The Executive plans to cut the budget in social areas such as public health and energy subsidies for vulnerable sectors.
On Thursday, Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella dismissed Interior Minister Rodrigo Lara following the crisis triggered by the failure of the 2027 National Budget bill in Congress.
The controversy arose after the Senate and the House of Representatives approved different versions of the budget without reaching a consensus before the constitutional deadline for the legislative process.
Faced with the impossibility of passing the initiative through parliamentary means, the government decided to use a decree to implement the national budget for the next fiscal year.
Senator Esmeralda Hernandez criticized the procedure followed during the legislative debate and attributed the failure to irregularities and errors committed during the discussion of the bill.
According to complaints, the version of the budget decreed by the Executive includes cuts in social areas such as public health, energy subsidies for vulnerable sectors, and programs for senior citizens.
The Colombian Congress approved a 634.9 trillion peso ($201.14 billion USD) national budget for 2027, cutting funding for peace accord bodies while increasing debt service and defense allocations.#Newspic.twitter.com/FqIZRk6t8s
To replace Lara, the president appointed Alejandro Ordoñez, former Attorney General and former ambassador to the Organization of American States, as the new Minister of the Interior. Ordoñez is one of the most prominent figures in Colombia’s conservative sector.
He served as Attorney General from 2009 to 2016, a period marked by controversial decisions, including the dismissal of Gustavo Petro, then-mayor of Bogota, a decision later overturned by international bodies.
While his appointment is being formalized, the Ministry of the Interior will be led on an interim basis by Minister of Justice Ivan Cancino, amid concerns about the country’s projected fiscal deficit.
The government confirmed that it will use the mechanism provided for in the budget legislation to directly enact the 2027 budget, arguing that this measure will guarantee the functioning of the State following the failure of the legislative process.
#Colombia | Artists and cultural workers rallied outside the Culture Ministry in Bogotá against a proposed nearly 30% cut to the sector’s 2027 budget. Demonstrators demanded funding for cultural programs and payment for artistic work, warning the cuts are already affecting the… pic.twitter.com/lhtVLTRY0V
The European Parliament overwhelmingly supported an increased budget and scope for the Erasmus+ student-exchange programme under the new EU budget on Thursday (22 October).
The plenary in Strasbourg opted for a €7bn increase in Erasmus+’s budget compared to the commission’s proposal, by 454 votes, with 34 abstentions, against 93, mostly from right-wing parties.
And it was an audacious move, seeing as ‘frugal’ EU capitals are pushing for €150bn of cuts to the commission’s draft.
But even a “slight increase” in Erasmus+ funds would mean more opportunities for thousands of people, said Bogdan Zdrojewski, a Polish centre-right MEP, who was the rapporteur on the file, during a parliamentary debate earlier on Wednesday.
Celebrating its 40th anniversary in 2027, Erasmus+ enables young people to study, live, and work in foreign countries both inside the 27 EU states and the programme’s 160 “associate” states worldwide.
Some 17 million people have taken part since it began, with an estimated 1 million babies also born to couples who met on exchange, in what the commission has long used as a flagship PR project for creating a feel-good factor about the EU.
Meanwhile, the UK will rejoin the programme in 2027, which means EU students will once more have the opportunity to also spend a semester in Britain, which hosts some of Europe’s and the world’s top universities.
And the parliament would also welcome Canada’s full participation in a few years’ time, Zdrojewski told press on Wednesday.
The EU Parliament would like to expand Erasmus+ to more vocational training. “Erasmus+ will be a programme for Europeans no matter what age, what stage of life,” Zdrojewski said.
And students from poorer homes should get more support to live in pricey cities abroad, he added.
The share of Erasmus+ participants who had fewer opportunities to travel under the present structure stood at 15 percent in 2023 – up from 10 percent only two years earlier, according to a commission evaluation.
“Far too often, it is still the parents’ financial situation that determines who can take part in Erasmus+ and who cannot,” said Sabrina Repp, a German socialist MEP, in Wednesday’s debate in Strasbourg.
Working students often cannot afford to quit their current job to go abroad, she added: “That is precisely what we must change.”
The EU budget talks are to be finalised early next year.
Some 83 percent of Erasmus+ participants say they gained professional skills that helped them in the labour market.
But in order for those opportunities to be available more widely, “we need more funding for this programme,” also said Lucia Yar, a Slovak liberal MEP in the Strasbourg debate.
Ukraine is heading into 2027 with a rising fiscal gap. Growth forecasts have been cut, inflation is rising, and the need for external financing seems to just keep going up. The economy is being squeezed by a labor market drained by mobilization and emigration, energy infrastructure has been decimated, and
Kemi Badenoch has said a "red warning light" is flashing on the economy as Britain's debt tops £3 trillion for the first time and inflation surges to 3.5% ahead of the Budget next week.
The EU is pressing allies, such as the UK, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Norway, to help close a €70bn shortfall in Ukraine’s funding for next year, after president Volodymyr Zelensky warned that the war will cost €155bn in 2027.
EU Council president António Costa told MEPs in Strasbourg on Wednesday (21 October) that member states already provided 80 percent of external aid to Ukraine and “international partners must also step up their efforts”.
“Our commitment to peace must go hand in hand with sustained pressure on the aggressor,” he also said, after meeting Zelensky at an EU summit in Brussels last week.
European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen also told MEPs on Wednesday: “The war will not be decided on the frontline; the war will be decided in our political will, in whether we stand up for freedom and democracy and support our Ukrainian friends.”
Zelensky’s €155bn figure refers to Ukraine’s total war-related spending in 2027, part of which Kyiv covers from its own budget.
But that still left a €70bn gap that Ukraine needed foreign partners to fill, as next year approached.
The EU has already agreed a €90bn loan covering 2026 and 2027, meant to meet two-thirds of Ukraine’s financing needs over that period.
The remaining third was supposed to come from other partners, but so far that money has been secured only for 2026, not for 2027.
Costa told MEPs on Wednesday that €16bn had been disbursed this year under the defence line of the loan, while another €17bn could be sent to Ukraine if anti-corruption reforms were implemented.
“Our determination to support Ukraine and its people is stronger than ever,” he said.
EU hopes for Ukraine cash from allies
Meanwhile, EU commissioner Maroš Šefčovič also indicated on Monday that Britain will be asked to increase funding to Ukraine, speaking ahead of an EU-UK summit on 20 November.
