British defense contractor Babcock has confirmed that it is putting itself forward for the U.S. Navy’s future frigate program, with its Arrowhead 140 general-purpose frigate, the design behind the Royal Navy’s Type 31 class, expected to form the basis of its proposal. The move adds another foreign-designed warship to Washington’s search for a relatively mature frigate that can be built quickly and in significant numbers.
Babcock has held preliminary discussions with Pentagon officials and is expected to submit an expression of interest before the end of October, according to recent reporting by The Telegraph and Navy Lookout. The proposal is understood to potentially involve Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), America’s largest military shipbuilder, with the two companies exploring an arrangement that could see the Arrowhead 140 built in the United States under license.
“Of course we’re interested. We have a world-class frigate, close links to the U.S. and U.S. industry. It would be insane for us not to respond,” Sir Nick Hine, head of Babcock’s marine business and a former Second Sea Lord, told The Telegraph.
The initiative comes as the U.S. Navy seeks to accelerate the acquisition of smaller surface combatants after the troubled Constellation class frigate program was axed. Japan’s upgraded Mogami class, South Korea’s Chungnam class, and Turkey’s Istanbul class have also been reported as candidates for the Navy’s international frigate effort. You can read more about all three designs here.
Fincantieri Marine Group, which had developed the cancelled Constellation class frigate for the U.S. Navy, also says it sees a possible new opportunity in the service’s latest frigate plans.
Meanwhile, German defense contractor Rheinmetall, a newcomer to the surface combatant market, recently unveiled its GMF 140 frigate, which it has said it plans to offer “initially as part of a procurement project in North America” before pursuing opportunities with other allied navies.
For Babcock, the opportunity would be a major expansion of its relationship with the U.S. defense industry. If successful, the company would likely provide the design, engineering expertise, and potentially the intellectual property needed for American shipyards to manufacture the frigates.
This would mirror the process for the Polish Navy’s Project 106 Miecznik (Swordfish) class, which is building three new multirole frigates in Poland, rather than using the company’s own facilities in Britain.
The Navy’s assessment of potential options is due by November 12. No contract has been awarded, and the details of any Babcock-HII proposal remain unconfirmed.
The Arrowhead 140 is the foundation of the Royal Navy’s five-ship Type 31 program, which is being built at Babcock’s Rosyth shipyard in Scotland. The design is derived from the Danish Iver Huitfeldt class frigate. As well as Poland, the warship has also been selected for Indonesia.
The Arrowhead 140 has a baseline length of approximately 455 feet, a beam of 65 feet, and a displacement of around 5,700 tonnes, although national variants may be considerably heavier. The vessel uses a conventional combined diesel-and-diesel (CODAD) propulsion system and can achieve speeds exceeding 28 knots. Its design emphasizes long endurance, with a baseline endurance of approximately one to two months. The AH140 incorporates a flight deck and hangar for naval helicopter operations, accommodation for embarked personnel, boat-handling facilities, and adaptable mission spaces. Its modular architecture allows customers to integrate different sensors, combat management systems, electronic warfare equipment, and weapons according to national requirements.
Taking the Polish Navy’s Project 106 class as an example of an Arrowhead 140 iteration, this is a notably heavily armed adaptation, featuring a 76mm Leonardo Strales main gun, a 32-cell Mk 41 vertical launch system for surface-to-air missiles, eight Naval Strike Missiles for anti-ship strike, and lightweight torpedo launchers. The Polish variant is reported to have a maximum displacement of approximately 7,700 tonnes.
The Type 31 is a general-purpose warship capable of undertaking maritime security, escort, and surface warfare missions. Its relatively large hull offers considerable internal volume for weapons, sensors, aviation facilities, and future upgrades.
That could make it attractive to a U.S. Navy looking for a ship able to protect convoys, operate independently, and supplement its larger destroyers. A frigate with a significantly lower operating cost than an Arleigh Burke class destroyer could still take on a range of missions, freeing more capable combatants for broad area air and missile air defense, sustained strike operations, and other more demanding tasks.
The Arrowhead 140’s size could also provide flexibility in accommodating American weapons and combat systems. However, a U.S. version would require a defined configuration, and there is no publicly established weapons fit for a potential American variant.
At the same time, the Royal Navy’s Type 31 frigate has not yet entered operational service, and its baseline configuration is not optimized for every mission the U.S. Navy may require. In particular, the integration of the sonar and other systems needed for sustained anti-submarine warfare would be a significant undertaking.
The Navy will also have to wrestle with how much of the existing design can be retained while meeting its own requirements. One of the major lessons from the Constellation program was that extensive modifications to an existing foreign design can create huge cost and schedule risks. With so little left of the original design after it was adapted to Navy specifications, this eventually doomed the program.
For Babcock, it will be essential to keep the Arrowhead 140 as close as possible to its established configuration, while integrating essential American equipment, to keep the proposal competitive.
Babcock does not operate a shipyard in the United States, making an American industrial partner central to its approach.
HII, which operates major shipbuilding facilities at Newport News and Ingalls, would offer substantial experience constructing warships for the U.S. Navy. Babcock and HII already have an established relationship in the submarine sector, including work supporting the Virginia class attack submarine program.
Babcock’s facilities in Rosyth and Bristol manufacture tactical missile-tube assemblies for General Dynamics Electric Boat, supporting the Common Missile Compartment used by the U.S. Navy’s Columbia class and the Royal Navy’s Dreadnought class ballistic missile submarines. HII has also expanded its relationship with Babcock through work involving Virginia class submarine components.
Those existing industrial relationships could provide a foundation for a surface-ship partnership. Under a potential arrangement, Babcock could transfer the necessary design rights and provide technical support while an American yard undertakes construction.
Such an arrangement would fit the Trump administration’s stated goal of using allied expertise to accelerate warship production while rebuilding domestic shipbuilding capacity. It would also allow Babcock to pursue a potentially significant U.S. order without requiring Rosyth to absorb a large new construction program alongside its Royal Navy commitments.
The prospect of HII supporting more than one design raises questions about production capacity, program priorities, and how the company would manage competing demands on its shipyards.
More generally, the administration’s interest in foreign frigates reflects growing concern about the time and expense involved in developing new American warships.
The Constellation class program was supposed to provide a modern replacement for the Navy’s retired Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates. Based on the European FREMM design, it underwent extensive modifications for American service before suffering serious schedule and cost problems. The Navy subsequently abandoned the program.
The service is now pursuing FF(X), a patrol frigate intended to be easier to build and field. Its initial configuration, however, is not expected to include a vertical launch system, limiting its ability to provide some of the capabilities associated with a more heavily armed multi-mission combatant.
HII is building the FF(X) frigate, based on the Coast Guard’s Legend class National Security Cutter. It is somewhat telling that they would partner with Babcock on the foreign frigate offering considering they already have the FF(X) contract.
The international frigate effort is intended to examine whether a ship based on an existing allied design could provide a different balance of capability, cost, and delivery speed.
An August presidential memorandum opened a route for the Navy to consider allied designs and, under limited circumstances, overseas construction through a national security waiver. The approach has been compared with a model in which an initial small number of ships could be constructed abroad before production moves to U.S. yards.
The reported framework limits overseas construction to no more than two ships and ties it to investment in American shipbuilding. Any eventual Babcock proposal would therefore need to demonstrate how the design could be transferred and produced domestically at the required pace.
That could be a big challenge. Babcock’s own Type 31 production line is already committed to the five ships ordered by the Royal Navy, while setting up an American production line would require workforce training, supply-chain development, and the transfer of manufacturing knowledge.
HMS Bulldog has officially entered build.
— Babcock International (@Babcockplc) February 24, 2026
The ceremonial Steel Cut for our fourth Type 31 frigate marks another major step forward for our programme, joining a production line that is gathering real speed.
More to come from Rosyth later this evening.https://t.co/ZoTM5OWNVv pic.twitter.com/35Y3qBpMJg
The Navy will also need to establish whether a foreign design can meet its minimum operational requirements without undergoing the kind of extensive redesign that dogged the Constellation program.
Babcock enters a field that already includes several established frigate designs from Japan, South Korea, and Turkey — and potentially more.
Each offers a different combination of design maturity, combat systems, production capacity, and potential industrial arrangements. The Mogami and Chungnam programs have operational ships in service, while the Arrowhead 140 has been selected for multiple export programs but is yet to enter operational service.
Babcock’s selling point is likely to be the Arrowhead 140’s size, adaptability, and established design pedigree, combined with the prospect of American production through HII.
With the Arrowhead 140 adopted by multiple navies, this brings potential cost savings through economies of scale, shared design evolution, and collaborative upgrades across the fleet. A wider international user base also brings the possibility of overseas industrial partnerships, including training and logistical support around the globe.
At the same time, U.S. Navy selection would represent a major endorsement of the platform and would further strengthen its position in other export markets.
