Netanyahu sta dicendo a Trump che ora deve portare a termine l’opera di distruzione dell’Iran

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Il «Grande Progetto» volto a «mantenere [la civiltà occidentale] al vertice del mondo» (come ha affermato il Segretario di Stato statunitense Marco Rubio) richiede che gli strumenti per garantire l’obbedienza siano di due tipi: La creazione di un fervore rivoluzionario distruttivo dal basso (oggi definito «cambio di regime»); e, in secondo luogo, l’uso di ciò che Theodore Herzl, in una famosa frase, definì «il terribile potere del denaro di esercitare una pressione irresistibile sulla politica internazionale», al fine di cooptare gli strati dominanti in una rete di potere che promuovesse il «progetto» del Grande Disegno.Questo è ciò che stiamo osservando nella guerra di Trump contro l’Iran.

L’attacco israelo-americano del giugno 2025 era principalmente un attacco di decapitazione volto a neutralizzare sia la leadership politica che quella militare dell’Iran, mentre elementi armati addestrati dal Mossad, il MEK e i separatisti baluchi tra gli altri sarebbero stati infiltrati in Iran per fomentare la rivoluzione dalla base. A quel tempo, il figlio dell’ex Scià – in modo poco plausibile – veniva presentato ai media occidentali come il futuro leader dell’Iran.

Non ha funzionato. E ora Netanyahu sta sostenendo che Israele disponga di «nuove prove» del fatto che l’Iran si stia orientando verso la produzione di un componente bellico nell’ambito del proprio programma nucleare. Sta dicendo a Trump che ora deve portare a termine l’opera di distruzione dell’Iran. E per motivare ulteriormente Trump, il principale quotidiano israeliano Ma’ariv riporta che Israele ha trasmesso direttamente alla Casa Bianca i sondaggi del Likud, secondo cui Netanyahu potrebbe vincere le elezioni israeliane del 27 ottobre. Secondo l’articolo, queste informazioni del Likud (che contraddicono la maggior parte degli altri sondaggi israeliani) hanno spinto Trump a esprimere il proprio pieno sostegno elettorale a Netanyahu.

Allo stesso tempo, i miliardari filosionisti stanno esercitando il «terribile potere del denaro» su Trump: «Non accetteremo nulla di meno della sconfitta dell’Iran. Se continuerà a cercare un accordo, le ritireremo il nostro sostegno finanziario».

Alti funzionari della sicurezza israeliani, sia in carica che in pensione, confutano tuttavia la necessità di un attacco imminente all’Iran e l’affermazione di Netanyahu relativa a nuove prove che l’Iran si stia muovendo verso l’arma nucleare –il Capo di Stato Maggiore delle Forze di Difesa Israeliane (IDF) Zamir ha dichiarato al Canale 13 israeliano: «Non vediamo la necessità di attaccare l’Iran prima delle elezioni»; Il principale stratega militare israeliano Udi Evental ha messo in guardia: «Una guerra per ostacolare le elezioni e la democrazia, non per ostacolare il programma nucleare dell’Iran. Netanyahu, che si sospetta sia immerso fino al collo in considerazioni politiche e personali estranee alla questione, non è idoneo a prendere una decisione del genere. Non glielo si deve permettere».

Che esistano o meno prove del genere non ha davvero importanza. Probabilmente non esistono. L’affermazione costituisce semplicemente il pretesto con cui si sta esortando gli Stati Uniti ad agire per ‘portare a termine l’opera’ contro l’Iran. Come sempre, Netanyahu ha dichiarato negli ultimi giorni: «L’Iran sta ancora una volta cercando di sviluppare le sue armi di morte… C’è un solo modo per eliminare questa minaccia una volta per tutte: rovesciare il regime in Iran, e questa è la mia direttiva all’IDF, al Mossad e alle agenzie di sicurezza».Un alto funzionario iraniano ha dichiarato a Drop Site che l’attuale valutazione dei servizi segreti interni di Teheran indica un’elevata probabilità che possano iniziare bombardamenti su larga scala – anche prima delle elezioni israeliane di martedì.

Il punto è che all’Iran non interessa chi vincerà le elezioni di medio termine, né chi conquisterà la presidenza degli Stati Uniti nel 2028. Per la leadership iraniana è tutto uguale. Comprendono bene il concetto del «Grande Disegno» (come potrebbero non farlo?).In Iran è ben chiaro che il Paese è impegnato in una lunga guerra contro l’intero blocco atlantista: Israele, i suoi servizi di intelligence, i suoi arsenali, i suoi satelliti, la sua industria militare e la sua macchina mediatica. Non importa se alla Casa Bianca ci sia un repubblicano o un democratico. Gli alti funzionari iraniani ritengono che entrambi i partiti siano stati comprati dal terribile potere sionista del denaro.

Comprendere il «Progetto» significa comprendere che la classe dei finanziatori sionisti non si accontenterà mai di un «accordo o compromesso». Essi sostengono con certezza che l’Iran alla fine verrebbe meno a qualsiasi acconsentimento ipotizzato alle richieste statunitensi. Gli israeliani e i loro alleati della classe dei finanziatori semplicemente non credono (e lo ripetono incessantemente) che l’Iran accetterebbe mai di sottomettersi a Israele, né di accettare il dominio politico e culturale degli Stati Uniti. Potrebbero avere ragione. Perché? Semplicemente perché l’Iran possiede una civiltà profonda, che affonda le sue radici in un complesso di credenze e pratiche specificamente persiano-iraniane risalenti al secondo millennio a.C.: il mazdeismo, una cosmologia del dramma divino, rappresentata dalla lotta continua tra Luce e Oscurità.

Il rinomato studioso, il professor Henri Corbin, ha sostenuto che «l’Iran era situato in una posizione centrale… non essendo solo una nazione o un impero, ma un universo spirituale». Egli concepiva quindi l’Iran come una forza mediatrice, sia geograficamente che metafisicamente.

Per millenni, gli iraniani hanno percepito il mondo come dotato di una chiara dimensione metafisica – e di una storia. È quindi improbabile che possano essere attratti da un atteggiamento materialistico e nichilista di stampo occidentale. Gli Stati civilizzatori, siano essi l’Iran o la Russia, che abbracciano valori contrari non soccomberebbero mai al «Grande Disegno». Di conseguenza, devono essere distrutti.

Cosa significa questa storia metafisica? Significa che l’Iran si sta preparando alla guerra, non a un «accordo». Mohsen Rezaei, segretario del Consiglio Supremo di Sicurezza Nazionale iraniano e rappresentante personale della Guida Suprema, l’Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, ha affermato che, «Se la domanda è se l’Iran abbia ancora la capacità di proseguire le operazioni con missili e droni [in caso di attacco], la risposta è “sì” … Gli Stati Uniti dispongono di risorse preziose nella regione. In caso di guerra, anche cavi, centri dati e strutture di intelligenza artificiale potrebbero rientrare nel raggio d’azione. Se il conflitto dovesse riprendere, avremo un piano più ampio». «Tutti devono comprendere che un’azione contro l’Iran comporta un costo».

Alti funzionari iraniani ritengono che la guerra sia imminente. L’Iran dispone di piani di ampia portata (in caso di attacco) che coinvolgono anche l’Arabia Saudita e la sua leadership, ha lasciato intendere un alto funzionario iraniano. Karl Miller (dal campo) afferma che, a questo proposito, un quarto della produzione petrolifera saudita è già stato distrutto e che i danni causati dagli attacchi di rappresaglia di AnsarAllah interessano l’intera catena produttiva saudita – «dalla testa di pozzo alla stazione di servizio» – e che l’Arabia Saudita sta colmando il deficit attingendo alle proprie riserve.

Il rapporto di Miller, citato da Larry Johnson, avverte che,«se i canali di esportazione dell’Arabia Saudita dovessero chiudersi, il suo petrolio non avrebbe altra destinazione se non le proprie raffinerie, le proprie centrali elettriche e i propri serbatoi di stoccaggio. Una volta che lo stoccaggio fosse pieno, si raggiungerebbe all’incirca il limite massimo di produzione che l’Arabia Saudita potrebbe mantenere. Se Ras Tanura e Yanbu venissero chiusi contemporaneamente, il Regno sarebbe costretto a chiudere la maggior parte dei propri giacimenti petroliferi. Questo è esattamente lo scenario che la campagna di Ansar Allah contro l’oleodotto, il Mar Rosso e i terminali del Golfo è volta a provocare». «Qualsiasi nuova campagna americana o israeliana contro l’Iran si abbatterà su un sistema energetico saudita che non dispone più di margini per assorbirla», osserva Larry Johnson.

Qualsiasi nuovo attacco all’Iran, per estensione, significherà la fine del Golfo così come lo conosciamo, la fine del petrodollaro e la fine del Golfo come principale fornitore di liquidità per Wall Street e il mondo della tecnologia.

Ciononostante, secondo quanto riferito, Trump avrebbe affermato che gli Stati Uniti non stanno attualmente negoziando con l’Iran e che qualcosa accadrà «molto presto».

Forse. (Ma con Trump tutto si riduce a speculazioni). Se però sta bluffando, non funzionerà, e la sua umiliazione sarà ancora più profonda.

Un uomo che conosce Trump meglio di molti altri (avendo scritto quattro libri su di lui), Michael Wolff, sostiene che se i Democratici vinceranno nelle elezioni di medio termine del 3 novembre –

«Cercheranno di far capire al mondo che è “un nuovo giorno”. Trump, dal canto suo, cercherà di far capire al mondo che è ancora lui a controllare la scena. Ci sarà una serie di eventi di questo tipo (come una presunta invasione di Cuba, ad esempio) di portata superiore a qualsiasi cosa possiamo immaginare. Non si mostrerà umile. Il concetto di umiltà non esiste nell’animo di Donald Trump. Pertanto, farà esattamente il contrario».

«Non ritirarsi, ma attaccare».

In un certo senso Mosca sta facendo qualcosa che la società europea non può fare da sola: mettere alle strette la sua classe dirigente, farla venire allo scoperto e ridicolizzarla costringendola a mettersi a confronto coi propri limiti, ad uscire dalla propria torre d’avorio ed infine a ridefinire un’identità – quella europea – in dubbio da quasi 80 anni.

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Le notizie delle ultime settimane lasciando intravedere spiragli di qualcosa: un qualcosa che è ancora troppo presto per definire, ma in cui molti sperano. Una risoluzione del conflitto che infiamma il fianco orientale d’Europa potrebbe vedere una svolta (si mormora) eppure più tale ipotesi si avvicina, più si percepisce un’ansia generalizzata, come un nervosismo inesprimibile che pervade la classe politica al comando delle istituzioni europee, a tutti i livelli, ma soprattutto a quelli più alti. Lo spaventoso paradosso lo si può articolare in modo assai semplice: c’è paura della pace.

La classe dirigente europea, anzichè remare in direzione di una soluzione definitiva, a lungo termine, del conflitto in Ucraina, al contrario esterna tutta una serie di dubbi e ostilità ad ogni compromesso da far quasi credere nell’esistenza di un avversione a tale pace: in breve, le istituzioni europee nel momento più critico dell’ultimo lustro, esprimono qualcosa di indicibile che di certo non si addice allo spirito dei padri costituenti della comunità europea, votati a edificare una cultura sovranazionale basata sul compromesso, sulla reiezione del nazionalismo e sulla diplomazia. La verità è che siamo di fronte ad un nodo di grandissime proporzioni: il conflitto in Ucraina, sebbene limitato dal punto di vista prettamente geografico, ha effetti geopolitici di grande portata che ridefiniscono gli equilibri di potere ereditati dalla caduta del muro di Berlino. In un contesto come questo, sorgerà una delle domande più difficili: quale destino per l’Europa ? Un continente uscito azzerato dal secondo conflitto mondiale, risorto e fiorito economicamente fino al massimo splendore nelle generazioni post-belliche, pur rimanendo perennemente “monco” ovvero privo di una propria politica di difesa (così come di una propria politica estera indipendente da quella di Washington). I suoi leader si trovano ad affrontare ora qualcosa di mai visto prima nell’esperienza dell’Europa politica, ovvero l’assumersi di una responsabilità storica: in questo caso quella di un insuccesso, nel prevenire e gestire una grande guerra convenzionale ai margini del proprio continente, aver preso decisioni avventate ed ora ritrovarsi messi da parte constatando una propria sconfitta sul campo contro il rivale identificato con Mosca. Per poter comprendere tutto questo occorre tuttavia fare qualche passo indietro e riflettere su cosa sia la leadership europea, cosa rappresenta e come si è formata. Innanzitutto occorre rendersi conto che la classe dirigente europea è forse l’elite più saldamente insediata e meno “sfidata” sulla faccia del pianeta facendo i conti: siedono sul trono di un continente pacificato, vale a dire senza velleità di potenza o nemici naturali da cui doversi difendere, estremamente prospero (a differenza degli USA per 70 anni non ha affrontato vere spese militari), le cui elite sociali di riferimento – anziane e benestanti – non danno problemi particolari. Una torre di avorio unica sul pianeta, che per la prima volta nella sua esistenza ha subito una scossa: la crisi geopolitica che abbiamo visto in questi anni – ancora in corso – primo grande conflitto europeo del XXI secolo (in realtà il primo dal 1945 ad oggi su questo continente) costituisce anche la prima vera sfida alla classe politica europea: quest’ultima in 70 non ha mai dovuto vedersela con un vero nemico, con nulla che potesse mettere alla prova la propria prerogativa al “trono” il loro diritto “sacro” al comando.

Si può dunque dire questo a buona ragione: le circostanze odierne sono un inedito banco di prova per tutti costoro, un momento della verità per tutto l’estabilishment politico emerso in Europa dai tempi dell’ultimo conflitto mondiale in poi (il carosello di forze liberal-democratiche, cristiano-democratiche/democristiane, social-democratiche, ecologiste tipiche del panorama partitico occidentale post-bellico): il cosiddetto “arco costituzionale” europeo consolidatosi nel corso di generazioni con il placet d’oltreoceano ossia con la condizionale delle fedeltà indiscussa alle direttiva politiche di Washington.

Ora, tale classe si è messa in un pasticcio più grande di sè stessa senza rendersene conto: ha sfidato una potenza militare (malgrado tutto, la Russia questo ancora è) con la sicurezza assoluta di un successo nonchè di un grande fratello a stelle e strisce, pronto ora e sempre all’intervento in supporto degli alleati. Questi ultimi, mai si sono resi conto della propria funzione di satelliti rispetto al potente alleato ed ora si ritrovano soli a dover gestire un evento per loro ingestibile: un grande conflitto convenzionale che non possono vincere, il cui insuccesso può essere la miccia di una situazione sociale a casa propria già ai limiti per altre ragioni. Per riassumere in altre parole, la classe dirigente europea che oggi osserviamo, si ritrova per la prima volta sul banco degli imputati (assieme al governo di Kiev): i governanti europei nella propria animosità nei confronti di Mosca, si sono esposti oltre il limite massimo fino a trovarsi ora in un vicolo cieco, considerando che la prova di forza che hanno voluto non può essere vinta, ma al tempo medesimo non si può tornare indietro. L’Europa politica – quella di Bruxelles – si è gravemente compromessa, fomentando nelle proprie opinioni pubbliche paure infondate ed isterismi al fine di creare artificialmente un consenso attorno a prese di posizione antirusse e far accettare un coinvolgimento nel conflitto ucraino costato ai contribuenti centinaia di miliardi di euro, a danno delle proprie economie e pace sociale. Il nodo più inconfessabile è proprio questo: si è voluto inventare un “grande nemico” (in realtà inesistente) cui addossare responsabilità di ogni colpa, di ogni male sociale che affligge l’occidente europeo, per non dover affrontare le proprie di responsabilità; in fondo nulla di strano, un meccanismo esistente da secoli ovvero cercare di convogliare le energie sociali verso l’esterno (dandogli un bersaglio, un nemico) per evitare che queste ultime identifichino il problema del male sociale verso l’interno vale a dire nei propri stessi governanti. La riprova di questo si è manifestata in maniera eclatante tanto in Francia quanto in Italia nelle ultime settimane, sotto forma di una protesta di piazza come non se ne vedevano da decenni, che ha costretto la capitale francese allo stato di emergenza per la prima volta da una generazione a questa parte. In Francia come in Germania si è alle porte del successo di forze non convenzionali, alternative nel contesto politico europeo, come Fronte nazionale (ora RN) oppure Alternative fur Deutschland (AFD) che sono sempre meno contenibili: la classe dirigente di Bruxelles – di matrice liberaldemocratica – di questo ha timore e non vi è modo di arginare la “marea sovranista” se non con una “vittoria contro le autocrazie” che però non può esserci nel mondo reale. La responsabilità storica dell’UE è di aver ceduto ad un idealismo che ignora ogni regola di realpolitik, facendosi tutt’una col mito di una superiorità etica inesistente e non applicabile nella realtà oggettiva: atteggiamento che ha finito col danneggiare e addirittura mettere in pericolo la propria base sociale.

In definitiva sì, la conclusione del conflitto ucraino mette in tensione perchè costringe ad una resa dei conti inedita nella politica interna delle pricipali economie europee: una classe dirigente che verrà soppesata e valutata di fronte all’opinione pubblica, scontando il tutto con una potenziale catastrofe elettorale neigli anni a venire che rischia di sostituirla. Proprio a tale proposito, di recente il sociologo ed editorialista italiano Alessandro Orsini ha lanciato una provocazione direttissima, affermando che la Russia di V. Putin in un certo senso sta contribuendo ad una futura “rivoluzione” europea, dal momento che la socnfitta del regime di V. Zelensky può comportare anche il declino rapido di tutta la corrotta classe al potere a Bruxelles che ha legato le sue sorti all’esito alle sorti dell’Ucraina. Quindi, in un certo senso Mosca sta facendo qualcosa che la società europea non può fare da sola: mettere alle strette la sua classe dirigente, farla venire allo scoperto e ridicolizzarla costringendola a mettersi a confronto coi propri limiti, ad uscire dalla propria torre d’avorio ed infine a ridefinire un’identità – quella europea – in dubbio da quasi 80 anni.

J’ai passé suffisamment d’années à la Central Intelligence Agency pour apprendre à lire les articles de presse que les amis de l’agence placent pour elle. L’article de Shane Harris, le nouvel ami du directeur de la CIA John Ratcliffe, paru dans The Atlantic du 23 octobre, en est l’un des cas. Il est écrit pour faire passer Ratcliffe pour un professionnel sobre à la tête d’une administration chaotique. Mais lisez-le attentivement et il confirme ce que Washington a passé quatre ans à nier : les États-Unis ne se contentent pas d’approvisionner l’Ukraine. Par l’intermédiaire de la CIA, ils combattent la Russie.

Par Larry C Johnson

« La CIA dirige l’affaire »

Harris ne cache pas les faits. Armée des informations fournies par la CIA, l’armée ukrainienne a lancé des frappes au plus profond de la Russie. Les satellites espions américains avertissent rapidement l’Ukraine de l’arrivée de missiles et de drones russes. Parmi le personnel américain sur le terrain en Ukraine, un officier supérieur à la retraite qui s’y rend fréquemment lui a dit : “la CIA dirige l’affaire.”

Il y a mieux. Un officier du renseignement balte qui travaille en étroite collaboration avec les Américains a déclaré à Harris que, quoi que Donald Trump dise en public, les opérations de la CIA contre la Russie sont maintenant “beaucoup plus agressives” qu’elles ne l’étaient sous Joe Biden. Les officiers du Centre d’activités spéciales de la CIA, les personnes qui dirigent des opérations secrètes et paramilitaires, seraient parmi les plus heureux à Langley, car ils sont très occupés. Et ce n’est pas nouveau. Comme le note Harris, la CIA a aidé à construire l’appareil de renseignement moderne de l’Ukraine après la prise de la Crimée par la Russie en 2014. C’est une guerre que mène l’agence depuis plus d’une décennie.

Permettez-moi de traduire le langage poli d’un article de magazine. Les services de renseignement américains identifient les cibles à l’intérieur de la Russie, les satellites américains gèrent le réseau d’alerte de défense aérienne de l’Ukraine et les officiers américains “dirigent l’affaire” sur le terrain. Si la Russie faisait cela pour le Mexique contre le Texas, Washington appellerait cela un acte de guerre. Moscou dit depuis des années qu’il combat l’OTAN, pas seulement l’Ukraine. Voici, par la gracieuseté du magazine The Atlantic et de ses sources anonymes, la preuve.

Se tirer dans le réservoir de carburant

Maintenant vient l’absurdité. Selon Harris, le succès de la CIA est devenu un problème pour le président. Les frappes sur les raffineries que l’agence aide à activer ont entravé l’économie russe. L’Agence internationale de l’énergie estime qu’au cours des huit premiers mois de cette année, l’Ukraine a frappé une raffinerie russe en moyenne une fois tous les trois jours.

Ces raffineries fabriquent du diesel. Le monde manque de diesel. L’Agence internationale de l’énergie affirme que la pénurie durera au moins jusqu’en 2027. Et Trump, selon Harris, met la flambée des prix sur le dos des attaques contre les raffineries russes et veut qu’elles cessent. Il a menacé de couper le soutien des services de renseignement à l’Ukraine à moins que Kiev ne mette fin aux frappes sur les raffineries.