“Following the signature of a contribution agreement on 13 July 2026, the UK can now participate under the EU’s €90bn Ukraine support loan,” he said.
Both the EU and UK would support Ukraine “as long as it takes to bring Russia’s illegal war of aggression to an end”, Šefčovič added.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
Portugal’s Socialist Party is bringing together its main leaders today to discuss the position to take in the vote on the State Budget for 2027 (OE2027). The party’s secretary-general, José
Europe wants cheaper energy, stronger industries, secure borders and the capacity to sustain Ukraine. Its budget negotiations are exposing the difficulty of paying for those ambitions while protecting established spending programmes and containing national contributions.
Wednesday’s European Parliament debate on the October EU summit brought that contradiction into focus. The dispute over the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework is becoming a test of whether Europe can translate geopolitical urgency into durable financial commitments.
According to Parliament’s account of the debate, European Council President António Costa wants agreement before the year’s end. He advocated an ambitious budget while keeping national contributions reasonable, alongside progress on new EU revenue sources.
Those objectives are politically attractive. Reconciling them will require difficult choices over spending, taxation and the distribution of authority.
MEPs challenged the assumption that the Union can keep expanding its responsibilities without providing additional resources. Speakers identified support for Ukraine, industrial competitiveness, agriculture, regional development and household living costs among competing priorities.
Their argument has force. A budget negotiated around yesterday’s compromises risks leaving Europe poorly equipped for tomorrow’s threats. Yet calls for ambition become less persuasive when they avoid specifying which programmes deliver measurable European benefits.
The emerging distribution of cuts illustrates the problem. As EU Today previously reported, the Irish presidency’s compromise proposed reducing the Commission’s plans by approximately €141 billion, with competitiveness and security facing proportionately deeper reductions than agriculture and cohesion spending.
That creates an uncomfortable possibility: the policies most closely associated with Europe’s strategic renewal could become bargaining chips in negotiations dominated by established beneficiaries.
Protecting farmers and poorer regions has clear economic and political justification. Nevertheless, preserving familiar allocations while squeezing newer priorities would undermine leaders’ repeated promises to strengthen European independence.
Energy offers perhaps the clearest example of why spending decisions and structural reform must advance together.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told MEPs that dependence on imported fossil fuels and the absence of a genuine European energy union were weakening Europe. Costa emphasised affordable production and modernised electricity grids.
The implication is significant. Industrial subsidies cannot indefinitely compensate for an energy system that leaves European manufacturers facing persistently high costs. Cross-border connections, infrastructure investment and better market integration therefore belong at the centre of competitiveness policy.
Von der Leyen also pressed governments to complete the single market and avoid making European rules more complicated through national implementation. Her argument highlights a limitation of the budget debate: additional money cannot, by itself, remove regulatory fragmentation.
The same distinction applies to China. The Commission president described heavily subsidised Chinese competitors and promised action on dependencies, supply chains and market access. Such measures require coherent enforcement and political resolve alongside investment.
Ukraine adds a security imperative that cannot readily be postponed. Costa linked Ukrainian and European security, while MEPs warned about the consequences of weakening support. Long-term commitments require predictable financing rather than recurring emergency bargains.
But the budget dispute also concerns who controls the money.
As EU Today’s reporting on regional concerns explained, local leaders fear that restructuring could concentrate investment decisions in national capitals, weakening regional influence and potentially widening disparities.
That warning deserves attention. A larger European budget would not automatically produce more balanced development. Allocation rules, accountability and local participation will help determine whether spending strengthens cohesion or reinforces existing advantages.
New revenue sources could ease pressure on national contributions, but they cannot make financing politically painless. Costs ultimately fall somewhere, and governments must explain the distribution honestly.
The central challenge is therefore broader than securing agreement on a headline figure. Europe needs a settlement that protects essential commitments, finances credible common priorities and demonstrates results.
MEPs are right to demand resources consistent with Europe’s responsibilities. Governments are entitled to demand discipline. The failure would be a compromise that satisfies neither requirement: expensive enough to provoke domestic opposition, yet too fragmented to provide the strategic capacity Europe’s leaders insist is indispensable.
University students, and those in other forms of higher education, will be protesting today in front of the government’s headquarters, at Campus XX1, against the proposal in the 2027 State
Romania has formed a new government after six months of political deadlock, with parliament approving a minority administration led by independent diplomat Luca Niculescu on Tuesday, 20 October. The vote brings an end to repeated failed attempts to establish an executive, although the new prime minister faces considerable uncertainty over his government’s parliamentary support.
Niculescu secured 280 votes in favour and 58 against, comfortably exceeding the 233 required for confirmation. His ministers were sworn in before President Nicuşor Dan at the Cotroceni Palace in Bucharest later that evening, formally ending the prolonged government formation process.
The new administration comprises 18 ministers, including two delegated ministers. The Social Democratic Party (PSD) controls the majority of portfolios, while independent specialists hold several important positions, including finance and foreign affairs.
A government built on temporary parliamentary support
The appointment represents a political success for President Dan, who nominated Niculescu on 5 October following three unsuccessful attempts to assemble a functioning government.
The new cabinet is heavily dependent on agreements between parties that have frequently disagreed over economic policy and public spending. Although the parliamentary vote demonstrated sufficient support for its installation, the arrangement does not provide the government with a permanent majority.
The National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) supported the investiture while remaining outside the administration.
The arrangement gives Niculescu an opportunity to govern, but each major legislative proposal will require continued cooperation between parties with competing priorities.
The Social Democrats, who hold 11 of the ministerial positions, will exercise substantial influence over domestic policy, particularly decisions involving public-sector spending, welfare and taxation.
Budget deficit presents immediate challenge
Romania’s public finances represent the government’s most urgent problem.
The previous administration, led by Ilie Bolojan, collapsed in May following unpopular austerity measures. Political opposition to fiscal consolidation has complicated efforts to stabilise the budget and meet Romania’s commitments under the European Union’s fiscal framework.
Niculescu has indicated that addressing the deficit will be an immediate priority. Finance Minister Alexandru Nazare, appointed as an independent, faces the task of establishing a credible budget programme without provoking another parliamentary crisis.
The choices are politically difficult. Spending reductions risk resistance from public-sector employees and households already affected by higher living costs, while substantial tax increases could place further pressure on businesses and consumption.
