From N.Y. State Div. of Hum. Rts. V. D. Auxilly NYC LLC, decided today by New York appellate judges Sallie Manzanet–Daniels, Manuel Mendez, Barbara Kapnick, Bahaati Pitt–Burke, and Matthew Parker–Raso:
Complainant, at the time a Missouri resident, emailed D. Auxilly, a New York based business that produces and sells attire, including bridal outfits, to inquire about a bridal jumpsuit she had seen advertised on one or more of D. Auxilly's social media pages. Specifically, complainant requested information about payment options for the jumpsuit. Complainant also informed D. Auxilly that as her fiancé had "fallen in love" with it after struggling to find anything she liked, complainant wanted to purchase it for their upcoming wedding.
Dominique Galbraith, D. Auxilly's owner and operator, responded on behalf of D. Auxilly advising complainant of the payment requirements of the business but that she would not be able to make the garment for a same-sex wedding because it would go against her religious beliefs. She also urged complainant and her fiancé to reconsider getting married….
The First Amendment does not shield D. Auxilly from liability for this discrimination. Unlike the baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm (2018), D. Auxilly was not asked to design and create customized items which might constitute an "expressive statement." Nor was it tasked with creating a customized wedding website, as in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (2023). Instead, D. Auxilly refused to sell the wedding garment it had previously designed and which it had marketed to the public. While the garment likely would need to be adjusted for sizing, this potential sizing alteration would not constitute an expressive statement. Neither would D. Auxilly's "speech" be compelled here by requiring it to sell the previously designed and marketed garment.
Enforcement of the [law] here also does not violate D. Auxilly's right to free exercise of religion. The statute is "neutral, both on its face and due to a lack of evidence that it targets religious conduct for a distinctive treatment."
{[T]he Division had jurisdiction in the instant matter because the discriminatory conduct occurred in New York and its impact was felt in the state. Complainant reached out to D. Auxilly, a business which markets its clothes as "made in New York," seeking to purchase goods from this New York business. D. Auxilly's discriminatory conduct based upon complainant's sexual orientation deprived complainant of an opportunity to engage in commercial activity here. Indeed, by affirmatively labeling its products as being "made in New York" but then refusing to sell those same "New York" products to people of a certain sexual orientation, D. Auxilly implicitly associated the City and State of New York with a discriminatory act, and the impact test is satisfied. Additionally, the fact that complainant communicated with D. Auxilly online through social media rather than traveling to a New York storefront does not deprive petitioner of jurisdiction over this matter.}
Finally, we find the awards of compensatory damages [$5,000] and civil penalties proper. The award to complainant is reasonably related to the wrongdoing, supported by evidence before the Division, and in line with other awards for similar injuries. Likewise, the civil penalty of $20,000 is neither disproportionate to the offense nor does it shock the conscience.
My thoughts:
Bridal jumpsuit! New one on me. A quick Google Images search further enlightened me.
Pedantically speaking, wouldn't it be "her fianceé" rather than "her fiancé"?
Oh, wait, there's a legal issue here. Well, I think that there's a First Amendment right not to be compelled to create speech, such as photos, videos, and web sites, and I've argued this since 2012. But I don't think there's such a right as to fundamentally nonspeech products, even ones that people use as conventional parts of ceremonies, such as cakes or jumpsuits (as I've argued since 2017). The precise line, of course, can at times be fuzzy, e.g., as to cakes or jumpsuits that have specific expressive decorations (e.g., words, possibly rainbow designs, etc.), but it's still a sensible line; for more on that, see this amicus brief that Dale Carpenter and I put together in Masterpiece Cakeshop.
For more on the designer, see here and here; for more on the case, see here.
Melissa Franco and Michael K. Swirsky (New York State Division of Human Rights) represent the state.
On December 2, the Supreme Court will consider constitutional challenges to "assault weapon" bans in Connecticut and Cook County, Illinois, that cover widely owned rifles, including the AR-15. As the plaintiffs in those consolidated cases see it, such laws plainly violate the Second Amendment because they prohibit arms in common use for lawful purposes. In briefs filed on Wednesday, Connecticut and Cook County urge the justices to reject that test, saying a weapon's popularity is not dispositive. The relevant question, they say, is whether their rifle restrictions fit a historical tradition of banning "unusually dangerous weapons."
Cook County and Connecticut have the burden of showing that their laws are "consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation," the test established by the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. On the face of it, that is a daunting challenge.
In the 2008 case District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court said the Second Amendment protects the right to own "bearable arms" that are "in common use" for "lawful purposes like self-defense." That description indisputably encompasses "AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles," the firearms at issue in these cases. But Heller also recognized "the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and unusual weapons.'" Cook County and Connecticut argue that the rifles they have deemed intolerable fall into that category.
"There is a robust historical tradition of regulating unusually dangerous weapons that
compromise public safety," Cook County says. "Such regulations, which long
predate the founding, have included outright bans and other restrictions on exceptionally dangerous weapons like launcegays, trap guns, Bowie knives, and slung shots."
Cook County argues that its ordinance is "relevantly similar" to those historical restrictions because it targets "exceptionally lethal weapons that are disproportionate to the end of self-defense." AR-15s are "offensive weapons of war designed for maximum lethality and are not customarily used for self-defense," the brief says. "The purpose and operation of the ban is consistent with our Nation's historical tradition and accounts for the exceptional dangerousness of these technologically advanced weapons."
The ban is "an appropriate contemporary restriction implemented by the legislature in response to dramatic technological change and unprecedented societal concern," the brief says. "It is tailored to respond to the particular dangers presented in areas with mass casualty exposure and acute public safety risk."
Connecticut offers a similar argument. One problem with this defense is the premise that "assault weapon" bans focus on "exceptionally lethal weapons." As critics of such laws have been pointing out for decades, the features they target, such as folding stocks, pistol grips, and barrel shrouds, do not affect a rifle's basic operation. With or without them, a rifle fires the same ammunition at the same rate with the same muzzle velocity. And because AR-15s use intermediate-caliber ammunition, they are arguably less lethal than shotguns and many hunting rifles that are not classified as "assault weapons."
Cook County's emphasis on technological developments is also questionable. Constitutional guarantees establish principles that courts routinely apply to technologies that did not exist at the founding. Although the Framers did not have radio, television, or the internet, for example, the First Amendment nevertheless constrains government regulation of those media.
More specifically, Heller rejected the idea that modern weapons are not covered by the Second Amendment by recognizing a constitutional right to own semiautomatic pistols. The Supreme Court said "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding." The Court confirmed that point in the 2016 case Caetano v. Massachusetts, which involved a state ban on stun guns.
Cook County also asserts that AR-15s are not suitable for self-defense, a claim that would be hotly contested by many owners of such rifles, who commonly report using them for that purpose. "Plaintiffs have shown that AR-15s are well-adapted for self-defense," U.S. District Judge Peter Sheridan wrote in 2024, when he reluctantly concluded that New Jersey's AR-15 ban was inconsistent with Heller while expressing his dismay at that result. "Evidence has been presented to the Court that the build of the AR-15 makes it well-suited to self-defense because it is 'light weight, [has] very mild recoil, and [has] good ergonomics'; it is a weapon which is 'well suited to younger shooters, female shooters, and other shooters of smaller stature.'"
