Recently, Kim Yo-jong, the younger sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, warned that Pyongyang could take strong retaliatory measures if Seoul continues activities it considers provocative. To casual observers, this may appear to be just another routine exchange of verbal threats between the two Koreas. However, a closer examination of the current situation suggests […]
Sonríe Carlos Alcaraz, de vuelta en Viena. Queda ya lejos aquella primera aparición de 2021, cuando empezaba a elevar el vuelo —tenía solo 18 años— y el alemán Alexander Zverev tuvo que tirar de oficio para reducirlo en las semifinales. “Cinco años pueden parecer poco tiempo, pero, al mismo tiempo, para mí ha sido un camino muy largo. Desde la primera vez que competí aquí hasta hoy he conseguido grandes cosas, aunque sigo sintiéndome el mismo chico de entonces, con la misma ambición y los mismos sueños. Continúo disfrutando”, dice después de batir a Karen Khachanov en el retorno: 6-4 y 7-6(5), tras 2h 04m. Chocará el jueves con Nikoloz Basilashvili o Jurij Rodionov, por decidir.
Al estreno de Alcaraz se unió, en paralelo, el de Rafa Jódar en el torneo de Basilea (también ATP 500). El madrileño, de 20 años, resolvió sin dudas frente a Alejandro Tabilo, al que derrotó por 6-4 y 6-2 (en 1h 25m). Se enfrentará el jueves al monegasco Valentin Vacherot (27 años y 31º del mundo).
En la línea exhibida recientemente en Shanghái, el español firmó una actuación seria y desbordó de nuevo al chileno, a quien ya había derrotado dos veces en verano (Washington y Cincinnati) y al que domina por 3-1 en los cruces.
Jódar encaró el pulso con determinación y supo resolver con aplomo los instantes de mayor tensión; de hecho, anuló las seis opciones de rotura que se costeó su adversario.
La victoria —56ª en los 74 partidos que ha disputado este año— supone otro paso adelante en su objetivo de acceder a la Copa de Maestros —hoy día entra en el corte— y también al top-10. Es noveno en la race (carrera anual) y undécimo en el ranking.
No obstante, en este último caso es noveno de forma virtual, con una renta de 79 puntos sobre Alex De Miñaur y 119 sobre Novak Djokovic. Se jugará con ambos una plaza en Turín; ahora mismo los supera, con una ventaja de 279 puntos sobre el primero y 344 sobre el segundo.
De Miñaur competirá durante estos días en Viena, mientras que Nole lo hará en Basilea. El serbio conquistó el título de Pekín el 6 de octubre y cedió a la primera en Shanghái. Ha expresado su deseo de clasificarse una vez más para el encuentro maestro.
Por otra parte, el suizo Stan Wawrinka se despidió del tenis al caer ante Jiri Lehecka (7-5 y 7-6(2). Se va con 41 años, tras haber ganado tres grandes (Australia 2014, Roland Garros 2015 y US Open 2016) y haber sido número tres. También posee el oro olímpico en dobles (2008) y la Copa Davis (2014).
O atacante João Pedro, do Chelsea, deve ficar afastado dos gramados por algumas semanas após sofrer uma lesão na coxa durante um treino, informou o técnico Xabi Alonso nesta terça-feira (27), antes do confronto da equipe contra o Liverpool pela Copa da Liga.
O brasileiro de 25 anos ficou de fora da derrota de sábado para o Tottenham Hotspur após se lesionar durante um treino na sexta-feira.
“Ele sofreu uma lesão na coxa e ficará fora por algumas semanas”, disse Alonso aos repórteres. “Vamos ver quantas; não queremos fazer previsões, mas ele não estará pronto para os próximos jogos.”
João Pedro teve um início de temporada brilhante, marcando cinco gols e dando três assistências em sete partidas em todas as competições.
Alonso reconheceu a perda do jogador da seleção brasileira, mas afirmou que o Chelsea tem elenco suficiente para lidar com sua ausência.
O Chelsea enfrentará o Liverpool na quarta-feira pelas oitavas de final da Copa da Liga e receberá o Manchester United pelo campeonato no sábado.
The messages from the world’s biggest supertanker owner often begin with pleasantries: “Dear Ladies and Gentlemen.”
Within minutes, the WhatsApps are the talk of the oil-tanker industry, a multibillion-dollar corner of the energy market that’s been plunged into chaos by the Iran war this year, and where word of mouth is the main way information spreads.
No single Argentine capability shaped British planning during the 1982 South Atlantic conflict more than the pairing of the Dassault Super Étendard strike fighter and its deadly AM39 Exocet anti-ship missile. Against that threat, the British launched a series of special forces operations, all with the same objective: kill the Argentine pilots and destroy their aircraft and missiles before they could be used again. Together, the strike fighter and missile pairing had proven to be the biggest threat to the Royal Navy task force that had been sent to recapture the islands.
Two Super Étendards of the Argentine Navy in flight around the time of the Falklands War in 1982. Photo by UPI/Bettmann Archive/Getty Images
Five Super Étendard aircraft and five AM39 Exocet missiles had been delivered to Argentina before a French embargo took hold. The jets were flown by the Argentine Navy’s 2nd Naval Fighter and Attack Squadron out of Río Grande, on Tierra del Fuego, a region at South America’s southernmost tip, shared by Chile and Argentina. The Super Étendard/Exocet combination had already cost the British the destroyer HMS Sheffield on May 4 and the container ship Atlantic Conveyor on May 25.
A casualty from HMS Sheffield being rushed to the sick bay on board the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes. Crown Copyright
The special forces operations were broken down into four phases — named PLUM DUFF, MIKADO, KETTLEDRUM, and IMPI — the last of which is the least well-documented, and the focus of this article.