Failure to establish a credible fiscal programme would prolong uncertainty over Romania’s borrowing requirements and its ability to comply with European budgetary obligations.
Brussels has a direct interest in the outcome. Romania remains subject to EU fiscal oversight, and the European Commission will assess whether the new administration’s financial plans are consistent with the country’s obligations.
The government’s credibility will depend on whether its parliamentary supporters are prepared to approve the measures that fiscal consolidation requires.
European funds and political credibility
The change of government also comes at a sensitive moment in Romania’s relationship with European institutions.
Romania has faced scrutiny over reforms linked to the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility, particularly legislation concerning public integrity and institutional accountability.
Although the EU recovery programme reached its principal implementation deadline in August, outstanding assessments and financial decisions continue to carry consequences for national budgets.
A functioning government is therefore important not only for domestic legislation but also for negotiations with Brussels over fiscal commitments, investment and the wider EU budget.
Romania must also address longer-term weaknesses in public administration, infrastructure financing and the implementation of European legislation.
Political stability remains uncertain
Niculescu takes office against the background of Romania’s unusually turbulent political history since the annulment of the 2024 presidential election amid allegations of Russian interference.
The subsequent institutional disputes damaged confidence in the political system and contributed to the fragmentation of parliamentary support.
Opposition parties, including the nationalist Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), are positioned to challenge the government’s legitimacy and economic measures as the administration begins work.
Romania’s strategic importance extends beyond its domestic political difficulties. As an EU and NATO member bordering Ukraine and Moldova, it plays a substantial role in Black Sea security, military logistics and regional infrastructure.
Prolonged instability in Bucharest has therefore affected a country whose decisions carry consequences for European security and cross-border economic cooperation.
For the new prime minister, the immediate objective is to translate Tuesday’s parliamentary majority into support for legislation. His first serious test will come when the cabinet presents the fiscal measures that its supporters have so far struggled to agree upon.
The parliamentary vote has ended Romania’s government formation crisis. It has not resolved the disagreements that produced it.
Budget watchdog UTAO (full title: Technical Budget Support Unit) is querying the government’s forecasts for employment growth and prices in 2027, highlighting discrepancies with recent data. In its analysis of
MEPs have put themselves on a collision course with EU governments by rejecting plans for a 17-percent cut in foreign spending – instead demanding additional spending worth €25bn.
Earlier this month, the Irish government, which holds the six-month rotating EU council presidency, proposed that €38bn of cuts be made from the ‘Global Europe’ heading, which covers foreign aid, as part of an overall package of €141bn of cuts to the seven-year EU budget, known as the multi-annual financial framework (MFF).
But in a vote on Monday evening (19 October), the European Parliament’s development committee instead backed a dedicated minimum budget of €25bn for humanitarian aid, as well as dedicated budget lines for a Gaza reconstruction fund and for candidate countries. Put together, that would mean a €25bn increase on the EU Commission’s original budget of €200bn for the Global Europe heading.
The position agreed by MEPs, by a 61-to-34 vote margin, will eventually form the basis of negotiations between MEPs and ministers when EU governments agree their position on the budget.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
European Union governments have agreed a negotiating position on new agricultural market rules intended to take effect under the bloc’s 2028–2034 budget, advancing reforms to support arrangements for farmers while leaving the most contentious financial questions unresolved.
The Council approved its partial negotiating mandate on Monday, 19 October, covering changes to the Common Market Organisation regulation, which governs agricultural markets across the European Union.
The proposals include new arrangements for wine producers, protein crops and oilseeds, revised marketing standards, changes to the EU school food programme and provisions intended to improve preparedness for agricultural market disruptions.
However, the agreement does not settle future funding allocations or the broader structure of agricultural subsidies, which remain under negotiation as EU governments attempt to reconcile farming expenditure with competing demands for defence, industrial investment and regional development.
Agricultural markets under review
The Council’s negotiating position retains much of the European Commission’s original proposal while introducing amendments intended to accommodate national differences in agricultural production.
Under the proposed arrangements, sector-specific interventions would become mandatory in several areas, including beekeeping, fruit and vegetables and, under certain circumstances, wine production.
The Council has also proposed flexibility for countries where particular sectors are absent or relatively undeveloped.
For the wine industry, governments would be able to seek exemptions from certain obligations where national circumstances justify different arrangements.
This would allow the framework to retain common European rules while avoiding requirements that would be inappropriate for member states with little or no domestic wine production.
Sectoral interventions form part of the mechanisms through which the EU supports agricultural markets and producer organisations. They can cover measures intended to improve competitiveness, manage production and strengthen farmers’ commercial position.
New provisions for protein crops
The Council has endorsed the establishment of a separate sector for protein crops and oilseeds, replacing existing provisions covering dried fodder.
The objective is to encourage domestic production and reduce dependence on imported agricultural inputs, particularly crops used in animal feed and food production.
European livestock producers rely on protein-rich feed ingredients, including soyabeans, that are often sourced internationally.
Greater domestic production could reduce exposure to fluctuations in global commodity prices, transport costs and disruptions to international supply chains.
Under the Council’s proposal, member states would be encouraged to recognise producer organisations specialising in protein crops and oilseeds.
Such organisations can help farmers coordinate production, marketing and investment, although the effectiveness of the proposed measures will depend on how they are implemented nationally.
The proposals follow broader EU efforts to improve supply security in sectors extending from agricultural inputs to critical industrial materials.
School food and product labelling
The negotiating mandate also preserves the EU school scheme, which provides support for the distribution of fruit, vegetables and milk to schoolchildren.
Under the proposed framework, the programme would move from a school-year financing cycle to a calendar-year system, with transitional provisions intended to prevent disruption during implementation.
The Council has maintained the Commission’s objective of encouraging healthier eating habits by limiting products containing high levels of free sugars and fats.
The proposal also opens the possibility of additional marketing standards for several agricultural products, including protein crops, beef, pork, sheepmeat, goatmeat and rice.
These standards could provide consumers with more detailed information about product origins, subject to the final legislation.
Such measures would also have implications for producers and food businesses, which would need to comply with any new requirements concerning classification, marketing and labelling.
The Council additionally supports the harmonisation of rules covering industrial hemp, while retaining safeguards concerning seed certification and the permitted level of tetrahydrocannabinol.