Sheridan added that "the AR-15's design features—including the effectiveness of its cartridge for self-defense use and its better continuity of fire when used with available magazines—make the AR-15 a good choice for self-defense." And he noted that "the AR-15 has been used recently in several, relatively high-profile self-defense events in Florida, Illinois, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma."
Cook County and Connecticut are also wrong in suggesting that self-defense is the only "lawful purpose" that matters. While Heller emphasized the use of handguns "in defense of hearth and home," it did not say that was the full extent of the Second Amendment right. To the contrary, the phrase "lawful purposes like self-defense" implies that the right extends to other uses, such as hunting, pest control, and target shooting. The decision explicitly mentioned hunting as a "reason Americans valued the ancient right."
The briefs are misleading in another way that may prove decisive. They conflate "dangerous and unusual" with "unusually dangerous," which is not the same thing.
During the 19th century, state legislators restricted (and sometimes banned) weapons such as Bowie knives, spears, sword canes, slungshots, and brass knuckles. But the historical evidence suggests those weapons were not targeted simply because they were "unusually dangerous." Legislators were also concerned about how the weapons were typically used.
Solicitor General D. John Sauer, who filed a brief supporting the challenges to the AR-15 bans, notes that the 19th-century laws targeted weapons associated with "duels, brawls, and other criminal activities." And in reviewing those laws, state courts distinguished between arms favored by criminals and arms commonly used for lawful purposes.
In 1871, for example, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that legislators could ban weapons that were "not usual" but could not ban "the usual arms of the citizen." The top courts of Texas, Arkansas, West Virginia, North Carolina, and Michigan concurred that the right to arms encompassed weapons commonly owned by law-abiding people, including rifles.
AR-15s and similar rifles readily pass that common-use test. In January, the National Shooting Sports Foundation, the gun industry's trade association, reported that Americans own more than 32 million "modern sporting rifles," its preferred term for the models covered by "assault weapon" bans. Survey data suggest that somewhere between 16 million and 25 million Americans have owned AR-15-style rifles. Last year, a unanimous Supreme Court described the AR-15 as "the most popular rifle in the country."
According to Cook County and Connecticut, however, none of that matters. "Once it is established that a regulation pursues a legitimate public safety objective in a permissible manner, raw ownership numbers cannot immunize a firearm from regulation," Cook County says. It argues that opponents of its ordinance have misconstrued the significance of the common-use test and misunderstood how it interacts with Bruen.
"When the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct," the Supreme Court said in Bruen. "To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's 'unqualified command.'"
The common-use question, Cook County argues, figures only in the first Bruen step: "the inquiry whether the weapon at issue is one 'the Second Amendment protects.'" But even if ownership of AR-15s is covered by "the Second Amendment's plain text," it says, that does not resolve the question of whether they can be banned, which depends on the historical analysis required by the second step of the Bruen test.
"This Court's decision in Bruen confirms that the Second Amendment's step-two inquiry does not insulate popularly owned firearms from regulation," the brief says. In Bruen, it was "undisputed" that "handguns are weapons 'in common use' today for self-defense," including "outside the home." But "instead of being the end of this Court's inquiry, that observation was just the beginning." The decision also included an "extended analysis" of the historical laws that New York cited to justify its "proper cause" requirement for carry permits. "If lawful common use alone were enough to forbid regulation," Cook County argues, "there would have been no need to engage in that careful and prolonged analysis."
The question in Bruen was not whether the Second Amendment precludes "regulation." It was whether New York's specific approach, which required residents to demonstrate a "special need" before they were allowed to exercise the right to bear arms, was consistent with the historical tradition. That is why the Court considered (and rejected) the purported historical analogs that New York offered.
Cook County conflates requirements for carry permits, the issue in Bruen, with an outright ban on ownership, the policy it is defending. Connecticut likewise blurs the distinction between carry restrictions and complete prohibition.
"The Bowie knife was 'widely carried by Americans of all stripes,' including 'upstanding citizens and villains' alike," Connecticut's brief says. "The widespread use of Bowie knives and other weapons for lawful purposes did not prevent dozens of States from restricting those weapons." But those laws generally restricted or banned public carry. They rarely made it illegal to acquire or possess a Bowie knife, which is the approach that Connecticut and Cook County have taken with AR-15s.
That policy is hard to reconcile with Heller. I will quote Sheridan again, since his comments made it clear that he would have preferred to uphold New Jersey's AR-15 ban. Under Heller, he said, "a categorical ban on a class of weapons commonly used for self-defense is unlawful." Given "the Supreme Court's clear direction on this point," he concluded, New Jersey's law "is unconstitutional" as applied to "the Colt AR-15 for use for self-defense in the home."
Last July, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit agreed and went further, extending that conclusion to "the full class of semi-automatic rifles" banned in New Jersey. "Together, Heller and Bruen teach that bans or broad prohibitions on possessing or carrying of a class of weapons in common use for lawful purposes fail to find support in our Nation's tradition of firearm regulation," Judge Arianna Freeman, a Joe Biden appointee, wrote in the majority opinion. "That principle resolves our inquiry here."
To beat back the challenges to their laws, Connecticut and Cook County will have to persuade the justices that the 3rd Circuit's understanding of Heller and Bruen is wrong, meaning they are free to ban firearms in common use for lawful purposes. That seems like a tall order, and Cook County's position is especially puzzling. According to its brief, the fact that a weapon is covered by the Second Amendment does not mean Americans have a right to possess it. The more you think about that claim, the less sense it makes.
On November 3, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in a case that asks whether Colorado has unlawfully discriminated against a religious preschool because the school is barred from participating in the state's universal preschool program due to its refusal to accept LGBTQ families. In addition to involving multiple hot-button political and cultural issues, the case also has big implications for the future of federal antidiscrimination law.
St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy is not about a state law that directly prohibits a religious preschool from operating. Rather, at issue here is a government requirement that any preschool that wants to participate in the state's universal preschool program, and receive the public benefits that follow, must first satisfy various criteria, including that "each preschool provider provide eligible children an equal opportunity to enroll and receive preschool services regardless of race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, lack of housing, income level, or disability."
According to the Catholic preschools overseen by the Archdiocese of Denver, however, complying with that rule would force the schools to violate their religious beliefs. "It is undisputed that these preschools would otherwise be eligible [universal preschool] providers," the schools told the Supreme Court. "They are excluded solely because of their religious exercise—namely, their religious practices of ensuring that all enrolling families are supportive of the Catholic Church's teachings on sex and marriage and of treating enrolled four-year-olds in accordance with their biological sex."
These schools can point to a pair of recent Supreme Court precedents that will very likely count in their favor. In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020), the Court held that if a state provides educational subsidies that help parents send their children to private schools, the state "cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious." Then, in Carson v. Makin (2022), the Court held that Maine's tuition assistance program violated the Constitution by excluding private schools that offered "sectarian" education. "A State's antiestablishment interest," the decision said, "does not justify enactments that exclude some members of the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise."