PLUM DUFF was the insertion phase and was a reconnaissance mission. On May 16, an RAF Hercules airdropped eight special forces troops onto RFA Fort Austin to form a recce party. On the night of May 17/18, a Sea King HC4, ZA290, lifted off from the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible for a one-way flight to Tierra del Fuego, where the men were to observe Río Grande and report back. The patrol was set down far from the objective and never completed the reconnaissance; the helicopter crew flew on into Chile, where the aircraft was deliberately burnt to try and hide the evidence, while they tried to evade capture.
Commandos being lifted from the decks of HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible to be transferred by Sea King helicopters to other ships while the two aircraft carriers forge ahead to the Falkland Islands from Ascension Island, leaving the marines ready to move at short notice. Photo by Fox Photos/Getty Images
MIKADO was the planned attack phase, and it depended on that missing intelligence. Two Hercules were to air-land up to 70 men of B Squadron, 22 Special Air Service (SAS), directly on Río Grande — the air operation order of May 19 also named Río Gallegos, further up the Argentine coast, as an alternative. The men would destroy the Super Étendards and their Exocets on the ground, kill the pilots, and then withdraw overland into Chile. Commander Task Force 317, at Northwood, accepted from the outset that the mission could well cost both Hercules.
Lieutenant Juan José “Tierno” Rodríguez Mariani in Super Étendard 3-A-203, preparing to take off from Río Grande on May 23, 1982; note the ground power unit still connected. Armada Argentina
The aircrew did not refuse the task, but they were blunt about what it demanded: formation landing by two heavy transports on a possibly heavily defended, icy military runway, with a probable 20-knot tailwind, at night and on passive night-vision goggles in minimum light levels, with intelligence that was inadequate to support any air-land option at all. The RAF planning team recommended an airdrop as the better way to maintain a covert posture, and the Senior Air Staff Officer at Headquarters 38 Group warned the Air Commander to watch for overambitious schemes coming out of the SAS.
The U.K. Ministry of Defense formally cancelled MIKADO on June 4.
KETTLEDRUM was planned as the third of the set. It was aimed at Puerto Deseado, Santa Cruz Province of Argentina, and would have inserted a Special Boat Service party (SBS, the Royal Marines’ special forces unit) from the submarine HMS Onyx — a boat that will reappear before the end of this story.
None of the three was executed as planned.
The Oberon class submarine HMS Onyx on the surface off Ascension Island. HMS Onyx was the only diesel-electric British submarine to serve in the conflict, and its ability to operate silently close inshore enabled it to play an important role. At Ascension Island, Onyx boarded SAS and SBS special forces personnel and supported them during a series of operations. Imperial War Museums via Getty Images
Less well-known is that the cancellation of MIKADO produced a fourth project: Operation IMPI, named after a Zulu fighting force.
Cancelling MIKADO did not mean the wider operation was over. Also on June 4, the U.K. Ministry of Defense tasked CTF 317 to produce a new plan for special forces to destroy the combat effectiveness of the Super Étendards.
CTF 317’s staff went to work on what became IMPI. The planning document, Ops 1/3, is dated June 14 — the day of the Argentine surrender in the islands. In broad terms, the objective was to be attacked by special forces arriving both by air and by sea.
That much has been known, in fragments.
Teniente de Naviro (Lieutenant Commander) Alfredo Astiz signing the Instrument of Surrender on behalf of his Argentine forces at Leith, on the island of South Georgia, on board HMS Plymouth. Crown Copyright
What has not been published until now is the fact that the operation had already been resourced.
At 2240Z on June 12, Maj. Gen. Jeremy Moore, commanding the land forces as CTG 317.1, signalled Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward’s battle group (CTG 317.8), with Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse at Northwood (CTF 317) and Commodore Michael Clapp’s amphibious group (CTG 317.0) as information addressees. The message called for B Squadron, 22 SAS, to be made available for operations as soon as possible: cover was needed against rapid developments of an unfavorable nature in West Falkland (Gran Malvina), and the theatre’s existing special forces assets were fully absorbed supporting the battle for Stanley — and IMPI. Operation IMPI, Moore noted in passing, was by then self-sufficient.
Maj. Gen. Sir Jeremy Moore Mc, Commander, Land Forces Falkland Islands Conflict. Photo by Avalon/Getty Images
Examining two lines of routine signal traffic settles several things at once. Forty-eight hours before the surrender, IMPI was not a staff study but an operation that had been resourced, and that was enough to consume the theatre’s special forces and justify calling a fresh SAS squadron forward. It is also the only contemporary, operational-level reference to IMPI released so far: everything else comes from a narrative written years afterwards.
As that later narrative describes it, the concept behind IMPI was much leaner than MIKADO. Against two Hercules and 70 men, the air element of IMPI rested on a single RAF Hercules.
Overflying Stanley Airfield in November 1983, with two RAF Hercules aircraft present. Getty Images
The aircraft was to fly from Ascension Island, refuel in flight, and then track east of the Falkland Islands and south of Cape Horn before making a low-level approach below Argentine radar cover for a night landing of special forces at the airfields codenamed San Jose and Arco Iris. Other special forces would have been inserted by sea. That air element, as will be seen, is the most questionable part of the entire file.
The routing is worth attention, because it rules out the intuitive picture of a direct run south from Ascension. Instead, the aircraft would have entered from the least-covered and least-expected direction, coming around the bottom of the continent rather than from the northeast.
A schematic map of the planned Operation IMPI. via author
The precise identities of San Jose and Arco Iris are not established in the declassified record.
The most likely reading is that they stand for Río Grande and Río Gallegos — the airfields at which the planned navigation ended, and the two named in MIKADO’s air operation order a month earlier. For a document circulating through restricted channels, encrypting the names of the two targets was an elementary precaution, although it should be noted that an operational order would more commonly have designated them simply as Target One and Target Two.
