Hungary’s Western anchor is set. The rest depends on pipelines, not speeches.
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The days of October
“Magyarország nem kompország”: Hungary is not a “ferry country”; it cannot drift between East and West. With this statement, delivered on October 23 before the Parliament in Budapest, Prime Minister Péter Magyar set the political tone for the 70th anniversary of the 1956 revolution. Immediately afterward, he added that in ’56 the Hungarians had already made their choice: “We belong to a free and democratic Europe.”
The phrase is no accident. The kompország is an image coined by Endre Ady, who in 1905 described Hungary as a ferry doomed to shuttle back and forth between East and West without ever docking permanently on either shore. For sixteen years, Viktor Orbán had overturned that assessment, transforming the oscillation into a strategy: Hungary as a bridge, Moscow’s interlocutor within the European Union, a hub of “opening to the East.” The new government chose the day most steeped in memory on the national calendar to declare that era over. This is the political significance of the day, and it is the appropriate place to begin.
On October 23, 1956, students from the Budapest University of Technology took to the streets in solidarity with Polish workers. The procession gathered in front of the statue of General Bem, then headed toward the Parliament; among their demands were free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In the evening, part of the crowd moved to Városliget, where the monument to Stalin stood. The Budapest police chief, Sándor Kopácsi, provided a detailed account in his book *Au nom de la classe ouvrière*: the demonstrators wrapped a steel cable around the neck of the statue—which, including its pedestal, stood about twenty-five meters tall—while others, who had arrived in trucks loaded with oxygen tanks and cutting torches, began cutting through the bronze at the level of the boots. It took about an hour for the statue to collapse. Only the boots remained on the pedestal, into which a Hungarian flag was planted. At the same time, in front of the Radio headquarters, the political police (ÁVH) opened fire on the crowd, and the protest turned into an armed uprising.
On October 25, in Kossuth Square, shots fired at demonstrators gathered in front of the Parliament caused a massacre whose death toll, even today, ranges from a few dozen to several hundred. This year’s state ceremony took place in that same square.
The revolution was not a bloodless affair on just one side. In the alleys of the 8th and 9th districts, around Corvin Passage, groups of insurgents—many of whom were boys barely out of their teens—attacked Soviet tanks with Molotov cocktails, and many crew members were burned to death inside their vehicles. Total Soviet casualties exceeded seven hundred. The fiercest violence, however, was directed at the men of the political police. On October 30, in Republic Square (Köztársaság tér), the insurgents stormed the party headquarters in Budapest: more than twenty ÁVH officers and conscripts were killed, some lynched and hanged from trees, along with City Secretary Imre Mező. The revolution’s own leaders condemned these acts and called for an end to summary justice.
The October 28 ceasefire marked the beginning of the withdrawal phase. Moscow agreed to withdraw its units from Budapest on the condition that they be replaced by Hungarian units and that the insurgents surrender their weapons. The columns in direct contact with the fighters left their positions on October 30; the last ones departed from the Parliament area in the early afternoon of the 31st. It was a retreat carried out in an openly hostile atmosphere. The groups at the Corvin Passage, convinced that this was a ruse, refused to assist in securing the convoys, and their suspicion was not unfounded: several armored vehicles remained hidden in Népliget and other parts of the city. However, the available sources—both Hungarian and Soviet—do not document any systematic attacks against the departing troops during those two days. The most harrowing accounts—those of Soviet soldiers killed while fleeing from burning vehicles—pertain to the clashes that occurred after November 4. Meanwhile, on October 31, the Presidium of the CPSU had already overturned the decision.
On November 1, Imre Nagy’s government proclaimed the country’s neutrality and its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. At dawn on November 4, Operation “Turbine” brought seventeen Soviet divisions back to Budapest. The final toll included approximately 2,500 Hungarian deaths, about 200,000 exiles, tens of thousands of convictions, and more than two hundred executions; Nagy, Pál Maléter, and Miklós Gimes were hanged after a secret trial in June 1958.
Three squares, three memories
Magyar said that for years Hungarians had been led to believe that the national holiday belonged to a single political party. The day showed that the memory of ’56 remains divided, even if the roles have been reversed. The state held its celebrations in Kossuth Square, with the morning flag-raising ceremony and a solemn session of Parliament. Fidesz, KDNP, and Mi Hazánk did not participate because they do not recognize the legitimacy of the new President of the Republic, András Baka.
Fidesz organized its own “March of the National Flag” from the Technical University to Bem Square, following the route taken by the students in 1956. Speakers included former President János Áder, historian Mária Schmidt, and parliamentary group leader János Bóka. For the first time in many years, Orbán did not deliver the October 23 speech: he was in Paris and limited himself to sharing Bóka’s video on social media. The slogan chosen for the demonstration—“No war, no gender, no migration—God, homeland, family”—makes it quite clear which interpretation of 1956 the opposition intends to uphold: that of a revolt for the nation, faith, and family against ideology—an interpretation to be revived today against Brussels.
Mi Hazánk has taken this interpretation to its logical conclusion. Its leader, László Toroczkai, has argued that in 1956 the Hungarians did not rebel against Russia but against an internationalist empire—and that today that empire is called the European Union—which reveals that, at least for a segment of the Hungarian right, 1956 has become an anti-Western symbol.
Magyar’s speech in Kossuth Square addressed this contentious issue. He recalled Erika Szeles, Péter Mansfeld, István Angyal, Nagy, and Maléter; he said that military superiority was able to crush the revolution and execute “the martyred prime minister,” but could not extinguish the desire for freedom. Then he turned to the present. Those who seek support against their own people “in Moscow or elsewhere,” he said, should remember that power sustained by foreign backing lasts only a short while. Anyone who, after 1956, parades an aggressor through the streets or subordinates the nation to foreign empires “has understood nothing of the message of ’56,” and Magyar added: “whether in Budapest or on a Parisian terrace” . The target was Orbán.
The section on foreign policy was brief and clear: Hungary wants to be a reliable ally and an equal partner, not a country that follows an isolated course. The speech never explicitly mentioned Russia, nor did it speak of neutrality. This choice is significant. In 1956, neutrality was Nagy’s ultimate demand; seventy years later, the Hungarian government interprets that same legacy as an anchor to the West, not as equidistance.
Brussels in Budapest
The presence of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa gave the day an explicitly European framework. Von der Leyen, on her first visit to Hungary since 2024, spoke in Parliament of a return “to a reborn country.” She said that in 1956 even the Soviets were afraid, because a victory by the Hungarian people would have spread the desire for democracy. She then directly linked the anniversary to the April 12 election: in April, Hungary would once again send a message of hope, demonstrating that democratic regression is reversible. She had already made the same comparison between Orbán’s defeat and the 1956 revolution in the aftermath of the elections, sparking protests among the Hungarian right.
The rest of the guest list was more modest than the government had led people to believe. Delegations were sent by some forty countries, almost all at the level of ministers or parliamentary speakers; Moldovan President Maia Sandu and Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze were in attendance. Emmanuel Macron, whose attendance Magyar had announced in an interview, did not attend: the French embassy clarified that the visit had never been confirmed, following days of tension over certain comments by the Hungarian prime minister regarding the unrest in France. Also absent were Giorgia Meloni, who was visiting Kuwait, and Donald Tusk, who was in India. Volodymyr Zelenskyy was not present; Ukraine was represented by the Speaker of Parliament. Vladimir Putin was the only head of state from Europe to not receive an invitation.
On October 23, he symbolically confirmed a shift that had already begun in practice. The Magyar government has classified Russia as a security threat, given the green light to open four negotiation chapters for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, and set the 2027 defense budget at 2% of GDP. The role of bridge between Europe and Russia—which Orbán had made the hallmark of Hungarian foreign policy—is no longer government doctrine.
It remains to be seen to what extent this can be achieved in practice. Last April, Magyar pointed out that Hungary is “close to Russia” and that paying more for raw materials harms European competitiveness; he said he was ready for pragmatic cooperation with Moscow and wanted to renegotiate the terms of Paks II with the Kremlin. Oil still comes via the Druzhba pipeline, and the country’s only nuclear power plant burns Russian fuel. Energy Minister István Kapitány maintains that, starting in October 2027, gas could come entirely from non-Russian sources, and a decision on Paks II is expected by the end of the year.
The 70th anniversary thus leaves one question unanswered. Ady feared that Hungary would remain a ferry forever. Orbán had tried to turn the ferry into a bridge. Magyar now promises a permanent landing on the western shore. Whether that landing will be stable will be determined more by geography and infrastructure than by speeches.
The two squares on October 23—Kossuth and Bem—did not celebrate the same revolution.
The European Commission has proposed increasing total fishing opportunities by approximately 35 per cent compared with 2026, largely because of improved assessments for several herring stocks and sprat. At the same time, it wants substantial reductions in permitted accidental catches of cod, whose depleted populations have shown little evidence of sustained recovery.
The negotiations, scheduled for 26th and potentially 27th October, will determine how fishing opportunities are allocated between EU member states bordering the Baltic Sea.
According to the Council’s published agenda, ministers are seeking a political agreement on total allowable catches and national quotas for ten commercially significant fish stocks.