Farming subsidies remain contested
The agricultural market agreement forms part of negotiations over the next Common Agricultural Policy, which will operate within the EU’s new seven-year financial framework.
Under the Commission’s proposed budget structure, several funding streams, including agricultural and cohesion programmes, would be brought together within national and regional partnership plans.
The restructuring has encountered opposition from governments and agricultural interests concerned that farming could lose protected access to EU funding.
As EU Today previously reported, 17 member states have called for agricultural and regional development expenditure to be protected against further reductions.
The Council’s latest position addresses how agricultural markets should operate rather than determining the size of the financial support available to them.
A separate debate concerns the conditions for receiving direct farm payments, including the definition of an active farmer and the degree of discretion granted to national governments.
Those questions remain central to the continuing CAP negotiations, which are due to return to the Agriculture and Fisheries Council on 26–27 October.
Negotiations move to Parliament
The Council’s partial mandate now provides a basis for negotiations with the European Parliament on the agricultural market provisions.
The legislation will still require agreement between the institutions, while its financing will depend on the eventual settlement of the 2028–2034 budget.
Governments must also complete negotiations on the wider CAP framework, including direct income support and the distribution of responsibility between Brussels and national administrations.
The market agreement reached on 19 October therefore establishes important elements of the proposed agricultural rules, but leaves unresolved the level of financial support available to European farmers after 2027.
The European Parliament has demanded €225 billion for the European Union’s foreign policy and development programmes between 2028 and 2034, challenging proposals by member states to reduce spending under the bloc’s next long-term budget.
The Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Development committees approved their negotiating position on the Global Europe Instrument on Monday, 19 October, by 63 votes to 27, with five abstentions. The proposed allocation represents an increase of €25 billion over the European Commission’s original €200 billion proposal.
The decision comes as negotiations over the wider 2028–2034 EU budget have become increasingly contentious, with Germany and several other net contributors opposing higher expenditure while Brussels faces mounting demands for defence, industrial investment, enlargement and support for Ukraine.
Parliament rejects proposed reductions
Under the position adopted by the parliamentary committees, at least €25 billion would be reserved for humanitarian assistance. MEPs also want dedicated funding for reconstruction in Gaza and financial support for countries seeking EU membership.
The committees are proposing that 20 per cent of official development assistance should be directed towards human development, alongside stronger provisions covering democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Global Europe is intended to consolidate several existing financing instruments into a single framework governing much of the Union’s external expenditure. The programme would finance activities ranging from development cooperation and humanitarian assistance to economic partnerships and support for countries preparing to join the EU.
The Commission introduced the original €200 billion proposal in July 2025. However, subsequent negotiations among member states have raised the prospect of substantial reductions.
Germany, the Netherlands and several Nordic countries have argued that the next budget must reflect the financial constraints facing national governments. Their objections have complicated efforts to accommodate additional spending on European security and economic competitiveness.
The European Parliament has taken a different position, maintaining that reducing external expenditure would restrict the Union’s ability to operate internationally when European security and economic interests increasingly depend on developments beyond its borders.
Ukraine and enlargement funding
The parliamentary proposal would preserve support for Ukraine while seeking to prevent assistance connected with Russia’s invasion from reducing resources available to other partner countries.
Ukraine’s reconstruction, institutional reforms and integration with European markets will require substantial financing over the coming years. However, the precise allocation will depend on negotiations over the wider budget and the financing arrangements eventually approved.
For candidate countries, MEPs want clearer incentives linking EU assistance to progress on political and economic reforms. The proposed framework would also provide Brussels with greater powers to suspend funding where democratic standards, human rights or judicial independence deteriorate.
A separate provision would permit the Commission to suspend payments where partner countries seriously fail to meet obligations concerning the readmission of their nationals.
That measure reflects the growing connection between the EU’s development policy and its migration objectives. Brussels has increasingly sought cooperation on returns and border management as part of agreements with countries receiving European assistance.
The committees have also called for stronger parliamentary supervision of Global Europe, including more detailed reporting by the Commission and regular discussions with the commissioners responsible for implementation.
Difficult negotiations ahead
The financial disagreement extends well beyond external policy. The overall seven-year budget remains contested, particularly over agricultural subsidies, regional development funds, defence investment and repayment of borrowing undertaken during the coronavirus pandemic.
As EU Today previously reported, a group of 17 member states has opposed reductions in agricultural and cohesion spending, adding further pressure to negotiations.
The Parliament’s proposed €225 billion allocation has not been agreed by governments and does not constitute an approved spending commitment.
The committees also approved a mandate for negotiations with the Council, although their position still requires endorsement by the full Parliament, provisionally expected in November.
Meanwhile, member states must settle their own negotiating position, including the financial ceilings governing the programme.
The eventual settlement will determine how much Brussels can spend on development cooperation, humanitarian operations and international partnerships after 2027, and how those commitments can be reconciled with the EU’s expanding domestic financial obligations.
Is this really about cost of living? Over the weekend, the civil unrest that had been at a simmer boiled over in cities all over France. Over 1,000 police officers were injured, with seven seriously injured. More than 2,400 people were arrested.
"Rioters…attacked city halls from Lille in northern France to Marseille in the south, where they broke into the local government headquarters and tipped over a bust of Marianne, a symbol of the French Republic," reportsThe New York Times. "A fire destroyed a tourist office in Lyon, and 1,500 shops were damaged or looted nationwide, according to Alexandre Bompard, head of the French federation of commerce and distribution, who estimated that the cost of repairs could run into hundreds of millions of dollars."
"They came prepared," claimed the French journalist Paul Amar on CNews. "They had the addresses of town halls. They had addresses of Jewish shop owners. In a street in Marseille, all businesses owned by Jews were set on fire. Businesses run by Muslims weren't." The Jewish Community Protection Service has disputed such claims.
Reason's Matt Welch has a good write-up of how the violence and destruction have altered Lyon, Paris, Marseille, and Limoges, where the city hall was burned and collapsed.
Ces images doivent faire le tour du monde. Nos voisins doivent savoir.
Lyon l'une des plus grandes villes de France le 17 octobre est l'une des villes les plus touchées.
