No fue la venta de ese diésel lo que le interesaba a Putin, pero no sabemos bien todavía qué.

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“Pero les diré que es raro tener conversaciones tan largas en las que ninguno de ellos quisiera terminar la conversación, ninguno de ellos quería colgar el teléfono si se puede decir así”

Yuri Ushakov. Asesor de la Presidencia rusa, 19 de mayo de 2025

“Fue una conversación muy intensa y amistosa. Nadie quería ser el primero en colgar”, reveló Ushakov, quien destacó el ambiente cordial del diálogo entre ambos mandatarios.

Yuri Ushakov. Asesor de la Presidencia rusa, 9 de octubre de 2026

El día 9 de octubre un desesperado Donald Trump -que no había extendido como gesto cordial y diplomático una felicitación por el cumpleaños de su homólogo ruso el 7 de octubre- llamó al Kremlin y entabló un acuerdo para nada modesto: habilitó la venta de petróleo y diésel rusos, mismo que había vetado apenas en septiembre con aranceles del 100% a quien comerciara con Moscú.

De esta forma:

…acordaron que Rusia suministrará inmediatamente más de 300.000 toneladas de combustible diésel a los mercados estadounidense y mundial. Según detalló, Moscú entregará otras 500.000 toneladas durante el mes de noviembre y un millón de toneladas adicionales inmediatamente después, así como otros tres millones de toneladas en un corto período de tiempo, dependiendo del estado de las refinerías rusas.

La noticia cayó mal en Kiev y en Europa e incluso congeló la conversación que mantenían una comitiva ucraniana con Kushner y Witkoff en Miami, terminándola un día antes de lo previsto.

La Europa desconcertada empezó a tener comunicaciones con Zelensky para mostrar de nuevo el apoyo a esta demencial apuesta por la guerra en donde Ucrania pone los muertos y los europeos endeudan a los ucranianos que quedan vivos.

Sin embargo, los vaivenes del presidente estadounidense no son nuevos y mucho menos en lo que tiene que ver con suministro energético. Una breve cronología lo confirma: 1) tras el inicio de la guerra contra Irán el 28 de febrero de este año, Trump se vio obligado el 5 de marzo a dar una licencia temporal para que India comprara petróleo a Rusia; 2) el 12 de marzo se emitió otra licencia temporal por parte del Departamento del Tesoro estadounidense por treinta días para venta de crudo ruso, que estaba sancionado; 3) el 18 de septiembre, Donald Trump firma la Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, que le daba el poder de imponer aranceles de hasta 100% a los 5 mayores compradores de petróleo y gas rusos (principalmente China e India); 4) finalmente este 9 de septiembre suspendió Trump esa ley exhibida con toda la parafernalia propia del siniestro gobierno Trump, por parte del senador Richard Blumenthal,  quien dijo: “Vladimir Putin, te tenemos fichado, tu economía se tambalea” … amenazó a China e India y hoy, Trump da las gracias al presidente Putin por salvarle el trasero en vísperas de elecciones.

Y así, como un Déjà vu, Yuri Ushakov volvió a decir las mismas palabras del año anterior: ninguno de los dos quería colgar. Y bueno esta vez colgaron a Zelensky y a la Unión Europea, la pregunta es: ¿cuándo volverá a dar otro bandazo Trump? ¿Cuándo volverá a ser amigo de von der Leyen, mentor de Zelensky y enemigo de Putin?

La Unión Europea, ridículo completo

Es sabido por ellos y por varios analistas esta cruda verdad: Trump no quiere a los europeos, a penas los soporta, siempre ha querido sacar las tropas de esa zona, siempre quiso salir de la OTAN, les puso en ridículo desde las primeras reuniones, les dijo que estaban muriendo las buenas costumbres con una Europa llena de migración desordenada y grupos LGBTI+Q por todo lado, hombres en competencias de mujeres y etc. etc. El propio J.D. Vance les dijo que había una caída moral de Europa y a eso se debía su crisis.

No siendo esto poco, Úrsula von der Leyen se comprometió en nombre de la UE a comprar 750.000 millones de dólares en energía a EE.UU. (gas natural licuado, petróleo y productos nucleares) hasta 2028. Además, se comprometió a realizar inversiones adicionales por 600.000 millones de dólares en Estados Unidos. Y a cambio, Estados Unidos fijó un arancel general del 15% sobre la mayoría de productos europeos, en lugar del 30%.

Y ahora, luego de tanto ir y venir, Estados Unidos le sigue comprando petróleo a Rusia, además de uranio y otros materiales que luego revende a Europa más caro. Ya los precios de gas están reventando al ciudadano común y mientras Trump viola las sanciones occidentales que pretenden asfixiar a Rusia, Europa tiene que pagar por tratos leoninos con EE.UU., invertir en la guerra en Ucrania y exprimir al poco Estado de Bienestar que les queda y del cual ya se ven revueltas nuevamente por vivienda, educación o empleo en Francia, España, Alemania, Portugal y Bélgica.

