A wave of student protests has spread across several European countries in recent weeks, with France at its centre, where demonstrations over staff shortages, underfunded schools and run-down facilities have continued since mid-September.

The French protests began on September 17th, when teachers at a high school in south-eastern Paris protested over staff shortages and students joined them, Australia’s ABC News reported. Demonstrations followed in Spain, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Albania, and smaller protests took place in Greece, Austria, Ireland and Germany, according to the same report. What began over education has since widened to include the cost of living and public-sector cuts.

In this context, the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (FEMYSO) has come under the spotlight following its announcement of support for student protests in France and Belgium, and subsequently in Albania.

Several European reports have drawn links between FEMYSO and the Muslim Brotherhood, describing the student forum as the organisation’s youth wing. Among the most notable is a report by a French National Assembly investigative committee, published in December 2025, which points to close ties between the forum and networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and characterises its role as contributing to the spread of the movement’s ideas across Europe.

In a parliamentary question submitted in 2025, Germany’s Baden-Württemberg State Office for the Protection of the Constitution was cited as viewing FEMYSO as an umbrella organisation for youth groups with links to the Muslim Brotherhood.

FEMYSO, however, rejects these allegations. In a previous statement, the organisation affirmed that it has no ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Statements of Support for Protests Across Europe

On October 9th, the forum announced its solidarity with student demonstrations in France and Belgium. On October 18, it declared its support for student and youth protests in Albania, while also referring to ongoing demonstrations in Spain and Greece in the same context.

On October 15th, 2026, the French Muslim Students Association (Étudiants Musulmans de France, EMF), a member organisation of FEMYSO, went beyond expressing solidarity. It called on students, education workers and the broader social movement to join a nationwide mobilisation scheduled for October 17th, reaffirming its support for demonstrations stretching from Paris to Marseille and from Bordeaux to Strasbourg.

In a statement, EMF stressed the need to build a balance of power through protests. The statement came just two days before large-scale demonstrations took place across France, attracting hundreds of thousands of participants in largely peaceful gatherings before separate groups became involved in acts of violence, looting, arson and attacks on police officers and public buildings. These incidents reportedly resulted in more than 1,000 arrests and injuries to dozens of security personnel.

Such initiatives and calls for participation in demonstrations have raised concerns that political Islamist networks may seek to capitalise on public discontent, particularly when protests are accompanied by public disorder or acts of vandalism. This, critics fear, could turn student and social demands into instruments for expanding organisational influence and securing political leverage.

According to official French data, masked and violent individuals were present at the demonstrations. In several cities, shops were looted, while cars and rubbish bins were set on fire. In the city of Limoges, flames engulfed the historic town hall, a building dating back to 1883.

The same data indicated that 1,800 people had been arrested and more than 500 police officers and firefighters had been injured. In response to the violence and rioting, the French government announced the imposition of curfews in several cities.

Concerns Reach the Heart of European Institutions

These developments come at a time when the activities of organisations suspected of having links to the Muslim Brotherhood are facing increasing political scrutiny.

On September 15th, 2026, French MP Constance Le Grip submitted a written question to the government concerning European funding for projects involving FEMYSO, calling for clarification of funding mechanisms and oversight procedures governing grants.

The question followed recent reports and studies that raised concerns over the continued involvement of FEMYSO in projects benefiting from European funding, despite an earlier announcement by the European Commission that the organisation was no longer receiving direct funding.

FEMYSO has consequently become one of the most contentious issues in the wider European debate.

A recent study published by CERIF and AK Polis in September examined the organisation’s participation in the EmpowerAction project, which forms part of the TACKLE initiative funded by the European Union through its DEAR programme.

According to the study, the funding does not necessarily take the form of a direct EU operating grant to FEMYSO. Instead, it may be channelled through partner organisations, projects and sub-granting mechanisms.

This has raised concerns that European funds could reach an organisation through a project led by another partner or through a consortium and its sub-granting arrangements.

Against the backdrop of FEMYSO’s visibility in the protests, some of which were subsequently accompanied by violence and looting, as well as allegations of links to the Muslim Brotherhood, concerns have emerged over the possibility that the organisation could gain a foothold in current social unrest and convert it into political influence by winning the sympathy of European communities and left-wing parties.

FEMYSO: Background, Membership and European Footprint 

The Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (FEMYSO) describes itself as a European umbrella organisation bringing together Muslim youth and student associations.

FEMYSO currently comprises 32 member organisations across 22 European countries. Its roots date back to 1995, when the first meeting of Muslim youth organisations was held in Sweden.

The following year, FEMYSO was formally established at a meeting in Leicester, United Kingdom, which brought together 19 organisations from 11 countries. In 2000, the forum established its headquarters in Brussels.

A letter to its supporters announced that instead of high profile endorsements and PAC donations, it will quietly mobilize individual donors for direct contributions

Breast cancer, flour crises in Gaza as Israel considers restarting "war" ■ Danger for Palestinians, Americans (including Jews) in West Bank ■ News on Iran, US politics, AIPAC, free speech ■ More

“I think that everything that Israel has done since the 7th of October is justified. Israel should not suffer.”

These words were spoken last month by Milorad Dodik, the de facto leader of Republika Srpska, the Serb-majority entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

This statement was hardly surprising. In recent years, Dodik has been outspoken in his support for Israel and its genocidal war on Gaza at a time in which relations between Republika Srpska and Israel are growing.

From high-level political endorsements and the opening of an Israeli Chamber of Commerce office in Banja Luka to increasingly explicit expressions of mutual solidarity. Such growing alignment speaks to how both leaderships are seeking to bolster their international legitimacy amid mounting political pressures.

For Dodik, deep relations with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could strengthen his access to Washington and bolster his long-standing ambitions to expand the Bosnian-Serb entity’s autonomy, while Israel may see the relationship as an opportunity to cultivate new allies and increase its diplomatic leverage in Europe.

The implications, however, extend beyond bilateral cooperation. In BiH, where the fragile constitutional order rests on the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, the growing alignment raises questions about the international legitimisation of separatism, the resurgence of ethnic and religious nationalist narratives, and Brussels’ ability to preserve stability in Europe’s “Inner Courtyard.”

Political calculations

Republika Srpska’s mounting tensions with some Western European governments and international institutions provide some of the necessary context for understanding the significance of Israel’s growing engagement with the Bosnian-Serb entity.

According to Dr Asim Mujkić, an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Sarajevo, the sharp decline in international support for Israel’s government has made Tel Aviv more open to unconventional partnerships. 

By engaging with Dodik publicly, Israel demonstrates its ability to maintain existing partnerships while forging new ones. At the same time, Israel’s ties to the Republika Srpska government may provide Tel Aviv with greater leverage in its dealings with European powers.

“I would say the ever-growing lack of international support for [Netanyahu’s] government, the rise of criticism and even boycott by traditionally amicable countries and organisations made Netanyahu open to political adventurism of this kind. For [the] domestic public it is surely advantageous to be able to show that some political leaders in fact visit Israel,” he told The New Arab.

Giorgio Fruscione, a research fellow at the Milan-based Italian Institute for International Political Studies, sees a related but broader set of motivations. He holds that Netanyahu’s government seeks international legitimacy via relationships with political actors that have strong connections to Washington and Moscow.

Fruscione also understands disputes over the interpretation of the Srebrenica genocide as part of the political context shaping Israel-Republika Srpska relations.

Viewed at a regional level, the expansion of Israel’s partnerships with actors in the Balkans serves to counter the influence of Iran, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, which have their own networks in southeastern Europe.

Put simply, while Israeli officials will frequently stress the importance of commercial cooperation, trade, and investment with Republika Srpska, Albania, and other players in the Balkans, there is no denying that the significance of these partnerships goes beyond stated economic objectives.

Dodik’s search for political leverage

Above all these considerations, Dodik’s main motivation for establishing closer ties with Israel seems to be his desire to enhance his access to Washington.

Although Dodik was officially removed from the Republika Srpska presidency last year, he remains the de facto leader in Banja Luka, and the Bosnian-Serb strongman is determined to continue advancing his political agenda at the expense of BiH’s fragile stability. International support, therefore, remains valuable to Dodik as he pursues his political ambitions, even if full independence is not necessarily his ultimate goal.

In terms of cultivating deeper ties with the Trump administration, Dodik has relied on conventional lobbying. But that alone might not suffice for the Bosnian-Serb leader, who can probably count on Netanyahu as a key intermediary in Washington.

Support, or at least accommodation, from the United States and Russia has benefited Dodik’s political position. With an Israeli Chamber of Commerce office opening in Banja Luka and officials from Republika Srpska and Israel increasing their public engagement, Dodik has an easier time presenting his leadership as globally connected instead of isolated.

At the heart of Dodik’s desire to bolster ties with the United States, Russia, and Israel is his interest in obtaining greater bargaining power when dealing with other actors in BiH and internationally. By invoking independence without necessarily attempting to establish Republika Srpska as an independent state (a process that would be extremely challenging and messy in practice), Dodik can gain such leverage.

There are important economic and security dimensions to Israel and Republika Srpska’s deepening ties. Dodik wants greater cooperation with Israel in technology and investment, while Netanyahu’s government is focused on energy and security as key areas of this bilateral relationship.

Yet, given the lack of concrete details available to the general public, the scale and scope of this envisioned economic cooperation remain unclear.

Nonetheless, with Republika Srpska under financial pressure, it is understandable that the leadership in Banja Luka would welcome Israeli capital alongside any political advantages that could come from this growing partnership.

Belgrade's role

Republika Srpska’s growing ties with Israel should be understood in the context of Belgrade’s relationship with Tel Aviv, given Serbia’s influence in Banja Luka. Particularly in the area of defence, Serbia has strengthened its relationship with Israel, underscored by the establishment of a drone assembly plant involving Israeli defence company Elbit Systems and Belgrade’s arms exports to Tel Aviv.

