Recently, Kim Yo-jong, the younger sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, warned that Pyongyang could take strong retaliatory measures if Seoul continues activities it considers provocative. To casual observers, this may appear to be just another routine exchange of verbal threats between the two Koreas. However, a closer examination of the current situation suggests […]

The post Is the Korean Peninsula moving closer to war? appeared first on Asia Times.

Kylian Mbappé has apologized for comments referring to Mao Zedong as a dictator. He said his remarks were ill-judged and hurt many people in China and Chinese communities worldwide.

Organizações da sociedade civil acusam a Nicarágua de perseguição às igrejas e aos lideres religiosos de forma a impedir qualquer tipo de criticas contra o Governo de Daniel Ortega e Rosario Murillo.

© JORGE TORRES/EPA

An Indonesian taxi driver who went looking for work abroad ended up in Russia's army and died in his first battle in Ukraine, Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) said. Russian recruiters found him through a job application, and he reached the front in Donetsk Oblast within weeks of signing. HUR calls him one more foreigner drawn into Russia's war through deception.

Russia's war against Ukraine consumes men faster than the Kremlin is ready to replace them through another mobilization at home, so it keeps hiring abroad. Ukraine has identified nearly 46,000 foreigners who signed with Russia's army since 2022. On 26 October, a UN commission found “compelling evidence” that Russia trafficked men from 29 countries into its forces.

A résumé that reached Russian recruiters

Taufiq Muhammad, born in 1978 in Sorong, Indonesia, drove a taxi in Jakarta and had once worked in the US. Russian recruiters found him through a résumé he had sent out while looking for work, the agency said. He probably believed promises of “easy money” and traveled to Moscow. HUR sees his case as part of a pattern.

“In fact, he became yet another victim of Russia's scheme of recruiting foreigners for the criminal war through deception,” HUR said.

A week and a half of training, then the front

Muhammad signed a one-year contract with Russia's army in Korolyov, near Moscow, on 19 April 2026. HUR called that term typical for foreigners Russia uses as “disposable” infantry. Russia made him a machine gunner and gave him only a week and a half at a training center near Voronezh, Army Inform reported, citing HUR.

Russia moved him to occupied Ukraine in early May. He died almost at once, in his first battle. Russian troops were trying to advance from the village of Zelena Dolyna toward Novoselivka and Drobysheve in Donetsk Oblast, Militarnyi reported.

Indonesia is the newest recruiting ground

Russia's recruiters have been working in Indonesia for months. In August, Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service said it held documents on at least eight Indonesians recruited into Russia's army.

Another Indonesian, Rendi Apriyanto, 30, was reportedly killed in September, his family learned from an Indonesian fighting for Russia. Rendi had told his family he was recruited for logistics work, The Jakarta Post reported.

HUR has traced the same fast track before. In January, it identified a Filipino recruit killed in a Donetsk Oblast assault after one week of training. A Nigerian, 34, died in Kharkiv Oblast after a similar week of training, HUR said in May.

Russia courts Africa ahead of a summit

Ukraine's Foreign Ministry has counted at least 2,982 Africans recruited into Russia's army, and 486 of them have died. Ahead of a Russia–Africa summit on 28–29 October, Moscow plans military and port-access deals with a string of African states, HUR said. The deals would help expand the campaign of Russia's Africa Corps, the Defense Ministry-controlled force on the continent, Army Inform reported, citing HUR.

Each recruit Ukraine identifies gives his home government a documented case to act on. Jakarta has said citizens shown to have been deceived will get its protection, while those who enlisted by choice could lose their citizenship.

 

Britain and Poland are giving European security something it urgently needs: a practical plan to turn allied solidarity into stronger military capabilities. Their new Warsaw Defence Plan brings together missile development, ammunition production, maritime cooperation and protection against drones and cyberattacks, strengthening a partnership with consequences well beyond either country’s borders.

Announced as British Defence Secretary Wes Streeting met his Polish counterpart, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, in Warsaw, the agreement establishes the first phase of defence cooperation under the countries’ new Security and Defence Partnership Treaty. According to the Ministry of Defence announcement, it covers operations and industry across land, sea, air and cyberspace.

Its significance lies in that breadth. Modern deterrence depends on much more than the number of soldiers available for deployment. It requires protected infrastructure, reliable supplies of ammunition, effective air defences and forces capable of operating together under pressure. London and Warsaw are addressing those requirements as connected parts of the same challenge.