None of this rules out Chilean participation in other phases of the operation; if anything, it suggests it’s more likely. The narrative survives inside a folder classified Top Secret and restricted to the Chief of the Air Staff, whose declared subject is cooperation with Chile. That setting contrasts with the earlier stage of the planning, when mounting and recovering a special forces insertion from a Chilean airfield was considered and expressly discounted on political grounds — much as the use of an Antarctic strip was discounted after the New Zealand High Commission advised that the Antarctic winter precluded safe trans-polar flight.
The maritime half of IMPI can be traced in the records of those who were there.
Navigational support for the final phase was to come from the nuclear attack submarine HMS Conqueror. On June 9, 1982, Conqueror was off Bahía Camarones, working as an advanced picket and hunting targets of opportunity that ventured outside the 12-nautical-mile limit of Argentine territorial waters, with authority to sink any civilian vessel judged to be running to the Falklands/Malvinas; that same morning the sub had in fact entered Argentine territorial waters trying to locate the Argentine Navy’s Task Group 79.2.
Nuclear attack submarine HMS Conqueror returning to port. via author
That day, Conqueror received preparatory information on IMPI. The sub’s task was to come to periscope depth and act as a radio beacon, giving the Hercules a radio reference against which to refine a navigation that, low and at night, allowed no error. The resulting picture is an odd one: a nuclear submarine deployed on interdiction off the Patagonian coast, turned into a navigation aid for a transport aircraft.
The insertion itself fell to HMS Onyx, the Oberon class diesel-electric boat that had already taken part in Operation KETTLEDRUM and the only conventional submarine Britain deployed to the South Atlantic. On June 14, at 0815Z, lying in San Carlos Water, Onyx embarked a party of 10 men from B Squadron, 22 SAS and the SBS for the mission. The timing matches Moore’s signal of two days earlier almost exactly.
The plan called for the submarine to surface some two nautical miles offshore at night. The troops would close the beach in Gemini inflatables and destroy the objective — aircraft and missiles, if any were there — using anti-tank weapons and demolition charges.
What happened next illustrates the inertia of military machinery. The Argentine surrender in the islands came on that same June 14, hours after the party had gone aboard Onyx. Even so, preparations did not stop at once: on June 15 the embarked troops carried out practice landings from a Gemini. That does not mean IMPI was ever executed — it was not — but it does show that with the strategic outcome already settled, the machine was still rehearsing.
HMS Onyx operating with special forces. via author
The British record closes the matter with administrative dryness: the surrender of the Argentine forces in the Falkland Islands and the cessation of hostile activity by Argentine aircraft resulted in the operation being cancelled.
The air part of the mission is another matter entirely and is where IMPI becomes more uncertain.
The only link between IMPI and an aircraft is a single paragraph in an RAF historical narrative. The folder that holds it was opened on April 18, 1986 — four years after the war — as an eyes-only briefing file for the Chief of the Air Staff, and the pages appear to be a working draft rather than a finished submission, carrying pencil amendments throughout.
Had a Hercules been earmarked, there is no doubt which unit would have provided it. The Special Forces Flight that runs through the whole chapter — five crews, commanded by a squadron leader, exercising regularly with SAS and SBS Sections — appears with its squadron number blanked out, yet the number surfaces a few paragraphs later, where two of its crews are described training on the probe-fitted Hercules C1P. The unit was No. 47 Squadron, RAF, home-based at Lyneham, and it would keep the special forces air support role for decades afterward.
The men who were at Ascension with that detachment, however, say they had nothing to do with it. Reliable sources with direct knowledge of the flight’s activity state that they never saw the codeword at the time, had never heard of the operation until this file surfaced, and consider it inconceivable that a special forces Hercules and crew could have been earmarked for a mission of this kind without the flight — a community of five crews that has stayed in touch ever since — learning of it at some point in the intervening four decades. By June 14, at most one aerial-refueling-qualified special forces crew was at Wideawake.
That skepticism is reinforced by the way the same narrative handles events those crews lived through. Its account of their own work-up does not survive contact with their logbooks.
For example, a practice infiltration into RAF Laarbruch in Germany that the narrative describes as successful had in fact been detected; the Hercules was notionally shot down about two miles out on the approach. The ramp toes (attachable extension plates located at the very end of the rear cargo ramp) it describes as droppable at 20 to 30 knots were never meant to be lowered with the aircraft moving, which would have been unsafe and risked the airframe. There are other anomalies, too.
West Falklands seen from the ramp of an RAF Hercules. Donald Morrison/Getty Images
A document that misstates the squadron’s own exercises is thin evidence on which to place that squadron over Tierra del Fuego.
What is not in question is what the Special Forces Flight could have done, had it been asked.
By mid-May the flight had two crews qualified in air-to-air refueling — one deployed to Ascension, the other held in the United Kingdom to train the others — flying Hercules C1s fitted with probes and, where the task required it, additional fuel tanks in the fuselage. It had rehearsed stream landings and rapid offloads, parachute insertion below radar cover to a pinpoint coastal feature, as well as flying on ANVIS goggles at 250 feet over sea and land. The goggles themselves were fitted to the crews’ helmets by RAE Farnborough specialists in a single day in mid-April. The reach was demonstrated on May 16, when the sortie that dropped the PLUM DUFF party stayed airborne for 24 hours and five minutes, with Victor tankers refueling some 1,800 miles from Ascension. Almost none of it was routine: nearly everything the force did during the conflict was improvised, at speed, in a matter of weeks.
A picture taken on May 24, 1982, at Wideawake Airfield on Ascension Island, showing an RAF Victor tanker prepared for air-to-air refuelling tasks. Photo by AFP
What never had an answer — not for MIKADO, and not for whatever IMPI intended — was the other end of the problem. Putting men ashore deep inside Argentine territory was the solvable half. Getting an aircraft and its passengers out again after a direct action, from a strip in range of the Argentine Air Force, was not.
All of the above is reconstructed from lateral references: the RAF’s narrative in file AIR 20/13036 at the National Archives, unit records, submarine logs, operational signal traffic, and the accounts of participants.