I would expect the outcome of St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy to follow in this same general pattern and hold something to the effect that when a state provides an educational public benefit, it must make some sort of accommodation for the religious views of the recipients.
In Other Legal News
Justice Elena Kagan made news a few months back when she defended her conservative colleagues on the Supreme Court from the oft-heard charge that they are totally in the tank for President Donald Trump. "I don't see this as a court that is just like, 'We're just going to rubber stamp what the current administration does.' You know, quite the opposite," Kagan said. "I think that that is a bad rap." In support of her argument, Kagan pointed to the fact that the Supreme Court had recently ruled against Trump on the two big issues that Trump himself valued the most: tariffs and birthright citizenship.
Kagan was in the news again on Tuesday, this time because she publicly blasted those same conservative colleagues for issuing decisions on voting rights and political gerrymandering that, in Kagan's words, have produced "a democracy that does not work as well as it should." According to Kagan, the Court's conservative majority "has kind of blinded itself to the very deleterious effects of their rulings on how the political system works."
Does this mean that Kagan has now stopped defending the conservative justices from the pro-Trump charge? Not at all. In fact, as The New York Timesput it, "she reiterated her defense of the conservative-dominated bench from a July appearance and said it was a 'bum rap' to suggest the court had been too deferential to Mr. Trump."
I don't know about you, but I find Kagan to be a refreshing public figure in these simplistic, partisan times. She is a staunch legal liberal with clearly stated objections to what the Supreme Court's conservative majority is getting up to, yet she refuses to be associated with the laziest progressive attacks on the Court. How many people of comparable public stature these days are willing to call out the shortcomings of their own side?
The battle to save the global court and its capacity to enforce accountability for the most heinous crimes is one struggle with many fronts, writes Marjorie Cohn.
A Russian ballistic missile fitted with a cluster warhead struck the historic Pecherskyi district of Kyiv overnight on 21–22 October 2026, damaging buildings near two of the Ukrainian capital’s principal religious complexes, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said.
The missile landed between the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, a UNESCO World Heritage site, and the Holy Presentation (Sviato-Vvedenskyi) Monastery. Monastery buildings, homes, shops, cafés and other civilian infrastructure sustained damage in the surrounding area.
Zelenskyy disclosed that Russian forces had used three cluster-equipped ballistic missiles during the assault. Ukrainian authorities described weapons designed to explode in the air as they approach their targets, distributing explosive submunitions over an area approximately 400 metres in diameter.
After receiving reports from officials overseeing emergency operations across Ukraine, the president accused Moscow of deliberately choosing a weapon capable of inflicting extensive civilian casualties in a densely populated district.
“This was a deliberate choice of weapon and area of deployment,” Zelenskyy said.
He maintained that there were no military installations in the vicinity and that the attack had been intended to inflict maximum damage on civilians and their property.
Religious Buildings and Civilian Properties Damaged
Pecherskyi is one of Kyiv’s oldest districts, containing religious institutions and architectural monuments associated with centuries of Ukrainian history.
Among them is the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, established in the 11th century and subsequently developed into an important centre of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.
The complex includes historic churches, monasteries and an extensive system of underground caves. Together with Saint Sophia Cathedral and its related buildings, it forms part of a UNESCO World Heritage property that has appeared on the List of World Heritage in Danger since 2023.
Thursday’s explosion occurred in the area separating the Lavra from the Holy Presentation Monastery. Ukrainian authorities identified damage to buildings belonging to the latter, alongside neighbouring residential and commercial premises. Assessments of the destruction across the historic district were continuing.
This was not the first occasion in 2026 on which Russian weapons had damaged the area’s religious heritage.
On 15 June, a Russian drone struck the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra complex, causing severe damage to the Dormition Cathedral. Its roof and structural elements suffered extensive destruction, prompting UNESCO to undertake emergency stabilisation measures.
The October strike has again exposed the vulnerability of the capital’s historic religious buildings, as well as the civilian neighbourhoods surrounding them.
The Use of Cluster Weapons in Urban Areas
The reported choice of ammunition has particular implications for the investigation into the attack.
Whereas a conventional missile warhead delivers its explosive force around a principal impact point, cluster munitions release numerous smaller explosive devices capable of striking separate locations across a broad area.
In an urban environment, such weapons can cause casualties and destruction well beyond an intended target. Unexploded submunitions may remain dangerous after the initial attack, posing further risks to residents and emergency workers.
The International Committee of the Red Cross has warned that deploying cluster munitions in populated areas creates a high likelihood of indiscriminate effects.
Under international humanitarian law, military operations must distinguish between civilian persons and objects and legitimate military targets. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.
The reported deployment of cluster warheads in central Kyiv therefore raises questions about whether those requirements were observed. Zelenskyy’s account of the three missiles had not, at the time of reporting, been independently established through publicly available forensic evidence.
Russian Barrage Follows Diplomatic Contact with Washington
The Pecherskyi explosion was one incident in a much larger attack on the Ukrainian capital.
According to Zelenskyy, Russia launched 21 ballistic missiles against Kyiv in three successive waves overnight. Ukrainian authorities reported at least two people killed and more than 30 wounded, with strikes damaging apartment buildings, commercial premises, transport infrastructure and energy facilities.
The bombardment took place shortly after Russian President Vladimir Putin met US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff in St Petersburg on Wednesday, 21 October.
During their discussions, Putin indicated that Russia was prepared in principle to resume negotiations with Ukraine and the United States, potentially in November. However, no confirmed timetable emerged.
Witkoff’s visit followed consultations in Norway between American, Ukrainian and European representatives over possible arrangements to end the war.
The renewed diplomatic activity has done little to resolve the underlying disagreements. As EU Today has previously examined, Moscow continues to advance territorial demands while the parties remain divided over Ukraine’s future security guarantees.
Meanwhile, Kyiv faces an immediate requirement for additional air-defence ammunition.
Zelenskyy has repeatedly appealed for more Patriot interceptor missiles capable of engaging ballistic targets. Difficulties surrounding American military assistance and intelligence cooperation have increased tensions between Washington and Kyiv at a time when Russia is intensifying attacks against Ukrainian cities.
The latest strike also presents Ukrainian investigators with the task of establishing whether the reported use of cluster munitions against a historic civilian district constituted an unlawful attack.
For Zelenskyy, the bombardment following Putin’s latest diplomatic discussions demonstrates that Moscow’s military conduct remains unchanged. He has argued that Russia’s actions provide no evidence of a genuine intention to bring the war to an end.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has received the EU’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought.
Reacting to EU Parliament president Roberta Metsola’s announcement of the prize winner on Thursday (22 October), the Hague-based court said it is “thankful” for the recognition of the court and its officials.
“This award comes at a time when the court and its officials face unprecedented challenges, including sanctions aimed at disrupting the court’s judicial mandate,” ICC president judge Tomoko Akane told EUobserver in a statement.
The parliament’s recognition “underscores the importance of […] support to enable the Court to carry out its mandate independently and impartially, in the service of justice and the victims of the gravest crimes,” said the Japanese judge.
