O atacante João Pedro, do Chelsea, deve ficar afastado dos gramados por algumas semanas após sofrer uma lesão na coxa durante um treino, informou o técnico Xabi Alonso nesta terça-feira (27), antes do confronto da equipe contra o Liverpool pela Copa da Liga.

O brasileiro de 25 anos ficou de fora da derrota de sábado para o Tottenham Hotspur após se lesionar durante um treino na sexta-feira.

“Ele sofreu uma lesão na coxa e ficará fora por algumas semanas”, disse Alonso aos repórteres. “Vamos ver quantas; não queremos fazer previsões, mas ele não estará pronto para os próximos jogos.”

João Pedro teve um início de temporada brilhante, marcando cinco gols e dando três assistências em sete partidas em todas as competições.

Alonso reconheceu a perda do jogador da seleção brasileira, mas afirmou que o Chelsea tem elenco suficiente para lidar com sua ausência.

O Chelsea enfrentará o Liverpool na quarta-feira pelas oitavas de final da Copa da Liga e receberá o Manchester United pelo campeonato no sábado.

Ex-Lazio acusado de ter 42 anos aos 17 desabafa sobre boatos

Russia shipped the least crude in more than a month, even as operations at its key Baltic port recovered strongly from an earlier halt.

No single Argentine capability shaped British planning during the 1982 South Atlantic conflict more than the pairing of the Dassault Super Étendard strike fighter and its deadly AM39 Exocet anti-ship missile. Against that threat, the British launched a series of special forces operations, all with the same objective: kill the Argentine pilots and destroy their aircraft and missiles before they could be used again. Together, the strike fighter and missile pairing had proven to be the biggest threat to the Royal Navy task force that had been sent to recapture the islands.

Five Super Étendard aircraft and five AM39 Exocet missiles had been delivered to Argentina before a French embargo took hold. The jets were flown by the Argentine Navy’s 2nd Naval Fighter and Attack Squadron out of Río Grande, on Tierra del Fuego, a region at South America’s southernmost tip, shared by Chile and Argentina. The Super Étendard/Exocet combination had already cost the British the destroyer HMS Sheffield on May 4 and the container ship Atlantic Conveyor on May 25.

The special forces operations were broken down into four phases — named PLUM DUFF, MIKADO, KETTLEDRUM, and IMPI — the last of which is the least well-documented, and the focus of this article.

PLUM DUFF was the insertion phase and was a reconnaissance mission. On May 16, an RAF Hercules airdropped eight special forces troops onto RFA Fort Austin to form a recce party. On the night of May 17/18, a Sea King HC4, ZA290, lifted off from the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible for a one-way flight to Tierra del Fuego, where the men were to observe Río Grande and report back. The patrol was set down far from the objective and never completed the reconnaissance; the helicopter crew flew on into Chile, where the aircraft was deliberately burnt to try and hide the evidence, while they tried to evade capture.

MIKADO was the planned attack phase, and it depended on that missing intelligence. Two Hercules were to air-land up to 70 men of B Squadron, 22 Special Air Service (SAS), directly on Río Grande — the air operation order of May 19 also named Río Gallegos, further up the Argentine coast, as an alternative. The men would destroy the Super Étendards and their Exocets on the ground, kill the pilots, and then withdraw overland into Chile. Commander Task Force 317, at Northwood, accepted from the outset that the mission could well cost both Hercules.

The aircrew did not refuse the task, but they were blunt about what it demanded: formation landing by two heavy transports on a possibly heavily defended, icy military runway, with a probable 20-knot tailwind, at night and on passive night-vision goggles in minimum light levels, with intelligence that was inadequate to support any air-land option at all. The RAF planning team recommended an airdrop as the better way to maintain a covert posture, and the Senior Air Staff Officer at Headquarters 38 Group warned the Air Commander to watch for overambitious schemes coming out of the SAS.

The U.K. Ministry of Defense formally cancelled MIKADO on June 4.

KETTLEDRUM was planned as the third of the set. It was aimed at Puerto Deseado, Santa Cruz Province of Argentina, and would have inserted a Special Boat Service party (SBS, the Royal Marines’ special forces unit) from the submarine HMS Onyx — a boat that will reappear before the end of this story.

None of the three was executed as planned.

Less well-known is that the cancellation of MIKADO produced a fourth project: Operation IMPI, named after a Zulu fighting force.

Cancelling MIKADO did not mean the wider operation was over. Also on June 4, the U.K. Ministry of Defense tasked CTF 317 to produce a new plan for special forces to destroy the combat effectiveness of the Super Étendards.

CTF 317’s staff went to work on what became IMPI. The planning document, Ops 1/3, is dated June 14 — the day of the Argentine surrender in the islands. In broad terms, the objective was to be attacked by special forces arriving both by air and by sea.

That much has been known, in fragments.

What has not been published until now is the fact that the operation had already been resourced.

At 2240Z on June 12, Maj. Gen. Jeremy Moore, commanding the land forces as CTG 317.1, signalled Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward’s battle group (CTG 317.8), with Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse at Northwood (CTF 317) and Commodore Michael Clapp’s amphibious group (CTG 317.0) as information addressees. The message called for B Squadron, 22 SAS, to be made available for operations as soon as possible: cover was needed against rapid developments of an unfavorable nature in West Falkland (Gran Malvina), and the theatre’s existing special forces assets were fully absorbed supporting the battle for Stanley — and IMPI. Operation IMPI, Moore noted in passing, was by then self-sufficient.

Examining two lines of routine signal traffic settles several things at once. Forty-eight hours before the surrender, IMPI was not a staff study but an operation that had been resourced, and that was enough to consume the theatre’s special forces and justify calling a fresh SAS squadron forward. It is also the only contemporary, operational-level reference to IMPI released so far: everything else comes from a narrative written years afterwards.

As that later narrative describes it, the concept behind IMPI was much leaner than MIKADO. Against two Hercules and 70 men, the air element of IMPI rested on a single RAF Hercules.

The aircraft was to fly from Ascension Island, refuel in flight, and then track east of the Falkland Islands and south of Cape Horn before making a low-level approach below Argentine radar cover for a night landing of special forces at the airfields codenamed San Jose and Arco Iris. Other special forces would have been inserted by sea. That air element, as will be seen, is the most questionable part of the entire file.

The routing is worth attention, because it rules out the intuitive picture of a direct run south from Ascension. Instead, the aircraft would have entered from the least-covered and least-expected direction, coming around the bottom of the continent rather than from the northeast.

The precise identities of San Jose and Arco Iris are not established in the declassified record.

The most likely reading is that they stand for Río Grande and Río Gallegos — the airfields at which the planned navigation ended, and the two named in MIKADO’s air operation order a month earlier. For a document circulating through restricted channels, encrypting the names of the two targets was an elementary precaution, although it should be noted that an operational order would more commonly have designated them simply as Target One and Target Two.

None of this rules out Chilean participation in other phases of the operation; if anything, it suggests it’s more likely. The narrative survives inside a folder classified Top Secret and restricted to the Chief of the Air Staff, whose declared subject is cooperation with Chile. That setting contrasts with the earlier stage of the planning, when mounting and recovering a special forces insertion from a Chilean airfield was considered and expressly discounted on political grounds — much as the use of an Antarctic strip was discounted after the New Zealand High Commission advised that the Antarctic winter precluded safe trans-polar flight.

The maritime half of IMPI can be traced in the records of those who were there.

Navigational support for the final phase was to come from the nuclear attack submarine HMS Conqueror. On June 9, 1982, Conqueror was off Bahía Camarones, working as an advanced picket and hunting targets of opportunity that ventured outside the 12-nautical-mile limit of Argentine territorial waters, with authority to sink any civilian vessel judged to be running to the Falklands/Malvinas; that same morning the sub had in fact entered Argentine territorial waters trying to locate the Argentine Navy’s Task Group 79.2.

That day, Conqueror received preparatory information on IMPI. The sub’s task was to come to periscope depth and act as a radio beacon, giving the Hercules a radio reference against which to refine a navigation that, low and at night, allowed no error. The resulting picture is an odd one: a nuclear submarine deployed on interdiction off the Patagonian coast, turned into a navigation aid for a transport aircraft.