The specific file — the one holding the complete plan with its annexes, the identification of the airfields and the execution sequence — remains closed. It is DEFE 71/980, titled Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): Operation IMPI, retained at the National Archives at Kew with no announced opening date. Until it is released, the air element of IMPI cannot be settled either way.
Forty-four years after the conflict, the last British special operation of the war is still, in essence, a document the British state is not prepared to show. That is not a trivial detail: the files touching on cooperation with Chile have consistently been the most reluctantly opened of all.
The folder holding the outline plan for Operation IMPI. National Archives
What remains is an operation of two halves. One of them is solid: a resourced plan, declared self-sufficient on June 12, with a nuclear submarine briefed to act as a beacon, 10 men of the SAS and the SBS embarked in a conventional submarine in San Carlos on the morning of the surrender, and rehearsals continuing the following day. The other half — a lone Hercules coming round Cape Horn to land on a codenamed strip — rests on one paragraph of a flawed staff narrative and is rejected by the only men who could have flown it.
Either way, the obsession is the same.
Between June 4 and June 14, 1982, while the final battle for Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino was being fought and the Argentine land campaign was collapsing, part of the British planning effort was still revolving around five French-built aircraft, their 10 aircrew, and their missiles. That the plan carries the date of the surrender itself, that it was still being rehearsed the following day, and that it remains classified today says a good deal about how far the British were prepared to go to destroy the Super Étendards and their Exocets.
Contact the editor: thomas@thewarzone.com
Mariano Sciaroni holds a master’s degree in Strategy and Geopolitics as well as a postgraduate diploma in Contemporary Military History, both earned at the Argentine Army’s Military Academy. Sciaroni has published five books and numerous articles on military and naval history. He is also an active member of the Argentine Institute of Military History and serves as a sub-lieutenant in the Argentine Army Reserve (Army Aviation Reserve Squadron). You can find out more about his books here.
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Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority said it would take “legal action” against tankers belonging to Sinokor, the world’s biggest oil tanker owner that has carried millions of barrels out of the Strait of Hormuz in recent weeks.
emen's Iran-aligned Houthis said on Tuesday they had hit Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura oil refinery, the ?biggest in the kingdom, with a ballistic missile.
O mercado brasileiro de biocombustíveis registra forte valorização na reta final de outubro.
De acordo com levantamentos do Cepea (Centro de Estudos Avançados em Economia Aplicada), os preços do etanol, tanto o hidratado quanto o anidro, acumulam alta nas principais regiões produtoras, impulsionados pela combinação de oferta restrita devido ao clima e demanda aquecida pelas distribuidoras.
Dentro das usinas o etanol anidro registrou a cotação mínima, de R$ 2,30, em 7 de agosto. Na última semana o preço estava cotado em R$ 3,39, o que representa uma alta de 47,39% no período.
Já o etanol hidratado a menor cotação foi registrada em 31 de julho: R$ 2,04. E na última semana, em 23 de outubro, passou para R$ 2,74. Acumulando alta de 33,94% em 3 meses.
A retração na moagem e na oferta estão entre os principais motivos. As chuvas, acima da média histórica para o período, tem dificultado o avanço das frentes de colheita e a operação das usinas.
Além disso o relatório do Cepea reforça que o excesso de umidade dificulta a logística de colheita e também compromete o acúmulo de sacarose, reduzindo o teor de ATR (Açúcar Total Recuperável) e a qualidade geral da matéria-prima destinada à industrialização.
No caso específico do etanol anidro, que é usado na mistura com a gasolina, a queda na qualidade da matéria-prima e os gargalos na produção tem gerado apreensão entre os agentes do setor quanto ao cumprimento de entrega dos volumes estabelecidos em contratos de obrigatoriedade, diz os pesquisadores do Cepea.
Já no caso do etanol hidratado, vendido diretamente nas bombas, a demanda crescente deve fazer com que o volume comercializado pelas usinas paulistas seja recorde neste ciclo. A parcial de outubro já supera o montante registrado em setembro e a expectativa é de que o mês com 350 milhões de litros comercializados, a maior marca da safra 2026/2027.
Com a possibilidade de uma oferta mais restrita nos próximos meses, devido ao ritmo lento da moagem, muitos distribuidores tem antecipado as compras para garantir estoques de segurança e atender a procura do mercado consumidor já que a paridade dos preços, entre a gasolina e o etanol, permanece atrativa para os motoristas estimulando o consumo do biocombustível.
Secondo la Commissione, i piani nazionali dovranno coprire i diversi settori dell’economia e il monitoraggio sarà collegato anche al Semestre europeo, per trattare il problema come una questione di resilienza economica e non solo ambientale. Il quadro prevede un’iniziativa legislativa e una comunicazione non vincolante. Il piano adottato non introduce nuove risorse finanziarie, dal momento che nel quadro finanziario pluriennale 2028-2034 Bruxelles ha proposto un obiettivo di spesa del 35% per il clima e la biodiversità naturale, che include anche la preparazione ai cambiamenti climatici.
Il quadro fissa una traiettoria comune di riferimento basata sulla base delle evidenze scientifiche del gruppo intergovernativo sul cambiamento climatico che considera un aumento di 2°C di riscaldamento entro il 2050 e +3°C entro il 2100. Non si tratta di un obiettivo politico, ma uno scenario di riferimento comune sulla base del quale gli Stati membri possono valutare i futuri rischi climatici al momento di prendere decisioni. Per sostenere le autorità pubbliche ad affrontare i rischi climatici, la Commissione europea lancerà una piattaforma online europea per la resilienza climatica che includerà una serie di strumenti, tra cui l’European Climate Viewer, sviluppato dal Centro europeo per le previsioni meteorologiche a medio termine, che fornirà una mappa interattiva dei rischi climatici previsti in tutto il continente. E il Navigator of Climate Resilience Tools, sviluppato dall’Agenzia europea dell’ambiente per aiutare gli utenti a individuare strumenti di resilienza climatica pertinenti in base alla loro ubicazione, al settore di appartenenza e ai rischi specifici che devono affrontare.
