East to prepare for possible new military strikes against Iran after next week’s US midterm elections, raising the prospect of another escalation in a conflict that has already disrupted international energy markets.

According to an Associated Press investigation published on 29 October, two diplomats familiar with the warnings said US officials had urged regional allies to consider the possibility of Iranian retaliation against energy facilities and other critical infrastructure.

The diplomats emphasised that President Donald Trump had not made a final decision to resume military operations.

Nevertheless, Washington’s warnings suggest that preparations are being discussed for a potential campaign extending over several days.

Regional governments are concerned that retaliatory action by Iran or organisations aligned with Tehran could prolong the fighting beyond the duration initially envisaged by the United States.

The White House and American officials declined to comment on the reported communications.

Military Preparations and Political Timing

The warnings come as Trump approaches the final days of campaigning ahead of the 3 November elections.

The president has repeatedly suggested that further military action against Iran could follow the vote, although he has also claimed that the conflict may be approaching its conclusion.

During a campaign appearance in Texas, Trump said the war could end within weeks, while reiterating his insistence that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons.

The timing of possible military action remains uncertain.

The Pentagon has increased its regional military presence, including the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and additional amphibious forces.

Approximately 9,000 military personnel were associated with the deployment announced in September.

However, the movement of forces does not establish that an attack has been authorised or that particular targets have been selected.

American military preparations can also serve as deterrence, signalling and contingency planning.

The distinction is important because the political consequences of renewed strikes would depend on their scale, objectives and Iranian response.

Tehran Maintains That Diplomacy Remains Possible

Iran has indicated that it remains willing to pursue negotiations.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on 28 October that Tehran was continuing to consider diplomatic proposals and wanted elements of its earlier ceasefire initiative to form the basis for renewed discussions.

That proposal had previously been rejected by Washington.

The continuing disagreement concerns both the conditions for ending military operations and wider questions about Iran’s nuclear programme.

The United Arab Emirates has urged the parties to seek political solutions and avoid returning to large-scale fighting.

Regional governments face a particularly difficult position because they may be exposed to retaliation even when they are not directly involved in American military operations.

Energy facilities, airports, ports and other infrastructure could become targets during an escalation.

Such attacks would also affect civilian populations and commercial activity beyond the immediate combatants.

The Conflict Has Already Spread

The war involving Iran, the United States and Israel began in late February and has subsequently affected other parts of the Middle East.

Iran-aligned Houthi forces have carried out attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and airports, prompting retaliatory operations by a Saudi-led coalition against targets in Yemen.

These developments have complicated attempts to contain the conflict geographically.

The United States has not conducted a strike against Iran since early September, according to the reporting available on 29 October.

However, the absence of recent American attacks has not removed the risk of renewed operations.

Regional governments are therefore considering a range of possible developments, including limited strikes, a longer military campaign or retaliatory attacks preceding any American operation.

None of these scenarios should be treated as inevitable.

Europe Faces Another Energy Risk

For the European Union, a renewed confrontation would have implications extending well beyond diplomatic relations with Washington.

The Middle East remains a major source of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies.

The Strait of Hormuz is particularly important to international energy shipping, connecting producers in the Persian Gulf with markets in Europe and Asia.

An increase in attacks on shipping, production facilities or export terminals could place further pressure on global energy prices.

The consequences would not necessarily be confined to countries purchasing oil or gas directly from the region.

European consumers compete in internationally connected markets, meaning supply disruptions can influence prices even where import arrangements have been diversified.

The EU has substantially reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas since 2022, but growing reliance on liquefied natural gas creates exposure to fluctuations in international supply and demand.

A further Middle Eastern escalation could therefore complicate Europe’s efforts to rebuild gas reserves and contain industrial energy costs before winter.

Higher fuel prices would also affect transport, food production and household expenditure.

The Strategic Dilemma for European Governments

European governments must balance several interests.

They support efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, maintain relations with the United States and preserve stability in the Middle East.

At the same time, they have a direct economic interest in avoiding prolonged disruption to maritime trade and energy production.

A new American military campaign could revive debates concerning the legality, necessity and proportionality of military action, particularly if diplomatic alternatives remain available.

European governments may also face decisions about the protection of their nationals, regional diplomatic missions and commercial shipping.

The immediate significance of Washington’s warnings lies in the possibility of renewed hostilities, not in confirmation that such hostilities have been ordered.

With the American elections approaching, governments across the Middle East and Europe are preparing for developments that remain contingent on decisions in Washington and Tehran.

Whether the warnings lead to military action or renewed diplomacy will determine the next phase of a conflict whose economic effects are already being felt far beyond the region.

Photo: Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Kaylianna Genier / US Navy / Wikimedia Commons (Public Domain).