The insertion itself fell to HMS Onyx, the Oberon class diesel-electric boat that had already taken part in Operation KETTLEDRUM and the only conventional submarine Britain deployed to the South Atlantic. On June 14, at 0815Z, lying in San Carlos Water, Onyx embarked a party of 10 men from B Squadron, 22 SAS and the SBS for the mission. The timing matches Moore’s signal of two days earlier almost exactly.

The plan called for the submarine to surface some two nautical miles offshore at night. The troops would close the beach in Gemini inflatables and destroy the objective — aircraft and missiles, if any were there — using anti-tank weapons and demolition charges.

What happened next illustrates the inertia of military machinery. The Argentine surrender in the islands came on that same June 14, hours after the party had gone aboard Onyx. Even so, preparations did not stop at once: on June 15 the embarked troops carried out practice landings from a Gemini. That does not mean IMPI was ever executed — it was not — but it does show that with the strategic outcome already settled, the machine was still rehearsing.

The British record closes the matter with administrative dryness: the surrender of the Argentine forces in the Falkland Islands and the cessation of hostile activity by Argentine aircraft resulted in the operation being cancelled.

The air part of the mission is another matter entirely and is where IMPI becomes more uncertain.

The only link between IMPI and an aircraft is a single paragraph in an RAF historical narrative. The folder that holds it was opened on April 18, 1986 — four years after the war — as an eyes-only briefing file for the Chief of the Air Staff, and the pages appear to be a working draft rather than a finished submission, carrying pencil amendments throughout.

Had a Hercules been earmarked, there is no doubt which unit would have provided it. The Special Forces Flight that runs through the whole chapter — five crews, commanded by a squadron leader, exercising regularly with SAS and SBS Sections — appears with its squadron number blanked out, yet the number surfaces a few paragraphs later, where two of its crews are described training on the probe-fitted Hercules C1P. The unit was No. 47 Squadron, RAF, home-based at Lyneham, and it would keep the special forces air support role for decades afterward.

The men who were at Ascension with that detachment, however, say they had nothing to do with it. Reliable sources with direct knowledge of the flight’s activity state that they never saw the codeword at the time, had never heard of the operation until this file surfaced, and consider it inconceivable that a special forces Hercules and crew could have been earmarked for a mission of this kind without the flight — a community of five crews that has stayed in touch ever since — learning of it at some point in the intervening four decades. By June 14, at most one aerial-refueling-qualified special forces crew was at Wideawake.

That skepticism is reinforced by the way the same narrative handles events those crews lived through. Its account of their own work-up does not survive contact with their logbooks.

For example, a practice infiltration into RAF Laarbruch in Germany that the narrative describes as successful had in fact been detected; the Hercules was notionally shot down about two miles out on the approach. The ramp toes (attachable extension plates located at the very end of the rear cargo ramp) it describes as droppable at 20 to 30 knots were never meant to be lowered with the aircraft moving, which would have been unsafe and risked the airframe. There are other anomalies, too.

A document that misstates the squadron’s own exercises is thin evidence on which to place that squadron over Tierra del Fuego.

What is not in question is what the Special Forces Flight could have done, had it been asked.

By mid-May the flight had two crews qualified in air-to-air refueling — one deployed to Ascension, the other held in the United Kingdom to train the others — flying Hercules C1s fitted with probes and, where the task required it, additional fuel tanks in the fuselage. It had rehearsed stream landings and rapid offloads, parachute insertion below radar cover to a pinpoint coastal feature, as well as flying on ANVIS goggles at 250 feet over sea and land. The goggles themselves were fitted to the crews’ helmets by RAE Farnborough specialists in a single day in mid-April. The reach was demonstrated on May 16, when the sortie that dropped the PLUM DUFF party stayed airborne for 24 hours and five minutes, with Victor tankers refueling some 1,800 miles from Ascension. Almost none of it was routine: nearly everything the force did during the conflict was improvised, at speed, in a matter of weeks.

What never had an answer — not for MIKADO, and not for whatever IMPI intended — was the other end of the problem. Putting men ashore deep inside Argentine territory was the solvable half. Getting an aircraft and its passengers out again after a direct action, from a strip in range of the Argentine Air Force, was not.

All of the above is reconstructed from lateral references: the RAF’s narrative in file AIR 20/13036 at the National Archives, unit records, submarine logs, operational signal traffic, and the accounts of participants.

The specific file — the one holding the complete plan with its annexes, the identification of the airfields and the execution sequence — remains closed. It is DEFE 71/980, titled Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): Operation IMPI, retained at the National Archives at Kew with no announced opening date. Until it is released, the air element of IMPI cannot be settled either way.

Forty-four years after the conflict, the last British special operation of the war is still, in essence, a document the British state is not prepared to show. That is not a trivial detail: the files touching on cooperation with Chile have consistently been the most reluctantly opened of all.

What remains is an operation of two halves. One of them is solid: a resourced plan, declared self-sufficient on June 12, with a nuclear submarine briefed to act as a beacon, 10 men of the SAS and the SBS embarked in a conventional submarine in San Carlos on the morning of the surrender, and rehearsals continuing the following day. The other half — a lone Hercules coming round Cape Horn to land on a codenamed strip — rests on one paragraph of a flawed staff narrative and is rejected by the only men who could have flown it.

Either way, the obsession is the same.

Between June 4 and June 14, 1982, while the final battle for Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino was being fought and the Argentine land campaign was collapsing, part of the British planning effort was still revolving around five French-built aircraft, their 10 aircrew, and their missiles. That the plan carries the date of the surrender itself, that it was still being rehearsed the following day, and that it remains classified today says a good deal about how far the British were prepared to go to destroy the Super Étendards and their Exocets.

Contact the editor: thomas@thewarzone.com

Mariano Sciaroni holds a master’s degree in Strategy and Geopolitics as well as a postgraduate diploma in Contemporary Military History, both earned at the Argentine Army’s Military Academy. Sciaroni has published five books and numerous articles on military and naval history. He is also an active member of the Argentine Institute of Military History and serves as a sub-lieutenant in the Argentine Army Reserve (Army Aviation Reserve Squadron). You can find out more about his books here.

The post Britain’s Final Plan To Kill Argentina’s Super Étendards Attack Jets appeared first on TWZ.

emen's Iran-aligned Houthis said on Tuesday they had hit Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura oil refinery, the ?biggest in the kingdom, with a ballistic missile.

A dispute over maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean has entered a new phase after the European Union joined Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in formally rejecting an agreement between Turkey and Libya.

The six parties issued a joint declaration at the United Nations on 26 October, following the decision by Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives to approve a maritime delimitation memorandum originally signed with Ankara in 2019.

The declaration, delivered by Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis, argued that the agreement disregards the maritime rights of other coastal states and cannot establish boundaries affecting countries that are not parties to it.

Turkey has rejected the criticism, maintaining that its agreement with Libya complies with international law and protects the legitimate interests of both countries.

The competing positions concern more than the interpretation of a maritime boundary. They affect offshore energy exploration, relations between Turkey and its neighbours, and the political balance within Libya itself.

Why Libya’s decision changes the dispute

The original memorandum was signed in November 2019 between Turkey and Libya’s then internationally recognised Government of National Accord, based in Tripoli.

It established a claimed maritime boundary extending across part of the Eastern Mediterranean, where Greece maintains that the maritime entitlements of its islands, including Crete, must be taken into account.

The agreement was opposed by Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, while Libya’s rival eastern authorities initially rejected it.

That division appeared to weaken the political foundations of the arrangement, even though Ankara continued to defend its validity.

However, on 20 October 2026, Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives reversed its previous opposition and approved the memorandum.

The decision reflects changes in relations between Turkey and eastern Libya, where military commander Khalifa Haftar has exercised considerable influence.

Turkey has expanded contacts with authorities in Benghazi despite having previously been associated primarily with the rival administration in Tripoli.

Approval by the eastern parliament consequently gives the agreement broader political acceptance within Libya than it enjoyed in 2019, although it does not resolve the country’s institutional divisions or the objections raised by neighbouring states.

A dispute over geography and maritime rights

The central disagreement concerns the legal principles used to determine maritime boundaries.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states possess rights within exclusive economic zones, while the delimitation of overlapping claims is intended to produce an equitable solution.

Greece argues that Turkey and Libya cannot establish the maritime boundary claimed in their memorandum without disregarding the legal entitlements of Greek islands situated between their coastlines.