Bruxelles conferma che nei prossimi mesi lancerà un piano europeo contro le ondate di calore, un’alleanza per l’assicurazione contro i rischi climatici e un’iniziativa europea per l’acqua. Avvierà inoltre un gruppo consultivo PreparEU sulla preparazione alle catastrofi e un’iniziativa per individuare 100 territori europei più vulnerabili ai cambiamenti climatici. “L’Europa si sta riscaldando a un ritmo doppio rispetto a quello globale. Per diventare veramente resilienti al clima, dobbiamo adattarci e imparare lungo il percorso”, sottolinea la presidente della Commissione europea, Ursula von der Leyen. “Si stima che l’adattamento delle infrastrutture, dell’ambiente costruito, degli ecosistemi e dell’economia dell’Europa alle future condizioni climatiche richiederà investimenti pari a circa 70 miliardi di euro all’anno”, ha spiegato la Commissione europea
Le perdite economiche stimate, dovute ai danni causati dal clima nel periodo 2022-2025, ammontano a circa 200 miliardi di euro, ovvero 50 miliardi di euro all’anno, “in aumento rispetto agli 8,6 miliardi di euro del periodo 1980-1989”. Si legge nei documenti del nuovo quadro. “Le ondate di calore previste in Europa per il 2026 potrebbero comportare un costo annuo in termini di produzione pari a 113miliardi di euro in 30paesi, un onere economico sostanziale derivante da un unico fenomeno climatico”, si legge ancora. L’agricoltura viene indicata tra i settori che registrano le perdite più consistenti legate al clima. La perdita media annua nell’Ue è stimata a circa 28,3 miliardi di euro, con solo il 20-30% di tali perdite assicurato. La siccità è la principale causa delle perdite in questo settore: “Ad esempio, nel 2026 le perdite potrebbero raggiungere i 90miliardi di euro”.
“L’estate scorsa sarà anche stata una delle più calde o la più calda mai registrata, ma con ogni probabilità sarà la più fresca degli anni a venire. E qualunque cosa facciamo, la situazione probabilmente peggiorerà”. È l’avvertimento lanciato dal commissario Ue al clima, Wopke Hoekstra, in conferenza stampa. “La buona notizia è che abbiamo un certo margine di manovra: le scelte che facciamo oggi possono effettivamente rendere meno gravi tali impatti. Quindi occorre fare di più a tutti i livelli: locale, regionale, nazionale, ma naturalmente anche a livello europeo. Per aiutare a proteggere, pianificare e prepararci a un’Europa più calda”, conclude.
Russia is expanding drone storage at the Hvardiiske military airfield in occupied Crimea, Ukrainian OSINT channel Dnipro Osint reported on 26 October, citing new satellite images. The channel did not say who took the images or when. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) said it struck drone hangars at the same airfield in July, and the military said strikes on 13 October damaged four drone storage sites nearby.
Hvardiiske has stayed in use since then. Ukraine’s General Staff has listed it among the sites Russia launched attack drones from in every daily report since 7 October. The airfield was on the list again on 24, 25, and 27 October, the night Russia aimed its main strike at Kyiv. The new construction, as the channel describes it, adds protected storage at a base Ukraine has already shown it can reach.
Shelters and “garages”
The images show more than 20 small shelters under construction, each protected by earth berms, the channel said. It also counted about 40 smaller structures it calls “garages.” It said they are meant for storing, servicing, and preparing Geran drones for launch.
Geran is the name Russia gives the Iranian-designed Shahed drones: the Shahed-136 became the Geran-2, which Russia now builds itself. The images show at least one hangar damaged by a Ukrainian drone hit, Dnipro Osint noted.
Launched from vehicles
Hvardiiske, north of Simferopol, uses mobile launch platforms instead of fixed installations, according to Dnipro Osint. Crews load drones onto specially equipped vehicles, which then launch them from the runway.
Struck repeatedly since June
On 24 June, the SBU said it hit infrastructure at Hvardiiske and at the Saky airbase. On 3 July, the SBU reported that its drones struck two hangars at Hvardiiske that stored Shaheds and aviation equipment. Ukraine’s General Staff said its forces struck the airfield again overnight on 5 July, and the SBU said a day later that it hit three hangars with aviation equipment there. A strike on 3 August destroyed nine aviation-fuel tanks and damaged two aircraft hangars, the General Staff said. Strikes on 13 October damaged four drone storage sites near Hvardiiske, with signs of secondary detonation, it reported two days later.
Not the only base Russia is building up
Hvardiiske is not the only Russian drone base Ukrainian OSINT channels have flagged this month. On 13 October, the anonymous channel Absolutely Reliable Source said Russia had nearly finished the first section of a launch site for jet-powered Geran-5 drones near Millerovo in Rostov Oblast, with eight launcher positions and 32 drone-preparation spots. Hvardiiske and Millerovo were both among the launch areas the General Staff listed for the night of 27 October, when Russia launched 280 Shahed-type drones, 69 of them jet-powered, with Kyiv as the main target.
A dispute over maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean has entered a new phase after the European Union joined Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in formally rejecting an agreement between Turkey and Libya.
The six parties issued a joint declaration at the United Nations on 26 October, following the decision by Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives to approve a maritime delimitation memorandum originally signed with Ankara in 2019.
The declaration, delivered by Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis, argued that the agreement disregards the maritime rights of other coastal states and cannot establish boundaries affecting countries that are not parties to it.
Turkey has rejected the criticism, maintaining that its agreement with Libya complies with international law and protects the legitimate interests of both countries.
The competing positions concern more than the interpretation of a maritime boundary. They affect offshore energy exploration, relations between Turkey and its neighbours, and the political balance within Libya itself.
Why Libya’s decision changes the dispute
The original memorandum was signed in November 2019 between Turkey and Libya’s then internationally recognised Government of National Accord, based in Tripoli.