The outcome will determine how much fish can be landed legally during 2027, while also influencing the future prospects of coastal communities, processing companies and fishing fleets.
The Commission’s proposal for 2027 fishing opportunities reflects significant differences in the condition of individual stocks.
Brussels recommends increasing the catch limit for central Baltic herring by 49 per cent and for sprat by 44 per cent. Proposed increases for Bothnian herring and Gulf of Riga herring are more modest, at three and 11 per cent respectively.
The improved outlook for sprat follows stronger reproduction in recent years, while scientific assessments suggest some herring populations are beginning to recover.
However, these improvements do not mean the Baltic ecosystem as a whole has returned to a healthy condition.
Central Baltic and Bothnian herring remain below important sustainability reference levels, even though the latest scientific assessments permit increased catches under specified conditions.
For cod, the position is considerably worse.
The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, known as ICES, has advised that there should be no catches of eastern Baltic cod in 2027 or 2028 under its precautionary approach.
Its scientific advice for eastern Baltic cod reflects the continuing failure of the stock to recover sufficiently to support fishing.
Western Baltic cod faces similarly severe restrictions.
The Commission consequently proposes reducing the permitted incidental catch of western Baltic cod by 88 per cent and eastern Baltic cod by 51 per cent.
These allowances are designed to account for fish caught unintentionally during other fishing operations. They do not amount to the reopening of a targeted commercial cod fishery.
The proposed increases in herring and sprat quotas would benefit some fishing operators and processing industries, but the economic effects will vary significantly between countries and fleets.
Larger vessels specialising in pelagic species such as herring and sprat are likely to benefit more directly from increased catch opportunities.
Smaller operators whose activities depend on depleted stocks or mixed fisheries may face continued restrictions.
The Commission also proposes reducing the permitted incidental catch of western Baltic herring by 45 per cent and removing an exemption previously available to certain small-scale coastal fisheries.
That proposal creates a particularly difficult issue for smaller fishing businesses, whose operations may have limited capacity to switch fishing grounds or target different species.
The economic effects will depend not only on the size of the quotas but also on how national governments distribute them among individual operators.
The Baltic Sea’s problems cannot be explained by fishing pressure alone.
Nutrient pollution, changes in oxygen availability, habitat degradation and shifting environmental conditions have contributed to the deterioration of several stocks.
Restrictions on fishing can reduce direct pressure on fish populations, but they cannot independently resolve pollution or other environmental problems affecting reproduction and survival.
This complicates the relationship between scientific advice and political decisions.
Ministers are required to take account of conservation objectives under the Common Fisheries Policy. They must also consider the economic consequences for fishing communities and the viability of fleets operating within the agreed limits.
EU Today previously examined the political compromises surrounding European fishing quotas, including the tension between short-term commercial demands and the recovery of depleted fish populations.
The Baltic negotiations present a particularly concentrated version of that conflict because the condition of individual stocks varies so substantially.
The Commission’s proposed increases are based on the latest assessments rather than a general relaxation of conservation policy.
Indeed, its draft regulation envisages maintaining restrictions on vulnerable stocks while allowing greater exploitation where the scientific evidence supports it.
The proposed overall catch volume is approximately 543,000 tonnes, compared with substantially lower fishing opportunities in 2026.
That figure represents a proposed ceiling, not a confirmed agreement or a forecast of actual landings.
Once ministers reach a political agreement, the Council is expected to adopt the final regulation formally in November, with the principal catch limits applying from 1 January 2027.
The central question is whether governments will preserve the distinction between stocks showing measurable recovery and those for which scientific advisers continue to recommend no fishing.
Their decision will determine both the short-term economics of Baltic fisheries and the pace at which the region’s most vulnerable commercial fish populations may recover.
The European Commission wants to revise the rules governing network tariffs, encourage more efficient electricity consumption and accelerate the introduction of smart meters and digital grid technologies. The measures form part of a wider effort to reduce electricity costs, which remain a significant concern for European households and industrial competitiveness.
According to the Council’s published agenda, ministers will examine legislation presented on 17th July alongside the European Commission’s Electrification Action Plan.
The proposals come as Europe faces continued energy-market volatility, with the war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East affecting supply expectations and prices. Ministers will also assess energy security ahead of the 2026–27 winter.
Electricity bills contain several distinct components. Consumers pay for the electricity itself, the operation and maintenance of transmission and distribution networks, and applicable taxes and levies.
Network charges finance the infrastructure needed to deliver electricity from generating facilities to homes and businesses. They also contribute towards grid maintenance, balancing and new investment.
Unlike wholesale electricity prices, which fluctuate according to supply and demand, these charges are generally determined through regulated national tariff systems.
The Commission argues that existing arrangements do not always encourage efficient use of infrastructure or reflect the costs created by electricity consumption at different times and locations.
Its proposed regulation would amend Regulation 2019/943 to strengthen incentives for network operators to control costs and use existing capacity more effectively.
The legislation would also encourage tariffs that reflect when electricity is consumed and the demands placed on local networks.
For example, consumers who can move electricity-intensive activities away from periods of peak demand could face lower charges under certain tariff arrangements.
However, the financial benefits would depend on national implementation, available technology and individual consumption patterns.
The Commission’s proposal recognises that electricity prices have become a major issue for European industrial competitiveness.
Energy-intensive manufacturers, including steel, chemicals and other industrial producers, face particular difficulties when electricity costs are substantially higher than those of international competitors.
The proposed legislation would allow specific categories of users, including energy-intensive businesses and data centres, to benefit from differentiated network charges where justified by their consumption patterns.
Such arrangements would be subject to safeguards intended to prevent disproportionate costs being transferred to households and smaller businesses.
The proposal also addresses energy taxation. Brussels wants the minimum taxation level for electricity to remain below that of natural gas, reducing a financial disincentive to replacing fossil-fuel equipment with electric alternatives.
As EU Today previously reported, the Commission has been examining changes to electricity taxation as part of its response to Europe’s exposure to imported energy and volatile international markets.
However, reducing charges for one category of consumer does not automatically reduce the overall cost of maintaining a national grid. Regulators must still determine how those costs are recovered.
Europe’s electricity networks require considerable investment to accommodate renewable generation, electric vehicles, heat pumps and expanding industrial demand.
The Commission estimates that approximately €600 billion in electricity-grid investment will be needed by 2030, rising to around €1.2 trillion by 2040.
These figures, outlined in its accompanying assessment, illustrate the difficulty of pursuing lower consumer charges while simultaneously financing substantial infrastructure expansion.
Grid congestion is already delaying connections for renewable-energy projects, industrial facilities and other electricity users.
As EU Today examined in its coverage of Europe’s grid bottlenecks, limited transmission capacity can prevent relatively inexpensive electricity from reaching regions where demand is greatest.
The latest proposal therefore places greater emphasis on making better use of existing infrastructure before committing to conventional network expansion.
It would encourage regulators and operators to consider digital technologies, flexible connection arrangements and improved network planning.
The Commission is also seeking faster deployment of smart meters, which can provide consumers and network operators with more detailed information about electricity consumption.
In principle, such systems allow households and businesses to adjust demand in response to changing prices and network conditions.
Industrial consumers may have greater flexibility to shift production schedules or invest in electricity storage. Households, however, may have fewer opportunities to change when they use energy, particularly where consumption is linked to heating or essential daily activities.
This raises questions about how tariff reforms would affect different consumers.
A system that rewards flexible consumption could reduce costs for households with smart appliances, batteries or electric vehicles, while offering fewer benefits to people unable to alter their electricity usage.
National regulators would therefore have to balance economic efficiency against the risk of unevenly distributing network costs.
The 29th October meeting will not itself introduce new electricity charges or establish binding national tariff rates.
The Commission’s proposal remains subject to negotiations through the EU legislative process, involving the Council and European Parliament.
Governments will need to consider how much discretion national regulators should retain, whether tariff structures can be made more consistent across the single market and how vulnerable consumers should be protected.
The meeting will also examine longer-term energy security and possible targets for the period after 2030.
For Brussels, the difficulty is that electricity must become sufficiently competitive to encourage industrial investment and electrification, while the infrastructure required to support increased consumption must still be financed.
Whether the proposed reforms eventually reduce electricity bills will depend on their final legislative form, national implementation and the extent to which more efficient grid management produces measurable savings.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlined the initiative during a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on Wednesday, 21 October, following discussions among EU leaders over growing global trade imbalances.
The proposal would form part of a wider package addressing economic dependence on foreign suppliers and attempts by third countries to exert commercial pressure on individual EU member states. Although the Commission has not yet published detailed legislation, the announcement signals Brussels’ intention to expand its capacity to intervene in international trade disputes.
European manufacturers have faced increasing competition from imported products in sectors including chemicals, machinery, vehicles, steel and industrial components.
Much of the concern centres on China, where extensive manufacturing capacity and government support have enabled companies to expand their presence in international markets.
European producers argue that differences in subsidies, production costs and market access place them at a competitive disadvantage.
According to the European Commission, the EU’s goods trade deficit with China exceeded €1 billion per day in 2025.
Von der Leyen has described the imbalance as unsustainable and argued that European trade policy must respond more effectively to market distortions.