The Greek Foreign Ministry’s response maintains that geography and the law of the sea cannot be changed through parliamentary approval of a bilateral agreement.

Turkey takes a different position on the weight that islands should carry when continental shelves and maritime jurisdictions are delimited, and is not itself a party to UNCLOS.

The dispute therefore involves competing interpretations of international maritime law as well as disagreements over the boundaries shown on maps.

The European Union has aligned itself with Greece and Cyprus.

In a statement issued on 21 October, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas described the memorandum as incompatible with the law of the sea and incapable of producing legal consequences for third states.

The latest declaration extends that position into a broader diplomatic coalition involving governments from the Gulf and North Africa.

Ankara rejects the criticism

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan responded on 26 October by arguing that objections from the EU and other parties had no legitimate basis.

According to his remarks on the agreement, Turkey was not seeking an advantage at the expense of other Mediterranean countries.

Ankara’s position is that its maritime arrangements with Libya reflect the interests of two sovereign states and should not be invalidated by objections from outside parties.

This creates a diplomatic complication for the EU.

Turkey remains a NATO member and an important partner on migration, regional security and Black Sea affairs, while Greece and Cyprus are EU member states whose maritime claims Brussels supports.

The Union must therefore manage a disagreement involving a strategically important partner without retreating from its established legal position.

Energy resources and Libya’s political future

The Eastern Mediterranean contains established and potential offshore gas resources, giving maritime boundaries commercial significance.

Delimitation determines which governments may authorise exploration and exploitation in particular areas, while overlapping claims can discourage investment or provoke disputes over survey vessels and drilling operations.

Greece has already concluded maritime delimitation agreements with Italy and Egypt, including a partial agreement with Cairo in 2020 that overlaps with areas claimed under the Turkish-Libyan arrangement.

The competing agreements illustrate why the issue cannot be settled exclusively through bilateral negotiations that exclude other interested coastal states.

Libya’s internal political structure introduces another uncertainty. The country remains divided between competing institutions, and the European declaration explicitly connects maritime stability with the reunification of Libyan state authorities.

As EU Today previously examined in its coverage of Eastern Mediterranean tensions, disputes over maritime jurisdiction intersect with regional military positioning and the broader relationship between Turkey and European governments.

For the moment, the confrontation remains diplomatic.

The principal question is whether the parties can prevent overlapping legal claims from developing into renewed confrontations over exploration rights while maintaining channels for negotiations with Libya and Turkey.

Commodity trader Mercuria Energy Group accused the Baltic Exchange of continuing to publish the world’s benchmark oil tanker rate, despite distortions caused by the Iran war, because it feared losing business to a competitor.

British defense contractor Babcock has confirmed that it is putting itself forward for the U.S. Navy’s future frigate program, with its Arrowhead 140 general-purpose frigate, the design behind the Royal Navy’s Type 31 class, expected to form the basis of its proposal. The move adds another foreign-designed warship to Washington’s search for a relatively mature frigate that can be built quickly and in significant numbers.

Babcock has held preliminary discussions with Pentagon officials and is expected to submit an expression of interest before the end of October, according to recent reporting by The Telegraph and Navy Lookout. The proposal is understood to potentially involve Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), America’s largest military shipbuilder, with the two companies exploring an arrangement that could see the Arrowhead 140 built in the United States under license.

“Of course we’re interested. We have a world-class frigate, close links to the U.S. and U.S. industry. It would be insane for us not to respond,” Sir Nick Hine, head of Babcock’s marine business and a former Second Sea Lord, told The Telegraph.

The initiative comes as the U.S. Navy seeks to accelerate the acquisition of smaller surface combatants after the troubled Constellation class frigate program was axed. Japan’s upgraded Mogami class, South Korea’s Chungnam class, and Turkey’s Istanbul class have also been reported as candidates for the Navy’s international frigate effort. You can read more about all three designs here.

Fincantieri Marine Group, which had developed the cancelled Constellation class frigate for the U.S. Navy, also says it sees a possible new opportunity in the service’s latest frigate plans. 

Meanwhile, German defense contractor Rheinmetall, a newcomer to the surface combatant market, recently unveiled its GMF 140 frigate, which it has said it plans to offer “initially as part of a procurement project in North America” before pursuing opportunities with other allied navies.

For Babcock, the opportunity would be a major expansion of its relationship with the U.S. defense industry. If successful, the company would likely provide the design, engineering expertise, and potentially the intellectual property needed for American shipyards to manufacture the frigates.

This would mirror the process for the Polish Navy’s Project 106 Miecznik (Swordfish) class, which is building three new multirole frigates in Poland, rather than using the company’s own facilities in Britain.

The Navy’s assessment of potential options is due by November 12. No contract has been awarded, and the details of any Babcock-HII proposal remain unconfirmed.

The Arrowhead 140 is the foundation of the Royal Navy’s five-ship Type 31 program, which is being built at Babcock’s Rosyth shipyard in Scotland. The design is derived from the Danish Iver Huitfeldt class frigate. As well as Poland, the warship has also been selected for Indonesia.

The Arrowhead 140 has a baseline length of approximately 455 feet, a beam of 65 feet, and a displacement of around 5,700 tonnes, although national variants may be considerably heavier. The vessel uses a conventional combined diesel-and-diesel (CODAD) propulsion system and can achieve speeds exceeding 28 knots. Its design emphasizes long endurance, with a baseline endurance of approximately one to two months. The AH140 incorporates a flight deck and hangar for naval helicopter operations, accommodation for embarked personnel, boat-handling facilities, and adaptable mission spaces. Its modular architecture allows customers to integrate different sensors, combat management systems, electronic warfare equipment, and weapons according to national requirements.

Taking the Polish Navy’s Project 106 class as an example of an Arrowhead 140 iteration, this is a notably heavily armed adaptation, featuring a 76mm Leonardo Strales main gun, a 32-cell Mk 41 vertical launch system for surface-to-air missiles, eight Naval Strike Missiles for anti-ship strike, and lightweight torpedo launchers. The Polish variant is reported to have a maximum displacement of approximately 7,700 tonnes.

The Type 31 is a general-purpose warship capable of undertaking maritime security, escort, and surface warfare missions. Its relatively large hull offers considerable internal volume for weapons, sensors, aviation facilities, and future upgrades.

That could make it attractive to a U.S. Navy looking for a ship able to protect convoys, operate independently, and supplement its larger destroyers. A frigate with a significantly lower operating cost than an Arleigh Burke class destroyer could still take on a range of missions, freeing more capable combatants for broad area air and missile air defense, sustained strike operations, and other more demanding tasks.

The Arrowhead 140’s size could also provide flexibility in accommodating American weapons and combat systems. However, a U.S. version would require a defined configuration, and there is no publicly established weapons fit for a potential American variant.

At the same time, the Royal Navy’s Type 31 frigate has not yet entered operational service, and its baseline configuration is not optimized for every mission the U.S. Navy may require. In particular, the integration of the sonar and other systems needed for sustained anti-submarine warfare would be a significant undertaking.

The Navy will also have to wrestle with how much of the existing design can be retained while meeting its own requirements. One of the major lessons from the Constellation program was that extensive modifications to an existing foreign design can create huge cost and schedule risks. With so little left of the original design after it was adapted to Navy specifications, this eventually doomed the program.

For Babcock, it will be essential to keep the Arrowhead 140 as close as possible to its established configuration, while integrating essential American equipment, to keep the proposal competitive.

Babcock does not operate a shipyard in the United States, making an American industrial partner central to its approach.

HII, which operates major shipbuilding facilities at Newport News and Ingalls, would offer substantial experience constructing warships for the U.S. Navy. Babcock and HII already have an established relationship in the submarine sector, including work supporting the Virginia class attack submarine program.

Babcock’s facilities in Rosyth and Bristol manufacture tactical missile-tube assemblies for General Dynamics Electric Boat, supporting the Common Missile Compartment used by the U.S. Navy’s Columbia class and the Royal Navy’s Dreadnought class ballistic missile submarines. HII has also expanded its relationship with Babcock through work involving Virginia class submarine components.

Those existing industrial relationships could provide a foundation for a surface-ship partnership. Under a potential arrangement, Babcock could transfer the necessary design rights and provide technical support while an American yard undertakes construction.