It established a claimed maritime boundary extending across part of the Eastern Mediterranean, where Greece maintains that the maritime entitlements of its islands, including Crete, must be taken into account.
The agreement was opposed by Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, while Libya’s rival eastern authorities initially rejected it.
That division appeared to weaken the political foundations of the arrangement, even though Ankara continued to defend its validity.
However, on 20 October 2026, Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives reversed its previous opposition and approved the memorandum.
The decision reflects changes in relations between Turkey and eastern Libya, where military commander Khalifa Haftar has exercised considerable influence.
Turkey has expanded contacts with authorities in Benghazi despite having previously been associated primarily with the rival administration in Tripoli.
Approval by the eastern parliament consequently gives the agreement broader political acceptance within Libya than it enjoyed in 2019, although it does not resolve the country’s institutional divisions or the objections raised by neighbouring states.
A dispute over geography and maritime rights
The central disagreement concerns the legal principles used to determine maritime boundaries.
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states possess rights within exclusive economic zones, while the delimitation of overlapping claims is intended to produce an equitable solution.
Greece argues that Turkey and Libya cannot establish the maritime boundary claimed in their memorandum without disregarding the legal entitlements of Greek islands situated between their coastlines.
The Greek Foreign Ministry’s response maintains that geography and the law of the sea cannot be changed through parliamentary approval of a bilateral agreement.
Turkey takes a different position on the weight that islands should carry when continental shelves and maritime jurisdictions are delimited, and is not itself a party to UNCLOS.
The dispute therefore involves competing interpretations of international maritime law as well as disagreements over the boundaries shown on maps.
The European Union has aligned itself with Greece and Cyprus.
In a statement issued on 21 October, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas described the memorandum as incompatible with the law of the sea and incapable of producing legal consequences for third states.
The latest declaration extends that position into a broader diplomatic coalition involving governments from the Gulf and North Africa.
Ankara rejects the criticism
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan responded on 26 October by arguing that objections from the EU and other parties had no legitimate basis.
According to his remarks on the agreement, Turkey was not seeking an advantage at the expense of other Mediterranean countries.
Ankara’s position is that its maritime arrangements with Libya reflect the interests of two sovereign states and should not be invalidated by objections from outside parties.
This creates a diplomatic complication for the EU.
Turkey remains a NATO member and an important partner on migration, regional security and Black Sea affairs, while Greece and Cyprus are EU member states whose maritime claims Brussels supports.
The Union must therefore manage a disagreement involving a strategically important partner without retreating from its established legal position.
Energy resources and Libya’s political future
The Eastern Mediterranean contains established and potential offshore gas resources, giving maritime boundaries commercial significance.
Delimitation determines which governments may authorise exploration and exploitation in particular areas, while overlapping claims can discourage investment or provoke disputes over survey vessels and drilling operations.
Greece has already concluded maritime delimitation agreements with Italy and Egypt, including a partial agreement with Cairo in 2020 that overlaps with areas claimed under the Turkish-Libyan arrangement.
The competing agreements illustrate why the issue cannot be settled exclusively through bilateral negotiations that exclude other interested coastal states.
Libya’s internal political structure introduces another uncertainty. The country remains divided between competing institutions, and the European declaration explicitly connects maritime stability with the reunification of Libyan state authorities.
For the moment, the confrontation remains diplomatic.
The principal question is whether the parties can prevent overlapping legal claims from developing into renewed confrontations over exploration rights while maintaining channels for negotiations with Libya and Turkey.
Twenty years since the DPRK’s first nuclear test is a good occasion to recall things that seemed far from obvious at the time. To begin with, had the United States and the collective West been less inclined to view North Korea as a tyrannical regime on the verge of collapse, and had they therefore faithfully […]
La excandidata permanece detenida desde el 23 de octubre, fecha en la que fue ejecutada una orden de captura emitida por un juez a solicitud de la Fiscalía.
In Alaska si vota già, ma la certificazione dei risultati dipenderà dal vincitore. È la premessa della causa del Dipartimento della Giustizia, che chiede a un giudice federale di bloccare, a certe condizioni, la certificazione dell’elezione al Senato se il repubblicano Dan Sullivan dovesse perdere. Trump ha rivendicato l’iniziativa: «Sono stato io a dire di farlo». Non è un’ipotesi sulle sue intenzioni, è una sua dichiarazione.
Il pretesto è un omonimo sulla scheda, Daniel J. Sullivan Jr., insegnante in pensione di Petersburg, che secondo l’amministrazione potrebbe sottrarre voti al senatore e favorire la democratica Mary Peltola. La richiesta: se Sullivan perde e con i voti dell’omonimo avrebbe vinto, la certificazione va rinviata in attesa di un’«indagine» sulle intenzioni degli elettori. Come si accerti, a voto concluso, che cosa pensasse chi ha votato in segreto, la causa non lo spiega.
Il problema è già stato affrontato da chi ne ha la competenza: lo Stato e i suoi tribunali. Il procuratore generale Todd Blanche sostiene che il dipartimento non voglia impedire né il voto né la certificazione, ma solo conservare le schede per eventuali verifiche. Lisa Murkowski, senatrice per l’Alaska, che pure sostiene Sullivan, ha scritto che il dipartimento «non avrebbe mai dovuto presentare questa causa». Nessuna elezione è stata annullata, ma l’esecutivo cerca di ostacolare la proclamazione di un risultato che non gli piace. E fin qui…
Andiamo avanti. Il «Trump dividend» promette cinquemila dollari a ogni adulto americano, se i repubblicani manterranno Camera e Senato. Trump dice di non vedere l’ora di «firmare quegli assegni», ma il conto sarebbe dello Stato: circa 1.200 miliardi di dollari secondo Reuters, e serve il Congresso. È un ricatto collettivo: se volete il dividendo, votate per i miei. Noi la chiameremmo «tangente politica». Sul piano giuridico è la faccenda discutibile, perché il beneficio andrebbe anche a chi vota democratico o non vota. Sul piano politico, però, racconta una Repubblica in cui il presidente mette la mano nel portafoglio dei cittadini.