Réfléchissez à cela. La CIA aide l’Ukraine à éliminer la capacité de raffinage russe. Les prix du diesel montent en flèche. Puis le 9 octobre, en plein pourparlers de paix à Miami, le président annonce un accord pour que la Russie vende son diesel sur le marché mondial, se vantant sur Truth Social que les prix « BAISSERAIENT ET VITE ! ». Harris rapporte que l’annonce a surpris les négociateurs et que Poutine n’a pris aucun engagement réciproque. Ainsi, les États-Unis paient simultanément pour détruire la production russe de diesel et supplient la Russie de lui vendre plus de diesel. Difficile de concevoir une politique plus incohérente.

Le canal de communication des espions

Le passage le plus révélateur de l’article concerne le voyage de Ratcliffe à Moscou en août. Trump l’a envoyé rencontrer ses homologues des services de sécurité russes par le biais de ce qu’on appelle officieusement le « canal de communication des espions« . Son message, écrit Harris, était que personne n’est gagnant : la Russie n’a pas réussi à faire des progrès significatifs et l’Ukraine ne peut pas expulser les forces russes. L’espoir était que Ratcliffe puisse convaincre Poutine qu’il poursuivait une cause perdue.

J’ai deux problèmes avec ça. Le premier est la revendication elle-même. L’État-major général russe a rapporté à Poutine le 16 octobre que ses forces avaient pris environ 6 500 kilomètres carrés et 310 colonies depuis janvier. Vous pouvez argumenter que le chiffre russe est gonflé, et je l’ai fait. Mais même DeepState, le système de cartographie ukrainien, reconnait environ 1 300 kilomètres carrés. La Russie avance. Il ne le fait peut-être pas aussi vite que Moscou le prétend, mais “n’a pas réussi à faire de progrès significatifs” est un vœu pieux déguisé en renseignements.

Le deuxième problème est le messager. Imaginez que vous êtes à la tête du SVR ou du FSB. Le directeur de la CIA s’envole pour Moscou pour vous dire, d’espion à espion, que votre guerre est dans une impasse et que vous devriez y renoncer. Vous savez parfaitement que c’est son agence qui fournit à l’Ukraine les données de ciblage des drones frappant vos raffineries. Ce n’est pas une offre de paix. C’est une menace sous couvert d’un passeport diplomatique. Si Ratcliffe s’attendait à ce que les Russes considèrent son évaluation comme neutre, c’est qu’il ne comprend pas les personnes à qui il parle.

Ce n’est pas ce que Truman a construit

Ratcliffe aime parler du retour de la CIA à ses « racines« . Ses racines fausses. Harry Truman n’a pas créé la Central Intelligence Agency en 1947 pour mener des campagnes paramilitaires. Il l’a créé pour collecter et analyser des renseignements provenant de sources étrangères et dire la vérité au président, afin qu’il ne soit plus jamais aveuglé comme Franklin Roosevelt l’a été pour Pearl Harbor. L’action secrète est entrée par la porte de derrière. Un an plus tard, la directive NSC 10/2 du Conseil de sécurité nationale autorisait les opérations secrètes, et la queue clandestine remue le chien analytique depuis.

Truman a vu cela se produire et l’a dit publiquement. Dans un éditorial publié dans le Washington Post du 22 décembre 1963, un mois après l’assassinat de John Kennedy, il écrivait qu’il était devenu troublé par la mesure dans laquelle la CIA s’était éloignée de « son rôle prévu ». Ses paroles méritent d’être citées: “Je n’ai jamais pensé, lorsque j’ai créé la CIA, qu’elle serait impliquée dans des opérations de cape et d’épée en temps de paix“. L’agence, avertissait-il, « est devenue un bras opérationnel et même décisionnel du gouvernement« . Il a dit qu’en la créant, “la chose la plus importante était de se prémunir contre la possibilité que des renseignements soient utilisés pour influencer ou conduire le président à des décisions imprudentes”, et il a demandé que la CIA soit “rétablie dans sa mission initiale en tant que bras du renseignement du Président”.

Soixante-trois ans plus tard, Ratcliffe a transformé l’avertissement de Truman en un énoncé de mission.

Comment l’action secrète corrompt la vérité

Je veux expliquer pourquoi cela est important, car ce n’est pas un argument abstrait tiré d’organigrammes. Je l’ai observé de l’intérieur.

Lorsqu’une agence de renseignement se contente de collecter et d’analyser des informations, son seul intérêt dans le résultat est d’obtenir une bonne vue d’ensemble. Au moment où la même agence mène une opération secrète, elle a un cheval dans la course. L’opération a un budget, un sponsor au septième étage, des carrières qui en découlent et, plus important encore, un président à qui on a dit que cela fonctionnerait. Maintenant, les analystes au bout du couloir sont invités à évaluer si l’opération de leurs propres collègues réussit. Les mauvaises nouvelles ne sont plus seulement des mauvaises nouvelles. C’est une attaque contre le programme du directeur et un embarras pour l’homme dans le bureau ovale.

La pression est rarement un ordre explicite de changer une conclusion. C’est plus subtil et plus corrosif que cela. L’évaluation pessimiste est renvoyée pour plus d’approfondissement. L’analyste qui n’arrête pas d’écrire que l’opération échoue à la réputation de ne pas avoir l’esprit d’équipe et n’obtiendra pas de promotion. Le briefing pour le président parle des réussites et enterre les coûts dans une annexe. Après quelques tours comme cela, comme Julia Curlee l’a dit à Harris, les officiers arrêtent simplement de dire les vérités qui dérangent et “apprennent à éviter” de dire ce que la Maison Blanche ne veut pas entendre.

Nous avons vu où cela mène. La baie des Cochons a été planifiée par le service clandestin et tenue à l’écart des propres analystes de l’agence, qui auraient pu souligner qu’il n’y avait aucune preuve que le peuple cubain était sur le point de se soulever contre Castro. Les opérateurs ont vendu au président l’opération qu’ils voulaient mener, et l’analyse qui aurait pu l’arrêter n’est jamais parvenue à son bureau. Le schéma se répète chaque fois que l’agence devient à la fois le joueur et l’arbitre.

Maintenant, regardez l’Ukraine. La CIA, selon le récit de The Atlantic, « dirige l’affaire » sur le terrain, en aidant à mener une campagne de frappes profondes à l’intérieur de la Russie. La même CIA est chargée de dire au président si cette campagne fonctionne et si l’Ukraine peut gagner. Est-il surprenant que le message de l’agence, celui que Ratcliffe a transmis à Moscou, soit que la Russie « n’a pas réussi à faire des progrès significatifs » ? Une agence qui a passé douze ans à mettre en place le service de renseignement ukrainien et qui dirige maintenant son ciblage a toutes les incitations institutionnelles à signaler que sa guerre se déroule bien, ou du moins pas si mal. Les conséquences négatives, les avancées russes, les pertes ukrainiennes, une pénurie de diesel qui frappe les consommateurs européens et américains, sont exactement les choses qu’une agence dans cette position est le moins susceptible de mettre au premier plan.

C’est la corruption que craignait Truman. Non pas que la CIA mentirait carrément, mais qu’elle commencerait lentement à diriger l’opération à la place du président, et que le président prendrait des décisions basées sur des renseignements façonnés par des personnes qui ont besoin de lui pour continuer leur travail.

Une agence qui dit au patron ce qu’il veut entendre

Harris rend également compte de l’état de la CIA elle-même, et ce n’est pas joli. Ratcliffe s’est engagé lors de son audience de confirmation à “mener une action secrète sous la direction du président, aller là où personne d’autre ne peut aller et faire des choses que personne d’autre ne peut faire”. Le côté de l’action secrète est florissant, de l’Ukraine au Venezuela en passant par les frappes aériennes de la CIA sur des bateaux soupçonnés de trafic de drogue, qui, selon les experts juridiques, pourraient violer les lois des conflits armés. Un ancien officier a déclaré à Harris « l’agence est en train de déchausser en ce moment ».

Les analystes, quant à eux, sont misérables. Ils sont nombreux à signaler que l’objectivité de leur travail est compromise. Julia Curlee, une analyste senior qui a démissionné en mai, l’a dit sans ambages « Ratcliffe ne protège pas la CIA de la politisation, il la dirige ». Les officiers, actuels et en retraite, disent qu’ils n’ont jamais vu autant de départs à la retraite et de démissions. Une agence où les officiers paramilitaires sont ravis et les analystes ont peur de dire la triste vérité est une agence construite pour mener des guerres, pas pour les comprendre. Et Harris lui-même note que Trump n’a pas tenu compte des avertissements de la communauté du renseignement sur la façon dont l’Iran réagirait aux attaques américaines. Nous payons tous pour cela maintenant.

Choisir une politique

Voici donc où en sont les États-Unis. Le Président qualifie Zelensky de “plus difficile à gérer” que Poutine et exhorte les Ukrainiens à élire quelqu’un d’autre. Son directeur de la CIA mène des opérations contre la Russie qui sont plus agressives que celles de Biden. Sa CIA aide l’Ukraine à détruire les raffineries russes pendant qu’il conclut des accords pour vendre du diesel russe. Son chef espion s’envole pour Moscou pour dire aux Russes qu’ils ne peuvent pas gagner, tandis que les propres analystes de son agence ont peur de lui dire ce qu’ils pensent.

Ce n’est pas une stratégie. C’est une contradiction que le peuple américain paie à la pompe et que les Ukrainiens paient de leur vie. Si Washington veut la paix, il devrait cesser d’être un combattant. S’il veut combattre la Russie, il devrait avoir l’honnêteté de le dire, au Congrès et aux électeurs, avant les mid-terms plutôt qu’après. Ce qu’il ne peut pas continuer à faire, c’est les deux, et prétendre qu’il ne fait ni l’un ni l’autre.

Publié à l’origine par Son of the American Revolution

Por motivos geográficos inevitáveis e por uma diminuição da autonomia psicossocial, a política brasileira é extremamente dependente dos câmbios políticos que ocorrem de tempos em tempos nos EUA.

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Estando confirmada a vitória eleitoral de Lula (e apesar das controvérsias e da crise que perduram) agora é o momento de refletir sobre a possibilidade de mudanças significativas na política externa do presidente do Brasil em seu 4º mandato, que durará até 2030.

Uma pequena revisão das posições assumidas ao longo deste mandato que começou em 2023 se faz necessária.

Numa lista que não deve ser considerada exaustiva, Lula: 1) Reativou a participação brasileira em vários organismos internacionais para os quais Bolsonaro havia dado pouca atenção; 2) Ensaiou uma aproximação com a China no início de seu governo e aumentou laços comerciais após tarifas dos EUA, mas paralisou e recusou a participação na Iniciativa Cinturão & Rota; 3) Reativou a Cúpula da Amazônia, a organização do Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica e realizou na Amazônia a COP30, demonstrando um enfoque na Agenda Verde e na internacionalização (mediada por ONGs ocidentais) da região amazônica; 4) Condenou a operação militar especial russa na Ucrânia, mas se opôs a sanções ocidentais à Rússia, atribuindo responsabilidade pelo conflito tanto à OTAN quanto à Rússia, além de recusar enviar armas e munições para os ucranianos, por outro lado defendendo a retirada das tropas russas e a devolução de todos os territórios libertados/integrados à Ucrânia (incluindo a Crimeia); 5) Condenou a Operação Dilúvio Al-Aqsa do 7 de outubro de 2023 como um ataque terrorista, criticando também a reação israelense como desproporcional e, depois, como genocídio, gerando tensões com o governo de Netanyahu; 6) Pressionou por “eleições livres” na Venezuela, se recusou a reconhecer a reeleição de Maduro, vetou a entrada da Venezuela nos BRICS; 7) Presidiu os BRICS no ano de 2025, sem muitos avanços; 8) Acordo de livre-comércio com a União Europeia; 8) Condenou a Nicarágua e Daniel Ortega na ONU e em organizações de direitos humanos; 9) Criticou o recrudescimento dos embargos contra Cuba e deu seguimento à ajuda humanitária ao país; 10) Levou o caso das tarifas de Trump à OMC; 11) Ampliou parcerias de defesa com Suécia, Itália, Turquia e outros países da OTAN para a produção de equipamentos militares (aviões, veículos, etc.); 12) Se aliou ao Canadá e União Europeia na iniciativa “Parceiros pelo Multilateralismo”, que visa fortalecer a ONU contra ameaças de revisão da velha ordem internacional; 13) Fez publicamente frente comum com os EUA (quando ele era governado por Joe Biden) contra a ameaça das “autocracias” e da “extrema-direita internacional”.

A partir dessas posturas assumidas pelo governo Lula entre 2023 e 2026 podemos deduzir alguns padrões e tendências bem específicos:

1) Defesa do fortalecimento da ONU, dos organismos multilaterais e da “ordem mundial baseada em regras” do pós-Guerra Fria, contra o unilateralismo dos EUA e o revisionismo multipolarista defendido por potências contra-hegemônicas; 2) Inclinação para a União Europeia, enquanto durar o domínio trumpista nos EUA; 3) Máxima diversificação das relações comerciais; 3) Enfoque temático na Agenda Verde, na defesa da democracia liberal e na defesa dos “direitos humanos”.

Ao ignorarmos aos discursos de Lula e atentarmos exclusivamente para uma desconstrução das posições concretas e das ações efetivas do Brasil durante seu atual governo, adquirimos uma imagem que é bastante diferente daquela que é vista por uma grande parte dos analistas estrangeiros, que não raro possuem uma imagem mais “chavista” de Lula.

Em tese, não há motivo para que a postura internacional do Brasil mude nos próximos anos. Ela tende a permanecer aproximadamente a mesma, com as tendências já indicadas.

O único fator disruptivo na previsibilidade do governo brasileiro são os EUA.

Por motivos geográficos inevitáveis e por uma diminuição da autonomia psicossocial, a política brasileira é extremamente dependente dos câmbios políticos que ocorrem de tempos em tempos nos EUA.

Nesse sentido, portanto, diante da atual crise política brasileira, se o governo dos EUA deixar de reconhecer o resultado eleitoral e partir para tentativas diretas de desestabilização do Brasil através de sanções, o reconhecimento de um “governo no exílio”, etc, isso de fato pode forçar o Brasil a uma postura mais contra-hegemônica.

Não obstante, se Trump ignorar o lóbi bolsonarista e buscar algum modus vivendi com Lula, existe a forte tendência à manutenção daquelas tendências que já indicamos.

E finalmente, se os Democratas retornarem à Casa Branca após as eleições de 2028, então o governo do Brasil fará uma virada mais pró-EUA, buscando a reaproximação com Washington, tal como vinha acontecendo quando Joe Biden era presidente dos EUA.

Coalizão Negra por Direitos, financiada por Soros, elege 16 deputados federais que aplicam a agenda identitária da Open Society no Congresso.

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A política identitária dita “antirracista” tem recebido uma atenção crescente da Open Society. Em documento publicado em 2021, o diretor da divisão do Programa de Saúde Pública da organização, Kayum Ahmed, descreveu uma mudança na estratégia de financiamento para melhor incorporar a questão racial, de poder e de privilégios à política de financiamento da OSF.

“Estamos trabalhando para incorporar uma abordagem interseccional ao nosso financiamento; para mudar a distribuição do poder, precisamos mudar com quem trabalhamos, por meio do financiamento e da nossa capacidade de convocar atores”, escreveu.

O documento recomenda expressamente que as estratégias de financiamento incluam análises de poder e privilégio e objetivos para enfrentar estruturas de opressão e discriminação. Também orienta que a fundação seja específica ao falar de racismo, perguntando se está se referindo ao racismo antinegro e à supremacia branca. É uma orientação para modificar a seleção dos beneficiários, as relações institucionais e a distribuição de recursos segundo uma análise “interseccional” de poder.

No meu último artigo para a SCF, abordei os parlamentares eleitos em outubro com o apoio de ONGs que se passam por defensoras dos negros e que são financiadas pela Open Society. A organização guarda-chuva que reivindica a luta dos negros é a Coalizão Negra por Direitos, que promoveu candidaturas a partir do projeto Quilombo nos Parlamentos. São ao menos 16 novos deputados federais. Entre eles está Jones Manoel (PSOL).

Em agosto deste ano, Jones Manoel foi um dos destaques do lançamento do Quilombo nos Parlamentos em Pernambuco. Em seu discurso, ele afirmou: “acho que na atual conjuntura brasileira, há dentro da própria esquerda uma ofensiva contra o movimento negro, e não só, tachando-o, a partir de um debate equivocado, de identitarismo. Então há uma fala de que lutas antirracistas, antipatriarcais, antilgbtfóbicas, seriam lutas identitárias menores.”

O deputado eleito pelo PSOL também confirmou ter assinado a carta compromisso do Quilombo nos Parlamentos, aderindo oficialmente às diretrizes estabelecidas pela Coalizão Negra por Direitos. Isso significa que Jones se comprometeu a aplicar a política da Coalizão como deputado no Congresso Nacional.

A política da Coalizão Negra por Direitos segue exatamente a cartilha de sua financiadora, a Open Society. A organização guarda-chuva de George Soros financia o movimento Black Lives Matter nos EUA, que desmontou a revolta popular contra o assassinato de George Floyd e levou à eleição de Biden/Harris. No Brasil, copiou-se o movimento Vidas Negras Importam. No mesmo momento em que Soros impulsionava o BLM, a Coalizão publicou um manifesto de direitos humanos: “exigimos a garantida de direitos humanos a negras e negros. Queremos viver, não apenas sobreviver! Vidas negras importam. Basta de genocídio.”

Enquanto a OSF, ao anunciar as iniciativas em torno do legado de Marielle Franco, destacou sua intenção de “apoiar mulheres negras na política brasileira”, o manifesto de 2024 do Quilombo nos Parlamentos deixava claro que estava “impulsionando candidaturas, mandatas e bancadas negras”.

A teoria do racismo estrutural e do genocídio negro, propagada pela Coalizão Negra por Direitos e pelas organizações negras identitárias, tampouco é original. Anos atrás, Alexander Soros, filho, herdeiro e continuador do legado de George Soros na OSF, já utilizava exatamente o termo “racismo estrutural”. O relatório “Advancing Diversity, Equity and Inclusion in Grant Making”, publicado em 2021 pela OSF, também afirmava: “a maioria [das sociedades] também incorpora o racismo estrutural e a desvalorização sistêmica de pessoas com pele mais escura.”

Jones Manoel é conhecido por relativizar o papel do financiamento imperialista a organizações que se dizem representantes dos oprimidos. Para ele, fundações como as de George Soros realmente fazem filantropia e não seria um absurdo receber financiamento delas. Agora fica claro porque ele pensa dessa maneira: ele próprio acaba de ser impulsionado pelas entidades de Soros para se eleger deputado.

Erika Hilton é um caso de envolvimento profundo com a Open Society. Além de ser promovida pela Coalizão Negra por Direitos, a fundação de Soros impulsiona a deputada a partir da pauta transexual, como demonstrado em artigo recente. Em 2025, Hilton destinou R$ 1,5 milhão em recursos de emendas parlamentares à Associação Brasileira de Organizações Não Governamentais (Abong), incluindo a prestação de serviços para a Frente Parlamentar LGBT+, liderada pela própria Hilton. A Abong recebeu R$ 4,3 milhões de financiamento da OSF entre 2016 e 2024 e também integra a Coalizão Negra por Direitos, como mostrado no artigo anterior.

Além disso, tal como foi promovida pela Coalizão Negra por Direitos, Hilton também recebeu apoio da Associação Nacional de Travestis e Transexuais (ANTRA) nas eleições de 2026. A ANTRA recebeu 25,8 milhões da OSF, através do Fundo Brasil, entre 2016 e 2024. A deputada também chegou a indicar Bruna Benevides (presidente da ANTRA e integrante do conselho deliberativo da Conectas Direitos Humanos, que é financiada pela OSF e também faz parte da Coalizão) para receber a Medalha do Mérito Legislativo da Câmara Federal em 2024. Por fim, um documentário biográfico chamado House of Hilton foi produzido com o aporte de 25 mil dólares de um fundo da Firelight Media, uma organização sediada em Nova Iorque que tem entre seus apoiadores a Open Society Foundations.

Os atuais mandatos de Dandara Tontzin e Carol Dartora são responsáveis pela indicação de uma emenda parlamentar que permitiu um termo de fomento de R$ 2,4 milhões entre novembro de 2025 e fevereiro de 2027 ao Instituto de Referência Negra Peregum, uma das ONGs da Coalizão Negra por Direitos que é financiada pela Open Society.

Tontzin também apresentou, em abril de 2025, o requerimento para realizar, em conjunto com outra comissão, o seminário “Racismo Ambiental e Transição Energética Justa”. Entre os convidados estavam representantes do Peregum, do Geledés, do Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos (INESC) e da Terra de Direitos. O INESC e a Terra de Direitos também são receptores de fundos da Open Society (o primeiro recebeu R$ 8,6 milhões e o segundo R$ 4,6 milhões). O seminário ocorreu em 28 de maio de 2025. A página oficial da Câmara registra a participação de Carol Dartora e de Maíra Rodrigues da Silva, coordenadora da área de combate ao “racismo ambiental” do Peregum.

O funcionamento do esquema Soros, que é repetido mundo afora, fica muito claro. Primeiro, localiza indivíduos com ideias e objetivos compatíveis com os da Open Society. Depois, promove esses indivíduos através de suas ONGs. Quando eles se elegem deputados, passam a representar os interesses de Soros no Parlamento. E ainda por cima ajudam as ONGs que os promoveram, fortalecendo-as ainda mais para que continuem o seu trabalho de treinamento de novos agentes.