Fruscione holds that Republika Srpska’s foreign policy is not entirely independent and that Banja Luka’s international relationships remain closely connected to Serbia’s priorities on the international stage.

“Republika Srpska does not have an autonomous foreign policy. Although it may appear so, it is aligned with, if not even piloted by Belgrade. Therefore, relations between Israel and Republika Srpska must be understood within this framework,” he explained to The New Arab.

This perspective places Republika Srpska’s growing partnership with Tel Aviv within a broader network of political and economic relationships linking its leadership with Belgrade, Moscow, and Washington.

These relationships reflect overlapping, and at times competing, efforts to secure external support and advance political interests. The relationship with Israel also intersects with political cooperation between Milorad Dodik’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrats and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, BiH’s principal Croat nationalist party.

Both parties have sought changes to aspects of BiH’s political arrangements, particularly those affecting entity autonomy, political representation, and the distribution of power, although their objectives and interests are not identical.

According to Dr Mujkić, the Netanyahu government’s engagement with Serb and Croat nationalist leaders risks reinforcing political forces that challenge BiH’s Daytonian balance. Taken together, these relationships could increase pressure on the institutions in Sarajevo and complicate efforts to develop a coordinated Bosnian foreign policy.

They also create a regional dynamic in which developments involving Tel Aviv become increasingly intertwined with Belgrade’s ambitions, internal divisions within BiH, and competing US and Russian interests amid an era of intensifying great-power competition.

"Netanyahu’s government has supported [the Croat nationalist hard-liners of the] ethnic party in Bosnia, HDZ, even economically through the presence of Amir Kabiri, [an] Israeli businessman who not only supported Croat nationalism but also distorted [the representation of the] Bosnian Jewish community. It has supported Serb nationalist hard-liners as well, so of course, such a policy [threatens the] Dayton equilibrium,” he told The New Arab.

According to Dr Mujkić, both nationalist movements have increasingly incorporated Christian nationalism and claims of an “Islamist danger” posed by Bosniaks into their political rhetoric.

The irony of history is that contemporary Croat nationalism is heir to the ideology of the Nazi-allied Independent State of Croatia, which sought to exterminate local Jews. Meanwhile, contemporary Serb nationalism draws on a radical nationalist tradition that, under Milan Nedić’s collaborationist regime in 1941, proudly declared Serbia the first Judenrein country in the ‘new Europe’

"Yet today, these are - and not, for example, [the] Jewish Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina - [who] are the ‘allies’ of [Netanyahu],” Dr Mujkić told The New Arab.

The Dayton order and Bosnia's fragile stability

Republika Srpska’s strengthening relationship with Israel stands to reinforce a political environment in which there is greater acceptance of serious challenges to BiH’s territorial dignity.

This development, as Dr Mujkić explains, fits into a wider geopolitical pattern in which Moscow’s support for local nationalist movements and shifts in Washington’s foreign policy during the Trump 2.0 era risk weakening the European Union’s capacity to respond to instability in the Western Balkans.

As Fruscione told The New Arab, Israeli support is not creating a new secessionist dynamic in BiH. Yet, it might accelerate one already underway, particularly as the EU’s internal divisions serve to complicate Brussels’ engagement with the Balkan country.

The challenges surrounding the appointment of a new High Representative, whose office provides a critical international safeguard for the Dayton framework, highlight the serious issues facing the existing system of oversight.

However, the eventual consequences of the strengthening Republika Srpska-Israel relationship remain uncertain. Tel Aviv’s growing engagement may help Dodik bolster his international standing and bargaining power, but how far Washington or Tel Aviv would go to support him remains unclear.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics

Follow him on X: @GiorgioCafiero

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

Ukraine is heading into 2027 with a rising fiscal gap. Growth forecasts have been cut, inflation is rising, and the need for external financing seems to just keep going up. The economy is being squeezed by a labor market drained by mobilization and emigration, energy infrastructure has been decimated, and

Washington, DC - The midterm elections in the United States are in full swing, with early voting starting in most states.

The results will set the tone of US foreign and domestic policy for the rest of President Donald Trump's term. Control of both chambers of Congress - the Senate and the House of Representatives - is at stake.

If the Democrats flip one of the two chambers, which are currently under the control of Trump's Republican Party, they can thwart Trump's legislative agenda.

And if they can gain control of the Senate, they can block his judicial nominees. The upper chamber is also responsible for confirming cabinet appointees, ratifying treaties and holding impeachment trials.

There are 35 seats in the 100-member chamber up for grabs in this year's election, which will conclude on 3 November.

The current makeup of the Senate is now 53-47, so the Democrats need to flip four seats without losing any to reclaim the majority in the legislative body.

In most Senate races, the results are all but known before the votes are cast due to the political makeup of the states where the contests are playing out.

Barring a miracle, Republicans will win in Alabama, and Democrats will win in Massachusetts. That leaves a handful of competitive states that will determine the fate of the Senate.

The New Arab looks at the candidates in five key close races and where they stand on the issues.

Michigan (open seat): Abdul El-Sayed (Democrat) v Mike Rogers (Republican)

The Senate contest in Michigan is one of the most closely watched races in the election. Abdul El-Sayed, a progressive public health advocate, is taking on Mike Rogers, a Trump-backed former Congress member.

In recent weeks, Rogers and his allies have tried to focus the race on El-Sayed's Muslim identity, smearing him with baseless accusations of ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran.

Trump has repeatedly mocked El-Sayed's name. "His name is actually Abduladadalalala. It's Adulbabababababa Mohammed Al-Sayed," the US president said at a rally last week.

El-Sayed has pushed to refocus the race on the issues - particularly the affordability crisis, tariffs and the rise in the price of gasoline linked to the Iran war and his support for universal healthcare.

The progressive Democrat opposes US aid to Israel and argues that Washington should focus on investing in communities at home.

He has accused Israel of carrying out a genocide in Gaza - an allegation backed by leading human rights groups and United Nations investigators.

"I oppose the illegal and unjustifiable war in Iran and demand an immediate end to the hostilities," El-Sayed says on his platform.

Rogers initially supported the war with Iran, calling the decision to launch the conflict the "right thing to do".

But the former Republican legislator curbed his enthusiasm for the conflict as it dragged on and proved unpopular with voters. "The war with Iran needs to end, and end quickly," he said in a campaign ad in September.

Rogers is a staunch supporter of Israel. "When I get to the United States Senate, I will continue to unconditionally support Israel's right to defend itself," he said earlier this year.

Texas (open seat): James Talarico (Democrat) v Ken Paxton (Republican)

In a sign that highlights the declining popularity of Republicans, Democrats are mounting a competitive Senate challenge in deep-red Texas, which has been a Republican stronghold for decades.

Public opinion polls have shown Democratic State Representative James Talarico neck-and-neck with Republican Attorney General Ken Paxton.

Talarico has focused his campaign on fighting corruption, closing tax loopholes and lowering the cost of living. Paxton has presented himself as a defender of Trump's agenda, emphasising securing the southern border against irregular migration.

On foreign policy, Talarico calls for conditioning US aid to Israel. He broadly backs Israel's right to "defend itself", while focusing his criticism of Israeli atrocities in Gaza and the West Bank on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

"As a former teacher, seeing the death and the destruction in Gaza, seeing what’s happening to children in particular, makes me sick to my stomach," he said at a CNN townhall last week.

Talarico has stopped short of calling the atrocities a genocide, saying that the issue is a legal determination that should be made by international courts.

He has pledged to work to "end the forever war in Iran that’s driving up the cost of gas and groceries".

In contrast, Paxton has backed Trump's military action in Iran, but in a recently leaked audio recording he bemoaned the war's impact on gasoline and diesel prices.

"It's the war, it's gas prices, it's diesel," he said when asked about the issues dragging his campaign, according to Axios, which first reported on the leaked remarks.

Paxton is a strong supporter of Israel. As attorney general, he has defended and enforced laws to penalise companies and individuals that boycott Israel.

Maine: Susan Collins (Republican incumbent) v Troy Jackson (Democrat)

Maine generally leans Democratic in presidential elections, but Republican Susan Collins has won five consecutive elections in the northeastern state, earning her a reputation as one of the most tenacious politicians in the country.

This time, Democrats are hoping to use the mounting anger against Trump to finally topple the 73-year-old senator.

But the Democratic push was off to a terrible start after the party's nominee, Graham Platner, stepped down due to allegations of sexual misconduct.

Platner was replaced by former state Senate President Troy Jackson.

Collins, who has shown willingness to break with Trump, has promoted herself as an experienced and hardworking "common sense" leader.

Jackson has focused on his deep roots in the state as a former logger and supporter of workers' rights.

The Democrat agrees that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. "When I'm in the US Senate, I’ll never vote in favour of US taxpayer-funded military aid to Israel," he wrote in a social media post in July.

Collins is an unflinching advocate for Israel and has backed continuing military aid to the US ally, calling herself a "strong supporter" of the assistance, which totals at least $3.8 billion annually.

On Iran, the Maine senator has been a rare Republican dissenter against the conflict, voting repeatedly with Democrats to curb Trump's war powers.

Jackson, however, has argued that Collins' presence in the Senate tilts the balance in favour of Republicans and enables Trump's agenda, including the Iran war.

"Senator Susan Collins says that she voted against [the war] nine times, but she didn’t have the votes," Jackson said during a debate earlier this month.

"Well that sounds like then we probably ought to have Democrats in charge of the US Senate so that we have the votes."

Alaska: Dan Sullivan (Republican incumbent) v Mary Peltola (Democrat)

Alaska is another traditional Republican stronghold where Democrats are making gains and hoping to stage a big surprise.

The race pits Trump-backed two-term senator Dan Sullivan against former Democratic Congresswoman Mary Peltola. The Democratic candidate's campaign slogan is "fish, family, freedom", focusing on lowering costs in Alaska.