Più brutale il messaggio ai veterani, alle famiglie e ai civili avvelenati dall’acqua di Camp Lejeune, che dal 2022 hanno presentato oltre 550mila richieste di risarcimento. Trump promette di chiudere presto quelle «legittime» se i repubblicani conserveranno il Congresso: «Se non vinciamo, non ci sono soldi». Ma i risarcimenti sono previsti da una legge bipartisan del 2022 e pagati con fondi già stanziati. Un diritto presentato come premio per la vittoria di un partito.
In Kansas la logica è la stessa. Trump ha già concesso la deroga per la benzina E15 tutto l’anno, ma lega la promessa di renderla permanente alla rielezione del senatore Roger Marshall: «Se vince Adam Hamilton, non lo faccio. Lo faccio solo per lui». Una scelta energetica diventa premio per chi vota repubblicano e punizione per un intero Stato se vota democratico.
Resta il denaro privato. Secondo Judd Legum, il No Going Back Pac (comitato per la raccolta dei fondi elettorali) costola del super Pac Maga Inc., ha speso circa 2,4 milioni di dollari per uno spot contro la democratica Kathy Castor, accusata di aver acquistato in passato azioni di Blackstone. Quanto? Meno di quindicimila dollari. Teniamo presente che fra i maggiori finanziatori di Maga Inc. c’è Stephen Schwarzman, cofondatore e amministratore delegato di Blackstone, con dieci milioni. Trump stesso ha posseduto azioni della società per 1,35-2,93 milioni.
Gli episodi hanno solidità diversa ma vanno nella stessa direzione: risorse pubbliche presentate come favori, decisioni amministrative usate per premiare e punire, apparati dello Stato chiamati a proteggere il potere, fedeltà personale come misura del merito.
Una democrazia si fonda su due pilastri: chi governa può perdere il potere, e chi vota contro il governo mantiene gli stessi diritti di chi lo sostiene. L’Alaska mette alla prova il primo, Camp Lejeune e il Kansas il secondo. Lo stato di diritto inizia dove finisce la pretesa del potere di decidere per chi le leggi debbano valere. Negli Stati Uniti non è più così sicuro.
Il prezzo del gas ha toccato un nuovo picco. L’indice TTF di Amsterdam ha raggiunto quota 97,29 euro al megawattora, una quota che non si registrava dal 2022. Il Brent invece ha registrato un calo dell’1,2%, chiudendo a 115 dollari al barile, mentre il WTI ha fatto segnare una discesa del -1,85% attestandosi a 101,36 dollari al barile.
Il dato in crescita, quello del gas, si scontra quindi con diverse realtà: l’incertezza geopolitica, la ricomposizione delle scorte e la vicinanza con l’inverno. Non aiuta la situazione dei trasporti attraverso Hormuz, dove ora passa verso l’Europa e l’Asia un terzo del metano esportato a Occidente e Oriente rispetto ai volumi precedenti all’inizio del conflitto.
Gas come nel 2022: 97,29 euro al megawattora
Lunedì 26 ottobre, il prezzo del gas all’indice TTF di Amsterdam ha raggiunto quota 97,29 euro al megawattora. Non succedeva dal 2022, dallo scoppio della crisi tra Russia e Ucraina. In serata il prezzo è poi sceso a 95,81 euro al megawattora, comunque un aumento del 2,13% rispetto al giorno precedente e quindi ancora un valore piuttosto elevato. Il superamento dei 100 dollari al megawattora potrebbe essere solo una questione di ore o giorni.
Gli analisti si domandano cosa c’è dietro l’attuale crescita delle quotazioni del gas e le motivazioni sono ormai sempre le stesse, anche se con alcune nuove incertezze. Da una parte i ritardi nella ricomposizione delle scorte, il fatto che si sta avvicinando effettivamente l’inverno e poi ci sono le motivazioni di natura geopolitica, come le incertezze rispetto a nuovi possibili attacchi sull’Iran da parte degli Stati Uniti.
Lo Stretto di Hormuz infatti continua a rappresentare una strettoia fisica e artificiale al passaggio di gas e petrolio verso l’Europa e l’Asia. Ma anche il Qatar, uno dei massimi venditori al mondo di Gnl, con la riduzione della produzione, sta aumentando le importazioni di gas naturale liquido statunitense.
Quanto costa il Gnl Usa: +12 miliardi
Dalla guerra tra Russia e Ucraina, l’Europa ha iniziato a importare Gnl americano. Un prodotto più costoso rispetto al gas russo e che già gravava sul bilancio. Ora con la crisi in Medio Oriente, la pressione per stoccare il gas è ancora più alta.
Considerando solo gli acquisti di gas naturale liquefatto, soprattutto americano, il rincaro nelle bollette europee è di circa 12 miliardi di euro. Miliardi in più, nonostante una domanda inferiore di ben 24 milioni di tonnellate acquistate.
Perché paghiamo così tanto? Il motivo è legato alla forte esposizione al mercato spot, dove i prezzi fluttuano ogni giorno. Come spiega l’analisi del Messaggero, per comprare più Gnl dagli Stati Uniti l’Europa paga da otto mesi i prezzi del giorno segnati dal TTF europeo, quello che ha raggiunto quota 97 euro al megawattora, mentre negli Stati Uniti si paga l’equivalente di 8 euro al megawattora. Dall’inizio della guerra il gas europeo è più che triplicato (+200% nell’ultimo anno).
L’Europa è tra i continenti più esposti: compra circa il 65% del suo Gnl sul mercato spot, mentre un quarto dei suoi contratti a lungo termine sono legati agli indici dei prezzi del gas. Questo perché incompatibile con la politica green che punta alla riduzione dell’utilizzo del gas.