Such an arrangement would fit the Trump administration’s stated goal of using allied expertise to accelerate warship production while rebuilding domestic shipbuilding capacity. It would also allow Babcock to pursue a potentially significant U.S. order without requiring Rosyth to absorb a large new construction program alongside its Royal Navy commitments.

The prospect of HII supporting more than one design raises questions about production capacity, program priorities, and how the company would manage competing demands on its shipyards.

More generally, the administration’s interest in foreign frigates reflects growing concern about the time and expense involved in developing new American warships.

The Constellation class program was supposed to provide a modern replacement for the Navy’s retired Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates. Based on the European FREMM design, it underwent extensive modifications for American service before suffering serious schedule and cost problems. The Navy subsequently abandoned the program.

The service is now pursuing FF(X), a patrol frigate intended to be easier to build and field. Its initial configuration, however, is not expected to include a vertical launch system, limiting its ability to provide some of the capabilities associated with a more heavily armed multi-mission combatant.

HII is building the FF(X) frigate, based on the Coast Guard’s Legend class National Security Cutter. It is somewhat telling that they would partner with Babcock on the foreign frigate offering considering they already have the FF(X) contract.

The international frigate effort is intended to examine whether a ship based on an existing allied design could provide a different balance of capability, cost, and delivery speed.

An August presidential memorandum opened a route for the Navy to consider allied designs and, under limited circumstances, overseas construction through a national security waiver. The approach has been compared with a model in which an initial small number of ships could be constructed abroad before production moves to U.S. yards.

The reported framework limits overseas construction to no more than two ships and ties it to investment in American shipbuilding. Any eventual Babcock proposal would therefore need to demonstrate how the design could be transferred and produced domestically at the required pace.

That could be a big challenge. Babcock’s own Type 31 production line is already committed to the five ships ordered by the Royal Navy, while setting up an American production line would require workforce training, supply-chain development, and the transfer of manufacturing knowledge.

HMS Bulldog has officially entered build.

The ceremonial Steel Cut for our fourth Type 31 frigate marks another major step forward for our programme, joining a production line that is gathering real speed.

More to come from Rosyth later this evening.https://t.co/ZoTM5OWNVv pic.twitter.com/35Y3qBpMJg

— Babcock International (@Babcockplc) February 24, 2026

The Navy will also need to establish whether a foreign design can meet its minimum operational requirements without undergoing the kind of extensive redesign that dogged the Constellation program.

Babcock enters a field that already includes several established frigate designs from Japan, South Korea, and Turkey — and potentially more.

Each offers a different combination of design maturity, combat systems, production capacity, and potential industrial arrangements. The Mogami and Chungnam programs have operational ships in service, while the Arrowhead 140 has been selected for multiple export programs but is yet to enter operational service.

Babcock’s selling point is likely to be the Arrowhead 140’s size, adaptability, and established design pedigree, combined with the prospect of American production through HII.

With the Arrowhead 140 adopted by multiple navies, this brings potential cost savings through economies of scale, shared design evolution, and collaborative upgrades across the fleet. A wider international user base also brings the possibility of overseas industrial partnerships, including training and logistical support around the globe.

At the same time, U.S. Navy selection would represent a major endorsement of the platform and would further strengthen its position in other export markets.

For now, Babcock’s confirmation that it intends to pursue the opportunity adds another contender to the Navy’s search for a new frigate. Whether the Arrowhead 140 advances beyond the initial expression of interest will depend on how its capabilities and production prospects compare with the other candidates. And critically, Babcock and its U.S. partners will need to convince the Pentagon that they can deliver a ship that meets the Navy’s requirements without repeating the delays and redesign challenges of the Constellation program.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post British Type 31 Frigate Variant Offered To The U.S. Navy appeared first on TWZ.

A low turnout and security concerns shaped the first round, setting up a close contest between Iotova and pro-Western rival Andrey Gyurov.

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Outgoing Bulgarian President Iliana Iotova led the first round of presidential elections on Sunday with between 35% and 36.5% of the vote, according to exit polls, but fell short of the result expected by her supporters. She will face former caretaker prime minister Andrey Gyurov, backed by the pro-Western opposition, in a runoff scheduled for Nov. 1.

RELATED: Serbia’s Student Opposition Wins Decisive Parliamentary Victory

Gyurov secured between 32.2% and 32.5% of the vote, according to the same exit polls, putting him within reach of Iotova ahead of the second round.

The election took place amid security concerns following a series of drone attacks on merchant vessels in the Black Sea. Voter turnout stood at around 20%, as some political parties called for a boycott.

Iotova, 62, has campaigned on dialogue with Russia and opposed military assistance to Ukraine. She has made ending the war in Ukraine a central theme of her campaign, presenting herself as a “president of peace.”

#Bulgaria’s presidential vote delivered a result few polls anticipated. Exit polls gave incumbent Iliana Iotova, who favors dialogue with Moscow and opposes military aid to Ukraine, up to 36.5 percent, a far narrower lead than surveys had suggested.https://t.co/rqlYf7ehlZ

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) October 25, 2026

After casting her ballot, she called for a government capable of tackling poverty and regional inequalities. “I believe there must be peace, stability and security,” Iotova said.

Gyurov, meanwhile, called for a Bulgaria oriented toward Europe and the future, emphasizing economic security and effective governance.

He said he had voted for “a European, free and proud country, where incomes are sufficient, where we feel secure about tomorrow and where the state functions as it should.”

Iotova assumed the presidency earlier this year after Rumen Radev resigned to contest parliamentary elections, seeking to become prime minister. Bulgaria is a member of both the European Union and NATO.

If Iotova wins the Nov. 1 runoff, she would become the first woman elected president of Bulgaria, a country of 6.4 million people with the lowest per capita gross domestic product in the European Union.

Green blobbers want us to stop drilling because the North Sea is running dry – so why the panic about oil and gas extraction? The answer is that it’s as much about politics and punitive taxes as geology, says Ben Pile.

The post The North Sea Green Paradox appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

European Union fisheries ministers are meeting in Luxembourg on 26th October to negotiate catch limits for the Baltic Sea in 2027, confronting a sharply divided scientific picture in which some commercially important fish populations are recovering while others remain at critically low levels.

The European Commission has proposed increasing total fishing opportunities by approximately 35 per cent compared with 2026, largely because of improved assessments for several herring stocks and sprat. At the same time, it wants substantial reductions in permitted accidental catches of cod, whose depleted populations have shown little evidence of sustained recovery.

The negotiations, scheduled for 26th and potentially 27th October, will determine how fishing opportunities are allocated between EU member states bordering the Baltic Sea.

According to the Council’s published agenda, ministers are seeking a political agreement on total allowable catches and national quotas for ten commercially significant fish stocks.

The outcome will determine how much fish can be landed legally during 2027, while also influencing the future prospects of coastal communities, processing companies and fishing fleets.

Some stocks recover while cod remains depleted

The Commission’s proposal for 2027 fishing opportunities reflects significant differences in the condition of individual stocks.

Brussels recommends increasing the catch limit for central Baltic herring by 49 per cent and for sprat by 44 per cent. Proposed increases for Bothnian herring and Gulf of Riga herring are more modest, at three and 11 per cent respectively.

The improved outlook for sprat follows stronger reproduction in recent years, while scientific assessments suggest some herring populations are beginning to recover.

However, these improvements do not mean the Baltic ecosystem as a whole has returned to a healthy condition.

Central Baltic and Bothnian herring remain below important sustainability reference levels, even though the latest scientific assessments permit increased catches under specified conditions.

For cod, the position is considerably worse.

The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, known as ICES, has advised that there should be no catches of eastern Baltic cod in 2027 or 2028 under its precautionary approach.

Its scientific advice for eastern Baltic cod reflects the continuing failure of the stock to recover sufficiently to support fishing.

Western Baltic cod faces similarly severe restrictions.

The Commission consequently proposes reducing the permitted incidental catch of western Baltic cod by 88 per cent and eastern Baltic cod by 51 per cent.

These allowances are designed to account for fish caught unintentionally during other fishing operations. They do not amount to the reopening of a targeted commercial cod fishery.

Fishing communities face uneven consequences

The proposed increases in herring and sprat quotas would benefit some fishing operators and processing industries, but the economic effects will vary significantly between countries and fleets.

Larger vessels specialising in pelagic species such as herring and sprat are likely to benefit more directly from increased catch opportunities.

Smaller operators whose activities depend on depleted stocks or mixed fisheries may face continued restrictions.

