Two tankers caught fire within about 12 hours off Sulina, Romania’s port at the mouth of the Danube, Romanian authorities reported. The crew of one said a drone hit it inside Romania’s territorial waters, while Bucharest says it is still checking whether drones were involved. Bulgaria, where drones sank ships in its economic zone this month, says it lacks proof that Russia launched them.
For months, Russia has struck civilian ships on the sea route that carries most of Ukraine’s farm exports, while its drones have repeatedly crossed into Moldova and Romania during attacks on Ukraine. As long as Bucharest and Sofia wait for drone wreckage before naming anyone, Russia, the party Bulgaria’s own prime minister says the logic points to, pays no price for extending its war on Ukraine’s trade routes into NATO members’ waters.
The San Marino-flagged chemical tanker Wine Trader reported a fire in its superstructure around 07:00 on 15 October while anchored in Romanian territorial waters about 13 nautical miles southeast of Sulina, Romania’s Naval Authority said. By midday, five of its 12 crew had been recovered and seven were still missing.
Hours earlier, at 01:34, a drone entered Romanian airspace over the country’s waters southeast of Sulina for about a minute before vanishing from radar, the Defense Ministry said. Authorities have not named a cause for the fire, though unnamed sources
Russia’s expanding campaign against commercial shipping in the Black Sea is creating a security crisis that extends far beyond Ukraine. The latest drone attacks off Bulgaria’s coast have left 11 sailors missing, forced Sofia to seek assistance from NATO and the European Union, and raised concerns that Moscow is attempting to disrupt one of the world’s principal agricultural export routes.
On 13th October, the Guinea-Bissau-flagged HS Dignity sank after being struck by drones approximately 17 nautical miles east of the Bulgarian village of Krapets. Another vessel, the Ukrainian-owned, Maltese-flagged Chelsea 3, was attacked near Byala. All 15 crew members were rescued, although five sustained minor injuries. The incidents followed earlier attacks in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone on 6th October, when the ALFA WATAN sank and the grain-carrying ABLE was damaged.
The significance lies not simply in the destruction of merchant vessels but in the geographical expansion of the threat. Commercial routes previously regarded as comparatively safer alternatives to Ukraine’s exposed ports are now becoming operationally dangerous. Bulgaria and Romania, both NATO and EU members, face disruption to trade, maritime insurance and port operations as the conflict spreads across the western Black Sea.
The latest attacks follow months of Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports, export terminals and civilian shipping. As EU Today previously reported, repeated attacks on Odesa have already reduced Ukraine’s grain-export capacity, while alternative routes through the Danube and neighbouring European countries cannot fully replace its major Black Sea terminals.
The extension of attacks towards Bulgaria changes the economic calculation. Ships carrying agricultural products, those approaching Danube ports and vessels operating between Black Sea countries now face greater uncertainty, regardless of whether they enter Ukrainian territorial waters.
Maritime security company Ambrey assessed the earlier October attacks as highly likely to have been conducted by Russian forces. Its assessment identified vessels associated with Ukrainian grain trade as the principal targets, rather than suggesting that every commercial ship was being attacked indiscriminately.
This distinction is important, but it offers little reassurance to international shipping companies. A campaign directed against Ukrainian trade can disrupt the wider maritime economy when insurers, shipowners and exporters cannot establish which routes remain safe.
The economic consequences are already becoming apparent. Shipowners must consider higher insurance premiums, additional security measures and the possibility of losing vessels and crews. Traders may redirect cargoes or withdraw from routes whose commercial returns no longer justify the risks.
The attacks have also placed Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev in an increasingly difficult political position.
Radev has advocated renewed diplomatic engagement with Moscow and questioned the emphasis placed on military assistance to Ukraine. He has rejected accusations of being pro-Russian, presenting his approach as a pragmatic alternative to prolonged confrontation.
Yet the attacks have demonstrated the limitations of maintaining political distance from a war whose economic and security consequences are reaching Bulgarian waters.
