Ukraine is remaking its air force on NATO’s model, down to the way its squadrons are organized and the aircraft they fly. The reforms are planned to be completed by 2035 and include modernizing its F-16s while pursuing the Swedish Gripen jets, Air Force Spokesperson Yurii Ihnat says, per Tse Baza.
Ukraine’s fighters are working hard against Russia’s air war, and in the previous month alone the Air Force faced around 3,500 jet-powered targets, with F-16s heavily used to intercept Russian drones. The new reform is meant to build an air force that can be sustained over the long term and can contest Russian jets and glide bombs, not only survive the next wave.
The central change, Ihnat said, is a move to the “wing” units that NATO air forces use. The first steps have already been taken: Ukraine has set up the 107th F-16 wing, which now has its own Facebook page and may publish material about its work.
Ukraine also plans to build universal air bases on the operational airfields it has used through the full-scale war. In the future, Ihnat says, those bases should be able to receive and service different models of combat aircraft, as NATO does.
Currently, the F-16s Ukraine flies are older Block 15 jets, used by other countries before they arrived, and intensive combat has left them in need of repairs, service life restoration, and upgrades.
Ukrainian officials discussed modernization with the American manufacturer Lockheed Martin, while Kyiv would prefer the newer Block 70/72 version, which Ihnat says would let its pilots stand up more confidently to Russia’s Su-35 fighters.
Keeping the current fleet flying has been hard: fewer than half of Ukraine’s F-16s may be operational, held back by slow maintenance abroad.
At the same time, Lockheed Martin and Kyiv are discussing a special F-16 variant for Ukraine, with a modern AESA radar, longer range, and a wider choice of weapons, though no firm deal exists yet.
Ukraine is also counting on Swedish Gripen fighters. Ihnat says Ukrainian pilots are drawn to them for their lower operating costs and simpler maintenance, with the country likely to receive older C/D models first, before the newer Gripen E that Saab is developing.
Ukrainian pilots have already begun their training on the Gripen, a jet seen as a counter to the Russian aircraft dropping guided glide bombs on the front, though delivery timing depends on further agreements.
The prime minister is a candidate again. And it shows. He speaks fluidly, dodges jabs, and stands his ground with a smile. Pedro Sánchez, who seemed somewhat weakened after his brother’s conviction and the Ceuta migrant crisis, appears to have been energized by the general election of November 29, which will be his sixth. “These elections can be summed up in a very simple idea: either the past moves forward, or Spain moves forward,” he says.
In Italia oltre 5,4 milioni di persone vivono in condizioni di povertà assoluta, pari al 9,3% della popolazione residente. Il dato, riferito al 2025, rimane sostanzialmente stabile rispetto all’anno precedente, ma evidenzia un peggioramento nel lungo periodo. Secondo il Rapporto sul Benessere Equo e Sostenibile (Bes) 2026 dell’Istat, nel 2014 la povertà assoluta interessava il 6,9% dei residenti. Nell’arco di undici anni l’incidenza è quindi aumentata di 2,4 punti percentuali.
I dati Istat mostrano che nel 2025 l’8% delle famiglie residenti si trova in povertà assoluta, una quota stabile rispetto al 2024. Considerando le singole persone, il fenomeno interessa il 9,3% della popolazione, per un totale superiore a 5,4 milioni di individui.
La povertà assoluta viene misurata sulla base della capacità di una famiglia di sostenere le spese necessarie per acquistare beni e servizi essenziali e mantenere condizioni di vita considerate adeguate.
Il confronto storico evidenzia un aumento significativo. Nel 2014 la povertà assoluta colpiva il 6,9% della popolazione, contro il 9,3% del 2025. Secondo l’Istat, nel periodo considerato il fenomeno ha registrato una diminuzione soltanto nel 2019, mentre gli aumenti più rilevanti si sono verificati nel 2020 e nel 2022.
Nel primo caso hanno inciso le conseguenze della pandemia, mentre nel secondo l’accelerazione dell’inflazione ha pesato soprattutto sulle famiglie con minori disponibilità economiche.