The court’s win comes after US president Donald Trump put his weight behind Israeli efforts to discredit the international judicial body by extending sanctions against it.
The ICC investigates and tries individuals charged with war and human-rights related crimes. When it issued an arrest warrant in 2024 for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu for alleged war crimes, the US responded by sanctioning its judges.
EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen welcomed the win, saying: “For victims of the world’s gravest crimes, justice means a voice. The ICC must be free to pursue its mission, independently, and without pressure or intimidation. Europe stands firmly behind president Tomoko Akane, the Court’s judges and officials, and their vital work for a world governed by rules.”
New sanctions against the court were announced by the Trump administration this month after the Nobel Peace Prize went to Navi Pillay, a former ICC judge who concluded in a UN report that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza.
Tomoka said: “While this prize recognises the work of the court in combating impunity and ensuring fair trials, it is also an important recognition of the role of international justice as a cornerstone of lasting peace. In a world marked by rising conflicts, there is no peace without justice and no security without law.”
Strasbourg stands for justice
French MEP Chloé Ridel initiated the ICC’s nomination for the Sakharov Prize on behalf of the Socialists & Democrats parliament group.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
The European Commission has urged Malta to strengthen judicial independence, tackle corruption and improve protection for journalists, as a European Parliament debate exposes continuing disagreements over the country’s rule-of-law record.
The European Commission has called on Malta to accelerate judicial reforms and strengthen safeguards for journalists, nine years after the assassination of investigative reporter Daphne Caruana Galizia, as the European Parliament revisited concerns over corruption and institutional accountability on Wednesday, 21 October.
European Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection Michael McGrath told MEPs in Strasbourg that Malta had made progress in certain areas but had yet to implement several outstanding recommendations concerning judicial independence, high-level corruption and media freedom.
The debate followed the controversial acquittal of businessman Yorgen Fenech, who had been accused of involvement in Caruana Galizia’s murder. Maltese prosecutors appealed the verdict in September, leaving the criminal proceedings subject to further judicial consideration.
Commission identifies continuing weaknesses
The European Commission’s 2026 Rule of Law Report, published in July, assessed Malta’s progress in reforming its justice system, anti-corruption institutions and protections for the media.
The report acknowledged certain improvements, including additional resources allocated to judicial and prosecutorial authorities.
However, it found that progress remained limited on several recommendations.
These include reducing delays in judicial proceedings, improving the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption and ensuring greater judicial involvement in the appointment of the Chief Justice.
The Commission has also expressed concern about the effectiveness of existing anti-corruption arrangements.
Although investigations and prosecutions have increased in some areas, Brussels continues to seek a stronger record of final judgments in major corruption cases.
Court delays and pressure on judicial resources remain significant difficulties.
McGrath told Parliament that the Maltese authorities must continue implementing reforms to address these shortcomings.
Caruana Galizia was killed by a car bomb near her home in Bidnija on 16 October 2017.
The 53-year-old journalist had investigated corruption, money laundering and political connections involving prominent figures in Malta’s business and political establishment.
Her assassination prompted international condemnation, widespread demonstrations and investigations into the circumstances surrounding the killing.
Several men have subsequently been convicted for participating in the murder or supplying the explosives.
However, the criminal proceedings concerning the alleged commissioning of the assassination have remained contentious.
On 2 September 2026, a nine-member jury acquitted businessman Yorgen Fenech of complicity in the murder and criminal association. The verdict was reached by eight votes to one.
Fenech had denied ordering or financing the killing.
The acquittal prompted criticism from Caruana Galizia’s family and organisations campaigning for press freedom.
On 22 September, Malta’s Attorney General formally appealed the verdict, challenging legal decisions made during the trial.
The appeal does not overturn Fenech’s acquittal or establish criminal responsibility.
The Court of Criminal Appeal must determine whether the legal grounds presented justify further proceedings, potentially including a retrial.
The criminal case remains separate from the broader political debate over Malta’s institutional reforms.
Maltese MEPs clash in Strasbourg
Wednesday’s parliamentary debate exposed sharp disagreements between representatives of Malta’s opposition Nationalist Party and governing Labour Party.
Nationalist MEPs Peter Agius and David Casa criticised the authorities’ record on corruption and institutional accountability.
Agius argued that repeated European Commission assessments had failed to produce sufficient improvements and questioned whether Malta’s institutions were effectively addressing allegations of wrongdoing.
Casa referred to the findings of the independent public inquiry into Caruana Galizia’s assassination, which concluded in 2021 that the state had contributed to circumstances in which a climate of impunity enabled the killing.
He argued that significant recommendations arising from that inquiry remained outstanding.
Labour MEP Alex Agius Saliba rejected the criticism, maintaining that Malta had implemented reforms and that its judicial institutions should be allowed to perform their functions independently.
He pointed to the prosecution’s appeal against Fenech’s acquittal as evidence that the judicial process was continuing.
Labour MEP Thomas Bajada concentrated on the protection of journalists and the need to counter misinformation while preserving independent reporting.
The disagreements subsequently prompted a response from Maltese Prime Minister Robert Abela, who accused opposition MEPs of damaging Malta’s reputation through their interventions.
Protection of journalists remains unfinished
Media freedom featured prominently in the Commission’s concerns.
Malta has introduced legislation addressing certain abusive legal proceedings against journalists, including transposing EU protections against strategic lawsuits intended to discourage public participation.
However, the existing measures principally concern civil proceedings with cross-border implications.
The Commission has urged Malta to extend comparable protections to domestic cases.
Other concerns include journalists’ access to official information, protection from intimidation and the need for more comprehensive legislative safeguards.
McGrath indicated that the Maltese government intended to present additional media legislation in the coming weeks.
The Commission has called for consultations with journalists, media organisations and civil society before the measures are adopted.
European institutions are also examining Malta’s implementation of wider EU requirements under the European Media Freedom Act.
Further pressure for reform
The European Parliament’s proceedings form part of the continued scrutiny of Malta’s institutional record following Caruana Galizia’s assassination.
The Commission’s annual rule-of-law assessments provide a mechanism for identifying outstanding problems and monitoring governments’ responses.
However, the implementation of many recommendations remains the responsibility of national authorities.
For Malta, the immediate issues concern the government’s promised media legislation, outstanding judicial reforms and the progression of the appeal in the Fenech case.
The Commission has made clear that further improvements are required, while the Maltese government maintains that substantial institutional changes have already been introduced.
The next assessment will depend on legislative measures actually adopted, their implementation and progress through the relevant judicial proceedings.
Over the past 30 years, Zionist manipulation of US foreign policy has facilitated Israel’s destruction/destabilization of a 4,000-km swath of countries across North Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, & Western Asia…
Holy Trinity is a Ukrainian Catholic parish outside Pittsburgh. It practices the Catholic faith, but with rituals and architecture that are distinctively Ukrainian. The parish owns two plots of land. On one of them, in Carnegie, sits a church, where it holds regular liturgies. The other plot, in nearby Collier Township, has been owned by the parish for more than seven decades. That 41-acre plot houses the parish's cemetery and mausoleum but is otherwise mostly wooded.
