TEL AVIV — There is one country on earth where Donald Trump could plausibly win a national election, and he knows it. “I could run for Prime Minister,” he joked in May, claiming 99% approval here. No poll has ever shown that. But the joke landed because it is only half a joke. Thirteen days before […]
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By Marco CARNELOS
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Record debt, a paralysed trade-dispute architecture and the normalisation of sovereign-asset seizure as a policy tool means fragility is baked into the global economic system
Since 2022, a steady drumbeat of forecasts has warned that cascading military and political upheavals – war in Ukraine, conflict in the Middle East, an accelerating tariff war, the weaponisation of sanctions and the disruption of energy supplies – would eventually overwhelm the world economy’s capacity to absorb shocks.
The most destructive of those scenarios have not materialised, or at least not yet.
As the IMF’s managing director Kristalina Georgieva stated last year, while previewing the fund’s World Economic Outlook, the global economy “has generally withstood significant strains from various shocks”.
Although that resilience is real, on closer inspection, it is a more fragile and more contested achievement than it first appears.
The adaptive mechanisms behind this resilience are visible and measurable. Trade has rerouted rather than collapsed. Energy corridors have diversified. And reserve managers have spent the past three years quietly re-engineering the architecture of the international monetary system.
According to the World Gold Council’s 2026 Central Bank Gold Reserves survey – which drew responses from 76 institutions, its highest participation in nine years – 89 percent of central banks expect global gold holdings to keep rising over the next year, with a record share planning to add to their own reserves.
The result: gold has overtaken US Treasuries as the largest single component of global central bank reserves for the first time since the mid-1990s.
Mother of all ticking bombs
Analysts tracking the shift link it directly to a single event: reserve managers were unsettled by the seizure of the Central Bank of Russia’s reserves at the start of the Ukraine war by Washington and have since been actively reducing the dollar share of their portfolios.
This is a clear example that the economic system is not breaking under political pressure, it is adapting to it – flexibly, and crucially, without severing the interconnections that make global trade and finance function at all.
In other words, central banks accumulating gold are not exiting the system; they are just hedging within it.
But adaptability has a cost, and that cost is compounding.
Global debt – government, household, corporate and financial combined – surpassed $365 trillion in the first half of 2026, according to the Institute of International Finance’s Global Debt Monitor, the sixth consecutive quarterly record.
Emerging-market debt alone rose by $6.5 trillion in the same period, breaking past $110 trillion. Georgieva has been blunt about the trajectory: speaking at the IMF and World Bank annual meetings, she warned that global public debt is projected to reach 110 percent of the world’s GDP by 2029.
There is an evident reluctance to address what is not a crisis in any single country’s balance sheet, but a structural drift that every major economy appears aware of and none is prepared to correct unilaterally.
Debt of this scale narrows the fiscal space available to absorb the next shock, military or otherwise, which is precisely what makes today’s resilience difficult to extrapolate into tomorrow’s.
In this context, there is also the mother of all ticking bombs, a nuclear one: the $40 trillion US federal debt which US Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent is desperately trying to reign in.
The third strand, the onslaught of punitive political measures targeting market principles, is best illustrated by the fate of Russia’s frozen central bank reserves. Roughly $300bn in Russian sovereign assets have been immobilised globally since 2022, with some €210bn ($235bn) held within the European Union.
Erosion of neutrality
Rather than remaining in legal limbo, these reserves have become the financial engine of a specific policy outcome: the EU’s proposed €140bn ($157bn) “reparations loan” to Ukraine, structured so that Ukraine would repay it only once Russia itself pays war damages – effectively converting a sanctions freeze into a grant.
Russia’s central bank has responded by suing the Brussels-based depository Euroclear, which holds the bulk of the assets, calling the manoeuvre illegal.
Whatever one’s view of the underlying conflict, the precedent is the point economists increasingly raise: the first large-scale use of frozen sovereign reserves as collateral for a geopolitical objective changes the calculus for every reserve-holding state watching from outside the western bloc.
It is one more data pointing to the reinforcing of the gold-accumulation trend described above – and a vivid example of how political tools aimed at a single adversary can erode the perceived neutrality of the system itself.
A parallel erosion is under way in trade governance. The WTO’s Appellate Body (the one supposed to settle trade dispute among countries) has been non-functional since December 2019, after the United States blocked the appointment of new judges and talks on reviving or replacing it remain stuck.
More than 30 appeals currently sit unresolved, and the workaround mechanism created to fill the gap – the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement – has resolved only a single case. The institution designed to prevent trade disputes from becoming purely a function of relative power has been quietly sidelined for seven years.
It is then worth wondering – in such a situation – if the Global West and Global Rest see the same picture here.
The evidence suggests convergence on diagnosis but real divergence on meaning. Both recognise that debt is unsustainable and that institutions are strained. But where western policymakers tend to treat sanctions, frozen assets and trade paralysis as defensive responses to external aggression.
Voices from the Global Rest increasingly read the same tools as confirmation that the system was never as neutral as advertised.
India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar captured this gap memorably in 2022, telling European interlocutors that Europe needed to “grow out of the mindset” that its problems are everyone’s problems while the reverse does not hold.
Selective status
This is something many Global Rest governments had been thinking but not saying aloud: that the postwar order’s claim to universality was always, in practice, more selective than it appeared.
The more honest and outspoken western leader to recognise such an unfair situation, to use an understatement, was Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney earlier this year in Davos.
None of this means the system is about to fracture. The world economy has proven more elastic than feared, absorbing shocks that a decade ago might have triggered genuine crisis. But elasticity and durability are not the same thing.
The real test of this sort of “economy of resistance” is not whether it survives the next military-political storm – it plainly has, repeatedly.
It is whether record debt, a paralysed trade-dispute architecture, and the normalisation of sovereign-asset seizures as a policy tool are quietly converting what is in effect a short-term adaptability into long-term fragility, especially at a moment when the Global Rest and Global West can no longer agree on what the system is actually for.
Original article: www.middleeasteye.net
“Yemen did not want this war, but we are bringing the fire back to Saudi Arabia.”
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The Saudi kingdom is facing the danger of collapse from soaring war costs as Yemeni air strikes ramp up, hitting its northern neighbor’s capital and industrial centers with impunity.
Yemeni journalist Hussein al-Bukhaiti says the corruption and arrogance of the “House of Evil” is culminating in historic defeat. Its U.S. patron seems unable to avert the coming collapse.
Despite decades of the U.S. selling weapons worth hundreds of billions of dollars to the Saudi rulers, the regime seems shockingly exposed, with no viable defenses. Yemen’s missiles are striking Saudi Arabia at will. The panicky rulers are pleading with the United States and Europe for help.
Yemen’s armed forces are taking the war to Saudi Arabia, striking its airports, imposing a no-fly zone over the entire state and shutting down its vital oil industry.
“The Saudis cannot stop our drones and hypersonic missiles… we are taking the war to them,” says Sanaa-based Hussain al-Bukhaiti.
With no oil exports, Al-Bukhaiti reckons the Saudi rulers are facing an existential nemesis. Many observers have long predicted that the autocratic Saudi kingdom, created by the British Empire, is awaiting downfall from its ossified and family-run power structure.
Speaking from the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, Hussain al-Bukhaiti described the Saudi monarchy as “a house of glass” that is now being shattered by air strikes that cannot be defended against.
“Yemen did not want this war, but we are bringing the fire back to Saudi Arabia.”
Western politicians and media are portraying the conflict between the two Arab Peninsula countries as being caused by recent aggression from the Ansar Allah-led Yemeni government.
Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid international airport was attacked on October 10 with ballistic missiles that killed several people. Other Saudi airports have also been hit. This has led international airlines to suspend flights.
The state-owned Aramco oil industry has also been blasted with missiles. Fires are raging at major facilities, including at the main base of operations in Dammam on the Persian Gulf coast.
Following the missile strike on Riyadh airport at the weekend, U.S. President Donald Trump and all European leaders condemned an “act of terrorism” by Yemen.
Hussain al-Bukhaiti pointed out the gross hypocrisy of European governments not condemning the thousands of Saudi air strikes on Yemen that have occurred since 2015. These governments still remain silent about the ongoing Saudi atrocities against Yemeni civilians. The European Union even declares “solidarity” with Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi monarchy, led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, started the war with unprovoked attacks in March 2015. The aggression was enabled by the United States, Britain, and France supplying warplanes, bombs, and intelligence.
These Western powers continue to arm and direct the Saudi regime in its war against Yemen.
Since 2015, there have been thousands of Western-backed air strikes on Yemen, resulting in more than 20,000 mainly civilian deaths.
“They hit everything, schools, hospitals, water-treatment plants, farms, homes, wedding and funeral halls,” says Al-Bukhaiti.
In addition, over 400,000 Yemenis have died from starvation and diseases caused by a blockade on the country imposed by Saudi Arabia and its Western backers for over 10 years.
He says the war reignited in July 2026 after the Saudis broke a four-year truce signed in 2022 by bombing Sanaa international airport. There was no condemnation by Europe of the Saudi violation then.
What Yemen is doing to Saudi Arabia now is but a taste of what the House of Saud inflicted on Yemenis since 2015 with Western support.
The Yemenis this week rejected a reported Saudi proposal for a short-term truce because they see it as just a ploy by the Saudis for rearming and regrouping in a losing situation.
For the war to end, Saudi Arabia must respect Yemen’s sovereignty and stop interfering in its internal affairs.
However, Hussain al-Bukhaiti thinks that the United States will double down and escalate its military involvement in Yemen with a full-blown war. This is not primarily to support the Saudi monarchy, he believes, but rather to prop up the Israeli regime.
Yemen has inflicted huge damage on the Israeli state since it intensified the genocide against Palestinians in October 2023. Yemeni air strikes have repeatedly struck Tel Aviv despite American air defenses.
An expanded U.S. war in Yemen might seem surprising given that Trump has made such a mess of his reckless aggression against Iran and may not have the military forces at his disposal.
But Al-Bukhaiti believes the issue is beyond Trump’s choice. Washington is locked in with the Zionist regime and will do whatever it takes to salvage Israel from defeat. Yemen represents the biggest threat to Israel from the cutting off of its shipping in the Red Sea.
“We are ready for the war that is coming,” he warns.
Sacrifica ciò che è scomodo, mai il progetto. Il “pal-washing” in azione.
Un copione già noto
Il 9 ottobre 2026 il Comitato norvegese per il Nobel ha assegnato il Premio per la pace a Navanethem Pillay, giurista sudafricana di 85 anni, già giudice della Corte penale internazionale e Alta commissaria Onu per i diritti umani. La motivazione parla di una persona che ha aperto la strada a un ordine giuridico globale più completo. Il presidente del Comitato, Jorgen Watne Frydnes, ha aggiunto che il premio è un messaggio per chi attacca e mina il sistema internazionale e le sue istituzioni. Il verdetto è dichiaratamente politico, ed è su questo piano che va discusso.
La stessa figura che nel 2011 avrebbe «abbattuto» Gheddafi, spianando la strada al saccheggio del petrolio libico e alla schiavitù dei migranti africani, ora «abbatterebbe» Netanyahu, e preparerebbe così la riabilitazione di Israele. Il filo logico non sarebbe la morale né la pace, ma l’agenda dell’Open Society di George Soros: sacrificare i soggetti diventati scomodi, mai l’essenza del progetto. Qualcuno l’ha battezzata «pal-washing». La domanda di fondo è seria, perché chiede se dietro premi e giurisdizioni dell’ordine liberale ci sia una regolarità.