Este nuevo pacto comercial, que va hasta abril de 2027 ridiculiza a Europa, la pone en el lugar que le corresponde: el de una civilización – collage en decadencia. Europa anhela el regreso de los halcones demócratas para retornar a una presión unánime sobre Rusia y en franca escalada bélica como la llevaba ‘sleepy’ Biden. Esto no pasará. El nuevo rumbo estadounidense es Asia Oriental.

Rusia y sus socios, actores globales

Si bien esta venta es un golpe no sólo económico sino reputacional a favor del presidente Putin y Rusia, también deja abiertos otros aspectos no menos relevantes.

Por un lado, China mira con celo cualquier acercamiento entre Rusia y USA en este baile de tres potencias globales. Los chinos son los principales socios comerciales de los rusos y muy seguramente de mantenerse la restricción al diésel ruso, chinos e indios lo comprarían. Entonces, ¿qué ganó y condicionó Vladímir Putin en la llamada con Trump? Los rusos tienen acuerdos comerciales y han aprendido a maniobrar en medio de más de treinta mil sanciones así que este trato fue un guiño a Trump ante su SOS.

Es claro que no le cae mal esto a Rusia que ahora puede poner un precio no por debajo de los costos -de haberlo tenido que vender con restricciones por sanciones- pero quien marcó el teléfono fue Trump no Putin.

Por otro lado, Irán no creo que esté cómodo con esto. Con claridad Trump quiere no sólo estar bien con los precios y abastecimiento de combustible en su país, sino estar lo suficientemente seguro de que se mantiene un flujo nada modesto de diésel en el mercado mundial para atacar a Irán sin problemas o no tantos. Por cierto, hay que ser una potencia para decir sin duda alguna: ‘cuente señor Trump con tres millones de toneladas de diésel’. Sin lastimar su consumo interno, lo hace Rusia.

Además, la ruta por el Ártico plantea una alternativa a los cierres de Ormuz y Bab el-Mandeb que derivan de las resistencias al imperio y al sionismo por parte de Irán y Yemen. Lo que implica que como de costumbre EE.UU. celebra comerciar por Alaska con Rusia.

De tal suerte que, si Irán lleva a su manera una presión mediante la diplomacia y el cierre estratégico del flujo de petróleo, fertilizantes y mercancías con lo cual busca desgastar a los estadounidenses y una salida de la guerra en sus términos, el guiño del Kremlin a Trump no le favorece. Fortalece a su enemigo, quien gana tiempo y sin desesperar puede atacarlo de mejor manera. No implica una derrota de Irán, implica un cambio en los cálculos de presión, si en abril se extiende el plazo y si Trump decide atacar antes.

Finalmente, hay un socio que los propios rusos lo señalan como valioso. Cuba. La Isla, país que apoyó a millones de personas en el mundo de diversas formas y cuando sucedió en 1986 la catástrofe de Chernóbil en la URSS hace cuarenta años, en pleno Periodo Especial, Cuba recibió a 26 mil niños de Rusia, Bielorrusia, Moldavia y Ucrania para darles tratamiento y los adoptó como hijos propios. Esa Cuba amiga incondicional y solidaria no recibe petróleo desde hace un año largo y en septiembre la Guardia Costera de EE.UU. devolvió el buque Grace con combustible.

Sobre Cuba se teje un genocidio. No le llega combustibles ni mercancías. ¿Se habrá acordado el presidente Putin de la Isla, patria del más grande antiimperialista del siglo XX en todo occidente cuando negoció con Trump salvando el trasero a su enemigo, este republicano vetusto? Si Trump permitió liberar de sanciones el combustible para todo el mundo, ¿Ese ‘todo el mundo’ incluirá a Cuba?

Potencias: sin amigos y sin engaños

Es claro que cuando el asesor presidencial, Ushakov, señala que la conversación fue amable y llego a un punto de: ‘cuelga tú, ¡no!, ¡cuelga tú!’ entre los dos mandatarios, sólo desea crear una sobrecarga de cortisol en la UE y los ucronazis y seguro logró tal efecto. Esto no significa que crean que están tratando con la esperanza de una amistad. Por el contrario, sólo un pragmatismo puro y duro tiene las tripas para llegar a estos acuerdos.

Qué pasaría si el presidente Putin le dice a Trump: no te daré un gramo de diésel. No lo sabremos, pero seguro ofende a este tarado mental y lo pone del lado de Europa y Ucrania.

Es el mismo hombre que respaldó a Marco Rubio, su secretario de Estado, cuando hace unos meses celebraba los bombardeos sobre colegios de infantes en Rusia señalando que era válida la máxima presión. Es el mismo hombre que autoriza la entrega de datos de la CIA y el Pentágono a los ucronazis para atacar las mismas refinerías que condena que Zelensky ataque.

Esto también es claro, como nota al pie. El propio neonazi Volodómir Zelensky, presidente ilegítimo de Ucrania hace dos años y asesino de su pueblo, tiene razón al criticar la acción de Trump y hasta de tildarlo de débil. “La paz nunca llega gracias a la debilidad”, señaló. Trump salió a decir que era ya necesario cambiar de presidente por alguien que deseara negociar, que Zelensky perdió más de un millón de ciudadanos y 30% del territorio.

