On January 5, 2025, Saudi Arabia’s then ambassador to Bangladesh, Essa Youssef Essa Al Duhailan, delivered a stark reminder of a lost opportunity. Saudi Aramco, the Kingdom’s state-owned oil giant, had sent high-level delegations to Bangladesh three times between 2016 and 2018 to explore investment opportunities, including an oil refinery. Yet, according to the ambassador, […]

The post Houthi hits on infrastructure helping lure Aramco to Bangladesh? appeared first on Asia Times.

NATO’s threat to blockade the Gulf of Finland could backfire by disrupting regional trade, triggering Russian military retaliation, and escalating tensions in the Baltic Sea. Rather than weakening Moscow, such a move could expose NATO’s logistical vulnerabilities and undermine its own military readiness. “We are able within a few hours to form a force of […]

The European Commission has selected 77 industrial and technology projects across 23 European Economic Area countries to receive €3.4 billion in funding, as Brussels attempts to strengthen the continent’s manufacturing capacity and reduce dependence on imported energy and critical materials.

The funding, announced on Monday, 19 October, will come from the EU Innovation Fund, which uses revenues generated by the Emissions Trading System to support investment in technologies intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

The selected projects include manufacturing facilities, renewable energy installations, advanced energy storage, critical raw materials processing and industrial carbon management. For the first time, the programme also includes a small modular nuclear reactor project and a direct air carbon capture and storage initiative.

The announcement comes amid growing concern over Europe’s industrial competitiveness, particularly as manufacturers face high energy costs, increasing competition from China and difficulties securing investment for major industrial projects.

Funding for industrial production

According to the Commission’s announcement, the 77 selected projects span energy-intensive industries, clean technology manufacturing, alternative fuels, transport and several other sectors.

Six projects concern critical raw materials, an area in which the EU has been seeking to reduce its exposure to foreign suppliers.

These investments are intended to strengthen European supply chains for technologies including batteries, renewable energy equipment and permanent magnets, which are essential components in electric motors and other industrial applications.

The funding follows renewed political pressure to expand the processing and production of strategically important materials inside Europe.

As EU Today recently reported, the European Parliament has been pressing for stronger measures to reduce dependence on China for critical raw materials used by European manufacturers.

China occupies a dominant position in several international processing and refining markets, leaving European companies exposed to supply interruptions and trade restrictions.

The Commission is seeking to support alternative production capacity through financial assistance, industrial regulation and measures designed to attract private capital.

However, the selection of projects for EU funding does not automatically mean that the proposed facilities will be built. Their implementation will still depend on financing agreements, regulatory approvals and commercial decisions.

Nuclear technology enters funding programme

The inclusion of a small modular nuclear reactor project represents a new development in the Innovation Fund’s portfolio.

Small modular reactors are designed to produce electricity or industrial heat using nuclear technology on a smaller scale than conventional nuclear power stations.

Supporters argue that modular construction could reduce certain project risks and provide stable electricity supplies for energy-intensive industries.

However, the technology faces substantial challenges involving construction costs, regulatory approval, supply chains and the transition from demonstration projects to commercial production.

The Commission published a European strategy for small modular reactors in March, outlining plans to accelerate their development and support the first operational facilities in the early 2030s.

The latest funding decision gives the technology access to a financial instrument principally associated with industrial decarbonisation and clean energy investment.

Another newly represented technology is direct air carbon capture and storage, which involves extracting carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and storing it.

Both technologies remain at comparatively early stages of commercial deployment in Europe, making their eventual costs and performance important considerations.

Emissions trading revenue finances investment

The Innovation Fund is financed through revenues from the EU Emissions Trading System, under which companies operating in covered sectors must obtain allowances for their greenhouse gas emissions.

Part of the revenue generated from auctioning allowances is reinvested into projects designed to introduce lower-emission technologies into industrial production.

The Commission estimates that the 77 newly selected projects could avoid approximately 290 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions during their first ten years of operation.

That figure is a projection based on the projects’ anticipated performance, rather than an achieved reduction. Actual results will depend on construction, commissioning and subsequent commercial operation.

The funding announcement also follows the publication of the EU’s broader industrial policy initiatives, which seek to increase domestic production of clean technologies and improve investment conditions for European manufacturers.

The Commission announced a separate allocation of more than €390 million to 135 environmental and climate projects under the LIFE programme on the same day. That funding is distinct from the €3.4 billion Innovation Fund selection.

Funding agreements still to be concluded

The companies and organisations behind the selected Innovation Fund projects must now complete the procedures necessary to obtain their grants.

During the Commission’s 19 October press briefing, officials indicated that project-specific grant amounts would become available when the agreements are signed, currently envisaged for the first quarter of 2027.

The final allocations and implementation conditions therefore remain subject to the grant preparation process.

For industrial companies, the principal test will be whether the European funding attracts sufficient additional investment to bring the selected technologies into commercial operation.

The results will also provide an indication of how effectively Brussels can translate its industrial policy objectives into additional European manufacturing capacity, particularly in sectors where supply chains remain concentrated outside the Union.

Image Credit: © European Union, 2024 / CC BY 4.0

Twelve migrants, including an infant, have died in two separate incidents involving boats travelling from Turkey towards the Greek islands of Lesbos and Samos, prompting investigations into the circumstances of the deaths and the activities of suspected people smugglers.