During her 21st October address to Parliament, she confirmed that the Commission was working on additional safeguards intended to address sudden increases in imports affecting European businesses.
The proposed measures follow a Franco-German initiative calling for stronger instruments to counter systemic economic imbalances.
France and Germany have urged Brussels to act more quickly where existing trade investigations and enforcement procedures prove insufficient.
The announcement follows recent negotiations between Brussels and Beijing aimed at reducing tensions over industrial competition.
Earlier this month, the two sides reached an arrangement restricting Chinese hybrid vehicle exports to the European market.
As EU Today reported on 13rd October, the agreement established an annual ceiling of 350,000 vehicles, potentially reducing Chinese manufacturers’ expected market access.
However, European officials acknowledge that restrictions covering a single automotive category cannot resolve the wider trade imbalance.
Other industries remain concerned about Chinese production capacity, including chemicals, machinery and manufactured components.
Beijing has warned against further unilateral European restrictions, arguing that protectionist measures could damage commercial relations.
The Chinese authorities have also demonstrated a willingness to pursue trade investigations involving European products.
As previous EU Today coverage established, China opened an anti-dumping investigation into an EU chemical product in early October, adding to existing commercial disputes.
Further European restrictions could therefore prompt additional Chinese countermeasures affecting exporters from member states.
The proposed market-access mechanism is intended to give Brussels greater scope to act when existing safeguards cannot address economic threats quickly enough.
However, its legal structure, enforcement thresholds and relationship with existing anti-dumping and anti-subsidy legislation have not yet been specified.
The EU already possesses several trade-defence instruments, including duties against unfairly priced or subsidised products and safeguards designed to protect industries from damaging import surges.
Those mechanisms generally require formal investigations and evidence demonstrating the conditions for intervention.
The new proposal could introduce a faster response, but questions remain over how any restrictions would comply with international trade obligations and the EU’s commitments under World Trade Organisation rules.
Member states would also have to consider the consequences for European businesses that depend on imported materials, components and finished goods.
The Commission’s strategy extends beyond restrictions on imports. Von der Leyen confirmed that a separate initiative, known as DiversifyEU, would be presented in December.
The programme is intended to help European companies reduce excessive dependence on individual suppliers and countries, particularly where critical raw materials and strategic technologies are involved.
The Commission also plans a solidarity mechanism designed to assist member states and industries facing external economic coercion or retaliation. Such arrangements could become relevant when a foreign government targets exports from a particular member state in response to an EU policy decision.
The initiative follows growing concern that Europe’s access to strategically important industrial supplies can be disrupted through export controls or political disputes.
The Commission will still have to translate the proposed measures into legislation and secure sufficient political support among member states and the European Parliament.
National governments have different commercial relationships with China and varying levels of dependence on imported industrial goods. Countries with substantial export markets in China may be particularly concerned about retaliation, while manufacturers facing foreign competition are likely to press for faster intervention.
The Commission must also determine whether new trade powers should be exercised centrally in Brussels or require additional approval from national governments. For European industry, the immediate question is whether the new mechanism can provide effective protection without increasing production costs through restrictions on essential imports.
The Commission’s forthcoming legislative proposals will establish how far the EU intends to move towards a more interventionist trade policy.
The findings, reported on 23 October, indicate that 32,619 people died as a consequence of temperatures intensified by human-induced climate change. The estimated total represents a 71 per cent increase compared with 2022, previously the deadliest summer in the researchers’ historical dataset, when 29,480 heat-related deaths were calculated.
The research builds on a long-term assessment of heat-related mortality, published in Nature Health on 14 October, which examined the impact of rising temperatures across European cities between 2000 and 2025. The latest estimates for 2026 extend that analysis to an exceptionally severe summer marked by successive heatwaves across much of the continent.
The highest estimated death tolls were recorded in Italy, France, Spain and Germany, where prolonged periods of extreme heat placed considerable pressure on vulnerable populations and public-health services.
Approximately one-third of the deaths occurred between 17 June and 1 July, when temperatures in some affected areas exceeded seasonal averages by 5.3°C.
The scale of the June heatwave had already become apparent in preliminary national mortality statistics. As EU Today reported in July, France, Belgium and the Netherlands recorded at least 3,700 excess deaths during the early stages of the summer’s extreme temperatures.
Subsequent official assessments suggested that the mortality impact was considerably greater. According to France’s national public-health agency, at least 5,764 excess deaths were recorded during the heatwave between 17 June and 2 July, followed by another 1,243 during the period from 3 to 22 July.
These national figures measure excess deaths from all causes during heatwave periods and are not directly equivalent to the temperature-attributable mortality estimates in the European study.
The researchers also cautioned that their European estimates probably understate the total mortality burden. The 854 cities included in the analysis represent approximately 40 per cent of Europe’s population, while deaths associated with an earlier heatwave in May were excluded.
Researchers used established climate-attribution methods to estimate how many deaths would have occurred under natural summer conditions and how many resulted from additional warming associated with greenhouse gas emissions.
Their calculations compared observed temperatures with computer simulations representing a climate without human-induced global warming. The difference between the two scenarios provided an estimate of mortality attributable to climate change.
Clair Barnes, a climate scientist at Imperial College London and lead author of the research, said Western and Northern European infrastructure was not designed to withstand the temperatures now being experienced.
In some European cities, temperatures during the summer reached as much as 12°C above seasonal norms.
The researchers estimated that the proportion of heat-related deaths attributable to human-induced climate change has increased from approximately 45 per cent in the early 2000s to around 65 per cent today.
The findings are consistent with the European Commission’s assessment of rising heat risks, which identifies Europe as the world’s fastest-warming continent, with temperatures increasing at approximately twice the global average rate.
People aged 85 and above accounted for more than half of the estimated deaths, although the research also identified more than 800 deaths among adults aged between 20 and 44.
Extreme temperatures increase the risk of cardiovascular and respiratory complications, dehydration and heatstroke. According to the World Health Organisation’s assessment of heat-related health risks, older people and those with existing medical conditions face particularly serious consequences from prolonged exposure.
The findings also reflect the impact of high overnight temperatures, which prevent buildings from cooling and reduce opportunities for physical recovery after extreme daytime heat.
EU Today previously examined how rising night-time temperatures are exposing weaknesses in European housing and public-health preparedness, particularly in densely populated urban areas.
The latest research identified Rome as having the highest cumulative heat-related death toll among European capitals between 2000 and 2025.
A study published by Vrije Universiteit Brussel on 20 October provides additional evidence of the mortality impact of this summer’s temperatures.
Researchers estimated that Belgium’s June heatwave caused 1,181 heat-related deaths, of which 665, or 56 per cent, were attributable to human-induced climate change.
The study found that climate change increased temperatures during the heatwave by approximately 3.9°C and more than doubled the estimated number of heat-related deaths. Its findings have not yet undergone peer review.
Belgium’s public-health authorities separately recorded 2,018 excess deaths during and immediately after the heatwave, the highest figure associated with any Belgian heatwave since monitoring began in 2003.
The latest findings add to concerns about the capacity of European healthcare systems, residential buildings and urban infrastructure to withstand increasingly severe summer temperatures.
The European Commission has warned that public-health systems across many EU and European Economic Area countries remain insufficiently prepared for extreme heat.
Researchers have identified improved early-warning systems, accessible cooling facilities, better building design and targeted assistance for elderly residents as measures capable of reducing mortality.
The new estimates also demonstrate the limitations of existing mortality records. Heat frequently contributes to deaths without being identified as the immediate medical cause, requiring researchers to use statistical models to calculate its wider impact.
The estimated 50,391 deaths therefore represent modelled heat-attributable mortality rather than individually certified fatalities. Nevertheless, the results indicate that extreme temperatures are becoming an increasingly substantial public-health risk across Europe, extending beyond Mediterranean countries into regions historically less exposed to prolonged summer heat.
The decision follows pressure from European governments, energy companies and the United States, which have warned that implementing the regulations under the existing timetable could complicate fossil fuel supplies to the European market.
MEPs approved the amendments by 341 votes to 225, with six abstentions. The revised deadlines must now be negotiated with EU governments before they can become legally binding.
The parliamentary position also extends some postponements to European oil and gas producers, going beyond the Commission’s original proposal.
The EU Methane Regulation, adopted in 2024, established requirements intended to reduce methane emissions associated with fossil fuel production, transportation and imports.
Methane is a greenhouse gas with a considerably greater warming effect than carbon dioxide over shorter periods. Emissions occur throughout the oil and gas supply chain, particularly through leaks, venting and incomplete combustion.
Under the existing legislation, new monitoring, reporting and verification requirements for imported fossil fuels were scheduled to begin on 1 January 2027.
However, the Commission proposed amendments on 14 October 2026 to give companies additional time to comply.
The European Parliament has now supported a longer postponement than the Commission requested.
Under the parliamentary amendments, importers of crude oil, natural gas and coal would have until 31 May 2031 to demonstrate equivalent monitoring, reporting and verification arrangements for relevant supplies delivered in 2030.
The requirements would cover supply contracts concluded or renewed since 4 August 2024. Older contracts would remain subject to separate reporting requirements concerning efforts to obtain compliance.