Occorre sottolineare che il copione è già noto. Vi ricordate quando Barack Obama ricevette il premio Nobel per la pace, inaugurando guerre su guerre? O vi ricordare i personaggi in cerca d’autore come Machado, Mohammadi, o i difensori dei criminali Ucraini? Ma andiamo per ordine.
Atto Primo: la Libia
Nel febbraio 2011 Pillay, Alta commissaria, chiese al Consiglio per i diritti umani un’azione vigorosa per fermare le violenze e chiamare i responsabili a risponderne; il Consiglio condannò le violazioni e istituì una commissione d’inchiesta. Il passaggio successivo toccò al Consiglio di sicurezza: il rinvio alla CPI con la risoluzione 1970, poi la 1973, approvata con dieci voti favorevoli e cinque astensioni (Brasile, Cina, Germania, India, Russia). Nessuno sostiene che Pillay abbia deciso la guerra. Conta la sequenza: il linguaggio dei diritti umani aprì la porta, quello della protezione dei civili autorizzò la forza, e l’operazione scivolò verso il cambio di regime. Già in aprile Lavrov accusava la NATO di eccedere il mandato, e un ministro francese ammetteva che il cambio di regime avrebbe richiesto un nuovo voto.
Poi i costi. Nel 2017 l’OIM documentò aste di migranti subsahariani nel sud della Libia, venduti per somme tra 200 e 500 dollari. Il nesso con il crollo dello Stato dopo il 2011 è la lettura più plausibile, benché la fonte documenti il fenomeno e non la sua causa. Il prezzo lo pagarono la Libia e i migranti; la cornice giuridica ne uscì, sul piano formale, intatta, anche se la controversia sul mandato avrebbe poi pesato sui veti di Mosca e Pechino in altri dossier.
Atto Secondo: Bibi
Il 21 novembre 2024 la Camera preliminare I della CPI emise mandati d’arresto per Netanyahu e per l’ex ministro della Difesa Gallant, per crimini di guerra e crimini contro l’umanità. Pillay aveva lasciato la Corte nel 2008, ma ha presieduto la Commissione d’inchiesta Onu che il 16 settembre 2025 ha concluso che Israele ha commesso genocidio a Gaza. Qui il «pal-washing» trova il suo meccanismo. Il diritto penale internazionale lavora su persone: un imputato, un’imputazione, un periodo. Se il caso si chiude con la sorte di un leader, si apre una cesura narrativa, il prima e il dopo di un uomo, dopo la quale lo Stato può presentarsi come reintegrato. La Libia offre l’analogia: là il caso si chiuse con la caduta di un uomo.
I limiti del percorso giocano a favore della lettura. La Corte non ha una polizia e l’esecuzione dei mandati dipende dagli Stati parte; la Commissione non è un tribunale e non parla a nome dell’intera Onu; lo stesso Comitato, riferisce AFP, ha detto che spetta a una corte stabilire se vi sia genocidio. Il premio non produce effetti giuridici, lo sappiamo, però produce legittimazione per un circuito che promette giustizia e non può garantirla.
Dobbiamo, poi, considerare che dinamiche del genere le abbiamo già viste più volte all’interno dell’ordine globalista che domina in Occidente. L’Open Society Foundations si presenta come il maggiore finanziatore privato al mondo di gruppi per giustizia, democrazia e diritti umani, attivo in oltre cento paesi, e Pillay ha ricevuto lo Stockholm Human Rights Award, lo stesso che nel 2011 è andato a Soros e a Neier. Sembra proprio che si ripeta di nuovo il pattern della agenda sorosiana, fatta di fondazioni, ONG, tribunali, commissioni e burocrazie che condividono un lessico e un orizzonte, quello di un ordine liberale da perfezionare e mai da rimettere in discussione. Chi opera dentro quel lessico può denunciare un governo, un leader, perfino uno Stato, ma non può contestare i presupposti dell’ordine che gli dà legittimità.
Alcuni obietteranno che la Commissione di Pillay attribuisce la responsabilità a Israele come Stato, non soltanto ai suoi leader, il che contraddice l’idea di un’operazione puramente personalizzante. Il secondo è la reazione. Netanyahu ha accusato il Comitato di aver perso la bussola morale, il Ministero degli Esteri israeliano ha parlato di una grottesca strumentalizzazione del premio, e Washington ha annunciato sanzioni contro la CPI poche ore dopo l’annuncio. Tutto vero. Ma avrebbe senso e valore se il sistema occidentale non fosse marcio fin dalle sue fondamenta, se il suo sistema giuridico funzionasse, ma così non è, sotto nessun aspetto (e abbiamo avuto già sufficienti dimostrazioni – non scordiamoci anche il caso Epstein).
Se nei prossimi dodici mesi la caduta politica di Netanyahu verrà presentata come chiusura del caso, anziché come una tappa di un procedimento che riguarda lo Stato, il «pal-washing» guadagnerà peso. Se i procedimenti proseguiranno oltre la sua persona, e se gli Stati parte eseguiranno i mandati, forse ne perderà. Allo stato delle prove la tesi è plausibile e, fino a smentita comprovata, questo è l’ennesimo Nobel della non-Pace, che non possiamo chiamare “guerra”.
In a major policy reversal of its pre-October 7 Apache drawdown plans, Israel has signed a deal with the United States to procure 12 Boeing AH-64E Apache Guardian helicopters.
The Israeli Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the deal on October 14, with deliveries expected in the early 2030s. Israel has not officially disclosed the deal’s value, but Israeli media reported it is expected to cost around US$ 1 billion.
Interestingly, the deal was announced nearly nine months after the US government approved the sale of up to 30 Apache helicopters to the Israeli Air Force (IAF) for an estimated USD 3.8 billion.
Israel has not disclosed if and when it will place the follow-on order for 18 more Apache attack helicopters, approved under the US government’s foreign military sale (FMS) program in February this year.
“The helicopters, scheduled for delivery at the beginning of the next decade, are of the Echo variant, the newest and most advanced model of the helicopter,” the Defense Ministry said.
According to the FMS agreement announced in February, the AH-64E will be delivered with mast-mounted Northrop Grumman AN/APG-78 Longbow fire-control radars and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) receivers.
This latest version adds a dedicated maritime strike capability and nearly doubles Apache’s stand-off range by increasing the range of the Northrop Grumman AN/APG-78 mast-mounted fire-control radar from 8 to 16 km.
The Apache AH-64E can fire the Lockheed Martin AGM-114 Hellfire II air-to-surface missile, the Rafael Spike Non-Line-Of-Sight (NLOS) missile, which will extend its stand-off firing range beyond 25 km, Stinger air-to-air missiles, Hydra rockets, and can rake targets two km away with 1200 rounds of 30mm milk-bottle-sized cannon ammunition.
The AH-64E models, equipped with advanced radar, sensors, and fire-control systems, can detect, identify, and engage targets at long range, including in adverse weather and poor visibility.
According to manufacturer Boeing, they also provide aircrews with significantly improved situational awareness compared with older models.
“The procurement of the Apache helicopters is a critical step in the IDF’s force buildup, one that will strengthen its operational capabilities against a wide range of threats and contribute to the security of the State of Israel in the years to come,” Defense Minister Israel Katz said.
Notably, the agreement was announced within a week after Israel missed the deadline to sign, and the US reportedly threatened Jerusalem that it would prioritize other foreign customers if Israel did not sign immediately.
Despite changing battlefield requirements, Apache attack helicopters remain in high demand, and nearly half a dozen countries have signed deals for over 150 new-build Apache AH-64Es in the last five years, including Poland, Saudi Arabia, India, and Morocco, with Boeing in advanced talks with countries like Kuwait, Egypt, and South Korea for the sale of these helicopters.
However, many experts question the rationale behind investing billions of dollars in expensive attack helicopters in the era of drone warfare, where they’re vulnerable to cheap, mass-produced FPV drones, shoulder-fired MANPADS, or even SHORAD (Short-Range Air Defense) missiles.
Interestingly, in the years leading up to the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks, the Israeli Air Force was itself planning to reduce its attack helicopter force, primarily AH-64 Apaches, including potentially closing one or more squadrons over rising maintenance costs.
Before the 2023 Hamas attacks, the IAF operated two Apache squadrons, the 13th “Hornet” and 190th “Magic Touch”. The 13th Hornet Squadron flies the AH-64D, and the 190th Magic Touch Squadron flies the AH-64A; both are based at Ramon Air Base in the Negev Desert.
A General Staff decision in the early 2020s called for shutting down one of the two Apache squadrons, which would have cut the attack-helicopter fleet by more than half.
The force cited aging platforms, with some IAF Apaches flying for over 35 years, high maintenance costs, and a broader doctrinal shift toward unmanned aerial platforms and drones.
However, following the Hamas attacks, the IAF not only reversed its decision to shut down one of the two Apache Squadrons, but also decided to expand its attack-helicopter fleet.
So, why did Israel reverse its policy on attack helicopters following the 2023 Hamas attacks?
The October 2023 Hamas terror attacks were one of the biggest security failures in Israeli history.
These security lapses and the failure to respond promptly prompted deep introspection and major defense policy reviews in Israel.
One of the major lessons for Israel was that Apache attack helicopters remain highly relevant and are often the most viable platform for responding to certain security contingencies.
In January 2024, Israeli media JNS reported that in light of the current and future threats to Israel and the lessons learned from the current war in Gaza, the Israeli Air Force is expected to grow dramatically and devise a new plan to procure four squadrons of advanced fighter jets, two squadrons of combat helicopters, and a refueling aircraft.
It also plans to procure two squadrons of advanced Apache helicopter gunships, it said.
“The delay in responding to Hamas’s attack in the initial hours of the war and the frequent use of close ground support during the fighting made it clear that a larger fleet of combat helicopters was needed. Therefore, it was decided to immediately initiate proceedings for the purchase of one Apache squadron, and subsequently also a second squadron,” it said.
Notably, since then, Israel has already ordered six Boeing KC-46A Pegasus tankers for US$ 2.4 billion and 25 F-15IAs for US$ 5.2 billion. Now, Israel has ordered 12 Apache AH-64E attack helicopters.
In 2025, Israeli news media platform YnetNews reported that the IAF has issued a new order, called “Thunder,” which details steps to be taken to deal with another large-scale infiltration attempt from Gaza.
“As part of the changes, minimum readiness levels for surprise infiltration scenarios have increased 2.5-fold, including attack helicopters, transport helicopters for moving forces, drones, and fighter jets,” it said.
The report noted the usefulness of attack helicopters in providing close air support to ground forces and in countering surprise, large-scale infiltration attempts.
Israeli business daily Calcalist reported that Apache AH-64E combat helicopters are intended to increase firepower and improve the Air Force’s response time to surprise attacks.
“October 7 sharpened our understanding that in many combat scenarios, attack helicopters still hold a distinct advantage over Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs),” a former senior Air Force official told Calcalist.
“There is a huge advantage in having a battalion commander on the ground able to speak directly with a pilot hovering over the combat zone to coordinate precise, high-intensity strikes, capabilities an RPA simply cannot match.”
Apache attack helicopters also proved their worth in the war in Gaza following the Hamas attack.
Israeli defense officials commended Apache’s performance in the October 7 Hamas attack and the war in Gaza, saying the line-of-sight advantage offered by the helicopters was essential for identifying attackers, striking swiftly, assisting ground forces, and thwarting early-morning abduction attempts.