For now, Babcock’s confirmation that it intends to pursue the opportunity adds another contender to the Navy’s search for a new frigate. Whether the Arrowhead 140 advances beyond the initial expression of interest will depend on how its capabilities and production prospects compare with the other candidates. And critically, Babcock and its U.S. partners will need to convince the Pentagon that they can deliver a ship that meets the Navy’s requirements without repeating the delays and redesign challenges of the Constellation program.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post British Type 31 Frigate Variant Offered To The U.S. Navy appeared first on TWZ.
Outgoing Bulgarian President Iliana Iotova led the first round of presidential elections on Sunday with between 35% and 36.5% of the vote, according to exit polls, but fell short of the result expected by her supporters. She will face former caretaker prime minister Andrey Gyurov, backed by the pro-Western opposition, in a runoff scheduled for Nov. 1.
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Gyurov secured between 32.2% and 32.5% of the vote, according to the same exit polls, putting him within reach of Iotova ahead of the second round.
The election took place amid security concerns following a series of drone attacks on merchant vessels in the Black Sea. Voter turnout stood at around 20%, as some political parties called for a boycott.
Iotova, 62, has campaigned on dialogue with Russia and opposed military assistance to Ukraine. She has made ending the war in Ukraine a central theme of her campaign, presenting herself as a “president of peace.”
#Bulgaria’s presidential vote delivered a result few polls anticipated. Exit polls gave incumbent Iliana Iotova, who favors dialogue with Moscow and opposes military aid to Ukraine, up to 36.5 percent, a far narrower lead than surveys had suggested.https://t.co/rqlYf7ehlZ
— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) October 25, 2026
After casting her ballot, she called for a government capable of tackling poverty and regional inequalities. “I believe there must be peace, stability and security,” Iotova said.
Gyurov, meanwhile, called for a Bulgaria oriented toward Europe and the future, emphasizing economic security and effective governance.
He said he had voted for “a European, free and proud country, where incomes are sufficient, where we feel secure about tomorrow and where the state functions as it should.”
Iotova assumed the presidency earlier this year after Rumen Radev resigned to contest parliamentary elections, seeking to become prime minister. Bulgaria is a member of both the European Union and NATO.
If Iotova wins the Nov. 1 runoff, she would become the first woman elected president of Bulgaria, a country of 6.4 million people with the lowest per capita gross domestic product in the European Union.
Green blobbers want us to stop drilling because the North Sea is running dry – so why the panic about oil and gas extraction? The answer is that it’s as much about politics and punitive taxes as geology, says Ben Pile.
The post The North Sea Green Paradox appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
The European Commission has proposed increasing total fishing opportunities by approximately 35 per cent compared with 2026, largely because of improved assessments for several herring stocks and sprat. At the same time, it wants substantial reductions in permitted accidental catches of cod, whose depleted populations have shown little evidence of sustained recovery.
The negotiations, scheduled for 26th and potentially 27th October, will determine how fishing opportunities are allocated between EU member states bordering the Baltic Sea.
According to the Council’s published agenda, ministers are seeking a political agreement on total allowable catches and national quotas for ten commercially significant fish stocks.
The outcome will determine how much fish can be landed legally during 2027, while also influencing the future prospects of coastal communities, processing companies and fishing fleets.
The Commission’s proposal for 2027 fishing opportunities reflects significant differences in the condition of individual stocks.
Brussels recommends increasing the catch limit for central Baltic herring by 49 per cent and for sprat by 44 per cent. Proposed increases for Bothnian herring and Gulf of Riga herring are more modest, at three and 11 per cent respectively.
The improved outlook for sprat follows stronger reproduction in recent years, while scientific assessments suggest some herring populations are beginning to recover.
However, these improvements do not mean the Baltic ecosystem as a whole has returned to a healthy condition.
Central Baltic and Bothnian herring remain below important sustainability reference levels, even though the latest scientific assessments permit increased catches under specified conditions.
For cod, the position is considerably worse.
The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, known as ICES, has advised that there should be no catches of eastern Baltic cod in 2027 or 2028 under its precautionary approach.
Its scientific advice for eastern Baltic cod reflects the continuing failure of the stock to recover sufficiently to support fishing.
Western Baltic cod faces similarly severe restrictions.
The Commission consequently proposes reducing the permitted incidental catch of western Baltic cod by 88 per cent and eastern Baltic cod by 51 per cent.
These allowances are designed to account for fish caught unintentionally during other fishing operations. They do not amount to the reopening of a targeted commercial cod fishery.
The proposed increases in herring and sprat quotas would benefit some fishing operators and processing industries, but the economic effects will vary significantly between countries and fleets.
Larger vessels specialising in pelagic species such as herring and sprat are likely to benefit more directly from increased catch opportunities.
Smaller operators whose activities depend on depleted stocks or mixed fisheries may face continued restrictions.
The Commission also proposes reducing the permitted incidental catch of western Baltic herring by 45 per cent and removing an exemption previously available to certain small-scale coastal fisheries.
That proposal creates a particularly difficult issue for smaller fishing businesses, whose operations may have limited capacity to switch fishing grounds or target different species.
The economic effects will depend not only on the size of the quotas but also on how national governments distribute them among individual operators.
The Baltic Sea’s problems cannot be explained by fishing pressure alone.
Nutrient pollution, changes in oxygen availability, habitat degradation and shifting environmental conditions have contributed to the deterioration of several stocks.
Restrictions on fishing can reduce direct pressure on fish populations, but they cannot independently resolve pollution or other environmental problems affecting reproduction and survival.
This complicates the relationship between scientific advice and political decisions.
Ministers are required to take account of conservation objectives under the Common Fisheries Policy. They must also consider the economic consequences for fishing communities and the viability of fleets operating within the agreed limits.
EU Today previously examined the political compromises surrounding European fishing quotas, including the tension between short-term commercial demands and the recovery of depleted fish populations.
The Baltic negotiations present a particularly concentrated version of that conflict because the condition of individual stocks varies so substantially.
The Commission’s proposed increases are based on the latest assessments rather than a general relaxation of conservation policy.
Indeed, its draft regulation envisages maintaining restrictions on vulnerable stocks while allowing greater exploitation where the scientific evidence supports it.
The proposed overall catch volume is approximately 543,000 tonnes, compared with substantially lower fishing opportunities in 2026.
That figure represents a proposed ceiling, not a confirmed agreement or a forecast of actual landings.
Once ministers reach a political agreement, the Council is expected to adopt the final regulation formally in November, with the principal catch limits applying from 1 January 2027.
The central question is whether governments will preserve the distinction between stocks showing measurable recovery and those for which scientific advisers continue to recommend no fishing.
Their decision will determine both the short-term economics of Baltic fisheries and the pace at which the region’s most vulnerable commercial fish populations may recover.
An Alpha Research exit poll put Yotova and her running mate, Kiril Valchev, on 35.3 per cent, and Gyurov and his running mate, Georgi Kandev, on 32.4 per cent. Other agencies produced slightly different estimates, but all placed the two tickets in the lead and showed a narrow gap. These figures are preliminary; Bulgaria’s Central Election Commission has yet to confirm the official result.
The outcome contrasts with pre-election surveys that gave Yotova a sizeable advantage. A Market Links poll published before voting put her well ahead of Gyurov. The first-round estimates instead suggest that the contest has tightened as voters weighed the candidates’ positions on foreign policy, domestic economic pressures and the direction of the government.
Yotova became president in January after Rumen Radev resigned to enter parliamentary politics. She had served as his vice-president for nine years and is now seeking a five-year mandate in her own right. Her candidacy is backed by Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria party and the Bulgarian Socialist Party. The election is the first nationwide test of Radev’s influence since Progressive Bulgaria won April’s parliamentary election. A Yotova victory would leave the presidency and government in the hands of political allies.
Gyurov, an economist and former deputy governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, served as caretaker prime minister earlier this year. He is supported by pro-Western reformist parties. During his premiership, his government signed a security co-operation agreement with Ukraine, and he has argued for closer co-operation with Western allies.
Their foreign-policy differences have been a defining feature of the campaign. Yotova has called for negotiations to end Russia’s war against Ukraine and for better relations with Moscow. Gyurov has taken a more supportive position towards Kyiv. The choice reflects a longstanding debate in Bulgarian politics over how the country should balance its relationship with Russia against its EU and NATO commitments.
The war’s impact on the Black Sea has given that debate a direct security dimension. Drone attacks on commercial vessels near Bulgaria’s coast have raised concerns about shipping safety and the conflict’s potential to spread. The government has sought support from its partners to strengthen maritime security. Both leading candidates condemned the attacks, while their differences over the wider war have kept Bulgaria’s response and its ties with Moscow in focus. The attacks on merchant shipping were a prominent issue during the campaign.
Rising energy prices and inflation have also featured in the campaign, as households face pressure from the cost of living. Those concerns may matter to voters who backed neither of the two leading tickets. The second round will require Yotova and Gyurov to appeal beyond their first-round supporters, while also persuading voters who did not participate to return to the polls.