Sullivan is running on his record of helping push large tax cuts and "historic investments" in the US military. The senator has voted consistently against Democratic efforts to restrict Trump's ability to continue the war with Iran.

Last week, he appeared to blame the Democrats' energy regulations for the rising fuel prices in an effort to defend the war with Iran.

"Ladies and gentlemen, the conflict in the Middle East is temporary. The true forever war is the national Democrats’ war against Alaska oil and gas and our jobs. That’s the forever war," he said, according to Alaska Public Media.

Peltola has been overtly critical of the war and Sullivan's votes in support of Trump's military campaign in Iran.

"This war is driving up our energy bills and hurting Alaskans with no end in sight," she said earlier this month.

Both Peltola and Sullivan are staunch Israel supporters. Sullivan has voted repeatedly on pro-Israel measures in Congress, including sponsoring a measure to deepen military cooperation with the US ally.

When she served in the House of Representatives between 2023 and 2025, Peltola was one of the most uncompromising pro-Israel Democrats.

In 2024, she joined Republicans in voting to ban then-President Joe Biden from withholding weapons from Israel. She backed a bill to impose sanctions on the International Criminal Court in response to the arrest warrant against Netanyahu.

Ohio: Jon Husted (Republican incumbent) v Sherrod Brown (Democrat)

Former Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown is attempting to make a comeback in the Midwestern state that has been trending in Republicans' favour over the past decade.

He is taking on Jon Husted, who replaced Vice President JD Vance in the Senate after the Trump administration took office last year.

Beyond the single seat, the contest is of symbolic importance. It would restore the Democrats' competitive edge in the Midwestern state and serve as an early dig at Vance, who is expected to run for president in 2028.

Brown has made his opposition to the Iran war a key theme in his campaign.

"Jon Husted has voted 14 times to continue the reckless Iran war as gas and grocery prices continue to rise," he recently wrote in a social media post. "I’ll vote to end the war the first chance I get."

In March, Husted proclaimed that the war was going "much better than anyone thought it would".

But like other Republicans in competitive races, he has tempered his support for the conflict.

"The war needs to come to an end as quickly as possible so that we can lower gas prices," he told Politico earlier this month.

Husted and Brown are more closely aligned when it comes to Israel. Both are strong supporters of the US ally.

Ali Harb is a journalist based in Washington, DC. His work focuses on US foreign policy, elections, and Arab American communities

Follow him on X: @Harbpeace

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

For years, Serbia’s opposition has struggled to turn public discontent into a credible challenge to Aleksandar Vučić’s political dominance. On Sunday (25 October), a student-led movement that began with demands for accountability after a deadly train station collapse will attempt to do what established opposition forces have repeatedly failed to achieve: translate civic mobilisation into political change.

The upcoming parliamentary elections are about more than the (re)distribution of seats. They represent the endeavour citizens want and need in a democratic society.

For several years now, “the students operate according to the principles of direct democracy,” senior research associate at the University of Belgrade, Vasiljević told EUobserver. They gather in “plenums” and make collective decisions.

The motor behind that movement was anger. The lack of accountability after the collapse of a canopy at Novi Sad railway station on 1 November 2024, which killed 16 people was the main trigger.

Since then, protests have been taken place around in the country. Eventually, they grew into a nationwide challenge to the government. The student movement even marched from Belgrade to Brussels and Strasbourg to appeal to the EU institutions.

“It brought some irreversible changes that will have a lasting impact on society,” said Vasiljević.

And these changes could be now transposed into politics. “The country has been held captive for far too long by one ruling party and, in fact, one ruling elite,” Miloje Savić, a volunteering poll observer, told EUobserver.

For many Serbs, as for Savić, the students’ organisation represent “a tectonic shift in how society is organised and how it should function.”

The Student List, now the electoral vehicle for the mobilisation, has given people frustrated with established politics a new focus for their demands. The main idea being that political participation can be rebuilt from the ground up.

“It is not a good time to be living in Serbia. And during my life, I can’t remember a time when it was,” Ivan Bartoš, a 31-year-old organiser of student protests in Bački Petrovac told EUobserver.

Serbia, as many European countries, is suffering from an ageing population. It brings to the social debate a generational difference. On one side, the middle-aged and “corrupted” regime led by Vučić, on the other, a proposal of change without real political experience.

And the question that is heard in the run-up to the elections is “does Serbia need a professional politician who has been trained for years in kleptocracy, or is society willing to take a risk?”

Vučić’s ‘men in black’?

Yet the movement’s rise has exposed a fundamental tension: society may be changing faster than the institutions through which change must be delivered.

“The institutions have been captured and controlled by the regime. There is not enough institutional space to accommodate these political changes,” Vasiljević said.

Previous Serbian elections have been accompanied by allegations of vote-buying, voter intimidation and ballot-box stuffing. After the last ones, held in December 2023, European MP’s called for “independent investigations into the irregularities”.

Knowing what is at stake, the Student List is trained an unprecedented number of poll monitors (15,000), seeking to protect the vote and document potential irregularities.

Attacks on opposition representatives by groups of unidentified men dressed in black have repeatedly raised concerns during the rule of Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).

The media are not safe either.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

Egypt, a regional military power, has pledged to provide all forms of assistance to defend Saudi Arabia amid escalating Houthi attacks from Yemen, in a move aimed at maintaining its strategic position in the Gulf.

But analysts view another geopolitical objective behind the Egyptian support for Riyadh: countering Israel’s bid to play a security role in a region vital to Cairo’s political and economic interests.

On 17 October, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said Egypt would take any necessary measures to protect Saudi Arabia if Riyadh requested assistance. He called an emergency parliamentary session to authorise possible troop deployment.

The following day, the National Defence Council, Egypt’s top security body, pledged to provide all necessary and possible support to safeguard Saudi Arabia’s security, stability, and territorial integrity.

The Egyptian pledge came after US President Donald Trump said on 16 October that Israel had been helping Saudi Arabia counter Houthi attacks from Yemen and suggested Riyadh should accept further Israeli assistance.

It followed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Cairo last month to seek support against the Iran-backed Houthis. The visit highlighted the importance of Egyptian-Saudi coordination on issues affecting the Red Sea and wider regional stability.

For Cairo, which has longstanding strategic ties with Riyadh, the prospect of Israel becoming a more prominent security partner for the kingdom adds urgency to its efforts to reinforce its role in regional security.

“Egypt’s interest lies in doing everything possible to strengthen its ties with Saudi Arabia, or at least to ensure that its relationship with Riyadh is closer than Israel’s,” Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow at Chatham House in London, told The New Arab.

Strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia offers Egypt significant economic and geopolitical benefits as Cairo seeks foreign investment, financial support, and foreign currency. The kingdom is also important for millions of Egyptians working there, whose remittances provide a vital source of foreign currency.

Closer coordination with Riyadh also helps Egypt protect its interests in the Red Sea, particularly shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key route to the Suez Canal and a major source of revenue for Cairo.

During Trump’s first term, the US brokered the Abraham Accords in 2020 to normalise relations between Israel and Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia’s neighbours, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, allowing Tel Aviv to expand its economic, diplomatic, and security partnerships in the Gulf.

The American president has also pushed for normalising ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, but Riyadh insists that any normalisation depends on resolving the Palestinian issue, including the establishment of a Palestinian state.

If Riyadh accepts any Israeli assistance against Houthi attacks, cooperation in areas such as intelligence sharing and air defence could expand, potentially giving Israel a greater role in Gulf security.

For Egypt, that possibility raises concerns about a changing regional balance in which Israel could become a more influential security partner for Arab states traditionally linked to Cairo.

Cairo's bid to keep Israel at bay

“Egypt would oppose any attempt by Israel to become a player in the Arab world’s collective security, regardless of who was involved, and Saudi Arabia would certainly stand with Cairo. This means keeping Israel out of regional military and intelligence cooperation,” Egyptian military expert Samir Ragheb told The New Arab.

Egypt was the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, following decades of conflict and several wars, but their relations have remained largely cold despite formal diplomatic ties.

The relationship has been marked by mutual distrust, periodic tensions, and regional competition, particularly over Gaza and broader Middle East security arrangements.

Egyptian political analyst Mokhtar Ghobashi said Egypt’s pledge to defend Saudi Arabia could deter Israel from seeking a security role in the Gulf.

“Relying on Israel as a security guarantor for a country in the Arab world, amid divisions and conflicts between Arab states, is an extremely dangerous proposition,” he told The New Arab.

Since the 2020 Abraham Accords, security cooperation between Israel and some Gulf states has expanded, including arms sales and coordination on air and missile defence amid shared concerns over Iran.

Egypt’s support for Saudi Arabia reflects its interest in preserving its regional influence and maintaining a central role in shaping the security arrangements in the Middle East.

Cairo could face greater competition for influence if Riyadh turns to Israel for certain defence capabilities. While this would not necessarily weaken Egyptian-Saudi relations, it could reduce Egypt’s role in shaping the kingdom’s security policy.

The implications extend beyond bilateral relations. Closer security ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia could give Tel Aviv a greater role in shaping regional responses to threats, from Yemen’s Houthis to Iran.

Protecting Egypt's strategic interests

Red Sea security is another concern for Cairo. A broader Israeli security role in the Gulf could give Tel Aviv greater influence over decisions affecting the Bab el-Mandeb, a vital maritime corridor central to Egypt’s national interests.

Aboudouh said another objective behind Egypt’s pledge to defend Saudi Arabia is to protect its strategic interests in the Red Sea and around Bab el-Mandeb.

“Egyptian officials may have concluded that expanding the country’s regional role is now crucial to protecting maritime traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait against any Houthi attempt to exploit a conflict with Saudi Arabia to disrupt shipping, as they have done in the past,” he told The New Arab.