The Commission also proposes reducing the permitted incidental catch of western Baltic herring by 45 per cent and removing an exemption previously available to certain small-scale coastal fisheries.

That proposal creates a particularly difficult issue for smaller fishing businesses, whose operations may have limited capacity to switch fishing grounds or target different species.

The economic effects will depend not only on the size of the quotas but also on how national governments distribute them among individual operators.

The limits of quota management

The Baltic Sea’s problems cannot be explained by fishing pressure alone.

Nutrient pollution, changes in oxygen availability, habitat degradation and shifting environmental conditions have contributed to the deterioration of several stocks.

Restrictions on fishing can reduce direct pressure on fish populations, but they cannot independently resolve pollution or other environmental problems affecting reproduction and survival.

This complicates the relationship between scientific advice and political decisions.

Ministers are required to take account of conservation objectives under the Common Fisheries Policy. They must also consider the economic consequences for fishing communities and the viability of fleets operating within the agreed limits.

EU Today previously examined the political compromises surrounding European fishing quotas, including the tension between short-term commercial demands and the recovery of depleted fish populations.

The Baltic negotiations present a particularly concentrated version of that conflict because the condition of individual stocks varies so substantially.

Ministers must decide how much recovery is sufficient

The Commission’s proposed increases are based on the latest assessments rather than a general relaxation of conservation policy.

Indeed, its draft regulation envisages maintaining restrictions on vulnerable stocks while allowing greater exploitation where the scientific evidence supports it.

The proposed overall catch volume is approximately 543,000 tonnes, compared with substantially lower fishing opportunities in 2026.

That figure represents a proposed ceiling, not a confirmed agreement or a forecast of actual landings.

Once ministers reach a political agreement, the Council is expected to adopt the final regulation formally in November, with the principal catch limits applying from 1 January 2027.

The central question is whether governments will preserve the distinction between stocks showing measurable recovery and those for which scientific advisers continue to recommend no fishing.

Their decision will determine both the short-term economics of Baltic fisheries and the pace at which the region’s most vulnerable commercial fish populations may recover.

Main Image: By Wilhelm Thomas Fiege – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=122363104

Bulgaria’s presidential election is heading for a run-off on 1 November after incumbent Iliana Yotova led Sunday’s first round but fell well short of the majority required to win outright. The result was closer than pre-election polling had indicated, leaving her challenger, former caretaker prime minister Andrey Gyurov, within reach of the presidency.

An Alpha Research exit poll put Yotova and her running mate, Kiril Valchev, on 35.3 per cent, and Gyurov and his running mate, Georgi Kandev, on 32.4 per cent. Other agencies produced slightly different estimates, but all placed the two tickets in the lead and showed a narrow gap. These figures are preliminary; Bulgaria’s Central Election Commission has yet to confirm the official result.

The outcome contrasts with pre-election surveys that gave Yotova a sizeable advantage. A Market Links poll published before voting put her well ahead of Gyurov. The first-round estimates instead suggest that the contest has tightened as voters weighed the candidates’ positions on foreign policy, domestic economic pressures and the direction of the government.

Yotova became president in January after Rumen Radev resigned to enter parliamentary politics. She had served as his vice-president for nine years and is now seeking a five-year mandate in her own right. Her candidacy is backed by Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria party and the Bulgarian Socialist Party. The election is the first nationwide test of Radev’s influence since Progressive Bulgaria won April’s parliamentary election. A Yotova victory would leave the presidency and government in the hands of political allies.

Gyurov, an economist and former deputy governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, served as caretaker prime minister earlier this year. He is supported by pro-Western reformist parties. During his premiership, his government signed a security co-operation agreement with Ukraine, and he has argued for closer co-operation with Western allies.

Their foreign-policy differences have been a defining feature of the campaign. Yotova has called for negotiations to end Russia’s war against Ukraine and for better relations with Moscow. Gyurov has taken a more supportive position towards Kyiv. The choice reflects a longstanding debate in Bulgarian politics over how the country should balance its relationship with Russia against its EU and NATO commitments.

The war’s impact on the Black Sea has given that debate a direct security dimension. Drone attacks on commercial vessels near Bulgaria’s coast have raised concerns about shipping safety and the conflict’s potential to spread. The government has sought support from its partners to strengthen maritime security. Both leading candidates condemned the attacks, while their differences over the wider war have kept Bulgaria’s response and its ties with Moscow in focus. The attacks on merchant shipping were a prominent issue during the campaign.

Rising energy prices and inflation have also featured in the campaign, as households face pressure from the cost of living. Those concerns may matter to voters who backed neither of the two leading tickets. The second round will require Yotova and Gyurov to appeal beyond their first-round supporters, while also persuading voters who did not participate to return to the polls.

Revival party leader Kostadin Kostadinov placed third. His ticket with Petar Volgin received 12.6 per cent in the Alpha Research exit poll, though other estimates were higher. Kostadinov has opposed military support for Ukraine; Ukraine imposed a ten-year entry ban on him in 2022. His supporters could influence the run-off, but their votes should not be treated as a single bloc: some may back Yotova, others Gyurov, and some may stay at home.

Turnout was exceptionally low. Alpha Research estimated participation at 22.3 per cent by 7pm, with other agencies reporting similarly low figures. The Bulgarian constitution requires more than half of eligible voters to participate and a candidate to receive more than half of valid votes for a first-round victory. Neither threshold was met. Polling analysis cited election fatigue after April’s parliamentary vote and the fact that the presidential election was held separately.

The low participation makes Sunday’s estimates an uncertain guide to the run-off. A higher turnout could change the balance, particularly if one candidate succeeds in mobilising voters who stayed away or attracting supporters of eliminated candidates.

The presidency is largely ceremonial, with executive authority resting mainly with the prime minister and parliament. It nevertheless carries political weight: the president leads the armed forces, can veto legislation, signs international treaties and appoints ambassadors. The 1 November vote will decide whether Yotova secures a mandate of her own and consolidates the governing camp’s position, or whether Gyurov can turn his stronger-than-expected first-round showing into a change at the top of the state.

MOSCOW, Oct 25 (Reuters) – The Russian Defence Ministry said on Sunday that its drones had struck a cargo vessel bound for the Black Sea port of Chornomorsk in an overnight attack and another...

A country with a population of 1.3 million announces that it can strangle the commercial lifeline of the world’s leading nuclear power in a matter of hours.

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A string of provocations, but it’s all just cheap jewelry

Certain statements should be read twice – the second time aloud – to be sure you didn’t dream them. The one that Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna gave to The Times on October 7 falls into this category. Estonia, the minister informs us, would be able to assemble a force of 50,000 experienced soldiers “in a matter of hours” and, again within a few hours, block Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea, which he describes as a vital artery of the Russian economy. For Moscow, that sea is a matter of survival, he added, especially since the Black Sea, he claims, is already closed off. Then, with a sense of timing that no playwright would have dared to imagine, Tsahkna called it “absurd” to describe NATO as an offensive organization.

The minister’s outburst did not come out of the blue. It comes at the end of an autumn that Tallinn has methodically shaped. In mid-September, the government announced it was ready to seal the border if a general mobilization were declared in Russia; on October 1, it banned the transit of Russian and Belarusian wheat; around the same time, the Financial Times reported on elite units being deployed to the border and the purchase of weapons capable of striking deep into Russian territory. The defense budget for 2026 stands at 2.4 billion euros, or 5.4% of gross domestic product. We are looking at a country of 1.3 million people that has chosen to live in a state of constant readiness and to let the world know, every week, just how prepared it is to fight.

The minister was careful to specify that the blockade would be triggered only after a Russian attack capable of invoking Article 5. The clause is about as reassuring as a “friendly dog” sign hanging on the gate of a kennel. Publicly announcing a plan to choke off a nuclear power’s main energy export route remains a deliberate political act, regardless of any qualifying conditions attached to it. Under customary international law, a naval blockade is an act of war; and in the age of severed cables, stateless drones, and oil tankers in the so-called “shadow fleet,” the threshold for what constitutes an “attack” has become elastic. Who decides when it has been crossed? The very same government that denounces a new provocation every morning?