About three years ago, Holy Trinity's pastor felt called to turn the second plot into a shrine, a pilgrimage destination for faithful to gather from "near and far." The shrine would "honor Mary, the Mother of God, and would pay homage to the sanctity of life." With the help of lawyers, architects, and traffic consultants, Holy Trinity designed the shrine. It envisioned a 13,000-square-foot chapel with gold domes, a bell tower, a museum, a gift shop, and a retreat center.
But the plot is constrained by Collier Township's zoning code. The code divides the township into districts, each of which allows certain types of buildings. The northern, wooded half of the plot lies in a planned-economic-development district, allowing larger projects like business offices, amusement parks, or country clubs. The southern half is in a rural-residential district, allowing farms and single-family homes. Neither district contemplates shrines.
The zoning code is enforced by Collier's five-member Board of Commissioners. The Board has power not only to rezone land or amend the code, but also to approve or deny some building projects, because the code makes some land uses conditional. For instance, the code conditionally allows new churches in rural-residential districts, but only if the Board approves them. In any event, anything as big as Holy Trinity's shrine needs the Board's approval.
To fit the shrine project into the zoning code, Holy Trinity applied to do two things. First, it asked the Board to amend the zoning code to allow planned cultural centers, including the shrine, in economic-development districts. Second, it sought to rezone some of its rural-residential land into economic-development land, to make a larger plot for the shrine. As part of its application, Holy Trinity included sketches of its shrine plus a traffic study showing minimal impact on the surrounding community. After a live hearing with concerned residents, the Board denied Holy Trinity's application, expressing concern about traffic and Holy Trinity's fundraising projections. Some residents, and at least one Board member, were also troubled once they learned that the shrine's message would be pro-life.
So Holy Trinity tried again with a smaller project. It applied to build a modest chapel entirely on its rural-residential land. Though the Board approved the new application, it came with strings attached, limiting bell ringing, the height of the chapel, and who could be remembered at memorial services….
The majority held that Holy Trinity wasn't entitled to a preliminary injunction, because the harm could be repaired by damages (one of the elements of the preliminary injunction inquiry); on this matter, the majority and Judge Paul Matey's dissent had an interesting and complicated debate. But here's a passage as to the facts that struck me as worth noting, even apart from that controversy:
Finally, and most troubling, both community and Board members objected to the shrine's pro-life message. One resident worried that "Father Jason has been very involved in pro life. This is to be a pro life museum … [W]hen you think very political rights, either side, it brings a lot of danger, a lot of protests, as well as costs that could be incurred by the community." Another complained that "the intent of the shrine was a celebration for Roe vs. Wade being overturned … [and] reparation for sin of abortion and counseling, spiritual direction …. this will bring a bunch [of people] potentially for a rally and this could also bring the opposite as well for protest."
Privately, at least one of the Board's members agreed. The day after the hearing, that commissioner forwarded an email about the shrine's pro-life stance to the rest of the Board: "Looks like we might have dodged a bullet last night. The true inten[t] of the shrine" was pro-life and "This could have been a disaster." Another township officer, copied on the email, seemed to affirm those sentiments. Nothing in the record suggests that any other Board member responded and disagreed. And in her deposition, the Board member who wrote the email confirmed that "one of the reasons" that the Board had denied the application was Holy Trinity's pro-life purpose. She also defended denying land-use approval "based on the nature of the religious service to be held in the building."
These objections hint at unconstitutional religious hostility and content-based discrimination, concerns that would be better addressed on a more developed factual record. But at the very least, they strongly suggest that the Board resists ever approving the shrine project. If so, the rezoning denial is effectively absolute, and the "degree" of burden on Holy Trinity is substantial. Plus, the township does not show that denying approval altogether is the least-restrictive means to serve a compelling interest. That is enough to show that Holy Trinity is very likely to prevail on its RLUIPA [Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act] substantial-burden claim….
Italy’s response to a weekend of street violence has moved from emergency policing to tougher criminal law, with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni seeking to reassert control after unrest in Milan and other northern cities
The government approved measures on Tuesday creating an offence of violent participation in demonstrations, extending preventive detention powers to teenagers aged 14–17 and making parents financially liable for damage caused by their children. The package also provides for 500 soldiers to support security operations in Milan through December.
The crackdown presents a defining challenge for a prime minister whose political identity rests heavily on law and order: demonstrating that stronger powers can prevent another eruption while addressing the conditions feeding public anger.
Milan’s damaged shopping streets have become the most visible symbol of that challenge. Weekend violence brought looting, fires and confrontations with police, exposing businesses and residents to disorder in Italy’s financial capital.
As EU Today reported in its earlier coverage of the unrest, police brought 271 people to headquarters following Sunday’s disturbances, including 220 minors. Thirty-two were formally arrested, a detail that matters when assessing the scale of alleged criminal involvement.
The prominence of teenagers has shaped the government’s response. According to the Associated Press, the decree makes prosecuting minors over 14 easier and includes plans to expand juvenile detention capacity and judicial resources. Parliament must convert the decree into law within 60 days.
For supporters, the argument is straightforward: shopkeepers should not have to absorb the cost of destruction, and officers need effective tools against groups exploiting demonstrations to commit offences.
Yet preventive detention raises a different question from punishment after conviction. Its credibility depends on clear evidence, consistent safeguards and meaningful scrutiny, particularly when those affected are children.
Making the distinction will help determine whether the package strengthens public confidence or deepens distrust among young people already alienated from political institutions.
The wider European debate offers a warning. In its earlier editorial, EU Global examined the tension between public-order legislation and the right to protest, arguing that governments risk restricting legitimate dissent when security powers expand too broadly. That commentary predates the Milan disturbances but addresses the central democratic question now confronting Italy.
Peaceful assembly and criminal violence require different responses. Protecting the former gives authorities greater legitimacy when confronting the latter; treating an entire demonstration as suspect risks weakening that distinction.
Meloni also faces a political vulnerability that additional arrests cannot automatically resolve. The Financial Times reported that the unrest involved teenagers mobilised through social media, many without political affiliations, against a background of economic stagnation and expensive living conditions.
Those circumstances complicate any attempt to explain the disorder through a single organisation, ideology or grievance. Online mobilisation can accelerate confrontation without producing leaders capable of negotiating an end to it.
For the government, this makes prevention as important as punishment. Better intelligence, timely deployment and coordination between national and municipal authorities will influence whether stronger legislation produces safer streets.
The same applies to the military presence. Soldiers can provide visible reassurance, but the political test will be whether residents and businesses experience sustained security once the immediate emergency passes.
Italy faces two connected tasks.
Establishing individual responsibility for destruction and restoring confidence that lawful political participation can deliver results will be the priorities if public respect for the law is to be maintained.
Meloni’s new measures offer a forceful immediate answer to the first. Their lasting success will depend on whether the government can make progress on the second, before another weekend of anger becomes another emergency requiring still tougher powers.
The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) on Oct. 21 searched the premises of Andriy Pyshnyi, head of the National Bank of Ukraine, a law enforcement source told the Kyiv Independent.