Revival party leader Kostadin Kostadinov placed third. His ticket with Petar Volgin received 12.6 per cent in the Alpha Research exit poll, though other estimates were higher. Kostadinov has opposed military support for Ukraine; Ukraine imposed a ten-year entry ban on him in 2022. His supporters could influence the run-off, but their votes should not be treated as a single bloc: some may back Yotova, others Gyurov, and some may stay at home.
Turnout was exceptionally low. Alpha Research estimated participation at 22.3 per cent by 7pm, with other agencies reporting similarly low figures. The Bulgarian constitution requires more than half of eligible voters to participate and a candidate to receive more than half of valid votes for a first-round victory. Neither threshold was met. Polling analysis cited election fatigue after April’s parliamentary vote and the fact that the presidential election was held separately.
The low participation makes Sunday’s estimates an uncertain guide to the run-off. A higher turnout could change the balance, particularly if one candidate succeeds in mobilising voters who stayed away or attracting supporters of eliminated candidates.
The presidency is largely ceremonial, with executive authority resting mainly with the prime minister and parliament. It nevertheless carries political weight: the president leads the armed forces, can veto legislation, signs international treaties and appoints ambassadors. The 1 November vote will decide whether Yotova secures a mandate of her own and consolidates the governing camp’s position, or whether Gyurov can turn his stronger-than-expected first-round showing into a change at the top of the state.
A country with a population of 1.3 million announces that it can strangle the commercial lifeline of the world’s leading nuclear power in a matter of hours.
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A string of provocations, but it’s all just cheap jewelry
Certain statements should be read twice – the second time aloud – to be sure you didn’t dream them. The one that Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna gave to The Times on October 7 falls into this category. Estonia, the minister informs us, would be able to assemble a force of 50,000 experienced soldiers “in a matter of hours” and, again within a few hours, block Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea, which he describes as a vital artery of the Russian economy. For Moscow, that sea is a matter of survival, he added, especially since the Black Sea, he claims, is already closed off. Then, with a sense of timing that no playwright would have dared to imagine, Tsahkna called it “absurd” to describe NATO as an offensive organization.
The minister’s outburst did not come out of the blue. It comes at the end of an autumn that Tallinn has methodically shaped. In mid-September, the government announced it was ready to seal the border if a general mobilization were declared in Russia; on October 1, it banned the transit of Russian and Belarusian wheat; around the same time, the Financial Times reported on elite units being deployed to the border and the purchase of weapons capable of striking deep into Russian territory. The defense budget for 2026 stands at 2.4 billion euros, or 5.4% of gross domestic product. We are looking at a country of 1.3 million people that has chosen to live in a state of constant readiness and to let the world know, every week, just how prepared it is to fight.
The minister was careful to specify that the blockade would be triggered only after a Russian attack capable of invoking Article 5. The clause is about as reassuring as a “friendly dog” sign hanging on the gate of a kennel. Publicly announcing a plan to choke off a nuclear power’s main energy export route remains a deliberate political act, regardless of any qualifying conditions attached to it. Under customary international law, a naval blockade is an act of war; and in the age of severed cables, stateless drones, and oil tankers in the so-called “shadow fleet,” the threshold for what constitutes an “attack” has become elastic. Who decides when it has been crossed? The very same government that denounces a new provocation every morning?
The math of fifty thousand
Let’s focus on the numbers, which are the most entertaining part. According to public data from the Estonian armed forces, the wartime strength is just over 43,000. Of these, only 4,200 are on permanent standby; the rest are reservists and volunteers from the Defense League – brave people who train in the woods on weekends. So, there are no 50,000 “experienced” soldiers in a matter of hours. Unless you count those from other countries.
And that is exactly how the figure should be interpreted. Tsahkna’s 50,000 do not speak Estonian. They are the British contingent stationed in Tapa with its French reinforcements, the navies of Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, the aircraft of a few allies on rotation, and the Americans when they have time. A dozen or so flags, each with its own chain of command, its own parliament, its own public opinion, and its own election calendar. The Estonian minister disposes of that army the way a condominium manager disposes of the residents’ savings: in words, with great nonchalance. Could some assistant please explain to him how to do his job?
Let’s try to imagine the first missile. In London, the cabinet meets and seeks a legal opinion. Paris launches a strategic review, which requires a document and a conference. Berlin awaits the Bundestag’s vote and the blessing of its less-than-convinced coalition partner. Rome seeks clarification at the Atlantic Council; Budapest puts its reservations on record; Washington is busy elsewhere. Article 5, after all, doesn’t force anyone to fire a shot: it obligates each ally to take the action it deems necessary, and “necessary” can mean anything from an aircraft carrier to a note of protest. The oldest debate in any coalition would immediately begin: who steps in first, who withdraws last, who covers whose flank, and who pays for the fuel. Meanwhile, the Estonians would be there counting down the minutes.
European history is all too familiar with this scenario. In September 1939, France and Great Britain had guaranteed Poland’s security with the same solemnity with which Tallinn is guaranteed today. They declared war, and then spent eight months behind the Maginot Line simply watching: the French called it the drôle de guerre, the “phoney war.” Warsaw, meanwhile, had long since stopped laughing.
Let’s now set aside arithmetic for geography, which isn’t swayed by interviews – someone should tell the Minister that! About eighty kilometers of sea lie between Tallinn and Helsinki: it is along this narrow passage that the minister would like to close off the Gulf of Finland. From the Estonian capital to the Russian border at Narva, there are just over two hundred kilometers. Russia’s GDP, in nominal terms, is more than fifty times that of Estonia. The Baltic Fleet is based in Kronstadt, at the far end of the Gulf, and in Baltiysk, in the Kaliningrad exclave; which means, incidentally, that a substantial portion of that fleet is already outside the “plug” that Tallinn dreams of inserting.
Strategists carefully distinguish between three things that Estonian politicians happily confuse: guarding a passage, making its use risky for the adversary, and maintaining stable control over it. The first is possible; the second is costly; the third, against Russia, has never succeeded for anyone. Those who lay mines may fall victim to them; those who deploy coastal anti-ship batteries become, in turn, fixed targets, surveyed down to the meter.
And this is where physics comes in. Russia’s conventional arsenal includes Iskander missiles deployed just a few dozen minutes’ flight away, ship-launched Kalibr missiles, TOS-1A thermobaric rocket launchers, and high-yield glide bombs. There’s no need to bring up nuclear warheads, which remain the favorite bogeyman of Western talk shows. The coastal batteries, depots, command centers, and docks from which our dear friends in Tallinn intend to block the Gulf would go from a solid to a gaseous state in the time between launch and impact. And with them, the solidity of Estonia’s political stance would evaporate, long before an agreement on the statement is reached in Brussels. We’re not writing this to be smug. We’re writing this because, in that scenario, ordinary Estonians would be the first to pay the price, used as pawns by a ruling class that’s playing with fire in its own living room.
Creative accounting for oil
There remains the issue of the “lifeline.” Tsahkna attributes about 60% of Russian oil exports by sea to the Baltic route. Estimates from the Polish think tank OSW – which cannot be suspected of sympathizing with Moscow – put the figure at about one-third of crude oil and nearly half of refined products; and Reuters data from February show that oil continued to ship out from Russian ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, despite the sea being “already closed.” Inflating figures is an age-old rhetorical technique: it serves to make the threat seem more deadly than it is and one’s own position stronger than it actually is.
Moreover, a blockade would not affect only Moscow. Neutral shipowners, insurance companies, freight rates, refineries, and energy prices would all suffer the consequences, and Europe – which in recent years has already paid dearly for its economic war against Russia – would once again bear the cost. There’s even a grotesque detail: in 2025, Estonia sold goods worth approximately 252 million euros to Russia. They’re threatening to cut off their neighbor’s lifeline, but in the meantime, business as usual continues.
Why, then, all the fuss? The answer lies in the role the Estonian ruling class has carved out for itself within the Alliance: that of the permanent vanguard, the most zealous member of the eastern flank, the top student who raises their hand before the teacher finishes the question. It’s a source of privilege. It guarantees attention, funds, allied troops on its territory, and invitations to summits. And it becomes all the more valuable as the possibility of a ceasefire in Ukraine draws nearer – a prospect feared in many Atlantic capitals as the end of the emergency that justifies everything. So the fever must be kept high: a statement every week, a ban every month, a threat of a blockade every fall.
In 1955, Leonard Wibberley published a satirical novel, *The Mouse That Roared*, in which the tiny Grand Duchy of Fenwick declared war on the United States with the sole purpose of losing it and collecting reconstruction aid. The difference with Tallinn lies in the ending. The Grand Duchy counted on losing to a generous power, an ocean away. Estonia is threatening a neighboring power – one that has forgotten nothing since 1991 – and is entrusting its fate to a coalition that has never fought a real war together against an opponent of equal strength.