After summoning Russian Ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova on 13th October, Radev acknowledged that Bulgaria possessed no conclusive evidence establishing responsibility for the latest strikes. Nevertheless, he argued that their consequences benefited Russia and questioned why Ukraine would attack its own commercial vessels.
According to the Bulgarian News Agency’s account of the meeting, the prime minister also warned that higher insurance costs and shipping companies’ reluctance to serve Bulgarian ports were already damaging the national economy.
This is the fundamental change confronting Sofia. The conflict is no longer solely a question of Bulgaria’s position towards Ukraine or its diplomatic relationship with Russia. It is affecting the country’s commercial interests, energy supplies and responsibilities as a NATO member.
Radev’s response does not necessarily indicate a wholesale reversal of his previous political position. It demonstrates that the practical obligations of government can leave considerably less room for accommodation with Moscow than the arguments advanced from outside direct responsibility for national security.
The broader consequences may be felt most severely outside Europe.
Ukraine remains an important supplier of wheat, maize and vegetable oils to international markets, including countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Interruptions to these exports affect more than Ukraine’s agricultural revenues. They can increase transport costs, delay deliveries and reduce the availability of competitively priced food in import-dependent countries.
Speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum on 12th October, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned of a possible agricultural crisis, arguing that Russian interference with Black Sea shipping could leave countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East facing serious supply difficulties within months.
The warning reflects a mechanism already familiar from the earlier stages of Russia’s invasion. Following Moscow’s withdrawal from the UN-brokered grain agreement in July 2023, Ukrainian agricultural exporters faced renewed attacks on port infrastructure and substantial uncertainty over maritime access.
The danger is not necessarily an immediate worldwide shortage of grain. Wheat prices remained relatively steady following the 13th October incidents. Rather, sustained disruption could progressively reduce available export capacity, increase costs and place vulnerable importing countries under greater pressure.
For Moscow, such disruption could serve several purposes simultaneously: weakening Ukraine’s economy, raising the costs of international support for Kyiv and creating additional pressures on governments concerned about food inflation and social stability.
The immediate challenge for Brussels and NATO is how to protect commercial navigation without allowing the conflict to expand into a direct military confrontation.
Bulgaria has requested stronger air and maritime surveillance and is seeking closer coordination with Romania and Turkey. Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov said on 14th October that Sofia expected to join a NATO counter-drone initiative by the end of the month.
The EU has already developed a framework for addressing precisely such threats. Its Black Sea strategy, announced in May 2025, proposed a maritime security hub integrating surveillance, intelligence-sharing, infrastructure protection and regional cooperation.
The attacks now expose the difference between developing a security framework and providing effective protection to merchant vessels. Better intelligence can identify threats, but preventing further sinkings requires detection systems, coordinated responses and sufficient defensive capabilities.
Turkey’s involvement is particularly important because of its control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and its established role in Black Sea maritime security. Any workable regional arrangement must therefore extend beyond cooperation between Bulgaria and Romania.
The incidents occurred outside Bulgaria’s 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, meaning they do not automatically constitute an armed attack on NATO territory under Article 5. Nevertheless, repeated strikes within the economic zones of alliance members pose a substantial challenge to maritime security.
Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian exports is increasingly imposing costs on neighbouring European states and international trading partners. The question facing the EU is whether it can secure the commercial routes on which both Ukraine’s economy and the food supplies of millions beyond Europe depend.
European regions and cities demand clear rules and solid financial backing to help Europe’s ailing car industry through the shift to electric vehicles (EVs). The European Committee of the Regions (CoR) on Wednesday adopted an opinion on the European Commission’s Automotive Package, arguing that the transition will only succeed if regions are adequately equipped to carry it.
Regions said electrification is crucial to achieving climate-neutral road transport, but that success depends on affordability and access. They called for charging infrastructure across regions, funded by European, national and regional budgets, as well as targeted demand support in lower-income regions.
“Europe’s regions and cities have spoken with one voice: competitiveness and electrification by 2035 go hand in hand,” said María Chivite, President of the Navarre region in Spain, who drafted the opinion. Europe can only lead the transition, she argued, if regions receive “real financing”.