Moscow has indicated that European governments will not participate in the next round of negotiations over the war in Ukraine, despite their central role in financing Kyiv, supplying military assistance and shaping the continent’s security arrangements. The Kremlin’s position raises questions about whether any agreement negotiated principally by Washington, Moscow and Kyiv could be implemented without substantial European involvement.

Russia has ruled out European participation in the next round of trilateral talks with Ukraine and the United States, while suggesting that the negotiations could be delayed by developments on the battlefield and the continuing conflict in the Middle East.

Yuri Ushakov, foreign policy adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, said on 29 October that Moscow had not agreed to a specific date for further consultations and that European representatives were not being considered for inclusion.

Ushakov maintained that preparations concerned representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the United States.

His remarks followed statements by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicating that the next round could take place in Abu Dhabi between 6 and 10 November.

The Kremlin has not confirmed those dates.

The disagreement comes as European governments seek a more substantial role in diplomatic efforts concerning a conflict whose eventual settlement would have direct consequences for their security, defence expenditure and relations with Russia.

Moscow Sets Its Conditions

Ushakov’s position was particularly explicit when discussing European participation.

Speaking to Russian media on 28 October, he suggested that European representatives were free to travel to the proposed venue but would not be invited to join the negotiations.

His remarks were subsequently reinforced by a statement that European involvement was not under consideration.

The Kremlin adviser also linked the timing of the next meeting to developments in the Middle East, where the US-Israeli conflict with Iran has complicated Washington’s diplomatic and military priorities.

Ushakov said that conditions on the Ukrainian battlefield would also influence when negotiations could resume.

These explanations give Moscow considerable latitude over the timetable while leaving uncertainty about the practical arrangements for the next meeting.

They do not, however, establish that Washington and Kyiv have accepted Russia’s preferred arrangements for every subsequent stage of negotiations.

Technical consultations between three parties and broader discussions over a European security settlement are not necessarily the same diplomatic process.

Europe Wants a Place at the Table

The Russian position contrasts with statements from the leaders of Britain, France and Germany, who have maintained that European governments must participate in discussions concerning Ukraine’s future security.

Their argument rests partly on the responsibilities that European countries would be expected to assume after any agreement.

European states have provided substantial financial, military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

They have also introduced successive sanctions against Russia, expanded defence expenditure and debated arrangements for security guarantees intended to discourage renewed hostilities.

Any settlement that required changes to European sanctions, military deployments or financial assistance would therefore depend on decisions taken by European governments and institutions.

Neither Moscow nor Washington could independently commit the European Union to lifting sanctions or authorise European states to deploy forces.

This distinction limits the practical significance of excluding European officials from a negotiating session.

An agreement could be discussed without European participation, but implementing provisions that require European action would demand further negotiations.

The Donbas Question Remains Unresolved

The principal obstacle continues to concern territory and the conditions under which military operations would end.

Russia has maintained its demand that Ukraine relinquish territory in the eastern Donbas region, including areas remaining under Ukrainian control.

Kyiv has rejected the surrender of territory as a precondition for ending the war.

The proposed negotiations are consequently expected to concentrate on technical issues where limited agreements may be more achievable.

These include possible arrangements concerning energy infrastructure, maritime security, the exchange of prisoners and the return of Ukrainian children taken to Russia or Russian-controlled territory.

Such measures could produce humanitarian or economic benefits without resolving the central territorial dispute.

However, their implementation would require monitoring arrangements and sufficient confidence that the parties would honour their commitments.

The temporary humanitarian ceasefire around Oleshky, in the Kherson region, offers a narrowly defined example of cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian representatives.

It does not demonstrate that a broader political agreement is within reach.

The American Role

Washington remains the principal external mediator in the current negotiating format.

That position reflects American diplomatic influence and its capacity to engage directly with both Moscow and Kyiv.

However, the United States is simultaneously managing military commitments in the Middle East and domestic political pressures ahead of the 3 November congressional elections.

These competing priorities may affect the pace of diplomatic engagement.

For Russia, a negotiating framework centred on Washington offers the possibility of addressing wider bilateral issues alongside the conflict in Ukraine.

For Ukraine, American participation remains important because US decisions concerning military assistance and security commitments could influence the durability of any settlement.

Europe’s position is more complicated. Its governments possess substantial economic leverage, but their influence over the negotiating agenda depends on coordination with Washington and Kyiv.

Negotiating Without Europe Has Practical Limits

The immediate dispute concerns who participates in the next round of talks.

The longer-term question is which parties would be responsible for implementing a settlement.

A ceasefire might initially involve arrangements agreed by military and diplomatic representatives of Russia and Ukraine, supported by the United States.

A more comprehensive agreement could involve sanctions, reconstruction finance, security guarantees, troop deployments and Ukraine’s future relationship with European institutions.

Those issues cannot be settled on behalf of European governments without their consent.

Moscow’s attempt to restrict participation may therefore succeed at the level of an initial negotiating format while proving more difficult to sustain during discussions about implementation.