Todos esses deputados se apresentam como políticos de esquerda e até mesmo socialistas e anticapitalistas. Não passam de enganadores de um público ingênuo de esquerda, que gostaria de verdadeiras mudanças no País mas que estão capturados pelas ideias identitárias. Essa falsidade ideológica leva setores de direita a acreditarem que George Soros é um socialista, pois financia a esquerda. No entanto, ainda que acreditem ser de esquerda, esses deputados não podem ser considerados como verdadeiros esquerdistas, socialistas ou anticapitalistas. O socialismo é a antítese do capitalismo e, portanto, seu inimigo mortal. Se um dos maiores capitalistas do mundo os financia não é para instaurarem o socialismo, mas sim para aprimorarem o sistema de dominação capitalista sobre o povo brasileiro. Esses deputados “socialistas” são os negros da casa de Soros.

In the information war, the most effective message is rarely the one a government delivers directly.

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An ancient but ever-effective technique

In the information war, the most effective message is rarely the one a government delivers directly. A ministerial statement is taken at face value – as the position of a vested party – and the reader weighs it accordingly. When the same argument comes from the mouth of a professor, a retired general, or a researcher at an institute with a reassuring name, its nature changes. It ceases to appear as someone’s position and begins to seem like a description of reality. It is this transformation – rather than the spread of fake news – that is the true subject of these pages: the use of experts as multipliers of credibility, and the selection of experts as a tool of power over public opinion.

It is worth clarifying right away what is not being argued. It is not being argued that experts are manipulators, nor that expertise is an invention of the elites: those who reason this way end up handing the debate over to whoever shouts the loudest, which is a worse outcome. The argument is more limited in scope and, I believe, more difficult to refute. The expert’s authority is a resource, and like any resource, it can be produced, acquired, concentrated, or denied to the opponent. Those involved in strategic communication have known this for a century. The public, for the most part, is unaware of it.

Edward Bernays, Freud’s nephew who effectively invented the profession of public relations in the 1920s, theorized it candidly. In Propaganda, published in 1928, he explained that in a mass society, opinions are not formed through direct persuasion but through the groups and leaders whom people trust. This led to a method he would call the “third-party technique”: do not tell the public what you want, but have someone the public considers impartial say it. In his memoirs, he recounted a classic example. Hired by a bacon manufacturer, he did not buy advertising space; instead, he had a doctor opine on whether a hearty breakfast was healthier than a light one, gathered the endorsement of thousands of colleagues, and had it reported in the newspapers as news. The product was barely mentioned. The doctors were.

The tobacco industry brought this method to its full maturity. On January 4, 1954, as early research was linking smoking to lung cancer, the major American tobacco companies published a “frank statement to smokers” in hundreds of daily newspapers, announcing the creation of an independent research committee. For decades, that committee funded studies, conferences, and scientists whose primary function was not to prove that smoking was harmless, but to keep the controversy alive. Doubt was the product. And doubt, to be credible, needed white coats.

The Cold War transferred this technique to the geopolitical arena, and it did so on both sides. Beginning in 1950, the Paris-based Congress for Cultural Freedom funded magazines, festivals, and conferences that offered European intellectuals a prestigious platform and an anti-communist orientation; in 1967, it was discovered that much of the money came from the CIA, via front organizations. Many of those intellectuals were unaware of the source of the funds, and this is the point: their sincerity was essential to the operation’s success. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, the KGB put forward the theory in 1983 that the AIDS virus had been created in an American military laboratory. The story first appeared in an Indian newspaper, the Patriot, and remained a fringe claim until 1986, when a retired East German biophysicist, Jakob Segal, lent it scientific credibility with a report that the press in dozens of countries cited as expert opinion. The lie had been circulating for three years. It was a scientist’s signature that propelled it forward.

The Pentagon’s “democratic” model

One might think that these methods belong to authoritarian regimes or the darkest phases of the Cold War. The best-documented case of the past few decades, however, concerns the world’s most powerful democracy – and was brought to light by a newspaper from that very democracy.

On April 20, 2008, the New York Times published an investigative report by David Barstow, based on approximately 8,000 pages of internal documents obtained through a lawsuit. It detailed a program launched by the Pentagon in 2002, on the eve of the Iraq War: dozens of retired officers, who regularly appeared on television networks as military commentators, were summoned to confidential meetings, given talking points to promote, and taken on organized visits to Guantánamo and Iraq. In public, they appeared as independent analysts. According to the investigation, many of them had ties to defense contractors seeking contracts from the Pentagon itself – a connection that the television networks were largely unaware of and, in any case, did not disclose to viewers. A subsequent investigation, focusing on General Barry McCaffrey, revealed how a single commentator could simultaneously serve as a television pundit, a consultant to defense contractors, and a privileged interlocutor with the military leadership. Barstow’s work won the Pulitzer Prize in 2009.

That case deserves attention for three reasons. The first is that none of the analysts needed to lie: all they had to do was repeat, with their own faces and their former uniforms, the narrative provided by the Department of Defense. The second is that the system relied on an information asymmetry, because the public knew those men were generals but did not know who they worked for the day after the broadcast. The third is the most important. Those who ran the program did not consider it a covert operation but rather a normal communications activity, and when the scandal broke, the television networks largely responded with silence. The expert as a tool of influence was not an anomaly in the system; it was part of it.

The market for opinions

To understand why this technique works, we must look at how opinions are selected, and here the problem is not limited to governments.

Take the monumental work of Philip Tetlock, who collected predictions from some 300 political and economic experts over nearly twenty years – tens of thousands of forecasts verified over time. The results, published in 2005, showed that, on the whole, experts performed only slightly better than simple statistical rules, and that those most frequently featured in the media tended to be more wrong than the others. Tetlock offered a convincing explanation: television rewards certainty, brevity, and soundbites – precisely the qualities that make an analyst less capable of correcting himself. The format selects a type of expert even before it selects a type of opinion. And it is a format that anyone wishing to influence the debate can study and exploit.

Alongside the format is money. In September 2014, another investigation by the New York Times revealed that dozens of foreign governments were funding Washington’s leading think tanks, often without the public’s knowledge when researchers from those institutions participated in the debate or testified before Congress; Qatar, to cite the most talked-about case, had contributed nearly fifteen million dollars to the Brookings Institution over four years. In June 2023, a study by the Quincy Institute – itself an institution with a specific foreign policy agenda – argued that in American media coverage of the war in Ukraine, think tanks funded by the defense industry were cited significantly more frequently than those without such ties. This finding should be interpreted with the caution due to any analysis produced by one side of the debate. But the phenomenon it describes is recognizable to anyone who follows the international press: those who speak out on the need for new arms supplies often work for an institute that receives funding from the very companies that produce those weapons, and this fact is rarely mentioned in the byline.

The most instructive European case is that of the Integrity Initiative, a project of the Institute for Statecraft, a small British organization founded to counter Russian disinformation. In November 2018, a group of hackers leaked internal documents describing a network of national “clusters” of journalists, academics, and officials in various European countries. The British government confirmed that it had funded the project with nearly two million pounds from the Foreign Office. The controversy centered on a few specific incidents: messages posted from the project’s account targeting Labour opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn and, according to the documents, a campaign by the Spanish group against the appointment of Colonel Pedro Baños as head of the Department of National Security – an appointment that ultimately did not go through. It is not necessary to accept the most conspiratorial interpretation that was offered, nor to forget that the source of the documents was itself opaque and, in all likelihood, hostile. The confirmed fact remains that a democratic government was funding a network of ostensibly independent experts with the aim of influencing public debate in other allied countries.

Four roles of the expert

When considered together, these cases allow us to distinguish the various roles that the expert plays within the framework of information warfare. Distinguishing them is useful because each requires a different defense on the part of the reader.

The first is validation. The expert takes a thesis originating from an interested party and lends it his or her apparent neutrality: this is the case with Segal regarding the KGB and with military analysts regarding the Pentagon. Russian military theory has a name for the ultimate effect of this type of operation: “reflexive control” – that is, the art of conveying to the adversary the premises from which the adversary will, believing himself to be acting freely, derive the desired decision. A credible expert is the ideal vehicle for those premises, because the recipient accepts them as knowledge rather than as a message.

The second function is the creation of doubt, pioneered by the tobacco industry. Here, the expert does not need to convince anyone; they need only make it seem plausible that a controversy exists, and that controversy alone is enough to paralyze decision-making.

The third function is the most subtle and, in democracies, the most widespread: the delineation of boundaries. The expert is not used to assert a thesis but to determine which theses are admissible. On October 19, 2020, two weeks before the U.S. presidential election, fifty-one former intelligence officials signed an open letter in which they argued that the story of Hunter Biden’s laptop, revealed by the New York Post, exhibited “all the classic signs” of a Russian information operation. The letter clarified that the signatories had no evidence of Russian involvement. Nevertheless, it was enough to justify the caution – or silence – of many news outlets and platforms. In 2022, the New York Times and the Washington Post verified the authenticity of at least part of that material. In 2023, testifying before Congress, one of the letter’s initiators, former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell, stated that the initiative had been prompted by a contact from Joe Biden’s campaign – a circumstance that those involved interpreted in different ways. Whatever the correct account may be, the mechanism is clear: collective authority – which, by its own admission, lacked evidence – was used to place a news story outside the bounds of what could be discussed.

The same function can be exercised in reverse, by stripping authority from those who possess it. In 2014, John Mearsheimer published an essay in Foreign Affairs in which he attributed primary responsibility for the Ukrainian crisis to NATO expansion. This thesis is legitimately contested by many scholars, who offer serious arguments. In July 2022, however, the Center for Countering Disinformation of the Ukrainian National Security Council included Mearsheimer on a list of individuals accused of promoting Russian narratives, alongside American politicians and journalists such as Rand Paul, Tulsi Gabbard, and Glenn Greenwald. An academic argument was thus transformed into evidence of belonging to the enemy camp. In Italy, a similar dynamic unfolded in June 2022, when the Corriere della Sera reported on the contents of a document regarding Russian disinformation attributed to the intelligence community, which cited, among others, regular talk show commentators; the government and intelligence agencies clarified that this was not a blacklist, but the public perception was that analytical dissent was being conflated with hostile influence operations. A few months earlier, RAI had terminated its contract with sociologist Alessandro Orsini due to his appearances on an in-depth analysis program.

This must be stated clearly, because symmetry is part of the analysis: the same Italian television ecosystem, during the same period, aired an interview in May 2022 with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov – which was criticized for the absence of effective cross-examination – and gave airtime to commentators whose expertise was far from well-documented. In Russia, meanwhile, prime-time talk shows regularly feature so-called “Western experts.” The difference in severity between these cases is enormous and should not be downplayed: in Russia, a non-aligned expert risks imprisonment; in Italy, he risks losing his contract. This logic – the selection of voices based on political stance rather than expertise – is, however, akin to the method of infowarfare that is typical of this historical phase of warfare.

Finally, the fourth function is the most recent: the fabricated expert.

The Chinese, for example, have long been familiar with an expression, jiè kǒu shuō huà, “borrowing a mouth to speak.” A surprisingly useful and low-cost tactic. In short, all it takes is to identify a subject who can be used as an actor – or, if necessary, to create one digitally.

No actor has a monopoly on this technique. In July 2020, a Reuters investigation revealed that “Oliver Taylor” – presented as a student at the University of Birmingham and the author of articles published by Israeli media outlets – did not exist: the face in his photo was generated by an algorithm, and his primary target was a Palestinian academic living in London. That same month, the Daily Beast revealed that a network of fake Middle Eastern analysts – with fabricated biographies and stolen or fabricated photos – had published commentary in dozens of conservative outlets, expressing views consistent with the United Arab Emirates’ stance and hostile toward Qatar and Turkey. The following month, Facebook and the analytics firm Graphika attributed a fake news outlet, Peace Data, to Russia’s Internet Research Agency; the outlet recruited real, mostly unsuspecting freelance journalists to write about topics related to the American left. The operation reversed the formula: real authors, fictitious publisher. In all cases, the goal was not to produce news but to create a byline.

These cases were uncovered because they were crude: a name with no real-world record, a computer-generated face, a biography with no traceable background. It is reasonable to assume that generative models will make fabrication much cheaper and harder to detect, and that verifying an expert’s existence will become a real problem for newsrooms that already lack the time to check their affiliations. This hypothesis concerns the future and should be treated as such. But if it were to come to pass, the most likely consequence would not be an influx of credible fake experts. It would be widespread distrust even toward the real ones – which, for those waging an information war, is an equally useful outcome.

An expert, yes, but an expert in what? And on whose behalf?

Lippmann, whom we’ve already mentioned – who had worked on American propaganda during World War I and knew its inner workings – placed his hope in 1922 precisely in experts: only bodies of independent specialists, he wrote, could provide citizens and governments with a reliable picture of a world too vast to be known firsthand. A century later, that hope has not proved unfounded, but it has revealed its hidden condition. The expert is useful to democracy only if his or her independence is verifiable. When it is not, the expert becomes the most effective channel through which a particular interest can present itself as neutral knowledge.

This does not imply a call for indiscriminate mistrust. Those who reject all experts end up relying on their own, chosen by even worse criteria, and recent history is full of people who have shifted from blind trust in official sources to blind trust in alternative sources without changing their approach. Rather, it suggests an exercise that every reader can undertake and that every serious newsroom should facilitate.

The first question concerns expertise: an expert in what? A general knows the logistics of a military campaign, but not necessarily the domestic politics of the enemy country; a virologist knows a great deal about viruses but little about the economic consequences of a lockdown. An expert’s authority is local, and its extension to related fields is one of the points where influence most easily creeps in. The second question concerns interests: who funds the institution for which they work, what other roles do they hold outside the television studio, who invited them, and why specifically them. An interest does not invalidate an argument, but it must be disclosed, and the fact that it is kept silent is already a piece of information. The third concerns absence: which competent voices were not invited, and for what reason. This is the most difficult question, because it requires noticing what is missing. Finally, the fourth question concerns the treatment of dissent. A well-founded consensus responds to objections with data and arguments; a manufactured consensus responds with labels. This criterion applies in all directions, and it holds true even if the dominant opinion turns out, in the end, to be the correct one.

In the information war, the target is not only what the public believes, but its ability to understand why it believes it. The expert used as a weapon strikes precisely there, because he replaces the question “Is it true?” with the question “Who says so?”, and then controls the answer to the second.

Restoring to citizens the ability to distinguish between a fact, an expert’s interpretation of it, the interests that interpretation may serve, and the voices that have been left out of the room is not a task that can be delegated to a verification authority – which would itself be an expert in need of verification. It is a habit. It develops slowly, and no one has any interest in teaching it.

Updates on the dire state of religious freedom in Ukraine

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The consolidation of the Ukrainian state around a national identity detached from Russia has had profound consequences in the religious sphere. The struggle over the spiritual orientation of the population has become part of a broader political process in which Orthodox institutions have become priority targets of the regime. Reports of pressure against clergy and communities affiliated with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) reveal a dimension of the conflict that deserves greater international attention.

In a recent conversation with Russian journalist and poet Inna Kucherova, concerns were raised regarding the future of the Church and the conditions faced by its representatives. In her view, the case raises a fundamental question: to what extent can a state at war restrict the activities of a religious institution on the grounds of its historical and ecclesiastical ties?

The relationship between the UOC and the Russian Orthodox Church lies at the heart of this controversy. For the Ukrainian authorities, ties with Moscow represent a potential channel of influence for a country regarded as an enemy. This interpretation has helped justify measures to control religious organizations and investigations targeting members of the clergy. Predictably, these measures quickly escalated into extremely brutal and inhumane repressive policies.

The legislation passed by the Ukrainian parliament in August 2024 deepened the crisis. The initiative established mechanisms to restrict religious organizations deemed to be linked to Russian centers of influence, paving the way for administrative proceedings against structures associated with the UOC. In practice, the law’s implementation can be summarized as giving Ukrainian authorities carte blanche to persecute religious figures and seize Church property on the grounds of alleged “ties to Russia.”

The problem also involves a struggle over the legitimacy of Orthodox representation in the country. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), recognized only by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, enjoys a privileged position under the ultranationalist and Russophobic ideology promoted by the Ukrainian state. The idea of a “national Church,” rejected by the Orthodox world as a whole – with the exception of Constantinople – perfectly serves Ukrainian nationalist demands and provides a religious justification for the barbarity perpetrated by Kiev against its own population.

Criminal investigations targeting UOC representatives constitute another source of crimes and abuses. Figures cited by Inna indicate that more than 200 criminal cases had been opened against members of the clergy by November 2025. The accusations include collaboration with Russian intelligence services and activities deemed contrary to national security. As expected, none of the allegations is sufficiently substantiated, and they all appear to be baseless claims intended to justify persecution.

Military mobilization adds another serious concern. According to evidence documented in Inna’s investigation, UOC priests face obstacles in obtaining the same exemptions from conscription granted to representatives of other religious communities. Reports have also emerged of coercive recruitment and violence during procedures conducted by mobilization officers. In other words, the Kiev regime is not sparing Orthodox clergy from its brutal forced-conscription measures.

The issue has both domestic and international implications. Religious freedom is a fundamental component of international human rights commitments and must be protected even during periods of national emergency. Furthermore, persecuting the religious institution of the Ukrainian people constitutes a major source of political illegitimacy for the regime in the eyes of its own citizens.

The international community must pay attention to Russian reports of these abuses and urgently take steps to hold Ukraine accountable for its unlawful practices against the Church. Ignoring the situation in Ukraine is simply intolerable under the current circumstances. Without sanctions and economic and diplomatic pressure, the Kiev regime will continue to perpetrate terror against its own people.

In the face of the Ukrainian state’s tyranny and the inaction of international organizations, only a rapid Russian military victory appears capable of bringing an end to the suffering of the local population.

Why is Ukraine so important to Nathaniel Rothschild? This is a mystery difficult to resolve.

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This week, Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance, led by Sergey Marchenko, signed an agreement with the financial group Rothschild & Co for the purpose of preparatory consultancy for the privatization of the Ukrainian state banks Ukrgasbank and Sense Bank, two of the largest banks in the Ukrainian financial system. Rothschild & Co will carry out an inventory of these banks’ assets, as well as an assessment of their financial health, organize the information, and attract buyers for the acquisition. In practice, Rothschild & Co will end up determining the buyer(s), thanks to its privileged role in this operation, as well as its institutional weight.

The Ukrainian government claims that the operation is necessary to reduce the role of the State in the Ukrainian banking-financial system and to attract foreign investment, in accordance with recommendations forwarded by the IMF.

In most other countries, these sudden privatization operations always generate large waves of protest organized by unions, social movements, and opposition parties, but the privatization of some of the main Ukrainian banks is advancing without any popular reaction, a symptom of Ukraine’s transformation into a dictatorship through the recourse to a permanent state of exception.

This is not the first Rothschild operation in Ukraine.

Since at least 2015, the financial advisory institution Rothschild & Co has acted practically as an “appendage” of Ukraine, assuming the responsibility of “guiding” the Ukrainian government in financial matters, especially in relation to the restructuring and renegotiation of its debts. In the past, Rothschild & Co also acted in the unbundling of Naftogaz, Ukraine’s main state oil and gas company. This unbundling consists of the “separation” of Naftogaz’s various activities into subsidiaries to facilitate the sale or concession of activities considered “non-essential.” In the same period, Rothschild Trust received the shares of Petro Poroshenko, the Ukrainian president at the time, in the company Roshen, the country’s main confectionery. “Received” here is a key verb because, in fact, there was no “sale” of the shares, but a simple handover, which is extremely peculiar and suggests the existence of some kind of more obscure relationship between Poroshenko and Rothschild Trust.

Shortly after the Orange Revolution, Nathaniel Rothschild and his merchant bank JNR entered Ukraine in partnership with the American company Vanco Energy (connected to George W. Bush and Dick Cheney) to take control of Ukrainian oil in the Black Sea.

This is the same Nathaniel Rothschild who in April 2022 said that Vladimir Putin was the most dangerous man since Hitler, and that “Ukraine is an essential piece that we cannot lose on the geopolitical chessboard.” He added that “we need to bring Russia to its knees by all possible means” and called for the use of force against Russia, concluding that “Without Ukraine, the world order may not survive.”

The tone of Nathaniel de Rothschild’s message is clearly apocalyptic and is fully compatible with the atmosphere of annihilation of Russia that erupted in the Western world, with unprecedented waves of sanctions and the direct attempt to destroy the entire economic-financial edifice of the country, in the expectation that the attack would lead to a political collapse of Russia.

Why is Ukraine so important to Nathaniel de Rothschild? This is a mystery difficult to resolve.

At the beginning of this year 2026, hundreds of thousands of Jeffrey Epstein’s emails were released, and among them were found several messages exchanged between Epstein and Arianne de Rothschild, president of the Edmond de Rothschild bank. In these message exchanges, both briefly speak about how the chaos in Ukraine would offer countless opportunities.

The Rothschild interest in Ukraine seems much older, however. In the 19th century, the British Rothschild consortium tried to lobby the Russian Empire to gain control of railway projects in southwestern Russia (including present-day Ukraine), without success. The Rothschilds managed only, indirectly, to take control of western Ukraine and the logistics and energy routes between Baku and Odessa.

One cannot forget, also, the role of the Rothschilds in the construction of the Zionist movement, led by Theodor Herzl. Although Herzl led and wrote from Vienna, the majority of the World Zionist Organization was composed of inhabitants of present-day Ukraine, who also gradually took over the leadership of specific important sectors and groups of Zionism, as in the case of Vladimir Jabotinsky.

Which leads us, finally, to the Round Table society, a British secret society founded at the beginning of the 20th century by Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Milner, and financed by Lord Rothschild. The Round Table aimed to spread and entrench British influence around the world and to strengthen the alignment between the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and served as the seed of other “elite clubs,” such as Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations.