Egypt has been hard-hit by regional instability following Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip and Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea since 2023, losing an estimated around $20 billion in Suez Canal revenues.

Sisi framed Egypt’s potential role in Saudi Arabia as defensive, saying Cairo had no intention of attacking any party but was prepared to defend Saudi Arabia if requested. “We do not want to fight or attack anyone. We will only defend Saudi Arabia,” he said.

Egypt joined the Saudi-led coalition that intervened in Yemen against the Houthis in 2015, but its role remained limited. A deeper commitment now could expose Cairo to a costly conflict, particularly if operations extend beyond the defence of Saudi territory.

It could also strain Egypt’s resources and increase its exposure to instability along the Red Sea.

The extent and form of any Egyptian assistance will therefore be crucial. Intelligence-sharing, logistical support and maritime security cooperation would carry different risks from deploying troops to Yemen.

Cairo may seek to bolster Saudi Arabia’s defences while avoiding involvement in an open-ended conflict.

Mohamed Sabry is an Egyptian journalist based in Cairo with over two decades of experience covering Egypt, regional politics, foreign policy, and diplomacy. His work has appeared in Al-Monitor and InsideOver

Follow him on X: @MohamedSabry079

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

Don't ignore the Palestine issue because "it's complicated." It's un-complicated! Keep up in just a few minutes a day with IAK's curated and accurate Daily Updates.

The Houthis are seeking to manufacture parts of advanced Iranian-designed medium-range ballistic missiles inside Yemen, according to new research that raises questions about how effectively Saudi Arabia can interrupt the group’s ability to sustain its attacks.

In a report published on 14 October and previewed by The Wall Street Journal, Conflict Armament Research (CAR) identified components associated with the Iranian-designed Kheibar Shekan missile family alongside industrial equipment and raw materials in shipments intended for Houthi-controlled territory.

Shipping documents identified a Chinese supplier, suggesting that the group is expanding its procurement beyond Iran-linked networks.

The findings come as Riyadh faces repeated attacks on airports and other critical infrastructure. The strikes have disrupted aviation and exposed the costs of protecting a vast country against an adversary whose arsenal and methods have developed through years of war.

For Saudi Arabia, the concern extends beyond the specifications of an individual missile. A growing ability to source components, manufacture selected parts and adapt how different weapons are used could make the Houthi strike campaign more difficult to contain.

Beyond imported missile kits

The October report concerns four containers documented by Yemeni authorities in July 2026. They had arrived in Aden’s free zone aboard two vessels in June and October 2025, carrying shipments from China whose intended destination was the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah.

The cargo included machined components associated with the airframe and rocket motor of the Kheibar Shekan series, one of Iran’s most advanced and longest-range ballistic missiles, together with materials and machinery potentially useful for manufacturing and testing.

Their presence points towards an effort to produce parts locally, beyond reassembling weapons delivered in separate packages.

“Inspection of the cargo revealed Houthi ambitions to at least partially manufacture medium-range ballistic missiles inside Yemen,” Fabian Hinz, a senior analyst at CAR, told The New Arab. “Whether that effort has succeeded, remains a work in progress or has met major obstacles remains difficult to determine.”

Douglas Barrie, senior fellow for military aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), outlined a more limited scenario. “Final local assembly with domestic manufacturing of some components I think is most likely,” he told The New Arab.

The systems involved nevertheless represent a substantial ambition. Iran unveiled the original solid-propellant Kheibar Shekan in 2022, with a reported range of 1,450 kilometres. The missile was first used against targets in Syria in January 2024, and later against Israel and US bases in the MENA region.

CAR identifies several related variants in Houthi service, giving the group access to designs intended for long-range strikes and equipped with manoeuvring features that could complicate interception.

Earlier seizures show that the supply chain encompasses both weapons and the means to assemble or produce them. A shipment intercepted in Aden in August 2025, for example, included drone and propulsion-related equipment and advanced control components, according to US Central Command.

A separate CAR briefing, published in September, described missile kits bearing assembly labels that used Iranian rather than Houthi designations, suggesting they were produced in Iran. Broadening the supplier base would loosen that dependence.

“Sourcing components and raw materials from suppliers beyond Iran-linked networks can reduce dependence and potentially eliminate bottlenecks,” Hinz said. He cautioned that independence depends on the weapons involved: small drones built largely from commercial components are easier to manufacture than systems requiring specialised parts.

“For the more advanced weapons, the Houthis will likely continue to rely on the import of key subsystems, but further developing a domestic capability could increasingly allow for the manufacture of less sophisticated guided weapons. This would reduce dependency on external actors,” Barrie added.

Farzin Nadimi, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, sees the Chinese supply chain as a substitute for “the Iranian one, which has been severely hampered by the US naval blockade”.

The cargo documented by CAR arrived in 2025, before the current blockade, so such channels were already in use; they are likely to matter more now that Iranian routes are under pressure. Replacement has limits, however. “Houthis still depend on Iran for critical missile subsystems and guidance components,” Nadimi told The New Arab. “The Houthis cannot get those from China.”

Chinese suppliers, in other words, can provide raw materials and machined parts, but not the most sensitive components. Nor is the technology itself new. Kheibar Shekan and Fattah technology, Nadimi said, “has been transferred to Houthis for quite some time now”, though he could not say whether the group has incorporated “the latest upgrade kits”.

Iran unveiled the Fattah, which it describes as hypersonic, in 2023. The new evidence therefore concerns ambitions to manufacture parts locally, rather than the first acquisition of those technologies.

The concern predates CAR’s latest findings. On 11 September 2025, the US Treasury sanctioned Hubei Chica Industrial Co., Ltd., accusing the China-based supplier of coordinating with Houthi procurement operatives to provide chemical precursors used to manufacture ballistic missiles, explosives and other weapons inside Yemen.

The US Treasury also accused China-based Shenzhen Shengnan Trading of shipping dual-use electronics to Houthi front companies.

CAR’s evidence requires qualification. Shipping documents identified a Chinese precision-metal producer advertising custom aerospace components, but investigators have not traced the items with the manufacturer or independently verified the documentation. The findings do not establish Chinese government involvement, production volumes or a link to specific attacks on Saudi Arabia.

For Riyadh, this widens the interdiction challenge to commercial suppliers and intermediaries beyond Iran. It also gives the kingdom an incentive to seek Beijing’s cooperation on export controls and end-use checks.

An evolving strike campaign

The industrial investigation coincides with indications that the Houthis are refining how they employ their weapons. According to the Gulf Research Center, as of 15 October, the Houthis have staged at least 42 attacks on Saudi territory, including nine targeting Riyadh and five targeting energy infrastructure in the Eastern Province. At least one third of these raids involved ballistic missiles.

The Associated Press reported on 12 October that regional officials described drones preceding cruise and ballistic missiles in an attack on Riyadh airport. The sequence suggests an effort to combine weapons with different flight characteristics, although it remains unclear whether the drones acted as decoys.

“Houthis and Iranians have both tested hybrid tactics, and I am sure they compare notes too,” Nadimi told The New Arab.

Iran’s April 2024 attack on Israel combined drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, while its October 2024 attack relied exclusively on ballistic missiles. The strike on Riyadh airport followed the first pattern.

Mixed attacks require defenders to track threats across different altitudes and speeds, while repeated strikes keep personnel and equipment under pressure. Barrie cautioned that Kheibar Shekan-family missiles must be accounted for even if their actual performance falls short of advertised capabilities, “further complicating the challenges facing a defender”.

CAR’s September briefing identified another operational development: a reconnaissance drone helped cue a close-range ballistic missile against a time-sensitive target. This points to improvements in battlefield targeting, alongside the group’s expanding long-range strike capabilities.

Against Saudi Arabia, repeated attacks on airports and energy infrastructure aim to raise the costs of Riyadh’s intervention in Yemen, pressing the kingdom to scale back support for anti-Houthi forces and ease restrictions on Houthi-controlled ports and airports. The goal is bargaining power, without having to defeat Saudi forces directly.

Inside Yemen, the 15 October attack on Aden, which hit the presidential palace, exposed the internationally recognised government’s vulnerability at its own seat of power, while strikes on Marib appear intended to disrupt preparations for counteroffensives.

In the Red Sea, the threat to shipping gives the Houthis leverage over Riyadh and outside powers weighing intervention, on a trade route made more important by insecurity around the Strait of Hormuz. Their declared blockade of Saudi Arabia ties this maritime pressure to the campaign against the kingdom’s airports.

Together, these operations seek to protect Houthi territorial gains while raising the costs of attempts to reverse them. Greater military reach does not guarantee political concessions, however: attacks causing civilian casualties could instead harden Saudi resolve and draw greater external assistance.

Riyadh's containment dilemma

“They are already changing the battlefield around KSA,” Nadimi told The New Arab. For Saudi Arabia, the challenge is both immediate and cumulative: preventing the next strike while reducing the Houthis’ ability to keep launching them.

ACLED reported on 12 October that Houthi strikes and attempted strikes on Saudi territory had more than doubled over the preceding week. An airport need not be destroyed for airlines to suspend services.

Interception also consumes finite resources. Regional officials have reported pressure on Saudi interceptor stocks during the wider Iran war, making replenishment and outside assistance central to sustaining the defensive effort.

Offensive operations face a different problem: airstrikes can destroy launchers, depots and workshops, but suppressing the campaign means repeatedly locating assets that may be mobile, concealed or dispersed. Nor have Houthi air defences closed Yemeni airspace: CTP-ISW assessed on 15 October that the group’s occasional successful engagements had not significantly disrupted the Saudi air campaign.

Wider procurement networks and partial local manufacturing could make replenishment harder to interrupt, even without making the Houthis self-sufficient, while imported subsystems remain a point of vulnerability.

Riyadh’s challenge is to reduce both the group’s ability to rebuild its arsenal and the political leverage it derives from using it.