The Commission proposed the Automotive Package in December. It suggests a 90-percent-cut in tailpipe emissions from 2035, with the remaining 10 percent offset through low-carbon steel or e-fuels and biofuels. The CoR welcomed these temporary flexibilities but warned that they must not delay zero-emission mobility.
Brigitte Torloting, Chair of the Automotive Regions Alliance (ARA) and Vice-President of France’s Grand Est region, warned that time is short and “global competition will not wait for us”. She called for a strategy that protects automotive production in the regions, backed by strong European instruments such as “European preference.” Without a clear framework and targeted investment, she said, Europe risks losing its industrial base, from small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to major suppliers.
“European preference” is an approach first introduced in the Commission’s proposal for an Industrial Accelerator Act in March and is designed to prioritise EU-based manufacturing. The Commission suggests public procurement contracts and state-subsidised industrial projects to source a minimum percentage of materials or components from European producers. For EV production, the Commission proposed that 70% of components for new cars – excluding the battery – must originate within the EU.
CoR members also welcomed the “Made in the EU” approach to strenghten European production but insisted it must be proportionate, so that SMEs and regional supply chains are not buried in red tape.
With automotive production concentrated in specific territories, the opinion also calls for targeted cohesion funding, skills and quality jobs.
According to EU figures for 2024, the automotive industry contributed 7 percent of EU gross domestic product (GDP), about EUR 170 billion in exports and supported around 13.8 million jobs, 3.5 million of them in manufacturing. According to CoR figures, the 41 regions organised in the Automotive Regions Alliance (ARA) generate more than 40 percent of EU GDP.
This story was produced by the European Newsroom (enr) in cooperation with the European Committee of the Regions (CoR). The editorial responsibility lies with the enr.
Press contact:
Theresa Sostmann
Tel. +32475999415
On the night of March 20, 2024, unusually humid and mild in London, three people in their twenties pulled up at an industrial estate in the east of the city in a cherry-red Kia Picanto. They went inside, set fire to a warehouse, and filmed the blaze on a cellphone. The video of the flames consuming the premises ended up in the hands of another 20-year-old, Dylan Earl, who was reached via the Telegram messaging app by the Russian paramilitary organization Wagner, linked to the Kremlin, which had in turn recruited others to do the dirty work. One of the burned units contained humanitarian aid and Starlink satellite equipment destined for Ukraine. According to the British investigation, the three young men who lit the fuse did not know they were actually working for Russia.
© Jens Schlueter (Getty Images)
Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has used the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek and a wide-ranging interview with China’s Xinhua news agency to set out a closely connected vision of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy — combining deeper economic and technological cooperation with China with a broader commitment to multilateralism, Eurasian connectivity and reform of global institutions.
Speaking as leaders gathered in Bishkek for the 26th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and its SCO Plus format, Tokayev presented Kazakhstan as both a committed regional partner and an increasingly active “middle power” seeking to bridge geopolitical divisions.
His summit remarks were reinforced by an exclusive written interview with Xinhua, published on 1 September, in which the Kazakh leader described relations with China as being at an “unprecedentedly high level” and said Astana intended to continue strengthening what the two countries describe as an “eternal comprehensive strategic partnership”.
Taken together, the two interventions offer a clear picture of Kazakhstan’s current diplomatic strategy: maintain close relations with its major neighbours, promote trade routes linking Asia with Europe, embrace technological cooperation and at the same time argue for international relations based on dialogue rather than confrontation.
In his Xinhua interview, Tokayev stressed that Kazakhstan-China relations now extend well beyond traditional energy and commodity ties.
Cooperation encompasses trade, investment, transport, industrial production, agriculture, digitalisation, healthcare, science, education and culture, he said. China is now Kazakhstan’s largest foreign trading partner, while transport and logistics have assumed an increasingly strategic role.
Kazakhstan occupies a central geographical position between China and European markets, and Tokayev argued that the country was working with China to transform that location into a modern Eurasian transport and logistics network.
He specifically highlighted the Belt and Road Initiative, new railway construction, dry ports, logistics terminals and modernisation of border infrastructure.
Central to this strategy is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor, which links China with Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus and onward towards European markets.