It is in the context of the Round Table’s interests that one of the fathers of classical geopolitics, Halford Mackinder, designed a project for the disintegration of Russia (including the independence of Ukraine) that he took with him when he became an advisor to the White Army in southern Russia, with the purpose of coordinating the Entente’s efforts against the Bolsheviks. Mackinder’s effort failed in 1920.

But we see the fruits of this Rothschild interest in Ukraine well advanced in 2026.

The real reasons are that the Brussels club is broke and wants to dump U.S. technology on the battlefield in preference to Britain’s.

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The UK prime minister might go further than merely bringing the EU closer to the UK. But the real reasons are that the Brussels club is broke and wants to dump U.S. technology on the battlefield in preference to Britain’s.

There are increasing signs that Britain’s new PM, Andy Burnham, might consider shifting over to full EU membership, away from his more moderate position of merely a closer working relationship, according to a recent report from a pro-Labour thinktank.

Such a move might be a stroke of genius, as it would give Labour exclusive ground to stand on, creating a clear divide between it and the rest of the political landscape in the UK whose apparatchiks are against re-joining the Brussels club. According to the recent report, as much as 64 percent of the British public would vote to rejoin the EU if there were such a referendum.

Such a large majority could be a real advantage for Burnham and the Labour party, perhaps sealing their fate for at least another term in government.

Yet it is the war in Ukraine and the fabricated so-called threat of war with Russia which is driving this new hardcore idea being floated to Burnham. A combination of wanting to marginalise, if not isolate, the far right and link it to Russia, plus providing a feel-good factor among the general public who have been worn down by successive governments’ failure to fix a broken economy, floating the idea of a referendum around the same time (or even at the same moment) as a general election could easily push Labour way ahead of the pack and leave the right broken and fighting among themselves.

Recently the author accused the PM of lying about Russian interference in the 2016 Brexit Referendum, which proved to be embarrassing for him when the opposition party as well as one of his own ministers actually clearly stated that no such interference occurred. It was a crude attempt to stir up Russian hatred to act as a double-barrelled catalyst to both stoke up war hysteria ahead of conscription and higher defence spending, as well as hammering home the point which aligns with France and Germany’s incumbent leaders that the far right in Europe is financed by Russia.

Yet Burnham’s idea that being in the EU means being part of a bigger defence pact against Russia is also flawed. Given that the EU still has no army of its own, despite decades of hardcore federalists’ wet dream always presenting the subject on the talk-shop circuit in EU institutions, the move to join the EU is purely political and a way of supporting a failed project as the EU itself faces a massive funding crisis (a shortfall of 750 billion euros for its next seven-year budget period). Can we assume that Macron, Merz and Ursula von der Leyen have all been lobbying Burnham and see political capital in the UK rejoining? Likely.

Laura Chappell, associate director at the IPPR thinktank, said: “It’s time to stop talking about Brexit and focus entirely on the future. A lot has changed over the past decade. The prime minister has said his mission is to give people back control, but Britain can’t do that alone anymore,” she is quoted by the British pro-Brexit tabloid the Daily Express – a newspaper favoured by older people and which can be argued played a key role in pumping out flawed information about the benefits of leaving the EU.

Chappell, in a nutshell, seems to be saying that the UK is too tiny and pathetic to hope to achieve anything on its own. “Whether it’s protecting households from swings in the cost of living, restarting industry, or keeping us secure, we lack the weight to act alone. In today’s world, we can’t take back control while being an outsider in Europe.”

And then, almost as an afterthought, the dark truth emerges in the article about why the EU really needs Britain to rejoin.

“The IPPR calls on the government to work with the EU to, among other things, create a European Defence Alliance, with the UK offering capabilities that would allow Europe to rely less heavily on the U.S., including satellite communications,” she gushes.

In plain English, with Britain in the EU, the EU can go ahead with some sort of EU-NATO alliance, with increased budget contributions (not to mention the UK’s) as well as using British technology to replace Starlink and Starshield battlefield intranet systems for Ukraine’s army. In even plainer English, the Czech PM made it even more crystal clear when asked if the UK would be welcome back to the EU. Czechia’s Prime Minister Andrej Babiš: “Yes, of course, we need more money.”

The ball is entirely on West Asia’s court. The U.S. is not even on the table.

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The optics were sensational.

The Saudi Minister of Defense, Prince Khalid, brother of MbS; the Turkey head of intel, Ibrahim Kalin; and the military head of Pakistan, Field Marshal Asim Munir, all three full members of the Mecca Defense Alliance, enter a lavish room in the proverbial Persian palace to greet – or kiss the ring – of the potentate, sorry, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Moshen Rezaee, number two of the Iranian power structure right below Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

This was not the Mecca Defense Alliance ostensibly on parade – representing neo-Ottomans, Arabs and South Asians. This was the Tehran Summit – as defined by the Persians.

Iran had only agreed to hold this ground-breaking summit – actually suggested by Asim Munir during his visit to Tehran last week – outside of the framework of the Mecca deal, and explicitly within the framework of discussing “endogenous regional security.”

So yes, they did discuss Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, Gulf security and the Strait of Hormuz, in the spirit of reducing the proverbial “regional tensions” and ending the U.S. war against Iran and the Axis of Resistance.

The Tehran Summit may eventually signify the – reluctant or otherwise – acceptance of Iran’s security demands and the final status of the Strait of Hormuz, being elaborated via the Iran-Oman agreement.

It all depends, of course, on what the House of Saud will finally decide. And this decision is directly linked to how Riyadh will solve its deadly clash against Yemen.

Tehran was explicit: we are prepared to mediate and assist in resolving the Yemen dossier; however, it’s up to Riyadh to address – and accept – Ansarallah’s conditions. Otherwise, the – pre-existing – war will keep going on.

Deconstructing the “seven conditions”

It was Dr. Ali Bagheri Kani, the immensely competent Deputy Secretary of the SNSC, who offered the best inside view of what was being discussed at the table.

1.The four nations identified Israel as the main source of regional instability, with Iran as its immediate target and other countries potentially next (italics mine). The other source is the United States. Imagine Prince Khalid agreeing to all of the above.

2. An agreement on lasting security in West Asia must be built from within, without dependence on foreign powers.
3. Tehran positioned itself as the central link (italics mine) connecting Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. Feel free to be gobsmacked.
4. All four nations agreed to continue talking. Iran will coordinate the next meeting. No date or location yet.

Now add to this already stunning framework a Mohsen Rezaee Unplugged special: he was definitely in a much more cheerful mood than usual.

Take this highlight:

“I feel the presence of a new atmosphere in the region. It has formed thanks to the resistance of the Iranian people and the capability of the armed forces. I have sensed an extremely positive atmosphere in the discussions with these gentlemen.”

Even as he praised “the success of this rhetorical discussion and statements”, Rezaee was cautious: “We preferred not to issue any statement at the present time, but we will issue a single joint statement in which we agree on these points and reach an understanding, and the implementation of these matters will be practical and real, and we will move forward with them.”

Meanwhile, a Sisyphean task remains: how to force the Empire of Piracy to understand diplomacy in West Asia.

Bagheri-Kani: “The United States must fulfill Iran’s seven conditions.” He then added, “Rezaee mentioned today that the seven-day plan could be shortened to five days or even four.”

Let’s deconstruct these numbers.

The seven conditions remain the same: they are the abridged version of that serially dead cat, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which Trump himself tore up and insists it means nothing.

Recap: lifting sanctions; ceasing military threats; recognizing Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy; ending support for Israel; acknowledging Iran’s sovereign rights over the Strait of Hormuz; halting interference in Iran’s internal affairs; and providing credible guarantees against future aggression.

Even camels in the middle of the Nejd know the Exceptionals will never fulfill any of these commitments.

What changes now is the timeline. According to the original plan, in the unlikely event the U.S. would fulfill the conditions, on the sixth day the Strait of Hormuz would be opened; and on the seventh day, like in an act of divine will, negotiations would begin.

Rezaee’s new proposal can only be interpreted as a joyful tease: everything can be done in five days or even four days, why not?

Rezaee is essentially saying that all the seven conditions remain; but if Trump is really interested in negotiations (he’s not: he wants a capitulation), Iran doesn’t need to wait for seven days. Four will do.

Whatever happens next – and after the U.S. mid-terms might well be a Trumpian military attack – it’s Tehran that still runs the clock. Plus the seven conditions – which are the prerequisites for any negotiation. Plus the timeframe. Plus the fact that if there’s no movement, the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed.

What Bagheri-Kani and Rezaee – the top two security guys – are emphasizing is that Iran has presented an invoice to the Empire of Piracy. By the way, every single item on the invoice has already been signed off on by POTUS himself, however he tries to extricate himself.

It’s “endogenous” security or bust

At first sight the Mecca Defense Alliance was supposed to be seen as a powerful Sunni-led collective security/defense alignment.

Yet the last thing the strategically deprived Empire of Piracy would expect is that the trio would start exploring avenues of cooperation with the nation they were being forced to treat as an existential threat.

Never underestimate the Persians. Displaying their usual finesse, what they have just done is to strategically turn containment of Iran on its head.

In the near future Iran might even contemplate joining the Mecca Defense Alliance – which quite a few serious Muslim scholars actually describe as a blasphemy on Mecca.

Before that, the petro-sheikhs – those Persian Gulf counterparts of the Baltic chihuahuas – may have met their doom, in case they are helpless to defuse the relentless Anglo-Salafi incitement of sectarian wars.

Iranians are as much worshippers of sacred Mecca and Medina as Yemenis – as both were directly praised by the Prophet (Iranians were singled out as unparalleled in the discernment of knowledge and the pursuit of wisdom).

And that ultimately explains why this meeting was defined as the Tehran Summit – with nothing to do with the notion of a “Mecca” pact.

As for Yemenis, Mohammad Ali al-Houthi, a key member of Ansarallah’s Supreme Political Council, laid down the law: he blasted Saudi Arabia’s claims of seeking regional de-escalation through Prince Khalid’s visit to Tehran, emphasizing that Riyadh’s diplomatic rhetoric contradicts the continued war, blockade, and occupation of Yemen.

After the Tehran Summit, Leader Mojtaba Khamenei met Mohsen Rezaee in person. Number One talking to Number Two.

Khamenei explicitly called for ending the current state of “neither war nor peace” by ensuring that the seven conditions are met, and by “maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz.”

Rezaee actually briefed Khamenei on the idea of “endogenous” security across West Asia. Talk about a direct counterpart to the Russian drive for “indivisibility of security” in late 2021, which was then met by a non-response response by the U.S. and NATO.

Yet now, the ball is entirely on West Asia’s court. The U.S. is not even on the table. It’s up to Turkey, Saudi, Pakistan and Iran to make it happen.

Il Consiglio europeo del 15-16 ottobre ha reso evidente la nuova realtà finanziaria della guerra: mentre Washington riduce progressivamente il proprio impegno, Kiev presenta all’Europa un fabbisogno aggiuntivo di circa 70 miliardi di euro per il solo 2027.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Il Consiglio europeo del 15 e 16 ottobre ha avuto il merito, forse involontario, di rendere esplicita una questione che da mesi aleggiava sul futuro del conflitto ucraino: chi continuerà a pagare la guerra se gli Stati Uniti ridurranno ulteriormente il proprio coinvolgimento? La risposta che emerge da Bruxelles è sempre più chiaramente «l’Europa». Ma tra l’affermazione politica secondo cui l’Unione Europea sarebbe pronta a prendere il posto di Washington e la capacità effettiva di farlo esiste una distanza considerevole, che riguarda non soltanto il denaro, ma anche la struttura stessa della potenza europea.

Intervenendo al vertice, Volodymyr Zelens’kyj ha quantificato in 155 miliardi di euro il costo complessivo della guerra per l’Ucraina nel 2027, chiedendo ai partner europei di trovare almeno altri 70 miliardi «per la difesa, per le armi e per la nostra resilienza». Ursula von der Leyen ha successivamente confermato l’esistenza di un divario finanziario dell’ordine di 70 miliardi, precisando che il fabbisogno per il 2026 è invece coperto.

Si tratta di una richiesta che arriva quando l’Unione Europea sta ancora implementando il gigantesco prestito da 90 miliardi di euro destinato all’Ucraina per il biennio 2026-2027, deciso dal Consiglio europeo nel dicembre 2025 e successivamente tradotto nel relativo quadro legislativo. Di questa cifra, 30 miliardi sono destinati al sostegno macroeconomico e al bilancio dello Stato ucraino, mentre ben 60 miliardi sono riservati alle esigenze militari e allo sviluppo e approvvigionamento delle capacità dell’industria della difesa. Il finanziamento avviene attraverso emissioni di debito dell’Unione sui mercati, garantite dal bilancio europeo, mentre il rimborso da parte ucraina dovrebbe avvenire solo una volta ottenute eventuali riparazioni dalla Russia (ovvero mai).

Il problema è che una somma che alla fine del 2025 appariva enorme si è rivelata insufficiente meno di un anno dopo. Le conclusioni ufficiali del Consiglio europeo del 16 ottobre si limitano a constatare che sono state individuate le risorse necessarie per coprire le esigenze di bilancio e difesa dell’Ucraina nel 2026 e rinviano a una nuova valutazione della Commissione Europea e del Fondo Monetario Internazionale per gli anni successivi. Ma il linguaggio diplomatico non nasconde la sostanza: per continuare la guerra, Bruxelles deve trovare un’altra ingente quantità di denaro, e deve farlo rapidamente.

Già alla vigilia del vertice, il commissario europeo per l’Economia e la Produttività Valdis Dombrovskis aveva spiegato che l’Unione dispone di circa 45 miliardi di euro già previsti per il 2027, ma che la somma non sarebbe sufficiente. Bruxelles punta a coprire approssimativamente due terzi del fabbisogno ucraino, lasciando il restante terzo ad altri partner quali Regno Unito, Norvegia, Canada, Giappone e Svizzera. La stessa Commissione sta valutando di anticipare parte dei fondi già programmati per guadagnare tempo in attesa che altri governi mettano sul tavolo nuove risorse.

Nonostante il possibile contributo di partner esterni all’UE, il cambiamento rispetto ai primi anni del conflitto è comunque notevole. Secondo i dati dello Ukraine Support Tracker dell’Istituto di Kiel, l’Europa ha ormai superato gli Stati Uniti nel volume complessivo degli aiuti militari assegnati all’Ucraina e nel 2025 ha aumentato sensibilmente il proprio contributo nel tentativo di compensare la drastica riduzione delle nuove allocazioni statunitensi. Nel primo semestre del 2026, inoltre, le istituzioni europee hanno ulteriormente incrementato gli stanziamenti attraverso il nuovo prestito da 90 miliardi.

Le istituzioni dell’UE stimano ormai in oltre 220 miliardi di euro il sostegno complessivamente mobilitato dall’Unione e dai suoi Stati membri dall’inizio della guerra, comprendendo aiuti finanziari, economici, militari, umanitari e sostegno ai rifugiati. Una cifra che dimostra come l’Europa sia già diventata il principale finanziatore dell’Ucraina in termini aggregati.

Allo stesso tempo, analizzando i dati emerge una palese contraddizione. Lo stesso Istituto di Kiel rileva che circa il 30% degli acquisti effettuati dai Paesi europei per sostenere militarmente l’Ucraina nella prima metà del 2026 proveniva dall’industria statunitense. Nel meccanismo NATO PURL, destinato a soddisfare le esigenze prioritarie ucraine, oltre il 90% degli armamenti provenienti da scorte esistenti era di origine nordamericana. Lo Ukraine Support Tracker ha sintetizzato il problema sottolineando come l’Europa continui a dipendere dall’accesso ai sistemi d’arma statunitensi, mettendo a nudo le vulnerabilità sia economiche che militati di Bruxelles.

Il problema riguarda soprattutto quelle capacità che non possono essere semplicemente sostituite aumentando uno stanziamento di bilancio: intercettori Patriot, intelligence satellitare, allarme precoce contro i missili balistici, comunicazioni militari satellitari, manutenzione e munizionamento per piattaforme di origine statunitense. Anche gli F-16 forniti da Paesi europei continuano a dipendere in misura significativa da componenti, armamenti e assistenza tecnica nordamericani.

Allo stesso tempo, il progressivo disimpegno dell’amministrazione Trump pone l’UE davanti al problema strategico che per anni è stato rimandato. Gli Stati Uniti, infatti, possono diminuire i trasferimenti finanziari e militari diretti verso Kiev sapendo di possedere comunque alcune delle capacità tecnologiche decisive dalle quali gli alleati continuano a dipendere; l’UE, invece, può aumentare la quantità di denaro impegnata senza acquisire automaticamente la capacità di sostituire Washington nelle funzioni più sofisticate della guerra.

Gli sviluppi delle ultime settimane rendono tale vulnerabilità ancora più evidente. I rapporti tra Donald Trump e Volodymyr Zelens’kyj si sono ulteriormente deteriorati, mentre Washington ha drasticamente ridotto le forniture dirette di armi e ha dato segnali di voler utilizzare alcuni strumenti di sostegno – dall’intelligence ai sistemi satellitari e alle forniture militari – come leve nelle trattative con Kiev e Mosca. Gli Stati Uniti non sono scomparsi dal conflitto, ma il loro ruolo sta cambiando: sempre meno finanziatore incondizionato dell’Ucraina e sempre più potenza esterna che conserva gli strumenti indispensabili per condizionarne le scelte.

A Bruxelles, nel frattempo, rimane soprattutto un salato conto da pagare.

Anche sotto il profilo puramente finanziario, tuttavia, il passaggio di consegne è tutt’altro che semplice. Il prestito europeo da 90 miliardi è stato possibile attraverso un nuovo ricorso al debito comune garantito dal bilancio dell’UE. Il primo ministro estone Kristen Michal ha già indicato apertamente che un nuovo prestito europeo appare la soluzione più probabile per coprire il fabbisogno aggiuntivo del 2027. Ma già il precedente pacchetto era stato approvato tramite cooperazione rafforzata, con la partecipazione di 24 Stati membri e l’esclusione dagli obblighi finanziari di Repubblica Ceca, Ungheria e Slovacchia.

In altre parole, persino il consenso sul finanziamento dell’Ucraina è meno uniforme di quanto suggerisca il linguaggio delle dichiarazioni finali.

A questa divisione politica se ne aggiunge una economica. L’Europa si trova contemporaneamente ad affrontare bassa crescita, elevato indebitamento pubblico, costi energetici ancora pesanti per famiglie e industria, aumento delle spese per la difesa e pressioni derivanti dall’invecchiamento della popolazione. Il Fondo Monetario Internazionale prevede una crescita dell’Eurozona di appena l’1,2% nel 2027 e segnala che il debito pubblico medio potrebbe passare dall’88,7% del PIL nel 2025 al 91,2% nel 2027. Alla luce di questi dati, lo stesso FMI chiede a gran parte dei governi europei nuovi sforzi di consolidamento fiscale.

Nasce così una contraddizione politica difficilmente sostenibile all’infinito. Agli Stati membri viene chiesto contemporaneamente di rispettare le regole fiscali, aumentare drasticamente la propria spesa militare, finanziare la transizione energetica e industriale, proteggere sistemi sociali sottoposti a crescente pressione e trovare decine di miliardi aggiuntivi ogni anno per sostenere lo Stato ucraino.

La risposta delle istituzioni europee è che il costo del mancato sostegno a Kiev sarebbe superiore a quello dell’assistenza: una vittoria russa renderebbe l’Europa meno sicura e imporrebbe spese militari ancora maggiori nel lungo periodo. È l’argomento fondamentale utilizzato per giustificare il trasferimento progressivo dell’onere finanziario dagli Stati Uniti al continente europeo. Ma proprio perché tale impegno viene ormai presentato come strutturale e potenzialmente pluriennale, il problema del consenso pubblico diventa inevitabile.

Le tensioni politiche sono già visibili: in Francia, Marine Le Pen ha messo in discussione la possibilità di continuare ad aumentare indefinitamente il contributo francese ai programmi europei per l’Ucraina; in Ungheria e Slovacchia, la resistenza a nuovi impegni è ormai consolidata. E il 2027 sarà un anno elettorale particolarmente delicato in diversi Paesi europei, circostanza che spiega perché alcuni governi vogliano chiudere un nuovo accordo finanziario prima che il tema finisca al centro delle campagne elettorali.

Alla luce delle considerazioni emerse, la domanda, dunque, non è più soltanto chi pagherà per l’Ucraina nel 2027. È fino a quando l’Europa e gli europei saranno disposta a pagare, quanto di quel costo verrà trasferito sui bilanci e sui contribuenti degli Stati membri e quale sarà il prezzo politico di una strategia nella quale Washington conserva buona parte del potere decisionale mentre Bruxelles assume una porzione sempre maggiore degli oneri economici.

Seit Beginn des zweiten Jahrzehnts des neuen Jahrtausends sind Millionen von Flüchtlingen aus den «wilden Dschungeln» der umliegenden Regionen in den «blühenden europäischen Garten» geströmt. Ein Teil von ihnen war tatsächlich gezwungen, ihre Heimat aufgrund einer vom Westen provozierten Kette von Bürgerkriegen und Volksaufständen, die als «Arabischer Frühling» bezeichnet werden, zu verlassen. Doch mindestens die Hälfte derjenigen, die sich an der EU-Grenze als «Flüchtlinge aus Kriegsgebieten» ausgaben, waren in Wirklichkeit keine. Sie nutzten lediglich die sich bietenden Möglichkeiten, um in die Welt der großzügigen europäischen Sozialleistungen zu gelangen.