For the moment, neither the date nor the outcome of the proposed Abu Dhabi meeting is certain.

What has become clearer is the divergence between Russia’s preferred negotiating structure and Europe’s determination to influence the security arrangements that would follow the war.

A dispute between Germany and Italy over natural gas storage has exposed tensions within the European Union’s energy market, as wholesale prices approach levels last recorded during the 2022 energy crisis and governments confront the prospect of another expensive winter.

Italy has accused Germany of contributing to the latest surge in European natural gas prices by delaying the replenishment of its underground storage facilities, reopening a debate about national energy policies and their consequences for the EU’s single market.

The dispute emerged on 29 October after the European benchmark gas price briefly exceeded €100 per megawatt hour the previous day, its highest level since December 2022.

Germany’s gas storage facilities were just 61.7 per cent full, compared with almost 91 per cent in Italy and an EU average of approximately 75 per cent.

The difference has become politically sensitive because European countries purchase gas in an interconnected market, meaning decisions taken by one major consumer can influence prices paid elsewhere.

Speaking at the Montel Italian Energy Day conference in Milan, Alessandro Noce, director general for energy markets and infrastructure at Italy’s Energy Ministry, criticised Germany’s approach to preparing for winter.

According to Reuters, Noce argued that Italy had spent €300 million securing additional gas reserves, only to face higher market prices as Germany attempted to replenish its comparatively depleted stocks.

He also questioned whether Germany had delayed purchases because of preparations to privatise energy companies involved in the storage process.

Germany’s Economy Ministry did not immediately respond to the criticism.

Germany’s Storage Decisions Under Scrutiny

The German government’s approach has attracted particular attention because of its role in the operations of Uniper and Securing Energy for Europe (SEFE).

Both companies became important components of Germany’s energy-security arrangements following the disruption of Russian gas supplies in 2022.

Plans concerning their future ownership have coincided with renewed questions about how Berlin balances commercial considerations against the need to maintain strategic reserves.

At the Milan conference, an energy analyst suggested that preparations for privatisation had contributed to delays in storage purchases.

That assessment has not been established as the definitive explanation for Germany’s comparatively low reserves.

Nevertheless, the resulting political dispute demonstrates the difficulties of managing energy security through a system in which national governments retain considerable discretion while their purchasing decisions affect a common market.

Europe’s Gas Market Faces Renewed Pressure

Europe’s latest price increase has several causes extending beyond German storage policies.

Disruptions to liquefied natural gas shipments associated with the conflict involving Iran have constrained supplies from the Middle East.

At the same time, European countries entered the summer storage-refilling period with unusually low reserves following the previous winter.

The EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) reported that underground gas storage was only 28 per cent full at the end of winter 2025–26.

By 21 October, that figure had risen to 75 per cent, still below historical levels.

In its latest gas-market monitoring report, ACER estimated that disruption linked to the Middle East conflict had added between €18 billion and €33 billion to Europe’s gas-import bill.

The agency also found that American liquefied natural gas accounted for roughly 30 per cent of EU gas supplies, reflecting Europe’s growing reliance on transatlantic energy imports.

Although this diversification has reduced dependence on Russian pipeline gas, it has also increased Europe’s exposure to international competition for LNG cargoes.

European buyers must compete with customers in Asia, particularly when colder weather or geopolitical disruptions increase demand.

EU Storage Rules Face a Test

The disagreement has implications for the European Union’s gas-storage framework.

Following the 2022 energy crisis, the EU introduced mandatory storage requirements intended to reduce the risk of supply shortages during winter.

The arrangements were subsequently extended until the end of 2027.

Under the revised rules, member states retain a 90 per cent storage-filling target but have greater flexibility over when and how it is achieved.

Countries may reach the target between 1 October and 1 December, rather than being bound to the previous 1 November deadline.

Further flexibility is available in difficult market conditions.

These provisions were designed partly to prevent governments from creating artificial demand peaks by purchasing gas simultaneously to meet rigid deadlines.

However, the present dispute suggests that delayed purchases can create another problem if several major consumers need additional supplies as winter approaches.

Germany’s current storage level does not, by itself, establish a breach of EU requirements. The applicable deadlines and permitted exemptions must also be considered.

Italy Seeks Greater Scope for Intervention

The Italian government has meanwhile been seeking permission from the European Commission to use public funds to reduce energy costs for households and businesses.

Rome’s concerns reflect the economic consequences of sustained high gas prices, particularly for industries dependent on energy-intensive manufacturing.

Italy faces a general election expected in 2027, adding a domestic political dimension to the debate over energy subsidies.

Noce warned that prices could rise to between €150 and €180 per megawatt hour if January brings particularly cold weather.

Such an outcome remains a scenario rather than a forecast.

Energy markets will also be influenced by developments in the Middle East, LNG deliveries, industrial demand and winter temperatures.