Y lo que diga la UE al respecto tiene su parte de verdad, así como de ingenuidad, como señaló el presidente eslovaco Robert Fico. Pero nadie está seguro con lo que se pacte con Trump ni con ningún gringo. Nunca han mantenido la palabra. Quizá la excepción es Kennedy en la crisis de los misiles.

Siempre los más pequeños saldrán lastimados en los acuerdos entre potencias, pero no aprenden no leen la historia. Le pasó a Cuba en 1962 en la crisis de los misiles. Le pasó a Libia, cuando decidió no tener armas nucleares y europeos y estadounidenses acordaron robarla. Europa todavía era algo fuerte. Hay más ejemplos.

Lo clave es que en este intempestivo acuerdo hay más de enemistad que de amistad. EE.UU. no desea salvar ni ayudar a Rusia. No le interesa la paz, se limpió el trasero con el acuerdo del Anchorage, sólo vela por su bienestar, el de su élite. Por su parte Putin sabe que le desean muerto, que, durante una llamada en 2025, mientras hablaba con Trump caían drones en una de sus residencias.

La diferencia sustancial radica en que Putin juega a largo aliento, tiene calculadas las contingencias. No fue la venta de ese diésel lo que le interesaba, pero no sabemos bien todavía qué. Mientras, Trump lleva una política de mentiras apalancada en el poder de los medios y el peso de la información salida de la boca del presidente de una potencia, con la cual improvisa, salva, ataja, corrige, omite y salta a otra cosa.

Lo cierto es que por ahora -y sin saber cómo despertará mañana, pensando o deseando el frustrado candidato auto propuesto a Nobel de paz- felizmente al terminar la llamada, los presidentes, además de colgar sus teléfonos, colgaron a Zelensky y a la Unión Europea.

The American humorist Will Rogers observed that there are three kinds of people in this world: those who learn by reading; those who learn by observation; and the rest, who have to learn by peeing on the electric fence for themselves.

In Europe, we have been learning things the hard way.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting turmoil came as a shock to our energy system. More recently, the conflict in the Gulf has sparked fresh shock waves. 

Having built on our experience of the energy crisis in 2022, Europe was better prepared. But the fact of the matter is that we were still left exposed to external shocks.

Since the start of the conflict, the EU spent more than €100bn more on imported oil and gas, compared to the same period last year. We are not only learning the hard way – we are learning the expensive way.

And the lesson could not be clearer: we need to free ourselves from fossil fuel imports, as much as possible and as soon as possible.

The more clean energy that we produce – from homegrown sources like renewables, nuclear, and geothermal – the lower our bills become. At the same time, we also strengthen our energy security, cut our emissions, and reinforce our energy independence.

That’s the direction we are taking

Last year, we added 89 gigawatts of renewable energy to our energy system. One gigawatt is enough to provide electricity for up to 1m households.

And for the first time ever, the EU produced more electricity from solar and wind than from fossil fuels.

In other words, more of our energy is being “made in Europe”, which makes us less reliant on fossil imports. Since 2022, we have decreased our gas consumption significantly, to the order of 17 percent.

But it’s not just about how Europe generates electricity – it’s about how we share it. Over the past decades, EU countries have linked up their electricity markets to a degree not seen elsewhere in the world.

This makes it much easier to support each other with supplies in times of need, as well as to buy and sell electricity across borders at the best price.

This progress has firmed up the foundations of our energy system. But can these foundations withstand our uncertain times? I believe that they can and they will – as long we stick to a solid strategy.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

Saudi Arabia is looking at ways to expand its oil pipeline capacity to destinations outside the Persian Gulf to 10 million barrels a day within two to three years, said Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman.

The European Commission has rejected demands from Italy and Greece for additional exemptions from EU spending rules as the Middle East energy crisis drives inflation higher, exposing renewed divisions over how much financial assistance European governments can provide.

The European Commission has rejected requests from Italy and Greece for greater freedom to increase public spending in response to the energy crisis, resisting pressure from two member states that argue existing budget restrictions are limiting their ability to protect households and businesses.

The decision, confirmed on 8 October, follows renewed appeals from Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis for measures recognising the exceptional financial burden imposed by higher energy prices.

Meloni wants Brussels to take greater account of unexpected inflation when assessing national budgets and to permit additional tax revenue generated by rising prices to be used for energy relief. Mitsotakis has sought the exclusion of temporary support measures for consumers and businesses from the expenditure limits agreed under the EU’s fiscal framework.

Economic Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis rejected the argument for further concessions, maintaining that the existing arrangements already take inflation into account and provide mechanisms for responding to exceptional circumstances.

The disagreement comes as Europe’s governments confront the economic consequences of the Middle East conflict, including higher fuel costs, inflationary pressures and increased demands for state intervention.

Italy’s increasingly difficult budget choices

For Italy, the dispute adds to a fiscal problem that has been developing throughout the year.

The government expects its budget deficit to rise to 3.4 per cent of GDP in 2027, reversing an earlier objective of reducing borrowing below the EU’s three per cent reference value.

As EU Today reported earlier this month, Rome plans to use additional fiscal room for defence and energy-related expenditure, while public debt is projected to remain close to 138 per cent of GDP.

The new request concerns the treatment of inflation and the financial support required to offset its effects.