Il livello degli stoccaggi
La situazione però è sotto controllo. Anche se i prezzi del gas naturale sono elevati, l’inverno europeo potrebbe risultare più caldo della media degli scorsi anni e questo potrebbe ridurre la necessità di acquistare ulteriore gas.
Il 29 ottobre si potrebbe parlare di misure di riduzione forzata dei consumi di gas, qualora però la situazione dovesse peggiorare. Per “peggiorare” si intendono temperature più basse rispetto alla media e che necessiterebbero di maggior riscaldamento. In quel caso l’Unione Europea potrebbe ritrovarsi ad affrontare una carenza di gas del 12-15% rispetto alla domanda. È lo scenario peggiore.
Il 25 ottobre, la Serbia ci ha fatto una bella sorpresa. La Lista Studenti ha ottenuto circa il 52-53 per cento dei voti e la maggioranza assoluta in Parlamento, con un’affluenza record vicina al settanta per cento. Aleksandar Vučić ha ammesso la sconfitta: dopo quattordici anni di potere, un ciclo si è chiuso con il voto, non con la forza. Il Paese ritrova una prospettiva democratica concreta e, con essa, una possibilità concreta di riaprire il dialogo con l’Europa.
Bruxelles ha reagito subito e con calore. Ursula von der Leyen e António Costa si sono congratulati con la Lista e hanno offerto sostegno alle riforme su stato di diritto, libertà dei media e lotta alla corruzione. La commissaria Marta Kos ha parlato di «nuovo capitolo» e di porta aperta. Non sono solo parole di circostanza: il negoziato di adesione era fermo dal 2021, con 22 capitoli aperti su 35 e due soli chiusi. Rimosso l’ostacolo politico rappresentato da Vučić, le condizioni di partenza cambiano.
Il nodo più controverso resta il rapporto con la Russia. Vučić, alleato storico di Putin, ha denunciato interferenze europee e un deep state americano anti-Trump, e ha previsto sanzioni contro Mosca entro la primavera 2027. Alcuni media russi e filo-russi hanno ripreso la narrazione, presentando la Lista come appaltatrice di interessi occidentali.
Dall’altro lato non sono mancate le critiche alla Lista, accusata di non prendere le distanze dal Cremlino. Sulla politica estera il programma è pragmatico. Secondo il Foreign Policy Forum e i testi ufficiali, la Lista mantiene la neutralità militare proclamata nel 2007; vuole «preservare il partenariato tradizionale» con Mosca, soprattutto per il coordinamento al Consiglio di Sicurezza dell’ONU sull’integrità territoriale serba, cioè il Kosovo; si oppone alle sanzioni, giudicandole controproducenti alla luce dell’esperienza serba degli anni Novanta. Allo stesso tempo riafferma l’integrità territoriale dell’Ucraina, sostiene una soluzione pacifica del conflitto e privilegia il partenariato economico con gli Stati membri UE, lasciando l’eventuale adesione a un referendum, senza chiudere porte. Il Times ha notato che in campagna ha evitato di alienarsi un’opinione pubblica storicamente simpatetica con Mosca, ma ha anche riportato le critiche di candidati come l’ex governatore della Banca centrale Dejan Šoškić all’ingerenza di Putin a favore di Vučić.
Tra i sostenitori europei degli studenti c’è Sandro Gozi, segretario generale del Partito Democratico Europeo ed eurodeputato di Renew Europe. Il PDE è stato al fianco degli studenti per tutta la durata delle proteste e ha sostenuto la candidatura del movimento al Premio Sakharov. A settembre dello scorso anno Gozi era a Belgrado, e all’Europe House ha definito i giovani serbi «la nuova generazione di democratici che rappresentano la speranza europea della Serbia». Dopo il voto ha scritto che la vittoria è «il frutto di un’intera generazione di giovani» capace di convincere cittadini di ogni età che il cambiamento era possibile, e che, dopo la sconfitta di Orbán in Ungheria, «anche Belgrado invia un chiaro messaggio all’Europa».
I media più autorevoli (Guardian, Financial Times, Reuters, BBC) hanno letto il voto come un segnale di vitalità democratica nei Balcani, paragonabile alla caduta di Viktor Orbán, mentre le cautele sul filo-russismo sono rimaste secondarie. Ed è giusto così: a essere stato mandato a casa è il putiniano Vučić, simbolo di un potere personalizzato e di una corruzione endemica, sconfitto da una mobilitazione civica senza precedenti. Le ambiguità in politica estera sono reali e riflettono vincoli strutturali (energia, opinione pubblica, Kosovo), ma non cancellano il significato democratico del risultato.
Il programma su magistratura indipendente, lotta alla corruzione, liberazione dei media pubblici e de-partitizzazione delle istituzioni coincide con i temi su cui Bruxelles insiste da anni senza risultati strutturali. Se il nuovo governo produrrà risultati misurabili, lo sblocco dei negoziati diventerà possibile. Il vero banco di prova è ora la capacità di formare un esecutivo e di tradurre le promesse in fatti.
Per questo credo che Nona Mikhelidze, ricercatrice senior presso l’Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), abbia indicato il taglio giusto: «Prima ancora che una questione di schieramenti internazionali, è una questione di principi. Ridurre tutto alla domanda “sono antirussi?” significa ignorare la questione più importante – quale modello di società e di potere vogliono affermare? Perché il punto non è stabilire se un movimento sia filorusso o antirusso. Il punto è capire da che parte stia rispetto alla libertà, alla democrazia e alla responsabilità del potere. È solo partendo da questi principi che, semmai, si può capire se sia filorusso oppure no».
Questo è un estratto di “La Linea” la newsletter de Linkiesta curata da Marco Taradash per orientarsi nel gran guazzabuglio della politica e della vita, tutte le mattine – dal lunedì al venerdì – alle sette. Più o meno. Qui per iscriversi.
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