The incidents occurred on Monday, 19 October, in the northeastern Aegean Sea. Six people died when a speedboat collided with a Greek coastguard vessel near Lesbos, while another six were killed after a separate boat overturned north of Samos.

The deaths coincided with the publication of new figures from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, showing that irregular crossings into the EU fell by almost one-third during the first nine months of 2026.

According to the latest border monitoring figures, approximately 91,000 irregular crossings were detected between January and September, although the eastern Mediterranean remained the busiest migration route into the Union.

Two incidents under investigation

According to information released by the Greek authorities, the first fatal incident occurred near Agrilia on Lesbos when a speedboat carrying migrants struck a coastguard patrol vessel before overturning.

Six people died, while eight survivors were taken to hospital. The authorities subsequently arrested a 37-year-old Turkish national, identifying him as the suspected operator of the migrant boat.

Greece’s Maritime Affairs Minister Vassilis Kikilias said the available evidence indicated that the speedboat had struck the left side of the coastguard vessel. The precise circumstances remain under investigation.

In the second incident, approximately four nautical miles north of Samos, a boat reportedly overturned after making a sudden manoeuvre while being pursued by the coastguard.

Five men and one woman died, while 14 people were rescued. An Iranian national was arrested on suspicion of involvement in migrant smuggling.

The arrests do not establish criminal responsibility, and the circumstances surrounding both incidents remain subject to investigation.

Greek authorities have attributed the dangers of the crossings to trafficking networks operating between Turkey and the Aegean islands. The government has reiterated its policy of pursuing smugglers and restricting unauthorised maritime arrivals.

Fewer crossings, continued fatalities

Frontex recorded approximately 31,800 detections along the eastern Mediterranean route during the first nine months of this year, representing a decline of around 15 per cent compared with the equivalent period in 2025.

Across the European Union’s external borders, the agency reported an even larger reduction, with overall detections down by almost one-third.

The Central Mediterranean route experienced a particularly substantial fall, while the Western Mediterranean recorded an increase, reflecting changes in departure points and migration patterns.

These figures count detected border crossings rather than individual migrants and do not necessarily capture every unauthorised arrival.

The latest data also have to be considered alongside exceptional developments elsewhere on Europe’s borders. In July, large-scale movements through Spain’s Ceuta enclave created additional pressures on Spanish authorities and raised questions about the application of the EU’s new asylum arrangements.

The eastern Mediterranean figures encompass several routes, including crossings from Libya towards Crete, movements through the Aegean islands and arrivals across the land border with Turkey.

Consequently, the total recorded for the wider region should not be interpreted solely as the number of people arriving on the Greek islands.

Greece remains central to European border policy

Greece has occupied a central position in EU migration policy since the 2015–2016 crisis, when hundreds of thousands of people arrived from Turkey, many travelling onwards through the Balkans.

The subsequent EU–Turkey migration arrangements were intended to reduce unauthorised crossings and establish procedures for returning certain migrants who did not qualify for protection.

Athens has also faced persistent criticism from human rights organisations concerning allegations of unlawful returns at sea and land borders. Greek authorities deny operating an unlawful pushback policy and maintain that their border operations respect domestic and international law.

The EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, which entered into application in 2026, has introduced common procedures for screening arrivals, processing asylum claims and managing people who do not have permission to remain.

Its implementation has placed greater emphasis on border identification, biometric registration and cooperation between national authorities and Frontex.

However, the two disasters demonstrate the continued risks associated with maritime crossings, even during a period of declining arrivals.

Investigators must now establish precisely how both boats overturned, whether criminal offences were committed and what occurred during the encounters with coastguard vessels.

The findings will be relevant not only to the prosecutions of those arrested, but also to continuing scrutiny of maritime enforcement along one of the European Union’s principal external borders.

Apparent attempt to hack Rade Bajić’s iPhone comes amid efforts to undermine landmark criminal case

A Serbian prosecutor who investigated the authorities’ allegedly illegal scheme to help the Trumps build a tower in Belgrade has been targeted with advanced spyware, expert analysis indicates.

The finding suggests a disturbing new element in the authoritarian Serbian regime’s campaign to undermine what is believed to be the first criminal case related to global moneymaking drive of the US president’s family, which critics describe as a “pay to play” scheme trading the Trump administration’s favour for business opportunities.

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© Photograph: Andrej Isaković/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Andrej Isaković/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Andrej Isaković/AFP/Getty Images

A Sofia court has cleared European arrest warrants for two 19-year-old Germans charged with setting fire to Starlink antennas south of the Bulgarian capital, a court spokeswoman told dpa. Prosecutors named the pair in court, but both had already left Bulgaria. The case adds Bulgaria to a run of attacks on Starlink sites in Europe, which Poland and Lithuania have linked to Russia.

While Russia presses its assault along the front and strikes Ukraine’s cities, Starlink keeps Ukraine’s drone units and front-line troops connected, and Poland pays about $50 million a year for its terminals. The network’s ground links in Europe are now a target in their own right, and ISW has linked the Polish fire to a wider Russian pattern of sabotage. Each attack on a ground station hits a network whose speed caps already disrupted Ukraine’s drone missions this month.

Two names, a few hours in Bulgaria

Prosecutors identified the suspects as Zeka Islam and Tirpan Beytullah, Bulgaria’s state news agency BTA reported, noting the names may be misspelled. Their whereabouts are unknown, according to German authorities cited by the agency. They were charged in absentia on 14 October and face three to 12 years in prison if convicted.