A European Problem Without a Single National Solution

Europe has expanded its LNG import infrastructure and diversified energy sources substantially since 2022.

However, the latest price increases demonstrate that greater import capacity does not necessarily insulate consumers from global supply disruptions.

The German–Italian dispute also exposes the limits of national energy planning within an integrated European market.

Germany’s storage policies affect its neighbours, just as decisions taken elsewhere influence the price German consumers pay.

The central question for Brussels is whether existing coordination arrangements provide sufficient incentives for governments to safeguard their own winter supplies without transferring additional costs to other member states.

With the heating season approaching, that issue is becoming an immediate economic concern rather than a theoretical dispute about European energy solidarity.

Trade unions representing workers at 113 ports across five continents are preparing coordinated industrial action on 30 October, protesting against the movement of military equipment through commercial shipping terminals. The mobilisation raises questions about international trade, defence logistics and the growing involvement of organised labour in geopolitical disputes.

Dockworkers’ unions in 22 countries and regions are preparing coordinated strikes and demonstrations on Friday, 30 October, in an international campaign opposing the use of civilian ports to transport weapons and other military supplies to conflict zones.

The mobilisation involves more than 25 trade unions representing workers at 113 ports, according to organisers, with planned actions extending across Europe, North Africa, Asia and the Americas.

Major shipping centres expected to participate include Hamburg, Genoa, Le Havre, Valencia, Algeciras and Piraeus, alongside Morocco’s Tangier Med and India’s Nhava Sheva.

The scale of actual disruption remains uncertain.

Some unions have announced 24-hour stoppages, while others intend to organise shorter walkouts, demonstrations or symbolic protests.

Organisers have suggested that the action could affect more than 40 per cent of Mediterranean cargo traffic and freight worth over $2 billion.

However, these figures represent estimates of potential disruption rather than confirmed losses or cargo volumes that will necessarily be immobilised.

A Campaign Extending Beyond Europe

The initiative originated among dockworkers’ organisations in Italy, France, Greece, Spain’s Basque Country, Turkey and Morocco.

It subsequently attracted support from unions in northern Europe and several countries outside the Mediterranean region.

Among the participating organisations are Germany’s ver.di, France’s CGT Ports et Docks, Ireland’s SIPTU and Denmark’s 3F.

Indian maritime unions have also declared their support, citing the effects of armed conflict on commercial shipping and the safety of seafarers.

The campaign follows an international declaration agreed in Istanbul in May 2026, when dockworkers’ representatives called for ports to remain outside military supply operations.

The organisers argue that commercial transport infrastructure is increasingly being used to facilitate the movement of weapons and equipment to active conflict zones.

Their demands extend beyond any single war, although opposition to arms deliveries connected with the conflict involving Israel and the Palestinians has featured prominently in earlier industrial action.

Italy at the Centre of the Mobilisation

Italy is expected to become one of the principal centres of Friday’s protests.

The Unione Sindacale di Base (USB) has called a nationwide general strike, with demonstrations planned in more than 40 cities.

Port workers are expected to participate in Genoa, Livorno, Trieste, Ravenna, Gioia Tauro and several other maritime centres.

Genoa has previously been associated with protests against the handling of military cargo, including shipments linked to Israel and American military facilities.

However, the port’s representatives have indicated that they expect only limited operational disruption from Friday’s action.

The distinction between planned participation and actual interruption of shipping is important.

Large ports operate through complex arrangements involving terminal operators, subcontractors, transport companies and different categories of employees.

Consequently, industrial action affecting one part of a port does not necessarily bring all commercial activity to a halt.

Greek Ferries Face Disruption

Greece is among the countries where the effects on passenger transport could be more immediate.

Dockworkers, engineers and seafarers’ unions have announced participation in the protests, with Greek ferry services expected to remain suspended for 24 hours.

At Piraeus, the country’s largest port, dockworkers have announced a three-hour stoppage.

Other Greek maritime unions intend to participate in longer strikes.

Disruption to ferry operations could affect travel between the Greek mainland and its islands, demonstrating how a campaign directed primarily against military cargo can also affect civilian transport.

The effects will depend on the precise participation of employees and the arrangements made by port and ferry operators.

Defence Logistics and Commercial Shipping

The planned mobilisation draws attention to the relationship between military supply chains and civilian maritime infrastructure.

Commercial ports are essential to international trade, but they may also handle military vehicles, ammunition, equipment and other cargo connected with defence operations.

NATO members and other states depend on commercial transport networks for certain aspects of military logistics.

Military equipment may be transported aboard commercial vessels or through terminals that also process ordinary goods.

The use of such facilities is not inherently unlawful, and arms shipments may be authorised under national and international export-control arrangements.

Nevertheless, dockworkers’ organisations argue that employees should have a greater role in determining whether ports are used to facilitate military operations.

This creates potential tensions between industrial rights, contractual obligations, national security priorities and government decisions concerning defence exports.