Eitan Ben Eliyahu, a retired Maj. Gen. and former Commander of the Israeli Air Force said: “This is a lesson from the war in Gaza. After it appeared that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were pushing attack helicopters out, making them seem obsolete on the battlefield, the lesson learned during [the war] was different.” The last two years of war have shown that the Apaches “remain a vital necessity on the battlefield, particularly in urban warfare and commando operations.”
A report in The Jerusalem Post noted that senior Israeli defense officials said limited helicopter numbers, combined with the need to cycle aircraft through refueling and rearming, strained operations during prolonged, high-tempo fighting.
They said the experience reinforced the need for longer range, heavier payload, improved survivability, and better networking with forces on the ground.
Notably, newer AH-64E models support heavier fuel and weapons loads, improved durability, and a reduced acoustic signature, which can make the aircraft harder to detect by sound.
Additionally, the ability to control multiple drones from the helicopter offers pilots more options for reconnaissance and targeting while staying in the fight.
Commenting on the continued relevance of Apache combat helicopters in the era of drone warfare, Indian Air Force veteran Air Marshal Anil Chopra (retd) in a previous EurAsian Times article explained, “The main reason attack helicopters will not disappear is that they fill a niche that very few platforms can fill. They are the only 350 KMPH missile carriers that can hide behind trees, pop up, and literally shoot and scoot.”
“Apache helicopters are still the most survivable, efficient, and formidable flying anti-tank platforms available to militaries. They also have significant roles as anti-UAV and anti-attack helicopters,” Air Marshal Chopra added.
The October 2023 Hamas attacks, ironically, gave a new lease of life to Apache attack helicopters in the Israeli Air Force.
The post Israel Reverses U.S. Apache Drawdown in Post-October 7 Policy Shift, Signs Deal For 12 AH-64E Helos appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
The European Union has expressed serious concern over the Palestinian Authority’s decision to postpone legislative and presidential elections until September 2027, placing renewed pressure on President Mahmoud Abbas over democratic accountability and the future of Palestinian political institutions.
In a statement issued on 14th October, the EU said it regretted the postponement of legislative elections previously scheduled for 28th November 2026 and a presidential contest expected in early 2027.
The decision extends an electoral impasse that has lasted for nearly two decades. Palestinians last voted in legislative elections in 2006, while Abbas was elected president in January 2005.
The EU’s formal statement called for both contests to be organised as soon as conditions allow, stressing that credible elections are necessary for representative institutions and political accountability.
The intervention is particularly significant because the EU remains one of the Palestinian Authority’s most important financial supporters and has made institutional reform a central element of its approach to Palestinian state-building.
The postponement was announced through the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s executive structures following consultations over the conditions necessary to conduct voting in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Palestinian officials have cited restrictions imposed by Israel, continuing insecurity and difficulties involving election materials, observers and access to voting locations.
Israel has disputed the suggestion that it was responsible for preventing the elections from proceeding.
The practical difficulties are substantial. The Palestinian Authority exercises limited administrative control in parts of the West Bank, while Hamas has maintained de facto control over Gaza since 2007, despite subsequent changes in the territory’s security and governance arrangements.
Holding elections across geographically separated territories under different political and security conditions would require agreements extending well beyond the Palestinian Authority’s existing administrative powers.
Those obstacles do not, however, resolve the separate question of democratic legitimacy.
Abbas’s original presidential term expired in 2009, and subsequent extensions of his authority have not been confirmed through a new presidential election. The absence of regular legislative elections has similarly weakened the representative basis of Palestinian governance.
The latest postponement means that Palestinians must wait at least another year for an opportunity to choose their national political leadership.
For the European Union, the delay raises questions about the relationship between political reform and financial support.
In April 2025, the European Commission announced a proposed multiannual programme worth up to €1.6 billion for Palestinian recovery and institutional development between 2025 and 2027.
The programme includes approximately €620 million in direct financial support to the Palestinian Authority, alongside assistance for reconstruction, public services and economic recovery.
European officials have repeatedly stressed that part of this support is linked to implementation of agreed reforms, including improvements in public financial management, transparency and administrative accountability.
Those priorities were central to the Brussels donor discussions previously examined by EU Today, where international partners considered how a reformed Palestinian Authority might assume a greater role in Gaza’s future governance.
The election postponement adds a political dimension to those financial arrangements.
The EU’s statement did not announce any suspension of funding, nor did it specify that electoral delays would automatically trigger financial penalties.
Instead, Brussels emphasised that continued assistance to the Palestinian Authority must accompany progress towards institutional reform and the development of credible representative structures.
That distinction matters because European financial assistance also supports public services and civilian needs, which could be affected by reductions in funding unrelated to the conduct of elections.
The EU has consistently presented a functioning Palestinian administration as a necessary component of its support for a negotiated two-state settlement.
Its position depends on the existence of institutions capable of representing Palestinians, administering public services, exercising legitimate authority and negotiating internationally.
A prolonged absence of elections complicates that objective, particularly when Palestinian political factions remain divided over leadership and the future organisation of government.
The dispute also affects European discussions concerning Gaza’s reconstruction and its relationship with the West Bank.
Brussels has supported the eventual reunification of Palestinian governance under a reformed administration, but such arrangements face difficulties if the authority expected to assume responsibility lacks a renewed electoral mandate.
In its latest statement, the EU reiterated its willingness to support an eventual election process, including the deployment of an EU Election Observation Mission.
Such missions can provide independent assessments of electoral procedures, but their deployment depends on the necessary political arrangements, security conditions and access.
The European Union’s position now presents Abbas with a specific political demand: to establish conditions under which Palestinian voters can elect both a president and a legislature, rather than allowing temporary postponements to become a permanent substitute for elections.
For Brussels, the immediate question is how to pursue that demand while maintaining assistance to Palestinian institutions and civilians and supporting a diplomatic settlement.
The next test will be whether the Palestinian Authority produces a credible electoral timetable and the administrative arrangements needed to hold the postponed votes in September 2027.
As EurAsian Times reported yesterday, the Houthis claimed to have attacked a Saudi Arabian Eurofighter Typhoon using a surface-to-air missile. They claimed the fighter jet was at “risk of crashing.”
The Saudis, as expected, have not commented on the alleged strikes, but this is not the first time.
To begin with, if the Houthis claims are to be believed, this would be the second Eurofighter loss for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF).
The only previously confirmed RSAF Typhoon loss occurred on 13 September 2017, when the Eurofighter crashed into a mountain in Abyan province’s Al Wade’a district during a combat mission over Yemen.
The pilot, Lt. Col. Muhanna bin Saad Al-Baiz, was killed, and official reports attributed the incident to a technical failure.
This was the RSAF’s first official operational loss of a Eurofighter Typhoon.
Earlier, EurAsian Times was among the first to report on the loss of a Saudi F-15SA fighter jet.
The Houthis downed a Saudi Arabian F-15 on September 16, near Marib, using a locally-made surface-to-air missile.
“The Yemeni Armed Forces, with Allah’s aid and grace, succeeded in shooting down a Saudi F-15 fighter jet while it was carrying out hostile operations in support of its military mobilizations in the airspace of Marib province,” Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree announced in a post on social media.
The Houthis released images of their fighters posing with the aircraft wreckage. The downed jet was identified as the F-15SA Tail N.5539, operated by the 55th Squadron of the Royal Saudi Air Force.
There was no official response from the Saudi government — no acknowledgment, no denial.
Saudi Arabia has a long record of declining to confirm or deny Houthi claims.
In May 2015, Houthis claimed they shot down a Saudi fighter near Sanaa and shared images of wreckage. A Saudi official told CNN the government “would not comment on the claim.”
In January 2018, the Houthis claimed to have downed a Saudi Tornado over Saada and later released images of the wreckage. Saudi media reported that a Tornado on a combat mission had crashed for “technical reasons” and that both crew members were rescued.
The Saudi government did not accept the claims of a missile hit.
In March 2018, the Houthis released infrared footage they said showed a surface-to-air missile striking an F-15 over Saada. Spokesman Colonel Turki al-Maliki confirmed that a missile had been launched at an F-15 but said the aircraft “deal[t] with the source of fire and return[ed] safe to base.”
In February 2020, the Houthis claimed they shot down a Tornado jet over al-Jawf and released video of the engagement. RSAF had to confirm the loss as both pilots ejected and were captured by Houthi forces.
Overall, the silence limits the propaganda value of the Houthis and also protects the morale of the country and its security forces.
In the latest incident, it appears the RSAF Eurofighter may have landed, or even crashed, in Saudi territory, but there is no clear information. If there were any ejections, they would also have happened in Saudi territory. So, the Houthis can claim a hit, but they may never be able to prove anything.
Even in the case of the F-15 shootdown, Houthis were seen with the wreckage of the aircraft, but there was very little information on the two crew members on the aircraft: the pilot and the systems officer, who sits in the back seat.
EurAsian Times did a detailed analysis of the fate of the pilot, and it appears that, most likely, they were recovered by Saudi forces, giving no propaganda material to the Houthis.
The Eurofighter Typhoon forms a major element of the RSAF combat fleet. Saudi Arabia operates 72 of the twin-engine, multirole fighters, making it one of the largest Typhoon operators outside Europe.
The RSAF received all aircraft under the Project Salam program, and it bases them at King Fahd Air Base near Taif.
The RSAF assigns all Typhoons to the 2nd Aviation Wing at King Fahd Air Base (Taif), in the Hejaz mountains roughly 150 km southeast of Jeddah. The wing operates three squadrons: No. 3 Squadron, No. 10 Squadron, and No. 80 Squadron. Aircraft are generally configured as Typhoon F.2 (single-seat) and T.3 (twin-seat) or equivalent Tranche 2/3 standards.
The base’s location has made it a logical hub for operations near the Yemeni border.
The Typhoons complement the RSAF’s much larger F-15 family and the older Tornado fleet and have flown combat missions over Yemen since the Saudi-led intervention began in 2015, conducting close air support, interdiction, and strikes against Houthi targets. They have also participated in limited operations against ISIS targets in Syria.
Riyadh has been silent on Houthi shootdown claims, but it is quite vociferous on attacks on its critical infrastructure.
The Houthis have launched a sustained campaign of ballistic missile, cruise missile, and drone attacks against Saudi civilian airports and energy infrastructure.
The primary target of Houthi attacks was King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh.
According to spokesman Maj. Gen. Turki al-Malki, the airport was subjected to around 20 attacks between early October and mid-month, involving drones, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and other projectiles. These resulted in 17 deaths and more than 330 injuries at the airport alone.
Additional attacks hit Abha International Airport (near the Yemen border), King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, and facilities near Najran and Jazan.
Houthi spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree repeatedly claimed responsibility, warning airlines and travelers to avoid Saudi airports and airspace (except over Mecca and Medina) and declaring such sites legitimate targets in retaliation for Saudi operations in Yemen.
Houthis have also targeted Saudi energy assets. On or around 13–14 October, an attack struck an administrative building at Saudi Aramco’s headquarters complex in Dhahran. The Energy Ministry described it as causing a “limited fire” with no casualties.
Sources cited by Reuters and others reported extensive damage, with the fire spreading across multiple floors of an office tower and temporarily disrupting operations.
Earlier, Houthi attacks hit fuel tanks and related facilities at or near Riyadh airport, and reports cited smoke from an Aramco site south of the capital. The East-West pipeline (used to bypass the Strait of Hormuz) had previously been disrupted by drone attacks.