The math of fifty thousand

Let’s focus on the numbers, which are the most entertaining part. According to public data from the Estonian armed forces, the wartime strength is just over 43,000. Of these, only 4,200 are on permanent standby; the rest are reservists and volunteers from the Defense League – brave people who train in the woods on weekends. So, there are no 50,000 “experienced” soldiers in a matter of hours. Unless you count those from other countries.

And that is exactly how the figure should be interpreted. Tsahkna’s 50,000 do not speak Estonian. They are the British contingent stationed in Tapa with its French reinforcements, the navies of Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, the aircraft of a few allies on rotation, and the Americans when they have time. A dozen or so flags, each with its own chain of command, its own parliament, its own public opinion, and its own election calendar. The Estonian minister disposes of that army the way a condominium manager disposes of the residents’ savings: in words, with great nonchalance. Could some assistant please explain to him how to do his job?

Let’s try to imagine the first missile. In London, the cabinet meets and seeks a legal opinion. Paris launches a strategic review, which requires a document and a conference. Berlin awaits the Bundestag’s vote and the blessing of its less-than-convinced coalition partner. Rome seeks clarification at the Atlantic Council; Budapest puts its reservations on record; Washington is busy elsewhere. Article 5, after all, doesn’t force anyone to fire a shot: it obligates each ally to take the action it deems necessary, and “necessary” can mean anything from an aircraft carrier to a note of protest. The oldest debate in any coalition would immediately begin: who steps in first, who withdraws last, who covers whose flank, and who pays for the fuel. Meanwhile, the Estonians would be there counting down the minutes.

European history is all too familiar with this scenario. In September 1939, France and Great Britain had guaranteed Poland’s security with the same solemnity with which Tallinn is guaranteed today. They declared war, and then spent eight months behind the Maginot Line simply watching: the French called it the drôle de guerre, the “phoney war.” Warsaw, meanwhile, had long since stopped laughing.

Let’s now set aside arithmetic for geography, which isn’t swayed by interviews – someone should tell the Minister that! About eighty kilometers of sea lie between Tallinn and Helsinki: it is along this narrow passage that the minister would like to close off the Gulf of Finland. From the Estonian capital to the Russian border at Narva, there are just over two hundred kilometers. Russia’s GDP, in nominal terms, is more than fifty times that of Estonia. The Baltic Fleet is based in Kronstadt, at the far end of the Gulf, and in Baltiysk, in the Kaliningrad exclave; which means, incidentally, that a substantial portion of that fleet is already outside the “plug” that Tallinn dreams of inserting.

Strategists carefully distinguish between three things that Estonian politicians happily confuse: guarding a passage, making its use risky for the adversary, and maintaining stable control over it. The first is possible; the second is costly; the third, against Russia, has never succeeded for anyone. Those who lay mines may fall victim to them; those who deploy coastal anti-ship batteries become, in turn, fixed targets, surveyed down to the meter.

And this is where physics comes in. Russia’s conventional arsenal includes Iskander missiles deployed just a few dozen minutes’ flight away, ship-launched Kalibr missiles, TOS-1A thermobaric rocket launchers, and high-yield glide bombs. There’s no need to bring up nuclear warheads, which remain the favorite bogeyman of Western talk shows. The coastal batteries, depots, command centers, and docks from which our dear friends in Tallinn intend to block the Gulf would go from a solid to a gaseous state in the time between launch and impact. And with them, the solidity of Estonia’s political stance would evaporate, long before an agreement on the statement is reached in Brussels. We’re not writing this to be smug. We’re writing this because, in that scenario, ordinary Estonians would be the first to pay the price, used as pawns by a ruling class that’s playing with fire in its own living room.

Creative accounting for oil

There remains the issue of the “lifeline.” Tsahkna attributes about 60% of Russian oil exports by sea to the Baltic route. Estimates from the Polish think tank OSW – which cannot be suspected of sympathizing with Moscow – put the figure at about one-third of crude oil and nearly half of refined products; and Reuters data from February show that oil continued to ship out from Russian ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, despite the sea being “already closed.” Inflating figures is an age-old rhetorical technique: it serves to make the threat seem more deadly than it is and one’s own position stronger than it actually is.

Moreover, a blockade would not affect only Moscow. Neutral shipowners, insurance companies, freight rates, refineries, and energy prices would all suffer the consequences, and Europe – which in recent years has already paid dearly for its economic war against Russia – would once again bear the cost. There’s even a grotesque detail: in 2025, Estonia sold goods worth approximately 252 million euros to Russia. They’re threatening to cut off their neighbor’s lifeline, but in the meantime, business as usual continues.

Why, then, all the fuss? The answer lies in the role the Estonian ruling class has carved out for itself within the Alliance: that of the permanent vanguard, the most zealous member of the eastern flank, the top student who raises their hand before the teacher finishes the question. It’s a source of privilege. It guarantees attention, funds, allied troops on its territory, and invitations to summits. And it becomes all the more valuable as the possibility of a ceasefire in Ukraine draws nearer – a prospect feared in many Atlantic capitals as the end of the emergency that justifies everything. So the fever must be kept high: a statement every week, a ban every month, a threat of a blockade every fall.

In 1955, Leonard Wibberley published a satirical novel, *The Mouse That Roared*, in which the tiny Grand Duchy of Fenwick declared war on the United States with the sole purpose of losing it and collecting reconstruction aid. The difference with Tallinn lies in the ending. The Grand Duchy counted on losing to a generous power, an ocean away. Estonia is threatening a neighboring power – one that has forgotten nothing since 1991 – and is entrusting its fate to a coalition that has never fought a real war together against an opponent of equal strength.

From apotheosis to casus belli?

Let’s recap. A country with a population of 1.3 million announces that it can strangle the commercial lifeline of the world’s leading nuclear power in a matter of hours. To do so, it relies on soldiers it doesn’t have – lent by allies it hasn’t consulted – based on oil figures that Western sources themselves downplay. It ties all of this to a war that its rhetoric makes a little more likely every day, and in the same breath accuses those who see NATO as something offensive of absurdity. If there is such a thing as the apotheosis of the absurd, it can be found at the Foreign Ministry in Tallinn.

Moscow, to tell the truth, doesn’t even need to respond. Geography does it, the balance of power does it, and the history of European coalitions – which have always found it easier to make promises than to keep them – does it. Deterrence that turns into permanent provocation ceases to dissuade and begins to seek its own casus belli. The Baltic Sea deserves mature diplomacy among the coastal states that will have to share it anyway. For now, it must settle for – a minister who roars – and an audience of allies who, at the first real blow, will look around wondering who should answer the phone.

'Variety of operational scenarios' simulated by forces, marking 'significant leap forward in naval military cooperation'; both countries oppose Ankara's growing regional influence

MOSCOW, Oct 23 (Reuters) – Latvia, a member of the European Union and NATO, has emerged as one of the top five countries used to ship Russian grain this marketing season despite strained political...

A series of drone attacks on commercial shipping near Romania and Bulgaria has left sailors dead or missing, bringing Russia’s war against Ukraine closer to NATO territory. The European Parliament is calling for an EU naval mission, while Romania has begun shooting down hostile drones and NATO is preparing additional defensive measures.

The European Parliament has called for the possible deployment of an EU naval operation in the Black Sea following a series of deadly attacks on civilian merchant vessels near the Romanian and Bulgarian coasts. The resolution, adopted on 22 October 2026 by 432 votes to 52, with 88 abstentions, reflects mounting concern over the expansion of maritime threats towards NATO’s south-eastern flank.

The parliamentary resolution urges EU member states to consider establishing a naval mission to protect commercial shipping, while calling on NATO to examine a complementary regional initiative, provisionally described as Black Sea Sentry.

On 23 October, a drone struck the Comoros-flagged cargo vessel Khoryv, approximately 13 nautical miles from Romania’s port of Constanța. The vessel caught fire and sank, leaving one sailor confirmed dead and three missing. Nine crew members were rescued. The ship was carrying 13 Ukrainian and Azerbaijani sailors. According to information attributed to Romanian maritime authorities, difficult weather complicated rescue efforts.

Romanian President Nicușor Dan blamed Russia for the attack, which followed at least seven other strikes on commercial vessels during October. Across the incidents, approximately 30 sailors have been reported dead or missing, although the confirmed death toll is considerably lower.