The implications are particularly significant in Europe, where governments are expanding defence production and seeking to strengthen military supply chains.

Any sustained disruption to port logistics could complicate the movement of equipment and components, although the consequences of Friday’s planned action cannot yet be established.

Europe’s Growing Defence Trade

The protest comes as European countries increase military spending and procurement in response to deteriorating security conditions.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Europe became the world’s largest arms-importing region over the 2021–2025 period.

The expansion of defence trade has increased the importance of transport infrastructure capable of handling military equipment.

It has also exposed disagreements over the political responsibilities of companies and workers involved in these supply chains.

For governments, the movement of defence equipment may form part of legitimate security commitments and international assistance programmes.

For participating unions, opposition to particular military shipments is presented as an extension of workers’ rights and their broader political objectives.

These competing positions are unlikely to be resolved through a single day of industrial action.

An Immediate Test for International Shipping

Friday’s mobilisation will provide an indication of how effectively unions can coordinate industrial action across different countries, legal systems and transport networks.

Its practical significance will depend on how many workers participate, which terminals suspend operations and whether shipping companies can maintain schedules through alternative arrangements.

The organisers have demonstrated their ability to coordinate protests across a geographically extensive network.

Whether that coordination translates into substantial disruption to international maritime trade remains to be seen.

For European governments and shipping operators, the immediate task will be to manage any interruption to commercial and passenger services.

The wider question is whether opposition to the use of civilian transport infrastructure for military logistics will become a recurring feature of industrial relations across Europe’s major ports.

Christine Lagarde’s unexpected decision to leave the European Central Bank nine months ahead of schedule has triggered a politically sensitive succession process at a time when renewed inflation, rising borrowing costs and economic uncertainty are testing the eurozone’s monetary institutions.

Christine Lagarde will step down as president of the European Central Bank (ECB) on 7th February 2027, bringing her tenure to an early conclusion and opening negotiations among European Union governments over one of the continent’s most influential economic appointments.

The announcement, made by the ECB on 29th October, came on the same day that its Governing Council decided to leave interest rates unchanged, despite renewed inflationary pressure linked to rising energy prices.

Lagarde, who has led the institution since November 2019, was originally expected to remain in office until October 2027. Her departure will therefore bring forward a succession contest that had already attracted considerable attention in European financial and political circles.

Speaking after the announcement, Lagarde explained that she wanted greater freedom to address matters beyond monetary policy, arguing that the restrictions associated with central bank leadership prevented her from contributing publicly to wider debates.

Her explanation leaves open questions about the political consequences of her departure, particularly as EU governments prepare for difficult negotiations over the institution’s future leadership.

A Succession Shaped by European Politics

Under Article 283 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the ECB president is appointed by the European Council, acting by qualified majority following consultations with the European Parliament and the ECB’s Governing Council.

Although the process is formally governed by treaty provisions, appointments to the ECB’s Executive Board have historically involved negotiations among the eurozone’s largest economies.

Two former national central bank governors have emerged as prominent potential successors: Klaas Knot of the Netherlands and Pablo Hernández de Cos of Spain.

Both have substantial experience in monetary policy, although their possible candidacies remain subject to the political calculations of EU governments.

The timing is especially significant for France, which faces a presidential election in April 2027 against a background of domestic political instability and mounting concerns about public finances.

An appointment concluded before that election would be negotiated by the existing European leadership, potentially affecting the balance of influence over one of the eurozone’s principal institutions.

However, Lagarde has not publicly identified the French election as the reason for her departure.

The succession process will also coincide with other changes to the ECB’s Executive Board, increasing the importance of negotiations over the geographical and institutional balance of its leadership.

Inflation Returns to the Foreground

The leadership announcement coincided with a difficult monetary policy decision. On 29th October, the ECB maintained its deposit facility rate at 2.5 per cent, leaving the main refinancing and marginal lending rates at 2.65 and 2.90 per cent respectively.

Eurozone inflation reached 3.8 per cent in September, substantially above the ECB’s medium-term target of 2 per cent. Rising energy prices have complicated the institution’s position. Higher gas and oil costs threaten to increase consumer prices while simultaneously weakening industrial output and household purchasing power.

The ECB acknowledged that the energy shock could produce further inflationary pressures and reduce growth.

At the same time, tighter financial conditions across the eurozone have increased the risks associated with additional monetary tightening.

This leaves policymakers confronting a familiar but difficult problem: raising interest rates may restrain inflation, but it can also deepen economic weakness and increase borrowing costs for governments, businesses and households.

The next president will inherit these competing pressures rather than a settled monetary environment.

France Adds Another Complication

Financial developments in France have added urgency to the debate.

French government bond yields have risen sharply, with ten-year borrowing costs reaching levels not seen since 2002.

This reflects market concerns about the country’s fiscal position and political uncertainty, while raising wider questions about financial stability within the eurozone.

For the ECB, the challenge is particularly delicate.