Saudi officials have openly acknowledged the attacks.
The General Authority of Civil Aviation provided casualty figures and the nationalities of those affected. Spokesman al-Malki detailed the scale of the damage against the Saudi civilian infrastructure.
Riyadh strongly condemned the targeting of civilians, airports, economic facilities, and even the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, reaffirming the right to self-defense and calling for international action.
The Cabinet, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, warned that the Houthis would face consequences for attacks on airports, infrastructure, and visitors, while praising the armed forces.
Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, speaking at the WPC Energy Congress in Riyadh, described the events as “serious” and said the Kingdom’s response “must be equally serious.”
Saudi state media, including the official news agency SPA and Saudi television, reported the attacks in detail. They released official statements, updated casualty figures, and showed footage of the strike on Riyadh airport and the damage that followed. Civil defense authorities also issued public alerts and announced when incoming missiles or drones had been intercepted.
This level of official transparency is noteworthy as it contrasts with periods when Saudi responses to cross-border strikes were more restrained in public communications.
The idea appears to be obvious: while Saudi Arabia is keen to deprive the Houthis of any PR or propaganda material, the Kingdom wants to highlight attacks on the country to justify its counteroffensive, even if disproportionate.
Even though the Houthis have denied targeting Mecca and Medina, Riyadh could rally support, especially from the Islamic world and Mecca pact allies, Pakistan and Turkey, to crush the Houthis.
The post Silent on Fighter Jet Losses, Open on Airport and Oil Strikes: Saudi Arabia’s Selective Response to Houthi Attacks appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
Dialogue Works | October 15, 2026
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By Muhammad Hamid ad-Din – New Eastern Outlook – October 15, 2026
The Gaza Ceasefire Is Falling Apart. And So Is the American Plan to Expand the Abraham Accords.
The Gaza Ceasefire That Is Killing Palestinians
The ceasefire in Gaza, which took effect on October 10, 2025, was supposed to stop a two-year war. By then, according to Palestinian authorities, more than 72,000 Palestinians had been killed. A year after the document was signed, the picture was no more peaceful. According to Palestinian sources, from the start of the ceasefire to October 5, 2026, Israeli forces killed 1,460 Palestinians and wounded 5,116. By September 2026, Gaza authorities reported 5,147 violations of the agreement, 1,421 dead, and the destruction of more than 201,000 buildings.
The second phase of negotiations—the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the enclave and the disarmament of Palestinian factions—stalled almost immediately. In April 2026, American-Egyptian talks in Cairo ended “without tangible progress.” Hamas links disarmament to the end of the occupation. Israel demands disarmament as a precondition for any further step. Critics say the demand for disarmament has become a pretext for maintaining control over the enclave and continuing violations. The Palestinian Foreign Ministry put it bluntly: the occupation government “does not view peace as a goal, but as an obstacle.”
Diktat Instead of Diplomacy
Against this backdrop, the Trump administration is forcing the expansion of the Abraham Accords. In May 2026, the U.S. president publicly demanded that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey join the accords. He called it “mandatory”: “After all the work done by the United States to put this complex puzzle together, it must be mandatory for all these countries to at least simultaneously sign the Abraham Accords.” Pakistan publicly refused. The others remained silent.
Washington’s main interest is Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said at the White House in November 2025: “We want to be part of the Abraham Accords. But we also want to be sure that we secure a clear path to a two-state solution.” Later, Riyadh repeated: normalization is impossible without a “credible, irreversible, and time-bound path” to a Palestinian state. The Israeli government rejects this prospect. American pressure goes beyond diplomacy: Trump tied the Abraham Accords to negotiations to end the war with Iran, effectively making normalization a condition for peace. According to Axios, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan were “caught by surprise.”
Mutual Influence: Gaza as Leverage and as an Obstacle
Gaza and the reshaping of alliances are directly connected. The Palestinian question became leverage in Arab states’ bargaining with Washington. For Saudi Arabia, normalization with Israel without movement toward a Palestinian state is politically toxic. Riyadh is using the fragile ceasefire to postpone an unpopular step. Qatar, a key mediator, took an equally tough position. Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesman Majid al-Ansari said: “If the Palestinian question remains unresolved, joining the Abraham Accords is impossible.” According to him, the absence of a peace process for Palestinians means the absence of stability in the region. Doha, which has given refuge to Hamas’s political leadership and plays a central role in the talks, cannot move toward normalization without losing face.
There is also a reverse dependency. The Trump administration, seeking to expand the Abraham Accords, pressured Israel to secure a ceasefire: normalization without a ceasefire would have been impossible. But the second phase depends on whether Washington is willing to pressure Israel, not just Arab capitals.
Bombs Instead of Peace
The result of U.S. and Israeli policy looks increasingly contradictory. Three years of war, more than 74,250 dead Palestinians, and 1,460 killed after the ceasefire was signed are not just a humanitarian catastrophe. They are a verdict on America’s strategy in the Middle East. Trump tried to push through the expansion of the Abraham Accords by linking unrelated issues: normalization with Israel, a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, and ending the war with Iran. In July 2026, he stated directly that a U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear agreement “will depend entirely on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords.” Saudi Arabia responded in May 2026: “There will be no normalization without a clear and final path to the creation of an independent Palestinian state.” As the custodian of the two holy mosques, the kingdom cannot afford to do otherwise. Qatar refused. Pakistan publicly rejected it. Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey remained silent.
Criticism of Washington goes far beyond diplomatic missteps. The U.S. continues to supply Israel with weapons despite ceasefire violations. In September 2026, the Trump administration proposed a $2.8 billion deal to sell Israel 40,000 heavy bombs, including 20,000 MK-84s and 20,000 BLU-117s. Senator Chris Van Hollen vowed to block the transfer: “Trump is sending $2.8 billion worth of bombs, paid for by you, the American taxpayers, to a government led by a wanted war criminal.” Congressman Gregory Meeks, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, also vetoed it: “The Trump administration has not provided sufficient assurances that these weapons will be used in accordance with American and international law. Therefore, I will not approve this sale.” Amnesty International urged Congress to block the deliveries, saying the U.S. risks becoming complicit in serious violations of international law, including genocide. New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani accused Washington of “complicity with every arms shipment” to Tel Aviv.
What Next: The Results of U.S. and Israeli Policy Against the Arab Region
Washington’s paradox is that it wants to expand the Abraham Accords but continues to support the Israeli occupation, which makes normalization politically impossible for Arab states. The U.S. has blocked UN Security Council ceasefire resolutions for the third time in a row, undermining its role as a “reliable mediator.” Public opinion in the Arab world is sharply opposed to normalization. Polls show that 89% of Moroccans oppose recognizing Israel. Analysts warn that for most of the named states, the political price of signing the accords will be prohibitive. The war in Gaza has strengthened this sentiment, not weakened it.
The main question is whether the ceasefire will hold. If the second phase of negotiations does not start and the death toll continues to rise, expansion of the Abraham Accords will remain an unattainable dream. Saudi Arabia will wait. Qatar will mediate. The UAE will increase oil production. Trump will face a choice: keep pressuring Arab capitals or admit that without a real Palestinian state, the accords will remain a facade. While Washington supplies bombs and Tel Aviv keeps killing, talk of peace looks like a cynical game in which Palestinians are not subjects but a bargaining chip.
Muhammad Hamid ad-Din is a well-known Palestinian journalist.
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Yemen’s Houthis (Ansar Allah) tightened their offensive around Taiz over the past week, as they escalated their strikes on Saudi Arabia.
On October 8, the Houthis claimed missile attacks targeting King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh. Saudi aviation authorities said three Saudi citizens were killed, and an aircraft was damaged. The attacks disrupted international flights and prompted a response from the Saudi-led coalition. Explosions were also reported in Sanaa the following day, with Houthi media reporting six people wounded.
The attacks escalated on October 10, when a missile struck Riyadh airport, killing 12 people and injuring more than 300. Another projectile hit a passenger terminal on October 11, killing a Pakistani national and wounding 11. The repeated strikes severely disrupted air travel and exposed vulnerabilities in Saudi Arabia’s air defenses.
On the ground, Houthi forces reported capturing al-Misrakh district and positions in Jabal Habashi in Taiz on October 11. The following day, Houthi media showed operations around the Birin Triangle and Yafrus junction. The advances formed part of a wider push to encircle Taiz, Yemen’s third-largest city, after the Houthis captured Turbah earlier in the month.
Also on October 12, Houthi military media released footage from al-Faliha in Marib showing artillery and missile strikes against Saudi-backed troops, with several military vehicles burning. The group said its forces had repelled a government offensive.
On October 13, the Saudi-led coalition struck fuel facilities in Sanaa and storage infrastructure around Ras Isa and elsewhere in Hodeidah and Dhamar, saying the sites supported Houthi missile and drone operations. Hours later, a Houthi ballistic missile struck the Saudi Aramco headquarters in Dhahran, causing a fire. Saudi authorities reported no casualties.
Houthi media also reported clearing al-Sharjan, al-Ka’ala, Harazu and al-Khabakhib in western Lahij, potentially putting additional pressure on Saudi-backed forces near Bab al-Mandab.
On October 14, the group released footage it said showed fighters driving Saudi-backed troops from Dhubab Airport in Taiz, capturing personnel and seizing military vehicles. Houthi forces also reported capturing al-Hangar checkpoint and clearing positions in Anbian and Wateer, further tightening pressure around Taiz.
The very next day, October 15, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said that a surface-to-air missile had directly hit a Saudi Eurofighter Typhoon over Saada province in northern Yemen.
All in all, the Houthis have escalated on all fronts in recent weeks, tightening their siege of Taiz, pushing Saudi-backed forces away from Bab al-Mandab, and stepping up strikes on Saudi Arabia. The kingdom and its allies are yet to respond in any meaningful way in the face of this escalation, and despite their repeated military failures, they are yet to seek a real diplomatic solution.
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The post Houthis Escalate On All Fronts appeared first on South Front.
By Harrison Berger – Responsible Statecraft – October 13, 2026
In August, the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) publicly took credit for shaping “multiple provisions” now in this year’s defense policy bill, stating that many were “impacted by prior JINSA policy recommendations,” including “proposals to strengthen U.S.-Israel defense industrial base integration” and “renew pre-existing joint U.S.-Israel programs.”
Among the provisions JINSA takes credit for is the controversial Section 219. In the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), this section mandates the creation of a single executive agent tasked with “synchronizing cooperative efforts” between the U.S. and Israel across nine basket categories, including AI, quantum technology, biotechnology, and virtually every category of weapons.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has argued that such provisions would transition the U.S.-Israel security relationship from aid to partnership. But pro-Israel advocates have emphasized the leverage it would provide over Washington’s military policy.
Mark Dubowitz, the CEO of the pro-Israel Foundation for Defense of Democracies, appeared to reference this provision in an article arguing that the U.S. and Israel must “deepen their military, technological, intelligence and economic integration to such an extent that inflicting financial harm on Israel would also carry a significant cost for Washington.”
Other initiatives JINSA has advocated for likewise read like an Israeli government wishlist. They include a pending provision to “extend the existing War Reserve Stockpile Authority for Israel,” which provides a secretive and high-speed pathway for funneling weapons to Israel, as well as Abraham Accords provisions including “Improvements to Air and Missile Defense Acquisition” and a “United States-Abraham Accords Defense Cooperation Initiative.”