According to the indictment, the two crossed from Serbia at the Kalotina checkpoint at 17:37 on 9 October and told border officers they were tourists. At about 22:25, wearing gloves and masks, they allegedly set fire to antennas at the Plana teleport, a satellite ground station near the village of Plana. They drove back into Serbia through the same checkpoint at 23:55.

Three antennas burned completely, two were partly damaged, and three more were affected, prosecutors say. The pair traveled in a Volkswagen with German plates, and a national warrant followed two days after the charges, ZDF reported.

The court-appointed lawyers argued that investigators had pinned down the vehicle, not the men in it. The court rejected those objections, finding reasonable grounds to suspect the pair. The lawyers said they would appeal. The ruling can be challenged within three days.

An opposition MP made the fire public three days later

The fire became public only on 12 October, when opposition MP Ivaylo Mirchev of Democratic Bulgaria posted about it on Facebook. He said 11 antennas had been set on fire, more than prosecutors later counted.

In parliament two days later, Prime Minister Rumen Radev asked the head of the State Agency for National Security (DANS) not to reveal details, saying disclosure could harm the investigation. DANS head Plamen Tonchev told lawmakers he believes the fire was sabotage and that more such attacks cannot be ruled out, dpa reported.

After the ruling, Mirchev wrote that Radev personally owes the public an explanation of what has been achieved, BTA reported.

Bulgaria’s case joins attacks Poland and Lithuania tie to Russia

Bulgaria has not said who might be behind the fire. Authorities in Poland and Lithuania have linked similar recent arsons on Starlink equipment to Russia.

In September, fire hit a Starlink ground station south of Warsaw, and Germany later detained two suspects. On 18 October, Lithuania’s prime minister said intruders had tried to burn a company’s Starlink antennas used by Ukraine, calling it part of Russia’s hybrid war. Moscow claims such accusations are baseless, Reuters reported.

Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski made an unusually confident assessment of a hypothetical war between NATO and Russia during the Yalta European Strategy conference in Kiev on September 12. “If Russia attacked us, and we took our gloves off, I think we would defeat Russia quite quickly,” Sikorski said. “We have overwhelming superiority over Russia […]

US envoy Steve Witkoff is joining negotiations in Norway before an expected visit to Moscow, but American pressure on Ukraine, uncertainty over military assistance and renewed economic dealings with Russia raise questions about Washington’s approach to ending the war.

The latest American diplomatic initiative on Ukraine comes at a particularly difficult moment in relations between Washington and Kyiv. President Donald Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, is taking part in talks in Oslo on Tuesday, 20 October, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European leaders, before an anticipated visit to Moscow for discussions with Vladimir Putin.

The Norwegian government has confirmed that the meetings will include Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb. Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, will participate remotely. The meeting was requested by Zelenskyy, with Norway and Finland providing the diplomatic setting.

Yet the significance of the Oslo discussions lies less in the gathering itself than in the political circumstances surrounding it. Washington is seeking an agreement with Moscow while simultaneously becoming more confrontational towards Kyiv. Recent American decisions affecting military assistance, intelligence cooperation and Russian energy exports have introduced serious doubts about how the administration intends to use its considerable negotiating leverage.

Washington’s pressure on Kyiv

The immediate difficulty concerns the growing discrepancy between American diplomatic assurances and the practical conditions under which Ukraine is expected to negotiate.

Zelenskyy has accused Washington of delaying military deliveries, restricting intelligence sharing and limiting access to the Starshield satellite communications system. The Ukrainian president suggested that these developments reflected a political decision to reduce support at a particularly sensitive stage of the war. American officials have disputed allegations that assistance is being deliberately restricted.

Among the disputed deliveries are Patriot air-defence interceptors purchased by European NATO members through the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List programme. Zelenskyy has indicated that shipments remain subject to authorisation by US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth.

These are operational matters with immediate consequences. Ukraine relies on American intelligence, communications infrastructure and air-defence equipment to counter Russian missile attacks. Any interruption affects Kyiv’s military calculations, irrespective of whether Washington formally acknowledges a change in policy.

The political message is equally consequential. Trump has publicly questioned Zelenskyy’s willingness to negotiate and suggested that Ukraine might need somebody else to conduct talks with Russia. Such remarks place additional pressure on the Ukrainian leadership while leaving Moscow’s territorial demands largely untouched.

Russia’s incentives remain unchanged

The central weakness in the American diplomatic approach is the assumption that renewed engagement with Putin will necessarily produce meaningful Russian concessions.

Moscow has repeatedly treated negotiations as an opportunity to pursue political objectives that its armed forces have not achieved on the battlefield. Russian demands concerning Ukrainian territory and restrictions on Kyiv’s future security arrangements remain incompatible with Ukraine’s sovereignty.

An agreement reached under these conditions could suspend hostilities without resolving the underlying conflict. Russia would retain the capacity to rebuild its forces, while Ukraine could find its military options constrained by commitments made in exchange for an uncertain ceasefire.

The Trump administration’s recent economic dealings with Moscow further complicate the negotiations. Washington’s arrangements concerning Russian diesel have attracted criticism from Kyiv and European governments, particularly because Russian energy revenues remain an important source of financing for the war.

Trump has also pressed Ukraine to curtail attacks on Russian oil infrastructure, reflecting American concerns about fuel prices. For Moscow, relief from attacks on refineries would preserve economically important facilities that Ukraine has demonstrated an increasing ability to reach.