Air defence is a central priority. The two countries will collaborate on developing and manufacturing the next generation of air defence missiles, building on an industrial relationship that includes Poland’s procurement of the Narew system from MBDA UK. Closer procurement coordination offers an opportunity to align military requirements and strengthen production.

That approach has clear strategic value. Missiles become more useful when allies can sustain their supply, maintain their systems and plan their deployment together. By connecting industrial cooperation with operational needs, Britain and Poland can help develop the dependable defensive capacity that Europe requires against an increasingly demanding range of aerial threats.

The plan also embraces joint development of drones and technologies designed to defeat them. The ministry explicitly links this work to protecting civilians and critical national infrastructure amid Russian drone incursions. It is a welcome recognition that security must extend beyond military installations to the services and networks on which everyday life depends.

Cybersecurity cooperation follows the same logic. Strengthening the resilience of civilian and defence sites can reduce opportunities for disruption and make national responses more effective. For both countries, sharing expertise offers a practical way to improve preparedness against hostile activity that can unfold without a conventional military attack.

At sea, the agreement builds on an existing technical connection: Britain’s Type 31 frigates and Poland’s Miecznik ships share a common design. Exchanging experience as those capabilities develop should help both navies learn from each other. Planned exercises and regional coordination will also increase defensive maritime activity in the Baltic, supporting the protection of vital communications routes.

The industrial commitments are equally encouraging. BAE Systems and Poland’s PGZ will expand capacity and capability in large-calibre ammunition production. The announcement supplies no production figures or delivery timetable, but its direction is important. Credible defence requires the ability to replenish supplies and sustain operations, giving manufacturing capacity a direct role in military readiness.

Cooperation on defence education, training and workforce mobility could strengthen that foundation further. Advanced weapons programmes depend on skilled people as well as investment. Building shared expertise can support delivery while creating opportunities for engineers, technicians and the wider industrial supply chain in both countries.

Joint exercises will test the partnership in practice. Continued participation in Steadfast Defender, Polish Dragon and Joint Warrior is intended to prepare forces for challenges including electronic warfare, counter-drone operations and missile defence. Such training gives commanders opportunities to identify weaknesses, improve coordination and build confidence before a crisis demands immediate action.

Ukraine remains integral to this effort. The countries are preparing a major Coalition of the Willing exercise in Poland in November, involving thousands of personnel. The stated purpose is to prepare the Multinational Force Ukraine to support military training and post-war rebuilding. Preparation cannot determine the course of diplomacy, but it can make future commitments more credible.

For Europe, the promise is straightforward: two committed allies are connecting operational readiness with industrial strength. Delivering the plan will require sustained effort, but Warsaw and London have established a constructive agenda whose success would benefit the wider alliance.

Tutto è partito da un meme sul leader cinese Mao Zedong, che Kylian Mbappé trovava molto divertente, ma adesso almeno tre aziende cinesi hanno interrotto le collaborazioni con il calciatore. La decisione da parte delle aziende di opporsi a “qualsiasi parola o comportamento che ferisca i sentimenti nazionali” è arrivata dopo la diffusione di un video sui social in cui Mbappé, intervistato prima della partecipazione al programma online francese The Bridge, cita un meme “in cui c’è un video di un tizio, un dittatore cinese“, ha affermato il calciatore. Nel filmato, che non è più presente sul canale YouTube del programma, si vede un’immagine manipolata del capitano della nazionale francese con il volto sovrapposto a quello che sembrerebbe essere Mao. Al momento non sono ancora circolate dichiarazioni di Mbappé o The Bridge sulla vicenda.

“Le parole e le azioni che feriscono i sentimenti del popolo cinese incontreranno naturalmente l’opposizione congiunta di tutti i settori della società cinese”, ha affermato il portavoce del ministero degli Esteri cinese, Guo Jiakun. Le aziende che hanno annunciato la fine degli accordi con Mbappé sono tre al momento: il produttore di bevande energetiche Dongpeng, il gruppo lattiero-caseario Mengniu e l’azienda di formaggi Milkground. Anche la piattaforma social RedNote ha annunciato la rimozione dei materiali promozionali legati al giocatore. Sul social network cinese Weibo gli hashtag relativi alla fine delle collaborazioni e al boicottaggio di Mbappé sono diventati virali.

Nell’annuncio dell’interruzione “con effetto immediato” di ogni collaborazione con l’attaccante del Real Madrid, Dongpeng ha dichiarato che l’azienda “adotta una politica di tolleranza zero nei confronti di qualsiasi comportamento che offenda i sentimenti nazionali”. Durante i Mondiali di quest’anno, in Cina sono stati trasmessi degli spot pubblicitari che mostravano immagini generate dall’intelligenza artificiale in cui il 27enne capitano della Francia, molto popolare in Cina, beveva una bevanda sportiva Dongpeng.