Energy inflation creates an unusual budgetary problem. Governments can receive additional nominal tax revenue as prices rise, particularly through consumption taxes, while simultaneously facing public pressure to compensate consumers for higher living costs.

Meloni argues that such unexpected revenue should be available for targeted assistance without forcing equivalent reductions elsewhere in national expenditure.

Brussels is reluctant to accept arrangements that could turn temporary increases in tax receipts into an opportunity for permanent spending expansion.

Italy’s position also reflects the political competition between defence spending and domestic economic support. Rome has accepted the need for higher military expenditure but faces immediate pressure from households and energy-intensive industries.

That competition was already apparent when the government chose to prioritise energy relief over the full use of defence-spending flexibility.

Greece seeks different treatment for emergency support

Greece’s request is more narrowly focused on the treatment of temporary assistance under the EU’s expenditure rules.

Athens argues that measures intended to help businesses and households manage exceptional energy costs should not be counted against the normal spending limits.

The Greek government faces an economic environment in which higher imported energy prices threaten household purchasing power and business profitability, particularly in sectors dependent on transport and fuel.

Excluding temporary relief from expenditure calculations would give Athens additional room to intervene without breaching its agreed fiscal trajectory.

The Commission, however, has resisted establishing further exemptions beyond those already provided in the fiscal framework.

Its objection is institutional as well as financial. If additional categories of emergency expenditure are repeatedly excluded from fiscal calculations, the system becomes increasingly difficult to enforce consistently across the Union.

The limits of Europe’s reformed fiscal rules

The EU revised its fiscal governance framework in 2024, introducing nationally agreed expenditure paths intended to provide greater flexibility while maintaining sustainable public finances.

The Commission’s rules on exceptional circumstances permit member states to depart temporarily from normal requirements under specified conditions.

Those provisions have already been used to accommodate higher defence expenditure, while the Commission has also issued guidance on their application to energy-security investments.

Temporary financial assistance intended to reduce household energy bills, however, is not necessarily treated in the same way as investment in infrastructure that reduces Europe’s long-term dependence on imported fuel.

That distinction has become a source of friction between Brussels and national capitals.

Governments argue that the immediate economic effects of an international crisis require exceptional measures. The Commission is concerned that repeated concessions could weaken the credibility of the spending framework.

A wider dispute over Europe’s economic response

The Commission’s decision also comes as France faces increasing pressure over its debt and budget deficit.

The deterioration in French borrowing conditions has reinforced concerns about the risks associated with heavily indebted governments continuing to expand expenditure.

France, Italy and Greece have different fiscal positions, but the problems confronting them originate partly in the same combination of expensive energy, weak economic growth and competing spending commitments.

The dispute will now feed into preparations for the European Council meeting on 15–16 October, where energy prices and economic competitiveness are prominent agenda items.

EU leaders are expected to consider targeted and temporary measures to reduce the burden on businesses and consumers, alongside longer-term initiatives intended to reduce dependence on fossil fuels.

The Commission’s refusal to provide Italy and Greece with further fiscal exemptions establishes the limits within which those discussions will take place.

National governments remain free to introduce assistance, but Brussels is insisting that they account for its cost within the fiscal rules already agreed.

For Rome and Athens, the question is whether those rules provide sufficient room to respond to an energy crisis whose duration remains uncertain.

By Catherine Lucey and María Paula Mijares Torres Oct 11, 2026 (Bloomberg) –President Donald Trump said Sunday that Russia and Ukraine had agreed to an “energy ceasefire” effective immediately. “Both parties...

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Is Trump planning on using Putin to get him out of the mess of both his low polling and the Iran war? Seems far-fetched perhaps at first, but he is completely snared in Iran, with whatever option he looks at appearing to be a doomsday scenario. Could Putin help him out both with diesel prices back home but also to broker a deal with Iran which makes it appear to Americans that he, and America, are somehow the winners?

For the Russian president to sell close to 2 million tonnes of diesel oil to Western countries, including the U.S. of course, seems like a sticking plaster to a huge wound in the American and Western economies. Unless, that is, there is a second deal behind it which journalists and pundits are not aware of, or are simply choosing not to report. For the diesel initiative from Putin, the amount which is being offered isn’t huge, but there are a couple of precedents which it sets which are more important.

Firstly, it opens the doors for further lifting of sanctions (which could be bundled into Iran’s, given Moscow’s relations with Tehran), but perhaps even more importantly, it makes President Zelensky of Ukraine an even bigger target for Trump. Much will rest on the coming days and the decision that Zelensky will take to continue bombing Russia’s oil facilities. Will he take that suicide pill? Wars are often messy, and there are always grey areas where the two countries at war with one another find situations which are illogical and impractical. Perhaps the bombing of oil facilities within Russia in the Ukraine war has reached its tipping point, and regardless of how close EU leaders are with Zelensky – who at best we can call a caretaker leader – this will test this relationship to breaking point.

Do great numbers of citizens in France and Germany need to die this winter simply because of an energy crisis and/or an economic malaise in their own countries which have poured billions into keeping the war in Ukraine alive? Is Putin so confident that this winter will be the last one for his troops, as the defensive line between Ukraine’s forces and those of Russia’s looks like it is about to break at any moment? Are Ukrainians themselves ready to face a freezing winter in Kiev, unable to power or heat their own apartments? So many wars started over energy reserves, but not Ukraine. Yet it might end over them.