Any arrangement limiting such operations without corresponding Russian concessions would alter the military and economic balance in Moscow’s favour.

The broader American proposals reportedly include possible post-war economic cooperation with Russia. Their implications extend beyond Ukraine: commercial normalisation could offer the Kremlin substantial benefits before the conditions for a stable European security settlement have been established.

Europe’s influence depends on its willingness to use it

European participation in the Oslo process is therefore more substantial than a question of diplomatic representation.

Britain, France, Germany and Poland, alongside the European Union and NATO, are expected to be involved in the wider discussions. European governments would almost certainly bear much of the financial and military responsibility for implementing any settlement, including Ukraine’s reconstruction and long-term security.

They also possess considerable economic leverage through sanctions, financial restrictions and decisions concerning frozen Russian assets. Those instruments would form part of any serious negotiation over Moscow’s future relations with Europe.

However, European influence remains constrained by continuing dependence on American military technology and equipment. The controversy surrounding Patriot deliveries illustrates the problem: European governments can finance weapons for Ukraine without necessarily controlling when those weapons are released.

As EU Today previously examined, Washington’s negotiations with Moscow have consequences for European security that cannot be separated from the future of Ukraine.

European governments consequently face a difficult calculation. They wish to preserve American involvement, but excessive accommodation of Washington’s demands could leave them financing security arrangements over which they exercise limited control.

Norway and Finland have helped bring the Ukrainian and American delegations together at a moment when their relationship is deteriorating. Whether that produces progress will depend partly on Moscow’s response, but also on whether Washington is prepared to maintain the military and economic pressure necessary to make Russian concessions possible.

Witkoff’s anticipated journey from Oslo to Moscow will offer an early indication of the administration’s priorities. Putin will be assessing the terms Washington is prepared to offer, while Kyiv remains concerned about restrictions affecting equipment it needs to defend its cities.

For the Ukrainian leadership, the danger is that negotiations intended to end Russia’s invasion could become a process in which the country resisting that invasion is asked to make the most immediate concessions.

From October 19 to 23, the world gathers in Rome for the 54th session of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS)*—a global platform dedicated to combating hunger and malnutrition, and to upholding the right to food. Discussions will focus on food security, coordinated responses to food crises, and sustainable food systems. The agenda will […]

A judge ordered Abdulrahman Alfozan to remain in custody, likening the Saudi government’s offer to secure the former OpenAI engineer’s release to a “blank check.”

Dutch-Belgian supermarket group Ahold Delhaize has confirmed that malicious activity was responsible for the cybersecurity incident that disrupted its operations across Europe and the United States, forcing the company to take websites, applications and other computer systems offline.

In an official statement issued on Monday, 19 October, the company announced that it had filed a formal complaint with Dutch police and was cooperating with national cybersecurity authorities. Although physical supermarkets have remained open, the disruption has affected online shopping, deliveries and some distribution operations.

The company said investigators had so far found no evidence that sensitive information belonging to customers, employees or business partners had been taken. However, its investigation remains open, and the identity and objectives of those responsible have not been publicly established.

Online services interrupted across several countries

The disruption began on 12 October, when Ahold Delhaize detected suspicious activity within its information technology infrastructure.

The group responded by taking a number of systems offline as a precaution, affecting most of its retail brands in Europe and the United States. The consequences varied considerably between businesses, with some experiencing prolonged interruption to digital services while others were able to restore operations more quickly.

Albert Heijn, the Netherlands’ largest supermarket chain, has been particularly affected. Its website and mobile application have returned online, but home grocery deliveries are not expected to resume until Friday, 23 October.

Orders scheduled before that date have been cancelled, while the company continues preparations for a gradual restoration of its online delivery service.

The incident also interrupted some supply and distribution arrangements, resulting in shortages on supermarket shelves in parts of the Netherlands and Belgium.

In Belgium, Delhaize has restored its online shopping operations. Certain promotional and personalised services were still experiencing difficulties, although the parent company confirmed that its Belgian e-commerce business was operational again.

Dutch retailers Etos and Gall & Gall have also restored their websites. Meanwhile, several American supermarket brands owned by Ahold Delhaize have continued to experience service interruptions.

The group said it expected additional online services in the United States to become available over the coming days.

Dutch authorities investigate

Ahold Delhaize said it notified the Netherlands’ National Cyber Security Centre within 24 hours of detecting the malicious activity.

The company has subsequently provided updates to the authorities and, on Monday, confirmed that a formal police report had been submitted.

Chief executive Frans Muller defended the decision to shut down digital systems, arguing that the investigation had demonstrated the necessity of taking preventive action.

The company has not identified the perpetrators, confirmed whether ransomware was involved or disclosed the technical method used to gain access to its infrastructure.

These distinctions are important because malicious activity does not necessarily establish that information was stolen or that attackers obtained control over every system subsequently taken offline.

The retailer has instead described a controlled restoration process intended to ensure that affected systems can be brought back into operation without exposing the business to further risks.

Ahold Delhaize operates thousands of supermarkets and related retail businesses, including Albert Heijn, Delhaize, Food Lion, Giant Food, Hannaford and Stop & Shop.

Its geographical reach means that a disruption originating within shared corporate infrastructure can affect several national markets, even where individual retail chains maintain separate commercial operations.

Cybersecurity becomes a supply-chain concern

The attack comes amid increasing scrutiny of the vulnerability of European food retailers to digital disruption.

Earlier this month, investigators in France began examining cyberattacks against refrigeration control systems used by hundreds of supermarkets.