Energy security concerns have been central to the debate. The United States has become Europe’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas, particularly following the reduction of Russian pipeline gas deliveries after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
American officials have argued that certain provisions of the methane legislation could create substantial compliance difficulties for exporters and potentially disrupt gas deliveries.
France, Italy and the Czech Republic have also supported adjustments to the timetable, reflecting concerns about energy costs, administrative burdens and the availability of alternative supplies.
European industrial consumers remain sensitive to fluctuations in natural gas prices, while the continuing conflict in the Middle East has increased uncertainty in international energy markets.
For importers, the principal concern is obtaining reliable information about emissions generated by suppliers operating outside EU jurisdiction.
European companies must demonstrate compliance using data collected throughout production and transportation networks that they do not necessarily control.
Parliament’s position includes extensions for certain reporting obligations affecting oil and gas operators within the European Union.
Verified reports combining measurements of methane emissions at individual sources and production sites would be subject to revised deadlines.
For assets operated directly by reporting companies, the proposed deadline would move to February 2030. Certain non-operated assets would be covered by a later deadline in August 2031.
The amendments would also permit continuous monitoring systems to replace separate measurement campaigns where the equipment meets the required technical standards.
Independent verification would remain necessary. Romanian MEP Virgil Popescu, a former energy minister, supported the longer timetable, arguing that companies require additional time to make investments in monitoring infrastructure.
Environmental organisations have opposed further postponements, arguing that delays could prolong avoidable emissions and weaken the regulatory framework established in 2024.
Parliament also supported an exception preventing fossil fuel supplies covered by relevant EU import sanctions from benefiting from the extended deadlines.
Importers would be required to identify the affected volumes, including where restricted-origin fuels form part of mixed shipments.
The exemption would not authorise trade already prohibited by EU sanctions.
A further amendment would require the European Commission to review implementation readiness by July 2029, including the availability of accredited verifiers and potential risks to energy supplies.
The Commission would then be able to propose additional legislative changes if substantial implementation problems remained.
Thursday’s vote does not repeal the methane legislation or automatically postpone its requirements.
The adopted amendments represent the European Parliament’s negotiating position. The Council of the European Union must agree to any changes before the revised legislation can enter into force.
The outcome forms part of a broader debate over European industrial competitiveness and the economic consequences of environmental regulation.
As EU Today recently reported, Brussels is already adjusting parts of its climate-policy framework in response to pressure from energy-intensive industries.
Negotiations over methane reporting will now determine how far those adjustments extend into Europe’s international energy supply chains and whether the EU can preserve the regulation’s emissions objectives under a longer implementation timetable.
Officials will call on UK to ‘step up’ financial support at Brussels summit – with post-Brexit issues also on agenda
EU leaders will press Andy Burnham at a summit in Brussels to contribute more to Ukraine’s defence effort in 2027.
EU officials argue that the UK, Canada and Japan should do more to support Ukraine, but entreaties to these G7 countries for extra financial aid at recent international meetings have not been answered, Brussels says.
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© Photograph: Evgeniy Maloletka/AP
© Photograph: Evgeniy Maloletka/AP
© Photograph: Evgeniy Maloletka/AP
Visa quotas, university fees and NHS surcharges remain sticking points ahead of post-Brexit negotiations next month
A deadline for a youth mobility scheme between the EU and the UK could be deferred by six months in a bid to ensure Andy Burnham has a successful “reset” summit on 20 November, diplomats have said.
EU ambassadors in Brussels on Wednesday heard that the UK was still insisting on international tuition fees, quotas and an NHS surcharge for EU students. This has fuelled fears the summit could fail, just as the prime minister is promising to unveil a new vision for Britain’s long-term relationship with the EU.
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© Photograph: Neil Hall/EPA
© Photograph: Neil Hall/EPA
© Photograph: Neil Hall/EPA
The agreement, reached by the Council and European Parliament on 20th October and announced the following day, raises the invalidation threshold of the EU Emissions Trading System’s market stability reserve from 400 million to 700 million allowances.
The compromise reached by EU negotiators follows months of pressure from energy-intensive industries concerned about carbon prices, electricity costs and competition from manufacturers operating under less restrictive environmental regimes.
The measure requires formal approval before entering into force and forms part of a wider review of the EU’s principal carbon-pricing mechanism.
Established in 2019, the market stability reserve was designed to address the accumulation of surplus emissions allowances that had weakened the effectiveness of Europe’s carbon market.
Under the Emissions Trading System, companies in covered sectors must surrender allowances corresponding to their greenhouse gas emissions. The total quantity available is progressively reduced, creating a financial incentive to cut emissions.
The reserve adjusts the supply of allowances entering the market, withdrawing them when there is a substantial surplus and releasing them under specified conditions when supply becomes scarce.
Existing rules also provide for the permanent cancellation of allowances held above a threshold of 400 million.
Under the new agreement, that threshold would increase to 700 million, allowing a larger stock to remain available for potential future release.
The change does not automatically introduce 300 million additional allowances into circulation. Releases would continue to depend on the reserve’s operating rules and market conditions.
According to the Council, more than three billion allowances have been invalidated since the mechanism began operating in 2023.
The Commission initially proposed ending automatic invalidation indefinitely, while the Council’s September negotiating position envisaged a temporary suspension followed by a higher threshold.
The compromise retains invalidation but increases the amount protected from cancellation.
The agreement follows growing concern about the cumulative cost of European climate regulation, particularly for steelmaking, chemicals, cement and other energy-intensive sectors. Manufacturers have warned that carbon costs, combined with relatively expensive electricity and industrial gas, complicate investment decisions and weaken their ability to compete internationally.
Brussels must also consider the consequences of production shifting to jurisdictions with lower emissions-related costs, a phenomenon known as carbon leakage. Earlier this year, EU Today examined the Commission’s consideration of changes to industrial protections under the ETS, including the relationship between free allowances and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.
The latest reserve agreement does not directly change the allocation of free allowances, the emissions cap or the obligations imposed on individual industrial installations. Its principal effect would be to preserve a larger buffer that could become available if future market conditions trigger the release mechanism.
For manufacturers planning investments extending into the 2030s, the availability of allowances and the future trajectory of carbon prices influence production costs and the commercial case for decarbonisation technologies.
The European Commission reported in May that the total number of allowances in circulation during 2025 stood at approximately 1.023 billion.
Its annual market stability reserve calculation provided for approximately 190.5 million allowances to be withdrawn from auctions between September 2026 and August 2027.
These withdrawals reflect the existing mechanism for reducing market surpluses. The proposed higher invalidation threshold concerns how many allowances can subsequently remain in reserve rather than being cancelled.
The overall emissions cap will continue to decline under the legislation already governing the ETS.
Consequently, preserving a larger reserve does not remove the long-term constraint on emissions or guarantee lower carbon prices for European industry.
The agreement also concerns the established ETS covering power generation, industry and certain other sectors, rather than the separate ETS2 regime for emissions associated with road transport and buildings.
The latter has generated its own political controversy, as EU Today reported following the October European Council summit.
The Council and Parliament have agreed that the question of gradually reducing the invalidation threshold should be considered during the broader ETS review.
That exercise will address the carbon market’s operation over a longer period, when the declining supply of allowances could create tighter conditions.
The present agreement therefore provides an adjustment to the reserve mechanism without reopening the entire emissions trading framework. Following legal and technical finalisation, the provisional deal must be endorsed by both institutions and formally adopted.
The new 700 million threshold would apply after the legislation takes effect, while the larger review of the ETS continues through the EU legislative process.
The Council of the European Union adopted its negotiating position on Wednesday, 21st October, clearing the way for negotiations with the European Parliament once MEPs establish their position.
The measures form part of the European Commission’s Digital Omnibus package, introduced in November 2025, and represent one of Brussels’ most substantial attempts to simplify the regulatory obligations imposed on businesses operating across the single market.
The proposed reforms would modify several provisions of the GDPR, which has governed the processing of personal data across the EU since May 2018.
Rather than replacing the legislation, the Council wants to clarify existing obligations, particularly those concerning pseudonymised information, requests for access to personal data and the use of information in scientific research.
The agreed position retains the existing definition of personal data while introducing provisions intended to clarify when pseudonymised information can be linked to an identifiable individual.
Companies would also benefit from simplified procedures for handling manifestly unfounded or excessive data requests and from reduced information requirements in certain low-risk circumstances.
Another proposed change would extend the deadline for notifying authorities of personal data breaches, while establishing more consistent reporting templates across the EU.
For multinational companies, which currently navigate different interpretations of data protection obligations by national authorities, these provisions could reduce compliance costs and administrative duplication.
However, the changes have raised concerns among European privacy regulators.
In a joint opinion published in February, the European Data Protection Board and European Data Protection Supervisor warned that parts of the Commission’s original proposal could create legal uncertainty and undermine existing protections.
They were particularly concerned about proposals affecting the definition of personal data and the Commission’s potential role in determining when pseudonymised information falls outside GDPR requirements.
The Council’s decision to retain the existing definition addresses part of that debate, although the final legislative text remains subject to negotiations.
One of the most visible changes would affect the consent notices encountered by Europeans when visiting websites.