Last July, President Donald Trump imposed 50 percent tariffs on various Canadian goods, a list he subsequently expanded to include additional imports, some of which he banned outright. His legal justification was Section 338 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which Congress approved in 1930. Section 338 authorized tariffs in response to discriminatory trade practices. But in the 96 years since it was enacted, no president had ever used it to impose tariffs.
Why is that? According to a lawsuit that the Liberty Justice Center (LJC) filed on Tuesday in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), the answer is clear: Section 338 was superseded by subsequent legislation that likewise targeted discriminatory trade barriers, beginning with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and culminating in Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Section 301, the current remedy, includes requirements that Trump apparently sought to dodge by invoking Section 338 instead.
That maneuver is illegal, the LJC argues. "Congress already gave the executive branch a tool for responding to unfair foreign trade practices: Section 301, which requires an investigation, public comment and other safeguards," says Jeffrey M. Schwab, the LJC's director of litigation. "The administration cannot skip those protections by reaching for a 1930 statute that no president had ever used to impose a tariff."
Why not? "Where provisions in two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one," the lawsuit says. "Where a later act covers the whole subject of an earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it operates similarly as a repeal. And a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute controls the construction of an earlier one even absent express amendment."
Even if Section 338 somehow survived congressional approval of contrary laws, the LJC adds, Trump's tariffs exceed the authority it grants. And if Trump's interpretation of Section 338 were correct, the lawsuit says, the provision would violate the nondelegation doctrine, which bars Congress from delegating its tariff power to the president without providing "an intelligible principle" to guide and constrain his exercise of it.
Trump's Section 338 tariffs, in short, are "the Administration's latest attempt to exercise, through a statute never designed for the purpose, the tariff power that the Constitution assigns to Congress." That pattern should be familiar by now.
Shortly after taking office in 2025, Trump claimed to have discovered a previously unnoticed delegation of extensive tariff authority in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), a 1977 law that does not mention import taxes and had never been used to impose them. That claim was rejected by every court that considered it, and last February the Supreme Court ruled that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs at all.
Trump responded to that decision by immediately announcing similarly broad tariffs under Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act, which addresses "fundamental international payments problems" caused by "serious United States balance-of-payments deficits." In May, the CIT ruled that the new tariffs were illegal because Trump had failed to "identify balance-of-payments deficits within the meaning of Section 122."
Trump then switched to Plan C, invoking Section 301 of the Trade Act, which authorizes tariffs in response to a foreign "act, policy, or practice" that is "unreasonable or discriminatory" and "burdens or restricts" U.S. commerce. He claimed that provision justified tariffs on 86 trading partners, accounting for nearly all U.S. imports, because they had failed to "impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor." The CIT is currently weighing challenges to those tariffs, including an LJC lawsuit.
Trump's Section 338 tariffs have now added to the CIT's caseload. The LJC represents Gellert Global Group, an importer that was hit hard by those taxes after Trump added cheese to the list of disfavored Canadian goods. The lawsuit asks the CIT to certify a class of importers, numbering in "the hundreds, if not the thousands," that likewise have been clobbered by Trump's 50 percent tariffs.
Since Trump obviously is aware of Section 301, why did he resort to a never-used, seemingly obsolete provision to justify the tariffs on imports from Canada? As the LJC notes, Section 301 requires an investigation by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, "consultation with the foreign country concerned, notice, public comment, a hearing, and determinations within statutory deadlines." It also requires "that action be equivalent in value to the burden imposed, that duties be preferred over other import restrictions, and that actions terminate after four years absent a request for continuation and review."
Can Trump avoid those constraints by invoking Section 338 instead? The LJC thinks not: "Congress did not intend to leave in place a parallel authority that would allow the President to impose the same remedies, for the same conduct, free of every one of those safeguards."
Section 338 has been "impliedly repealed," the LJC argues. "At a minimum, Section 301 controls where, as here, the President seeks to respond to foreign practices within Section 301's scope, and the President may not impose duties in response to such practices while disregarding the procedures and limits Section 301 imposes. Because the President did not proceed under Section 301, the Section 338 Tariffs are unlawful whether or not Section 338 survives."
Even if you ignore subsequent legislation, the LJC argues, the Canadian policies that Trump cited when he announced the tariffs do not qualify as "discrimination" under Section 338. "Canada's motor vehicle surtax and its provinces' alcohol purchasing decisions are responses to tariffs that the United States imposed on Canada, not discrimination by Canada against the United States," it says. Trump also complained that Canada treats European cheese imports more favorably than U.S. cheese imports. But "when Congress enacted Section 338, a preference granted under a reciprocal agreement was not 'discrimination.'"
Section 338 "addresses discrimination: measures that single out United States commerce for worse treatment than the commerce of the world at large," the lawsuit says. "It is not a general authorization to impose tariffs whenever the President disagrees with a trading partner's policies, or whenever a trading partner responds to tariffs the United States has imposed on it."
Trump also was unfazed by Section 338's requirement that the president set duties to "offset" the costs imposed by discriminatory practices, which implies proportionality. Rather than attempt that, the LJC notes, Trump imposed "the statutory maximum rate of 50 percent without tying it to any measured burden."
As interpreted by Trump, the lawsuit warns, Section 338 authorizes the president to "impose tariffs of up to 50 percent on any products of any country that extends better treatment to any other country in any respect—including through any of the hundreds of preferential trade agreements to which the United States is not a party—or that responds to tariffs the United States has imposed on it." Yet Section 338 "contains no clear statement authorizing that power," contrary to the "major questions" doctrine, which applies to assertions of executive authority with "vast economic and political significance."
If Section 338 conferred the sort of unfettered authority that Trump is claiming, the LJC says, it "would supply no intelligible principle constraining the exercise of Congress's power to lay duties." His reading "would convert a narrow, fact-dependent provision into an effectively unrestricted delegation of Congress's tariff power," which would be "an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power."
This case "is not about the president," says LJC CEO Sara Albrecht. "It is about the presidency. No president should have the power to pull a dormant statute off the shelf and use it to impose sweeping tariffs or import bans without the limits Congress required."
“Every single village, we’re talking about 23,000 homes, is in ruins,” Katz boasted before a cheering studio audience, adding “there are no residents left, 200,000 people have been displaced,” using ‘Gaza model’
HRF alleges that Sean Glass likely gave the order to open fire. His alleged responsibility extends across Gaza: attacks on Al-Shifa Hospital, destruction of UNRWA headquarters, and the razing of entire neighbourhoods—devastation he publicly celebrated.
Officers are instruments of state whose job is to repress, rather than manage, public dissent
Familiar images of teargas clouds drifting across Paris squares, police baton charges against masked protesters and terrified teenagers floored – and worse – by stun grenades have once again focused the world’s attention on France’s policing methods.
While most of its western European neighbours generally favour police tactics that prioritise crowd containment and de-escalation, France has long responded to social movements that take to the streets with, at times, shocking physical force.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been shortlisted for the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, an annual human-rights award from the European Parliament.
The announcement on Monday (19 October) comes after US president Donald Trump put his weight behind Israeli efforts to discredit the international judicial body by extending sanctions against it.