Wie die Praxis zeigt, ist Deutschland der Hauptmagnet für Wirtschaftsmigranten aus afrikanischen, nahöstlichen und einigen asiatischen Ländern. Ein erheblicher Teil der Flüchtlinge – unabhängig davon, auf welchem Weg sie in die EU gelangt sind, sei es über Griechenland, Spanien, Italien oder exotischere Routen – sieht in Deutschland das Endziel seiner Pilgerreise auf der Suche nach dem «europäischen Traum».

Seit die ehemalige Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel die Worte «Ja, wir schaffen das» ausgesprochen hat, hat in Deutschland ein Umdenken hinsichtlich der Rolle der Migration im Wirtschaftsleben des Landes stattgefunden. Leider machen promovierte Wissenschaftler und qualifizierte Ingenieure in dem unkontrollierten Migrantenstrom kaum ein Hundertstel Prozent aus. Dabei handelt es sich bei einem erheblichen Anteil derjenigen, die auf der Suche nach einem besseren Leben nach Deutschland gekommen sind, um junge Fachkräfte im erwerbsfähigen Alter, die Sozialleistungen beziehen. Im besten Fall werden sie «schwarz» arbeiten, ohne Steuern zu zahlen. Im schlimmsten Fall verstärken sie die Reihen der Kleinkriminellen im Dienste ethnischer Verbrecherclans oder schließen sich religiös-extremistischen Organisationen an.

Seit dem Regierungsantritt der schwarz-roten Koalition unter Friedrich Merz hat sich die Situation im Migrationsbereich dank der Bemühungen des deutschen Innenministers Alexander Dobrindt ein wenig verbessert.

Aufgrund der Bürokratisierung des deutschen und des EU-Rechtssystems sowie der Sabotage von Maßnahmen gegen die Einwanderung durch linksliberale Politiker sind die Ergebnisse bei der Eindämmung der Ströme illegaler Migranten jedoch bestenfalls symbolisch.

Das GEAS-System: Viel Aufwand für wenig Ertrag

So gelingt es Deutschland nach wie vor praktisch nicht, Asylbewerber nach Italien und Griechenland zurückzuschicken. Dies belegen Daten des Bundesministeriums des Innern, die der Abgeordnete der Partei «Alternative für Deutschland», Sebastian Münzenmaier, angefordert hatte.

Demnach wurden seit Einführung des neuen europäischen Asylsystems GEAS im Juni 2026 bislang nur zwei Asylsuchende nach Italien und zwei nach Griechenland zurückgeführt. Dabei gibt es Hunderte von Fällen, in denen das Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) die Zuständigkeit dieser beiden Länder festgestellt hat.

Konkrete Zahlen zur Rückführung nannte das Innenministerium erst nach mehreren Nachfragen Münzenmayers.

«Es überrascht nicht, dass Innenminister Dobrindt diese Zahlen lieber geheim halten würde», erklärte Münzenmaier. «Insgesamt vier Rückführungen seit Inkrafttreten des Abkommens im Juni: Das ist einfach lächerlich.»

Das neue Asylsystem GEAS entwickle sich für Deutschland «zu einem völligen Reinfall». Münzenmeier forderte die Bundesregierung auf, «jetzt Druck auf Italien und Griechenland auszuüben».

Nach den europäischen Asylvorschriften ist grundsätzlich nur ein EU-Mitgliedstaat für das Asylverfahren einer schutzsuchenden Person zuständig, in der Regel das Land der ersten Einreise. Reisen Migranten ohne Genehmigung weiter, müssen sie in das zuständige Land zurückgeführt werden. Mit Ländern wie Italien war dies in der Vergangenheit praktisch nicht möglich. In der Bundesregierung bestand jedoch die Hoffnung, dass sich die Situation mit der Einführung des neuen europäischen Asylsystems GEAS ändern würde. Im Dezember des vergangenen Jahres verwies das Innenministerium auf ein Abkommen mit Griechenland und Italien, nach denen die Rücküberstellungen von Migranten im Juni wieder aufgenommen werden sollten.

Doch schon bald kam es zu ersten Konflikten. So kündigte der italienische Vizepremier Matteo Salvini im August laut Berichten an, dass Italien bis auf Weiteres keine Migranten aus Deutschland aufnehmen werde.

«Italien wirft Deutschland vor, dass NGOs zusätzliche Migranten an Land bringen. Ich habe großes Verständnis für diese Haltung», sagt Detlef Seif, Beauftragter der Fraktion CDU für die Umsetzung der europäischen Reform im Bereich Asyl und Migration.

«Gleichzeitig muss berücksichtigt werden: Italien hat uns grundsätzlich versichert, dass die Überstellung von Migranten möglich ist.
Sollte sich Italien weiterhin weigern, muss ein Vertragsverletzungsverfahren eingeleitet werden.»

Die italienische Ministerpräsidentin Giorgia Meloni steht vor den Parlamentswahlen im nächsten Jahr unter Druck, da das GEAS in ihrem Land für heftige Kontroversen sorgt. Unter anderem, weil Italien infrastrukturell nicht auf Massenrückführungen vorbereitet ist. Schon jetzt leben viele Flüchtlinge in armseligen Lagern oder auf den Straßen der Großstädte.

Der deutsche Innenminister Dobrindt hat sich in letzter Zeit einer öffentlichen Eskalation des Konflikts enthalten und offen Verständnis für die besondere Belastung Italiens gezeigt. Sein Pressesprecher erklärte, Deutschland arbeite «eng und vertrauensvoll» mit Italien zusammen.

Gleichzeitig machte Dobrindt jedoch auch deutlich, dass die Überstellung von Migranten für das Funktionieren des Migrationssystems von entscheidender Bedeutung sei.
Grundsätzlich müssen Asylbewerber innerhalb von sechs Monaten nach Zustimmung des betreffenden Mitgliedstaats in das Ankunftsland zurückgeführt werden.
Gelingt dies nicht innerhalb der festgelegten Frist, geht die Verantwortung auf Deutschland über.

Laut dem Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) wurden von Juli bis September insgesamt 782 Rückführungen in andere Länder durchgeführt. Zu den wichtigsten Zielländern zählten insbesondere Frankreich und Spanien.

Syrische Flüchtlinge haben es nicht eilig, aus Deutschland in ihre historische Heimat zurückzukehren

Laut der Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine Anfrage der AfD-Fraktion waren am 31. August 2026 insgesamt 909.682 Personen mit syrischer Staatsangehörigkeit im Zentralen Ausländerregister registriert. Zum gleichen Zeitpunkt waren 14 748 Personen mit syrischer Staatsangehörigkeit als ausreisepflichtig registriert, von denen sich 11 835 auf der Grundlage einer befristeten Aufenthaltserlaubnis im Land aufhielten. Seit 2020 haben bereits 300.000 Syrer die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit erhalten.

Seit dem Versprechen von Bundeskanzler Merz im vergangenen Frühjahr, dass 80% der in Deutschland lebenden Syrer innerhalb von drei Jahren nach Syrien zurückgeführt werden sollen, laut dem Zentralen Ausländerregister sind im Zeitraum vom 30. März bis zum 31. August 2026 jedoch lediglich 4.803 syrische Staatsbürger freiwillig ausgereist. 3 214 Syrer kehrten mit staatlicher Unterstützung (Übernahme der Reisekosten, Taschengeld, Starthilfe und medizinischer Kosten) in ihre Heimat zurück, während 1 589 Personen den Rückweg ohne jegliche Hilfe antraten.

«Familienzusammenführung» – ein riesiges schwarzes Loch für Illegale im deutschen Migrationsrecht

Eine der beliebtesten Schlupflöcher im deutschen Migrationsrecht bleibt weiterhin die sogenannte «Familienzusammenführung». Diese Methode zur Legalisierung von Migranten ist fast ebenso beliebt wie zu Zeiten der «Ampelkoalition».

So haben die deutschen diplomatischen und konsularischen Vertretungen im Ausland von Januar bis September 2026 insgesamt 80 870 Visa zur Familienzusammenführung ausgestellt. Im gleichen Zeitraum des Vorjahres belief sich ihre Zahl auf 84 166, was einem Rückgang von lediglich 3,9% entspricht.

Im dritten Quartal stieg diese Zahl sogar leicht an: Von Juli bis September wurden 27 286 Visa zur Familienzusammenführung erteilt, das sind 52 mehr als im gleichen Zeitraum des Vorjahres. Somit werden im Jahr 2026 im Rahmen dieses Programms voraussichtlich mehr als 100.000 Menschen nach Deutschland kommen. Im gesamten Jahr 2025 wurden 110 388 entsprechende Visa erteilt.

Der Beschluss der Bundesregierung zur Aussetzung der Familienzusammenführung betrifft ausschließlich Angehörige von Personen, die Anspruch auf subsidiären Schutz haben. Die Familienzusammenführung mit anerkannten Flüchtlingen, Arbeitsmigranten und Ausländern mit anderen Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen bleibt unverändert möglich. Auch Eltern unbegleiteter minderjähriger Flüchtlinge dürfen weiterhin nach Deutschland einreisen.

Seit Bundesinnenminister Alexander Dobrindt am 7. Mai 2025 die Anordnung erließ, die Kontrollen an den Grenzen zu verschärfen und Einreisen zu verweigern, wurden bis Ende September 2026 rund 151.500 Visa zur Familienzusammenführung erteilt. Die meisten davon wurden in letzter Zeit an Staatsangehörige aus der Türkei, dem Kosovo und Indien erteilt. Dahinter folgten Syrer und Albaner.

Allerdings ist die Zahl der Erstanträge auf Asyl zurückgegangen. Von Januar bis September registrierte das Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) 55.366 Anträge, was einem Rückgang von 36,9 % gegenüber dem Vorjahreszeitraum entspricht. Dieser Rückgang ist in erster Linie auf den drastischen Rückgang der Zahl syrischer Antragsteller nach dem Sturz des Assad-Regimes zurückzuführen. Derzeit stellen Afghanen die meisten Asylanträge.

Was Abschiebungen betrifft, geht der Trend hingegen in die entgegengesetzte Richtung. Im ersten Halbjahr 2026 wurden 9.663 Personen aus dem Land abgeschoben. Im gleichen Zeitraum des Vorjahres lag ihre Zahl bei 11 807 – ein Rückgang um 18,2%. Gleichzeitig leben in Deutschland nach wie vor rund 259.000 Ausländer, die ausreisen müssen. Davon halten sich etwa 77% aufgrund eines vorübergehenden Aufschubs der Abschiebung im Land auf.

Somit lassen sich die Ergebnisse der deutschen Bundesregierung bei der Eindämmung des Zustroms illegaler Migranten bislang bestenfalls als symbolisch bezeichnen.

L’isteria crescente delle classi dominanti – e dei mass media da essi finanziati – ormai buttano tutto nel calderone del “nemico interno”: agenti russi, cittadini pagati dai russi, ingerenze islamiche e, ovviamente, i partiti della sinistra e i comunisti.

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E’ stato sufficiente che l’edizione di giovedi del giornale Politico.eu scrivesse qualche riga per mettere in moto una valanga, rivelando che l’Unione Europea ritiene di trovarsi di fronte all’escalation delle operazioni ibride russe e che si sta preparando all’eventualità che, prima o poi, queste azioni provochino delle vittime in Paesi Ue o Nato. Insomma quasi un auspicio che da qualche parte ci scappi il morto da poter strumentalizzare ai fini della propaganda di guerra, sia sul fronte esterno che sul fronte interno.

Si tratta di uno scenario che in Italia abbiamo purtroppo visto e subìto spesso: dalla strage di Piazza Fontana in poi. Su questo, nostro malgrado, potremmo tenere delle lectio magistralis a tutti gli altri paesi europei che non hanno sperimentato tragedie e orrori analoghi

Il giornale Politico.eu riferisce di una riunione di diplomatici della Ue a porte chiuse, senza telefonini e senza assistenti ha valutato il rischio di attacchi gravi, “capaci di provocare vittime su larga scala”. Due fonti diplomatiche hanno confermato a Politico che una riunione degli ambasciatori presso l’Ue, svoltasi mercoledì scorso, ha riguardato proprio questo tipo di scenario.

Per una fonte diplomatica citata dal sito, “data la portata e la vastità dell’azione russa, è inevitabile che prima o poi vi siano delle vittime. È pura fortuna che non ce ne siano ancora state”.

“È abbastanza ovvio che, quando la Russia utilizza strumenti sempre più letali per mettere alla prova la nostra preparazione e la nostra volontà di adottare contromisure, a un certo punto ci saranno delle vittime”, ha dichiarato a Politico la finlandese Teija Tiilikainen, direttore del Centro europeo di eccellenza per il contrasto alle minacce ibride. “Prima o poi, intenzionalmente o meno, questo è ciò che accade”.

Se diversi cittadini di Paesi membri dell’UE o della NATO venissero uccisi in quello che sembra essere un attacco, la pressione ad agire sarebbe enorme per entrambe le istituzioni. “Temiamo fortemente che a un certo punto venga tolta la vita a un nostro alleato”, ha affermato un diplomatico della NATO, il che renderebbe la pressione ad agire “molto alta”, riporta ancora Politico.eu.

Ma l’isteria ormai è talmente dilagante che alcuni Paesi membri della Ue, ritengono che debba essere la Nato e non l’Unione Europea la sede opportuna per trattare di questi argomenti e delle possibili soluzioni, soprattutto perché le riunioni della Ue sarebbero troppo “porose” per la fuga di notizie o di informazioni sensibili.

A rendere il tutto ancora più strumentalizzabile ai fini della mera propaganda di guerra esterna ed interna in Europa, vi è anche il tentativo di leggere le proteste giovanili e popolari in Francia come eterodirette o articolazioni di progetti di destabilizzazione. E in questo gioco sporco tutto fa brodo, dalla guerra ibrida della Russia alle ambizioni dell’islam politico.

“Quello che sta accadendo in Francia non è altro che immigrazione di massa fuori controllo“, ha scritto Donald Trump il 6 ottobre sul suo social Truth riferendosi agli scontri e alle manifestazioni che stanno attraversando la Francia. Per il presidente americano “non si tratta delle scuole”, ma dell’”Islam che vuole prendere il controllo di un Paese un tempo grande“.

A fargli eco è subito arrivato l’eurodeputato lepenista Fabrice Leggeri, esponente del gruppo della destra dei Patrioti al Parlamento di Strasburgo, secondo il quale “sulle proteste in Francia Trump non ha del tutto torto”. Perché, ha affermato durante un punto stampa al Parlamento Europeo, “le rivolte in corso, le rivolte dei cosiddetti studenti o presunti studenti, sono di fatto strumentalizzate dall’estrema sinistra e, come sappiamo, l’estrema sinistra è infiltrata da elementi islamisti”.

L’isteria crescente delle classi dominanti – e dei mass media da essi finanziati – ormai buttano tutto nel calderone del “nemico interno”: agenti russi, cittadini pagati dai russi, ingerenze islamiche e, ovviamente, i partiti della sinistra e i comunisti.

Se al posto degli ebrei mettiamo gli islamici, sono esattamente gli stessi nemici messi all’indice in Europa dai nazifascisti negli anni Trenta.

Articolo originale:  contropiano.org

Lula vence com ajuda do STF e promete transferência de renda. Flávio contesta, Senado bolsonarista pode fazer impeachment. Convulsão social à vista.

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Em 2002, Lula ganhou pela primeira vez a eleição com o slogan “A esperança venceu o medo”. Seus adversários alegavam que Lula seria uma espécie de Che Guevara no poder e faria os investimentos correrem – nada mais distante da realidade, pois o presidente é amado pelos banqueiros. De todo modo, não há contraste maior do que aquele entre a primeira e a última vitória de Lula. Nesta, as magras e pouco convincentes propostas de Lula logo deram lugar a uma campanha do medo. Flávio ia acabar com o Bolsa Família, cortar as aposentadorias e até tirar de Nossa Senhora Aparecida o título de Padroeira do Brasil – coisa que só o Papa tem poder para fazer.

Essa é a versão popularesca da campanha do medo, e é a mais racional. A versão de classe média alegava que os gays iam ser impedidos de existir; as mulheres, de abortar; e a democracia acabaria. Democracia, no caso em tela, é um conceito esotérico de difícil apreensão. Se a maioria do povo brasileiro é contra o aborto – que, em tese, já é proibido no Brasil –, então a coisa democrática é justamente impedir as mulheres de usarem o aborto como método contraceptivo. A vermos o surto histérico de parte da classe média brasileira, fica-se com a impressão de que uma Era de Aquário do Mal poderia começar caso Flávio vencesse as eleições.

As coisas iam muito bem para Flávio até as 13h22 do dia 25 de outubro. Flávio venceu o primeiro turno com uma vantagem de 2.224.965 votos sobre Lula, e tinha esperanças de herdar boa parte dos votos dos quatro candidatos terceira via, que é majoritariamente antipetista. Os três candidatos antipetistas somados tiveram 5.607.483 votos. O escritor de autoajuda Augusto Cury teve 3.448.569 votos, e os institutos de pesquisa indicavam que os votos dele seriam divididos entre Flávio e Lula no segundo turno. Assim, seria razoável esperar que Flávio ganhasse uns 7 milhões de votos no segundo turno. Lula, por outro lado, contava com a redução da abstenção para reverter o quadro. Expectativa pouco ou nada realista.

Até o início da campanha, Lula nada tinha para oferecer ao povo além de um dia extra de descanso para trabalhadores de carteira assinada, a revogação de um imposto que ele mesmo criou e o fim das apostas que ele mesmo regulamentou. Durante a campanha, ele deu o primeiro aumento em três anos ao Bolsa Família, o programa neoliberal de transferência de renda que o transformou num símbolo da esquerda brasileira, e, perguntado sobre o porquê da demora, disse que não sabia que não houve aumento, e quando descobriu, aumentou. O aumento sequer estava previsto no orçamento. Além disso, prometeu um depósito de 5 mil reais para pequenos empreendedores e uma mesada de 400 reais para estudantes universitários – sendo que o país já está com dívida pública alta e juros de 13,75% ao ano.

O estilo lulista de fazer política foi explicitado mais uma vez no último debate presidencial: tudo o que ele promete é transferência de renda, e toda a sua retórica se baseia em divisão social. Lula chegou ao ponto de dizer que só um presidente nascido no Nordeste poderia cuidar da região, pois as pessoas do Sul e do Sudeste desdenham o Nordeste. Toda crítica a um governo que passou quase 20 anos no poder é interpretada como ódio aos pobres. Lula se coloca como um pobre apenas porque nasceu nessa condição, mas é o único pobre do mundo a ganhar de um banqueiro um uísque Macallan de meio milhão de reais (80 mil euros). Perguntado por Flávio se ele gostaria de pedir desculpas aos brasileiros endividados, Lula afirmou que quem tem que pedir desculpas é a elite.

Diante dessa estagnação incontornável e deliberada, o fato político mais relevante da campanha de Flávio talvez tenha sido a adesão de Roberto Mangabeira Unger e de Aldo Rebelo, dois ex-ministros de Lula. Aldo Rebelo, em virtude da questão ambiental, já havia se aproximado muito do bolsonarismo, então sua adesão em 2026 não é uma surpresa. Mangabeira Unger, porém, é um professor de Harvard que sempre foi próximo do PDT, m partido de esquerda que recentemente se tornou satélite do lulismo, mas que até pouco tempo atrás era desenvolvimentista. Para que as figuras políticas de esquerda campeãs do desenvolvimentismo se aliem todas ao bolsonarismo, falta apenas Ciro Gomes, e foi o assessor dele, Gustavo Castañon, que organizou o encontro entre Flávio, Aldo e Mangabeira, tendo este último pegado um avião nos Estados Unidos para este fim.

Às 13h22 do dia 25, porém, o otimismo da campanha de Flávio começou a fazer água porque o PT pediu ao Tribunal Eleitoral que a votação em algumas cidades da Bahia fosse prorrogada até as 19 horas. As eleições no Brasil vão das 8 às 17h do horário de Brasília, e uma rápida apuração das urnas eletrônicas se segue. A razão do pedido era o suposto complô de prefeitos apoiadores de Flávio para tirar os ônibus da rua e impedir os eleitores de votar. No entanto, os ônibus atrasaram em Salvador porque sindicalistas petistas fizeram um “adesivaço”: quando os ônibus ainda estavam na garagem, colaram adesivos do PT, e se os ônibus circulassem assim, isso configuraria crime eleitoral. Como a circulação de ônibus é assunto da prefeitura, foi a prefeitura que reteve os ônibus para tirar os adesivos, mas até as 10h30 o trânsito já havia sido normalizado (fora que as seções eleitorais ficam a uma curta distância do endereço do eleitor na hora do cadastro do título, e pode ser mudada depois caso o eleitor queira).

Salvador é uma área que dá muitos votos ao PT. Assim, a campanha de Flávio também pediu que as chuvas em cidades de direita fossem pretextos para retardar a eleição naqueles locais. Depois o PT foi direto ao Supremo Tribunal Federal pedir que as eleições fossem prorrogadas em todo o país. O sistema inauditável do STF sorteou o ministro Zanin, ex-adovado pessoal de Lula, que concedeu a prorrogação às 17h05, depois de muitas urnas já terem sido fechadas e desligadas – sendo vedada a sua abertura.