Mao fondò la Cina comunista nel 1949 e ancora oggi viene celebrato come un’icona nazionale. In tutto il Paese, le battute sul il fondatore del Repubblica Popolare Cinese, morto nel 1976, sono considerate irrispettose e rimangono un tabù sociale.

L'articolo Pechino attacca Mbappé: il francese ride di un meme con “un dittatore cinese” e tre aziende lo scaricano proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Vientián, 27 oct (Prensa Latina) La embajadora de Cuba en Laos, Enna Esther Viant, agradeció hoy al vicepresidente del Parlamento Monexay Laomuaxong el permanente apoyo de su país contra el bloqueo de Estados Unidos a la isla caribeña.

The post Agradecen a vicepresidente parlamento de Laos apoyo a Cuba first appeared on Noticias Prensa Latina.

La organización presentará cargos internacionales contra el mandatario tras sus dichos contra cinco periodistas que cubrieron el caso de la criptomoneda $LIBRA.

Undercover reporters ordered 500 drone mesh modems from a Chinese firm, which billed them to Russia’s Alabuga drone plant, investigation by The Insider found. The outlet estimates the firm makes about half the high-power mesh modems that let Russia steer its drones deep into Ukraine. The firm’s director also named US company AMD as the source of a key chip, and AMD says it has not sold to the firm.

Geran drones and Banderol drone-missiles have become Russia’s main weapons against Ukraine’s energy grid. Russia began this winter’s strike campaign against that grid in late September, ISW assessed. Ukrainians’ survival this winter depends largely on how fast the West halts mesh modem sales to Russia, the outlet argued.

What a mesh modem does

A mesh modem links drones into one radio network. Each unit relays data for the others, so if one drone is shot down, traffic reroutes through the rest. Information keeps flowing even if nearly 80% of the drones are downed, Ukrainian defense adviser Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov said in November 2025.

Range is the other half of the threat. One XK F-359 holds a line-of-sight link over 100–300 km, The Insider says. In theory, a couple of relay drones could keep a whole attack on Kyiv connected. Operators can then send new commands in flight and steer around air defenses. Russia’s Gerbera drones, first built as cheap decoys, increasingly carry these modems.

A modem from an upgraded Gerbera

To trace the part, The Insider’s correspondent in Ukraine examined an unmarked mesh modem from an upgraded Gerbera with a vertical tail fin, a version that appeared this summer. The outlet identified it as Xingkai’s XK F-359, the part Ukrainian intelligence and earlier reporting, Euromaidan Press included, had logged as the XK-F358. The Insider calls that label a misidentification.

Next, The Insider and the Nordsint investigative project contacted Xingkai on WeChat, posing as a Russian military supplier based in Alabuga. A company employee who introduced himself as “Jack Jiang” confirmed the firm is the model’s sole maker. The Insider identified him as Jiang Qin, Xingkai’s director and owner.

500 modems, three banks

The reporters then ordered 500 units for delivery to Alabuga, home to the plant that makes most of Russia’s long-range drones. Jiang invoiced 19.5 million yuan, which The Insider put at about $2.87 million. He offered two ways to pay: dollars to Xingkai’s DBS Bank account in Hong Kong, or yuan to his personal Ping An Bank account.

In the chat, the reporters said outright that the end user was a military production facility. Jiang raised no objection, The Insider reported.

Later, after the reporters asked to update the address, Xingkai sent a revised invoice with “Alabuga” spelled in Latin letters. This time, it routed payment to a China Merchants Bank account in the name of a former Xingkai manager. She left a management post at the company in 2025, according to Tesari corporate records cited by The Insider. None of the three banks answered The Insider’s requests for comment.

Jiang also claimed the modem’s programmable chip is made by AMD. Asked for an AMD license, he refused, saying Xingkai buys the chips through a middleman. AMD told The Insider that Xingkai “is not an AMD customer or authorized partner,” and said it had sold the company nothing. AMD added that it bars exports of its products to Russia that violate US export controls and sanctions.

Russia's state-backed payment firm A7 took in at least 283 tons of cash rubles, worth more than $14 billion, between November 2024 and July 2025, and turned much of it into payments to China that hide where the money came from, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and Russian investigative outlet Proekt reported on 21 October, citing leaked internal records.