Francesco Salesio Schiavi is an Italian specialist in the Middle East. His focus lies in the security architecture of the Levant and the Gulf, with a particular emphasis on Iraq, Iran, and the Arab Peninsula, as well as military and diplomatic interventions by international actors

Follow him on X: @frencio_schiavi

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

On 5 October, Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces stopped a van with two people on board at the Dahr al-Baydar checkpoint.

When searched, authorities discovered and then seized about 780 kg of explosives, including TNT and Composition C-4 plastic.

The two people arrested were reportedly linked to Hezbollah. They were tasked with transporting the cargo from the Bekaa region to Beirut.

The reported involvement of Hezbollah members in the explosives seizure prompted a wave of accusations from the group’s political rivals, with some suggesting they could be used for internal political assassinations.

Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea called the seizure “the most dangerous incident in years”, saying the weapons were probably meant for use inside Lebanon.

Kataeb leader Samy Gemayel wrote they were probably intended for a new wave of assassinations like those between 2004 and 2008, including that of former prime minister Rafic Hariri in 2005.

Lebanon’s prime minister, Nawaf Salam, also noted that C-4 had been used in previous assassinations and promised a full investigation.

However, on 15 October, Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah acknowledged that the vehicle and its cargo belonged to the group. He denied allegations of an assassination plot and stated that the explosives are part of the capabilities Hezbollah uses against Israel, demanding the return of the shipment.

On the same day, US Secretary of State Marc Rubio reportedly called Lebanon’s President Joseph Aoun, urging him not to return confiscated explosives to Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s demand for the return of the explosives has further strained its relationship with a government that has banned the group’s military activity and is pushing to disarm it.

Israel's occupation creates openings for Hezbollah to rebuild

The discovery of explosive materials comes as Israel continues to occupy swathes of southern Lebanon and launch near-daily strikes despite a US-brokered ceasefire agreed in June.

Hezbollah has halted its attacks since then, but the seizure of explosives points to efforts to rebuild its military capabilities as the risk of renewed US-Iran conflict threatens to reignite the Lebanese front.

It is not uncommon for Hezbollah to use ceasefire windows to rebuild its capabilities following a conflict with Israel.

Between the November 2024 ceasefire that ended the Israel-Hezbollah war linked to Gaza and March 2026, reports indicate that the group has rebuilt its command structure and rearmed with assistance from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

David Wood, senior Lebanon analyst at the International Crisis Group (ICG), said that Israel’s continued occupation and attacks in Lebanon also contribute to the conditions that enable the group’s rebuilding.

“While it might be true that Hezbollah continues to operate militarily, despite the Lebanese government wanting to have a state monopoly over arms, it would be much harder for Hezbollah to do that if Israel were more willing to grant actual concessions as part of its negotiations with Lebanon and to create a viable and fair security arrangement between the two countries,” he told The New Arab.

The US-brokered framework signed in June between Lebanon and Israel has yielded limited results. Lebanon demands an end to Israeli attacks and occupation, the release of detainees, and the return of the displaced. Israel ties these conditions to Hezbollah’s disarmament, which the group rejects.

Israel has continued its military operations in southern Lebanon, occupying more than 600 square kilometres of Lebanese territory while conducting near-daily airstrikes, artillery fire, and home demolitions.

It has mostly levelled 48 of about 60 occupied southern Lebanese towns and villages. In September, Israeli forces took control of the strategic Ali al-Taher ridge near Nabatieh. They previously captured Beaufort Castle and crossed the Litani River.

Lebanon’s Health Ministry says more than 4,300 people have been killed since 2 March, following Hezbollah’s entry into the wider US-Iran war. Nearly 9,000 have been killed since 2023. Almost 330,000 people remain internally displaced.

Nicholas Blandford, a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programmes, told The New Arab that daily shelling and drone surveillance are ongoing, along with efforts to prevent reconstruction south of the Litani River, even outside the occupied zone.

“So in effect, the Israeli occupation extends far beyond where they are physically deployed. It's been quite intense over the last month,” he said.

Israel is also escalating threats to expand its southern Lebanon occupation. Last week, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz warned that Lebanon would lose Nabatieh and the Litani area to permanent Israeli control if Hezbollah joins Iran in attacking Israel.

A renewed Iran war could draw Lebanon back into conflict

In fact, US President Donald Trump is weighing fresh strikes against Iran, with Israel reportedly pushing for renewed hostilities. Iran is likewise preparing for war, and the conflict in Yemen further fuels regional escalation.

RANE’s lead MENA and defence analyst Freddy Khoueiry explained that repeated interceptions of weapons transfers in Syria and recent seizures of Hezbollah-linked material inside Lebanon show that the group is "clearly attempting to reconstitute parts of its military capability" to rebuild supply lines and replenish stock.

“Hezbollah is likely attempting to restore enough capability to at some point defend against a potential Israeli preemptive campaign and at the same time preserve the option to participate in another regional conflict involving Iran,” he told The New Arab.

For example, Khoueiry explained that seized TNT and C-4 could be used in explosive-drone payloads, rocket and missile warheads, and roadside bombs, mines and demolition charges against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon if conflict resumes.

Dual-use items like fibre-optic cables for drones could enter Lebanon through standard commercial channels, providing Hezbollah with an alternative route to Syria.

Hezbollah may be prioritising experimenting with and expanding the use of low-cost, fibre-optic-guided FPV drones, heavily deployed against Israeli troops in southern Lebanon before the June ceasefire, as they offer a cheap, effective, and hard-to-intercept option.

On the ground, the presence of Israeli troops in southern Lebanon may give Hezbollah an opening to use guerrilla tactics, such as small units staging hit-and-run attacks from familiar terrain. Its drone operations there could also expand the pool of trained drone operators.

Wood said that while Israel has vast military superiority, Hezbollah, this year, “has still managed to make a nuisance of itself”, demonstrating that “while it can't win a military victory over Israel, it can still inflict casualties”. Hezbollah drone attacks have reportedly killed at least 12 Israeli soldiers.

However, what Hezbollah’s role would be if the US and Israel resume strikes on Iran remains to be seen.

Blandford said that Hezbollah’s involvement would depend on Iran’s ability to absorb renewed US and Israeli attacks.

“The Iranians may conclude that if they can absorb fresh Israeli and US strikes, they don’t need to involve Hezbollah,” he said. However, if Iran deems additional pressure necessary, it may activate Hezbollah to engage Israel along the border, stretching and diverting Israel's resources.

Khoueiry further explained that Hezbollah’s weakened capabilities and fragile domestic position may limit its initial involvement, though opening a Lebanese front could pressure Israel and strengthen Hezbollah’s and Iran’s negotiating leverage.

“Hezbollah could specifically seek to link pressure on Israeli military presence inside of Lebanon and potentially northern Israel again to demand an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, while Tehran could again attempt to incorporate the Lebanese front into a broader regional ceasefire or negotiating framework,” he said.

However, other kinds of pressures are also likely to shape Hezbollah’s calculations. The Shia community, estimated at 32% of Lebanon’s population, has borne much of the war’s human cost during the war. Last week, Hezbollah announced plans to financially help families in Lebanon whose homes were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable.

Polls diverge on Shia support for Hezbollah’s weapons, with a May poll finding that most respondents opposed disarmament and a September survey finding that most favoured placing their weapons under state control, reflecting the complexity of the group’s relationship with its constituency.

Wood said that Hezbollah weighs the suffering of its constituency but, at the same time, also weighs its deep alliance with Iran.

The group also argues that disarmament would leave the Shia community and Lebanon “wide open to Israeli abuses,” and at times, it “has used those factors to justify its decision to enter conflict in Lebanon, in the knowledge that the Shia will first and foremost pay the price”.

Blandford also argued that if Hezbollah loses Shia support, “then the game is over.”

“It doesn't matter how many weapons or how much money the Iranians give Hezbollah; if they haven't got the support of the Shia community, it's finished.”

Dario Sabaghi is a freelance journalist interested in human rights 

Follow him on X: @DarioSabaghi

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

Talks in Oslo have restored diplomatic contact between Kyiv and Washington, but Donald Trump continues to demand concessions from Ukraine while Moscow shows little willingness to compromise. Steve Witkoff’s forthcoming meeting with Russian officials will expose the limits of the American peace initiative.

The latest negotiations over Russia’s war against Ukraine have produced a renewed diplomatic initiative, with US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff preparing to travel to St Petersburg on Wednesday, 21 October, following consultations with Ukrainian and European leaders in Oslo.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met Witkoff alongside Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb on Tuesday. Jared Kushner, Donald Trump’s son-in-law, participated remotely. The discussions covered territorial questions, security guarantees, sanctions and proposals for a partial ceasefire.

The meeting concluded with cautious expressions of optimism. Stubb suggested that the negotiating process was back on track, while Støre confirmed that Witkoff would present proposals developed by American, Ukrainian and European representatives to the Russian leadership.

However, the diplomatic improvement contrasts with Trump’s renewed public pressure on Zelenskyy, raising questions about Washington’s negotiating strategy and whether Moscow has any intention of accepting the proposed settlement.

Washington’s contradictory signals

Speaking in the Oval Office on Tuesday, Trump again insisted that Ukraine must reach an agreement with Russia, portraying Moscow’s military position as increasingly advantageous.

His remarks closely resembled arguments advanced during earlier disputes with Zelenskyy, when Washington pressed Kyiv to accept territorial concessions rather than increase pressure on the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to reassure the Ukrainian leadership that American military cooperation had not been deliberately restricted.

Rubio denied that Trump had ordered changes to intelligence-sharing or weapons assistance. Zelenskyy subsequently confirmed that Ukraine was again receiving American early-warning intelligence concerning Russian ballistic missile attacks.

Nevertheless, serious problems remain. Ukraine has reported delays in deliveries of American-made Patriot interceptors purchased by European allies, while restrictions affecting the military Starshield satellite communications system have not been fully resolved.