Under the Council’s proposal, additional categories of cookies and similar tracking technologies could be used without obtaining explicit consent, provided the relevant legal conditions are satisfied.
The proposed exemptions include technologies necessary to deliver a service, maintain device security or conduct audience measurement.
For website operators, publishers and online businesses, the changes could reduce the number of consent requests displayed to visitors and simplify technical compliance.
The current system has generated extensive legal disputes over whether consent is genuinely voluntary and whether tracking technologies collect information beyond what users have authorised.
EU Today has previously examined the enforcement of these obligations, including a Belgian court ruling concerning the legality of the advertising industry’s consent framework.
The latest proposal would not abolish consent requirements for commercial tracking or behavioural advertising. Technologies falling outside the permitted exemptions would remain subject to the applicable privacy rules.
The package also addresses the growing number of reporting obligations imposed on European businesses under overlapping cybersecurity legislation.
The Commission originally proposed a single European reporting mechanism for certain data and cybersecurity incidents.
Member states have instead agreed to establish national entry points, supported by an EU-level information system and provisions for coordinating cross-border notifications.
The Council’s position would also clarify the legal grounds for certain uses of personal data in artificial intelligence systems and introduce safeguards for processing sensitive information in specified circumstances.
These provisions follow increasingly complicated disputes over the application of European privacy legislation to AI development and automated decision-making.
As EU Today reported in its coverage of a major GDPR enforcement case involving Uber, automated processing already presents substantial compliance risks for companies operating within the bloc.
The Commission estimates that its wider digital simplification initiative could save European businesses up to €5 billion in administrative costs by 2029.
The initiative reflects pressure from European governments and business organisations to reduce the regulatory fragmentation that makes operating across multiple EU jurisdictions more expensive.
The Digital Omnibus is part of a broader legislative programme influenced by the competitiveness reports produced by former Italian prime ministers Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi.
Under the Council’s negotiating mandate, several existing data-related rules would also be consolidated, while provisions governing the protection of trade secrets would be strengthened.
The European Parliament must now determine its negotiating position before formal discussions between the institutions can begin. Until the legislation is agreed and adopted, existing GDPR, cookie consent and cybersecurity requirements remain in force.
The Council adopted its position on 21st October, proposing an exemption from the obligation to appoint an authorised representative in another EU country when the amount of packaging placed on that country’s market remains below one tonne per calendar year.
The measure addresses complaints from small and medium-sized enterprises that the Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation, which became applicable on 12th August 2026, creates unnecessary expenses for companies engaged in relatively modest volumes of cross-border commerce.
The proposal forms part of the EU’s eighth legislative simplification package and will now be negotiated with the European Parliament.
Under the Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation, businesses placing packaging or packaged products on the European market are subject to obligations concerning waste management and extended producer responsibility.
The extended producer responsibility system requires producers to contribute to the management of waste generated by products and packaging placed on the market.
For businesses operating across borders, the framework also includes requirements concerning authorised representatives in member states where producers are not established.
These representatives perform specified compliance functions and provide a point of contact for national authorities.
The system can create substantial administrative obligations for businesses trading in several countries, particularly when the quantity of packaging supplied to individual markets is limited.
A small Belgian retailer, for example, may sell products to customers in Germany, France and the Netherlands without maintaining physical operations in those countries.
The requirement to arrange representation separately across different markets can add compliance costs regardless of whether the volume of trade justifies them.
Under the Council’s proposal, eligible EU-based producers placing less than one tonne of packaging annually on another member state’s market could be exempted from appointing a representative there.
The threshold would be assessed by reference to the quantity placed on the market of the member state concerned.
However, the proposed exemption would not abolish the wider principle of extended producer responsibility or automatically release businesses from their other environmental obligations.
The regulatory changes come only two months after the EU’s revised packaging framework began applying across the single market.
The legislation, Regulation (EU) 2025/40, is intended to reduce packaging waste, improve recyclability and establish more consistent requirements for products and packaging materials.
It covers an extensive range of commercial activities, including manufacturing, retail, food distribution, transport packaging and online sales.
As EU Today reported when the regulation began applying in August, the legislation introduces new requirements affecting packaging design, materials and waste prevention.
However, the practical implications for smaller firms have generated pressure for modifications.
In September, EU Today examined the emerging campaign for simplification, as business organisations questioned whether the compliance system adequately reflected the circumstances of smaller producers.
The Council’s latest agreement represents a further legislative step, replacing general calls for administrative relief with a specific negotiating position.
The Commission also issued detailed implementation guidance in June 2026 after receiving numerous questions from member states and businesses about how the regulation should be interpreted.
The proposed exemption would not apply without conditions.
The Council’s negotiating mandate includes a safeguard allowing the relevant authorities to respond when a producer fails to comply with extended producer responsibility obligations.
It also provides for the European Commission to review the duration of the temporary suspension by 31st December 2030, ahead of its scheduled expiry in 2032.
The timetable reflects the possibility that broader reform of producer responsibility arrangements could replace the temporary measure.
The Commission is preparing a Circular Economy Act intended to address additional problems affecting Europe’s recycling and secondary raw materials markets.
That initiative could provide a more comprehensive framework for the administration of producer responsibility systems across member states.
For now, the Council has opted for a narrower intervention designed to reduce the immediate burden on smaller companies without reopening the entire packaging regulation.
The proposal also reflects a broader problem with European regulatory integration.
Although companies can sell goods throughout the single market, compliance requirements often remain administered through national systems, requiring businesses to deal with separate authorities and procedures.
For multinational corporations, such costs can be distributed across substantial commercial operations. For smaller exporters and online retailers, similar administrative requirements can consume a much greater proportion of turnover.
The Council argues that removing unnecessary representation requirements would support cross-border trade while preserving the objectives of European environmental legislation.
The Irish presidency will now seek agreement with the European Parliament on the proposed amendment.
Until that legislation is adopted and becomes applicable, businesses must continue to comply with the existing rules, including relevant national producer responsibility requirements.
The agreement, announced on Wednesday, 21st October, follows negotiations between the Council and European Parliament over changes to prudential requirements and the regulation governing securitised financial products.
The reform package agreed by EU negotiators would reduce capital requirements for lower-risk transactions, introduce a new category of resilient securitisations and simplify administrative procedures for financial institutions and investors.
It forms part of the EU’s Savings and Investments Union initiative, which aims to channel more private capital into the European economy.
Securitisation allows banks and other lenders to combine financial assets, including mortgages, consumer credit and corporate loans, into securities that can be purchased by investors.
By transferring some of the financial risks associated with these assets, banks can reduce the amount of regulatory capital they are required to maintain against particular exposures.
This can increase their capacity to extend new loans, although it does not guarantee that additional lending will follow.
The provisional agreement would recalibrate capital requirements according to the risk of individual transactions.
Lower-risk securitisations would receive more favourable treatment, while higher capital requirements would continue to apply to riskier structures.
A new category of resilient securitisations would be introduced alongside the existing framework for simple, transparent and standardised transactions, commonly known as STS securitisations.
The agreement would also strengthen supervision of independent organisations responsible for verifying compliance with the STS criteria.
The Council said that third-party verifiers would become subject to EU-level supervision, with the aim of improving consistency across national markets.
The reforms address a long-standing concern that European banks face higher administrative and capital costs for securitisation than competitors operating under other regulatory systems.
Following the financial crisis of 2008, European authorities introduced tighter rules governing structured financial products, including restrictions intended to improve transparency and ensure that lenders retained appropriate exposure to credit risks.
The resulting framework, which began applying in 2019, strengthened investor protection but also increased compliance costs.
The European Commission proposed the latest review in June 2025, arguing that the existing arrangements had constrained the development of securitisation as a financing tool.
According to the Association for Financial Markets in Europe, approximately €252.3 billion in securitised products was issued across Europe in 2025, with €156.3 billion placed with investors.
Those figures cover the wider European market, including activity outside the EU.
Brussels regards the development of deeper financial markets as necessary to finance infrastructure, technological investment and industrial development.
As EU Today previously reported, the EU’s largest economies have also been examining proposals to strengthen supervision and reduce fragmentation across European capital markets.
The potential benefits of securitisation are not automatic.
Research published by economists on the European Central Bank’s website in September 2026 found that banks using synthetic securitisation increased corporate lending only modestly, while also distributing more capital to shareholders.
Synthetic securitisation allows banks to transfer credit risk to investors without necessarily removing the underlying loans from their balance sheets.
The researchers found that a one per cent increase in synthetic securitisation issuance was associated with an increase of approximately 0.02 per cent in corporate loan growth.
Their findings also indicated that banks participating in the synthetic securitisation market made greater use of capital released through these transactions to increase dividend payments.
The study suggests that easing capital requirements alone may not generate the substantial expansion in business lending envisaged by European policymakers.
Credit demand, economic conditions and banks’ commercial decisions will also influence whether the reforms produce measurable increases in investment financing.
The provisional agreement includes additional measures intended to encourage participation by institutional investors.
Investment limits for certain regulated funds, known as UCITS, would be increased, while targeted changes would allow insurers and reinsurers greater participation in specified synthetic securitisation transactions.
The package also seeks to facilitate securitisation arrangements used to finance infrastructure projects before they become operational.