From apotheosis to casus belli?
Let’s recap. A country with a population of 1.3 million announces that it can strangle the commercial lifeline of the world’s leading nuclear power in a matter of hours. To do so, it relies on soldiers it doesn’t have – lent by allies it hasn’t consulted – based on oil figures that Western sources themselves downplay. It ties all of this to a war that its rhetoric makes a little more likely every day, and in the same breath accuses those who see NATO as something offensive of absurdity. If there is such a thing as the apotheosis of the absurd, it can be found at the Foreign Ministry in Tallinn.
Moscow, to tell the truth, doesn’t even need to respond. Geography does it, the balance of power does it, and the history of European coalitions – which have always found it easier to make promises than to keep them – does it. Deterrence that turns into permanent provocation ceases to dissuade and begins to seek its own casus belli. The Baltic Sea deserves mature diplomacy among the coastal states that will have to share it anyway. For now, it must settle for – a minister who roars – and an audience of allies who, at the first real blow, will look around wondering who should answer the phone.
The European Parliament has called for the possible deployment of an EU naval operation in the Black Sea following a series of deadly attacks on civilian merchant vessels near the Romanian and Bulgarian coasts. The resolution, adopted on 22 October 2026 by 432 votes to 52, with 88 abstentions, reflects mounting concern over the expansion of maritime threats towards NATO’s south-eastern flank.
The parliamentary resolution urges EU member states to consider establishing a naval mission to protect commercial shipping, while calling on NATO to examine a complementary regional initiative, provisionally described as Black Sea Sentry.
On 23 October, a drone struck the Comoros-flagged cargo vessel Khoryv, approximately 13 nautical miles from Romania’s port of Constanța. The vessel caught fire and sank, leaving one sailor confirmed dead and three missing. Nine crew members were rescued. The ship was carrying 13 Ukrainian and Azerbaijani sailors. According to information attributed to Romanian maritime authorities, difficult weather complicated rescue efforts.
Romanian President Nicușor Dan blamed Russia for the attack, which followed at least seven other strikes on commercial vessels during October. Across the incidents, approximately 30 sailors have been reported dead or missing, although the confirmed death toll is considerably lower.
The escalation began on 5 October when the Royad Mammadov, a Turkish-owned grain carrier sailing under the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis, sank in Romania’s exclusive economic zone. Two sailors died and eleven were rescued. The vessel had departed the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail carrying corn destined for Ravenna, Italy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy attributed the sinking to Russian drones, although Romanian authorities did not initially establish responsibility.
The following day, two merchant ships were attacked approximately 70 nautical miles east of the Bulgarian coastal town of Byala. As EU Today reported, the Togo-flagged Alfa Watan sank after sustaining severe damage, while the Palau-flagged Able caught fire. All 18 sailors aboard the latter vessel were rescued, but the crew of the Alfa Watan remained unaccounted for.
The Bulgarian authorities confirmed that both aerial and maritime drones had been involved. Further attacks followed on 13 October, when the HS Dignity sank near Shabla, leaving eleven sailors missing, while the Chelsea-3 was struck near Byala. All 15 crew members of the latter vessel were evacuated.
Two chemical tankers, the Yara J and Wine Trader, were subsequently attacked near the Sulina Canal, a strategically important route connecting the Danube with the Black Sea. The incidents exposed the vulnerability of shipping corridors connecting Ukraine with international markets.
Romania has responded by strengthening surveillance and authorising direct military action against drones entering its airspace. On 17 October, two Romanian F-16 fighter aircraft intercepted and destroyed hostile drones over Romanian territorial waters.
According to the Romanian Ministry of National Defence, the aircraft were scrambled from Borcea Air Base after radar systems detected aerial targets approaching from the direction of Snake Island. The drones, identified as jet-powered Geran-family attack aircraft, entered Romanian airspace before being destroyed southeast and east of Sulina.
The ministry disclosed that, during the preceding week, its radar systems had detected eight separate incidents involving aerial targets near the Romanian border, including four brief incursions into national airspace. On 14 October, Spanish F-18 aircraft operating under NATO air-policing arrangements were scrambled after drones approached Romanian airspace.
Bulgaria has taken a more reserved position concerning responsibility for the attacks. Although Prime Minister Rumen Radev acknowledged their seriousness, his government maintained that investigations must establish the origin of the drones before definitive conclusions could be drawn. Sofia nevertheless strengthened maritime surveillance, deployed rescue resources and requested assistance from European and NATO partners.
In August, a drone crossed into Bulgarian airspace from Romania and exploded near infrastructure associated with the Trans-Balkan Gas Pipeline. According to the Bulgarian government’s account, the aircraft was not detected by either national radar systems or NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre in Torrejón, Spain. The European Parliament has now urged Sofia to accelerate participation in NATO’s counter-drone initiatives.
The European Parliament’s proposals include establishing an EU naval operation, improving early detection of hostile drones, accelerating the development of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub and providing additional defence funding to Romania and Bulgaria. MEPs have proposed using resources under the EU’s SAFE defence financing instrument to support regional capabilities.
The proposed hub would facilitate intelligence-sharing, maritime surveillance and protection of critical infrastructure. Romania and Bulgaria have requested EU satellite imagery to improve their awareness of maritime threats, while the European Maritime Safety Agency has offered additional support.
At their October summit, EU leaders condemned attacks on civilian shipping and called for safe passage for vessels transporting agricultural products. The European Council’s conclusions addressed Black Sea and Danube shipping routes. However, the parliamentary resolution does not authorise a naval deployment: such an operation would require agreement among EU governments on its mandate, resources and rules of engagement.
NATO has responded by examining additional maritime surveillance and defensive measures, including patrol aircraft, radar systems and unmanned platforms. Romania has proposed stronger regional command arrangements involving NATO’s Black Sea members.
An existing framework provides a basis for cooperation. In July, Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye agreed to expand the responsibilities of their joint mine countermeasures task group to include protection of critical underwater infrastructure. The agreement announced by Romania’s Defence Ministry extended cooperation beyond detecting and neutralising drifting mines.
Protecting commercial vessels against aerial and maritime drones would require broader capabilities. NATO must also operate within the restrictions of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which regulates passage of warships through the Turkish Straits and limits deployments by non-Black Sea countries. Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye would therefore play central roles in any sustained maritime security operation.
Ukraine’s maritime export corridors remain essential to agricultural shipments following repeated Russian strikes on ports and logistics infrastructure. Attacks on commercial vessels can increase insurance costs, discourage shipping companies and disrupt trade even when port facilities remain functional.
The sinking of merchant vessels near allied territory, combined with repeated drone incursions into Romanian airspace, increases the possibility of military confrontation arising from an individual incident. The legal and military circumstances differ depending on whether an attack occurs in territorial waters, an exclusive economic zone or international waters.
The European Parliament’s proposal raises questions extending beyond maritime patrols: how civilian shipping can be protected, what military responses are authorised and how responsibility for attacks will be established. The sinking of the Khoryv on 23 October illustrates how the western Black Sea has become an increasingly exposed part of Europe’s security frontier.
A Russian drone strike sank the Comoros-flagged cargo ship Khoryv in the Black Sea near Romania’s port of Constanța on 23 October, killing a Ukrainian sailor and leaving three crew members missing. Nine others were rescued, Digi24 reported.
The sinking comes amid a surge in attacks on commercial shipping near Romania and Bulgaria, threatening civilian crews and routes used to transport Ukrainian agricultural exports. As Russia intensifies strikes on Ukrainian ports and shipping, the Danube corridor and nearby waters have become increasingly important to Ukraine’s maritime trade.
Romanian President Nicușor Dan blamed Russia for the attack, describing it as part of Moscow’s escalation of the war against Ukraine and its attacks on NATO’s eastern flank, Reuters reported.
Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry confirmed to Radio Svoboda that a Ukrainian citizen was among those killed.
The Khoryv sent a distress signal at around 10 a.m. local time, about 13 nautical miles (24 kilometers) east of Constanța, just outside Romania’s territorial waters, Digi24 reported. The vessel caught fire, sustained major damage, and capsized, with only a small part of its hull remaining visible above the water.
Romania’s naval authority said 13 crew members were aboard: 10 Ukrainians and three Azerbaijanis. Rescue teams recovered nine sailors alive and one body, while three crew members remained missing, Reuters reported.
Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry said the vessel had been traveling from a Turkish port and confirmed that the Ukrainian Embassy in Romania had received information from Romanian authorities about one Ukrainian sailor’s death. Four Ukrainian survivors, including the captain, were taken to a hospital, while two others did not require medical assistance.
The sinking comes amid a surge in attacks on commercial vessels off the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria. At least seven cargo ships have been hit over the past two weeks, with around 30 sailors reported dead or missing, according to Reuters.