The policy wins JINSA is trumpeting are a result of its strong foothold within the military-industrial complex, and are perhaps one of the most overlooked aspects of the pro-Israel lobby. The group says it achieves these goals “by conducting both educational programs that build ties among American, Israeli and other Middle Eastern partner military leaders, along with in-depth research and actionable recommendations to influence U.S. policy.” JINSA’s “Our People” webpage includes a long roster of retired U.S. military officials.
One of JINSA’s most important programs, which has existed for more than four decades, is its “Generals and Admirals Program.” The initiative involves flying recently retired U.S. military officials to Israel. Many of the trip’s participants were already sitting on defense-industry boards when they went, while others joined soon afterward. At least 55 of the 83 alumni from the 2019–2026 G&A program cohorts (about 66%) have held or currently hold positions in the defense industry spanning board seats, executive jobs or advisory roles at defense contractors and defense-tech firms, or posts at defense-focused investment funds, consultancies and lobbying shops.
JINSA hopes that, when these former military officials return from Israel, they will use their credentials and defense industry power to become Israel’s advocates.
JINSA describes the program, founded in 1981, as “designed to ensure that the delegation is well briefed on the security concerns of Israel, as well as the key role Israel plays as a friend and ally of the United States.” The Helmsley Charitable Trust, which provided a 13 month grant for the program in 2017 worth $237,846, similarly says the purpose of the program is in part for participants to “return home to share publicly what they learned.”
The itinerary for the Generals and Admirals program includes meetings with Israel’s prime minister, defense minister, IDF chief of staff and the Director of Mossad. According to JINSA, after completing the program, “participants often engage on important policy initiatives through JINSA’s Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy that strengthen…the U.S.-Israel security relationship.” JINSA CEO Michael Makovsky highlighted the program’s influence in 2014, calling U.S. generals and admirals “America’s most admired leaders, who remain very influential even after retirement.”
The JINSA program trains retired military leaders, many of whom go on to work in the defense industry, to be advocates for Israeli interests, both in their public writing and in their work behind the scenes.
A 2023 Quincy Institute report found that 80% of four-star officers who retired between June 2018 and July 2023 went on to work for the defense industry. Of the 32 officers tracked in the report, nine appear on JINSA’s participant lists, and seven of those nine retired officers hold industry lobbying or defense-tech roles. Gen. Joseph Dunford, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joined Lockheed Martin’s board five months after leaving the military and went on JINSA’s Israel junket the following year, 2021. Adm. Michael S. Rogers, the former NSA director and head of U.S. Cyber Command, retired in 2018, became a senior adviser at the lobbying and public relations firm Brunswick Group in 2019 and went on the JINSA trip in 2021.
Gen. Hawk Carlisle participated in the 2019 delegation while serving as president and CEO of the National Defense Industrial Association, the war lobby’s leading trade group, and has served on the board of the U.S. subsidiary of Israel’s largest defense contractor, Elbit Systems of America, which was renamed Twenty-Six Defense in September. Some participants, such as retired Gen. Robert Magnus and Gen. Duncan McNabb, joined the board of Elbit America after their JINSA trips.
Embedded within the highest levels of the most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill, JINSA’s roster of retired generals and admirals often use their credentials to advocate for pro-Israel policy in Washington.
In 2010, when then-head of U.S. Central Command Gen. David Petraeus testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Israel-Palestine conflict “foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel,” which is used to “mobilize support” for various militant groups in the region, JINSA’s G&A participants rushed to Israel’s defense. Responding to Petraeus, 30 ex-military leaders associated with the program put out an ad claiming that “a strong, secure Israel is an asset,” labeling the country, which has been deemed an apartheid state by numerous human rights groups, as “a democracy” that “shares our commitment to freedom, personal liberty and rule of law.”
In May 2018, a JINSA task force of retired senior officers chaired by Adm. James Stavridis released “Atlas Supported,” urging Washington to elevate Israel to “a top-tier ally” and invest jointly in next-generation military technology — the latter now a central purpose of Section 219. JINSA says the report was also the first to recommend moving Israel from the U.S. European Command to U.S. Central Command, which Trump then ordered on January 15, 2021. JINSA celebrated the fifth anniversary of Israel’s shift into CENTCOM this January by noting that the “Wall Street Journal recognized” it as “the only organization promoting this move,” and by featuring glowing tributes from JINSA G&A participants.
JINSA’s roster of retired military officials was once again mobilized in October 2026 to deny the findings of a trifecta of human rights groups and the U.N. that Israel committed a genocide in Gaza, praising what it called a “pattern of law-abiding IDF conduct in Gaza.”
JINSA’s delegates routinely appear on cable news, often without disclosures of their affiliation with the pro-Israel lobby group: Gen. Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie, who commanded CENTCOM from 2019 to 2022 and traveled with JINSA’s 2023 delegation, and became a “distinguished fellow” at JINSA in 2024, is now a CBS News contributor. In July, McKenzie appeared on Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan, who introduced McKenzie as a retired CENTCOM commander but omitted his fellowship with JINSA. In that appearance, McKenzie recommended Washington consider seizing Kharg Island. Ret. Vice Admiral Robert Harward, a member of JINSA’s “Iran Policy Project,” frequently appears on Fox News too, though his affiliation is generally disclosed.
One of the group’s most consequential efforts was to push the Trump administration to start a war with Iran, with a group of JINSA-aligned military leaders writing a March 2025 letter arguing that “U.S. support for Israeli action to prevent a nuclear Iran should be a top priority,” adding that “time is running out to stop its march to the bomb.” Sixty-six of the 79 signers of that letter appear on JINSA’s Generals and Admirals participant lists. Members of JINSA’s roster of retired military officials subsequently wrote open letters of support for the 12-Day War and the current months-long Iran War.
Harrison Berger is an independent journalist who has contributed to Drop Site News, The American Conservative, and The Nation. Previously, he was a researcher and producer for System Update with Glenn Greenwald. His work focuses on civil liberties and U.S. foreign policy. He holds a BA in Political Science and Russian Studies from Union College (NY).
One of Israel’s Leading Think Tanks Put Out a Disturbing “National Security” Doctrine
By Justin K.P. | The Dissident | October 14, 2026
Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, one of it’s leading think tanks, put out a psychotic paper written by Tamir Hayman, the former IDF chief of intelligence from 2018 to 2021, which outlined Israel’s current “national security concept”.
Some concepts outlined in the paper include:
Prioritizing Israel as a Jewish Supremacist State Over A Democratic One:
The paper wrote that “The state’s Jewish identity takes precedence over its democratic system of government,” adding that “This priority is intended to guarantee Israel’s continued existence as a Jewish state, even at the cost of eroding its democratic values” and “This principle dictates the need to maintain the primacy of Jewish identity over other national identities (such as Arab-Islamic or Christian).”
Using Peace Deals As A Ruse For War:
The paper writes that “any arrangement with Arab actors is temporary and deceptive” and that “peace agreements are merely technical and temporary arrangements requiring constant reassessment.”
Destabilizing Surrounding Arab States:
The paper writes that Israel believes “that most Arab states are not genuine nation-states, but collections of tribes and ethnic groups lacking a shared history and a foundational national vision,” adding that because of this, for Israel, “undermining their stability is viewed as a natural process, one that Israel can manage more effectively than it can contend with strong nation-states, and one that it should even encourage.”
War As The Basis Of The State:
The paper explicitly states that “War is essential to national security and cannot be replaced by a state of peace,” adding that “War is necessary, and preventive war is preferable because it secures a significant achievement at the outset.”
Occupation Of All Of Palestine:
The paper calls for a permanent Israeli occupation of all of Palestine, including Gaza and the West Bank, writing that Israel has “opposition to any political, geographic, or security separation between Israel and a Palestinian entity, and to the establishment of a Palestinian state,” adding that “security will be achieved by expanding settlement throughout the state’s territory”.
Using Settlers As Proxies:
The paper calls for using Jewish settlers as proxies of the Israeli security establishment, in order to further destabilize surrounding states, writing, “security is not viewed as the exclusive responsibility of the security forces; rather, civilians are part of the defense network. Defense is established by creating communities and outposts in all areas of friction with the Arab population, in Judea and Samaria (West Bank), and in security zones in Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip,” adding that increased Jewish settlements “further contribute to the destabilization of the ‘synthetic’ Arab states.”
Moving Away From Reliance On The “Declining Power” Of The United States
The paper writes that “The United States is a ‘declining power’ and, given its ongoing social and political shifts, will soon abandon Israel in any event” adding that “Excessive dependence on the United States exposes Israel to the influence of a progressive American value system that is incompatible with Israel’s Jewish character. Severing ties with the United States is therefore not only inevitable, but essential to Israel’s independence and the resilience of its Jewish national identity.”
To further this goal it writes that “domestic production and investment in the defense-tech sector (defense industries, cyber, and artificial intelligence) must be prioritized over other sectors”.
Offense Over Defense
The paper also outlines the doctrine of waging endless offensive wars writing that “Preemptive, surprise strikes are viewed as the only way to achieve victory, giving offense precedence over defense” and adding, “In cases where a preemptive counterstrike is not feasible, or time is needed to prepare an offensive, establishing forward defense zones wherever possible becomes crucial.”
Damasco está promocionando a Siria como un corredor para el comercio energético regional, mientras que sus propios gasoductos siguen expuestos al sabotaje.
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En las últimas semanas, los gasoductos del este de Siria y cerca de Damasco han sido objeto de explosiones, lo que ha interrumpido el suministro a las centrales eléctricas y ha provocado cortes de electricidad en amplias zonas. Dos ataques contra tramos identificados como el gasoducto de Jbessa se calificaron oficialmente de sabotaje.
Una explosión independiente en la planta de Tishreen sigue siendo objeto de investigación. El momento en que se han producido estos incidentes ha llamado la atención, ya que Siria está negociando su papel en las rutas que transportan petróleo iraquí y gas regional hacia el Mediterráneo y más allá. Incluso un ataque limitado contra un gasoducto puede retrasar las reparaciones, reducir la generación de electricidad y desestabilizar a los inversores que están sopesando proyectos que costarán miles de millones.
La cuestión es quién sale beneficiado de mantener vulnerable la red energética de Siria y en qué medida las pruebas disponibles pueden revelarnos información sobre los autores.
El gasoducto de Jbessa y la explosión de Tishreen
El primer incidente confirmado tuvo lugar el 18 de agosto, cuando una explosión interrumpió el bombeo a través del gasoducto de exportación desde la planta de gas de Jbessa, situada en la zona rural de Hasaka, al noreste de Siria. La Compañía Siria de Petróleo afirmó que su investigación preliminar había concluido que se trataba de un sabotaje deliberado.
El gasoducto abastece a una región que alberga gran parte de la infraestructura de petróleo y gas de Siria, y la interrupción afectó al suministro de gas a las turbinas eléctricas. Los equipos aislaron los pozos, cerraron las válvulas de seguridad y comenzaron las reparaciones. No se registraron heridos. Ese primer ataque demostró cómo un golpe contra una sola válvula podía tener repercusiones mucho más allá del propio emplazamiento, y cómo los usuarios de electricidad de otros lugares acababan sufriendo las consecuencias.
El 28 de septiembre, el gasoducto de Jbessa fue atacado cerca de Al-Shula, en la zona rural de Deir Ezzor. Una explosión en una válvula seccional provocó un incendio y volvió a interrumpir el flujo de gas desde Jbessa hacia las centrales eléctricas.