Together, these provisions could widen the investor base and make financing structures available to a broader range of businesses and projects.
However, transferring credit exposure between banks and investors does not eliminate the underlying risk.
If borrowers default or the financial institutions providing protection encounter difficulties, losses may still emerge within the wider financial system.
European regulators will therefore have to assess whether the new classification and supervisory arrangements adequately reflect the risks of different securitisation products.
The political agreement now requires legal finalisation and formal approval by the Council and European Parliament.
The new arrangements would then form part of the EU’s wider programme to strengthen financial markets and reduce barriers to investment across the single market.
The European Commission has called on Malta to accelerate judicial reforms and strengthen safeguards for journalists, nine years after the assassination of investigative reporter Daphne Caruana Galizia, as the European Parliament revisited concerns over corruption and institutional accountability on Wednesday, 21 October.
European Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection Michael McGrath told MEPs in Strasbourg that Malta had made progress in certain areas but had yet to implement several outstanding recommendations concerning judicial independence, high-level corruption and media freedom.
The debate followed the controversial acquittal of businessman Yorgen Fenech, who had been accused of involvement in Caruana Galizia’s murder. Maltese prosecutors appealed the verdict in September, leaving the criminal proceedings subject to further judicial consideration.
The European Commission’s 2026 Rule of Law Report, published in July, assessed Malta’s progress in reforming its justice system, anti-corruption institutions and protections for the media.
The report acknowledged certain improvements, including additional resources allocated to judicial and prosecutorial authorities.
However, it found that progress remained limited on several recommendations.
These include reducing delays in judicial proceedings, improving the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption and ensuring greater judicial involvement in the appointment of the Chief Justice.
The Commission has also expressed concern about the effectiveness of existing anti-corruption arrangements.
Although investigations and prosecutions have increased in some areas, Brussels continues to seek a stronger record of final judgments in major corruption cases.
Court delays and pressure on judicial resources remain significant difficulties.
McGrath told Parliament that the Maltese authorities must continue implementing reforms to address these shortcomings.
Caruana Galizia was killed by a car bomb near her home in Bidnija on 16 October 2017.
The 53-year-old journalist had investigated corruption, money laundering and political connections involving prominent figures in Malta’s business and political establishment.
Her assassination prompted international condemnation, widespread demonstrations and investigations into the circumstances surrounding the killing.
Several men have subsequently been convicted for participating in the murder or supplying the explosives.
However, the criminal proceedings concerning the alleged commissioning of the assassination have remained contentious.
On 2 September 2026, a nine-member jury acquitted businessman Yorgen Fenech of complicity in the murder and criminal association. The verdict was reached by eight votes to one.
Fenech had denied ordering or financing the killing.
The acquittal prompted criticism from Caruana Galizia’s family and organisations campaigning for press freedom.
On 22 September, Malta’s Attorney General formally appealed the verdict, challenging legal decisions made during the trial.
The appeal does not overturn Fenech’s acquittal or establish criminal responsibility.
The Court of Criminal Appeal must determine whether the legal grounds presented justify further proceedings, potentially including a retrial.
The criminal case remains separate from the broader political debate over Malta’s institutional reforms.
Wednesday’s parliamentary debate exposed sharp disagreements between representatives of Malta’s opposition Nationalist Party and governing Labour Party.
Nationalist MEPs Peter Agius and David Casa criticised the authorities’ record on corruption and institutional accountability.
Agius argued that repeated European Commission assessments had failed to produce sufficient improvements and questioned whether Malta’s institutions were effectively addressing allegations of wrongdoing.
Casa referred to the findings of the independent public inquiry into Caruana Galizia’s assassination, which concluded in 2021 that the state had contributed to circumstances in which a climate of impunity enabled the killing.
He argued that significant recommendations arising from that inquiry remained outstanding.
Labour MEP Alex Agius Saliba rejected the criticism, maintaining that Malta had implemented reforms and that its judicial institutions should be allowed to perform their functions independently.
He pointed to the prosecution’s appeal against Fenech’s acquittal as evidence that the judicial process was continuing.
Labour MEP Thomas Bajada concentrated on the protection of journalists and the need to counter misinformation while preserving independent reporting.
The disagreements subsequently prompted a response from Maltese Prime Minister Robert Abela, who accused opposition MEPs of damaging Malta’s reputation through their interventions.
Media freedom featured prominently in the Commission’s concerns.
Malta has introduced legislation addressing certain abusive legal proceedings against journalists, including transposing EU protections against strategic lawsuits intended to discourage public participation.
However, the existing measures principally concern civil proceedings with cross-border implications.
The Commission has urged Malta to extend comparable protections to domestic cases.
Other concerns include journalists’ access to official information, protection from intimidation and the need for more comprehensive legislative safeguards.
McGrath indicated that the Maltese government intended to present additional media legislation in the coming weeks.
The Commission has called for consultations with journalists, media organisations and civil society before the measures are adopted.
European institutions are also examining Malta’s implementation of wider EU requirements under the European Media Freedom Act.
The European Parliament’s proceedings form part of the continued scrutiny of Malta’s institutional record following Caruana Galizia’s assassination.
The Commission’s annual rule-of-law assessments provide a mechanism for identifying outstanding problems and monitoring governments’ responses.
However, the implementation of many recommendations remains the responsibility of national authorities.
For Malta, the immediate issues concern the government’s promised media legislation, outstanding judicial reforms and the progression of the appeal in the Fenech case.
The Commission has made clear that further improvements are required, while the Maltese government maintains that substantial institutional changes have already been introduced.
The next assessment will depend on legislative measures actually adopted, their implementation and progress through the relevant judicial proceedings.
European Commission calls accommodation website’s approach to fraudulent listings and phishing scams as ‘absolutely substandard’
EU regulators have opened an investigation into Booking.com, alleging that the accommodation website has not done enough to protect consumers from fake listings and scams.
The European Commission, which regulates the world’s biggest tech companies operating in the EU, said Booking.com may have breached the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) with its “absolutely substandard” approach to tackling fraudulent listings and phishing scams, where criminals impersonate a third party to trick people to hand over money.
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© Photograph: Dado Ruvić/Reuters
© Photograph: Dado Ruvić/Reuters
© Photograph: Dado Ruvić/Reuters
Hungary has blocked a procedural decision needed to advance Ukraine and Moldova’s European Union accession negotiations, raising fresh questions about Budapest’s position under Prime Minister Péter Magyar, whose government had recently agreed to remove longstanding objections to Kyiv’s membership ambitions.
The intervention took place in Brussels on Tuesday, 20 October, during a meeting of the Council of the EU’s Working Party on Enlargement and Countries Negotiating Accession to the EU (COELA). Representatives of the 27 member states were examining the screening results for the final two negotiating clusters, covering environmental policy, transport, agriculture and regional development.
According to diplomats familiar with the discussions, the Hungarian delegation refused to approve the proposed procedural step. When representatives of other member states requested an explanation, Budapest reportedly maintained that its position remained unchanged, without providing further arguments.
The obstruction comes only seven days after the EU formally opened two additional negotiating clusters with Ukraine and Moldova.
On 13 October, the Council approved the opening of Cluster 2, covering the internal market, and Cluster 3, dealing with competitiveness and inclusive growth. The decision followed an agreement between Kyiv and Budapest on educational rights for Ukraine’s ethnic Hungarian minority.
Ukraine’s parliament adopted legislative amendments on 12 October extending minority-language education rights, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed the legislation the same day.
The agreement had appeared to remove the principal bilateral obstacle to further negotiations. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha and his Hungarian counterpart, Anita Orbán, welcomed the development following discussions in Luxembourg.
The diplomatic rapprochement continued on 16 October, when Zelenskyy and Magyar held their first official bilateral meeting in Brussels. Both governments expressed an intention to improve relations after years of disputes under former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
Magyar also invited Zelenskyy to Budapest for commemorations marking the 70th anniversary of Hungary’s 1956 anti-Soviet uprising.
The subsequent Hungarian objection has therefore interrupted a process that Ukrainian and European officials had expected to advance before the end of the year.
Ukraine and Moldova have now formally opened four of the six negotiating clusters required under the EU’s enlargement methodology.
The remaining two are Cluster 4, Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity, and Cluster 5, Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion. They cover several of the most economically sensitive areas of prospective Ukrainian membership.
Cluster 4 includes environmental regulation, energy policy and transport infrastructure, while Cluster 5 encompasses agriculture, food safety, fisheries and regional development funding.
Ukraine’s agricultural sector presents particular challenges for the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. The country’s extensive farmland and substantial grain production could affect agricultural subsidy allocations, market competition and the distribution of EU budgetary resources.
Poland and other agricultural member states have previously expressed concerns about the implications of Ukrainian agricultural integration. Such questions will require negotiation regardless of Hungary’s immediate position.
However, the 20 October meeting was not intended to settle these substantive issues. Its purpose was to advance the procedural preparations for formally opening negotiations on the remaining clusters.
The explanation for Budapest’s latest move may lie in Hungary’s domestic political calculations rather than a new dispute over minority rights.