These difficulties are particularly serious as Russia intensifies attacks against Ukrainian electricity infrastructure, attempting to undermine civilian services ahead of winter.

The conflicting signals leave Kyiv negotiating with an administration whose diplomatic representatives promise continued cooperation while its president publicly demands Ukrainian concessions.

Security guarantees without NATO membership

Among the proposals discussed in Oslo were security arrangements intended to provide Ukraine with protection comparable to NATO’s Article 5 collective-defence provision.

Zelenskyy acknowledged that American representatives had discussed such guarantees, although their precise obligations and enforcement mechanisms remain undisclosed.

The proposal presents a fundamental negotiating problem.

Russia has consistently opposed Ukrainian NATO membership, partly because the alliance’s collective-defence commitments would increase the consequences of any renewed Russian aggression.

An alternative arrangement offering genuinely comparable protection would consequently encounter many of the same Russian objections.

Conversely, guarantees lacking a credible enforcement mechanism would leave Ukraine exposed to another attack after a ceasefire.

Moscow’s record provides little reassurance. Russia violated Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders in 2014 and launched its full-scale invasion in 2022 despite previous commitments to respect Ukrainian sovereignty.

The Kremlin’s objectives extend beyond territory

Washington’s approach appears increasingly concentrated on securing an agreement involving territorial concessions and restrictions on Ukraine’s future security arrangements.

Yet Putin’s objectives have consistently extended beyond the territories occupied by Russian forces.

The Kremlin has demanded constraints on Ukraine’s military capabilities, international alliances and strategic independence. Accepting territorial gains alone would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s wider political ambitions.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has maintained that Moscow is unwilling to make substantial political concessions, while the Kremlin continues to insist that any agreement must address what it describes as the underlying causes of the conflict.

Those conditions have previously included demands that would substantially restrict Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Consequently, even a Ukrainian willingness to consider elements of Washington’s proposals would not guarantee Russian acceptance.

The political calculation behind an energy ceasefire

One possibility under consideration is a limited ceasefire protecting energy and potentially food-related infrastructure.

Zelenskyy has indicated that Ukraine could suspend attacks against Russian energy facilities if Moscow stopped striking Ukrainian infrastructure.

Such an arrangement could reduce immediate civilian suffering. It would also have military and economic consequences.

Ukrainian attacks against Russian refineries, oil terminals and other energy installations have increasingly targeted infrastructure supporting Moscow’s war economy.

A temporary suspension could allow Russia to repair damaged facilities, restore production and stabilise export revenues. Without credible monitoring and enforcement, Moscow could exploit a limited agreement while leaving the wider conflict unresolved.

Trump has additional reasons to seek a rapid diplomatic result. With American congressional elections scheduled for 3 November, his administration is attempting to contain domestic fuel prices and demonstrate progress towards ending the war.

His recent decision to ease restrictions on Russian diesel exports has already provoked concern in Kyiv and European capitals over the potential financial benefits to Moscow.

The danger for Ukraine is that an agreement presented as a diplomatic achievement in Washington could provide Russia with economic relief without altering its military objectives.

The decision awaiting Washington

Witkoff’s visit to St Petersburg will establish whether Moscow is prepared to engage with the proposals developed in Oslo.

Putin could accept a temporary arrangement, particularly one suspending Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, while postponing discussions over territorial and political questions.

Alternatively, Moscow could reject the initiative and maintain its existing demands.

In either case, Washington will face a decision over the consequences of Russian intransigence.

For Kyiv, continued engagement with the United States remains essential because American intelligence, satellite communications and advanced air-defence weapons cannot readily be replaced.

But the prospects for a negotiated settlement will depend less on further Ukrainian concessions than on whether Russia faces sufficient political, military and economic pressure to abandon its maximalist demands.

The Oslo negotiations have restored cooperation between Ukraine, Europe and American mediators. They have not established that Putin is prepared to end the war on terms compatible with Ukraine’s continued independence.

Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has rejected calls to reconsider his government’s direction after a crushing Senate election defeat, as the opposition strengthens its position and fresh disputes over Russia, European funding and domestic reforms add to his difficulties.

Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has ruled out changing his government’s policies despite a humiliating defeat in the Senate elections, in which his ANO movement failed to win a single seat. The result has strengthened the parliamentary opposition and intensified questions over the political direction of his coalition, less than a year after it took office.

Speaking after a cabinet meeting on Monday, 19 October, Babiš insisted that the election results would have no effect on the functioning of his government or its alliance with the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party and the Motorists movement. His administration would continue implementing its programme, including controversial changes to public broadcasting and proposed legislation regulating the financing of non-governmental organisations.

The prime minister’s refusal to reconsider his government’s agenda has drawn criticism from Senate president Miloš Vystrčil, who accused Babiš of transferring responsibility for the defeat to regional party organisations rather than accepting personal accountability.

A defeat with consequences beyond the Senate

The elections, held on 9–10 and 16–17 October, concerned 27 of the Senate’s 81 seats. ANO entered 13 candidates in the second-round contests, but every one of them lost. The party’s representation consequently fell to 14 senators.

Babiš called the outcome “catastrophic”, acknowledging a result that was particularly damaging given ANO’s success in the 2024 Senate elections and its subsequent victory in the October 2025 parliamentary contest.

The opposition Mayors and Independents movement (STAN) emerged as the strongest performer, with ten successful candidates or endorsed contenders. The centre-right Civic Democratic Party (ODS) secured seven seats, maintaining its position at the head of the Senate’s largest parliamentary group alongside TOP 09.

In an interview published on 20 October, Vystrčil said the results demonstrated that Babiš’s personal electoral appeal did not translate into successful Senate campaigns. He also criticised the prime minister’s response to the defeat, describing his attempts to blame regional organisations as an evasion of leadership responsibility.

The vote followed municipal elections in which ANO lost ground in several important urban centres, while SPD also suffered substantial losses.

Opposition leadership becomes the next political contest

STAN leader Vít Rakušan has interpreted the result as evidence that his movement can become ANO’s principal national challenger.

The party’s Senate performance followed a strong showing in municipal elections, including victory in Prague, where its leading candidate Petr Hlaváček is seeking to form the next city administration.

The movement’s growing appeal is supported by recent opinion polling. A Median electoral model published on 17 October, based on September interviews, placed ANO at 29.5 per cent, STAN at 17 per cent and ODS at 12.5 per cent.

Yet STAN’s ambitions face competition from within the opposition. ODS retains substantial institutional influence through the Senate, while the Christian Democrats’ new leader, Jan Grolich, is increasingly discussed as another possible contender for national opposition leadership.

The opposition’s unity is also less straightforward at municipal level. In Ostrava, ANO has negotiated a local governing agreement with Starostové pro Ostravu and the Ostravak movement, illustrating the flexibility of local political alliances.

Russia policy brings fresh controversy

The electoral setback coincides with renewed controversy over the Czech government’s approach to Russia.

On 19 October, Foreign Minister Petr Macinka, leader of the Motorists, defended his decision not to support a Finnish initiative calling for tighter European Union restrictions on entry visas for Russian citizens.

The proposal, promoted by Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen, sought stronger EU-wide restrictions on non-essential travel by Russian nationals, including tourists, against a background of growing concerns over Russian sabotage and hybrid operations.

According to details of the diplomatic disagreement, senior Czech foreign ministry officials had recommended supporting the initiative.

Macinka argued that Prague already maintained extensive national restrictions and had previously endorsed a comparable Estonian proposal. He questioned the effectiveness of the Finnish initiative, which attracted limited support from other EU governments.

The disagreement comes as Czech security policy remains under scrutiny. On Tuesday, 20 October, the National Security Council discussed the country’s security outlook, military development plans and changes to NATO’s air and missile defence implementation arrangements.

The issue exposes a continuing area of contention between Babiš’s coalition and opposition parties favouring closer coordination with Ukraine’s European supporters.

Brussels presents another challenge

Meanwhile, Babiš faces unresolved questions concerning his former business conglomerate Agrofert and access to European Union funding.

The European Commission has maintained restrictions on certain EU reimbursements after concluding that the trust arrangement involving Babiš’s business interests does not sufficiently address the potential conflict of interest.

The measures affect particular cohesion-fund expenditure and rural development reimbursements, rather than all EU agricultural payments. Babiš has maintained that the arrangements governing his business interests comply with the law.

The dispute carries particular significance as Prague participates in negotiations over the EU’s next long-term budget, covering 2028–2034.

At the European Council summit on 15–16 October, Babiš argued for protecting national allocations of EU funds, revisiting aspects of the emissions trading system and addressing high industrial energy costs. These negotiations will continue while the Commission’s concerns about his business arrangements remain unresolved.

Government retains power despite opposition gains

The Senate defeat does not threaten Babiš’s parliamentary majority. The lower chamber can override most Senate objections to ordinary legislation, and the governing parties continue to command sufficient support to pursue their programme.

The September Median model projected that ANO, SPD and the Motorists would retain 107 seats in the 200-member Chamber of Deputies, only slightly below their current combined strength.

Nevertheless, the elections have given the opposition a stronger platform for challenging the government over public broadcasting, European relations, defence policy and constitutional legislation, where the Senate possesses more substantial powers.

The immediate political contest is therefore not over the survival of Babiš’s government, but over whether STAN can convert its regional and Senate successes into a credible national alternative before the next parliamentary elections. For Babiš, whose party remains the largest in the country, the more pressing difficulty is its inability to defeat opposition candidates when elections are decided beyond ANO’s established electoral base.

Israel withholds shelter from Gazans ■ US ignores American citizens attacked in West Bank ■ Another Palestinian dies in prison ■ More.

Baku - "The European Parliament consists of these Islamophobes, and this must always remain in focus," Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said on 15 September, accusing the West of waging an "undeclared war" against Islam.