The vessels targeted in recent incidents were either anchored near or heading toward the Sulina Canal, which connects the Danube River to the Black Sea. The canal has become a key export route for Ukraine, one of the world’s largest exporters of grain and vegetable oils.
Ukraine has increasingly relied on Danube ports and routes through Romanian territorial waters as Russia attacks its own Black Sea ports. Strikes on commercial vessels threaten crews and risk disrupting Ukrainian agricultural exports to international markets.
Russia has intensified attacks on Ukrainian ports and ships traveling to or from Ukraine. Moscow has described its strikes on vessels as retaliation for Ukrainian attacks on Russian or Russia-linked ships.
NATO said on 20 October it would send additional maritime patrol aircraft, radar systems, and drones to the Black Sea following the attacks on commercial shipping, according to Reuters. The alliance has not specified which capabilities it will deploy.
Romania, Ukraine, and Bulgaria have called on NATO to do more to protect commercial vessels. The latest sinking adds urgency to those calls as attacks increasingly affect shipping near NATO territory.
The latest incident highlights the growing risks to commercial shipping as Russia’s war against Ukraine increasingly affects maritime traffic beyond Ukraine’s own coastline.
German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul has warned that disruptions to global shipping routes could trigger famine in vulnerable countries, citing Russian attacks on Black Sea shipping as part of the wider threat to international food supplies.
Russia has increasingly targeted civilian shipping in the Black Sea as part of its campaign against Ukraine’s maritime trade, striking cargo vessels, port infrastructure, and ships transporting agricultural goods. The attacks threaten Ukraine’s ability to export grain to global markets, raise risks for international shipping companies, and jeopardize food supplies in countries that rely on Ukrainian agricultural exports.
Speaking ahead of a meeting of foreign ministers in Istanbul on Friday, 23 October, Wadephul said attacks and threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea were disrupting trade in food and fertilizers, DW reported. The impact extends far beyond the conflict zones, threatening countries that depend on imported wheat and agricultural inputs.
Wadephul said fertilizer shortages could threaten basic agricultural production in poorer countries, where access to imported food and farming supplies is already limited. He also pointed to Türkiye, the world’s largest wheat-processing country, as vulnerable to disruptions in the supply of grain.
Russia has intensified attacks on Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and civilian cargo ships, disrupting a maritime corridor that carries most of the country’s agricultural exports. In July, Russian strikes brought traffic through the corridor close to a standstill during the harvest season, leaving grain with fewer routes to international markets.
The attacks have also hit foreign-flagged vessels carrying or preparing to load Ukrainian grain. On 16 October, Euromaidan Press reported that Russian attacks had sunk merchant ships and damaged others in the Black Sea region, with seafarers missing. The campaign has increased risks for shipping companies and reduced the routes available for Ukrainian exports.
Ukraine is a major supplier of wheat and other agricultural commodities to global markets, including countries in the Middle East and Africa. Disruptions to its exports can tighten global supplies and push prices higher, adding pressure on countries that depend on imported grain.
Wadephul made the remarks ahead of a meeting of foreign ministers in Istanbul, where he said countries must send a signal that they will not accept Iran or Yemen’s Houthi militia holding global trade hostage. He called for an end to indiscriminate attacks on shipping and neighboring countries, warning that prolonged insecurity puts vulnerable populations at greater risk of hunger.
His remarks place Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian shipping within a wider pattern of threats to key maritime trade routes, with consequences for food security far beyond the regions directly affected.
Bulgaria will elect a president on Sunday, 25 October, in a contest that has become a test of the country’s relationship with Russia, its commitments to NATO and the European Union, and its response to deteriorating security in the Black Sea.
The Central Election Commission has registered 27 presidential and vice-presidential candidate pairs, although the contest is dominated by incumbent President Iliana Yotova and former caretaker prime minister Andrei Gyurov.
An opinion poll conducted by Market Links between 13 and 19 October placed Yotova ahead with 47.3 per cent support, compared with 30.6 per cent for Gyurov. However, low anticipated turnout makes a second round on 1 November highly likely.
Although Bulgaria’s presidency is primarily ceremonial, the office carries constitutional authority over defence, legislation and government formation. The election also comes six months after former President Rumen Radev secured a parliamentary majority and became prime minister, substantially changing the country’s political landscape.
Yotova, 62, became Bulgaria’s first female president in January 2026 after Radev resigned to enter parliamentary politics. Previously his vice-president, she is now seeking a five-year mandate of her own.
Her candidacy is supported by Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria coalition, which won 131 seats in the 240-member National Assembly in April, as well as the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Her running mate is Kiril Valchev, director-general of the Bulgarian News Agency.
Gyurov, an economist and former deputy governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, is supported by the pro-European reformist opposition, including We Continue the Change and Democratic Bulgaria. His vice-presidential candidate is Georgi Kandev, a former senior Interior Ministry official.
A third significant contender is Kostadin Kostadinov, leader of the nationalist Revival party, whose political platform includes opposition to Western military assistance for Ukraine and closer relations with Moscow. His running mate is European Parliament member Petar Volgin.
The election follows years of political instability, during which Bulgaria held eight parliamentary elections between 2021 and April 2026. Radev’s parliamentary victory ended a prolonged period of fragmented governments, but it has also raised questions about the concentration of political influence.
A Yotova victory would place both the presidency and the parliamentary majority within the same political camp. A Gyurov victory would instead create an institutional counterweight to Radev’s government.
Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007, but its relationship with Russia remains politically complicated.
Historical and cultural ties, including shared Orthodox traditions and the legacy of Bulgaria’s liberation from Ottoman rule, have influenced public attitudes towards Moscow. During the Cold War, Bulgaria was among the Soviet Union’s closest allies, and Russian influence continued after the collapse of communism, particularly through energy, business and political networks.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 exposed divisions over whether Sofia should provide military assistance to Kyiv or adopt a more cautious position.
Since returning to power as prime minister in May, Radev has advocated maintaining Bulgaria’s European commitments while seeking improved relations with Moscow. His government has halted military deliveries to Ukraine and taken a more restrictive approach to further sanctions against Russia.
Yotova has similarly emphasised negotiations as the means of ending the war and warned against further militarisation of the Black Sea. Her position appeals to voters concerned that escalating confrontation could expose Bulgaria to additional security and economic risks.
Gyurov represents a more explicitly Euro-Atlantic political orientation, arguing for stronger Western alignment and institutional reform.
The contest therefore concerns not whether Bulgaria will formally leave its existing alliances, which would require decisions far beyond presidential authority, but how actively it participates in their policies towards Russia.
The security debate has intensified following a series of drone attacks against merchant vessels operating near Bulgarian and Romanian waters in October.
According to a maritime threat assessment published by Ambrey, three commercial ships were struck on 5–6 October within the exclusive economic zones of the two NATO members. Two sank, marking a substantial escalation in the geographic exposure of commercial shipping.
Ambrey assessed that Russian forces were highly likely responsible and that the vessels had been targeted because of their connections to Ukrainian grain exports.
The attacks have raised concerns about navigation, maritime insurance, food exports and the potential for further incidents involving NATO member states.
Bulgaria’s position on the western Black Sea coast gives these developments particular significance. Its ports, maritime infrastructure and commercial shipping depend on maintaining secure access to international sea routes.
As EU Today previously reported, the expansion of Russian attacks into areas close to NATO territory creates difficult questions for coastal governments seeking to protect commercial interests without becoming direct participants in the conflict.
For Bulgarian voters, maritime security is no longer simply an aspect of the war taking place elsewhere. It has become a question of national security, economic vulnerability and the government’s capacity to respond.
The campaign has also been influenced by inflation and higher energy costs, particularly among lower-income households and residents of rural areas.
Bulgaria’s historical dependence on Russian energy has long complicated its foreign-policy choices. Although the country has pursued diversification, fluctuations in international energy markets continue to affect domestic prices and industrial competitiveness.
Economic concerns have acquired an additional dimension following Bulgaria’s adoption of the euro on 1 January 2026, making it the euro area’s 21st member.
The transition represents a significant stage in Bulgaria’s economic integration with the European Union, but it has occurred during a period of price pressures and uncertainty over household purchasing power.
The presidency does not determine energy policy or monetary decisions. Nevertheless, candidates’ positions on Russia, European integration and economic security form part of the wider political debate.
Under Article 93 of Bulgaria’s Constitution, a candidate must receive more than half the valid votes, with turnout exceeding 50 per cent of eligible voters, to win in the first round.
Neither requirement is expected to be easily satisfied. Turnout in the first round of the 2021 presidential election was approximately 38.6 per cent, reflecting the broader problem of electoral participation after repeated national votes.
If no candidate meets the constitutional requirements on Sunday, the two leading candidates will contest a runoff on 1 November.
Yotova enters the election with a substantial polling advantage, but Gyurov could benefit from opposition voters consolidating around his candidacy in the second round.