Diplomatic sources have suggested that Magyar’s government is attempting to avoid accusations from Viktor Orbán’s opposition that it is making excessive concessions to Ukraine.
Although Magyar defeated Orbán in April’s parliamentary elections and has adopted a more cooperative approach towards Brussels, he has consistently opposed accelerated Ukrainian membership.
In an interview conducted on 20 October, Magyar reiterated his opposition to fast-tracking accession, arguing that membership must remain conditional on compliance with EU requirements. He also questioned whether a country at war could join the Union.
Another potential complication concerns Hungary’s financial relationship with Brussels.
The European Commission agreed in May to unlock €16.4 billion in previously frozen funds following reforms introduced by Magyar’s administration. Some disbursements remain subject to conditions, while separate disputes over EU financial penalties continue.
However, there is currently no publicly established evidence that Hungary’s objection on 20 October was intended to secure additional financial concessions. Any connection between the two negotiations remains speculative.
Hungary’s position also affects Moldova, despite the absence of an equivalent bilateral dispute between Budapest and Chișinău.
The EU has kept the accession negotiations of Ukraine and Moldova politically aligned, seeking to advance both countries through the six negotiating clusters together.
Consequently, an objection directed principally at Ukraine can delay Moldova’s progress even when its own technical preparations satisfy the relevant requirements.
Separating the two accession tracks would allow Moldova to advance independently, but such a move would require political agreement among member states and could raise further questions about the EU’s enlargement strategy.
Ireland, which holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU until 31 December, has made progress on Ukrainian and Moldovan accession a priority.
The disputed procedural decision is expected to return to subsequent meetings of the enlargement working party, with senior EU and national officials still anticipating that the final two clusters could formally open in December.
The latest obstruction does not reverse the four clusters already opened, nor does it terminate accession negotiations. It does, however, demonstrate that the change of government in Budapest has not eliminated Hungary’s capacity or willingness to obstruct individual stages of enlargement.
For Kyiv and Chișinău, the immediate question is whether the 20 October decision represents a short-lived domestic political manoeuvre or the beginning of another prolonged dispute over the conditions of EU membership.
Presented on Tuesday, 20 October, by the European Commission and EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, the strategy proposes a maritime security hub, expanded satellite surveillance, greater icebreaker capacity and improved military mobility across northern Europe.
The document marks a departure from the EU’s 2021 Arctic policy, which placed greater emphasis on climate change, environmental protection and scientific cooperation. The revised framework treats the region as an increasingly important component of European security and economic policy.
Russia’s expanding military infrastructure in the High North is a principal concern behind the policy revision.
Moscow has reopened Soviet-era military installations, strengthened its northern forces and maintained substantial nuclear capabilities on the Kola Peninsula. The region contains strategically important naval bases used by Russia’s Northern Fleet, including facilities supporting its submarine-based nuclear deterrent.
Russian operations in the Arctic also have implications for maritime access between the Atlantic and the Barents Sea, an area increasingly important to NATO’s northern defence arrangements.
The EU intends to work more closely with NATO and its northern partners, including Norway, Iceland, Britain, Canada and the United States, while developing capabilities that complement existing military structures.
Kallas said the Arctic’s security environment had deteriorated significantly since 2021, with geopolitical competition increasingly affecting a region previously associated principally with environmental and economic cooperation.
The EU’s revised priorities reflect concerns extending beyond conventional military deployments, particularly the exposure of undersea communications networks and energy infrastructure to sabotage and disruption.
A central proposal involves establishing an EU Maritime Security Hub to improve information-sharing between member states and partner countries operating in Arctic waters.
The system would strengthen monitoring of maritime movements and support the identification of suspicious activity near critical infrastructure.
Brussels also proposes an Arctic Cable Hub, initially concentrating on the protection, monitoring and repair of submarine communications cables across the North Atlantic and Arctic.
Such infrastructure carries international data traffic and supports communications between Europe, Greenland and North America. Damage to cables could interrupt telecommunications, financial services and government networks.
The Commission’s new Arctic policy framework also supports the proposed Pan-Arctic Cable connecting Greenland directly with Europe, together with secure satellite communications through the EU’s IRIS² programme.
Further measures envisage expanded use of Copernicus satellite surveillance, improved maritime intelligence and closer monitoring of vessels associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.
These measures form part of a broader attempt to improve European surveillance capabilities without relying exclusively on military assets provided by individual NATO members.
The strategy also addresses Europe’s limited capacity to operate in extreme northern conditions.
The Commission wants to support additional icebreaker capabilities, which are essential for maintaining access to Arctic waters, conducting emergency operations and supporting scientific and logistical activity.
Russian icebreaker capabilities remain considerably more extensive than those available to most European countries, providing Moscow with operational advantages along the Northern Sea Route.
European investment would also support ports, railways, energy terminals and digital infrastructure capable of serving both civilian and security requirements.
The emphasis on dual-use infrastructure reflects the growing importance of military mobility across northern Europe, particularly following Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO.
Improved transport links could facilitate the movement of equipment and personnel while also supporting economic development in sparsely populated northern regions.
However, the Commission has not provided a comprehensive financial allocation for the proposed security measures, leaving important questions about funding, procurement and implementation.
The revised strategy also introduces a significant change in the EU’s position on Arctic fossil fuel development.
In 2021, Brussels proposed pursuing an international legal commitment to prohibit further oil, gas and coal extraction in the Arctic.
The new strategy maintains the EU’s opposition to environmentally damaging fossil fuel development but no longer includes the explicit ambition to secure a multilateral legal prohibition.
The adjustment follows sustained disagreement with energy-producing countries and recognition that an international agreement would be difficult to achieve under current geopolitical conditions.
Norway has argued that continued exploration in parts of the Barents Sea remains important for European energy security, particularly as production from mature Norwegian fields is expected to decline.
EU Today previously reported on Brussels’ opposition to Norwegian Arctic drilling plans and the disagreements between environmental objectives and Europe’s long-term energy requirements.
The latest strategy does not represent an endorsement of new Arctic drilling. It does, however, acknowledge the limitations of the EU’s previous diplomatic approach.
Greenland occupies a prominent position in the revised strategy because of its location, mineral resources and importance to transatlantic communications.
The Commission wants to expand cooperation on digital connectivity, critical raw materials, research and infrastructure investment, while recognising the responsibilities of Greenland’s own institutions and the Kingdom of Denmark.
Brussels also intends to strengthen scientific cooperation and support Arctic communities adapting to rapid environmental change.
The Arctic is warming nearly four times faster than the global average, creating new commercial opportunities while imposing substantial costs on local populations and infrastructure.
The EU’s proposals therefore combine security measures with investment in transport networks, research facilities and economic diversification.
For Brussels, implementation will require agreement between member states with different geographical interests, defence capabilities and budgetary priorities. Cooperation with NATO will also require careful coordination to avoid duplicating existing military arrangements.
The Commission has established a significantly broader Arctic agenda than the one adopted five years ago. Its practical impact will depend on whether member states finance the surveillance systems, vessels and infrastructure that the new strategy envisages.
Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has ruled out changing his government’s policies despite a humiliating defeat in the Senate elections, in which his ANO movement failed to win a single seat. The result has strengthened the parliamentary opposition and intensified questions over the political direction of his coalition, less than a year after it took office.
Speaking after a cabinet meeting on Monday, 19 October, Babiš insisted that the election results would have no effect on the functioning of his government or its alliance with the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party and the Motorists movement. His administration would continue implementing its programme, including controversial changes to public broadcasting and proposed legislation regulating the financing of non-governmental organisations.
The prime minister’s refusal to reconsider his government’s agenda has drawn criticism from Senate president Miloš Vystrčil, who accused Babiš of transferring responsibility for the defeat to regional party organisations rather than accepting personal accountability.
The elections, held on 9–10 and 16–17 October, concerned 27 of the Senate’s 81 seats. ANO entered 13 candidates in the second-round contests, but every one of them lost. The party’s representation consequently fell to 14 senators.
Babiš called the outcome “catastrophic”, acknowledging a result that was particularly damaging given ANO’s success in the 2024 Senate elections and its subsequent victory in the October 2025 parliamentary contest.
The opposition Mayors and Independents movement (STAN) emerged as the strongest performer, with ten successful candidates or endorsed contenders. The centre-right Civic Democratic Party (ODS) secured seven seats, maintaining its position at the head of the Senate’s largest parliamentary group alongside TOP 09.
In an interview published on 20 October, Vystrčil said the results demonstrated that Babiš’s personal electoral appeal did not translate into successful Senate campaigns. He also criticised the prime minister’s response to the defeat, describing his attempts to blame regional organisations as an evasion of leadership responsibility.
The vote followed municipal elections in which ANO lost ground in several important urban centres, while SPD also suffered substantial losses.
STAN leader Vít Rakušan has interpreted the result as evidence that his movement can become ANO’s principal national challenger.
The party’s Senate performance followed a strong showing in municipal elections, including victory in Prague, where its leading candidate Petr Hlaváček is seeking to form the next city administration.
The movement’s growing appeal is supported by recent opinion polling. A Median electoral model published on 17 October, based on September interviews, placed ANO at 29.5 per cent, STAN at 17 per cent and ODS at 12.5 per cent.