Its mandate requires monetary policy to be directed towards price stability across the currency union. However, the economic consequences of higher interest rates differ considerably between member states.

Countries with elevated public debt face greater pressure from rising financing costs, while economies exposed to higher energy prices may experience weaker investment and industrial production.

The ECB possesses instruments intended to address disorderly financial-market conditions, but these do not eliminate the underlying fiscal and political differences between eurozone members.

The appointment of Lagarde’s successor will therefore take place against a backdrop of renewed debate about the relationship between monetary independence and national economic interests.

An Institution Facing a Different Europe

Lagarde’s presidency began before the pandemic, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent European energy crisis.

During her tenure, the ECB navigated emergency monetary interventions, unusually high inflation and substantial changes in interest rates.

Her successor will confront a different combination of challenges: renewed geopolitical disruption, economic competition with the United States and China, and growing demands for European investment in defence and industrial development.

These priorities are primarily the responsibility of governments, but they influence the economic conditions in which the central bank operates.

The immediate question is who will replace Lagarde. The more consequential question is how the next ECB president will manage monetary policy in a eurozone whose economic and political divisions are becoming increasingly difficult to separate.

For EU leaders, the succession is an opportunity to determine the institution’s leadership. For the ECB, it will be another test of its ability to maintain monetary independence while managing the consequences of Europe’s changing political economy.

The ECB faces an ugly choice as eurozone inflation hits 3.8pc

Why Norway and Finland Were Right to Call Putin

By Glenn Diesen | October 29, 2026

The leaders of Norway and Finland are criticised for breaking with the European consensus on boycotting diplomacy by calling President Putin. Their decision to undermine this solidarity is seen as dividing and weakening Europe. I argue the opposite. It was a brave and necessary move, as the European consensus is based on a rhetorical trap that isolates Europe, makes it increasingly irrelevant, and risks taking it to war with Russia – the world’s largest nuclear power. I will make a further argument: we should develop a healthy scepticism towards the notion that speaking with one voice is always a strength.

How to Speak with One Voice: The Rhetorical Trap

Ask yourself: how can 27+ countries with different political, economic, and security interests agree on a common foreign policy and speak with one voice? A common voice can be achieved by defining collective interests or by setting a rhetorical trap. A rhetorical trap is set when politicians use shared values and earlier commitments to pressure others into supporting policies they would otherwise oppose. Disagreement is portrayed as a betrayal of these values, making it politically costly to dissent, even when the policy goes against national interests.

The easiest way to force a consensus is to frame every issue as a struggle between good and evil. Once political disagreements become moral questions, those who challenge the consensus can be shamed rather than answered. If every issue is reduced to a choice between freedom and imperialism, it becomes much easier to speak with one voice. The obsession with speaking with one voice makes Europeans vulnerable to Manichean thinking and warmongering policies.

Europeans unite around absurd slogans such as “Putin is Hitler” and “Russia wants to restore the Soviet Union”. These slogans do not help us understand Russia or develop sensible policies to mitigate the security competition. Their purpose is to establish moral clarity and enforce political conformity. Challenging these slogans with well-documented arguments is considered immoral and a threat to European unity. This rhetorical trap is extremely dangerous because, in a struggle between good and evil, we reach the conclusion that diplomacy is appeasement and weapons are the path to peace.

The End of Debate

Consider the debate about European security after the Cold War. We once recognised the principle of indivisible security, which means that one state should not strengthen its security at the expense of others. Discussions about security entailed balancing deterrence with reassurance. These principles have largely disappeared from European political discourse. It is now only about deterrence. It is heresy to contest the notion that NATO is a “force for good”, and all concerns about NATO expansionism are framed as opposition to democracy and freedom. How can we resolve a security competition if we are not even allowed to discuss its causes?

Instead, European leaders increasingly measure the success of their policies by their moral intentions rather than their consequences. Sanctions are presented as a demonstration of resolve, the willingness to fight a war as an expression of solidarity, and refusing diplomacy as standing firm against aggression. But what happens when these policies fail to produce the intended results? The answer is usually more sanctions, more war, and less diplomacy. The policies themselves cannot be questioned without appearing to undermine the moral foundations of European unity.

Weaponising Solidarity

The demand for solidarity is also weaponised to override reason. WikiLeaks exposed how Norwegian officials had initially expressed serious concerns that US strategic missile defence would disrupt the nuclear balance with Russia and destabilise the world. The US ambassador reported to Washington that the Norwegians could be persuaded to change their position, not through arguments, but by emphasising the need for NATO solidarity. If the Norwegians were presented with a choice between “repeating Russian narratives” and defending NATO solidarity, they would fall in line.