Tokayev described making the route more competitive as a shared priority, pointing to “smart customs”, digital documentation, interconnected information systems and automated border procedures as necessary elements in reducing transit times.
That message closely reflected his position at the SCO summit, where Kazakhstan again offered to help develop transport initiatives throughout the organisation and called attention to the potential integration of the Belt and Road Initiative, Middle Corridor, North-South Corridor and routes connecting Central and South Asia.
For the European Union, which has increasingly sought alternative and resilient connections with Central Asia and China, the development of the Middle Corridor gives Kazakhstan an importance that extends considerably beyond the size of its domestic economy.
Tokayev also placed technology and artificial intelligence near the centre of the emerging Kazakhstan-China relationship.
China's position in AI, robotics, digital technology, new energy and advanced manufacturing complements Kazakhstan's own ambition to accelerate its digital transformation, he argued.
Kazakhstan has declared 2026 its Year of Digitalisation and Artificial Intelligence, and Tokayev referred to meetings with leading Chinese technology companies during his recent participation in the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai.
He said there was mutual interest in projects involving the digital economy, intelligent manufacturing, e-commerce, research and skills development.
The subject moved seamlessly from the bilateral interview into Tokayev's multilateral message in Bishkek.
Addressing the SCO Plus meeting, he warned that global stability increasingly depends upon the responsible development of artificial intelligence and called for universal rules capable of encouraging innovation while preventing uncontrolled use and narrowing the digital divide.
Kazakhstan is also establishing an Asia-Pacific digital solutions centre in Almaty under the auspices of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, which Tokayev said should help developing countries gain access to technological expertise.
In his Xinhua interview he went further, arguing that AI should ultimately serve humanity as a whole and that countries should have equitable access to technology, knowledge and computing resources. Kazakhstan was among the founding participants this year in a new international AI cooperation initiative launched in Shanghai.
Underlying both the interview and Tokayev's summit speech was a wider political argument.
The Kazakh president portrayed the SCO not simply as an economic or security grouping but as a potential model for cooperation between states with different political systems and interests.
In Bishkek, he said the organisation's principles of equality and consensus had become a “gold standard” for multilateral cooperation. He proposed that core SCO principles should ultimately be reflected in a UN General Assembly resolution linked to the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace.
The formulation is consistent with Kazakhstan's long-standing attempt to avoid being drawn exclusively into competing geopolitical camps.
Tokayev reiterated that Kazakhstan would maintain what he described as a balanced, constructive and peaceful foreign policy, while arguing that the international order should move away from the “cult of force and confrontation” towards collective responsibility and long-term cooperation.
In his interview with Xinhua, he similarly said Kazakhstan and China shared support for the central role of the United Nations, international law, mediation, multilateralism and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.
One of the more significant elements of Tokayev's Bishkek intervention was his argument that responsible middle powers should have greater influence within global governance.
With tensions between major powers putting pressure on existing international institutions, Tokayev suggested countries such as Kazakhstan could facilitate dialogue between competing centres of power and help develop collective solutions.
“Kazakhstan is ready to actively contribute to this process,” he told the summit.
At the same time, he resisted suggestions that shortcomings within the United Nations justified weakening the organisation.
Despite criticism of the UN, Tokayev said there was no viable alternative to it. Kazakhstan's position, he argued, was that the UN should remain at the centre of the international system and that its Charter should continue to provide the universal foundation of international law.
The President called for closer interaction between the UN and regional organisations such as the SCO, stronger preventive diplomacy and greater emphasis on peaceful settlement of disputes.
Tokayev also used the summit to promote another issue of growing importance to Central Asia: water.
Climate pressures, population growth and competing demands on shared water resources make the issue increasingly important to Kazakhstan and neighbouring states.
Tokayev proposed creating an International Water Organisation under UN auspices, arguing that although numerous UN bodies deal with water, no universal intergovernmental organisation currently has a comprehensive mandate.
He also proposed an SCO Water Problems Analysis Centre as a regional complement to such a global organisation.
The proposal fits into Kazakhstan's broader effort to move environmental and resource-security questions higher up the international agenda.