Yet just days later, the Azerbaijani government stepped up its enforcement of restrictions on Islamic headscarves in schools, triggering social media campaigns and protests both inside the country and abroad.

This is not the first time Azerbaijan has attempted to ban the hijab in schools. WikiLeaks cables revealed that, as early as 2007, Ramiz Mehdiyev, then head of the Presidential Administration, had expressed concern over the growing number of women wearing headscarves.

He reportedly outlined the government’s intention to introduce school uniforms prohibiting the hijab as a preventive measure, warning that the trend would otherwise become impossible to stop.

In November 2010, the Education Ministry’s decision to prohibit the hijab in schools sparked mass protests in Baku, Ganja, and other cities. As a result, in the years that followed, restrictions were enforced inconsistently, leaving the issue in a legal and administrative grey zone.

The 21 September measure, however, signals a renewed determination to enforce the ban. Although it does not explicitly prohibit the hijab, the authorities rely on school uniform regulations and the principle of secular education to justify restrictions on religious headwear.

Unlike in 2010, the latest enforcement also affects teachers. Videos showing distressed students in tears and parents protesting outside schools have circulated on social media.

Hundreds of people have reportedly been detained amid the wider crackdown.

There have also been reports of women in other public-sector workplaces being pressured to remove their headscarves, suggesting that the issue may extend beyond the education system.

Azerbaijan’s religious landscape is already subject to extensive state control. Since the early 2000s, the country’s religious policy has shifted towards increasingly restrictive regulation.

Successive legislative amendments have narrowed the space for religious freedom, including through restrictions on public religious gatherings and foreign-trained religious preachers, mosque closures, and state control over the appointment of mosque imams.

The Shia Muslim community, which constitutes the majority of the country’s Muslim population, has faced particular scrutiny. A list of 322 political prisoners published by Azerbaijani rights monitors on 5 October included 178 religious believers, making them the largest category on the list.

By presenting the hijab as a “Persian-Arab value” alien to Azerbaijani national identity, the authorities portray restrictions on religious expression as a defence of national identity and sovereignty.

Pro-government media and commentators have framed the controversy as a national security issue, linking visible Islamic dress to alleged Iranian influence and associating the protests with Tehran.

Importantly, this framing also reinforces Baku’s preferred international image as a secular state and a reliable partner for Western governments.

The rift with Turkey

The controversy opened an unusual fault line between Azerbaijan and Turkey. Turkish social media had already been awash with criticism over Baku’s decision to keep its representative in the UN General Assembly hall during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech in September.

The Turkish delegation joined representatives of numerous other countries in walking out during the address, amid widespread condemnation of genocide in Gaza.

Azerbaijan’s subsequent hijab restrictions further intensified this criticism, bringing renewed attention to the tension between Baku’s invocation of Muslim solidarity, its domestic religious policies, and its relationship with Israel.

Protestors staged demonstrations outside Azerbaijan’s embassy and consulate in Turkey.

In an address to a convention of his ruling New Azerbaijan Party (NAP) in Baku on 2 October, Aliyev criticised unnamed actors for interfering in Azerbaijan's domestic affairs.

“Everyone should know their place; they should not interfere in our affairs, stick their noses into our way of life, or tell us what to do. Everyone should mind their own nation and state,” he said.

Although Aliyev did not explicitly name Turkey, his remarks were widely interpreted as a rebuke to Turkish critics. This was particularly notable because, at the time, no Turkish government official had publicly commented on the headscarf restrictions in Azerbaijan.

That changed when Oktay Saral, a chief adviser to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, described the exclusion of hijab-wearing students from schools as “unacceptable” and expressed hope that Azerbaijan would “correct this mistake” soon.

Leyla Şahin Usta, deputy parliamentary group chair of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), also criticised the restrictions. Sharing a video of the controversy on X, she wrote: “We hope Azerbaijan will reverse this mistake as soon as possible. These distressing images are unbecoming of the modern world.”

The issue is particularly sensitive for the AKP, whose rise was partly shaped by opposition to restrictions on Islamic dress following Turkey’s 28 February 1997 military-led intervention, known as the “postmodern coup."

Yet the criticism was not confined to the ruling party. Politicians from across Turkey’s political spectrum also spoke out against the restrictions, suggesting that the controversy had become a broader public issue rather than an exclusively partisan dispute.

Baku, nonetheless, views the criticism from Turkey as a campaign backed by Ankara.

After Saral’s X post, in a statement, the NAP accused Ankara of fomenting “artificial tensions” between the two countries. It also alleged that Turkish media outlets close to the AKP government were publishing reports about Baku that were “contrary to the facts” and warned that the controversy could damage bilateral relations.

The statement went further, rejecting what it called attempts to distort Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel and the accusations directed at Baku over those ties. It defended the relationship as one based on international law and mutual interests.

The response suggests that Baku views the controversy not simply as criticism of its domestic religious policies but also as a challenge to its right to pursue an independent foreign policy.

What's next?

Despite the increasingly sharp rhetoric, a major deterioration in Azerbaijani-Turkish relations remains unlikely.

The two countries maintain deep strategic, military, and economic ties, giving both governments strong incentives to contain disagreements rather than allow them to escalate.

Although Turkish officials did not directly escalate the dispute with public counter-accusations, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan addressed the tensions during his 15 October visit to Baku. He emphasised the countries’ shared history and their ability to manage differences without undermining their strategic relationship.

“There is no need for these issues to be turned into a propaganda tool through social media,” he said.

Yet the recurring controversies expose tensions beneath the familiar rhetoric of the “one nation, two states” alliance. This is particularly significant as tensions between Turkey and Israel continue to grow.

From Israel’s perspective, such disputes create a potential strategic advantage, as they expose the limits of Azerbaijani-Turkish solidarity. Baku’s decision to bring Israeli President Isaac Herzog to the CICA summit aboard a scheduled Azerbaijan Airlines passenger flight is particularly telling.

The aircraft crossed Turkish airspace despite Ankara’s restrictions on Israeli government aircraft.

The arrangement underscored the contrast between Turkey’s efforts to isolate Israel and Azerbaijan’s continued willingness to facilitate high-level Israeli engagement.

It may reinforce suspicions in Turkey that Baku’s strategic partnership with Israel places limits on the solidarity Ankara can expect from its closest regional ally.

Rovshan Mammadli is a Baku-based journalist and independent analyst. Holding a BA in Israel and Middle East Studies and an MA in International Policy Studies, he focuses on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, Middle East politics, and peace and security in the South Caucasus. 

Follow him on X: @MammadliRovshan

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

Zelenskyy’s urgent discussion with the US Secretary of State suggests that Washington cannot pursue accommodation with Moscow without confronting opposition in Congress, the requirements of American national security and Ukraine’s continuing dependence on US military support.

The telephone conversation between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Tuesday, 20 October, has exposed an increasingly uncomfortable contradiction in American policy towards Russia. While President Donald Trump is easing economic pressure on Moscow and attempting to restrain Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, senior members of his administration are having to address the consequences for Ukraine’s defence.

Zelenskyy raised three immediate concerns: the availability of Patriot interceptor missiles, interruptions to American early-warning intelligence concerning Russian ballistic attacks, and restrictions affecting Starlink and Starshield satellite communications. He described the discussion as constructive, expressing appreciation for Rubio’s willingness to help.

The significance lies less in the diplomatic language than in the circumstances surrounding the call. Washington is attempting to obtain concessions from Moscow while several of its own decisions have weakened confidence in the security arrangements on which Kyiv depends. Rubio’s involvement suggests that these difficulties cannot simply be left unresolved while Trump’s envoys pursue another round of negotiations.

The political cost of concessions to Moscow

Trump’s recent decisions concerning Russian energy exports have brought an existing disagreement over Ukraine into American domestic politics.

The administration has facilitated Russian diesel exports and waived new sanctions under the Graham Act, legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia and its principal energy customers. Rubio has said the president will use a 60-day period to assess the economic consequences of implementing the measures.

For Trump, the immediate attraction is apparent. Rising fuel prices have become a political liability ahead of the 3 November congressional midterm elections. Increasing supplies on international markets offers the administration a potential means of relieving pressure on American consumers.

The difficulty is that concessions to Vladimir Putin carry their own electoral consequences. Moscow remains deeply unpopular among substantial sections of the American political establishment, including Republicans who regard support for Ukraine as a matter of American strategic interest.

That opposition is no longer confined to public criticism. Republican senators have joined Democrats in challenging decisions affecting Ukraine’s military capabilities, creating an additional problem for an administration already facing a difficult electoral environment.

Trump can justify Russian energy concessions as an attempt to protect American consumers. Explaining why Ukraine should simultaneously experience interruptions to critical defence systems is considerably more difficult.

Rubio and the machinery of American foreign policy

Rubio’s position within the administration is particularly important. As both Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, he occupies two offices central to the formulation and execution of American foreign policy.

His conversation with Zelenskyy took place during a diplomatic tour of Uzbekistan and India, demonstrating that the deterioration in relations with Kyiv required attention even while the administration was pursuing other international priorities.

It would be premature to interpret Rubio’s intervention as evidence of an independent foreign policy. There is no indication that he is acting against Trump’s instructions. The more plausible interpretation is that the administration recognises a need to contain the consequences of its recent decisions without requiring the president publicly to reverse his position.

The controversy surrounding Starshield is particularly revealing. Reuters reported that instructions to restrict the satellite service used by Ukrainian forces originated inside the White House. The officials cited did not identify who authorised the order, while the administration has denied Trump’s personal involvement.

Separately, Zelenskyy has reported failures to receive advance warnings of Russian ballistic attacks. The cause of those interruptions remains disputed.

These developments have already attracted congressional scrutiny. Republican Senator Thom Tillis and Democratic Senator Jeanne Shaheen led a bipartisan request for an investigation, warning that failures in communications and intelligence-sharing may have endangered American personnel in Ukraine.