Those incidents reportedly affected equipment at chains including Carrefour, Intermarché and Monoprix, with some retailers forced to discard products after refrigeration systems malfunctioned.

There is no established connection between the French incidents and the attack affecting Ahold Delhaize.

Nevertheless, both episodes illustrate the dependence of modern retail operations on interconnected digital systems supporting stock management, refrigeration, logistics, payments and customer services.

The consequences of a serious cyber incident can extend beyond the loss of access to websites. Interruptions to inventory systems, warehouse operations or communications with suppliers can affect the availability of physical products.

This creates particular difficulties for food retailers, where delays in transport and storage can result in the loss of perishable goods.

European regulatory implications

The incident also draws attention to the European Union’s NIS2 cybersecurity framework, which establishes stricter risk-management and incident-reporting obligations for organisations operating in designated sectors.

Food production, processing and distribution are among the activities covered by the directive, although its application to particular companies and operations depends on the relevant legal definitions and national implementing arrangements.

The legislation requires organisations within its scope to establish appropriate cybersecurity protections, address supply-chain risks and notify competent authorities of significant incidents.

Separately, the General Data Protection Regulation establishes notification requirements where personal-data breaches meet the relevant reporting threshold.

Ahold Delhaize’s statement that it has found no evidence of sensitive data being taken does not conclude the technical investigation, but it means that a confirmed theft of personal information should not presently be presented as a fact.

For the company, the immediate challenge remains restoring online services while maintaining normal supermarket operations. The wider commercial consequences, including the cost of the interruption and its effect on sales, have not yet been quantified publicly.

Spain’s government has declared that the first phase of its emergency response to the Ceuta migration crisis has been completed, following the arrival of an estimated 80,000 migrants from Morocco at the end of July.

Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska said on Friday, 16 October, that approximately 12,000 people had returned voluntarily to Morocco since August, while the authorities had expanded facilities to process asylum applications and return decisions.

Nevertheless, substantial administrative and humanitarian challenges remain in the Spanish enclave, particularly concerning people awaiting decisions on their legal status and unaccompanied minors. The situation has become an important test of the European Union’s revised migration and asylum legislation.

Unprecedented crossings at the African border

The crisis began on 30 July, when tens of thousands of people entered Ceuta from Morocco by land and sea following the circulation of misleading information on social media about access to Spanish territory.

According to an October briefing by the European Parliament’s Research Service, approximately 80,000 people crossed into the enclave during the incident, overwhelming local reception facilities and creating an emergency at one of the EU’s few land borders with Africa.

A subsequent European Parliament resolution referred to at least 141 deaths associated with the crossings, although the initial figure reported by Spanish authorities was lower. The exact number of people who crossed and the final death toll have remained subjects of uncertainty.

Most entrants returned to Morocco within days. However, thousands remained, leaving Spain responsible for assessing individual claims, arranging lawful returns and providing appropriate accommodation.

Ceuta’s geographical position complicates these procedures. Although the enclave is Spanish and forms part of the EU, travellers departing for mainland Spain remain subject to specific controls at its ports and airports.

Spain expands its processing capacity

During a visit to Ceuta on 16 October, Grande-Marlaska defended the government’s management of the emergency and announced that additional police resources would substantially increase administrative capacity.

The expanded temporary reception and processing facilities at El Tarajal are intended to handle at least 100 files daily, including applications for international protection and return procedures.

According to figures presented by the Interior Minister, approximately 1,200 applications for international protection had been formally submitted, with around 700 decisions already issued.

He also rejected allegations that the authorities had conducted concealed or involuntary returns, insisting that departures to Morocco had followed voluntary decisions or the appropriate legal procedures.

The minister said more than 500 expulsions had been executed through judicial or administrative decisions in recent months. These are distinct from the approximately 12,000 voluntary returns recorded since August.

The treatment of unaccompanied minors remains contentious. The European Parliament’s research briefing estimated that around 1,100 such minors were in Ceuta, including some who arrived before the July emergency.

Responsibility for their care has generated disagreement between the Spanish central government and Ceuta’s autonomous administration, particularly over guardianship, identification and the distribution of minors to other regions.

New EU asylum system faces a practical test

The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which began applying in June 2026, was designed to strengthen external border procedures while establishing clearer responsibilities for Member States.

Its provisions include identity and security screening, accelerated procedures for certain asylum applications and a solidarity mechanism allowing countries to support those facing disproportionate migration pressures.

Under the screening rules, the authorities generally have up to seven days to complete the initial checks required for people apprehended after irregular entry.

However, the Ceuta emergency demonstrates the difficulty of applying individual administrative procedures when arrivals occur in exceptionally large numbers within a short period.

The geographical concentration of arrivals means that adequate staffing, interpretation, legal assistance and reception facilities become essential to ensuring the system operates within its prescribed deadlines.

Spain requested assistance from Frontex, Europol and the European Union Agency for Asylum in August. The Commission subsequently announced €114.7 million in emergency assistance in September.

Political dispute over migration policy

The crisis has widened divisions between European governments over border enforcement and the regularisation of migrants already living within the EU.

Italy and several other Member States have questioned whether Spain’s separate regularisation programme could encourage further irregular migration. Madrid rejects the suggestion that the programme caused the Ceuta crossings.

The Spanish scheme covers only people who met the residence requirements by the end of 2025. Those who arrived during the July 2026 crisis are not eligible.