Trump’s threatening comments on social media about Zelensky should be taken seriously. If Trump’s own cabal of unqualified advisers can seriously convince him that a ground invasion of Iran is feasible, if not winnable, one could argue simply that regime change in Ukraine should be a children’s picnic and gives him a huge payday – politically, economically and geopolitically. Removing Zelensky would stop the war immediately, and Trump could claim victory for that, while he asks his friend Putin to quietly intervene in Iran and fix the Straits of Hormuz.

For Trump to actually respond to Zelensky’s outburst to reporters that the move to buy Russian diesel was “weak” by threatening Zelensky with being removed shows that his patience has reached a point where he is starting to think of the Ukrainian president as the source of the problems. To remove Zelensky through backing a rival will be hard and will pitch him against EU leaders, but one could argue relations couldn’t really get any worse, and that once Macron and Merz understand that peace is the only option and Zelensky is actually the only real obstacle to that, they will do what all EU leaders do and follow America’s lead.

We often hear analysts on YouTube talk about the game of “chicken”, but there has never been a more fleeting moment than now, as both Trump and Zelensky will be watching each other to see who blinks first. Zelensky, until now, has been playing a dangerous game of pretending to be servile to U.S. hegemony, while really just taking the cash and weapons and laughing at Trump among a coterie of weak European leaders in their palatial residences. The war has been complex since it began, as the U.S. and EU rarely saw eye to eye, but if Trump goes ahead with his threat of denying the Ukrainians shared intel, then this will be a very bad omen for the future of Zelensky, as he will put even more pressure on the British, French and Germans to come up with more weapons and money in an unwinnable war which they’ve bet the farm on and their entire political careers depend on.

The war, after this diesel decision, might have just become much simpler and more binary, and a collective narrative might emerge from the insanity of EU gibberish from countries who can’t even protect their own people on their own soil against an invasion of bogus asylum seekers. It will not only be the ultimate test for U.S.-Ukraine relations, but also one for U.S.-EU ones, and perhaps represent the end of NATO as we know it.

Donald Trump has presented his agreement with Vladimir Putin as a means of reducing American fuel prices. Yet the Treasury authorisation extends far beyond the announced diesel shipments, opening opportunities for international trade in Russian petroleum products as American investors negotiate the acquisition of Lukoil’s overseas assets.

President Donald Trump’s decision to reopen trade in Russian diesel has implications extending well beyond American fuel prices. The agreement, announced ahead of November’s congressional elections, coincides with negotiations over Russian energy assets and mounting American pressure on Ukraine to suspend attacks against Moscow’s oil infrastructure.

The US Treasury’s General Licence 135, issued on 9 October, authorises transactions involving Russian-origin diesel until 7 April 2027. Unlike Trump’s public announcement, which referred to specific quantities destined for the American market, the licence establishes no corresponding volume ceiling or restriction confining authorised trade to the United States.

Its provisions permit American businesses to participate in eligible international transactions involving Russian diesel, including associated financial and commercial services. Existing sanctions remain formally in force, but an important category of Russian petroleum trade has been reopened.

The arrangement potentially benefits not only Russian producers but also American commodity traders, financial institutions and intermediaries capable of purchasing Russian fuel and distributing it internationally.

Sanctions relief without removing sanctions

The legal mechanism offers Washington considerable flexibility. Rather than formally abandoning restrictions imposed over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the administration can authorise selected transactions while maintaining the broader sanctions framework.

Congress’s Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 strengthened the legislative basis for economic pressure on Moscow but also provided presidential waiver powers.

General Licence 135 was issued under existing Treasury sanctions authorities, rather than necessarily through those waiver provisions. Nevertheless, the combined framework leaves the administration substantial discretion over the practical application of economic restrictions.

Washington can consequently maintain its declared sanctions policy while selectively restoring commercial relations with Russia. European governments, which have maintained extensive restrictions on Russian energy, have little influence over such unilateral American exemptions.

The Lukoil connection

The timing becomes more revealing when considered alongside negotiations over Lukoil’s international assets.

American investors have been exploring the acquisition of the Russian company’s overseas operations, including oilfields, refineries, storage facilities and retail distribution networks. The portfolio has been valued at approximately $20–22 billion.

Among the prospective investors is billionaire Todd Boehly, while discussions concerning Russian-American economic cooperation have involved Trump’s representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.

An American-controlled acquisition of Lukoil’s international network could complement the commercial opportunities created by the diesel authorisation.

Russian petroleum products could potentially be purchased and marketed through American-controlled businesses, allowing Russian suppliers to retain export revenues while intermediaries earn profits from financing, distribution and resale.

No evidence establishes that General Licence 135 was specifically designed for the prospective Lukoil purchasers, or that Trump personally holds an interest in the proposed transactions. Nevertheless, the parallel negotiations suggest the possibility of an emerging commercial arrangement under which American intermediaries assume a greater role in Russian energy exports.

Ukraine and the conflict of interests

The consequences for Ukraine could be considerable.