A Lyon, aucun commerce n'a été épargné, oui aucun commerce n'a aucun épargné vous avez bien lu. Toutes les… pic.twitter.com/15dG6QB5lK
What was nominally about cost of living and budget issues appears to have expanded far beyond those. ("Free Palestine" and "ACAB" graffiti have been seen everywhere.) President Emmanuel Macron has blamed far-left protesters, saying they have taken advantage of the situation. Far-right leader Marine Le Pen has blamed the "Macronist administration that is out of steam, exhausted, and disoriented."
It's not clear to me how the possibility of that retirement age needs to be raised will in any way be changed by, say, donning black balaclavas and breaking into the Louis Vuitton store:
French rioters loot Louis Vuitton store located just 2 KM away from the Élysée. pic.twitter.com/cnb5aWczcN
Here's how it all started: Since September 18, lycée (or secondary-school) students have held demonstrations, starting in the Paris suburb, Créteil. The students said the Education Ministry had neglected them—not enough resources, not enough teachers, and overcrowded classes. (The original demands were met and that strike ended, but not before sparking a wider movement.) This was all happening concurrently as the government was deciding its budget, and public-sector strikes were beginning. High social-program spending, an aging population, and high debt-to-GDP, plus an ever-increasing cost-of-living is resulting in a math problem that politicians have no real way out of except by raising the retirement age. Over the last few years, the French have had several hissy fits over the possibility of that happening.
Lawmakers from left-wing party La France Insoumise were at the first blockade on September 21, which has sparked questions about whether the party helped fuel the protests ahead of April's presidential election. I take all this—the disparate movements, the sheer volume of violence, the political-party involvement, the elections coming up—to mean that what started as an education-quality/cost-of-living protest has been used to lodge all kinds of grievances, and is attracting allies with an unquenchable thirst for violence and destruction.
Scenes from New York: "Darrel Rodriguez, 26, was shot on Saturday in the 7th Avenue Station on 53rd Street, a few blocks from Times Square, the police said. An unidentified man approached Mr. Rodriguez on the northbound E train platform, drew a gun and shot him once in the chest, they said," reportsThe New York Times. The man who shot Rodriguez was wearing a full balaclava-style face covering, and has not been found by the cops.
Philadelphia enacted a ban on such masks back in 2023. Just anecdotally, I've seen a lot of them in New York, but not by people trying to stay warm in the cold—these types of masks are used by people hopping turnstiles, stealing from bodegas, and more. Some bodega owners have started posting signs on their doors saying masks aren't allowed, since it's become such a problem.
"As of Oct. 11, there have been 1,697 crimes in the transit system since the start of the year, 27 more than the same period in 2025," reportsThe New York Times, citing Police Department figures.
In Texas, Ken Paxton appears to have lost the support of suburban women, according to The Washington Post.
"Jewish life in the Emirates has grown quieter and less visible," notesThe New York Times. "Religious symbols have disappeared, and gatherings have moved into private. Many have become more guarded about their online presence and their willingness to speak to the media. Some are reconsidering how openly to identify themselves as Israeli or Jewish, while others weigh whether they can still build a life in a nation they once considered a haven."
Can you really see everything?
YOU CAN SEE EVERYTHING is doing a public service if it gets the general population to question why, precisely, folks lend so much credence to documentaries as vehicles of truth. https://t.co/n7CHwkmDmrpic.twitter.com/IHUvEbKECl
"I recently attended a meeting of the Democratic Socialists of America, where I officially enrolled as a member. Though I was new to the party, I put forth a number of proposals, many of which were met with considerable enthusiasm and, I'm happy to report, have now been incorporated into their manifesto," writes Larry David in a satirical essay for Airmail. "We contend that the only way anyone can be rehabilitated is through the simple act of love. When the D.S.A. takes over, it will be our policy to close the jails and release all prisoners. Once released, the former prisoners will continue to walk around in their orange jumpsuits, the easier to spot them. People will be encouraged to give them a pat on the back, offer some words of encouragement, and maybe even get them to open up about their crimes. Imagine how upsetting it must be to know you've taken a life! To err is human, to forgive, divine. With empathy and compassion, it's easy to see a day when these former convicts will be contributing to society in a very meaningful way." It's not that funny of an essay, but I think it's great for more people to be talking about how asinine DSA ideas are.
EU leaders have failed to settle their differences over the 2028–2034 budget, with Germany demanding further reductions to the proposed spending framework and the European Council taking charge of negotiations ahead of a difficult December deadline.
European Union leaders have ended their Brussels summit without agreement on the bloc’s next seven-year budget, after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz rejected the scale of spending envisaged under the latest compromise proposal and demanded deeper cuts.
The discussions on 15–16 October exposed the continuing division between governments determined to contain national contributions and those seeking to protect agricultural subsidies, regional development and new European investment programmes. The dispute now threatens the political timetable for approving the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, the budget that will determine the Union’s spending priorities over the next seven years.
In their formal summit conclusions, leaders invited European Council President António Costa to take negotiations forward towards a timely agreement. No new spending settlement was endorsed, despite the Irish presidency having presented revised figures immediately before the summit.
Germany rejects the compromise
The European Commission originally proposed a framework approaching €2 trillion in current prices, arguing that Europe needed greater financial capacity to meet its growing responsibilities in defence, competitiveness, technological development, migration and external security.
Ireland, which holds the rotating Council presidency, submitted a revised negotiating document on 10 October intended to narrow the differences between governments. The latest proposal includes substantial reductions compared with the Commission’s initial ambitions while seeking to preserve financing for established EU programmes.
Those concessions have not satisfied Berlin. Merz argues that the Union must recognise the difficult fiscal position facing national governments and that the proposed increases in common spending remain excessive.
Germany, the largest contributor to the EU budget in absolute terms, has been working with other budget-conscious governments to seek reductions from the original Commission proposal.
The Irish compromise has done little to bridge the divide. The revised framework seeks to combine greater financial restraint with protection for agricultural and cohesion policies, while retaining significant investment in security, research and competitiveness.
Yet every attempt to rebalance the proposed spending exposes another political conflict.
Agriculture, cohesion and defence compete for funding
The Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion funding remain among the largest and most politically sensitive components of the EU budget. Agricultural payments support farmers across the Union, while cohesion programmes finance infrastructure, regional investment and economic development, particularly in less prosperous territories.
Governments benefiting heavily from those programmes are reluctant to accept reductions, particularly when national finances are already under pressure.