The result will determine more than the occupant of the presidential office. It will indicate whether Radev’s parliamentary dominance can be extended to the presidency, or whether voters prefer a political counterweight at a time when Bulgaria faces growing pressure to define its position between Moscow and its Western allies.
Zone 5 Technologies has shared with TWZ the first photos of its latest Block 40 Rusty Dagger low-cost cruise missile in a surface-launched configuration. The images offer a new look at a weapon developed first with air-launched applications in mind, and for export to Ukraine. It is now being adapted for use from land and sea, including by U.S. and other allied forces.
Zone 5 has not disclosed where or when the pictures were taken, or which programs, specifically, the ground-based launches were conducted under. The images do not offer a clear view of the trailer-mounted launcher, either. A spokesperson for the company did stress to TWZ that versions of Rusty Dagger have now been selected for separate U.S. Army and Navy programs, in addition to its initial development through the U.S. Air Force.
In May, Zone 5, as well as Anduril, CoAspire, and Leidos, received framework agreements from the Pentagon under the Low-Cost Containerized Missile (LCCM) program. The U.S. Army’s Portfolio Acquisition Executive Fires (PAE Fires) is running LCCM in cooperation with the Office of the Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering (OUSW R&E). The aim of this program is to procure more than 10,000 low-cost cruise missiles, in total, over three years, beginning in 2027.
Then there is also the Consolidated Affordable Ordnance System (CHAOS) effort from the U.S. Navy’s Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Munitions (PAE Munitions). CHAOS is focused on low-cost anti-ship cruise missiles, particularly for U.S. allies and partners. CoAspire is also on contract for CHAOS with a version of its Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile-Extended Range (RAACM-ER) design.
“We designed a surface-launch Rusty Dagger to be the foundation of U.S. and allied mass-produced affordable precision deep strike weapons,” Tom Kanewske, chief strategy officer at Zone 5, told TWZ in a statement.
“Our team went from design to demonstration in less than three months, bringing Rusty Dagger from pylons and pallets to ground launcher and shipping containers,” added Kyle Maxhimer, Zone 5’s president.
Zone 5 says the Block 40 version of Rusty Dagger can accommodate warheads in the 100-to-250-pound classes. It can still be configured for air-launch, either from pylons under the wings of aircraft or via palletized munitions systems. In order to be fired from launchers on the ground or at sea, the new version of the missile is fitted with a solid-fuel booster rocket at the tail end.
More specific details about the Block 40’s capabilities compared to the preceding air-launch-only version, also referred to as the Block 20, remain limited. From what we can see now, the two variations appear outwardly similar in many respects, at least broadly speaking. Earlier variations had a distinctive tail configuration with four squared-off fins, two facing upward and two more angled to either side. The shaping of the fins on the Block 40 does look to be more rounded. It’s also possible the missile may have a new cruciform tail fin arrangement, but this could also be a trick of the angle from which the missile is being viewed, coupled with the low resolution of the available images.
Previous reports have said that Rusty Dagger has a range of 300 nautical miles when delivered at low altitude, which is increased to 500 nautical miles when launched by aircraft at medium altitudes and flying at higher speeds. In general, surface-launched versions of missiles typically have shorter maximum ranges compared to their air-launched counterparts.
Zone 5 Rusty Dagger. #AffordableMass pic.twitter.com/Pzj1KnceHC
— Air-Power | NatSec Ledger (@NatSecLedger) June 7, 2025
Regardless, the Block 40 version is an important further evolution of the Rusty Dagger design. The initial air-launched version of the missile, now designated the AGM-188A, has already been in development for several years, in part now under the U.S. Air Force’s Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) program. This has included live-fire tests conducted at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida in January 2025. We now know that Rusty Dagger has been cleared for use on four different types of fighters, including the F-16. Development of CoAspire’s Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile (RAACM) was also conducted as part of the ERAM effort.
Like the Navy’s CHAOS effort, ERAM has been focused primarily on supporting allies and partners, starting first with Ukraine. A Zone 5 spokesperson told TWZ that, as things stand, Rusty Dagger remains the only publicly reported operational missile in its class fielded by the Ukrainian military.
It appears that the AGM-188A “Rusty Dagger” cruise missile has undergone field testing in Ukraine.
— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱
Russian sources are publishing photos of an unknown 8-element CRPA antenna. On the back side of the unit there is a circuit board with a large heatsink, which carries the CAGE code… pic.twitter.com/phZeOJfHJ0(@TheDeadDistrict) June 7, 2026
ERAM has also been feeding into the Air Force’s own Family of Affordable Mass Missiles (FAMM) plans. The service wants to acquire 28,000 FAMM munitions in pylon-launched and palletized configurations over the next five years.
As we reported earlier this year, Rusty Dagger is now part of a broader portfolio under Norwegian defense company Kongsberg, which acquired a 90 percent stake in Zone 5. Kongsberg has positioned the missile alongside its stealthy Joint Strike Missile (JSM), with the two weapons serving different, complementary roles.
KONGSBERG announced today that it has closed the acquisition of US missile company Zone 5 Technologies LLC, following approval by US regulatory authorities.
— KONGSBERG (@kongsbergasa) June 10, 2026https://t.co/meRxfmYHH6 pic.twitter.com/EXVbYhDers
Rusty Dagger is designed around affordability and volume, while JSM offers a sophisticated, low-observable strike capability. The concept gives customers a mix of weapons suited to different targets and mission requirements, rather than relying exclusively on expensive, high-end missiles.
Zone 5 says it is now expanding manufacturing in the United States. Production is established in San Luis Obispo, California, with production beginning in the Dallas-Fort Worth area of Texas. A franchised facility is also being developed in Miamisburg, Ohio, with Hawthorn Aero, a company that describes itself as specializing “in high-rate airframe manufacturing, offering scalable solutions from design to full vehicle integration for aerospace industries.”
The company says each site is designed to reach a capacity of more than 2,500 missiles annually by the end of 2027. If all three reach that level, combined annual capacity would exceed 7,500 missiles.
The expansion reflects the growing emphasis on affordable weapons that can be manufactured in large quantities and replenished quickly, something that is considered especially critical if the United States is to face China in a future high-end conflict in the Indo-Pacific region.
The ground-launched Rusty Dagger shown in the photos underscores how far the missile family is moving beyond its original air-launched role. With production expanding and multiple U.S. military programs in the picture, the surface-launched variant adds another potential route to getting the weapon into service.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post Ground-Launched Rusty Dagger Low-Cost Cruise Missile Seen For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.
In a direct confrontation with Russia, European NATO states would likely be even more vulnerable than Ukraine to swarms of Russia’s new jet-powered strike weapons, Fabian Hoffmann of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS) argued in a 20 October op-ed for the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He calls them low-cost cruise missiles. Just three days earlier, Romania met what it believes were two of them over the Black Sea.
Romanian F-16 fighter jets shot down two jet-powered Geran-family drones over Romania’s territorial waters on 17 October, the Defense Ministry said. Interim Defense Minister Radu Miruță said they flew at about 450 km/h and were likely Geran-4s, the first of that type Romania had downed.
Russia began using the Geran-4 in May in response to effective Ukrainian interceptor drones, Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) said, adding that it reaches up to 500 km/h. By June, those interceptors were downing about half of slower Shahed-type drones, defense adviser Serhii Beskrestnov estimated.
Hoffmann traces the shift to the Geran-3, a model Ukraine recovered intact in 2025. In his account, a Chinese JT80 turbojet roughly doubled its speed, from 185 to 350 km/h. However, he puts newer models, including the Geran-4, at 600 km/h or more, above HUR’s figure for that model.
By his estimate, each costs $150,000–$250,000, against about $50,000 for a long-range drone. Still, from Russia’s perspective, he wrote, that buys a significantly higher chance of getting through.
Hoffmann argues defenses must match the threat’s speed, for example with jet-powered interceptor drones. Ukraine already fields some. On 4 October, President Zelenskyy said its Bars interceptors had shown the highest percentage among Ukrainian interceptors, about 30% of targets, according to Militarnyi. One unit destroyed five aerial targets with five Bars interceptors, Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara later told journalists. He also called aviation one of the most effective tools against jet drones.
Hoffmann’s concern is scale. Jet engines are in short supply, he wrote, because too few European and US suppliers can meet demand. Ukraine’s Defense Industry Council flagged a shortage of such engines for its drones in April. In his view, gun systems and higher-end missile defenses are too scarce or too costly to fill the gap.
The U.S. Army wants to infuse new autonomous capabilities into its current and future fleets of amphibious landing ships and other watercraft. The service is also aiming to acquire up to 100 new purpose-built uncrewed surface vessels (USV). The maritime assets the service has now, often referred to as ‘the Army’s Navy,’ are obscure and generally underappreciated. However, the small force offers an important additional set of naval logistics capabilities, especially for any future fight in the Pacific, which could be further bolstered with optionally-crewed or entirely uncrewed platforms.