Le condizioni economiche cambiano sensibilmente tra le diverse aree del Paese. Nel 2025 il Mezzogiorno presenta l’incidenza più elevata di povertà assoluta, pari all’11,5%, sebbene il dato sia diminuito rispetto al 12,5% registrato nel 2024.
Al Nord la percentuale si attesta all’8,5%, in lieve calo rispetto all’8,8% dell’anno precedente. La situazione più favorevole si osserva nel Centro, dove la quota di persone in povertà assoluta è del 7,4%, contro il 7,6% del 2024.
Un altro indicatore utilizzato dall’Istat è il rischio di povertà, che misura la quota di persone con un reddito disponibile equivalente inferiore al 60% del valore mediano nazionale.
Questo parametro è diverso dalla povertà assoluta, perché considera il reddito familiare rispetto alla distribuzione dei redditi della popolazione. Nel 2025 il rischio di povertà interessa il 32,1% dei residenti nel Mezzogiorno, una percentuale più di tre volte superiore al 10,4% registrato al Nord.
Nel Centro il valore è del 15,1%, mentre la media nazionale si attesta al 18,6%, sostanzialmente stabile rispetto al 18,9% del 2024. Le differenze sono particolarmente evidenti anche a livello regionale.
In Sicilia il rischio di povertà raggiunge il 38,4%, in Campania il 35,6% e in Calabria il 32,8%. Le tre regioni superano quindi il 30% e presentano valori nettamente superiori alla media italiana.
Il confronto internazionale mostra una situazione italiana meno favorevole rispetto alla media europea. Secondo i dati Eurostat riportati nel Bes 2026, il 22,6% della popolazione italiana è a rischio di povertà o esclusione sociale, contro una media del 20,9% nell’Unione europea. L’Italia occupa il 21° posto tra i 27 Stati membri, considerando l’ordinamento dal valore più basso a quello più elevato dell’indicatore.
Il parametro europeo comprende tre dimensioni: rischio di povertà, grave deprivazione materiale e sociale e bassa intensità lavorativa delle famiglie. Nel confronto con gli altri Paesi, l’Italia presenta una percentuale superiore a quelle di Germania e Francia, entrambe vicine alla media europea, ma inferiore alla Spagna, dove il valore raggiunge il 25,7%. La Repubblica Ceca registra il dato più basso, pari all’11,5%, mentre la Bulgaria presenta quello più elevato, con il 29%.
O encontro de 12 de novembro assinala o Dia Nacional das Raças Autóctones e abre as comemorações do centenário do antigo Posto Agrário de Tavira.
O conteúdo Centro de Experimentação Agrária de Tavira recebe fórum sobre raças autóctones algarvias aparece primeiro em Barlavento.
In alcune regioni ci sono più servizi, in altre la vita costa meno e in altre ancora c’è maggiore possibilità di trovare un lavoro. L’Italia presenta caratteristiche specifiche che variano a seconda della geografia. L’ultimo report, la 13ª edizione del “Rapporto sul benessere equo e sostenibile” dell’Istat, racconta proprio le tendenze delle disuguaglianze di benessere che si possono osservare sul territorio. In altri termini, l’Istat classifica le regioni in base a dove si vive meglio per accesso alla sanità, istruzione e formazione, lavoro, benessere economico, relazioni sociali, sicurezza, ambiente, innovazione, qualità dei servizi e diverse altre voci.
La mappa del benessere conferma la spaccatura tra Centro-Nord e Mezzogiorno. Infatti, mentre tutte le regioni del Nord e del Centro, con l’eccezione del Lazio, registrano prestazioni superiori alla media nazionale per almeno la metà degli indicatori, nel Mezzogiorno, con la sola eccezione dell’Abruzzo, la maggioranza degli indicatori segnala livelli inferiori alla media. Quindi dove si vive meglio in Italia? L’Istat ha trovato la risposta.