Yet STAN’s ambitions face competition from within the opposition. ODS retains substantial institutional influence through the Senate, while the Christian Democrats’ new leader, Jan Grolich, is increasingly discussed as another possible contender for national opposition leadership.
The opposition’s unity is also less straightforward at municipal level. In Ostrava, ANO has negotiated a local governing agreement with Starostové pro Ostravu and the Ostravak movement, illustrating the flexibility of local political alliances.
The electoral setback coincides with renewed controversy over the Czech government’s approach to Russia.
On 19 October, Foreign Minister Petr Macinka, leader of the Motorists, defended his decision not to support a Finnish initiative calling for tighter European Union restrictions on entry visas for Russian citizens.
The proposal, promoted by Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen, sought stronger EU-wide restrictions on non-essential travel by Russian nationals, including tourists, against a background of growing concerns over Russian sabotage and hybrid operations.
According to details of the diplomatic disagreement, senior Czech foreign ministry officials had recommended supporting the initiative.
Macinka argued that Prague already maintained extensive national restrictions and had previously endorsed a comparable Estonian proposal. He questioned the effectiveness of the Finnish initiative, which attracted limited support from other EU governments.
The disagreement comes as Czech security policy remains under scrutiny. On Tuesday, 20 October, the National Security Council discussed the country’s security outlook, military development plans and changes to NATO’s air and missile defence implementation arrangements.
The issue exposes a continuing area of contention between Babiš’s coalition and opposition parties favouring closer coordination with Ukraine’s European supporters.
Meanwhile, Babiš faces unresolved questions concerning his former business conglomerate Agrofert and access to European Union funding.
The European Commission has maintained restrictions on certain EU reimbursements after concluding that the trust arrangement involving Babiš’s business interests does not sufficiently address the potential conflict of interest.
The measures affect particular cohesion-fund expenditure and rural development reimbursements, rather than all EU agricultural payments. Babiš has maintained that the arrangements governing his business interests comply with the law.
The dispute carries particular significance as Prague participates in negotiations over the EU’s next long-term budget, covering 2028–2034.
At the European Council summit on 15–16 October, Babiš argued for protecting national allocations of EU funds, revisiting aspects of the emissions trading system and addressing high industrial energy costs. These negotiations will continue while the Commission’s concerns about his business arrangements remain unresolved.
The Senate defeat does not threaten Babiš’s parliamentary majority. The lower chamber can override most Senate objections to ordinary legislation, and the governing parties continue to command sufficient support to pursue their programme.
The September Median model projected that ANO, SPD and the Motorists would retain 107 seats in the 200-member Chamber of Deputies, only slightly below their current combined strength.
Nevertheless, the elections have given the opposition a stronger platform for challenging the government over public broadcasting, European relations, defence policy and constitutional legislation, where the Senate possesses more substantial powers.
The immediate political contest is therefore not over the survival of Babiš’s government, but over whether STAN can convert its regional and Senate successes into a credible national alternative before the next parliamentary elections. For Babiš, whose party remains the largest in the country, the more pressing difficulty is its inability to defeat opposition candidates when elections are decided beyond ANO’s established electoral base.
The European Commission is checking whether laws Ukraine’s parliament passed last week earn it a €3.7 billion ($4.3 billion) EU payment, spokesperson Balázs Ujvári told reporters in Brussels on 19 October. He also said Ukraine’s 2027 funding gap stands at about €70 billion, and that the EU “cannot do this all alone.” How Ukraine pays for Russia’s war next year now depends on reforms in Kyiv and on money from Europe and beyond.
Russia keeps striking Ukraine’s power grid and cities, and Kyiv already faces a hole in next year’s war budget before any new military spending. Foreign money keeps salaries, pensions, and repairs flowing while Ukraine spends its own revenue on defense. So each delayed payment is felt at home while Russia hits the energy system again.
The payment is the second tranche of the EU’s macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, and each one depends on reforms, Ujvári said at the Commission’s midday briefing.
“We saw that last week some important laws were adopted in the Rada, and we are in the process of analyzing these laws and we will formulate our assessment thereafter,” he said.
On its third attempt, parliament passed a law on 15 October ending the VAT exemption for foreign parcels worth up to €150 from 1 July 2027, and making online marketplaces collect the tax. The Commission had warned the law was one of 12 conditions for the tranche. Fewer than 1% of the 75 million parcels Ukrainians receive each year were taxed, and lawmakers had rejected the measure twice despite IMF pressure.
About €30 billion is in the pipeline for Ukraine this year, mostly under the EU’s €90 billion support loan, if reforms continue, Ujvári said.
Current pledges leave a gap of about €70 billion for 2027, Ujvári said, even counting the €45 billion ($52 billion) the EU has set aside for next year and some partners’ commitments.
“We cannot do this all alone. Therefore, our partners in general must step up,” he said. “They have to come forward with pledges, and they have to deliver on those commitments.”
On 16 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy asked EU leaders for at least €70 billion more for 2027. They tasked the Commission with a proposal but set no deadline. Asked whether it would revisit using frozen Russian assets, Ujvári said it was “a little bit early” to discuss options in that detail. New EU borrowing has also grown costlier: 10-year rates rose from 3.2% to just above 4% in six months, he said.
The €90 billion loan was designed on the assumption that the war would end in 2026. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico said Slovakia and Hungary would opt out of new aid but would not block others.
The funding, announced on Monday, 19 October, will come from the EU Innovation Fund, which uses revenues generated by the Emissions Trading System to support investment in technologies intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The selected projects include manufacturing facilities, renewable energy installations, advanced energy storage, critical raw materials processing and industrial carbon management. For the first time, the programme also includes a small modular nuclear reactor project and a direct air carbon capture and storage initiative.
The announcement comes amid growing concern over Europe’s industrial competitiveness, particularly as manufacturers face high energy costs, increasing competition from China and difficulties securing investment for major industrial projects.
According to the Commission’s announcement, the 77 selected projects span energy-intensive industries, clean technology manufacturing, alternative fuels, transport and several other sectors.
Six projects concern critical raw materials, an area in which the EU has been seeking to reduce its exposure to foreign suppliers.
These investments are intended to strengthen European supply chains for technologies including batteries, renewable energy equipment and permanent magnets, which are essential components in electric motors and other industrial applications.
The funding follows renewed political pressure to expand the processing and production of strategically important materials inside Europe.
As EU Today recently reported, the European Parliament has been pressing for stronger measures to reduce dependence on China for critical raw materials used by European manufacturers.
China occupies a dominant position in several international processing and refining markets, leaving European companies exposed to supply interruptions and trade restrictions.
The Commission is seeking to support alternative production capacity through financial assistance, industrial regulation and measures designed to attract private capital.
However, the selection of projects for EU funding does not automatically mean that the proposed facilities will be built. Their implementation will still depend on financing agreements, regulatory approvals and commercial decisions.
The inclusion of a small modular nuclear reactor project represents a new development in the Innovation Fund’s portfolio.
Small modular reactors are designed to produce electricity or industrial heat using nuclear technology on a smaller scale than conventional nuclear power stations.
Supporters argue that modular construction could reduce certain project risks and provide stable electricity supplies for energy-intensive industries.
However, the technology faces substantial challenges involving construction costs, regulatory approval, supply chains and the transition from demonstration projects to commercial production.
The Commission published a European strategy for small modular reactors in March, outlining plans to accelerate their development and support the first operational facilities in the early 2030s.
The latest funding decision gives the technology access to a financial instrument principally associated with industrial decarbonisation and clean energy investment.
Another newly represented technology is direct air carbon capture and storage, which involves extracting carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and storing it.
Both technologies remain at comparatively early stages of commercial deployment in Europe, making their eventual costs and performance important considerations.
The Innovation Fund is financed through revenues from the EU Emissions Trading System, under which companies operating in covered sectors must obtain allowances for their greenhouse gas emissions.
Part of the revenue generated from auctioning allowances is reinvested into projects designed to introduce lower-emission technologies into industrial production.
The Commission estimates that the 77 newly selected projects could avoid approximately 290 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions during their first ten years of operation.
That figure is a projection based on the projects’ anticipated performance, rather than an achieved reduction. Actual results will depend on construction, commissioning and subsequent commercial operation.
The funding announcement also follows the publication of the EU’s broader industrial policy initiatives, which seek to increase domestic production of clean technologies and improve investment conditions for European manufacturers.
The Commission announced a separate allocation of more than €390 million to 135 environmental and climate projects under the LIFE programme on the same day. That funding is distinct from the €3.4 billion Innovation Fund selection.
The companies and organisations behind the selected Innovation Fund projects must now complete the procedures necessary to obtain their grants.
During the Commission’s 19 October press briefing, officials indicated that project-specific grant amounts would become available when the agreements are signed, currently envisaged for the first quarter of 2027.
The final allocations and implementation conditions therefore remain subject to the grant preparation process.
For industrial companies, the principal test will be whether the European funding attracts sufficient additional investment to bring the selected technologies into commercial operation.
The results will also provide an indication of how effectively Brussels can translate its industrial policy objectives into additional European manufacturing capacity, particularly in sectors where supply chains remain concentrated outside the Union.
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