Congress cannot directly manage the administration’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, its powers over expenditure, legislation and oversight make sustained opposition politically consequential, particularly when members of the president’s own party are involved.

Ukraine needs military assistance, not diplomatic promises

The immediate requirements in Kyiv are considerably more specific than the objectives being discussed in Washington’s diplomatic negotiations.

Ukraine needs reliable satellite communications, uninterrupted intelligence concerning incoming missiles and sufficient Patriot interceptors to defend its cities and critical infrastructure. Delays in any of these areas have consequences that cannot be addressed through declarations about a future peace settlement.

The shortage of Patriot missiles is particularly serious. Zelenskyy has complained that American authorisation is delaying deliveries under arrangements financed by European governments. Washington’s commitments elsewhere, including the Middle East, add further pressure to American air-defence inventories.

Meanwhile, preparations for new negotiations in Oslo involving American envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner continue. The involvement of European leaders may broaden the diplomatic discussion, but it does not resolve the central obstacle: Putin has offered no convincing indication that he is prepared to end the invasion on terms acceptable to Ukraine.

Proposals concerning Ukrainian elections, NATO membership or alternative negotiating arrangements remain subordinate to that problem. Without a ceasefire that can be enforced, even an agreement on the political framework for peace would leave fundamental questions of security unanswered.

The limits of presidential power

Trump retains substantial authority over American sanctions, military assistance and diplomatic engagement. Yet his ability to offer Moscow meaningful concessions is constrained by several factors beyond his immediate control.

Congress can challenge further attempts to weaken sanctions or restrict assistance. European governments maintain their own sanctions regimes and are not obliged to follow Washington’s approach. Ukraine retains considerable military capacity, including the ability to attack Russian energy facilities that contribute to financing the war.

Nor can the American president compel Putin to accept a settlement. If Russia calculates that continuing military operations offers greater advantages than negotiations, additional concessions from Washington may encourage Moscow to prolong the conflict rather than end it.

Rubio’s conversation with Zelenskyy therefore suggests that the administration is being forced to confront the practical consequences of its policy. An American president may seek improved relations with Moscow, but the institutional interests of the United States do not necessarily change with his personal diplomatic priorities.

For Kyiv, the question is whether those interests will translate into the continued supply of weapons, intelligence and communications support. Russia’s attacks will continue irrespective of the timetable established for American diplomatic initiatives.

Further information on policing of Drumcree expected to be revealed on day two of the Orange Order case

The proposal, often referred to as Section 219, would go far beyond agreements with Washington's closest allies

On 10 October, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree cancelling the legislative elections set for 28 November.

Instead, presidential and legislative polls will be held together on 11 September 2027. The decree followed approval by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and consultations with political factions.

The official explanation was Israel's occupation. Fatah officials insist that the movement was ready and that Israeli restrictions made a free, fair, and inclusive vote impossible. While that argument is real, it is also incomplete.

Read closely, the accounts of those around the decision point to three pressures converging at once: external obstacles that have not changed, rivalries inside Fatah that its own leaders acknowledge, and a factional dialogue that gave the leadership a consensual route away from a deadline its critics say it was not ready to meet.

The postponement is less a verdict on Israeli obstruction than a decision about who gets to shape the next Palestinian political order, and on what terms.

The official case

The decree lists various obstacles, including Israel's continuing offensive in Gaza, restrictions on the movement of the Central Elections Commission and observers, and the impossibility of voting in occupied East Jerusalem given Israel's position.

Restrictions on movement, settlement expansion, and settler attacks across the West Bank were also cited, as were the exceptional security and humanitarian conditions in Gaza.

Fatah insists its own machinery was not the problem.

“We prepared seriously for these elections,” Tayseer Nasrallah, a member of Fatah's Revolutionary Council, told The New Arab.

“We mobilised our organisational structures in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, held meetings and electoral assemblies to choose our candidates, and we were about to register our official list with the Central Elections Commission.”

He rejects the suggestion that internal weakness forced the delay. “Organisational unreadiness and internal disagreements were not the direct reason for the postponement,” he said.

“Creating the right conditions for voting and guaranteeing that our people can take part in every area are among the biggest challenges that must be dealt with before elections are held.”

The obstacles are not invented. But the decree itself describes them as continuing, meaning they were already in place when the November date was set. Nothing in it explains why they should have been lifted by September 2027.

As a full explanation of why this vote was cancelled at this moment, the occupation argument does too little work on its own.

The fault lines inside Fatah

The harder question is what was happening inside the ruling movement.

“The disputes inside Fatah, whether between its leadership centres or with the Democratic Reform Current, have left their mark on the preparations for the elections,” said Noaman al-Abed, a writer and political analyst.

“These disputes came alongside questions about how ready the factions actually are,” he told The New Arab, “and whether they can provide the political, field, and logistical conditions needed, especially in Jerusalem and Gaza.”

Al-Abed's sharpest criticism is aimed at the mechanism Fatah used to pick its candidates. “The experience of the electoral assemblies inside Fatah has deepened the organisational divisions,” he said. “It is doubtful how far they included the different currents within the movement”.

This is where the power dynamics sit. Candidate selection decides who rises inside a movement and who is left out. A process that rival currents see as exclusive does not settle internal contests; it pushes them toward the ballot box, where they can split the vote.

The postponement halted that process: the same decision froze the work of the electoral assemblies for the Palestinian National Council. Folding the presidency into the same ballot raises the stakes further for whoever controls the list.

Fatah's leaders do not deny the rifts. They simply deny that the rifts decide anything.

“Differences within Fatah are not new,” Nasrallah said. “The movement has always dealt with them through internal dialogue”.

Wasel Abu Youssef, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, puts Israel's continuing aggression and the obstacles to the vote first, alongside the need for a comprehensive national dialogue.

Yet even this defence concedes the central point. If the delay was needed to secure consensus, then consensus was missing. The internal divide may not be the only cause of the postponement, but it is part of what made the November date untenable.

Consensus as cover - and leverage

The delay was not announced as a Fatah decision. It was framed as a response to the factions.

“Fatah respected the outcomes of the dialogue held in Cairo with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Hamas,” Nasrallah said, “and conveyed them to the movement's leadership bodies before the procedures for the postponement were completed”.

The decision was presented as answering factional initiatives, above all the PFLP's. On 10 October, the same day as the decree, the PFLP welcomed the change of date and the freezing of the National Council assemblies. It called for a comprehensive national dialogue based on its initiative, "A Roadmap for National Salvation".

That dialogue, it said, should end the division, restore national unity, and rebuild the political system on democratic and participatory foundations, with all forces taking part.

Abu Youssef echoed that agenda. “We need a comprehensive national dialogue that rearranges the internal Palestinian situation, ends the division and produces a consensus guaranteeing that all factions take part in the elections,” he said, adding that contacts with the factions and Egyptian officials were continuing.

“The aim of dialogue must be to end the division and strengthen national unity, so that elections become a means of renewing legitimacy and ordering Palestinian institutions, not an additional cause of fragmentation.”

This framing does two things. A delay requested by a faction outside Fatah reads as national consensus rather than self-interest, which gives the leadership cover. It also changes the question. The debate is no longer only about when Palestinians vote, but about the terms of the political system they vote into, with Hamas at the table in Cairo.

That is a bigger prize, and a riskier one. Whoever shapes the dialogue now shapes the timetable.

“Fatah is ready to abide by the outcomes of the dialogue and the national understandings that are reached,” Nasrallah said. Whether those understandings become concrete, enforceable steps is what the PFLP's roadmap, and the credibility of the delay, will depend on.

The international pressure test

The one clear dissent came from outside. In a statement on 14 October, the European Union expressed regret at the postponement of legislative and presidential elections until September 2027. It stressed the importance of holding them as soon as possible and said it stood ready to support the process, including through an EU observation mission.

Fatah's answer was to redirect the pressure. “Fatah respects the European Union's position rejecting the postponement,” Nasrallah said, “but we ask that this position be matched by political pressure on the occupation government to remove the obstacles hindering the work of the Central Elections Commission, and to guarantee freedom of movement and participation in the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and in the Gaza Strip”.

Abu Youssef framed it as a diplomatic task. “We must keep communicating with European states and the international parties concerned, explain the impact of the occupation's measures on the possibility of holding elections, and work to build an international position that guarantees their integrity and transparency,” he said.

The exchange sets a test for both sides. If Israeli obstruction is the main barrier, European pressure and an observer mission are the remedy Fatah says it wants. If the leadership does not take up that offer with a clear plan, the occupation argument will look more like a shield for internal problems than a reason.

A new deadline, an old political crisis

No single factor explains the postponement. Israeli obstruction is a real barrier to voting across the Palestinian territories. Fatah's internal rifts are real too, and its leaders' insistence on consensus shows the movement was not ready to face voters divided. The factional dialogue gave the leadership a way to turn that weakness into a national project.

The risk is that the delay becomes the outcome. “Repeated postponement of the elections may deepen the crisis of trust between citizens and the Palestinian leadership,” al-Abed warned, “and raise doubts about how serious the commitment is to renewing legitimacy through the ballot box”.

His prescription is simple.

“Overcoming this requires a clear date, early preparation and the political and organisational guarantees needed to hold the elections,” he said.

The postponement has bought eleven months. Its value will be judged by one measure: whether the dialogue produces a national consensus that clears the way for free and fair elections and renews Palestinian legitimacy, or whether divisions and obstacles push the vote back again and deepen the crisis of trust.

Monjed Jadou is a Palestinian journalist and founder of Palestine News Network (PNN), an independent Palestinian media network. He has contributed to international and regional media outlets. His work focuses on Palestinian affairs, independent journalism, media freedom, and promoting the principles of editorial independence and professional journalism in Palestine

This story was produced in collaboration with Egab

Edited by Charlie Hoyle