Later, the American ambassador sent another cable to Washington confirming that their work with NGOs, think tanks, journalists, and politicians had delivered the message, and that the Norwegians were abandoning their security concerns. This was not the result of arguments, but of pressure to show solidarity in a world where everything is framed in black-and-white terms. Since then, the nuclear arms control architecture has largely collapsed, and the world faces a dangerous future – but the political class takes comfort in the fact that it was all done in solidarity.

This is a dangerous way to organise European security. If solidarity means that countries must abandon their own security assessments to support a common position, then solidarity itself becomes a source of insecurity. The purpose of cooperation should be to reconcile different interests and develop better policies, not to pressure governments into repeating the same empty arguments.

Speaking with One Voice or Correcting Course?

A strong Europe should be able to tolerate disagreements among its members. Indeed, such disagreements are necessary if Europe is to correct mistaken policies. When dissent is treated as disloyalty, political mistakes become almost impossible to reverse. Leaders become prisoners of their own rhetoric.

Norway and Finland should therefore not be criticised for challenging the European consensus on diplomatic isolation. They should be encouraged. Europe needs countries willing to question policies that have become resistant to criticism, especially when those policies concern war and peace.

The current European consensus is sustained by a rhetorical trap that isolates Europe, makes the continent increasingly irrelevant, and risks dragging us into war. I therefore argue for a little less solidarity and a little more common sense.

In un certo senso Mosca sta facendo qualcosa che la società europea non può fare da sola: mettere alle strette la sua classe dirigente, farla venire allo scoperto e ridicolizzarla costringendola a mettersi a confronto coi propri limiti, ad uscire dalla propria torre d’avorio ed infine a ridefinire un’identità – quella europea – in dubbio da quasi 80 anni.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Le notizie delle ultime settimane lasciando intravedere spiragli di qualcosa: un qualcosa che è ancora troppo presto per definire, ma in cui molti sperano. Una risoluzione del conflitto che infiamma il fianco orientale d’Europa potrebbe vedere una svolta (si mormora) eppure più tale ipotesi si avvicina, più si percepisce un’ansia generalizzata, come un nervosismo inesprimibile che pervade la classe politica al comando delle istituzioni europee, a tutti i livelli, ma soprattutto a quelli più alti. Lo spaventoso paradosso lo si può articolare in modo assai semplice: c’è paura della pace.

La classe dirigente europea, anzichè remare in direzione di una soluzione definitiva, a lungo termine, del conflitto in Ucraina, al contrario esterna tutta una serie di dubbi e ostilità ad ogni compromesso da far quasi credere nell’esistenza di un avversione a tale pace: in breve, le istituzioni europee nel momento più critico dell’ultimo lustro, esprimono qualcosa di indicibile che di certo non si addice allo spirito dei padri costituenti della comunità europea, votati a edificare una cultura sovranazionale basata sul compromesso, sulla reiezione del nazionalismo e sulla diplomazia. La verità è che siamo di fronte ad un nodo di grandissime proporzioni: il conflitto in Ucraina, sebbene limitato dal punto di vista prettamente geografico, ha effetti geopolitici di grande portata che ridefiniscono gli equilibri di potere ereditati dalla caduta del muro di Berlino. In un contesto come questo, sorgerà una delle domande più difficili: quale destino per l’Europa ? Un continente uscito azzerato dal secondo conflitto mondiale, risorto e fiorito economicamente fino al massimo splendore nelle generazioni post-belliche, pur rimanendo perennemente “monco” ovvero privo di una propria politica di difesa (così come di una propria politica estera indipendente da quella di Washington). I suoi leader si trovano ad affrontare ora qualcosa di mai visto prima nell’esperienza dell’Europa politica, ovvero l’assumersi di una responsabilità storica: in questo caso quella di un insuccesso, nel prevenire e gestire una grande guerra convenzionale ai margini del proprio continente, aver preso decisioni avventate ed ora ritrovarsi messi da parte constatando una propria sconfitta sul campo contro il rivale identificato con Mosca. Per poter comprendere tutto questo occorre tuttavia fare qualche passo indietro e riflettere su cosa sia la leadership europea, cosa rappresenta e come si è formata. Innanzitutto occorre rendersi conto che la classe dirigente europea è forse l’elite più saldamente insediata e meno “sfidata” sulla faccia del pianeta facendo i conti: siedono sul trono di un continente pacificato, vale a dire senza velleità di potenza o nemici naturali da cui doversi difendere, estremamente prospero (a differenza degli USA per 70 anni non ha affrontato vere spese militari), le cui elite sociali di riferimento – anziane e benestanti – non danno problemi particolari. Una torre di avorio unica sul pianeta, che per la prima volta nella sua esistenza ha subito una scossa: la crisi geopolitica che abbiamo visto in questi anni – ancora in corso – primo grande conflitto europeo del XXI secolo (in realtà il primo dal 1945 ad oggi su questo continente) costituisce anche la prima vera sfida alla classe politica europea: quest’ultima in 70 non ha mai dovuto vedersela con un vero nemico, con nulla che potesse mettere alla prova la propria prerogativa al “trono” il loro diritto “sacro” al comando.