Civilian Shipping Under Attack

The escalation began on 5 October when the Royad Mammadov, a Turkish-owned grain carrier sailing under the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis, sank in Romania’s exclusive economic zone. Two sailors died and eleven were rescued. The vessel had departed the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail carrying corn destined for Ravenna, Italy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy attributed the sinking to Russian drones, although Romanian authorities did not initially establish responsibility.

The following day, two merchant ships were attacked approximately 70 nautical miles east of the Bulgarian coastal town of Byala. As EU Today reported, the Togo-flagged Alfa Watan sank after sustaining severe damage, while the Palau-flagged Able caught fire. All 18 sailors aboard the latter vessel were rescued, but the crew of the Alfa Watan remained unaccounted for.

The Bulgarian authorities confirmed that both aerial and maritime drones had been involved. Further attacks followed on 13 October, when the HS Dignity sank near Shabla, leaving eleven sailors missing, while the Chelsea-3 was struck near Byala. All 15 crew members of the latter vessel were evacuated.

Two chemical tankers, the Yara J and Wine Trader, were subsequently attacked near the Sulina Canal, a strategically important route connecting the Danube with the Black Sea. The incidents exposed the vulnerability of shipping corridors connecting Ukraine with international markets.

Romania Moves Towards Active Military Defence

Romania has responded by strengthening surveillance and authorising direct military action against drones entering its airspace. On 17 October, two Romanian F-16 fighter aircraft intercepted and destroyed hostile drones over Romanian territorial waters.

According to the Romanian Ministry of National Defence, the aircraft were scrambled from Borcea Air Base after radar systems detected aerial targets approaching from the direction of Snake Island. The drones, identified as jet-powered Geran-family attack aircraft, entered Romanian airspace before being destroyed southeast and east of Sulina.

The ministry disclosed that, during the preceding week, its radar systems had detected eight separate incidents involving aerial targets near the Romanian border, including four brief incursions into national airspace. On 14 October, Spanish F-18 aircraft operating under NATO air-policing arrangements were scrambled after drones approached Romanian airspace.

Bulgaria’s More Cautious Response

Bulgaria has taken a more reserved position concerning responsibility for the attacks. Although Prime Minister Rumen Radev acknowledged their seriousness, his government maintained that investigations must establish the origin of the drones before definitive conclusions could be drawn. Sofia nevertheless strengthened maritime surveillance, deployed rescue resources and requested assistance from European and NATO partners.

In August, a drone crossed into Bulgarian airspace from Romania and exploded near infrastructure associated with the Trans-Balkan Gas Pipeline. According to the Bulgarian government’s account, the aircraft was not detected by either national radar systems or NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre in Torrejón, Spain. The European Parliament has now urged Sofia to accelerate participation in NATO’s counter-drone initiatives.

EU Proposes Maritime Security Operation

The European Parliament’s proposals include establishing an EU naval operation, improving early detection of hostile drones, accelerating the development of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub and providing additional defence funding to Romania and Bulgaria. MEPs have proposed using resources under the EU’s SAFE defence financing instrument to support regional capabilities.

The proposed hub would facilitate intelligence-sharing, maritime surveillance and protection of critical infrastructure. Romania and Bulgaria have requested EU satellite imagery to improve their awareness of maritime threats, while the European Maritime Safety Agency has offered additional support.

At their October summit, EU leaders condemned attacks on civilian shipping and called for safe passage for vessels transporting agricultural products. The European Council’s conclusions addressed Black Sea and Danube shipping routes. However, the parliamentary resolution does not authorise a naval deployment: such an operation would require agreement among EU governments on its mandate, resources and rules of engagement.

NATO Faces an Expanding Security Challenge

NATO has responded by examining additional maritime surveillance and defensive measures, including patrol aircraft, radar systems and unmanned platforms. Romania has proposed stronger regional command arrangements involving NATO’s Black Sea members.

An existing framework provides a basis for cooperation. In July, Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye agreed to expand the responsibilities of their joint mine countermeasures task group to include protection of critical underwater infrastructure. The agreement announced by Romania’s Defence Ministry extended cooperation beyond detecting and neutralising drifting mines.

Protecting commercial vessels against aerial and maritime drones would require broader capabilities. NATO must also operate within the restrictions of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which regulates passage of warships through the Turkish Straits and limits deployments by non-Black Sea countries. Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye would therefore play central roles in any sustained maritime security operation.

Black Sea Security and the Risk of Escalation

Ukraine’s maritime export corridors remain essential to agricultural shipments following repeated Russian strikes on ports and logistics infrastructure. Attacks on commercial vessels can increase insurance costs, discourage shipping companies and disrupt trade even when port facilities remain functional.

The sinking of merchant vessels near allied territory, combined with repeated drone incursions into Romanian airspace, increases the possibility of military confrontation arising from an individual incident. The legal and military circumstances differ depending on whether an attack occurs in territorial waters, an exclusive economic zone or international waters.

The European Parliament’s proposal raises questions extending beyond maritime patrols: how civilian shipping can be protected, what military responses are authorised and how responsibility for attacks will be established. The sinking of the Khoryv on 23 October illustrates how the western Black Sea has become an increasingly exposed part of Europe’s security frontier.

A Russian drone strike sank the Comoros-flagged cargo ship Khoryv in the Black Sea near Romania’s port of Constanța on 23 October, killing a Ukrainian sailor and leaving three crew members missing. Nine others were rescued, Digi24 reported.

The sinking comes amid a surge in attacks on commercial shipping near Romania and Bulgaria, threatening civilian crews and routes used to transport Ukrainian agricultural exports. As Russia intensifies strikes on Ukrainian ports and shipping, the Danube corridor and nearby waters have become increasingly important to Ukraine’s maritime trade.

Romanian President Nicușor Dan blamed Russia for the attack, describing it as part of Moscow’s escalation of the war against Ukraine and its attacks on NATO’s eastern flank, Reuters reported. 

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry confirmed to Radio Svoboda that a Ukrainian citizen was among those killed.

Ukrainian sailor killed, three crew members missing

The Khoryv sent a distress signal at around 10 a.m. local time, about 13 nautical miles (24 kilometers) east of Constanța, just outside Romania’s territorial waters, Digi24 reported. The vessel caught fire, sustained major damage, and capsized, with only a small part of its hull remaining visible above the water.

Romania’s naval authority said 13 crew members were aboard: 10 Ukrainians and three Azerbaijanis. Rescue teams recovered nine sailors alive and one body, while three crew members remained missing, Reuters reported.

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry said the vessel had been traveling from a Turkish port and confirmed that the Ukrainian Embassy in Romania had received information from Romanian authorities about one Ukrainian sailor’s death. Four Ukrainian survivors, including the captain, were taken to a hospital, while two others did not require medical assistance.

Attacks threaten Black Sea shipping

The sinking comes amid a surge in attacks on commercial vessels off the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria. At least seven cargo ships have been hit over the past two weeks, with around 30 sailors reported dead or missing, according to Reuters.

The vessels targeted in recent incidents were either anchored near or heading toward the Sulina Canal, which connects the Danube River to the Black Sea. The canal has become a key export route for Ukraine, one of the world’s largest exporters of grain and vegetable oils.

Ukraine has increasingly relied on Danube ports and routes through Romanian territorial waters as Russia attacks its own Black Sea ports. Strikes on commercial vessels threaten crews and risk disrupting Ukrainian agricultural exports to international markets.

Russia has intensified attacks on Ukrainian ports and ships traveling to or from Ukraine. Moscow has described its strikes on vessels as retaliation for Ukrainian attacks on Russian or Russia-linked ships.

NATO plans stronger Black Sea surveillance

NATO said on 20 October it would send additional maritime patrol aircraft, radar systems, and drones to the Black Sea following the attacks on commercial shipping, according to Reuters. The alliance has not specified which capabilities it will deploy.

Romania, Ukraine, and Bulgaria have called on NATO to do more to protect commercial vessels. The latest sinking adds urgency to those calls as attacks increasingly affect shipping near NATO territory.

The latest incident highlights the growing risks to commercial shipping as Russia’s war against Ukraine increasingly affects maritime traffic beyond Ukraine’s own coastline.

A ship called the Agioi Fanendes, which had just left Russia's Baltic Sea port of Primorsk, was carrying 40,000 metric tons to New York and had been traveling westwards through the Baltic Sea ever since.

German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul has warned that disruptions to global shipping routes could trigger famine in vulnerable countries, citing Russian attacks on Black Sea shipping as part of the wider threat to international food supplies.