Cut off from Western banks over its war against Ukraine, Russia now moves money the way drug gangs launder theirs: cash goes in, and clean-looking wire transfers come out abroad. The overlap is literal.

Last year, UK investigators found that a network laundering British drug gangs' cash had bought a Kyrgyz bank that was handling payments for Promsvyazbank, Russia's state defense bank. That same bank co-owns A7, which "is also likely to facilitate cash-based money laundering," anti-money-laundering expert George Voloshin told ICIJ. On 1 October, the US Treasury named A7 a "significant transnational criminal organization." Most of the market cash pays Chinese suppliers, and China supplies about 90% of the high-priority Western-restricted items Russia imports for its weapons. Drone makers working for the Russian army are among A7's clients, Proekt found in April.

From market stalls to a defense bank vault

Much of the cash came from Moscow's giant Sadovod market, where broker teams known as "departments" collect bags of rubles from traders, the records show. Vans take the numbered bags to an A7 office, where about 50 cashiers count the money before it is trucked to Promsvyazbank. The bank vaults it and credits A7. At its peak, A7 handled at least 58 tons of cash a month.

Russia's central bank has flagged the problem itself. Money of unknown origin comes "primarily" from Moscow's wholesale and retail markets and from illegal crypto exchanges, a senior Central Bank official said in September, as quoted by ICIJ.

Clean money for Chinese factories

A7 then orders shell companies outside Russia to pay its clients' suppliers, mostly Chinese exporters. The money moves through Kyrgyzstan, largely via the state-owned Trading Company of the Kyrgyz Republic, and the wire transfers carry no trace of cash or of Russia. The records list accounts at ICBC, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, and China Construction Bank. One $287,000 transfer went through Standard Chartered's Hong Kong branch with "Sadovod" recorded as the client.

Chinese banks began refusing Russia-linked payments in December 2023 under the threat of US secondary sanctions. Stripping the funds of their origin makes them easier for Chinese banks to accept, illicit-finance expert Zachary Tvarozna told ICIJ. "The only company that sees everything is A7 itself," Voloshin said.

A7, Promsvyazbank, the Chinese banks, and Kyrgyzstan's economy ministry did not answer ICIJ's questions. A7 has publicly rejected the US accusations, saying it runs "a modern, multi-tiered compliance system."

Sanctioned, but still moving

A7 launched in late 2024, co-owned by Promsvyazbank and led by Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, a "sanctioned and convicted criminal fraudster," according to the US Treasury. Ukraine sanctioned its network in February, and the UK followed in May. A7 claimed to have moved more than 7.5 trillion rubles, about 13% of Russia's 2025 foreign trade transactions, and its network also helped Iran sell oil and buy weapons, the Treasury said.

Sanctions did hit A7's crypto side. Daily volume of its ruble token A7A5 fell 96% from its peak by June 2026, blockchain analytics firm Elliptic found. The cash channel is harder to touch: Western banks can see where A7's money lands, but not where it starts.

China disse que as condições para a devolução de Hong Kong, em 1997, não confere ao Reino Unido qualquer direito de supervisionar os assuntos do território após a transferência de soberania.

© MAY JAMES/EPA

Clínicas e salões de beleza disponibilizavam o tratamento sem supervisão médica e ocultando a sua origem humana, cobrando até 15 mil dólares de Hong Kong (1.700 euros) por três sessões.

© MAY JAMES/EPA

De acordo com a investigação, dois grupos são suspeitos de terem criado uma procura artificial pelas ações durante as ofertas públicas iniciais e de terem canalizado parte dos fundos angariados.

© JEROME FAVRE/EPA

A powerful reflection on the pull of nostalgia, on learning to accept that a past life is gone even as you tentatively reach back for it. Tiffany Huang captures the ache of lost opportunities and regretted paths, of staying a course out of duty and responsibility even as your sense of home erodes. It’s a gorgeous, bittersweet read about what it means to move on long before you’ve fully let go.

You unmasked for the first time, revealing smooth cheeks, a sharp chin, and a long nose. You talked about your book, in progress for several years now, about a Hong Kong man drifting aimlessly around the world. I asked you how you felt about the protests and noted the resignation in your tone. You wanted to write a book about what it meant to be a man from Hong Kong; if Hong Kong disappeared, what would happen to the man? You told me about your family, and it was clear we were not meeting to talk about writing anymore. When you spoke, you chose your words carefully. You didn’t ask me about my boyfriend, only how I felt about returning to America. When I hesitated, you did not ask why, and when I spoke, you listened instead of interrupting me. I didn’t want to leave.