Perhaps the strongest thread connecting Tokayev's interview with his SCO appearance is Kazakhstan's determination to turn geography into diplomatic and economic influence.
Astana is simultaneously strengthening its relationship with Beijing, maintaining important relationships with Russia and other neighbours, developing transport corridors towards Europe, expanding cooperation with Western partners and presenting itself as an advocate of multilateral diplomacy.
Tokayev's description of relations with China therefore carries a wider meaning.
He quoted a Kazakh proverb in the Xinhua interview: “Those travelling the same road share a common destiny.”
Yet the message emerging from Bishkek suggests Kazakhstan sees that road not as one running exclusively eastwards towards China, but as part of a much larger network connecting East and West.
As competition between the world's major powers becomes more pronounced, Kazakhstan is attempting to position itself at the centre of those connections — geographically through trade and transport corridors, technologically through digital cooperation, and diplomatically through its advocacy of multilateralism.
For Europe, that makes developments in Kazakhstan-China relations increasingly relevant. The more successfully Kazakhstan develops the Middle Corridor and other east-west transport links, the more the country becomes not simply a Central Asian partner but a strategic gateway connecting European and Asian economies.
And that, ultimately, appears to be the common theme running through Tokayev's words both to Xinhua and to the leaders assembled at the SCO summit: Kazakhstan believes its future influence will come not from choosing between competing blocs, but from connecting them.
Thirty-five years after Kazakhstan closed one of the most notorious nuclear weapons testing grounds in history, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has used the anniversary to deliver a pointed message to the world’s nuclear powers: resume dialogue, strengthen arms control and ensure that nuclear testing never returns.
At a time when the international security order is under growing pressure and some of the agreements that helped contain nuclear rivalry after the Cold War have weakened, Kazakhstan is seeking to turn its own traumatic nuclear history into a renewed diplomatic argument for disarmament.
Marking the International Day against Nuclear Tests on 29 August, Tokayev called on nuclear-armed states to return to negotiations and urged the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, or CTBT.
“Our country’s position as one of the leaders of the global anti-nuclear movement remains unchanged,” Tokayev said, according to Kazakhstan's presidential administration.
He called for negotiations between nuclear powers and “decisive multilateral action to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons use”.
For Kazakhstan, the date carries significance far beyond diplomatic symbolism.
On 29 August 1991, the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in north-eastern Kazakhstan was closed. It had been the Soviet Union's principal nuclear weapons testing ground and the location of 456 nuclear tests between 1949 and 1989, including atmospheric and underground detonations.
The consequences extended far beyond the perimeter of the test site. The United Nations has estimated that nearly 1.5 million people were affected by nuclear testing, while extensive areas were contaminated by radiation.
That history gives Kazakhstan a distinctive voice in the international nuclear debate.
Tokayev described the closure of Semipalatinsk as a warning that should continue to resonate worldwide.
“Thirty-five years later, this date will serve as a reminder to all humanity of the tragic consequences of nuclear tests and as a call to prevent them from ever happening again,” he said.
Kazakhstan's argument is strengthened by another remarkable chapter of its post-Soviet history.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, Kazakhstan found itself with a huge nuclear weapons infrastructure on its territory. Rather than retain the capability, the newly independent country chose to relinquish the weapons and establish itself internationally as a non-nuclear state.
Tokayev described that decision as a deliberate choice in favour of peace and long-term security.
“By voluntarily renouncing the fourth-largest nuclear arsenal on the planet, Kazakhstan made a historic choice in favor of peace, security and sustainable development,” he said.
It has subsequently made nuclear non-proliferation one of the defining elements of its foreign policy.
Kazakhstan was also responsible for proposing the creation of the International Day against Nuclear Tests, an initiative unanimously supported by the UN General Assembly. The first international observance took place in 2010.
This history matters because Tokayev's appeal comes at an increasingly uncertain moment for nuclear arms control.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was opened for signature in 1996 with a simple but profound objective: to prohibit nuclear test explosions anywhere in the world.
Thirty years later, however, the treaty has still not formally entered into force.