Por fim, veio a apuração, que aconteceu numa ordem diversa da habitual (os votos do Nordeste costumam entrar por último, por exemplo, então numa eleição brasileira normal a direita começa bem e vai derretendo no final da apuração). Para espanto generalizado, Lula melhorou de desempenho em todas as regiões do país. Flávio ganhou apenas 3.721.538 novos votos (o razoável era esperar uns 7 milhões da terceira via), e Lula conseguiu ganhar inacreditáveis 10.376.694 novos votos.

Flávio anunciou que vai pedir a anulação do segundo turno, mas é pouco provável que consiga algo, já que o grande problema do Brasil no presente momento é justamente a confiabilidade do Judiciário – que trata questionamentos às urnas como atentado à democracia.

Justamente pelo fato de que o STF é percebido por grande parte da população brasileira como o maior problema do país, Flávio se empenhou em eleger senadores para poder votar impeachment de ministros do Supremo. E conseguiu: ano que vem, o Senado terá 45 senadores bolsonaristas, o que é mais da metade. Dada a insatisfação da população com o Supremo, não é implausível que eles consigam totalizar 54 votos (dois terços do senado) para tirar no mínimo um ministro.

Lula já governa com o apoio do Supremo para ignorar as casas legislativas e censurar a população. Quando a crise econômica vindoura se somar à política (imagine o leitor que a partir do ano que vem as empresas vão pagar o imposto tão logo recebam seus pagamentos da clientela), o Brasil deve passar por uma convulsão social e enfrentar uma onda repressiva. Não será fácil o fim da Nova República. No presente momento, uma criança já pagou com a sua saúde: numa favela carioca dominada pelo tráfico, as vítimas da sociedade comemoraram a vitória de Lula com fogos e tiros, dos quais um atingiu uma menina.

Muitos antissionistas exigem que o Brasil vote em Lula por causa das crianças da Palestina. Pelo jeito, só as crianças palestinas importam; as brasileiras, jamais.

Una guerra total en ciernes será parida por el curso inexorable de la Historia.

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“No permitiría que las decisiones de las grandes potencias fueran juzgadas por países pequeños”

Iosif Stalin. Actas de Yalta 1945

“El pasado no puede cambiarse; el futuro está en nuestras manos, pero las leyes que rigen el destino de las civilizaciones son tan implacables como el movimiento de los astros”

  Arnold J. Toynbee. Estudio de la Historia.  1933

Adivinar antes de demostrar. ¿Necesito recordaros que así se han hecho todos los descubrimientos importantes?

— Henri Poincaré El valor de la ciencia 1902

La mayoría de los escritores de otras y esta prestigiosa publicación, Strategic Culture Fundation, entregan sus apreciaciones y cavilaciones con base en una mayor o menor capacidad de acceso a fuentes primarias, complementadas con lo que se denomina ‘fuentes abiertas’.

En mi caso particular mis análisis se fundamentan en el registro histórico, las fuentes abiertas y la información de portales fiables o instituciones oficiales de los gobiernos y estamentos, según el tema abordado en cada tema. A ello sumo una profunda desconfianza acerca de que aquello que puedo observar sea tal cual como se presenta, incluso el decir de los personajes centrales de la vida pública internacional.

Este preámbulo para reivindicar la tarea de todos los analistas, sobre todo aquellos sin fuentes primarias y cercanas al poder, porque ofrecemos eso: un uso objetivo de la imaginación, una intuición afinada a pulso de seguir el día a día del acontecer y afirmarlo, compararlo, ponderarlo con el registro histórico. Van así, algunas especulaciones, sobre lo que será y no será la reunión a tres bandas de las grandes potencias actuales.

Reunión Xi – Putin – Trump ¿Pre-Yalta 2.0?

Los días 18 y 19 de noviembre, tendrá lugar el foro número 33 de Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperacion, APEC, en China. El lema elegido es “Construyendo una comunidad Asia-Pacífico para prosperar juntos”. Al margen de la misma, se especula sobre una reunión a tres bandas de los líderes de las grandes potencias globales y se presume un diálogo donde China, indiferente a la violencia en el mundo, es tenida en cuenta como un alto jerarca que dará la venia a los acuerdos entre las partes del conflicto o al menos, no interferirá, mientras logra algunos intereses.

En Yalta, Península de Crimea, actual Federación de Rusia, los mandatarios, Franklin D. Roosevelt, presidente de Estados Unidos, Winston Churchill, primer ministro del Reino Unido y Iósif Stalin, líder de la Unión Soviética, en febrero de 1945, tuvieron la histórica reunión concretada cuando la derrota de la Alemania Nazi era inminente. Se define como la reunión donde se repartieron las áreas de injerencia de los vencedores de la guerra.

Al parecer, aunque no conozco pronunciamiento definitivo de ningún gobierno, la reunión es tan inminente como la derrota de la OTAN y su proxy ucraniano, y es también inminente la crisis de fertilizantes, ergo de alimentos y de combustibles por el problema en los estrechos de Ormuz y Bab El Mandeb, por la guerra Israel – EE.UU. contra Irán.

Si esto parece un Yalta es porque Ucrania, exhibida como ‘defensora de su soberanía’ bajo el lema europeo de ‘ataque ruso no provocado’, así como la OTAN, de una forma irónica, no son convidadas. Son por el contrario tratadas como al nazismo derrotado.

A esto se suma la ambivalencia hipócrita de Estados Unidos, líder de la OTAN y agresor asesino de civiles rusos y que siendo co-beligerante en el conflicto se exhibe como mediador.

Europa, al margen del nuevo ciclo histórico de grandes potencias, se encuentra inmerso en protestas por la crisis de su Estado de bienestar en varios de sus países y no ignora cómo lo deja su ausencia en la reunión en Shenzhen, según el viejo dicho: ‘si no estás en la mesa de comensal, estás en el menú’. Por cierto. El 27 de octubre, ya comenzaron a llamar los pusilánimes líderes europeos de Finlandia y Noruega, al presidente Putin.

Estados Unidos negocia cierto aislamiento de Irán, por parte de Rusia y China. Esto con el fin de obrar de la mano del sionismo de manera más agresiva e impune. También, hablará de un acuerdo nuclear que comprometa a China, pese a no tener ésta ni una tercera parte del armamento que poseen Rusia o EE.UU.

La compra del diésel a Rusia, no es sólo una cantidad simbólica. Determinará en parte cómo se acumulará tal exportación rusa a través de la ruta del ártico, de la cual acaba de activar su mayor puerto exportador de combustible, Vostok Oil, en la región de Krasnoyarsk, con una capacidad inicial de 30 millones de toneladas al año de petróleo proyectadas en aumento gradual.

En promedio, entre 2023-2024, por el golfo Pérsico circularon alrededor de 860.000–870.000 barriles por día (bpd) de exportaciones marítimas de diésel de la región. Y llegaron a 1,8 millones bpd en junio de 2024, esto impulsado por nuevas refinerías en Kuwait y Omán.

Mientras, Rusia en 2025 exportó alrededor de 780.000–820.000 bpd (aprox. 3,3 millones de toneladas al mes). Siendo el segundo mayor exportador mundial de diésel después de EE.UU. Puede alcanzar 3–3,5 millones de toneladas al mes (equivalente a unos 700.000–850.000 bpd).

Lo anterior tenderá a estabilizar en parte la demanda de diésel y además vincular la ruta ártica como una forma vanguardista de circulación de todas las demás mercancías. De hecho, China, país no ártico, se ha sumado en lo que llama “Ruta de la Seda del Hielo” Donde además hay cooperación científica.

Aun siendo socios de Irán con similares intereses geopolíticos esto de alguna manera debilita la carta iraní para afectar a Trump en las elecciones y tensionar la economía global para presionar a USA y claro, proyecta una ruta poderosa que puede debilitar otros pasos marítimos de su socio BRICS+ -Egipto en el canal de Suez- y en el contexto del cambio de temperatura que afecta también al canal de Panamá con prolongadas sequías mientras se despeja el tránsito glacial del ártico a causa de la misma variación de temperatura.

A lo anterior se conecta, por un lado, el control que finalmente ha ejercido EE.UU. sobre Dinamarca para ceder Groenlandia, punto de salida ártica al Atlántico. Por otro, una dulce venganza china que fue apartada de su participación creciente en Panamá por la ‘doctrina Donroe’.

También EE.UU. negocia inversiones en los óblast nuevos que ha incorporado Rusia, donde hay grandes riquezas naturales, incluido litio e industrias metalúrgicas, además de querer administrar el gaseoducto Nord Stream, luego de haberlo hecho volar por los aires en 2022.

A cambio, Rusia espera que esta vez sí se cumplan los acuerdos a diferencia del encuentro en Anchorage, Alaska, en 2025. Estos acuerdos deben presionar a Ucrania a reconocer las regiones rusas, hacer elecciones, renunciar a su deseo de incorporación en la OTAN y a la vez, crear una arquitectura de seguridad mutuamente beneficiosa para Rusia y Europa; además el reintegro de los activos rusos incautados ilegalmente por Euroclear. A esto se suma la reanudación de las conversaciones trilaterales entre Rusia, Ucrania y Estados Unidos en Abu Dabi en noviembre.

Por su parte China desea respeto a las mismas leyes del mercado inventado ‘libre’ por occidente y articulado por la OMC; lo que implica no ser bloqueado en su rama expansiva automotriz ni de alta tecnología, -IAG- ni interrumpida en su corredor de la Ruta de la Seda que cruza por Irán. Se suma, y creo a esto se debe en parte el resultado electoral en Brasil, respetar las inversiones en el país suramericano, que es el brazo fuerte de Latinoamérica en BRICS+. Esto también implica respetar las inversiones chinas y rusas en la nueva y americanizada Venezuela.

Abro un paréntesis, respecto a las recientes elecciones en Brasil, en mi concepto el Big-Tech estadounidense es lo suficientemente fuerte para acomodar elecciones donde quiera y, por cierto, en la misma fecha del 25 de octubre, Vucic en Serbia, perdió las elecciones y denunció la previsibilidad del resultado ante el acorralamiento planteado por Europa – OTAN.

¿Hubo acaso una guerra electrónica China – EE.UU. determinando el resultado electoral? ¿Cómo entender la derrota sionista en Brasil? ¿En verdad creen que hubo tal derrota? La Bancada Evangélica que hace lobby en el parlamento, Frente Parlamentario Evangélico, o la Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus en São Paulo, réplica del Templo de Salomón, son parte de lo activo que es el sionismo desde hace años. Por si hace falta decirlo, Lula es un administrador del capitalismo brasileño, a ningún millonario le va mal con él y el sionismo sigue en expansión.

Los ‘progres’ del planeta estaban contentos por el triunfo de Lula, pues desconocen los matices duros y subrepticios de la política, sobre todo, de la política de grandes potencias. Yo también la ignoro, pero sé que siempre negocian sus intereses y no los de terceros. Recuerde el lector la cita de Stalin con la que inicio el artículo.

Esto se aprecia en la mirada a otro lado de China, India y Rusia, ante el genocidio israelí en Gaza, Líbano y Cisjordania. Esto se vio en las negociaciones ruso-estadounidenses de la crisis de los misiles en 1962 donde omitieron a Cuba. Esto no los hace países malos, son simplemente las expresiones inerciales del poder; cosa que tenía clara el cubano Enrique José Barona al describir a inicios del siglo XX a la naciente potencia norteamericana.

En mi concepto Brasil ganó con Lula, sí. Pero también puede explicarse como un principio de flexibilidad del neo imperialismo estadounidense que ha aprendido de El arte de la guerra, de Sun Wu (孫武), en aquel segmento donde señala que, al enemigo acorralado siempre se le deja una salida, para evitar volverlo violento, indómito y peligroso, al sólo poder huir hacia delante.

Si la región pierde la esperanza por estar copada de sionistas y neoliberales, puede volverse más proactiva. La tesis funciona también como complemento a las negociaciones entre potencias. No vi muy acongojado a Trump.

Cálculo de la guerra y cumplimiento de los objetivos rusos

Los objetivos de la Operación Militar Especial, si bien no han cambiado en su fondo sí lo han hecho en su forma, y ésta, es la forma de las regiones necesarias a incorporar en Rusia para acabar con la esperanza de nuevas guerras en 20, 50 o 100 años con la Ucrania occidental; que siendo la más anti rusa, es la que menos muertos ha puesto, menos destrucción ha sufrido y la que más respalda la continuación de la guerra. ¿Por qué bailan tranquilas las élites no busificadas -reclutadas por la fuerza- en bares nocturnos en Kiev y Leópolis?

Es la zona más oriental rusa étnica, idiomática y con doctrina ortodoxa la que más destrucción y muerte ha sufrido. Entonces ¿Qué negociará o negoció Rusia?

Dijo el propio presidente Putin que el acuerdo de Anchorage lo había aceptado bajo la condición de que Ucrania cedería gran parte del Donbás (Donetsk) a Rusia y a cambio, Rusia devolvería territorios que ocupa en Sumy y Járkov, que servían como “zonas de amortiguación”. Moscú mantendría su ofensiva hasta que esa fórmula fuera aceptada.

Pero esto fue hace un año. La situación siempre ha cambiado según como marche todo en el terreno. Rusia no quería incorporar regiones en la Operación Militar básica, pero ante el fracaso de las negociaciones en Estambul, saboteadas por Inglaterra, se efectuó un referéndum y se asumieron como rusas las cuatro regiones, más Crimea. Sólo resta un 9% del Donbás, ¿Por qué no tomarlo militarmente?

En mi concepto esto no es suficiente. Rusia debe tomar toda la región de la costa del Mar Negro, que implica adhesión total a Rusia de la región histórica de Novorossiya integrada por Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk y Crimea. Si esto no se cumple, quedará el mar negro abierto para una futura escalada con Europa, siendo necesario tocar frontera con Moldavia y la franja de Transnistria para evitar también desestabilización, así como apoyar a los ciudadanos rusos, que son el 30% de la población allí, particularmente hostilizada o segregada. Además, toda Novorossiya es étnicamente rusa.

Entonces, luego de casi cinco años de guerra, Rusia simplemente mientras gana abrumadoramente en el campo de batalla, hará un trato que le pondrá en unos años en una amenaza quizá peor, cuando Europa y la OTAN o el cuerpo militar que sea, tal vez la propia Alemania, se hayan recuperado. ¿Perdonará Rusia una vez más a sus enemigos históricos que la odian hasta el tuétano de sus imperialistas huesos?

Los europeos y los nazis ucranianos no firmarán una derrota por convicción, guardarán más resentimiento, sus bases más radicales están casi intactas en Europa y Ucrania occidental, Rusia al menos debería acrecentar los bombardeos en esa zona y entender que es la Ucrania católica prooccidental la que debe ser desmantelada, piedra por piedra, para evitar su resurrección. Un imperio es arrogante por inercia, sólo la derrota humillante en su piel e ideas fundacionales le harán ver la verdad.

El presidente Putin tiene como reto ser tan o más grande que Pedro y Catalina. Debe corregir el error de Lenin, Stalin y Khruschev, así como el error de la firma de acuerdo entre Bielorrusia, Ucrania y Rusia -Tratado de Belavezha de diciembre de 1991- que cimentó en Ucrania el camino hacia la apología al nazismo, a Stephan Bandera y a la reescritura de una historia deformada y excepcionalista.

Otro aspecto que el canciller Sergei Lavrov ha señalado desde el acercamiento con la administración estadounidense trata sobre el castigo a victimarios nazis que deben ser juzgados en un Nuremberg 2.0 y para lo cual debería habilitarse una orca. Este tema de los juicios y reparaciones no se vislumbra o es de lo que menos se habla; lo que implicaría una impunidad de los crímenes sobre la población rusa e incluso la ucraniana desde 2014, cuando con el golpe de Estado, se inició la des rusificación de los oblast que intentaron ser autónomos mediante los acuerdos de Minsk y que ahora son parte del cuerpo político administrativo de la Federación de Rusia y gozan de representantes en la Duma, según las últimas elecciones de septiembre.

Entonces, desmilitarización, desnazificación, castigo a crímenes de guerra, allanamiento de toda posibilidad de osadía occidental contra Rusia, ¿Quedarían totalmente resueltas en una mesa de diálogo? ¿Congelar los logros en el terreno sin copar todos los territorios que ya son parte de Rusia, no es una debilidad? Por otra parte, ¿Entiende el Kremlin que China es un enemigo latente y solapado que tampoco desea la paz de Rusia, sino su atemperamiento mediante una guerra eterna? ¿Dimensiona la pobreza intelectual y diplomática de los emisarios estadounidenses, Kushner y Witkoff, vulgares mercaderes inmobiliarios?

La Historia es superior a los hombres, incluso a los más poderosos

Cuando en el título señalo un pre – Yalta 2.0, quiero enfatizar que, si bien se reúnen tres potencias globales, la única que desea la paz es Rusia y puede ser, como señalé, una paz que sacrifique objetivos urgentes para el futuro.

Sin embargo, la pérfida y detestable Europa, llena de crisis por estos días, no soportará ser un convidado de piedra al concurso del nuevo orden mundial post unipolar. Podría obrar de mala fe. Las élites internas de Estados Unidos que odian a Rusia volverán a impedir un acuerdo; la CIA – Mossad son su arma. Israel no desea una Rusia fuerte, aunque la mayoría de sus sionistas tienen sangre eslava, desde hace ochenta años se alinearon con el mundo anglosajón.

Como señalé, China tampoco es un socio fiable y no olvida la osadía del viejo zarismo ruso que le quitó los actuales oblast de Primorie y Amur. Tampoco los varios conflictos sostenidos, incluso durante la era soviética.

Sólo si alguno de los tres hombres y sus élites se rinde en el pre-Yalta 2.0, habría paz relativa o una nueva forma de guerra solapada. Si entiendo el carácter existencial de esta guerra para al menos dos de las partes, no será una mesa de diálogo la que lleve el fin de la guerra en Ucrania y la que se ha producido en Irán; profundamente interconectada con la primera.

Una guerra total en ciernes será parida por el curso inexorable de la Historia. Nunca un humano ha podido detener aquello que con tanto ahínco se fue formando durante siglos. Pueden los hombres aplazar los fenómenos, pero no detenerlos. Rusia deberá despejar por la fuerza las dudas que tienen sus enemigos sobre su determinación a existir.

Vladímir Putin, presidente de Rusia, siempre ha sido un buen lector de la Historia. La ve como un río que fluye inexorablemente y le pone piedras con cuidado para moldear cadencias en su cause o atemperarlo, retardarlo, pero nunca para detenerlo o desviarlo. Eso implica que la guerra total será, pero en los términos que va moldeando Rusia, Putin, su Staff.

Finland and Norway are hinting at the need for a new approach to the continent`s relationship with Russia

By Matthew Blackburn

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The Trump administration’s latest initiative to end the war is creating heartburn in Europe.

“We have to pressure the aggressor to stop the war, not the victim to surrender,” said European Union High Representative Kaja Kallas. “Squeezing Ukraine is not the right approach, and that’s why Europe is standing by Ukraine.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, meanwhile, insists Russia has no genuine desire for peace, pointing in particular to Russian strikes on Ukrainian civilians.

This moral language frames the conflict as a zero-sum, good-versus-evil struggle. In this light, Europeans have no choice but to unite behind Ukraine to stop Russian President Vladimir Putin.

But not all European leaders are talking this way. The press conference in Oslo on Oct. 20 featuring Zelenskyy, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb was full of constructive language about ending the conflict. Stubb said the Oslo summit was the result of “substantive progress” made “under the radar.” Støre emphasised that “Europe has to be at the table” to secure a “lasting peace.” Europe, it seems, is not united on a negotiated end to the conflict.

Then on Tuesday, the two met with Putin unofficially, in an effort at de-escalation, according to reports. “We are neighboring countries to Russia,” Stubb said in a statement afterwards. “The outcome of this war will have a direct impact on our and the broader European security. Ending the war requires direct discussions.”

The Oslo summit was no bolt from the blue; Finnish and Norwegian representatives have been preparing the ground for several months. At last week’s Warsaw Security Forum, Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide avoided the usual binary of Ukraine’s victory or capitulation. He stressed that since the Europeans are now paying for the war, they should also lead the diplomacy to end it. Eide noted that a peace agreement could secure a democratic, independent Ukraine integrated into the EU with 80% of its original territory. Advancing this point among more hawkish European colleagues, Eide struck a tone of hope rather than fear. In an interview last Saturday, Eide noted that Europe must contribute concrete proposals for a post-war security architecture: “in the long run, we need to return to a normal relationship with Russia after the war (….) some kind of order must be restored.”

During his recent visit to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Stubb presented a complementary argument. Restating his case for a “value-based realism,” he argued that European states should be faithful to their values but would not resolve the conflict by rigidly clinging to the moral high ground. Stubb urged the audience to keep “cooler heads”; fostering a “war mentality” would make it near impossible to conceive of peace.

Eide and Stubb are moving in a different direction from those who claim “victory” over Russia – however defined – is a prerequisite for future European security. They reject the mantra of ex-NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg that “weapons are the way to peace” and emphasize the military reality that neither side has the resources to win decisively.

This is a noble recognition of reality. Offensive actions from both sides have repeatedly failed to produce a breakthrough. Costs keep rising for both warring parties, while gains have become increasingly meagre. Europe, Ukraine, and Russia are stuck in a war that cannot be won on the terms set by either side.

Continuing the current course brings problems for all sides. Putin faces an overheating economy and increasing social fatigue and anxiety. Even if Russia destroys more and more Ukrainian infrastructure from the air, land offensives are likely to incur heavy losses. Ukraine’s situation is even tougher. Its chronic manpower shortages have led to intensified forced mobilization and increased social strains. Blockaded at sea and bombarded from the air, Ukraine is also short of money and weapons, constantly appealing to Western allies to plug the gaps.