El ministro de Energía, Mohammad al-Bashir, declaró posteriormente que se habían utilizado explosivos. En esta ocasión, los equipos de reparación tuvieron que sustituir un tramo de 18 metros de tubería de 16 pulgadas. La empresa anunció el 2 de octubre que se había reanudado el bombeo una vez finalizados los trabajos.
Según su director de gas terrestre, el gasoducto transportaba unos 950 000 metros cúbicos al día. Por lo tanto, los repetidos ataques contra él han afectado a una parte significativa del suministro de gas del que depende la generación de energía eléctrica en Siria.
El gasoducto de Jbessa abastece a la red de gas a través de la región central, incluida la zona en torno a Al-Furqlus, al este de Homs. Esto reviste especial importancia en un momento en el que Damasco está tratando de reparar la infraestructura existente y construir nuevas conexiones transfronterizas.
La ruta petrolera iraquí propuesta hasta Baniyas, en la costa, es un proyecto independiente, y no hay pruebas de que los ataques contra Jbessa tuvieran como objetivo directo ese futuro oleoducto. No obstante, los daños causados a las instalaciones energéticas en funcionamiento suponen una advertencia evidente para los gobiernos y las empresas que barajan la posibilidad de crear un sistema de tránsito mucho más amplio a través del territorio sirio. Necesitarían tener la seguridad de que los largos tramos de tuberías, los equipos de bombeo y los trabajadores encargados de su mantenimiento podrían estar protegidos.
El 30 de septiembre se produjeron otros dos incidentes violentos. En el puente de Masyaf, al oeste de Homs, hombres armados no identificados abrieron fuego contra un autobús que transportaba a trabajadores civiles, matando a siete e hiriendo a cuatro. Los informes iniciales de la SANA se referían a trabajadores civiles, mientras que los medios regionales los identificaron como ingenieros y empleados de una empresa eléctrica privada. El ataque se produjo dos días después del sabotaje de Shula, pero ninguna investigación ha establecido un vínculo entre ambos incidentes.
Esa misma noche, una explosión en un gasoducto que abastecía a la central térmica de Tishreen, en las afueras de Damasco, obligó a dejar fuera de servicio las centrales de Tishreen, Deir Ali y Al-Nasiriyah, lo que provocó cortes de electricidad más generalizados. Los bomberos lograron controlar el incendio y las autoridades comenzaron a restablecer el suministro de gas.
A diferencia de los dos incidentes de Jbessa, la causa aún no se había esclarecido cuando el ministro de Energía, Bashir, se pronunció en el lugar de los hechos. Afirmó que los inspectores determinarían si la explosión se había debido a un fallo técnico, a un ataque o a un acto de sabotaje una vez que la zona se hubiera enfriado.
¿Quién se beneficia de una Siria debilitada?
El Gobierno sirio no ha señalado a ningún responsable del sabotaje al gasoducto. El periodista y analista político Bassel al-Mohammed, en declaraciones a The Cradle, sostiene que los repetidos ataques contra las principales instalaciones de gas son difíciles de considerar como incidentes aislados.
Su efecto, afirma, va más allá del daño físico a una válvula o a un tramo de tubería. Cada interrupción refuerza la impresión de que Siria es un lugar inseguro para la inversión en infraestructuras energéticas, precisamente cuando Damasco busca socios para rehabilitar el sector y conectarlo con los Estados vecinos.
Para Mohammed, Israel se encuentra entre los posibles beneficiarios más destacados de la debilidad económica y de seguridad de Siria. Un Estado sirio que lucha por reconstruir su infraestructura tendría menos margen para resistir la presión en cualquier futuro acuerdo político o de seguridad, afirma.
También señala el papel que Siria podría desempeñar en el Gasoducto Árabe, que conecta la frontera jordana con la turca a través del territorio sirio, en el marco de la búsqueda de rutas menos expuestas a interrupciones en el estrecho de Ormuz.
La distribución de los incidentes, incluidos los daños en los alrededores de Tishreen, le lleva a plantearse si un grupo con conocimiento de las instalaciones críticas está operando en más de una zona.
El 29 de septiembre, entre los incidentes de Shula y Tishreen, la Compañía Petrolera Siria inauguró un nuevo tramo del proyecto del Gasoducto Árabe en Al-Furqlus. Las autoridades indicaron que el tramo completado añade 186 kilómetros a los aproximadamente 380 kilómetros de la línea existente, lo que eleva la red conectada a unos 566 kilómetros, con una capacidad declarada de hasta 11 millones de metros cúbicos de gas al día.
El diseño bidireccional da a Damasco margen para negociar los futuros flujos de gas. Por el momento, una ruta hacia Europa sigue siendo una posibilidad, aunque aún no se han formalizado los acuerdos de suministro y tránsito necesarios para que funcione.
Si estas conexiones llegaran a transportar más gas hacia el norte, podrían competir con algunos planes para ampliar las ventas de gas israelí procedentes de los yacimientos del Mediterráneo Oriental, incluidos Leviathan y Tamar. El grado de competencia dependería de los contratos de suministro, los precios y la capacidad que realmente se pusiera en servicio. No puede darse por sentado solo por la existencia de un gasoducto.
Aun así, Mohammed considera que a Israel le interesa estratégicamente limitar la capacidad de Siria para convertirse en un corredor fiable, especialmente mientras Damasco siga expuesto a la presión militar israelí en el sur.
Rutas energéticas y cálculos israelíes
La rivalidad en torno a Siria también se inscribe en una contienda más amplia por las rutas de transporte de petróleo y gas desde Irak y el Golfo. Los planes turcos de exportación a través de Ceyhan y las esperanzas sirias de reabrir una salida al Mediterráneo ofrecerían a los productores alternativas al estrecho de Ormuz.
Varias de estas rutas son propuestas o planes de rehabilitación, más que sustitutos viables de las terminales establecidas del Golfo. Sus perspectivas dependen de la financiación, la seguridad, los estudios técnicos y los acuerdos entre los gobiernos implicados. Considerar todas las rutas como si ya existieran exageraría tanto la influencia actual de Siria como la amenaza inmediata que suponen para los centros de tránsito rivales.
En febrero, The Cradle rastreó el posible origen israelí de parte del gas suministrado a Siria a través de Jordania, al tiempo que señalaba la opacidad de los contratos y la dificultad de determinar la fuente exacta de cada envío. Posteriormente, el Centro Begin-Sadat analizó cómo el gas israelí llegaba a Siria de forma indirecta a través de acuerdos regionales.
Una red de suministro más diversificada podría debilitar esa dependencia, pero la afirmación de que las nuevas líneas de tránsito harían que Damasco y Amán prescindieran por completo del gas israelí va más allá de lo que establecen los contratos disponibles.
Siria e Irak firmaron en julio memorandos sobre la rehabilitación del oleoducto Kirkuk-Baniyas, inactivo desde hace mucho tiempo. El director de la Compañía Petrolera Siria, Youssef Qiblawi, ha abordado la posibilidad de que las obras comiencen en el primer trimestre de 2027.
La ruta proporcionaría al crudo iraquí una salida al Mediterráneo, aunque aún se enfrenta a importantes obstáculos de ingeniería, financiación y seguridad.
Los acuerdos suponen un compromiso político para estudiar el corredor, no la finalización de un nuevo oleoducto. Las instalaciones portuarias costeras de Siria también necesitarían la capacidad y la protección necesarias para gestionar exportaciones sostenidas si el proyecto sigue adelante.
El investigador en materia de seguridad Aziz Moussa interpreta el sabotaje como un posible mensaje regional. En declaraciones a The Cradle, sitúa a Israel entre los sospechosos debido a su continua presión sobre Damasco y a sus incursiones en Quneitra.
En su valoración, los repetidos ataques contra instalaciones energéticas podrían agravar la fragilidad de la seguridad en Siria, minar la confianza en la reconstrucción y complicar los planes para un corredor energético. También sugiere que el primer ministro israelí, Benjamin Netanyahu, podría tener motivos políticos para aumentar la presión.
Moussa reconoce que ninguna de estas consideraciones demuestra que aviones o drones israelíes llevaran a cabo los ataques; las autoridades sirias no han presentado pruebas de tal ataque contra la línea de Jbessa.
Moussa señala una dificultad con respecto a esa teoría. Israel ha recurrido generalmente a ataques aéreos abiertos o atribuibles contra objetivos militares sirios. Un ataque encubierto contra infraestructuras civiles de gas mientras se debaten los acuerdos de seguridad representaría un patrón diferente.
Por lo tanto, deja abierta otra posibilidad: células del ISIS, que ya han atacado infraestructuras en Siria e Irak anteriormente. Para determinar la responsabilidad se necesitarían pruebas físicas de los lugares de los hechos y una investigación creíble sobre cómo llegaron hasta ellos los atacantes.
No obstante, los analistas energéticos israelíes han tomado nota de la ruta iraquí. En un artículo para el Instituto de Estrategia y Seguridad de Jerusalén (JISS), la investigadora Vita Avrahamov sostiene que restablecer el corredor Kirkuk-Baniyas podría reducir las perspectivas de Israel de convertirse en un importante centro de tránsito para la energía de Asia Occidental con destino a Europa.
Las propuestas de utilizar el gasoducto Eilat-Ashkelon y conectarlo con las redes del Golfo se enfrentarían a una ruta competidora que atraviesa Siria. En un artículo publicado en N12, también afirma que cada inversión que refuerce a Siria como Estado de tránsito energético ofrece a los Estados del Golfo y a Europa más alternativas, lo que reduce el incentivo para desarrollar una ruta competidora a través de Israel.
Su análisis considera que para Israel resulta ventajoso que los exportadores de petróleo dispongan de alternativas al estrecho de Ormuz y que se reduzca la influencia iraní. Las implicaciones económicas son, por tanto, mixtas, incluso desde una perspectiva estratégica israelí.
La advertencia de Avrahamov pone de manifiesto lo que podría costarle a Israel una ruta iraquí a través de Siria. Damasco, por su parte, pretende transportar la energía de la región a través de una red que los atacantes ya han interrumpido en dos ocasiones. Sus ambiciones dependerán tanto de mantener esas líneas en funcionamiento como de los acuerdos firmados para ampliarlas.
Publicado originalmente por Geopolítica rugiente
Barely weeks after rejecting Saudi Arabia’s request to join the air campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen, US President Donald Trump is rethinking his decision and has suggested that he may join the war against the Iran-backed Houthis.
The latest Houthi strikes on Saudi targets have revived a long-running American dilemma in Yemen — one that stretches back to the October 2000 bombing of the US Navy warship, which killed 17 U.S. sailors.
At least 25 people have been killed in Houthi drone and missile strikes on Saudi Arabia’s airports in recent weeks.
Separately, Houthis have occupied key port cities on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, threatening to choke the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, another key oil shipping route in the Middle East.
The rising Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, a key US ally in the Middle East, the threat of choking another global oil-supply route ahead of the US midterm elections, and the death of an American citizen have created a dilemma for President Trump on whether to open a new front in the Middle East.
Following the strike on Riyadh airport, Trump suggested that the US might join the Saudi war against the Houthis. “We may. We’re gonna look at it … We’ll make a decision. We move very quickly,” Trump replied on October 12 when asked whether Washington is considering joining the Saudi War against the Houthis.
Notably, last month Trump rejected the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s request to join the Kingdom’s war against the Houthis.
However, the decision to open a new front against the Houthis will not be an easy one, as Trump realizes that the war in Yemen could become another quagmire for the US when it is already tied down in the Iran War since February this year.