European Parliament members also adopted a resolution in September calling for stronger protection of the EU’s external borders and greater cooperation with Morocco. The resolution characterised the crisis as involving the possible instrumentalisation of migration, although Spain has said it has no evidence establishing Moroccan government involvement.

The continuing administrative backlog, the position of minors and the effectiveness of EU assistance will determine how quickly Ceuta can return to ordinary border operations.

Beyond Spain, the episode raises a practical question for Brussels: whether Europe’s new asylum framework can maintain border controls and individual legal safeguards simultaneously during an exceptionally large and sudden influx.

The post Saudi Royal Ties Emerge in OpenAI Spying Case appeared first on South Front.

A cyberattack affecting approximately 700 supermarkets in France has exposed serious weaknesses in the digital systems used to control commercial refrigeration, raising concerns about the vulnerability of European food distribution networks and other essential infrastructure.

The attack began overnight on 11–12th October, when intruders gained access to remotely managed refrigeration equipment and altered operating settings, causing refrigerators and freezers to overheat.

Stores belonging to several major supermarket chains were affected, including Intermarché, Netto, Coopérative U, Carrefour and Monoprix. Some were forced to discard substantial quantities of fresh and frozen food.

French Finance Minister Roland Lescure confirmed that approximately 700 of the country’s 10,000 supermarkets had been affected, although the severity of the disruption varied between locations.

The Paris prosecutor’s office has opened an investigation into the attack, including the damage caused by destroyed merchandise and reported fires.

The incident has drawn attention to industrial control systems that are routinely connected to the internet but may receive less cybersecurity protection than corporate networks and customer databases.

Refrigeration systems remotely manipulated

Investigators have established that refrigeration equipment was targeted through vulnerabilities associated with remote monitoring and control systems.

The French cybersecurity authorities identified compromises involving products supplied by Danish manufacturer Danfoss and American company Copeland.

Some of the affected systems used older equipment that no longer received regular security updates.

According to information released by the companies and cybersecurity specialists, certain industrial controllers had been accessible through public internet connections, creating opportunities for unauthorised access.

Hackers reportedly manipulated defrost cycles and increased temperature settings, preventing equipment from maintaining the cold conditions required to preserve food.

The attack affected approximately 300 Intermarché and Netto stores, while Coopérative U reported disruption at around 80 outlets.

Several retailers managed to contain the damage, but others lost substantial quantities of stock.

The consequences extended beyond malfunctioning equipment. Businesses faced the cost of replacing spoiled food, repairing refrigeration systems and restoring normal operations.

The precise financial damage is still being assessed, although estimates from the retail sector indicate that losses across France could amount to tens of millions of euros.

Vulnerabilities in connected equipment

The incident illustrates the security problems created by the growing use of internet-connected industrial equipment.

Modern refrigeration installations allow contractors and maintenance specialists to monitor temperatures, adjust settings and diagnose faults remotely.

These arrangements can reduce operating costs and improve efficiency, but they also create additional access points that attackers may exploit.

Cybersecurity specialists have identified vulnerabilities in commercial refrigeration platforms manufactured by Danfoss and Copeland.

The manufacturers subsequently addressed identified flaws, although older or unsupported equipment remained a concern.

A critical problem for businesses is that industrial machinery often remains operational for many years after its original software has become obsolete.

Replacing entire refrigeration installations can involve substantial expense and operational disruption, encouraging operators to retain equipment that may no longer meet contemporary cybersecurity standards.

The risks are particularly difficult to manage when responsibility for maintenance, software updates and network security is divided between retailers, equipment suppliers and external contractors.

France’s delayed cybersecurity legislation

The attack has renewed scrutiny of France’s implementation of the European Union’s NIS2 Directive, which is intended to strengthen cybersecurity across sectors providing important economic and public services.

The directive establishes common requirements covering risk management, incident reporting, organisational responsibility and protection against cyber threats.

Its scope extends beyond traditional critical infrastructure such as energy, telecommunications and transport to include certain businesses involved in food production, processing and distribution.

EU member states were required to incorporate the directive into national legislation by 17 October 2024.

France was among the countries that received a formal warning from the European Commission in May 2025 over incomplete implementation.

French cybersecurity specialists have since warned that delays have complicated efforts to establish consistent obligations for organisations operating industrial and commercial systems.

However, NIS2 does not automatically cover every supermarket. Its application depends on the nature and size of an organisation and the provisions of national implementing legislation.

The incident therefore raises questions not only about the pace of legislative implementation but also about the practical protection of equipment already in use.

Wider implications for European infrastructure

The disruption demonstrates how a cyberattack can cause physical damage without directly targeting a conventional industrial facility.

Unlike breaches intended to steal customer information, the French incident interfered with machinery responsible for preserving essential products.

The distinction is important for European policymakers, who increasingly face threats to infrastructure that combines digital controls with physical operations.

The European Union’s cybersecurity agency ENISA has organised cross-border exercises to test how authorities and companies would respond to disruption affecting essential services.

The attack itself has been established, but responsibility for it has not been publicly attributed.

French authorities have said there is no immediate threat to national food supplies. Nevertheless, the destruction of merchandise and interruption of ordinary retail operations have demonstrated the potential economic consequences of weaknesses in relatively commonplace equipment.

The continuing investigation must establish how access was obtained, which systems were compromised and whether the vulnerabilities were known to operators before the attack.