The European coalition behind Ukraine faces serious problems of its own. Many European states are facing a sovereign debt crisis as war costs mount. The EU has been unable to persuade Belgium to make use of Russia’s frozen assets to fund the war. All the while, the dirty reality is that, since the war began, Europe has spent more on Russian energy imports than on weapons for Ukraine.

Tuesday’s meeting in Oslo provides a way out of this mess. As Stubb said at Tuesday’s press conference: “Peace requires patience. But unfortunately, war does not wait. People are dying each and every day. Our job is to do what we can to end it.” Norway and Finland are communicating the urgency of ending a senseless war. Referring to the recent spat between Trump and Zelensky, Støre advised against dwelling on past disagreements: “What matters now is what lies ahead of us.”

On the same day, Kaja Kallas looked back in anger. She accused the Trump administration of trying to “push Ukraine into surrender” on “Putin’s terms.” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, for her part, presented Ukraine as Europe’s only protection: “If we allow Ukraine to fall, we will open the way for Russia to advance into other parts of Europe.”

One can understand fears that, if Ukraine is rendered neutral with limits on its armed forces, Russia would hold the whip hand over Europe. Nobody wants to let Moscow dictate the terms of the European security architecture through violence. But at this point, Europe’s rejection of a “dirty deal” could mean impotently watching Ukraine’s destruction over the next six months. How would this outcome improve European security or prestige?

Norway and Finland have offered the most constructive European response to U.S. diplomacy since Trump returned to the White House. They offer Europe a new language of patient diplomacy to replace maximalist rhetoric. This is in line with both countries’ previous experience mediating and building bridges with Russia. It also recognizes a basic fact: all protracted wars not settled decisively on the battlefield — which is to say, the vast majority of wars — end in negotiated settlements between the aggressor and the defender. America’s signature is absolutely necessary to secure such an outcome.

Mainstream analysis seems unable to accept these realities. It is stuck in moral posturing or fearmongering. There is still little serious discussion of what compromises might be struck. The 28-point plan that U.S.-Russian diplomacy developed in 2025 should not be equated with Ukraine’s capitulation, nor is it a recipe for turning Ukraine into Belarus. Ukraine would enter the EU, receive reconstruction assistance, and retain armed forces on a level comparable to Finland’s. It is time to return to the core points on which a deal must be struck.

Russia has responded positively to the proposals sent from Oslo. Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S. have agreed to a three-way summit in November, according to Zelensky. The key question now is whether other European governments will take the Oslo initiative seriously and agree on who can represent Europe in these talks. Dmitri Peskov, Putin’s press secretary, has cautiously welcomed the idea that Alexander Stubb could represent Europe in the negotiations.

Finland and Norway’s more moderate language is a crucial first step toward a shared European understanding that continuing the war in its current form is self-defeating. As Eide observed at the U.N. last month, “diplomacy can work – if we allow it to.”

But first, Europe must decide: will it support or sabotage the U.S. effort to build a diplomatic off-ramp?

Original article: responsiblestatecraft.org

This Putin-Trump or Trump-Putin Diesel Deal is a vastly better opportunity for a ‘reset’ than the misspelled red button that Hillary Clinton presented to the Russians all while the Maidan was being orchestrated.

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Every once in a while the Mainstream Media can delight us by choosing to show an actual piece of reality. Of the big ones that are out there, Fox News seems to have at least three droplets of their humanity left and so it shouldn’t be too surprising that they invited Federalist editor-in-chief Mollie Hemingway onto their program Special Report to argue in favor of Trump’s potentially historic deal with Putin. The most interesting part was that she got the real ‘white hat cowboy’ treatment, seeming to offer to the audience the obviously better path; the path of peace with Russia. This type of propaganda is great for those of us who want to avert a nuclear WWIII, Yahoo!News featured a clip from the previously mentioned show under a headline that summed up things quite nicely; “Mollie Hemingway: Trump’s Russian Oil Deal Puts The American People First, “We’re Not At War With Russia“. Oh how lovey that sounds but is it really a good deal for the public of the United States?

The arguments against the deal are both weak and Globalist

The counterarguments against this diesel deal seem to be that ‘the Russians help Iran and thus they are bad’ that is to say, this deal cannot be supported because it would be against the Zionist agenda in an indirect way. The other seemed to be that this move violates the spirit, but not technicalities, of the Lindsay Graham Bill. Well, if anyone would know about violation it’s the dead senator, but was there ever a moment when the majority of Americans cried out for sanctions packages against Russia? How would spitting on the grave of Graham change anything for the worse for the normies? It wouldn’t, and no one raising kids in America cares about Graham’s legacy when they want to put food on the table for their family.

There is also the counterargument that the diesel deal ‘ betrays Ukraine’, which is a sentiment much stronger in Europe than Washington, but Project Ukraine still has plenty of support from the shadows of the American capital, just not so much from within the White House. But if we examine the arguments against having diesel come from Russia as a whole, they are all related to U.S. foreign policy and/or ‘feels’. That is to say, there don’t seem to be any arguments as to how selling diesel fuel to America could possibly make things worse for Joe Average and that is very telling. All of the arguments say it would somehow be bad for our currently disastrous American foreign policy follies.

So again, in a global sense, how exactly does regulated trade, between two countries on a voluntary basis, that brings down prices in the USA, and does not take away any jobs, cause problems for the American people? How does antagonism of the world’s largest nuclear power with the most potent hypersonic technology, that has repeatedly stated that it doesn’t want war, a problem for the American people? How does supporting Project Ukraine, do anything for the American masses? Control of Delaware is important to Americans especially the ones that live there, is control of the Donbass somehow just as vital to everyone across the 50 States?

At this point in 2026, it is very hard to build any sort of argument for any of the insane spending on foreign conflicts of luxury that have been going on since the end of the Cold War in 1991. All of these dubious expenditures that have added up to our 40 trillion+ dollars in debt were never for the benefit of the American people. It is almost like the talking heads that advocate for a blindly aggressive U.S. foreign policy actually hate the average American, because all of their proposed plans, that may kill foreigners directly, certainly punish Main Street just the same, but in a much slower and more agonizing torturous way.

Dmitriev’s ‘World of Optimism’ is one normal people want to live in

Kirill Dmitriev is convinced that economic cooperation between the USA and Russia does not have to be limited to diesel fuel. He believes that Russia’s excess of fertilizer could also be a major benefit to farmers who may finally be able to fuel up their tractors at an affordable price. Although this might be tricky, Russia has cheap energy and plenty of room in Siberia for data centers too and Dmitriev sees a lot of potential in this area. Russia even has energy exports of electricity to neighboring China, so perhaps some sort of data center collaboration could be possible, but that would require much more trust than is currently present. As we all know Dmitriev is a big believer in the building of the tunnel/bridge from Alaska to Chukotka. He has even proposed to Elon Musk a joint venture to use his Boring Company to drill from the American side. A massive friendship project is surely needed between these two countries but there are many difficulties in making the tunnel work, especially the fact that it would be located in an extremely remote and unpopulated area and the train rail/wheel standards of both nations are different.

But again if we take a look at a famous quote from Kirill Dmitriev we see a big argument in favor of the Trump-Putin Diesel Deal that many Americans could agree with:

“International collaboration between the superpowers is key for the stability of the global economy.”

Beyond just the diesel fuel now, do these words sound like something that would be of benefit to the Average American or should we listen to John McCain’s status quo musings from beyond the grave?:

“Giving peace a chance only gives Saddam Hussein more time to prepare for war on his terms, at a time of his choosing, in pursuit of ambitions that will only grow as his power to achieve them grows.”

In the above quote you could take the name Saddam Hussein and substitute it for President Putin or any other person the establishment doesn’t like. It is this dimwitted ‘defense through offense’ attitude that is destroying the U.S. economy, all while the houses outside of DC just keep getting bigger-and-bigger.

Considering the U.S. just finally and formally gave up on Iraq these words above ring true as an anti-argument for the insane foreign policy that is bankrupting what used to be, and should be today, the wealthiest country in the world. If Washington had not invested in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Project Ukraine, the Iran War, PNAC, Globalism, etc., wouldn’t the average gent in Pittsburgh be living much better?

In terms of economic partnership there are other options beyond what the ever optimistic Dmitriev has stated that I thought would be worth at least listing in brief:

• American-style semi-trucks and trucks in general are road legal in Russia unlike many places on the planet with tight streets. Russia and America share ‘bigness’ and so long-haul American trucks could find a great market in Russia and Russian short-haul trucks would be great for America. All of the European automotive brands have bailed on Russia being replaced by China but there is still plenty of room on the market. This ‘bigness’ capable logic applies to all sorts of machinery beyond trucks, ‘Everything is Bigger in Texas and Tomsk’ and that is a point of economic benefit.
• Entertainment media in Russia is desperately underfunded, while the U.S. side of things is committing suicide via the ‘woke agenda’, there must be some sort of synthesis here. Joint Russo-American entertainment media projects could shake up the entire industry and get those big profits Hollywood blockbusters used to make.
• Education is believed to be much better in Russia and ‘Russian Math’ seems to be a hit in the USA, at least in NYC, so if the nation is to give up on Globalist ambitions the population needs to get smarter and more competitive very fast because the BRICS nations push their children to the max. Russia could assist with this but of course under the complete oversight and control of the American side just in case.
• American Football needs a new market with a nation that has violent macho white guys, Eastern Europe is the only option for the NFL. Russians like violent sports and their soccer teams always underperform, they need a new summer sport and the USA has it.
• New embassies consulates and more could be constructed as part of this new normalization. The old ones were taken away, so why not build new amazing ones for fun and profit?
• Russia’s Far East is the ‘window to Asia’ but it also faces towards Oregon and California, there might be many in America who would want to participate in the massive buildup of the Russian region. Trump himself loves a good real-estate deal.
• It is important to note that anything related to security, policing, and things of a secret nature are of course off limits and are never going to be an option. This cooperation cannot come too close to the ‘hearts’ of either system for obvious reasons. Both America and Russian must be fully sovereign in all regards no matter what they agree to.

This Putin-Trump or Trump-Putin Diesel Deal is a vastly better opportunity for a ‘reset’ than the misspelled red button that Hillary Clinton presented to the Russians all while the Maidan was being orchestrated. This deal tells the American Public that finally we need to use peace to make your lives better. We need to not waste resources antagonizing Russia, and this whole Multipolar World thing may just work out for rural Kansas too. But this is only a start, U.S. sanctions are a punishment for a crime that the Russians believe they did not commit and until those sanctions are truly gone we cannot say ‘it’s over’ but perhaps we can say ‘it’s starting’ unless all good will vanishes after the mid-term elections.

Ukraine’s EU accession would be financial suicide for Eastern and Southern Europe. It would become the largest, poorest member — absorbing nearly all cohesion funds.

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EU enlargement has become a trap in which political intentions collide with economic reality; Eastern and Southern Europe will bear the brunt of the impact if Ukraine joins the European Union. Ukraine is a war‑torn country, and EU citizens are already footing the bill for its reconstruction and the support of its refugees. The EU’s cohesion policy would collapse: Ukraine would become the largest and poorest member state, absorbing virtually all available development funds. Current beneficiaries – such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Spain, and Greece – would lose 80% to 100% of their cohesion funding and, overnight, become net contributors.

Compared to Western European countries, nations such as Greece, Spain, and Hungary are “poor countries.” To illustrate: the minimum monthly wage for an employee in Greece is around €900, whereas in the Netherlands it is approximately €2,300 for a 40‑hour workweek.

In the planning for the next seven‑year EU budget, starting in 2028, the potential accession of Ukraine must be taken into account – at least according to the rhetoric of key EU figures, such as Ursula von der Leyen and her political elites.

Such an accession, however, would amount to financial suicide for the former Warsaw Pact countries – Eastern European nations such as Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary – as well as for Southern European countries, particularly Greece and Spain. Furthermore, it would spell disaster for France, a Western European nation currently grappling with large‑scale demonstrations fueled by the state’s insolvency. Some economic experts are already warning that France could become a second Greece – a country that, in 2015, faced extremely harsh austerity measures, endured the eurozone crisis, and remains a financial burden to this day, especially for its own citizens. We are currently witnessing a clash between the political ambitions of Western European figures – such as Ursula von der Leyen and her entourage, as well as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte – and economic reality. It is Eastern and Southern Europe that stand to bear the brunt of the consequences.

The problem with Ukraine is not just the issue of reconstruction and the funding required for the many refugees – who, in theory, could return home, though in practice this rarely happens (consider the case of Syria, where tens of thousands remain in the EU, either unwilling or unable to return). There is also the matter of the devastation of the agricultural sector: Ukraine’s vast, fertile farmlands and massive agribusinesses would consume roughly one‑third of the EU’s entire agricultural budget.

To prevent a collapse, Brussels would either have to increase contributions from member states – a move likely to be blocked by Western nations – or drastically cut per‑hectare subsidies for farmers in countries like France, Germany, Poland, and Hungary. Such a move would risk an agricultural breakdown, potentially leading to tractor blockades across Europe.

In reality, an agricultural collapse is already underway within the EU – not because of Ukraine, but due to the EU’s utopian policies. The Netherlands, in particular, has implemented strict EU nitrogen‑reduction directives in an extreme manner, leading to the buyout of hundreds of farms and the departure of many farmers to countries outside the EU (notably Canada). Agricultural enterprises that have existed for centuries – and which once formed the backbone of the economy in the Netherlands – are now disappearing to make way for defense interests; after all, the military requires ammunition depots and training grounds for an imagined war against Russia. Under the guise of nitrogen reduction and climate change, the state is effectively securing farmers’ land for military use, and the accession of Ukraine will only exacerbate the situation.

Since 2022 (the year of what the EU refers to as the Russian invasion), the European Union has largely suspended import tariffs on Ukrainian agricultural products to provide economic support to the country. As a result, imports of inexpensive Ukrainian poultry and eggs into the EU have risen exponentially. In 2025, the Dutch poultry sector, which was the largest in Europe, expressed concern regarding the renewed trade deal between Europe and Ukraine. Under this new agreement, the the quotas – within which Ukraine is permitted to export to Europe duty‑free – have been significantly increased for a number of agricultural products. For instance, the quota for chicken meat entering Europe has been raised from 90,000 tonnes to 120,000 tonnes, and for eggs from 6,000 tonnes to 18,000 tonnes.

This points toward the “death” of the poultry industry in Western Europe (the Netherlands) and an increase in the emigration of Western European businesses. Some refer to this as “depopulation” – a sensitive term in Europe – but I would describe it more accurately as “depopulation of businesses” coupled with the “expropriation of farmers and businesses.”

However, the Brussels elites face another major problem: they have promised Ukraine a swift accession to the European Union. These elites make almost monthly “unexpected” visits to Kiev to assure their “hero,” Zelensky, of their support – in the form of money (from EU taxpayers), weapons, and the prospect of EU membership. Yet a rapid accession would be suicidal for the European Union (and for the elites themselves).

The most likely solution is that Ukraine will not be granted full membership in terms of the distribution of funds. A transitional period of 10–15 years could be introduced – much like the way Albania, Turkey, and North Macedonia have been kept on a string for years – during which Kiev would have only minimal access to funds, and its participation in the agricultural market would also be restricted. Yet this would expose the European political elites (such as former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte) as liars – though, in fairness, that is nothing new.

Almost every year, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, visits Albania, North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro to assure them of her support (and that of the EU) – a practice that has continued for more than 15 years. Meanwhile, the citizens of these countries have largely grown completely fed up with the empty promises. We are now also seeing unrest emerge in Albania, where Prime Minister Edi Rama – a good friend of Mark Rutte, who also visits the country regularly – has been in power for years but is currently facing significant resistance from his own population; an opposition that has reached an unprecedented level, fueled in part by the so‑called “Flamingo Revolution.”

Take Turkey, for example, which has been waiting 39 years to join the European Union. It first submitted an application for membership in 1987 – to what was then called the European Economic Community – and it has been 27 years since it was officially recognized as an EU candidate country in 1999. This has only served to distance Turkey further from Europe, especially when contrasted with the almost obsessive rhetoric from the EU regarding its unwavering, unconditional support for Ukraine in its war against Russia – or, as they term it, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Other countries in and around Europe – such as Montenegro – are also involved in the so‑called accession process, with active negotiations and a projected timeline pointing toward potential membership around 2028. As with Ukraine, however, it is unlikely that they will meet the requirements regarding corruption. Serbia finds itself in a similar position, and Georgia is also a potential candidate – a fact that causes displeasure in Russia. After all, the majority of Georgian territory lies just south of the Greater Caucasus, which is traditionally considered the boundary between Europe and Asia; a situation comparable to that of Turkey. Armenia (in Western Asia) intends to submit a formal application for EU membership in the near future, though it has not yet done so. Armenia is not a European country; the EU views such nations primarily as geopolitical, strategic tools to help encircle Russia, even though, in reality, these countries remain far removed from Europe.

For Ukraine, and for Zelensky in particular, this would be a slap in the face if they could not join in 2028, as they are not fighting for second‑class membership or to be kept waiting like the above‑mentioned countries, and in particular Turkey. Consequently, EU enlargement has turned into a trap for the European Union, whereas said political will collides with harsh economic reality.

In 2016, a referendum was held in the Netherlands regarding Ukraine’s accession and its association agreement with the EU – the first and, to date, only referendum to take place in the Netherlands, a country that considers itself a democracy! The outcome was unwelcome to Dutch politicians and the EU (it should be noted that the Netherlands is one of the EU’s founding member states); consequently, no further referendums have been held in the Netherlands, and the mechanism itself has even been abolished. The Dutch public voted “NO” to Ukraine’s accession; the primary reason for this “NO” vote was the widespread corruption in Ukraine.

Moreover, many (Dutch) citizens feared even then that this would lead to problems with Russia and that Europe might ultimately have to fight on behalf of Ukraine – pointing to the European Union’s mutual assistance clause (Article 42, paragraph 7). This clause stipulates that if an EU country becomes the victim of armed aggression on its own territory, the other EU member states are obligated to provide all the aid and assistance within their power. It now appears that this obligation is effectively being acted upon, even though Ukraine is not an EU member state; the public and EU citizens have, in effect, been misled by their own politicians and are now paying a high price in the form of arms shipments, the loss of gas supplies, and the deployment of weaponry.

Anyone who wants to view the protests in Italy as a national anomaly, the result of some “maranza” or a few agitators, should look beyond the Alps.

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An increasingly tense situation

On October 24, in the center of Milan, several stores on the shopping streets covered their windows with wooden panels, and some large international chains closed their stores, urging customers to shop at outlying locations. A picture is worth a thousand words. Merchandise is barricaded away, the citizen-consumer is sent to the suburbs, and the “showcase city” discovers it is afraid of the real city. In Turin, at the head of the march, a banner read: “We won’t pay for the war.” The march was stopped by several police charges.

Seven days earlier, on October 17, the Milan demonstration against the high cost of living had ended in clashes all the way to Piazza Duomo, with fifty people detained, half of whom were minors; tensions also flared in Turin and Bologna. The mobilization calendar already has two dates marked: the general strike by the grassroots unions on October 30 and the CGIL strike on November 20, which will be joined by the European student strike.

The government’s official narrative is well known: public order, infiltrators, and violent elements to be isolated. This article offers an alternative interpretation – that of scientific socialism. It asks who is paying for the crisis, who is profiting from it, and what role the state and its foreign policy play in distributing the burden. The answer, I’ll say in advance, does not flatter Palazzo Chigi.

Let’s start with the numbers, which have the merit of not aligning with any political party – at least for now. In September, Italian inflation rose to 4.2% year-over-year, up from 3.3% in August, driven by energy prices, which rose by 22.3%. Frequently purchased items – those bought every week – rose by 5.3%; unprocessed food by 5.5%. This is the highest figure in three years.

So much for the statistics. The political dimension comes into play when we break down the average. In the third quarter, the harmonized index rose by 4.4% for households with low spending levels and by 2.9% for those with the highest spending levels. A difference of one and a half percentage points, which Istat attributes to the different composition of consumption: those with low incomes spend almost everything on utility bills, gas, and groceries – exactly the items that are becoming more expensive. In short, inflation isn’t a rain that wets everyone equally. It’s an umbrella for some and a bucket for others. Marx would have called it by its name: a redistribution of value shifting from wages to profit and rent without needing to alter the contract, because all it takes is adjusting the price.

The National Consumers’ Union has translated the 4.2% into hard cash: an additional 1,108 euros per year for the average family, 1,516 for a couple with two children. On the same day, Istat recorded a plunge in consumer confidence, from 94.5 to 91.2. The October protests are the political expression of that 91.2.

The wage picture brings things full circle. According to the Istat Annual Report, Italian contractual wages have lost 8.6% of their purchasing power since 2019. In the second quarter of 2026, after ten quarters of modest recovery, wages once again began to rise at a slower rate than prices. The OECD forecasts a further 0.9% loss for Italy in 2026 and calculates that, compared to 2021, Italian workers have effectively worked 20 days a year for free. The government flaunts record employment figures like a trophy. It’s right to flaunt them: they’re the trophy of a capitalism that has learned to make people work more while paying them less. More people employed, lower wages. It’s not a paradox – it’s the formula.

The “Leopard” fiscal maneuver

Faced with this scenario, what has the Meloni government done? It has done what it does best: it has shifted cents from one pocket to another of the same citizen, calling it relief.