Russia has increasingly targeted civilian shipping in the Black Sea as part of its campaign against Ukraine’s maritime trade, striking cargo vessels, port infrastructure, and ships transporting agricultural goods. The attacks threaten Ukraine’s ability to export grain to global markets, raise risks for international shipping companies, and jeopardize food supplies in countries that rely on Ukrainian agricultural exports.

Speaking ahead of a meeting of foreign ministers in Istanbul on Friday, 23 October, Wadephul said attacks and threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea were disrupting trade in food and fertilizers, DW reported. The impact extends far beyond the conflict zones, threatening countries that depend on imported wheat and agricultural inputs.

Wadephul said fertilizer shortages could threaten basic agricultural production in poorer countries, where access to imported food and farming supplies is already limited. He also pointed to Türkiye, the world’s largest wheat-processing country, as vulnerable to disruptions in the supply of grain.

Russian attacks disrupt Ukraine’s grain exports

Russia has intensified attacks on Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and civilian cargo ships, disrupting a maritime corridor that carries most of the country’s agricultural exports. In July, Russian strikes brought traffic through the corridor close to a standstill during the harvest season, leaving grain with fewer routes to international markets.

The attacks have also hit foreign-flagged vessels carrying or preparing to load Ukrainian grain. On 16 October, Euromaidan Press reported that Russian attacks had sunk merchant ships and damaged others in the Black Sea region, with seafarers missing. The campaign has increased risks for shipping companies and reduced the routes available for Ukrainian exports.

Ukraine is a major supplier of wheat and other agricultural commodities to global markets, including countries in the Middle East and Africa. Disruptions to its exports can tighten global supplies and push prices higher, adding pressure on countries that depend on imported grain.

Wadephul made the remarks ahead of a meeting of foreign ministers in Istanbul, where he said countries must send a signal that they will not accept Iran or Yemen’s Houthi militia holding global trade hostage. He called for an end to indiscriminate attacks on shipping and neighboring countries, warning that prolonged insecurity puts vulnerable populations at greater risk of hunger.

His remarks place Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian shipping within a wider pattern of threats to key maritime trade routes, with consequences for food security far beyond the regions directly affected.

Bulgarians vote on 25 October in a presidential election shaped by Russia’s war in Ukraine, attacks on Black Sea shipping and economic pressures. The contest between incumbent Iliana Yotova and reformist challenger Andrei Gyurov will also test the political authority of Prime Minister Rumen Radev.

Bulgaria will elect a president on Sunday, 25 October, in a contest that has become a test of the country’s relationship with Russia, its commitments to NATO and the European Union, and its response to deteriorating security in the Black Sea.

The Central Election Commission has registered 27 presidential and vice-presidential candidate pairs, although the contest is dominated by incumbent President Iliana Yotova and former caretaker prime minister Andrei Gyurov.

An opinion poll conducted by Market Links between 13 and 19 October placed Yotova ahead with 47.3 per cent support, compared with 30.6 per cent for Gyurov. However, low anticipated turnout makes a second round on 1 November highly likely.

Although Bulgaria’s presidency is primarily ceremonial, the office carries constitutional authority over defence, legislation and government formation. The election also comes six months after former President Rumen Radev secured a parliamentary majority and became prime minister, substantially changing the country’s political landscape.

A presidency shaped by political realignment

Yotova, 62, became Bulgaria’s first female president in January 2026 after Radev resigned to enter parliamentary politics. Previously his vice-president, she is now seeking a five-year mandate of her own.

Her candidacy is supported by Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria coalition, which won 131 seats in the 240-member National Assembly in April, as well as the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Her running mate is Kiril Valchev, director-general of the Bulgarian News Agency.

Gyurov, an economist and former deputy governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, is supported by the pro-European reformist opposition, including We Continue the Change and Democratic Bulgaria. His vice-presidential candidate is Georgi Kandev, a former senior Interior Ministry official.

A third significant contender is Kostadin Kostadinov, leader of the nationalist Revival party, whose political platform includes opposition to Western military assistance for Ukraine and closer relations with Moscow. His running mate is European Parliament member Petar Volgin.

The election follows years of political instability, during which Bulgaria held eight parliamentary elections between 2021 and April 2026. Radev’s parliamentary victory ended a prolonged period of fragmented governments, but it has also raised questions about the concentration of political influence.

A Yotova victory would place both the presidency and the parliamentary majority within the same political camp. A Gyurov victory would instead create an institutional counterweight to Radev’s government.

Russia and Bulgaria’s foreign policy divisions

Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007, but its relationship with Russia remains politically complicated.

Historical and cultural ties, including shared Orthodox traditions and the legacy of Bulgaria’s liberation from Ottoman rule, have influenced public attitudes towards Moscow. During the Cold War, Bulgaria was among the Soviet Union’s closest allies, and Russian influence continued after the collapse of communism, particularly through energy, business and political networks.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 exposed divisions over whether Sofia should provide military assistance to Kyiv or adopt a more cautious position.

Since returning to power as prime minister in May, Radev has advocated maintaining Bulgaria’s European commitments while seeking improved relations with Moscow. His government has halted military deliveries to Ukraine and taken a more restrictive approach to further sanctions against Russia.

Yotova has similarly emphasised negotiations as the means of ending the war and warned against further militarisation of the Black Sea. Her position appeals to voters concerned that escalating confrontation could expose Bulgaria to additional security and economic risks.

Gyurov represents a more explicitly Euro-Atlantic political orientation, arguing for stronger Western alignment and institutional reform.

The contest therefore concerns not whether Bulgaria will formally leave its existing alliances, which would require decisions far beyond presidential authority, but how actively it participates in their policies towards Russia.

Black Sea attacks bring the war closer

The security debate has intensified following a series of drone attacks against merchant vessels operating near Bulgarian and Romanian waters in October.

According to a maritime threat assessment published by Ambrey, three commercial ships were struck on 5–6 October within the exclusive economic zones of the two NATO members. Two sank, marking a substantial escalation in the geographic exposure of commercial shipping.

Ambrey assessed that Russian forces were highly likely responsible and that the vessels had been targeted because of their connections to Ukrainian grain exports.

The attacks have raised concerns about navigation, maritime insurance, food exports and the potential for further incidents involving NATO member states.

Bulgaria’s position on the western Black Sea coast gives these developments particular significance. Its ports, maritime infrastructure and commercial shipping depend on maintaining secure access to international sea routes.

As EU Today previously reported, the expansion of Russian attacks into areas close to NATO territory creates difficult questions for coastal governments seeking to protect commercial interests without becoming direct participants in the conflict.

For Bulgarian voters, maritime security is no longer simply an aspect of the war taking place elsewhere. It has become a question of national security, economic vulnerability and the government’s capacity to respond.

Energy prices and economic concerns

The campaign has also been influenced by inflation and higher energy costs, particularly among lower-income households and residents of rural areas.

Bulgaria’s historical dependence on Russian energy has long complicated its foreign-policy choices. Although the country has pursued diversification, fluctuations in international energy markets continue to affect domestic prices and industrial competitiveness.

Economic concerns have acquired an additional dimension following Bulgaria’s adoption of the euro on 1 January 2026, making it the euro area’s 21st member.

The transition represents a significant stage in Bulgaria’s economic integration with the European Union, but it has occurred during a period of price pressures and uncertainty over household purchasing power.

The presidency does not determine energy policy or monetary decisions. Nevertheless, candidates’ positions on Russia, European integration and economic security form part of the wider political debate.

Why a second round is likely

Under Article 93 of Bulgaria’s Constitution, a candidate must receive more than half the valid votes, with turnout exceeding 50 per cent of eligible voters, to win in the first round.

Neither requirement is expected to be easily satisfied. Turnout in the first round of the 2021 presidential election was approximately 38.6 per cent, reflecting the broader problem of electoral participation after repeated national votes.

If no candidate meets the constitutional requirements on Sunday, the two leading candidates will contest a runoff on 1 November.

Yotova enters the election with a substantial polling advantage, but Gyurov could benefit from opposition voters consolidating around his candidacy in the second round.

The result will determine more than the occupant of the presidential office. It will indicate whether Radev’s parliamentary dominance can be extended to the presidency, or whether voters prefer a political counterweight at a time when Bulgaria faces growing pressure to define its position between Moscow and its Western allies.