The ICC issued an arrest warrant in 2024 for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu for alleged war crimes, as well as other senior Israeli officials and Hamas. The US then responded by targeting its judges by impeding their day-to-day activities such as banking.
New sanctions against the court were announced by the US administration this month after the Nobel Peace Prize went to Navi Pillay, a former ICC judge who wrote a UN report concluding Israel is committing genocide in Gaza.
The ICC court labelled the move as an “assault on the rule of law” and called on countries to step up to protect it.
Sakharov Prize finalists named
Members of the EU parliament’s foreign affairs committee shortlisted the ICC and its members for the Sakharov Prize.
Named after the Soviet nuclear scientist dissident Andrei Sakharov, the award has been previously awarded to the likes of Iranian protest icon Mahsa Amini and to the Ukrainian people enduring Russia’s attacks.
“We stand by the ICC and its officials, and we are committed to safeguarding its work,” said Yannis Maniatis, Greek MEP for the Socialists & Democrats group which nominated the ICC for the award. “If the aggressors become the victims, and if we stand by helplessly as international justice erodes, we risk allowing those who believe themselves above the law to prevail.”
Tundu Lissu, a Tanzanian opposition figure in court for inciting the public to disrupt an election and facing the possibility of death row, is also a Sakharov Prize finalist. “There is no doubt about the political nature of his detention,” said David McAllister, MEP for the European People’s Party who co-nominated Lissu.
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Saudi Arabia executed two Bangladeshis on October 14 but Dhaka’s response was conspicuously restrained. Its consulate in Jeddah reportedly sought formal confirmation and the foreign ministry requested details. Officials then reassured Riyadh that bilateral relations would remain unaffected. Public sentiment, reflected in a flood of angry and frustrated social media posts, stands in sharp contrast […]
Israel continues to imprison her without charge or trial. Her lawyers have not been able to visit her. Her prolonged solitary confinement is a violation of international standards – Supporters ask the Red Cross to urgently intervene
It all begins in Ravenna, a historic city and major Italian port on the Adriatic coast. The port of Ravenna is a civilian port: bulk cargo, fertilizers, containers, cruise ships. Yet in a brief filed this summer with the Council of State, the State Attorney General’s Office attributed “military significance” to it within the country’s maritime defense system. The reason lies in a single sentence: making certain data public would pose an unacceptable risk because “a ‘piecemeal’ and ‘hybrid’ world war is underway, involving, among others, Italy as well.”
The data did not consist of routes, schedules, or ship names. They were aggregate figures: the amount of military equipment that left the port in 2025, broken down by four-month period and categorized as exports or transit. Journalist Linda Maggiori had requested this information in January under the general right of access to public information—Italy’s equivalent of the FOIA—which does not require justification. On October 13, Il Fatto Quotidiano turned the statement into a national issue. On October 16, the Sixth Section of the Council of State rejected the Customs Agency’s appeal.
In February, the Customs Agency, which reports to the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), denied the request entirely, citing national security, public order, and commercial confidentiality. Maggiori, represented by attorney Andrea Maestri, filed an appeal with the Emilia-Romagna Regional Administrative Court (TAR), which on July 1 partially upheld the appeal: the quantities must be made public because the numerical data is “neutral,” while the destinations may remain confidential. Customs, represented by the State Attorney’s Office, filed an appeal. The Council of State upheld the Regional Administrative Court’s ruling: the administration failed to demonstrate either the necessity or the concrete nature of the harm. It also noted “apparently contradictory” conduct, as the Livorno Customs Office had previously provided similar data without objection.
In February 2025, approximately 13 metric tons of forged parts bound for an Israeli defense company were seized in Ravenna without export authorization; the proceedings are ongoing, and the presumption of innocence applies. It appears that on October 14 of this year, another 4 metric tons were at the port.
What does “war” mean, who decides, and the arms law
The word has three meanings, and memory confuses them. The first is constitutional. Article 11 establishes that Italy “rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means of resolving international disputes.” Article 78 entrusts the Chambers with the authority to declare a state of war and to grant the necessary powers to the government; Article 87 assigns the declaration of war to the President of the Republic. In the history of the Republic, a state of war has never been declared: neither in 1991, nor for Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Libya.
The second meaning is international: under international humanitarian law, armed conflict exists de facto, but supplying weapons to a belligerent party—according to prevailing legal opinion and that of the International Committee of the Red Cross—does not make one a party to the conflict. The third issue is political-strategic. “Hybrid warfare” (cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation below the threshold of armed conflict) and “proxy war” are analytical tools, not legal categories. In a judicial ruling, therefore, a political term was used to justify an exception to a legal right. The Council of State rejected the postponement.
Parliament declares a state of war, authorizes missions (Law 145/2016), and receives the annual report on exports. The government authorizes exports through the UAMA of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Prime Minister is the sole custodian of state secrets (Law 124/2007), under the oversight of COPASIR. The President of the Republic chairs the Supreme Defense Council. The Ministry of Defense signs the classified aid packages for Ukraine. The State Attorney’s Office, which reports to the Prime Minister’s Office, defends government agencies in court: its briefs are legal documents, not foreign policy statements. No minister has yet clarified whether they agree with the statements made therein.
Moreover, the information has never been classified as a state secret. Customs authorities have invoked the relevant provisions of Article 5-bis of the Transparency Decree (Legislative Decree 33/2013), which allow for a refusal only if necessary to avoid “concrete harm” to national security, defense, or international relations.
Law No. 185 of 1990 prohibits the export and transit of arms to countries engaged in armed conflict in violation of Article 51 of the UN Charter, to countries whose policies conflict with Article 11, to countries under embargo, or to those responsible for serious human rights violations. However, it excludes government-to-government transfers and transits for NATO forces. The annual report to Parliament (Art. 5) lists authorizations by country and company, not by port: no public document specifies how much passes through a single port. This is the gap that the Ravenna petition sought to fill. According to the Peace and Disarmament Network, the government’s reform bill, approved by the Senate in 2024 (A.C. 1730), would reduce the data included in the report; based on the sources consulted, it has not yet been definitively approved.
Those who defend confidentiality argue that harmless data—aggregated and cross-referenced with maritime tracking data—could reveal supply routes: this is the argument used by the Trieste Customs Office to deny an identical petition. Also important are obligations to allies and corporate confidentiality. Those advocating for transparency point out that Law 185 stems from the idea that arms require more public oversight, not less, because they pertain to Article 11 and, in the case of free transfers, involve public funds. An annual total does not enable hostile actions, and data published in Livorno does not become dangerous simply because it is in Ravenna.
Secrecy has a legitimate place. The Constitutional Court has linked it to national security since Ruling 86/1977 and reaffirmed this in the Abu Omar case (106/2009). Secrecy becomes problematic when it loses its criteria: concrete evidence of harm, proportionality, a time limit, consistency among agencies, and oversight by a judge or Parliament. The argument of a “piecemeal world war” failed on all counts. It did not identify any harm, rejected the Regional Administrative Court’s (TAR) compromise solution, treated data from a past year as if it were an ongoing operation, and contradicted the Livorno ruling. If merely invoking a widespread conflict suffices, then that justification applies to any data and indefinitely: hybrid wars, as described in official documents themselves, have no declared beginning nor anticipated end.