Kyiv has expanded attacks against Russian refineries, fuel depots and petroleum infrastructure, seeking to reduce Moscow’s export earnings and disrupt supplies supporting its armed forces.

Trump has repeatedly criticised these strikes, linking them to higher international fuel prices. His administration now has an additional commercial reason to seek their suspension.

On 11 October, Trump announced an energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, although President Volodymyr Zelenskyy indicated that Kyiv had not agreed to such an arrangement.

Ukraine has maintained that any suspension of attacks against Russian energy facilities must be matched by an end to Moscow’s strikes on Ukrainian power infrastructure.

An agreement protecting Russian refineries without equivalent Russian concessions would preserve an important source of Kremlin revenue while depriving Kyiv of military and economic leverage.

A separate accommodation with Moscow?

The immediate political advantage for Trump is apparent. Rising diesel prices have become a concern ahead of the 3 November midterm elections, particularly among farmers and transport businesses. Additional Russian supplies offer the administration an opportunity to demonstrate action on domestic fuel costs.

Yet the six-month Treasury authorisation extends considerably beyond the election, suggesting commercial objectives that cannot be explained exclusively by short-term electoral considerations.

The emerging pattern is one of bilateral economic engagement with Moscow proceeding independently of a settlement in Ukraine. Russian energy trade is being selectively reopened, American investors are pursuing Russian-owned assets, and Washington is seeking restrictions on Ukrainian operations against the infrastructure underpinning those commercial interests.

For European governments, this threatens the cohesion of the sanctions regime. Brussels may continue restricting Russian energy revenues while Washington authorises transactions that restore access to international markets.

The larger prospect is a system in which Russia retains export earnings, American intermediaries acquire profitable commercial positions, and sanctions become instruments of bilateral negotiation rather than coordinated Western pressure.

Trump’s diesel agreement may therefore represent the opening stage of a wider economic accommodation with Putin, negotiated while Russia continues its war against Ukraine and without any corresponding Russian commitment to withdraw from occupied territory.

By Jan Wolfe Oct 11 (Reuters) – Republican US Senator Thom Tillis on Sunday said President Donald Trump’s diesel supply deal with Russia may be illegal and will put American lives at risk, adding to bipartisan...

By Lucia Kassai Oct 9, 2026 (Bloomberg) –When hurricanes sweep through the Gulf of Mexico, oil companies can lose millions of dollars waiting for the all-clear to restart production. Shell Plc...

A giant wind farm risks blinding radar used to track Russian jets and missiles, the Ministry of Defence has warned as it opposes Net Zero plans to build 23 turbines twice the height of Big Ben in Yorkshire.

The post Giant Wind Turbines Risk Leaving Britain Blind to Russian Jets, Says MoD appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

Europe's estimated bill reaches €7.88 billion through September as U.S. sanctions deadline adds uncertainty for Yamal's specialized tanker fleet.

Indian refiners have cut back Russian crude purchases for November delivery, as rising competition from China pushes up prices at a time when buyers can tap alternative shipments from the Middle East.

How Iraq’s energy sovereignty can be measured and achieved? How do the geography and sanctions matter? What is the U.S.’ impact in this area? And who determines Iraq’s energy choices? Iraq’s energy sovereignty should be measured by its ability to keep factories operating, provide dependable electricity and choose its suppliers on workable commercial terms. Yet, […]

South Korea's presidential office on Wednesday dismissed a Ukrainian report that Russia has imported petroleum products from South Korean ports, calling the accusation inappropriate.

Europe’s Green party has called on the European Commission to exercise the powers it previously used during the Ukraine war to tax the exceptional profits made by big oil and gas companies during the ongoing conflict in Iran. 

“There are models in Europe that we can use to tax these super profits,” German MEP Rasmus Andresen told a European Parliament debate in Strasbourg on Wednesday (7 October), in his call to crack down on Iran-crisis profiteering.

The Strasbourg debate came after Austria, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain wrote to Ireland’s finance minister in August calling for an EU-wide framework to tax windfall profits.

Ireland holds the rotating EU presidency and can set agendas in the EU Council until the end of the year.

Several of those in the group of six EU states already put in place energy windfall taxes since this summer, ranging from 60 percent levies on excess fuel profits in Poland to 33 percent in Portugal.

Many other EU countries oppose introducing another tax at European level, which would require unanimity among all 27 member states to put in place.

But for his part, the Greens’ Andresen told MEPs in the hemicycle on Wednesday: “I don’t understand how despite the fact that there is this initiative from these six member states, that the commission is not taking action.”

Estimates from NGO Transport and Environment found that excess profits of €7.5bn were seen by eight oil companies alone in the first half of 2026 in Europe.

The figures were twice what they had made in the previous quarter. 

The EU had reacted to soaring energy prices after Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in 2022 with a special “solidarity” tax on oil and gas firms, said groups on the Parliament’s left.

A commission assessment found that the measure raised €28bn in 2022-2023.

A senior official representing the Irish presidency, Thomas Byrne, said on Wednesday that windfall taxes “could be considered to respond to the concern related to the rising cost of living“.