Si può dunque dire questo a buona ragione: le circostanze odierne sono un inedito banco di prova per tutti costoro, un momento della verità per tutto l’estabilishment politico emerso in Europa dai tempi dell’ultimo conflitto mondiale in poi (il carosello di forze liberal-democratiche, cristiano-democratiche/democristiane, social-democratiche, ecologiste tipiche del panorama partitico occidentale post-bellico): il cosiddetto “arco costituzionale” europeo consolidatosi nel corso di generazioni con il placet d’oltreoceano ossia con la condizionale delle fedeltà indiscussa alle direttiva politiche di Washington.

Ora, tale classe si è messa in un pasticcio più grande di sè stessa senza rendersene conto: ha sfidato una potenza militare (malgrado tutto, la Russia questo ancora è) con la sicurezza assoluta di un successo nonchè di un grande fratello a stelle e strisce, pronto ora e sempre all’intervento in supporto degli alleati. Questi ultimi, mai si sono resi conto della propria funzione di satelliti rispetto al potente alleato ed ora si ritrovano soli a dover gestire un evento per loro ingestibile: un grande conflitto convenzionale che non possono vincere, il cui insuccesso può essere la miccia di una situazione sociale a casa propria già ai limiti per altre ragioni. Per riassumere in altre parole, la classe dirigente europea che oggi osserviamo, si ritrova per la prima volta sul banco degli imputati (assieme al governo di Kiev): i governanti europei nella propria animosità nei confronti di Mosca, si sono esposti oltre il limite massimo fino a trovarsi ora in un vicolo cieco, considerando che la prova di forza che hanno voluto non può essere vinta, ma al tempo medesimo non si può tornare indietro. L’Europa politica – quella di Bruxelles – si è gravemente compromessa, fomentando nelle proprie opinioni pubbliche paure infondate ed isterismi al fine di creare artificialmente un consenso attorno a prese di posizione antirusse e far accettare un coinvolgimento nel conflitto ucraino costato ai contribuenti centinaia di miliardi di euro, a danno delle proprie economie e pace sociale. Il nodo più inconfessabile è proprio questo: si è voluto inventare un “grande nemico” (in realtà inesistente) cui addossare responsabilità di ogni colpa, di ogni male sociale che affligge l’occidente europeo, per non dover affrontare le proprie di responsabilità; in fondo nulla di strano, un meccanismo esistente da secoli ovvero cercare di convogliare le energie sociali verso l’esterno (dandogli un bersaglio, un nemico) per evitare che queste ultime identifichino il problema del male sociale verso l’interno vale a dire nei propri stessi governanti. La riprova di questo si è manifestata in maniera eclatante tanto in Francia quanto in Italia nelle ultime settimane, sotto forma di una protesta di piazza come non se ne vedevano da decenni, che ha costretto la capitale francese allo stato di emergenza per la prima volta da una generazione a questa parte. In Francia come in Germania si è alle porte del successo di forze non convenzionali, alternative nel contesto politico europeo, come Fronte nazionale (ora RN) oppure Alternative fur Deutschland (AFD) che sono sempre meno contenibili: la classe dirigente di Bruxelles – di matrice liberaldemocratica – di questo ha timore e non vi è modo di arginare la “marea sovranista” se non con una “vittoria contro le autocrazie” che però non può esserci nel mondo reale. La responsabilità storica dell’UE è di aver ceduto ad un idealismo che ignora ogni regola di realpolitik, facendosi tutt’una col mito di una superiorità etica inesistente e non applicabile nella realtà oggettiva: atteggiamento che ha finito col danneggiare e addirittura mettere in pericolo la propria base sociale.

In definitiva sì, la conclusione del conflitto ucraino mette in tensione perchè costringe ad una resa dei conti inedita nella politica interna delle pricipali economie europee: una classe dirigente che verrà soppesata e valutata di fronte all’opinione pubblica, scontando il tutto con una potenziale catastrofe elettorale neigli anni a venire che rischia di sostituirla. Proprio a tale proposito, di recente il sociologo ed editorialista italiano Alessandro Orsini ha lanciato una provocazione direttissima, affermando che la Russia di V. Putin in un certo senso sta contribuendo ad una futura “rivoluzione” europea, dal momento che la socnfitta del regime di V. Zelensky può comportare anche il declino rapido di tutta la corrotta classe al potere a Bruxelles che ha legato le sue sorti all’esito alle sorti dell’Ucraina. Quindi, in un certo senso Mosca sta facendo qualcosa che la società europea non può fare da sola: mettere alle strette la sua classe dirigente, farla venire allo scoperto e ridicolizzarla costringendola a mettersi a confronto coi propri limiti, ad uscire dalla propria torre d’avorio ed infine a ridefinire un’identità – quella europea – in dubbio da quasi 80 anni.