France, Italy and other countries defending traditional EU expenditure have therefore resisted attempts to transfer the burden of budget restraint disproportionately onto agriculture and regional support.
At the same time, the Commission has argued that the EU cannot simply preserve the spending structure of previous decades while promising a stronger role in European defence, industrial development and economic security.
The contradiction is increasingly apparent. European governments demand greater independence from external suppliers, stronger military capabilities and sustained financial support for Ukraine, yet remain unwilling to agree on the larger common budget that might help deliver those objectives.
Cuts to research, innovation, cross-border infrastructure or defence-industrial programmes would not necessarily produce immediate political costs. Their consequences would emerge later, through investments postponed, capabilities not developed and projects left dependent on national budgets.
Conversely, reducing agricultural payments or regional investment would produce more immediate resistance from farmers, local authorities and national governments.
The Council’s budget negotiations had been intended to deliver a political agreement before the end of 2026. That would leave 2027 for the European Parliament and member states to complete the legislation required for the new financial framework to operate from January 2028.
Failure to reach that timetable would not immediately stop EU expenditure. It would, however, compress the period available for completing the detailed legal arrangements underpinning individual programmes and could complicate the uninterrupted delivery of funding at the beginning of the next budget cycle.
The political environment is hardly favourable. Several governments face difficult domestic debates over public spending, taxation and the demands of European integration. In France, the approach of the 2027 presidential election adds another complication to negotiations requiring sensitive national concessions.
Agreement on the seven-year framework requires unanimity among member states, followed by the consent of the European Parliament. The latter has already argued that the EU needs sufficient financial resources to match the responsibilities its governments have assigned to it.
Costa now faces the task of converting competing national positions into a financial settlement that all 27 governments can accept. That will require decisions not only about the overall ceiling but also about the balance between national allocations and programmes managed at European level.
The Brussels summit has demonstrated that the principal disagreements remain unresolved. The next negotiating round will determine whether governments are prepared to compromise on spending priorities or whether their ambitions for a more capable European Union will once again run ahead of their willingness to finance it.
Nearly 93 million EU residents were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025, with the latest regional figures revealing sharp differences both between and within member states. The findings raise questions about how effectively European investment is addressing longstanding economic inequality.
More than one in five people living in the European Union remained at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025, according to Eurostat figures that reveal substantial differences in living conditions across the bloc’s regions.
Approximately 92.7 million people, representing 20.9 per cent of the EU population, fell into the category during the year. Although the total declined slightly from 93.3 million in 2024, regional data show that economic vulnerability remains heavily concentrated in particular areas.
In 26 of the 243 EU regions for which figures were available, at least 31 per cent of residents were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. At the opposite end of the distribution, 24 regions recorded rates below 13 per cent.
The regional figures published by Eurostat show that the highest rate was recorded in French Guiana, at 54.8 per cent, while Slovakia’s capital region, Bratislavský kraj, recorded the lowest at 2.9 per cent.
National averages conceal substantial differences
The contrast is not confined to richer and poorer member states. In several countries, internal regional disparities are more pronounced than comparisons of national economic performance might suggest.
Within Slovakia, the proportion of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in Východné Slovensko was 9.1 times the rate recorded in the Bratislava region.
In Italy, the equivalent rate in Calabria was 8.1 times that of Valle d’Aosta, illustrating the persistent economic divide between parts of the country’s north and south.
These differences are recorded in Eurostat’s regional living-conditions statistics, which provide a more detailed picture than EU-wide or national averages.
The comparison requires care. Eurostat’s measure of poverty or social exclusion combines three indicators: relative income poverty, severe material and social deprivation, and very low household work intensity.
Consequently, the figures do not mean that every person included lacks sufficient income to meet basic needs. They identify people experiencing at least one of the defined forms of economic disadvantage.
Differences in income, employment, household composition and living costs can also influence the results, making direct comparisons between metropolitan areas, rural districts and overseas territories more complicated than a single percentage might imply.
Nevertheless, the scale of regional variation illustrates why national economic growth does not automatically produce equivalent improvements in living standards throughout a country.
Poverty reduction remains an EU commitment
The European Union has set a target of reducing the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 15 million by 2030, including at least five million children.
The limited annual reduction recorded in 2025 indicates that progress remains modest relative to the scale of that objective.
The problem has become increasingly important for European policymakers as housing costs, energy prices and employment insecurity affect household finances in different ways across member states.
In May, the Commission presented an anti-poverty and housing policy package, bringing together measures concerning social inclusion, housing exclusion and child poverty.
The regional figures indicate that such initiatives will need to account for considerable differences in local economic conditions.
Policies designed for prosperous urban economies may have limited relevance in regions characterised by low employment, weak infrastructure or dependence on a small number of industries. Conversely, economic activity and relatively high average incomes do not necessarily prevent serious poverty problems within major cities.
Cohesion funding becomes a central question
The findings have direct relevance to negotiations over the EU’s next long-term budget, covering 2028 to 2034.
The European Commission’s proposal envisages roughly €450 billion for economic, social and territorial cohesion under national and regional partnership plans, including at least €218 billion for less developed regions.
The proposed structure would combine several funding programmes within broader national plans, with the Commission arguing that the changes could improve coordination and make spending more responsive to local requirements.
However, regional authorities have expressed concern that greater national control over financial allocations could weaken their influence over investment decisions.
As EU Today reported earlier this week, representatives of European regions have warned that the proposed budget arrangements could concentrate decision-making in national capitals.
The latest poverty statistics provide a concrete context for that disagreement. Investment priorities may differ considerably between a region experiencing industrial decline, an agricultural area with limited employment opportunities and a metropolitan district facing severe housing affordability problems.
A central question for EU institutions is therefore how funding allocations will reflect measurable regional needs rather than being driven primarily by national political negotiations.
The Commission maintains that its proposed partnership arrangements will protect allocations for less developed regions and continue supporting social inclusion.
Negotiations over the financial framework will determine how those commitments are translated into enforceable rules, while Eurostat’s figures provide a statistical basis against which future claims of progress can be assessed.
With 92.7 million people still at risk, the debate is not simply about the overall size of the EU budget. It is also about whether spending reaches the communities where economic disadvantage remains most concentrated.
EU leaders met Thursday (15 October) for their first face-to-face talks on the 2028–2034 budget, killing the latest negotiation proposal put forward by Ireland.