But energy commissioner Dan Jørgensen poured cold water on appeals for EU-level action, saying “corporate taxation falls mainly in the realm of national competence” in legal terms.

Andresen’s fellow Green MEP, Marie Toussaint, said taxing Iran profits could be used “to pay for the energy transformation” in Europe, in the context of difficult talks on the EU’s next multi-annual European budget.

If they were not taxed, “how can they be exonerated from all responsibility in the rise of prices at the gas station?,” said the French vice-president of the Greens group.

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Qatar has amassed a fleet of empty liquefied natural gas tankers in the Persian Gulf, a sign that one of the world’s biggest exporters of the fuel may be preparing to boost shipments through the Strait of Hormuz.

Carbon Brief claims that wind and solar power saved the UK from gas imports worth £5.9bn during the Hormuz crisis. Not mentioned, says Paul Homewood, is that the wind and solar power cost more.

The post Carbon Brief’s Con Trick appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

Germany and California parade as climate superpowers – yet both import energy, destroy industry and hand supply chains to Beijing. Western virtue, says Tilak Doshi, is made in Chinese coal-fired factories.

The post Beijing’s Useful Idiots: Germany, California and the Green Road to Chinese Supremacy appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

Last week, Russia recorded its highest estimated revenues from seaborne oil exports since the start of the war with Ukraine.

The main driver of this demand is the armed conflict and the resulting blockade of the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East. Due to supply problems, buyers are looking for additional sources of crude oil. This also applies to China which, although it has already secured reserves of the commodity, is also starting to increase purchases from the Russian Federation.

Russia’s record revenues from oil sales

Last week, Russia achieved record weekly revenues from seaborne oil exports since the beginning of the war. Oil companies there shipped about 3.99 million barrels of oil a day to foreign markets. Given the high prices, this significantly increased the value of Russian exports.

Bloomberg estimates that the total value of oil shipped from Russian ports last week was about $2.75 billion. That is about $180 million more than the previous week and the highest weekly figure since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war.

Diesel price explodes to record highs across Europe

Russian oil is now much more expensive than in previous months. As noted earlier, this is influenced by the situation in the global oil market, and in particular, the war in the Middle East. The price of Brent crude remained above $100 a barrel in September.

At the end of September, the price of this benchmark exceeded $103 per barrel. Earlier, prices rose further amid concerns about disruptions in oil supplies from the Middle East.

Average revenues for the last four weeks

The Kremlin has decided to limit fuel exports to support the domestic market. The ban on diesel exports by Russian producers has been extended until Sept. 30, and restrictions on the export of gasoline and some diesel fuels by other exporters remain in place for an extended period.

The UA News portal points out that an exceptional situation has arisen as a result, stating: “Russia cannot export as many petroleum products as before, but it has a surplus of crude oil that it cannot fully process domestically. Consequently, the oil surplus is diverted to the foreign market.”

This situation increases the volume of maritime exports. Russia’s current revenues have significantly exceeded the previous week’s value. To avoid drawing conclusions based on just one week, the agency also calculated average revenue over four weeks. This indicator is less susceptible to sharp short-term fluctuations in prices and volumes.

Europe races to contain energy crisis with patchwork measures

Over the past four weeks, the estimated average value of Russian oil exported by sea has been around $2.39 billion per week. That is about $290 million more than in the previous four-week period and the most since the second half of May.

Russia may continue to earn significant revenue from crude oil sales. As long as the price of Brent crude remains above $100 a barrel and Russian crude enjoys demand among buyers in Asia, Moscow can generate additional revenue, even despite operational problems at its own refineries.

This situation may change as supplies from the Middle East gradually resume. Reuters reported that exports from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates increased in September, and reconstruction of some infrastructure began after the attacks. This could ease pressure on the global market and affect the price of Russian oil, even if oil prices are expected to remain elevated throughout 2026 and 2027.

The post Russia earns record seaborne oil revenues despite Ukraine attacks appeared first on Remix News.

European governments are racing to blunt a fuel shock that even some analysts now refuse to forecast, as Brent crude holds near $100 a barrel and diesel prices climb across Europe.

The international oil market has been expensive for months. What has changed is the confidence of the people paid to explain it. JPMorgan told clients on Sept. 17 that, for the first time since fighting began around Iran about seven months earlier, its commodities team no longer has a baseline view of how the disruption ends. 

“We simply don’t know how to model the endgame,” the bank’s analysts wrote, after several economic thresholds they once assumed would force a diplomatic off-ramp, including oil above $100 a barrel, had already been crossed.

‘Diesel the most expensive ever! This may be just the beginning’

The bank said a Brent price near $90 would have been consistent with known supply and demand in September. Futures instead traded around $100 and higher as traders priced the risk of further losses that no one can yet measure. By Monday, front-month Brent was still hovering near $99 a barrel.

Inventories are doing little to cushion the blow. The U.S. Energy Information Administration has said prices are likely to stay elevated until Middle East oil trade is restored and stocks can be rebuilt. The International Energy Agency’s September report put the scale of the drain in starker terms: observed global inventories fell another 95 million barrels in August, taking the cumulative draw since February to 507 million barrels, or about 2.8 million barrels a day. World oil supply is now projected to average 100.7 million barrels a day in 2026, down 5.7 million from a year earlier.