Army Maj. Gen. Frederick Crist, head of 8th Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), issued plans for future autonomous watercraft capabilities during a talk last week during a talk at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual symposium. 8th TSC, which has its main headquarters at Fort Shafter in Hawaii, is one of the top formations tasked with managing U.S. military logistics across the Pacific.
“In order to be able to increase theater distribution, we have the two composite watercraft companies, at end state there, west of the IDL [International Date Line],” Crist explained, referring to the Army’s future planned maritime force posture in the Pacific. “We continue partnering with industry to be able to move into autonomous watercraft systems to be able to conduct other means of maritime distribution.”
To take a step back quickly, as part of its broader regional role, 8th TSC also has forward-deployed elements in Japan. This includes the 5th Transportation Company, which is currently organized as what the Army calls a composite watercraft company. As of 2024, the unit had a pair of General Frank S. Besson class Logistics Support Vessels (LSV), as well as 10 smaller Landing Craft Utility (LCU) type vessels and four small tugs, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
The Army has eight LSVs, in total, and these are by far its largest and most capable ships. The two youngest LSVs, which were acquired in the mid-2000s, also form a distinct subclass, and their design is optimized for long-distance open-ocean operations, as you can read more about here. It’s not immediately clear which LSVs are currently assigned to the 5th Transportation Company. The unit is also set to receive new Maneuver Support Vessel (Light) landing craft.
Until very recently, the 10th Support Group (Regional), headquartered in Okinawa, was more directly responsible for overseeing forward-deployed Army logistics units in Japan. Earlier this month, the Army performed a so-called ‘reflagging’ of that formation, a largely administrative process that transformed it into the 45th Sustainment Brigade.
As part of the reflagging of the 10th Support Group into the 45th Sustainment Brigade, the Army has also been pushing ahead with plans for “the standup of a second composite watercraft company in Yokohama North Dock,” in the port city of the same name on the Japanese home island of Honshu, Maj. Gen. Crist explained last week. “That end state will have two composite water[craft] companies west of the IDL [International Date Line] under the command and control of the 45th Sustainment Brigade.”
When it comes to the watercraft assigned to these units, “we’re also moving into the autonomous lane,” Crist added. “Just in August, USARPAC [U.S. Army Pacific] had an opportunity to conduct an experiment by retrofitting an existing commercial vessel, the HOS Resolute [sic; HOS Resolution], with a kit to provide autonomous navigation.”
Maritime autonomy firm Sea Machines was able to integrate its SM300 software package on the HOS Resolution in just nine days for this demonstration. The ship is a 257-foot-long offshore support vessel more typically used to support oil and gas rigs. However, it features a stern ramp and four jack-up legs that also make it well suited to loading and unloading cargo at remote beaches.
For years now, the U.S. Marine Corps has also been experimenting with the HOS Resolution and other similar ships more generally. That service has been using the vessels to help refine its new expeditionary and distributed concepts of operations, which are themselves heavily centered on future conflict scenarios in the Pacific. The Marines have brought those capabilities to Army demonstration exercises in the past, as well.
The Army sees the August experiment as a potential stepping stone to integrating increasing degrees into its existing watercraft fleets.
“You could increase the fleet of autonomous vessels by tapping into the existing manned fleet,” Maj. Gen. Crist said. “Put on retrofitting kits to be able to conduct navigation, and then eventually propulsion and engine room activities, and eventually get to a fully autonomous system.”
Even just adding in autonomous navigation capabilities could help reduce the workload for the human crews on Army vessels and provide added margins of safety. Blending autonomy with “propulsion and engine room activities” could improve reliability and reduce maintenance demands. Being able to operate those ships in a fully uncrewed mode, if desired, would open up additional operational possibilities, including just for repositioning ships across the broad expanses of the Pacific.
Reduced manning requirements could be especially attractive for the Army’s ‘Navy,’ which is already a very small part of the service’s overall force structure. Last week, Maj. Gen. Crist also talked about further leveraging traditional crewed vessels owned and/or operated by contractors.
“It’s going to be a broad portfolio of systems of systems,” he said of the overall watercraft vision for the Pacific. “Army watercraft with Army Mariners will be, of course, one aspect of it. We also look for the opportunity to be able to leverage USTRANSCOM’s (U.S. Transportation Command) contracting capability to leverage operational support vessels that are commercially owned and commercially operated. We’re considering ways of being able to have commercial vessels that become manned by Army mariners.”
It is also interesting to note here how extremely similar this all sounds to the modifications the U.S. Navy made to the Spearhead class Expeditionary Fast Transport USNS Apalachicola ahead of its commissioning in 2023. However, despite tens of millions of dollars spent and successful demonstration of autonomous capabilities, the Navy curiously decided to put the Apalachicola into service without any plan to make use of these features operationally. There does not appear to have been any effort to integrate these capabilities more broadly within the Spearhead class since then, either.
Last year, the Navy struck the four oldest Spearhead class ships from its rolls entirely and has put several others on reduced operating status, ostensibly as a cost-saving measure. The service is still acquiring new Expeditionary Fast Transports, including members of the Expeditionary Medical Ship subclass that feature expanded medical facilities. The Spearhead class was born out of a program specifically to meet Army and Marine Corps requirements, and the ships are regularly used to support those services in the Pacific and elsewhere globally.
The Army also wants to expand its fleets of purpose-built uncrewed surface vessels (USV) for use in the Pacific, as well as elsewhere globally. Just earlier this year, Army Maj. Gen. Gavin Gardner, who preceded Maj. Gen. Crist as head of the 8th Theater Sustainment Command, said he wanted to rapidly acquire as many as 100 drone boats. His vision included larger USVs capable of carrying eight to 10 standardized shipping containers.
“I could see those operating in the U.S. PACOM area of responsibility,” Gardner told reporters at a roundtable in June, according to Military Times. “I think that gives you a ton of operations, inventory in motion, easy to respond. And then because they’re autonomous, and we can work with our partner nations forward, you have those berthed up everywhere from Korea to Japan, the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, etc.”
“Clearly, [the autonomous vessels] would be forward in the theater, kind of moving supplies, because we have a constant demand for Army watercraft time now, to deliver equipment and supplies forward in the theater,” Gardner added at that time.
One of the inherent benefits of the Army watercraft fleets, and its LSVs in particular, is their ability to help alleviate the need for the U.S. Navy to meet more localized littoral logistics needs, if they are even available to help in the first place. Navy amphibious and military sealift ships would already be heavily strained by high demand during any major conflict in the Pacific or elsewhere globally. This could easily be further exacerbated by threats to those supply lines. All of this has already been underscored this year by pressure on maritime logistics chains in the context of the war with Iran. The Army’s ‘Navy’ also offers valuable additional capabilities and capacity in non-combat contingencies, such as responding to natural disasters.
More generally, the Army has been working to expand its use of smaller USVs, including speedboat-like designs, in various roles. The service has clearly been paying close attention to Ukraine’s very successful use of drone boats in one-way kamikaze attacks, as well as ones armed with guns and rockets and examples configured as launch platforms for surface-to-air missiles and weaponized uncrewed aerial systems (UAS).
The 7th Infantry Division, one of the Army’s main maneuver combat formations in the Pacific, just recently experimented with a Ukrainian-developed Magura-series USV during an exercise in Michigan. That particular USV was configured to launch a quadcopter-type drone. Another member of the Magura family was observed being used in a one-way-attack configuration by U.S. Army Green Berets from the 1st Special Forces Group during the annual Balikatan exercise in the Philippines earlier this year.
The Army has also been experimenting with American-designed USVs. The aforementioned recent exercise in Michigan also featured a Saronic Corsair, the same type of USV that the Navy used to rescue the crew of an Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter that went down in the Gulf of Oman in June. Explosive-laden Corsairs were also used to carry out the first known U.S. kamikaze USV attack, which was launched against a coastal target in Iran in July.
During another separate exercise in the Philippines this year, Salaknib 2026, Army forces used unarmed Rampage USVs from U.S. firm Havoc, as seen below. As part of that exercise, the USVs escorted a crewed General Frank S. Besson class LSV to its destination, heading out in front to help spot potential hazards.
“There’s all the work that the Department’s already doing with autonomy and autonomous systems that we look to take advantage of in the [Pacific] theater, as well,” Maj. Gen. Crist said at AUSA.
The Navy and the Marine Corps have both been working to grow their operational fleets of smaller USVs, as well as larger ones, in recent years. At the same time, the Navy has suffered years of setbacks and shakeups in its efforts to operationalize bigger and more capable designs. The service awarded contracts for a total of 30 new medium-sized USVs last month in its latest attempt to reverse that trend.
In September, Secretary Pete Hegseth also announced several new initiatives aimed at further expanding use of uncrewed platforms and advanced autonomous capabilities across the U.S. military and all domains. The Pentagon is presently laying the groundwork for the establishment of an all-new top-level Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM), which it hopes to see come to fruition next year.