The CTBT currently has 188 signatories and 179 ratifications, demonstrating overwhelming international support. But its provisions require ratification by a specified group of 44 states possessing nuclear technology when the treaty was negotiated before it can become legally binding.
Nine of those states have yet to ratify: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and the United States.
India, North Korea and Pakistan have not signed it.
Russia had ratified the treaty but revoked its ratification in November 2023. China and the United States signed it in 1996 but have never completed ratification.
The treaty nevertheless represents one of the more successful international norms of the post-Cold War period.
More than 2,000 nuclear tests were carried out during the five decades before the CTBT opened for signature. Since 1996, nuclear tests have occurred on only ten occasions, according to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, and North Korea is the only country to have conducted nuclear explosive tests during the 21st century.
Tokayev's warning is therefore also a defence of a system that has largely succeeded in suppressing nuclear testing — but whose legal foundations remain incomplete.
There is another important dimension to Kazakhstan's position.
Tokayev's opposition to nuclear weapons does not translate into opposition to nuclear technology.
On the contrary, Kazakhstan is now moving towards the development of civilian nuclear power. Tokayev emphasised that nuclear energy should be used for “exclusively peaceful and constructive purposes”, presenting civilian nuclear development as compatible with the country's anti-nuclear weapons philosophy.
Kazakhstan is already an important part of Europe's nuclear energy supply chain. According to the Euratom Supply Agency, Kazakhstan supplied 20.31% of the natural uranium delivered to EU utilities in 2025, making it the EU's second-largest source after Canada.
The connection became even more politically significant during Tokayev's visit to Brussels in June.
Following meetings with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 23 June 2026, the EU and Kazakhstan specifically identified energy security as an area for deeper strategic cooperation.
Their joint statement recognised Kazakhstan as an important supplier of oil and uranium to Europe and highlighted the potential for increased cooperation in both renewable energy and civil nuclear energy.
It is simultaneously one of the world's most prominent advocates of nuclear disarmament and one of the most important suppliers of the raw material on which civilian nuclear power depends.
Rather than regarding those positions as contradictory, Astana's policy is increasingly built around distinguishing sharply between the destructive and peaceful uses of atomic technology.
For the European Union, Tokayev's intervention is therefore not an abstract diplomatic message from a distant Central Asian state.
Kazakhstan has become increasingly significant to Europe's efforts to diversify energy supplies and strategic raw materials, particularly as Brussels attempts to reduce potentially dangerous dependencies.
During Tokayev's June visit to Brussels, European and Kazakh leaders agreed to deepen their strategic partnership in critical raw materials, transport, digitalisation and emerging technologies. They also reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
It shares a vast border with Russia and another with China, while simultaneously developing closer political and economic relationships with the European Union and maintaining partnerships with the United States and other Western countries.
That makes Astana one of a relatively small number of governments able to maintain meaningful dialogue across increasingly divided geopolitical blocs.
In an era when communication between major powers has become more difficult, that may make Kazakhstan's diplomatic role increasingly relevant.
The ruins of Semipalatinsk remain a stark physical reminder of what the nuclear arms race once meant.
Between 1949 and 1989, explosions equivalent collectively to thousands of Hiroshima-sized bombs were detonated at the site, according to UN documentation. Communities surrounding the testing ground were exposed to radioactive fallout whose health and environmental effects endured long after the final explosion.
Kazakhstan has sought to transform that legacy from one of victimhood into one of diplomacy.
Semipalatinsk's closure was followed by the relinquishment of nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan's participation in the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and its persistent advocacy of nuclear disarmament.
The political assumptions that allowed the world to move progressively away from nuclear testing after the Cold War cannot simply be taken for granted.
The CTBT is now 30 years old and still awaits entry into force. Relations between the major nuclear powers are deeply strained. Nuclear weapons have again assumed a conspicuous place in geopolitical confrontation.
Against that background, Kazakhstan's argument has an unusual moral force.
Few countries have experienced nuclear testing on the scale Kazakhstan did. Fewer still subsequently possessed nuclear weapons and voluntarily relinquished them.