Dublin, which holds the symbolic EU Council presidency, proposed cuts of up to €141bn from the long-term budget, about eight percent less than the commission proposal. But it failed to make anybody happy, for different reasons.
And now, EU Council president António Costa has been tasked to deliver a new compromise before EU leaders meet again on 26 November in Brussels, with the goal of striking a deal during the summit in December.
An EU official said Costa deemed the deal in December as “essential,” urging EU capitals “to assume their responsibility”.
For Denmark, for example, it is important to have more funds for defence, borders, illegal migration, and competitiveness. “It will probably be as difficult as it was last time or even more difficult,” said Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen ahead of the meeting.
“We need unanimity in the Council. We are far from that unanimity,” also said German chancellor Friedrich Merz before meeting counterparts.
The EU is divided into two camps. The so-called Frugals (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden) want “several hundred billion” more to be cut, mostly from agriculture and cohesion funds, while 17 EU member states (self-named as Friends of Cohesion) criticise the savings.
But time is of the essence to reach a deal this year, especially for French president Emmanuel Macron. France will hold presidential elections in the spring, and if Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Rally party, wins, reaching an EU deal would become far more difficult.
Le Pen has pledged that, if she comes to power, she will halve France’s contribution to the EU budget.
And Macron reportedly said in the room with EU leaders that from January onwards, there will be no political room for reaching an agreement.
‘Easier to give up what you don’t yet have’
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
Ukraine is seeking fresh funding for 2027 and says it is ready to deliver the reforms. Prime Minister Serhii Koretskyi says Ukraine’s external budget financing need for 2027 exceeds $52 billion, with more than $32.6 billion still to be raised.
That money underwrites the basics of a country at war: the army, pensions, hospitals, and support for business, he notes. Defense and security alone will take almost 44 percent of GDP in the 2027 budget, and the gap comes as Russia keeps hammering the infrastructure that generates Ukraine’s own revenue.
“The defense capability of the country, the payment of pensions, the support of hospitals and business depend on these funds,” Koretskyi says.
The hole Russia keeps digging faster than Kyiv can fill it
Russia’s strikes widen the gap even as Kyiv tries to close it. Russia systematically attacks critical infrastructure, business, production and civilian sites, and the destruction and halted enterprises will leave tax revenues about $1.5 billion below forecast by the end of the year, he warns.
For instance, output of Ukraine's steel industry, one of the pillars of its wartime economy, fell 57.3% in August due to Russian strikes. This sector is Ukraine's second-largest foreign-currency earner, employing more than 70,000 people directly and another 250,000 in related industries, and paying close to $1 billion a year in taxes.
Beyond the budget itself, the off-budget needs of Ukraine’s Defense Forces for 2027 are estimated at $45 billion, or about 40 billion euros, a figure that sits on top of the $52 billion budget requirement, he says.
The reforms Kyiv must deliver to unlock the money
The money hinges on reforms Ukraine still has to deliver. In the next few days, the government is to approve all the decisions needed to continue financing.
“Ukraine continues to work on fulfilling its part of the commitments. This week, the government is expected to approve all the necessary decisions to ensure continued funding,” the Ukrainian prime minister says.
Meanwhile, the Parliament plans to consider the bills required under the support programs of the IMF, the World Bank and the EU.
The Irish text, known in Brussels as the negobox, keeps all three of the commission’s borrowing programmes that sit outside the budget’s normal limits: Catalyst Europe, a €150bn lending facility; a crisis mechanism of up to €395bn for major unforeseen shocks; and support for Ukraine of up to €100bn.
Add loans for defence and lending to other non-EU countries and, by our estimates, joint borrowing could still equal around 44 per cent of the new budget, about €800bn at current prices, up from 41 per cent under the Commission’s proposal. The budget shrinks, but the borrowing hardly changes.
Ireland’s proposed budget is too small for Europe’s mounting common challenges, and its borrowing approach is too ad hoc and risky.
Excluding the distorting effects of NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the Covid recovery fund, the Commission’s budget proposal is already far smaller than the headline figures suggest, and Ireland’s proposal would make it smaller still.
That matters because, as the Draghi report argued, Europe’s shared challenges such as Ukraine, rearmament and competitiveness require European public goods because no single member state captures their full benefits.
A budget worth just over one percent of the EU’s gross national income (GNI) is a poor match for that responsibility.
By comparison, total government expenditure across EU countries comes to close to half of their combined GNI. Keeping most fiscal capacity at national level, while expecting such a modest EU budget to finance increasingly vital continental priorities, is a bad use of public resources.
A stronger common budget needs more of its own revenue, at least what the Commission proposes in its Own Resources Decision, which Parliament broadly supports and which would raise nearly €60bn extra a year.
The Irish plan’s acceptance of five new resources is encouraging. But it has to survive the negotiations, and the details of the final reform will decide whether it means anything.
The Council’s approach to common borrowing remains haphazard, lacking a permanent framework and relying on crisis-driven compromises. Governments may not like it, but a more European approach is coming, and the €800bn is likely to grow.
And a successor to SAFE, the EU’s defence loan scheme, is widely expected, since €150bn has proved far from enough for Europe’s rearmament.
France has just shown what it costs to borrow alone. Its yields recently hit a 24-year high, and the state now pays more to borrow than some major French companies. Sharing the effort through the common budget, including prudent joint borrowing, would help spread that risk.
Yet Europe has no clear, sustainable plan for borrowing. To date, EU governments have reluctantly signed up to each new borrowing instrument and called it an exception.
European borrowing capacity has been assembled one crisis at a time, starting with the euro area crisis and accelerating since the pandemic.
NGEU was accepted by fiscally cautious states as a one-off decision to deal with the Covid-19 emergency. Then the war in Ukraine and the need to fund rearmament produced new exceptions.
This year, EU governments used enhanced cooperation, a procedure that lets a subset of member states go ahead without the rest, to approve the €90bn Ukraine Support Loan, the EU’s largest foreign loan ever.
For defence, they reached for Article 122, the treaties’ emergency clause, to set up SAFE. Parliament, which felt sidelined, decided to sue the Council before the European Court of Justice.
There is a catch though.
These exceptional programmes are guaranteed by the so-called budget headroom, the margin between the EU’s revenue ceiling and the spending limits in the seven-year budget, rather than by money set aside in advance.
In barely five years, headroom-backed exposure has climbed to €681bn (see Figure 1), 82 percent of all EU debt.