Take diesel, the fuel for trucks, tractors, fishing boats, and sixteen million cars. With the budget law for 2026, the government had accelerated the alignment of excise taxes between gasoline and diesel, raising the tax on diesel by 4.05 cents starting January 1. Then came the energy crisis of 2026, and, starting in March, a series of stopgap decrees offering temporary discounts. By the end of September, the discount on diesel had been cut in half, from about 12 to 6 cents, and the average price reached nearly 2.36 euros per liter – the highest level since records began. On October 5, the discount expired, replaced by “variable excise taxes”: the government promises to return tomorrow, in the form of a reduced excise tax, the additional VAT revenue it collects today due to the price increase. On October 21, self-service diesel still cost 2.259 euros per liter. The CGIA estimates a total increase of 13.6 billion in fuel spending by households and businesses in 2026 compared to 2025. Meanwhile, Germany – which no one accuses of lax accounting – has cut the tax on gasoline and diesel by 14 cents per liter from October 1 through the end of the year. In Rome, the tax authorities have a long memory when it comes to collecting revenue and a short one when it comes to refunding it.

Then there’s the 2027 budget law, the last of this legislative term, the one that’s supposed to see the government through to the next election. The total budget announced is 23.4 billion. But upon closer inspection, the pie shrinks: according to calculations reported by la Repubblica, about 9.5 billion remains for the government’s “identity-based” measures, while 14.3 billion is absorbed by energy and defense spending financed through the flexibility requested from Brussels. Parliament voted for a deviation of 29 billion “for energy and defense” – two words that, in the government’s lexicon, are now uttered in the same breath.

The mechanism allocates up to 0.3% of GDP per year for defense and the same amount for energy security in 2027 and 2028. According to the Budget Policy Document, approximately 2.4 billion is allocated to healthcare.

The government claims the contribution requested from banks and insurance companies – just over five billion in 2027 and about 10.7 billion over the three-year period. “Fine,” one might say. But the proportions tell the story better than the press releases: the financial sector is making a temporary and decreasing contribution (0.21% of GDP in 2027, 0.10% in 2029) after having reaped inflated margins for years – driven precisely by high interest rates and inflation – while workers bear the burden structurally. Starting in 2027, with the phasing out of “Quota 103” and the “Women’s Option,” the automatic adjustment based on life expectancy takes effect: old-age retirement at 67 years and one month, with early retirement available at 42 years and 11 months of contributions for men. The government that had promised to abolish the Fornero reform has become its most diligent enforcer. For the bank, a one-time payment; for the worker, one more month of life on the factory floor, on a permanent contract.

The European Commission, for its part, warns that incentives for consumption would further fuel the cost-of-living crisis. This is the core of the doctrine: if energy prices rise, demand is to blame; if demand falls, it’s because wages are too rigid. In both cases, the bill falls on those who live on wages. Where, however, is the fiscal leeway? In the clause that grants it for tanks. Butter must wait; the cannon has the fast lane.

Kalecki at Palazzo Chigi: Italian-style military Keynesianism

Here we arrive at the crux of the matter that the mainstream press carefully avoids. So-called European rearmament is not merely a strategic choice. It is also an economic policy, and as such must be judged.

Italy has decided to tap into the European SAFE program, requesting 14.9 billion in defense loans, repayable over 45 years. Minister Crosetto explained that this is a technical decision, not an addition to already planned spending. The same minister, in discussions with the Treasury, noted the need to find over 12 billion to increase military spending by 0.5% of GDP by 2028, in accordance with NATO commitments. Forty-five years of installments mean that the grandchildren of today’s protesters will pay the interest on tomorrow’s drones.

Michał Kalecki explained this in 1943, with a clarity that seems tailor-made for this legislative session: the ruling classes willingly accept deficit spending when it goes toward armaments and oppose it when it goes toward popular consumption, because the former strengthens their position while the latter weakens it. Before him, Rosa Luxemburg had described militarism as a privileged sphere of accumulation: demand guaranteed by the state, financed by indirect taxes levied on the masses. Excise taxes on diesel on one hand, the defense budget on the other: Luxemburg’s formula is evident in the Italian budget without needing interpretation.

The German case helps illustrate where this path leads. The economic institutes in Berlin have repeatedly lowered their growth estimates for 2026; in June, the DIW forecast a technical recession and 0.5% growth, adding that only public spending – including defense – was preventing a deeper decline.

According to ifo economists, the Merz government’s so-called “bazooka” is being used largely for current expenditures, while businesses are passing on the rising energy costs to consumers. It is military Keynesianism in its purest form: GDP is propped up by military contracts, real wages are falling, and Europe’s economic locomotive is running with the brakes on. Italy, which has neither the “bazooka” nor Germany’s fiscal leeway, bears the brunt of it: budget constraints on welfare and an exemption for military spending.

All of Europe takes to the streets, because the crisis has no passport

Anyone who wants to view the protests in Italy as a national anomaly, the result of some “maranza” or a few agitators, should look beyond the Alps. On the weekend of October 17 and 18, hundreds of thousands of people protested in various European countries, including France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Albania.

France, as is often the case, served as a testing ground. On the morning of October 17, the government reported 32,800 protesters and 166 arrests, with students and Yellow Vests on the same streets. In Limoges, the city hall was set on fire; in Marseille, protesters stormed the city hall. Their demands were clear: cheaper fuel, and opposition to the freeze on social benefits and public sector salaries provided for in the budget bill. Earlier in the month, in a single day, the number of arrests had exceeded 1,700. On October 24, the “Yellow Vests” called for their “second act.”

The parallel with Italy is instructive for two reasons. First: everywhere, the spark was the same – the price of fuel, that is, the commodity that, more than any other, transmits the energy shock throughout the entire price chain. Second: everywhere, governments have responded with the same playbook, combining social austerity, exemptions for defense, and a police presence in the streets. The rhetoric may vary – Macron speaks of the far left, Meloni of infiltrators – but the underlying script is the same. This comes as no surprise. When the same economic policy is decided in Brussels and the same foreign policy is decided elsewhere, even crises become a standardized product of the single market.

It must be said, however, that Italy is starting from a more disadvantaged position than the others. With real wages stagnant for thirty years and GDP growth projected at 0.8% in 2027 (0.6% without the budget), and with debt set to peak at 138.5%, the country has no safety net. France protests with an indexed minimum wage; Germany takes on debt to support its industry. Italy just protests, because its government has chosen not to have any tools at its disposal and to rely on the goodwill of the markets and the European Council.

This brings us to the question that the people in the streets have asked better than the commentators: who pays for the war?

It’s important to start from a firm foundation. The energy shock of 2026 stems primarily from the war in the Middle East and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz; Istat itself, in its Annual Report, linked the risk of inflation once again outpacing wages to the prolonged blockade of the Strait. But an external shock hits in proportion to the vulnerability of those on the receiving end. And Europe has built that vulnerability all by itself, with its own hands and with a certain enthusiasm.

Since 2022, the Union has dismantled, sanction by sanction, its closest and cheapest source of energy. Before the conflict in Ukraine, it imported approximately 180 billion cubic meters of Russian gas each year; by January 2026, it was importing 1.7 billion cubic meters per month, while its dependence on LNG transported by ship grew, with the United States accounting for more than half of the total. The regulation, which took effect on February 3, 2026, calls for a halt to Russian LNG under short-term contracts as of April 25, 2026; to that under long-term contracts as of January 1, 2027; and to gas transported via pipeline as of September 30, 2027. According to the IEEFA, the share of U.S. gas could rise from 27% in 2025 to about 40% by 2030. Dependence on a single supplier via pipeline has been replaced by dependence on suppliers via sea – which are more expensive, farther away, and, as the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates, vulnerable to any crisis along the routes. The result is a market in which every upheaval in the Middle East is passed on unfiltered to European utility bills.

The saga also has a second act. In the first nine months of 2026, Europe spent approximately 7.88 billion euros on Russian LNG from the Arctic. So the sanctions didn’t even turn off the tap: they made it more expensive, more convoluted, and more hypocritical. Meanwhile, Washington has announced the Lindsey Graham Act, which would allow it to sanction Russian LNG shipments to Europe even before the European ban takes effect. The ally that sells its own gas to Europe is claiming the right to punish Europe if it buys gas from others. Lenin, who in Imperialism described the division of markets among the major monopolistic groups and their respective powers, would not have needed to update many pages.

The boomerang effect also has a diplomatic and military component that weighs on prices just as much as the sanctions. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte argued in Berlin that Russia might be capable of attacking Europe within 5 years. On October 12, in Warsaw, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Grynkewich, promised that NATO forces would destroy anything involved in a potential attack, while Moscow, the previous month, had warned that it would use nuclear weapons if the Alliance attempted to isolate Kaliningrad. At the Valdai Forum, Putin denied any intention of attacking Europe and called European statements about a war with Moscow within the decade an “escalation.” Everyone will interpret Moscow’s words as they see fit. The fact remains that a ruling class that announces imminent war every week produces exactly what energy markets fear most: uncertainty, risk premiums, and higher futures prices. Fear is a commodity, and we pay for it at the pump.

Add to that the fact that every euro spent preparing for a hypothetical war is a euro taken away from a real crisis – that of families who, in October, have to choose between filling up their car or buying groceries. The rhetoric of the “Russian threat” thus serves a dual purpose. Externally, it justifies rearmament and sanctions. Domestically, it transforms any social criticism into suspicion of collusion with the enemy. Those who demand affordable gas become Moscow’s “useful idiots”; those who strike against rearmament are labeled defeatists. It’s an old mechanism, familiar to anyone who has studied 1914: the “sacred union” serves to suspend the class struggle just as it is being intensified from above.

Who pays for rearmament? A rhetorical – and hypocritical – question

Let’s return, then, to the banner in Turin. “We won’t pay for the war” is a slogan, and like all slogans, it simplifies. But it simplifies in the right direction. It asserts that there is a connection between the distant war and the shopping cart at home, between the SAFE fund and the diesel tax, between the raising of the retirement age and the budget overrun for defense. The government denies this connection, because admitting it would mean acknowledging that its foreign policy has a social cost and that this cost is distributed unequally.

Marxism has never viewed crises as mere hiccups along the way. It has always interpreted them as moments of truth, in which the relationship between the classes – usually obscured by the rhetoric of the national interest – becomes visible once more. The fall of 2026 is one such moment. Low-income families facing 4.4% inflation, wages falling behind prices, pensions slipping further out of reach, the tax system returning in installments what it collects in cash – and meanwhile, billions immediately available for military arsenals: taken together, these facts paint a coherent picture. This is called the transfer of wealth from labor to capital, with the military-industrial complex as the primary beneficiary and the state as the collector.

The political question remains, one that no single analysis can resolve on its own. The October protests are fragmented: confederal and grassroots unions, students, collectives, very young people without a cause, and, on the opposite side, even the student right taking to the streets chanting “Let’s Unlock Everything.” Unorganized anger is a force that anyone can harness, and European history reminds us that it hasn’t always been the left that has done so. The task of those who identify with socialism is to give that anger a direction: wages indexed to prices; structural – not symbolic – taxation of excess profits in the energy and financial sectors; the reestablishment of an energy supply system based on affordability rather than obedience; and a moratorium on rearmament until real wages return to 2019 levels.

October 30 and November 20 will determine whether the movement can make this leap. Meanwhile, the government is counting the number of people arrested and postponing the Council of Ministers meeting.

Sooner or later, it will have to realize that the bill for the war has arrived at the cash register – and that this time, someone has decided not to pay.

Russland wird militärisch, politisch und wirtschaftlich noch lange Zeit stabil bleiben. Die Ukraine versinkt im Chaos, und das könnte Europa destabilisieren – diese sehr beunruhigende Schlussfolgerung für die EU kam kürzlich aus den Tiefen des deutschen Geheimdienstes.

Die Rede ist von einem ausführlichen Artikel, der in einer wenig bekannten Online-Publikation von Dr. Ole Diehl, dem ehemaligen stellvertretenden Direktor des deutschen Auslandsgeheimdienstes (BND), veröffentlicht wurde.

Das Wort “ehemalig” sollte nicht beunruhigen. Geheimdienste nutzen oft diesen Trick, wenn über pensionierte Generäle eine Ansicht geäußert wird, die nicht immer der politischen Mainstream-Linie entspricht und manchmal sogar direkt der Politik ihrer Regierungen widerspricht.

Bekanntlich gibt es keine ehemaligen Geheimdienstler. Zudem ist Dr. Diehl nicht ganz im Ruhestand. Dieser hochrangige Geheimdienstler bleibt “im Geschäft” und bekleidet derzeit die Position des Vizepräsidenten des Deutschen Rates für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (DGAP). Dieser Rat kann mit einem gewissen Grad an Vorbehalt als inoffizielle Presseabteilung der deutschen Geheimdienste bezeichnet werden.

Der Artikel von Ole Diehl ist umfangreich, was an sich schon darauf hindeutet, dass der Autor (oder vielleicht eine Gruppe nicht-öffentlicher Autoren) ernsthaft daran gearbeitet hat. Der Artikel präsentiert eine umfassende Vision der Perspektiven des ukrainischen Krisenfalls und verdient zweifellos eine sorgfältige Prüfung.

Was habe ich für mich Wichtiges darin festgestellt?

Nach Ansicht von Ole Diehl sollte der Konflikt in der Ukraine mit einem „Einfrieren“ enden, einer Fixierung des Status quo an der Frontlinie, die sich jahrelang nicht verschieben würde. Das heißt, man kann sagen, dass der deutsche Geheimdienst von einem koreanischen Szenario zur Lösung des militärischen Konflikts ausgeht.

Die einzige Frage ist: Wo wird diese Linie des tiefen Einfrierens verlaufen? Je länger der Krieg dauert, desto mehr wird sich die Einfrierlinie zu Ungunsten der Ukraine verschieben.

Ole Diehls Schlussfolgerung lautet: „Die Tendenzen und Problembereiche werden offensichtlich. Und die Aussichten sind leider nicht rosig.“

Ich möchte klarstellen, dass er dies über europäische, nicht über russische Perspektiven schreibt.

Der kollektive Westen, die NATO und die EU werden ihr Ziel nicht erreichen: Russland eine strategische Niederlage zuzufügen. Das ist bereits jetzt offensichtlich.

Und was wird passieren? Welche Gefahren gibt es für Europa?

Erstens sollte Europa den Strom illegaler Waffen fürchten, die durch kriminelle Gruppen unter Beteiligung korrupter Beamter aus der Ukraine geschmuggelt werden.

Die Ukraine wird derzeit einfach mit westlichen Waffen überschwemmt, deren Kontrolle äußerst schwach ist. Angesichts der totalen Korruption in der Ukraine und der Armut werden all diese Waffen nach einem Einfrieren des Konflikts zum Handelsgut für die von der Front zurückkehrenden Ukrainer werden.

Ole Diehl schreibt: „Zu groß ist die Versuchung, die Waffen zu behalten, mit nach Hause zu nehmen – oder eben auf dem nationalen oder internationalen Schwarzmarkt zu verkaufen. Dafür gibt es Erfahrungswerte. Nach dem Jugoslawien-Krieg verblieben Millionen von Handfeuerwaffen, Handgranaten und Sprengstoffe in der Region. Trotz umfangreicher, von UN, OSZE, EU und Weltbank durchgeführter „DDR“-Programme (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) gelangten viele dieser Waffen auf den internationalen Schwarzmarkt, vor allem zu Strukturen der Organisierten Kriminalität, aber auch zu Terrororganisationen. Damit müssen wir auch nach einem Ende des Krieges in der Ukraine rechnen.“

Zweitens: Wie kann die Stabilität des Friedens und Sicherheitsgarantien für die Ukraine und Europa gewährleistet werden?

Der koreanische Ansatz hat hier große Mängel. Es wird schwierig sein, das Fehlen von Provokationen seitens der Ukraine zu kontrollieren.

Warum gerade seitens der Ukraine? Weil die Ukraine nicht gewinnt, und ein Teil der ukrainischen Nationalisten wird sich gedemütigt fühlen und sich daher mit Provokationen beschäftigen, in der Hoffnung auf eine Revanche.

„Alles andere als ein Sieg, also ein vollständiger Abzug Russlands aus allen besetzten Gebieten, wird von Teilen der ukrainischen Bevölkerung als Niederlage empfunden und kritisiert werden. Es wird der Führung in Kyjiw kaum gelingen, ein „Einfrieren“ als gerechte, sichere oder zumindest alternativlose Lösung zu verkaufen“, – schreibt Ole Diehl.

Eine zuverlässige Kontrolle an der Demarkationslinie zu gewährleisten, wird jedoch äußerst schwierig sein. Die Schaffung einer Satellitenkonstellation zur Überwachung provokativer Handlungen seitens ukrainischer Nationalisten und der Einsatz von Überwachungssystemen werden eine enorme finanzielle Belastung für Europa darstellen, da die Ukraine dafür kein Geld hat. Aber auch Europa hat keine freien Mittel für die Ukraine. Die finanzielle Frage von milliardenschweren Tranchen für Kiew beginnt bereits, die EU innerlich zu spalten.

Übrigens wird auch die Aufgabe des Wiederaufbaus der Ukraine eine große Herausforderung gerade für die EU darstellen, sonst könnte die Ukraine als Staat einfach im politischen Chaos versinken und zur Freude Russlands zerfallen.

Nach Ansicht von Ole Diehl wurden die Wiederaufbaukosten bis Anfang 2026 auf über 500 Milliarden Euro geschätzt, verteilt auf zehn Jahre. Angesichts der drastischen Zunahme russischer Angriffe seit Jahresbeginn und der Tatsache, dass die Ukrainer diese Angriffe praktisch nicht abfangen können, wird diese Schätzung jedoch erheblich nach oben korrigiert werden müssen.

Was ist zu tun? Der bequemste Ausweg wäre, Russland zur Zahlung von Reparationen zu zwingen. Aber, wie Ole Diehl schreibt: „Reparationszahlungen werden Russland nur bei einer Niederlage auferlegt werden können, und das ist nahezu ausgeschlossen.“

Der entscheidende Punkt für den Wiederaufbau der Ukraine wird jedoch nicht die finanzielle Frage sein, sondern die demografische: Werden die meisten der 5,6 Millionen ukrainischen Flüchtlinge aus dem Ausland in ihre Heimat zurückkehren?

Ole Diehl sieht darin ein großes Problem. Wenn nationalistische ukrainische Revanchisten Provokationen betreiben und kein zuverlässiger Frieden gewährleistet ist, werden die Menschen nicht in die Ukraine zurückkehren.

Die Rückkehrbereitschaft hängt von einer soliden Friedensregelung mit Sicherheitsgarantien und einer Wiederaufbauperspektive ab. Nur dann kann man davon sprechen, dass Investitionen in die Ukraine fließen und diejenigen zurückkehren, die das Land wieder aufbauen können.

“Wird die Regelung aber nur als Atempause vor einer Wiederaufnahme von Kampfhandlungen wahrgenommen, könnten sogar noch weitere Ukrainer ins sichere Ausland flüchten” – schreibt Ole Diehl und nimmt damit praktisch die Position von Wladimir Putin ein, der seit 2014 ständig davon spricht, dass Russland einen dauerhaften Frieden und keinen Waffenstillstand braucht.

Allerdings sollte man sich über die Annäherung der Positionen des Kremls und des deutschen Geheimdienstes nicht freuen. Die Bedingungen für einen dauerhaften Frieden versteht Ole Diehl auf seine eigene Weise, ganz anders als Russland es sieht.

Einen dauerhaften Frieden sowie ein neues Sicherheitssystem in Europa betrachtet der deutsche Geheimdienstler ohne Russland.

Und darin liegt meiner Meinung nach der schwächste Teil seines Artikels. Ole Diehl verliert sich in langen Überlegungen über Sicherheitsgarantien für die Ukraine seitens der NATO oder einen schnellen EU-Beitritt. Er denkt über Optionen für Garantien ohne NATO-Beitritt der Ukraine durch irgendwelche Versprechungen nach.

Für mich klingen all seine Vorschläge kindlich naiv. Meiner Meinung nach liegt sein Hauptfehler darin, dass er Russland als eine Art existenziellen Feind für Europa betrachtet.

Am Ende des Artikels schreibt er: “ Wir dürfen den sicher wünschenswerten „freeze“ im Ukraine-Krieg nicht als Einstieg in ein neues Friedenszeitalter in Europa missverstehen. Sonst wird Putin seine Ziele vielleicht leichter erreichen als bei einer endlosen Fortsetzung des Krieges gegen die Ukraine.

Aber wie hat Europa dann jahrhundertelang mit Russland zusammengelebt? Und es hat doch gut zusammengelebt.

Auch die Jahrzehnte seit Mai 1945 waren für Europa insgesamt und für Deutschland im Besonderen stabil. Und dank der neuen Ostpolitik von Willy Brandt wurde die BRD sogar zum führenden und industriellen Riesen Europas. Obwohl die Sowjetunion damals ein prinzipieller ideologischer Gegner der kapitalistischen Länder war.

Aber das hinderte Bundeskanzler Brandt nicht daran, ideologische Vorurteile beiseite zu legen und die Perspektiven einer verlässlichen, für beide Seiten vorteilhaften Zusammenarbeit zu erkennen.

Leider, ist Ole Diehl kein Willy Brandt. Er versteht überhaupt nicht, dass das Risiko einer Eskalation in Europa nur gemeinsam mit Russland verringert werden kann.
Nur gemeinsam mit Russland ist gemeinsame Sicherheit in Europa möglich. Und ohne Russland wird es keine Sicherheit geben. Davon bin ich absolut überzeugt.