Thirty-five years after the gates of Semipalatinsk were closed, Tokayev is effectively asking the world's nuclear powers to remember why they were closed in the first place.
The message from Astana is straightforward: nuclear deterrence may remain part of international politics, but nuclear testing does not have to be — and dialogue between nuclear powers is more essential when relations are deteriorating, not less.
For Europe, confronting war on its eastern frontier while simultaneously reconsidering energy security and strategic autonomy, that is a message worth hearing.
EU Reporter journalist Derya Soysal was among the members of the press given direct access to President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana after he cast his vote in Kazakhstan’s first elections to the newly established Kurultai — an opportunity that offered a rare first-hand insight into the President’s thinking on political reform, government, youth, artificial intelligence and the country’s future direction.
For a journalist covering the rapidly changing political landscape of Central Asia, there are moments when being in the room matters.
For EU Reporter journalist Derya Soysal (pictured with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev) Kazakhstan’s historic Kurultai election provided precisely such an opportunity.
After President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev cast his vote in the country’s first election to the newly established Kurultai, Soysal was among the journalists with privileged access to the President during the press briefing that followed.
It gave EU Reporter a first-hand opportunity to hear Tokayev address some of the most important questions facing Kazakhstan as the country enters a new political chapter.
The exchanges went far beyond election day itself.
Questions ranged from the consequences of constitutional reform and the creation of the Vice Presidency to the future composition of the government, the role of younger politicians and the increasingly important place of artificial intelligence in Kazakhstan’s economic and social development.
The result was a revealing picture of how Tokayev sees the next phase of his country’s transformation.
Tokayev himself described the election as a historic milestone and the beginning of a new stage in Kazakhstan’s development.
The establishment of the Kurultai forms part of a much broader restructuring of the country’s political institutions.
During the briefing, the President was questioned about what ordinary citizens should expect from the constitutional reforms, how the newly created Vice Presidency would operate and what role the Kazakhstan People’s Council would play.
Tokayev portrayed the changes as essential components of a renewed political system.
He stressed the importance of the Vice Presidency as an institution capable of supporting effective governance during difficult periods, while describing the Kazakhstan People’s Council as a mechanism intended to strengthen public participation and national cohesion.
But the President’s vision was not restricted to political architecture.
He also pointed to ambitious infrastructure and development programmes encompassing healthcare facilities, rehabilitation centres, urban modernisation and environmental projects.
Among the most politically sensitive questions put to Tokayev concerned his own future.
Could he stand again for President?
Following recent constitutional developments concerning his eligibility for a future presidential election, journalists pressed Tokayev on whether he intended to seek another term.
His response was deliberately cautious.
While acknowledging that the legal possibility exists, Tokayev rejected speculation about a future campaign as premature.
Instead, he argued that Kazakhstan should be concentrating on the immediate challenges of modernisation, economic growth, social development and stability in an increasingly unpredictable international environment.
It was a response that sought to move attention away from political succession and back towards the governing agenda.
Soysal’s access to the presidential briefing also provided an opportunity to hear Tokayev set out his expectations of the people who will serve in the new political institutions.
Asked what qualities Kurultai deputies should possess, the President emphasised responsibility and accountability.
Members, he said, should be judged by the quality of the legislation they adopt, whether they fulfil promises made to voters and whether the programmes they pursue genuinely contribute to Kazakhstan’s development.
A recurring theme throughout the briefing was generational change.
Tokayev again argued that Kazakhstan needs younger people to play a greater role in public life.
New faces and new thinking, he suggested, will be essential if the country is to maintain momentum in the years ahead.
The creation of the Kurultai also has consequences for the government.
Journalists therefore questioned Tokayev about the future administration and whether Kazakhstan should expect major personnel changes.
The President praised the work of the existing government but confirmed that changes would come.
At the same time, he cautioned against replacing officials simply to create the appearance of political renewal.
For Tokayev, modernisation appears to mean continuous institutional renewal rather than political theatre: bringing in new energy and expertise where necessary while retaining effective administration.
Another important exchange concerned political competition.