That language has a specific origin: the Ministry of Defense’s non-paper from November 2025, according to which Italy is already embroiled in a hybrid conflict. Committees and unions believe that part of Ravenna’s cargo is destined for Haifa and Ashdod: the withheld data would make it possible to verify this.
The political paradox
The government states in Parliament that Italy is not at war; one of its agencies writes the same in court to conceal a figure. The case was successfully closed, but only thanks to a journalist willing to pursue the matter through two levels of appeal. Yet, even with the case closed, the gravity of what was stated remains.
If the state deems the international situation serious enough to restrict the right to information, that assessment cannot be confined to a customs office or a legal brief. The logic of Article 78 applies even on a small scale: whoever invokes the exception must answer for it before Parliament. All that is needed is the uniform publication of quantities for each port—as requested by the Ravenna Region and Municipality—their inclusion in the report on Law 185, and a review of the classifications by COPASIR, with predefined deadlines.
An emergency becomes permanent when no one declares it and no one revokes it. One question remains for Parliament: if the State considers itself to be at war, why does it not state so where the Constitution requires it to do so? And if it does not consider itself to be at war, by what authority does one of its bodies write as much?
Last week, not only did Oregon's restrictive gun laws fail to stop a shooter intent on killing innocent people, but a passing good Samaritan had to violate those laws to end the murder spree. Fortunately, authorities don't appear intent on prosecuting Kaylub Giamanco, father to two girls who attend the school, for ignoring the ban on guns on school grounds to save lives. But the law is clearly more of a threat to people with good intent than it is to those bent on doing harm. Such laws should and must be defied, but lawmakers need to remove these legal minefields before they do more damage.
A Hero Dad With a Gun Stops a Murder Spree
"I want to start by thanking and praising the quick thinking and courage of the Silver Rail Elementary School staff and parents—and the first responders who rushed to the scene," Oregon Gov. Tina Kotek commented in a press release after the attack by a 16-year-old shooter at Silver Rail Elementary School in Bend, Oregon. "And to the community member who heroically intervened to stop further loss of life, your actions carry a heavy emotional burden—and my thoughts are with you."
That community member was Kaylub Giamanco, who had two daughters at the school. He was reportedly driving past when he saw the shooter approaching Silver Rail with a shotgun in hand. Giamanco parked his vehicle, grabbed his firearm, and followed the shooter, who had blasted his way through the facility's locked doors.
The shooter murdered four people, but Giamanco was able to kill him before he did any more damage. In the incident, the murderer obviously violated the law. But so did Giamanco.
Restrictive Laws That Had To Be Ignored
"Oregon gun laws are rated as the 12th strictest in the nation according to data collected by gun violence prevention group Everytown for Gun Safety, but they didn't stop the shooting of four elementary school children and two teachers at a Bend elementary school on Thursday," wrote Lillian Mongeau Hughes of The Oregonian. (Reports say three children and a teacher were murdered, with two others injured.)
The gun-control group Everytown for Gun Safety boasts that "Oregon has passed a broad range of gun safety laws in recent years, including a requirement that guns be securely stored whenever they are not in their owner's immediate control, a prohibition on guns at the state capitol, and a law that gives universities the authority to prohibit guns on their grounds."
The similarly restriction-oriented Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence gives Oregon an A- for its laws, ranking the state 11th out of 50. The group notes that the state "allowed local governments to limit firearms in government buildings."
Of specific interest in this case, the state adopted a law in 2021 that, among other things, says "the governing board of a community college or a district school board" may adopt policies banning guns on school grounds, even for those "licensed to carry a concealed handgun."
Importantly, the Bend–La Pine Schools, which include Silver Rail, mandate that "no person on grounds of the schools controlled by the Board of Directors for Bend–La Pine Schools (including in school buildings) shall bring to, possess, conceal or use a weapon or firearm at any property under the jurisdiction of Bend-La Pine Schools, any activities under the jurisdiction of the district, or any interscholastic activities administered by a voluntary organization (i.e., Oregon School Activities Association). This prohibition includes those who may otherwise be permitted by law to carry such weapons or firearms."
The prohibition applies to the Silver Rail murderer, though it was unlikely to be a concern to a person already intent on slaughter. It also applies to Giamanco, who stopped the attack and who must now—probably successfully, given the case's high profile—rely on the authorities to not enforce their own laws.
A Long History of Defensive Use of Firearms
Giamanco is by no means alone in taking the initiative to stop an attack. I've written in the past about Jordan Salinas and others in the Twin Falls incident, as well as Elisjsha Dicken at the Greenwood Park Mall in Indiana. The actions of bystanders are crucial given the evidence that would-be mass murderers must be countered with defensive force within the first 30 seconds to avoid a double-digit body count.
There were 634 active attacks in the United States between 2000 and 2025, according to the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center at Texas State University. ALERRT defines an "active attack" as an incident in which "an individual or individuals is actively killing or attempting to kill multiple unrelated people in a public space." Of those, 374 were resolved before police arrived, with 29 concluded by civilians shooting the perpetrator and another 60 attackers otherwise subdued by civilians.
That's certainly not a full count of actions by armed citizens to defend themselves and others. The 2026 National Firearms Survey finds that "guns are used defensively by firearms owners in approximately 2.2 million incidents per year. In most defensive incidents no shot was fired (76.3%), about half (50.8%) involved more than one assailant, and in 70.6% of incidents respondents report that the defensive use was successful, such that no crime remained to be reported to the police."
Undoubtedly, many of those incidents aren't reported to the police because people who have just averted a threat to themselves or others don't want to get entangled with a legal system that is all too often hostile to self defense. If all has ended well, why risk arrest for violating a law that would have prevented you from defending yourself or that you may not even have known about?
As The Oregonian points out, Oregon's "strong laws" didn't stop the shooting. Those laws ban murder, of course. They also specify that "guns be locked, stored in gun safes or in specialized gun rooms as a way to keep children from accessing firearms," according to the report. "Police have not said if those laws were violated." They also ban guns on the grounds of schools with restrictive policies.
Authoritarian Laws Don't Deter Evil and Should Be Defied
The thing about criminals, though, is that they don't obey laws. That's especially true of those who plan murder sprees they don't intend to survive. The consequences the perpetrators anticipate involve death, and if that's not a deterrent, the potential prosecution of their moldering corpses holds little weight.
Unfortunately, legal peril can be a deterrent to good people who intend no harm. The threat of authoritarian laws and malicious prosecutors who enjoy state protection could convince some people to leave the means of self defense at home. Fortunately, Kaylub Giamanco wasn't one of them.
Giamanco's example at Silver Rail Elementary School is one to be emulated. If we're to protect ourselves, our children, and our neighbors, we have a right and a duty to defy laws that seek to disarm us and put us at the mercy of human predators. But we shouldn't have to suffer the threat of such laws to exercise our natural self-defense rights. Given the inability of weapons restrictions to deter crime and the harm they pose for good people, government officials need to eliminate these embarrassing restrictions and get out of our way.
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