The European Court of Auditors has warned that if a Ukraine loan guaranteed this way goes bad, future EU budgets, and the national contributions that fund them, would have to cover the loss.
Frugals vs Friends of Cohesion
EU capitals remain divided over the new budget and over joint borrowing. Net contributors, sometimes referred to as the Frugal Six, want deep cuts in the commission’s proposal, argue that new common borrowing is not the solution and have misgivings about the creation of new own resources.
By contrast, a group of sixteen southern and eastern countries, that call themselves the “Friends of Cohesion”, are much more open to joint borrowing and back an approach closer to the Commission and Parliament on the budget and own resources.
Ireland’s plan largely reflects the influence of the frugal countries, yet one diplomat has already dismissed it as “not even close to a landing zone.”
Europe needs an ambitious budget, backed by at least the Commission’s proposed new own resources, so it relies less on national contributions based on GNI. Joint borrowing should become a permanent, predictable part of it, with safeguards.
First, it should fund loans, not grants, as the Commission suggests. Second, riskier exposures, especially to non-EU countries, should be at least partly backed by money set aside in advance, as the Court of Auditors recommends.
Where it makes sense, the headroom guarantee could be topped up with national guarantees in proportion to each country’s size, as under SURE, and like-minded partners outside the EU could sometimes take part.
Stronger capital at institutions such as the EIB, or at any future defence-financing vehicle, would also let Europe borrow more together without putting its creditworthiness at risk.
Governments should also consider deferring repayment of the NGEU bonds, as the Draghi report suggested, especially if the own-resources reform falls short. It would protect priority spending when it is needed most.
Sustained joint borrowing brings a bonus: more common safe assets in euros, which strengthens the euro’s international role. The demand is already there.
Wobbles in US bond markets, which partly reflect doubts about America’s fiscal health, its reliability as a partner and the dollar’s safe-haven status, give the euro an opening.
But it can only take it if EU governments put their own fiscal houses in order.
Ongoing tensions in the French bond market provide a clear warning. Putting France’s finances on a sustainable path would do more than reassure markets about the euro. It would restore French debt as a safe euro asset.
EU leaders meet on Thursday and Friday in Brussels. Whatever they discuss (and later decide) on the budget, Europe should keep borrowing together, and in large amounts.
The task now is to give that borrowing a coherent plan: a permanent framework, money set aside in advance and safeguards that cautious capitals can accept.
European regional and local leaders have warned that the EU’s next long-term budget risks transferring control over investment programmes to national governments, potentially increasing economic disparities and reducing the ability of poorer regions to shape their own development.
The warning was delivered in Brussels on 12 October by Kata Tüttő, President of the European Committee of the Regions, during the opening of the European Week of Regions and Cities.
Her intervention comes as EU leaders prepare to negotiate the 2028–2034 budget, with disagreements over agricultural funding, regional development, defence, industrial competitiveness and the distribution of financial responsibilities among member states.
The Committee of the Regions warned that greater centralisation could concentrate economic opportunities in already prosperous areas while limiting other territories’ capacity to attract investment and develop essential infrastructure.
The concern goes beyond money allocated to regional development. It addresses who controls spending decisions and whether local authorities retain a meaningful role in determining how European funds are used.
Regional governments resist centralisation
EU cohesion policy has traditionally sought to reduce disparities between richer and poorer regions through investment in transport, infrastructure, education, business development and public services. While national governments administer considerable funds, regional and local authorities are frequently involved in identifying priorities and delivering projects.
The Committee argues that restructuring which concentrates decision-making at national level could weaken this arrangement. National governments may favour country-wide industrial or infrastructure programmes, while regional authorities identify specific problems arising from local conditions.
A national infrastructure strategy could prioritise major transport routes and industrial centres. Regional administrations might instead emphasise connecting smaller communities, maintaining local services or developing specialised economic activities.
The dispute concerns whether the next EU budget will maintain flexibility for regional priorities. In Belgium, Germany, Spain and Italy, regional institutions possess important responsibilities across economic development, education and infrastructure. Changes to EU spending governance could alter established relations between European, national and regional institutions.
The budget negotiations intensify the dispute
Ireland’s rotating Council presidency has proposed reducing the Commission’s original seven-year budget plans by approximately €141 billion while largely protecting agriculture and cohesion compared with other expenditure categories.
The proposed financial framework would nevertheless remain substantially larger than the current budget. The distribution of resources remains contentious, and an overall cut does not necessarily translate into the same reduction for every region.
Effects will depend on allocation formulas, national spending plans and programme governance. Meanwhile, European institutions face demands for stronger investment in defence production, digital infrastructure, competitiveness and support for Ukraine while maintaining agricultural and regional commitments.
Economic disparities remain a European problem
The Committee presented its seventh annual assessment of Europe’s regions and cities during the European Week of Regions and Cities, held in Brussels from 12 to 14 October.
The assessment examines competitiveness, resilience, public services, democratic governance and financial conditions. Regional disparities remain a significant feature of the EU economy despite decades of common investment programmes.
Large metropolitan areas often benefit from concentrations of universities, research institutions, advanced industries and capital. Less densely populated territories may struggle with demographic decline, shortages of skilled workers and the cost of maintaining infrastructure.
These differences can reinforce themselves over time. Businesses invest where suitable workers, transport networks and customers are already concentrated. Younger workers moving towards metropolitan economies may further reduce the economic prospects of communities they leave behind.
Defence spending creates new pressures
The increase in European defence expenditure introduces another dimension. Regions containing defence manufacturers, engineering firms, research institutions and military installations could benefit substantially from new spending, while others may receive little direct economic advantage.
If industrial investment concentrates in already advanced manufacturing centres, geographical disparities could widen. Conversely, procurement programmes and infrastructure investment could bring opportunities to weaker regional economies with suitable facilities and labour.
A question of political authority
The Committee of the Regions has limited formal authority over the EU’s long-term budget. National governments will negotiate the framework, and the European Parliament must consent to the final agreement.
Regional leaders are seeking to influence those negotiations before political compromises are established. Their central argument is that aggregate European economic growth alone does not capture the distribution of investment, employment and public services across the Union.
The approaching European Council negotiations will indicate whether governments intend to preserve regional influence over EU spending or concentrate greater authority over investment decisions at national level.
Login