Asked whether the campaign had demonstrated genuine competition, Tokayev pointed to televised debates, public engagement and particularly strong interest among younger voters.
He characterised the electoral process as another milestone in Kazakhstan’s continuing political modernisation and said the campaign had brought new political voices and new ideas into public debate.
For an international audience, however, the question of political pluralism remains one of the key issues against which Kazakhstan’s reforms will ultimately be judged.
The significance of the new institutions will therefore depend not only upon their constitutional design, but on how independently and effectively they operate in practice.
Young people repeatedly returned to the centre of the discussion.
With a significant number of younger candidates participating in the electoral process, Tokayev was asked whether this generation could genuinely transform the country’s political system.
His answer was notable for combining optimism with a measure of realism.
He acknowledged that not every young official promoted into senior positions in recent years had been successful.
Nevertheless, Tokayev insisted that Kazakhstan must continue putting its confidence in younger generations.
For a country with a comparatively young population, he suggested, long-term success will depend heavily upon the responsibility, engagement and leadership of its youth.
Some of the most revealing exchanges witnessed by Soysal moved beyond constitutions and elections.
Tokayev was questioned about his repeated calls for greater civic responsibility, discipline, respect and public ethics.
The President argued that national modernisation cannot be measured solely in economic growth rates or institutional reforms.
It also requires changes in behaviour and public culture.
He connected those ideas with the Taza Kazakhstan initiative, explaining that cleanliness should be understood both literally and symbolically — encompassing respect for public spaces but also ideas of dignity, moral responsibility and civic consciousness.
Perhaps the most forward-looking discussion concerned Kazakhstan’s digital ambitions.
Artificial intelligence has become a central part of Tokayev’s political and economic agenda.
Asked to assess progress in digitalisation, the President argued that Kazakhstan had already completed an important first stage in constructing a digital state by making electronic public services widely accessible.
Citizens can now carry out administrative tasks from home that once required lengthy bureaucratic procedures.
But Tokayev made clear that he regards this as only the beginning.
The next challenge, he said, is to move artificial intelligence and digital technology beyond conferences, presentations and policy documents and turn them into instruments that deliver practical economic benefits.
He highlighted entrepreneurs, farmers and regional communities as groups that should increasingly be able to use technology to improve productivity and generate income.
His message was strikingly simple: the smartphone should no longer be regarded merely as an entertainment device but as an instrument of economic opportunity.
For EU Reporter, Soysal’s participation in the presidential briefing provided something increasingly valuable in international reporting: direct access to the political decision-maker at the centre of the story.
Rather than interpreting Tokayev’s position through official statements alone, she was able to witness at first hand how the President responded when confronted with questions about political succession, institutional change, government performance and the expectations of Kazakhstan’s younger generation.
Soysal’s access is particularly significant at a moment when Kazakhstan is seeking to redefine both its domestic political institutions and its place internationally.
The country occupies an increasingly important strategic position between Europe and Asia, while its economic, energy and diplomatic relationships with the European Union continue to develop.
Understanding the direction Kazakhstan takes therefore matters well beyond its own borders.
What emerged from the presidential exchange in Astana was not simply a discussion about one election.
It was a debate about what kind of Kazakhstan should emerge from the reforms now under way.
How much influence will the new institutions exercise?
Will younger politicians genuinely reshape public life?
Can artificial intelligence translate into economic opportunity outside Kazakhstan’s major cities?
And how far will political modernisation alter the relationship between the state and its citizens?
Those questions will not be answered by one election or one presidential press briefing.
But Derya Soysal’s privileged position inside that briefing gave EU Reporter readers a valuable first-hand view of how Kazakhstan’s President himself answers them.
As the first Kurultai begins its work, the importance of the election may ultimately be judged not by the symbolism of its creation, but by what Kazakhstan’s new political institutions actually deliver.
For the moment, however, one thing is clear: the country has entered a new phase, and the political conversation about what comes next has already begun.
Derya Soysal is an EU Reporter journalist covering European and international affairs. She attended President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s press briefing in Astana following his vote in Kazakhstan’s first Kurultai elections.
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