Diesel shortages are acute

In some countries, such as Hungary, there is a major imbalance in terms of available energy sources. Crude held in strategic storage remains ample, but diesel is quickly running out. Data from the Hungarian Hydrocarbon Stockpiling Association show gas oil stocks at 520.3 kilotons at the end of January and about 390 kilotons at the end of both July and August. That thinner diesel cushion matters in a country where more than 1.3 million passenger cars run on the fuel and the regional market is competing for the same scarce imports.

Pump prices have already moved. Official and commercial trackers put Hungarian diesel around 701 forints a liter in late September on some official series and closer to 730 forints on daily station averages — well above the roughly 593 forints recorded at the end of June. The original worry in Budapest was not whether prices would rise, but how quickly 800 forints would stop looking like a distant ceiling.

Diesel price explodes to record highs across Europe

That speed is not a mystery to central bankers. Bank of Slovenia research covering euro-area data from 2005 through 2026 found that a 10% rise in Brent lifts pretax diesel and gasoline prices by about 6.5% and 6.2%, respectively, over the longer term. A large share of the increase shows up at stations within the first two weeks — faster than the physical chain of shipping, refining and wholesale delivery would suggest. 

The European Central Bank has reached a similar conclusion and added an unwelcome twist: refinery margins can amplify the shock. During the spring spike, Brent briefly reached $138 a barrel while diesel at the refinery gate jumped to $197. ECB staff later estimated that refining margins were contributing about 41 euro cents a liter to euro-area retail diesel in mid-September, and they told reporters those diesel margins may not peak until October.

The way down is slower than the way up. Taxes, refining and transport costs, inventories, margins and local competition all delay relief when crude finally eases. That asymmetry is why governments are acting now, before higher fuel bills work through freight, food and services and lift broader inflation.

Europe-wide crisis

The policy dilemma is the same from Lisbon to Warsaw: protect households and trucking firms without writing a blank check for fossil-fuel consumption. Europe has answered with a patchwork rather than a single rule. Some governments cap retail prices. Others cut excise taxes, sometimes below the European Union minimum. A third group aims help at farmers, haulers and other heavy users. A few still let global prices hit consumers with no cushion at all. The result is that the same barrel of oil can produce pump prices that differ dramatically at the pump across Europe.

Will Germany run out of gas this winter? Experts and energy executives warn of dire scenarios

Here are just a few examples of what Europe looks like in this regard.

• Austria has been running a mineral-oil tax cut of 1.9 euro cents a liter into the end of September. 
• Belgium has implemented an official price ceiling. 
• Croatia cut diesel excise duty by another 3 cents, taking it 10 cents below the EU floor; Zagreb says the average diesel price is 1.91 euros a liter instead of 2.26 euros without the intervention. 
• Cyprus is offering an 8.33-cent discount through Nov. 30. 
• Luxembourg is absorbing 5 cents of the pump price from July through December. 
• Malta is using direct state aid to keep prices below the euro-area average. 
• Portugal decided on Sept. 17 to recycle extra value-added tax receipts from more expensive fuel into tax relief worth about 1.3 billion euros through year-end. 
• Slovenia posted official maxima of 1.748 euros for gasoline and 2.012 euros for diesel in the week of Sept. 22-28. 
• Spain has kept an excise cut below the EU minimum through Sept. 30. 
• Italy reduced and capped diesel duty into early October. 
• Montenegro and Serbia combine retail caps with lower excise taxes.

Targeted aid is running in parallel

• Greece extended a 10-cent-a-liter diesel subsidy into October and is preparing a heating-oil package. 
• France steered relief to agriculture, high-mileage workers and construction rather than a blanket cut. 
• Ireland is rebating duty for commercial haulers and bus operators. 
• Spain added a 402 million-euro program for truckers on top of its general tax reduction. 
• Italy is offering carriers a tax credit for earlier extra costs.

Larger packages are still moving through parliaments

Germany will cut energy tax by 14 cents a liter from Oct. 1 through year-end, about 17 cents once lower VAT is counted, in a 2.5 billion-euro package. 

Chancellor Friedrich Merz said drivers who depend on a car every day “are reaching their breaking point.” 

Berlin is also talking with the oil industry about a temporary price cap modeled on Luxembourg or Belgium, aimed at Jan. 1, 2027. 

The Czech government will restore a station-margin ceiling from Oct. 1, cut diesel duty to the EU minimum and cap retail margins at 2.50 koruna a liter. 

Poland has floated a 60% levy on oil companies’ extra profits to finance about 4 billion zlotys of price relief, though the plan faces parliamentary and constitutional hurdles.

The International Energy Agency has described the response as global, not merely European. In a matter of months, the number of countries applying fuel subsidies rose from 16 to 38, and the number cutting energy taxes rose from 40 to 57. Pew Research Center, drawing on IEA tallies from mid-June, counted 113 countries that had taken at least one energy-cost measure after the Iran war, including tax changes in 55 countries and fuel subsidies in 32. The agency’s own warning is implicit in those numbers: governments are treating the symptom at the pump because they cannot reopen the Strait of Hormuz from a finance ministry or end the war in Ukraine.

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