For Brussels and national regulators, the case provides a practical test of whether European cybersecurity legislation can translate into effective protection for the connected equipment on which ordinary commercial activities increasingly depend.

Around 80 pages on WhatsApp’s website exposed instructions that were designed for its chatbot, including “WHAT NOT TO SAY.” Meta says a bug caused the issue.

Social Security is racing towards insolvency because the program pays out more in benefits to retirees than it collects in taxes from working Americans.

Handing out even more generous benefits will make that situation worse. Yet that is exactly what the trustees who run Social Security are planning to do: Retirees will get a 3.6 percent cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) next year. That increase is 0.8 percentage points higher than last year's, and it is 0.9 percentage points higher than what Social Security was expecting to pay.

The Social Security trustees are doing what the law requires during a time of high inflation. That's why Congress ought to intervene here.

It should cancel the COLA.

No, this isn't a demand that lawmakers stick it to America's retirees. It's an appeal for some fiscal common sense. There are three good reasons to cancel this year's COLA.

First: Handing out higher benefits to wealthy retirees simply doesn't make sense when Social Security is trending towards insolvency.

As the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget notes, the announced COLA would be a $900 increase in benefits for the average retired household—but some retirees could receive as much as $3,600 more.

Paying generous benefits to wealthy households is the main reason Social Security is facing insolvency in the first place. A program originally intended to keep seniors from falling into poverty has become a huge wealth-transfer scheme that overwhelmingly benefits those who don't need the handouts. The COLA doubles down on this flaw.

Second: What about the workers who are paying for those lavish benefits? Wages have risen by 3 percent, on average, over the past year. Those pay increases have already been outpaced by inflation, which is up 3.7 percent in the past 12 months.

You'll often hear retirees talk about how they are living on a "fixed income," but the math simply doesn't bear this out. Social Security beneficiaries will get a COLA that is larger than the average pay increase for the workers who are funding the COLA. Retirees are protected from the impact of inflation while younger Americans must deal with inflation and finance that protection for the elderly. That's crazy.

Third: Cutting the COLA could kick-start a conversation about how to solve Social Security's looming insolvency. The Social Security trustees estimate that an across-the-board cut of about 22 percent will be necessary in 2032. Eliminating COLAs won't meaningfully change that arithmetic, but it would change the conversation—which has for too long been dominated by politicians promising seniors that nothing needs to change. That's wrong—and the sooner that becomes apparent, the better off the political system will be.

If eliminating the COLA is too radical a change, Congress should instead change how the trustees calculate the annual increase.

Currently, the COLA is based on one particular measure of inflation: the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, otherwise known as CPI-W. This is a relatively narrow index that reflects the spending habits of only about one-third of all Americans, as Romina Boccia points out in her newletter, The Debt Dispatch. 

Instead, Boccia suggests using the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, or C-CPI-U, which covers about 93 percent of all Americans and is generally regarded as a better measure of the rising cost of living. Other parts of the federal government already use C-CPI-U to update such things as tax brackets.

If Congress simply changed how Social Security's COLA was calculated, it could close 12 percent of the program's long-term shortfall. And while some retirees would see smaller COLAs as a result, the result would more closely match those increases to inflation.

Social Security's COLA reflects many of the fundamental flaws with America's old-age entitlement program. Like Social Security as a whole, it is too generous to the rich, too costly to the taxpayers, and too unfair to younger, poorer workers.

The post 3 Reasons To Cancel This Year's 3.6% Social Security Boost appeared first on Reason Magazine.

When the Iran war closed the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year, about 20% of the world’s liquefied natural gas supply stopped flowing almost overnight. Roughly 90% of the LNG that moves through the strait goes to Asia, so the continent has absorbed the worst of it. Gulf producers have had few good responses. Saudi […]

The post Africa’s LNG boom giving Asia an alternative to Hormuz appeared first on Asia Times.

In late August, President Donald Trump's administration carried out its first deportation flight to Haiti since the Supreme Court allowed it to end temporary protected status (TPS) for the embattled country in June. "There are no extraordinary and temporary conditions in Haiti that prevent Haitian nationals…from returning in safety," the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) claimed in its TPS revocation, describing a country the State Department warns Americans not to visit "for any reason."

The Trump administration has eroded America's humanitarian avenues, including TPS, which shields migrants from deportation. As a result, many noncitizens may become undocumented and could be forced to return to unsafe places.

The DHS secretary may grant TPS for countries facing armed conflicts, natural disasters, or other disruptive events. TPS designations last anywhere from six to 18 months and may be extended. The government has designated 29 countries for TPS since Congress established the status in 1990, offering protection to Salvadorans fleeing a 12-year civil war, Haitians fleeing the 2010 earthquake, and millions of others. The Biden administration repeatedly made and extended TPS designations, but the Trump administration has been working to terminate them.

There were 1.3 million people living in the U.S. under TPS in March 2025, according to the Pew Research Center. By August 2026, the Trump administration had ended TPS for 13 countries, leaving 1 million people without its protections. Once someone loses TPS, he reverts to his previous immigration status, which is often undocumented. Over 600,000 Venezuelans, 330,000 Haitians, 170,000 Salvadorans, and 100,000 Ukrainians had TPS protections as of March 2025, according to the Congressional Research Service.

Critics often point out that TPS isn't really "temporary." That's frequently true: Although some designations have been brief, others have been decades-long. Designations for Haiti, Syria, Honduras, Nepal, Somalia, and El Salvador have all lasted at least 14 years, according to the Migration Policy Institute (MPI).