Trump launched Operation Rough Rider against the Houthis in March 2025, barely two months after taking the oath in January last year. The U.S. launched a major air and naval campaign after the Houthis resumed Red Sea attacks following the breakdown of a Gaza ceasefire.
Over the course of the next three months, the US struck over 1000 targets in Yemen, including radar systems, air defenses, missile and drone launch sites, manufacturing facilities, and some leadership targets.
However, the US abruptly ended the campaign in May, after agreeing to an Oman-brokered ceasefire. Houthis agreed to stop attacking U.S. vessels; the US halted strikes.
Trump later described the deal as Houthis “capitulating” under pressure; however, analysts disagreed as the ceasefire agreement did not cover Israel, the country that participated with Washington in bombing Houthi targets.
A New York Times investigation later revealed that Trump agreed to the ceasefire as the costs of the war exceeded $1 billion in munitions alone.
The US also lost three F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets and more than 15 MQ-9 Reaper drones in the campaign; however, it did not substantially weaken the Houthi position in Yemen.
However, the US involvement with Yemen goes much further back.
The US’s two-decade-long ‘War on Terror’ began after the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks in 2001.
However, that was not the first time that Osama bin Laden-led terrorist group had attacked Americans or U.S. interests.
Just one year earlier, on October 12, 2000, al-Qaeda carried out a suicide boat attack on the USS Cole, a US Navy guided-missile destroyer, while it was refueling in the port of Aden, Yemen.
The blast killed 17 American sailors and wounded nearly 40 others. It also tore a roughly 40-foot-wide hole in the ship’s hull near the waterline.
The crew’s damage-control efforts saved the vessel.
The US destroyer, en route to the Persian Gulf, was making a prearranged fuel stop at the port of Aden, Yemen, when the attack occurred.
Before al-Qaeda used civilian airliners to strike the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, it used a small inflatable boat as a suicide bomb to strike the US Navy destroyer.
In fact, the USS Cole bombing was al-Qaeda’s second attempt to target a US Navy vessel near a Yemeni port.
The investigation revealed that the USS Cole bombing followed an unsuccessful attempt on January 3, 2000, to bomb another US Navy ship, the USS The Sullivans.
In this earlier incident, the terrorist boat sank before the explosives could be detonated; however, the boat and the explosives were salvaged. The Navy refitted the boat, tested the explosives, and reused them in the USS Cole attack.
The extensive FBI investigation ultimately determined that members of the al Qaeda terrorist network planned and carried out the bombing.
By the end of 2000, Yemeni authorities had arrested several suspects, including Jamal Muhammad Ahmad Al-Badawi and Fahad Muhammad Ahmad Al-Quso, two of the alleged masterminds of the USS The Sullivans and the USS Cole plots.
Al-Badawi and Al-Quso, known al Qaeda operatives who trained in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan during the 1990s, were later killed in separate U.S. airstrikes.
However, the US failed to anticipate that such suicide attacks could be replicated on a much grander scale by using aircraft to attack US buildings.
It also failed to infiltrate al-Qaeda ranks to uncover plans for further attacks on the US.
Less than a year after the USS Cole bombing, al-Qaeda struck again, this time on US soil, executing the deadliest terror attack inside the US in history.
The Cole attack was part of al-Qaeda’s escalating campaign against the US after the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings.
It demonstrated al-Qaeda’s ability to strike a major U.S. military target overseas and served as a powerful propaganda victory.
The 9/11 Commission Report noted that the USS Cole attack “galvanized al-Qaeda’s recruitment efforts.”
Bin Laden ordered a propaganda video featuring a reenactment of the blast, training-camp footage, and calls to jihad.
The 9/11 Commission Report also noted that the planning for both the USS Cole attack and the 9/11 attacks took place during al-Qaeda’s summit in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000.
In retrospect, it’s clear that the USS Cole bombing was al-Qaeda’s warning to the US that more such attacks are coming; however, Washington failed to read the warning.
Yemen, in fact, was a major base for al-Qaeda before the rise of the Ansar Allah movement (precursor to the Houthis) in the early 2000s.
Osama bin Laden’s family also came from Yemen’s Hadhramaut region, and he saw the country as strategically important because of its weak central authority, remote tribal areas, and geography.
Al-Qaeda in Yemen was also responsible for the 1992 Aden hotel bombings targeting hotels used by US Marines en route to Somalia.
Aden hotel bombings were one of the first al-Qaeda terrorist attacks against the US.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, it was al-Qaeda in Yemen, and now it’s the Houthis; Yemen has been serving as a base for anti-US activities in the Middle East for over three decades now.
The post As Trump Weighs Joining War on Houthis, A Throwback To Yemen Bombing That Shook U.S. Navy! appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
As hostilities continue to escalate between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis (Ansar Allah), the Yemen-based group has claimed to have hit a Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jet of the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF).
On the night of October 14, the Houthis- claimed that they had managed to hit an RSAF fighter jet over the northern Yemeni province of Saada, which shares a border with Saudi Arabia.
“By the grace of God, our armed forces were recently able to target a Saudi warplane of the “Typhoon” type that took off from Taif Air Base. It was targeted in the airspace of Saada Governorate with a surface-to-air missile, struck directly, and is now at risk of crashing,” the military spokesperson of the group, Brigadier General Yahya Saree, wrote on X.
In addition, low-quality, night-time footage of a distant aerial engagement also surfaced on social media and was posted by some popular media outlets. However, the video does not conclusively prove the purported engagement involved a fighter jet, as it was shot in near-total darkness.
The claims come amid a sharp escalation in conflict between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition since last month, when the Houthis seized territory along the Red Sea coast, including Mokha and areas overlooking the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which had been crucial for Saudi energy exports after the closure of the Hormuz Strait.
Earlier this month, Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government launched a counteroffensive to reclaim Red Sea coast territory and declared full-scale war efforts, which have led to intensified missile and drone attack responses by the Houthis on Saudi cities and civilian targets, including in the capital, Riyadh.
Before claiming to have hit the Eurofighter, the Houthis stated that they had struck King Khalid International Airport in the Saudi capital Riyadh with a ballistic missile.
The group also announced that it targeted an administrative building belonging to Saudi Arabia’s Aramco in the eastern city of Dhahran, in retaliation for Saudi strikes on an oil facility in the al-Sabah area of the capital Sanaa, controlled by the Houthis.
Saudi Arabia, on its part, launches regular airstrikes on Houthi positions, backing Yemeni government-aligned forces as they try to reoccupy territory.
Saudi aircraft, including F-15SA and Eurofighter Typhoons, have been operating from bases such as Taif and Khamis Mushait to launch regular airstrikes across Houthi-controlled areas.
The latest claim of hitting a Eurofighter Typhoon comes nearly a month after the Houthis managed to down an F-15SA, scoring their first kill of a Saudi fighter since the fresh hostilities broke out between the two sides. The aircraft was reportedly downed on September 16, near Marib, using a locally-made surface-to-air missile (SAM), when it was allegedly conducting air strikes in support of the Yemeni troops.
The group published images of the wreckage of the Saudi fighter and the Ansar Allah personnel posing with it, although the fate of the pilots who probably ejected after being hit remains unknown to this day, as the EurAsian Times had also discussed in the past.
Unlike the F-15SA incident, there is currently no evidence the RSAF Eurofighter Typhoon was hit or crashed after taking the alleged hit.
Notably, advanced 4.5th-generation fighters like the Eurofighter are designed to absorb certain damage. Thus, a hit may not automatically mean a confirmed kill.
If we hypothetically assume the Eurofighter was hit, whether the Typhoon could make it back to the base depends on where it was allegedly struck, how far it was from a friendly base, and how severe the hit was.
The Eurofighter has two EJ200 engines—if one is damaged or fails after a hit, the other could provide enough thrust to keep the aircraft flying with some adjustments, allowing the pilot to land at a nearby safe base. Moreover, the jet features multiple flight-control computers, hydraulic systems, and electrical backups that could keep it controllable even after it loses parts of the airframe, control surfaces, or one of the two engines.
But most importantly, the damage may depend on whether the missile warhead detonated properly or was a near-miss that caused fragmentation.
For now, these crucial details about the alleged hit and damage remain unclear.
While independent verification of the alleged hit is pending and the RSAF has not officially acknowledged any such hit, previous reports suggest that the Houthis had earlier claimed downing a Saudi Eurofighter in October 2017 with a surface-to-air missile over Nihm.
“Yemen’s air defense unit told the country’s Arabic-language al-Masirah television network that the aircraft had been targeted with a surface-to-air missile as it was flying in the skies over Nihm district east of the Yemeni capital city of Sana’a on Friday evening,” Yemen Press had reported. However, no independent source verified the hit at the time.
Earlier this year, Italian Eurofighters sustained some damage during an Iranian strike on a Saudi base, as the EurAsian Times had earlier reported.
However, no combat shoot-down of a Eurofighter Typhoon—built by a consortium of the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain—has occurred anywhere in the world.
This means that if Ansar Allah’s claims are verified and the Eurofighter has indeed been hit and crashed, it would be the first incident involving the type.
It would boost the credibility of the Houthis’ surface-to-air missiles, which they market as “locally manufactured.” For the Houthis, successfully downing a modern, high-performance jet like the Typhoon, with advanced electronic warfare, missile-warning systems, and high-speed or high-altitude performance, would be akin to an endorsement that their air defenses can threaten one of the most capable Western fighters in the Saudi inventory, not just older aircraft.
Saudi Arabia currently operates about 71 Eurofighter Typhoons, so a single loss would not dramatically alter its combat capability or affect operations. However, with tensions running high between the two sides, it would be a major propaganda win for the Houthis and could lead to further escalation if Saudi Arabia launches a stern response.
For now, the EurAsian Times awaits further details about the initial claims.
The post Eurofighter Down? Houthis Claim Hitting Saudi Typhoon Jet with Surface-To-Air Missile Over Saada appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
A deadly Houthi attack on Riyadh’s international airport has highlighted how the Yemeni group is reframing its perceived “Iran proxy” role and shifting its regional focus to its ongoing battle against Saudi Arabia. The October 10 strike, in which 13 people were killed and hundreds injured, was the most violent episode on Saudi Arabian soil […]
The post Houthis reframing the narrative casting them as an Iranian proxy appeared first on Asia Times.
Escrito por Mehmet Perinçek en United World International. Traducción por el Dr. Enrique Refoyo.
El enfrentamiento entre la OTAN y Rusia desde la perspectiva de Turquía
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El profesor asociado Mehmet Perinçek, autor de la UWI, historiador y politólogo, participó como invitado en directo en el canal turco Ulusal Kanal para analizar el aumento de las tensiones entre Europa y Rusia y las razones que las subyacen.
Compartimos el programa con nuestros lectores.
La «amenaza rusa» como pretexto para la agresión
La «amenaza rusa» se está convirtiendo cada vez más en un tema de debate político en Europa. ¿Qué está ocurriendo y qué hay detrás de ello?
El discurso en Europa sobre una «amenaza rusa» no se ajusta a la realidad. Europa está inventando una supuesta amenaza rusa con el fin de ocultar su propia agresión hacia Eurasia y Rusia. Si echamos la vista atrás a Hitler y a la Segunda Guerra Mundial, ¿qué dijo Hitler cuando actuó contra Checoslovaquia? Las vidas de los alemanes en Checoslovaquia estaban en peligro, y Alemania tuvo que enviar tropas y ocupar Checoslovaquia para protegerlos. Afirmó que el comunismo se estaba extendiendo y que Alemania tenía que eliminar esa amenaza de raíz. Así pues, incluso la Alemania de Hitler intentó disimular sus ambiciones imperialistas y agresivas y fabricar un pretexto para justificarlas.