What is clear now is that the Army’s vision for future watercraft operations, especially in the Pacific, is increasingly autonomous.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post How The U.S. Army’s ‘Navy’ Aims To Go More Autonomous With Its Vessels In The Pacific appeared first on TWZ.
One drone launched another drone, which then shot down a third. All three were unmanned, and all at sea off Ukraine.
Ukraine’s Navy has destroyed a Russian Shahed attack drone with a Sting interceptor launched from the Sargan 3000 unmanned surface vessel, the Navy said, showing sailors adapting to new aerial threats with sea-launched interceptors.
Russian Shaheds threaten Ukraine’s ports, coastline and the ships that approach them, so meeting those drones out at sea, before they reach land, matters for the whole southern defense.
A Ukrainian Navy sea drone, the Sargan 3000, destroyed a Russian Shahed kamikaze drone with a Sting interceptor drone
— Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) October 21, 2026
Ukrainian troops continue to adapt to new threats to protect civilians and infrastructureUkrainian Navy pic.twitter.com/kXvnqaebAw
The Sting is built to destroy Russian kamikaze drones such as the Shahed, Geran and Lancet, as well as reconnaissance drones, with quick deployment, a short training course and a top speed of 280 km/h, its producer, Wild Hornets, says.
The Sting has earned its place at the front. The Ukrainian FPV interceptor has proven highly effective in combat, with a typical hit rate of 80 to 90% depending on the unit, and on some days reaching 100 percent, one launch for one kill.
It is currently Ukraine’s most productive Shahed interceptor, according to the Wild Hornets, having destroyed more than 3,000 drones in its first seven months of use. Mounting it on a sea platform extends that record from land into the Black Sea.
The Sargan 3000 has become a multi-purpose hunter. In July, Ukrainian naval personnel used a Sargan 3000 to sink a Russian second-rank border patrol ship.
In October, the same drone boat shot down a Russian Shahed with a turret-mounted machine gun over the Black Sea. Ukraine’s Navy took the Sargan 3000 into service in April 2026, and the drone boat has a combat radius of up to 1,600 kilometers, letting it clear the sky far from shore without putting a sailor in range.
New footage of Australia’s Ghost Shark extra-large autonomous underwater vehicle (XL-AUV) provides the first look at how the vehicle launches aerial drones, while also revealing a pair of deployable masts not previously seen on the platform. The video comes soon after we got a glimpse of some of the payloads that the Royal Australian Navy plans to integrate on the new uncrewed submarine, as you can read more about in our coverage here.
"Ghost Shark has teeth now." – @PatConroy1, Australia's Minister for Defence Industry.
— Anduril Industries (@anduriltech) October 21, 2026
The @ausgov and @Australian_Navy confirmed the payloads that our Ghost Shark extra-large autonomous submarine carries: sea mines, logistics caches, and air-launched effects for ISR and strike.… pic.twitter.com/IALPFpOf4V
Published by manufacturer Anduril, the footage shows a Ghost Shark surfacing before doors on the top of its hull slide open. A launcher consisting of 12 angled tubes then emerges from a drone sub. Another launcher is seen in the other upper payload bay, but is not raised in the video. While it appears to be of the same type, the second launcher could also have a different arrangement of tubes.
The footage subsequently cuts to an ALTIUS-type drone being launched from one of the tubes, with Ghost Shark itself remaining surfaced.
The sequence provides a much more concrete look at the aerial-drone deployment concept — or one of them — than the photographs released previously, which offered the first public view inside Ghost Shark’s side payload bay.
The Australian government has said the vehicle is being developed for missions including persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and strike, but the precise configuration and operational capabilities of its weapons and how they are launched had not previously been disclosed.
The video does not identify which ALTIUS variant is being launched. However, Ghost Shark has previously been displayed at the Altus factory in Australia alongside derivatives of the ALTIUS-600 family. This includes the ALTIUS-600 for ISR, as well as the ALTIUS-600M, which is designed for strike missions. You can read more about this family of drones here. As we noted before, unarmed variants of the ALTIUS-600 are designed to be optionally expendable, and can be reused, although in many scenarios that isn’t possible. In terms of capabilities, the ALTIUS-600 has a maximum range of around 275 miles and can remain airborne for at least four hours, according to Anduril.
Ghost Shark can clearly deploy a substantial number of aerial drones — two dozen in this case – in a single sortie, enabling swarms to be launched far from an adversary’s coastline. Depending on the drones carried and how they are employed, such a swarm could provide broad-area surveillance, wreak havoc on enemy air defenses via electronic warfare, or attack targets.
The concept could also have value below the threshold of open conflict. A mass launch of relatively inexpensive drones could be used to probe or stimulate an adversary’s air defenses, prompting them to reveal their locations, signatures and operating procedures for collection by other intelligence assets or even some of the drones themselves. There is a precedent for exactly this going back to the early Cold War years, which you can read all about here.
Ghost Shark could carry these capabilities deep into contested waters clandestinely without putting a crew at risk, unleashing their payload even at standoff distances or right next to the shore to give the drones maximum penetration and loitering time over target, depend on the risk profile.
At the same time, while the 12-tube launchers fit neatly into Ghost Shark’s hull architecture, the modular nature of the design means that the same space can accommodate many other payloads, which might include alternative types of aerial drones. This could be fewer larger, more capable types, or far more plentiful smaller, less capable ones.
The other notable development in the video is the appearance of two deployable masts. Their presence is particularly interesting given Anduril’s emphasis on designing uncrewed underwater vehicles without the kinds of protruding mast arrangements associated with traditional submarine designs. On UUVs, masts like these are generally used to support sensors, communications, and propulsion systems.
“We don’t have big masts running down the backbone of our vehicle that a lot of other designs do that then preclude the ability for the payloads to come out in different directions… of the payload module itself,” Dr. Shane Arnott, Senior Vice President for Engineering at Anduril and the company’s maritime lead, told TWZ back in 2024.
“So we have… in effect, unlimited flexibility in this design, just the way that we’ve configured the vehicle and the payload bay itself could be almost anything within a size configuration that you can dream up,” Arnott added. “We haven’t encountered a crazy idea yet from a customer that … we can’t fit.”
The larger mast that lies flat is actually a fairly traditional one for large UUVs. It lies along the centerline of the hull when stowed, between the upper payload bays. It then deploys upward in an arm-like motion and carries an antenna. The smaller mast is located farther aft and rises vertically from its own housing. Potentially, the tall mast supports a line-of-sight datalink to the drones, while the other being a satcom array, such as one connected to Starlink/Starshield, sends drone feed to controllers anywhere in the world. It’s also worth noting that Ghost Shark could just launch the drones and send them on their missions autonomously, without needing to stay surfaced at all. Other arrangements could exist, as well, such as Ghost Shark launching a dozen drones and one larger one capable of carrying its own satcom terminal. This would allow direct control of the drones by operators anywhere in the world without Ghost Shark remaining present near the surface.
Ghost Shark also has a lower-profile swept-back sail on top of its nose section, not visible in the video. Overall, the vessel would retain a very small signature above the waterline while connected to the drones, making it hard to detect by radar and electro-optical imaging systems.
The new video follows the recent disclosure of three payload concepts for the Royal Australian Navy’s Ghost Shark: the deployment of up to 12 sea mines in a mission, the placement of supply caches on the seabed, and the launch of aerial drones. Those capabilities expand the vehicle beyond conventional underwater surveillance into a broader range of undersea warfare missions.
The mine-delivery option could support operations in strategically important maritime areas, while seabed caches could provide a means of positioning equipment and supplies for later retrieval. The aerial-drone capability, as seen in the new video, would allow Ghost Shark to extend surveillance beyond the reach of its own sensors or potentially deliver strike effects without exposing crewed platforms to the same risks. Having 12 ALTIUS drones ready to launch (and potentially the same number in the adjacent upper payload bay) would allow multiple missions to be undertaken.
The modular design is central to Ghost Shark. As we have discussed, the payload section can be configured using different hull sections and mission-specific systems, allowing the same underlying vehicle design to accommodate different requirements. The newly revealed launcher provides a first look at how at least one of those payload concepts may be implemented in practice.
Australia has committed substantial resources to autonomous and uncrewed undersea warfare capabilities, with a planned fleet of Australian-designed and built Ghost Shark vehicles serving alongside the Speartooth large uncrewed underwater vehicle (LUUV) and the BlueBottle uncrewed surface vessel (USV). The Ghost Shark program is also part of the broader AUKUS effort to develop advanced maritime technologies alongside the United Kingdom and the United States.
The new footage provides a clearer picture of the practical design choices behind that effort. Most notably, how the underwater vehicle can operationalize its aerial drone launching capability and the quantity of those systems it could potentially deploy very quickly before slipping back below the waves.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post Ghost Shark Uncrewed Submarine Shown Launching Aerial Drones For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.
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