This says more about the U.S. immigration system and presidential power than it does about TPS. "In the absence of Congress acting to legalize what has become a long-settled unauthorized immigrant population, Republican and Democratic administrations, lawmakers, immigrants, and foreign governments had come to tacitly rely on TPS despite its nominally temporary nature," notes the MPI. Immigration policy is increasingly subject to presidential whims, and due to lengthy processing times and narrow qualifications, more durable immigration pathways such as asylum and refugee status are often inaccessible to eventual TPS beneficiaries. An immigrant-friendly president may use TPS designations to temporarily shield noncitizen populations, but an anti-immigrant successor can also revoke those protections. In either scenario, a TPS holder faces uncertainty.

In a rare bipartisan immigration effort last February, Reps. Laura Gillen (D–N.Y.) and Mike Lawler (R–N.Y.) introduced a bill to extend TPS for Haiti for three years. It passed the House this April and has been languishing in the Senate since. Its future, too, is uncertain.

The post Trump Slashing Deportation Protections Shows Why Temporary Status Shouldn't Depend on Who's President appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The United States is bringing its long-standing presence in Iraq to an end—a country whose fate it had shaped since 1980. After meddling in Iraq since 1980—backing Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War, bombing Iraq after it invaded Kuwait, and invading in 2003 on a false pretext to dismantle its military, political, and economic order—and […]

Latvia has called for a European Union-wide ban on tourist visas for Russian citizens, reopening a dispute between member states over border security, freedom of movement and the treatment of Russian nationals during Moscow’s continuing war against Ukraine.

Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs is pressing Brussels and other European capitals to adopt a common approach, arguing that continued visa issuance by some Schengen countries weakens restrictions imposed by states bordering Russia.

His intervention comes amid growing concerns over suspected Russian sabotage, espionage and other hostile activities across Europe. The Latvian government regards restrictions on non-essential travel as an additional measure to reduce potential security risks.

According to details of the Latvian proposal, Kulbergs has criticised the continued issuance of tourist visas by countries including France, Italy and Spain, maintaining that the consequences extend beyond the states granting entry.

The proposal would go considerably further than the restrictions already introduced by the EU since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

A divided European visa policy

The European Union suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia in September 2022, ending the preferential conditions previously available to Russian applicants.

The Council’s original decision introduced more demanding documentation requirements, higher application fees and stricter scrutiny, but it did not prohibit Russian citizens from obtaining short-stay visas.

National authorities therefore retained considerable discretion when assessing applications, subject to common Schengen rules.

In November 2025, the Commission introduced additional restrictions on multiple-entry visas, requiring Russian travellers covered by the new rules to apply again for subsequent visits.

The EU has also agreed a legal basis for restrictions targeting Russian military personnel and former combatants involved in the invasion of Ukraine, although implementation requires further measures.

Latvia argues that these steps remain insufficient because ordinary tourist visas continue to be available through some European consulates.

Once admitted to the Schengen area, a visitor can generally travel between participating countries without routine internal border checks. This creates difficulties for governments seeking to enforce stricter national entry policies.

Security concerns on the eastern border

Latvia shares borders with Russia and Belarus and has repeatedly warned that Moscow’s activities present risks extending beyond conventional military threats.

European governments have investigated incidents involving suspected sabotage, cyber operations, intelligence gathering and interference with transport infrastructure.

Such concerns have intensified following drone incursions and security alerts affecting NATO’s eastern members.

These concerns were also evident in EU Today’s reporting on suspected security breaches in Europe, although the circumstances of individual incidents must be investigated rather than assumed to involve foreign intelligence services.

The distinction is relevant to the Latvian proposal. European intelligence agencies have identified Russian-linked activities, but this does not establish that ordinary Russian tourists are collectively involved in intelligence operations.

Supporters of tighter visa restrictions argue that limiting discretionary entry could reduce opportunities for hostile activity and simplify security screening.

Opponents question whether a nationality-based prohibition would be proportionate or effective, particularly when intelligence operations may involve individuals travelling under other nationalities or using established residency arrangements.

Political and legal complications

A comprehensive tourist visa ban would require agreement on its precise scope, legal basis and implementation.

European governments would need to determine how the restrictions apply to Russian citizens with family members in the EU, people travelling for humanitarian purposes and individuals seeking protection from the Russian authorities.

The EU Visa Code already permits refusals where applicants present security risks, but a general prohibition based on nationality would involve a different policy decision.

Humanitarian exceptions would be particularly important for Russian dissidents, independent journalists and other individuals facing political persecution.

France has supported restrictions on entry by Russian combatants, while other member states are considering further measures. That does not necessarily mean they support Latvia’s broader proposal covering ordinary tourists.

Kulbergs is also seeking greater European financial assistance for countries facing the economic and security consequences of their proximity to Russia and Belarus.

Sanctions and Schengen controls

The renewed visa debate coincides with disagreements between Washington and Brussels over economic restrictions on Moscow.

EU leaders have maintained that sanctions should remain in place until Russia ends its aggression against Ukraine. Visa policy, however, requires separate legal and political consideration from economic sanctions.

Latvia’s proposal has not been adopted as an EU-wide rule. The immediate question is whether enough member states are prepared to move from tighter individual screening towards a general restriction on Russian leisure travel.

Until that agreement is reached, European countries will continue to apply different policies within a shared Schengen system, leaving the security concerns raised by Riga unresolved.