Observamos cómo resurgen tendencias similares en la Europa actual, con Merz, Macron y otras figuras destacadas del panorama europeo. Cuando analizamos los hechos, lo que realmente vemos no es a Rusia avanzando hacia Europa, sino a Europa y al bloque atlántico avanzando hacia Rusia.
La expansión de la OTAN: hacia Rusia y los demás
A principios de la década de 1990, cuando la Unión Soviética se desmoronaba, los dirigentes soviéticos, bajo el liderazgo de Gorbachov, afirmaron en esencia: disolveremos el Pacto de Varsovia, pero la OTAN no debe expandirse hacia el este. Los dirigentes occidentales dieron garantías verbales en ese sentido. Sin embargo, no cumplieron esas promesas. Por el contrario, la OTAN se expandió hacia el este, en dirección a Rusia, en seis ocasiones y, finalmente, llegó a las fronteras rusas.
Este intento de rodear a Rusia tiene paralelismos en otros lugares: en el Mediterráneo oriental y la cuestión de Chipre, en la cuestión de Taiwán, en el estrecho de Ormuz y en Yemen. En todas estas regiones, observamos intentos por parte de las mismas fuerzas de rodear, contener y asfixiar a Irán, China y Turquía.
«No se puede descartar la posibilidad de una guerra a gran escala»
Así pues, lo que usted está diciendo es que no hay fundamento alguno en esa afirmación de que Rusia no está preparando realmente un ataque. Por el contrario, usted sostiene que el bloque atlántico está tratando de traspasar las líneas rojas de Rusia y expandirse hacia el este, en dirección a Rusia. Entonces, permítame plantear la pregunta de otra manera. ¿Dispone Rusia actualmente de la capacidad militar y los recursos necesarios para abrir un segundo frente contra la OTAN?
No se puede descartar la posibilidad de tal guerra o enfrentamiento. Es necesario subrayar esto.
Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Francia y Polonia también deberían incluirse aquí, ya que vemos que se están preparando para una posible guerra con Rusia. Se están rearmando rápidamente. Están aumentando sus presupuestos militares y de defensa. Al mismo tiempo, están llevando a cabo campañas de propaganda y otras actividades destinadas a preparar a la sociedad para la guerra. Están diciendo a los jóvenes europeos que deben estar preparados para la guerra. La industria europea también se está orientando cada vez más en esa dirección.
Los principales fabricantes de automóviles y otras grandes empresas occidentales están empezando a invertir en la industria de la defensa. Volkswagen, por ejemplo, se ha puesto en contacto con el ejército alemán con propuestas para fabricar equipamiento militar. La francesa Renault se ha lanzado a la producción de drones. Añadimos a esta lista a Rheinmetall y otras grandes empresas. Esto demuestra claramente que Europa y las potencias atlantistas se están preparando para la guerra. Por lo tanto, la posibilidad de una guerra de este tipo sí existe.
Simulaciones de guerra por parte de EE. UU.
Si se produjera un conflicto de este tipo, también habría que señalar que la fuerza militar de Europa y su capacidad militar general son bastante débiles. Europa no está preparada para una guerra de este tipo. Y esta no es meramente nuestra valoración. Los propios expertos militares occidentales, los funcionarios occidentales e incluso algunas de las fuerzas que abogan por la confrontación reconocen que Europa no está realmente en condiciones de hacer frente a Rusia en el ámbito militar.
Tampoco, desde el punto de vista social, está la población europea preparada para la guerra. Además, por supuesto, está el hecho de que Rusia es una potencia nuclear. Asimismo, se han llevado a cabo numerosas simulaciones de guerra en EE. UU., incluidas aquellas realizadas o encargadas por el propio Gobierno estadounidense. Estas simulaciones han concluido que, en una guerra convencional no nuclear, EE. UU. sería derrotado por Rusia y China.
Hay otro factor que debemos tener en cuenta. En cualquier enfrentamiento armado con Rusia, especialmente en caso de una intervención militar dirigida contra Rusia, también existe la posibilidad de que se vean implicados los aliados y países amigos de Rusia.
Una posible guerra que se extienda desde Rusia y la OTAN
¿Qué quiere decir exactamente con eso? ¿Podría explicarlo con más detalle?
Una guerra entre Rusia y la OTAN significaría, en efecto, el inicio de una guerra mundial. No se limitaría a Rusia y la OTAN, sino que daría lugar a un conflicto mucho más amplio que abarcaría el mundo entero. En un enfrentamiento de tal magnitud, los países del lado euroasiático también se verían involucrados. Al igual que existe solidaridad económica entre ellos, países como Irán y otros no permanecerían indiferentes ante una guerra de esta magnitud. Inevitablemente surgirían otros frentes.
Como he dicho antes, la guerra en Ucrania y la cuestión de Taiwán no pueden separarse realmente entre sí. Tampoco pueden separarse la cuestión de Taiwán y el estrecho de Ormuz o el Mediterráneo oriental.
Por eso podemos afirmar que Europa, con su actual potencia y capacidades militares, no está preparada para hacer frente a Rusia. Una vez más, son los propios responsables occidentales quienes lo afirman.
Guerra justa e injusta
Existe otro factor: la distinción entre una guerra justa y una guerra injusta. No creo que un joven europeo, o por ejemplo un trabajador turco que viva en Europa, esté especialmente dispuesto a ir a morir al frente ruso en defensa de los intereses imperiales de Alemania. Los jóvenes rusos, por su parte, lucharían con una motivación mucho mayor si creyeran que están defendiendo su propia patria.
Así pues, el principal problema al que se enfrenta Europa hoy en día no es la afirmación de que Rusia esté a punto de atacar. Más bien, Europa carece de un enfoque político común y de un mecanismo de seguridad común capaz de gestionar tal confrontación o de librar una guerra contra Rusia u otro país. ¿Es eso lo que está diciendo?
Sí. Y están intentando crear ese mecanismo y la legitimación necesaria para ello. Pero se enfrentan a una fuerte oposición dentro de sus propios países. Lo hemos visto reflejado en las recientes elecciones en Alemania. En Suiza se están celebrando referéndums sobre la cuestión de la neutralidad. Macron se acerca al final de su carrera política, mientras que Le Pen y Mélenchon están ganando terreno.
El enfrentamiento entre la OTAN y Rusia desde la perspectiva de Turquía
Usted argumentó que, si estallara una guerra entre la OTAN y Rusia, esta no se limitaría a esas dos partes, sino que se extendería. Y mencionó algunos países. Esto nos lleva a la perspectiva de Turquía.
Cuando las potencias atlánticas intentan rodear a Rusia a través de Ucrania y el Mar Negro, también están rodeando a Turquía. Sus planes en el Mar Negro no pueden separarse de sus planes en el Mediterráneo Oriental ni de aquellos destinados a socavar la soberanía de la República Turca del Norte de Chipre (RTNC).
Del mismo modo, el sistema de dominación basado en el dólar que pretenden imponer a Turquía es similar al que pretenden imponer a Rusia. Por lo tanto, los intereses objetivos de Turquía la sitúan claramente en el bando opuesto al bloque atlántico. Si el bloque atlántico se fortaleciera y lograra llevar a cabo sus planes, ello también perjudicaría la soberanía de la TRNC. Debilitaría a Turquía en el equilibrio de fuerzas del Mediterráneo Oriental y fortalecería al bando contrario.
Un bloque atlántico más fuerte también implica un mayor apoyo a Israel. Significaría un aumento de la presión y las amenazas dirigidas por Israel contra Turquía, Siria, Palestina, el mundo árabe, el mundo islámico e Irán. Esto nos lleva de vuelta a lo que dije al principio: el Mar Negro y el Mediterráneo Oriental forman parte del mismo frente estratégico. La cuestión de Taiwán y el estrecho de Ormuz también forman parte de ese mismo frente más amplio. Desde ese punto de vista, los intereses objetivos de Turquía residen en oponerse al bloque atlántico.
La posición y la alineación adecuadas para Turquía
Pero hay algo que añadir aquí: existe una forma de evitar esta escalada. El mundo no tiene por qué encaminarse hacia una gran guerra. Si Turquía adopta la posición adecuada y se establece una alineación estratégica entre Turquía, Rusia, China e Irán, el poder económico creado por dicha agrupación, la disuasión militar que podría generar y la red más amplia de alianzas internacionales que podría atraer contribuirían a evitar tal guerra.
El bloque atlántico ya se encuentra en declive económico. Cada día que pasa pierde legitimidad a nivel internacional. Además, está cada vez más dividido internamente. Acontecimientos como el auge de la AfD en Alemania, el creciente apoyo a Le Pen y Melenchon en Francia, y las contradicciones entre Europa y EE. UU. lo demuestran. Todo el mundo es testigo de su fracaso en Irán y Palestina.
En ese sentido, la cuestión principal para Turquía, tanto para resolver sus propios problemas económicos y de seguridad como para ayudar a evitar que el mundo se vea arrastrado a otra gran guerra, es construir esta alianza. Dicha alianza también permitiría a Turquía establecer relaciones con Occidente sobre una base más equilibrada y sólida.
Ataques ucranianos contra buques y oleoductos turcos
Y me gustaría plantearle una última pregunta. ¿Cómo afectarán las tensiones entre Europa y Rusia al campo de batalla en Ucrania? Se acerca el invierno. ¿Seguirán los países occidentales y europeos prestando apoyo militar a Ucrania? A corto plazo, ¿hacia dónde cree que se dirige la guerra?
El apoyo occidental va a continuar. Sin embargo, el ejército ucraniano no ha podido avanzar y, de hecho, se ha visto obligado a retroceder. Por eso estamos asistiendo a un aumento de los ataques con drones y de los atentados terroristas en el interior de Rusia, dirigidos contra objetivos civiles. Estos ataques están ejerciendo presión sobre Rusia para que responda con mayor dureza, tal vez incluso hasta el punto de plantearse el uso de armas nucleares a escala limitada y táctica. La intensificación de los ataques tras las líneas del frente se debe a que fracasan en el campo de batalla.
Creo que cabe esperar que la intensidad de la guerra aumente en el próximo período, si tenemos en cuenta los preparativos que está llevando a cabo Occidente.
Debo señalar un aspecto relativo a Turquía. Los buques turcos y algunos de los proyectos energéticos más importantes de Turquía, entre ellos TurkStream y Blue Stream, también han sido objeto de ataques por parte de Ucrania. Debemos reconocerlo. Rusia no es el único objetivo en este contexto. Fíjese en el mar Negro hoy en día: el comercio se ha paralizado prácticamente por completo. Los barcos ya no navegan de un lado a otro de la costa opuesta como solían hacerlo. Los tomates cultivados por los agricultores turcos y la maquinaria fabricada por los fabricantes turcos ya no pueden llegar a Rusia como antes. Del mismo modo, las materias primas y otros bienes que Turquía necesita ya no llegan desde la otra orilla del mar Negro como antes.
Por lo tanto, no podemos considerar esta guerra como algo que no tenga una repercusión directa en Turquía. Y el coste del conflicto para Turquía aumenta con cada día que pasa.
Publicado originalmente por Geopolítica rugiente
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