Per rispondere alla domanda su dove si viva meglio in Italia basterebbe dire in tutte le regioni del Nord e del Centro, a eccezione del Lazio. Di conseguenza si potrebbe dire che in tutte le regioni del Mezzogiorno, fatta eccezione per l’Abruzzo, si vive peggio.
Ma oltre a quello che dice la media dei risultati dell’analisi del Rapporto sul benessere equo e sostenibile, si può scendere nei dettagli e rispondere caso per caso.
Per esempio, la distanza tra Nord e Mezzogiorno è evidente in alcuni domini del benessere, come lavoro e conciliazione dei tempi di vita, benessere economico e relazioni sociali.
Ma il quadro non è omogeneo:
Sorprende il valore della sicurezza in determinate regioni. Infatti, rispetto a quanto ci si potrebbe aspettare, la contrapposizione Nord-Sud sul tema della sicurezza non è così netta. Secondo l’Istat le regioni meridionali registrano risultati migliori rispetto alla media nazionale.
Tranne la Campania, le grandi aree metropolitane del Centro e del Nord risultano penalizzate da una maggiore incidenza di reati predatori e violenze.
Le criticità più marcate si registrano nel Lazio, seguito da Lombardia, Emilia-Romagna e Toscana. Un risultato che spinge a ragionare sugli stereotipi territoriali, ma soprattutto a non confondere il benessere economico con una maggiore sicurezza o una minore esposizione a determinati reati.
Il Friuli-Venezia Giulia e le due Province autonome di Trento e Bolzano sono le uniche realtà territoriali che hanno raggiunto valori medi superiori al valore dell’Italia in 10 dei 12 domini di benessere calcolati. Si può quindi dire che sono questi i territori dove si vive meglio.
All’opposto ci sono le regioni dove i valori di almeno 10 dei 12 domini sono peggiori rispetto al riferimento medio nazionale. Ciò accade in:
The attack took place on October 10th. Survivors describe an aircraft circling before attacking the workings at Jabal al-Uqaydat. One injured miner, Ali Mohamed Hamza, said workers were preparing tea at about eight in the morning when it appeared overhead, making three circuits before striking on its fourth pass. Other accounts describe five strikes. The number of weapons and attack runs remains unverified, as does the final death toll.
The New York Times placed the mine in Sudan’s Red Sea State, about 25 miles from the Egyptian frontier. Its reporting identified apparent Egyptian munitions in footage from the site. Subsequent accounts of that investigation described an unexploded Egyptian NASR 400 bomb, identified by Trevor Ball, a former American army explosive-ordnance specialist. This is significant physical evidence, although the identification requires further corroboration and manufacture alone cannot establish the operator.
On October 12th Egypt’s armed forces announced a third phase of a military and police campaign against illegal gold mining in the Eastern Desert. Warning leaflets had been dropped, it said, and operations were intended to protect national resources and enforce sovereignty. Cairo did not admit bombing the Sudanese mine or acknowledge casualties or crossing the frontier. Instead, its statement carefully described operations within Egyptian borders.
But taken together, the munition evidence, eyewitness accounts and Egypt’s own announcement mean Cairo can’t brush this off. Nor can they brush this off as an operation against the Rapid Support Forces. What it does suggest is that Egypt will use armed force indiscriminately against civilians wherever their Sudanese allies either won’t or can’t do it.
This is all part of the wider story of Egypt’s involvement in Sudan. Reuters reported in February that satellite imagery showed Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci combat drones at East Oweinat, an Egyptian airfield near Sudan. Egyptian officials acknowledged equipping two southern airports for border protection and military strikes. A separate Times investigation reported that drones operating from Egypt had attacked the RSF inside Sudan.
All this goes well beyond diplomatic sympathy. Cairo provides political backing and, as its security officials have acknowledged privately to Reuters, logistical and technical assistance to General al-Burhan’s forces. Egypt simultaneously occupies a seat in the Quad mediation group alongside the United States, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It therefore possesses leverage both over the battlefield and over negotiations intended to end the war.
The contradiction is sharp. The Quad’s September 2025 statement called for an independent, civilian-led government and a transition not controlled by either belligerent. But under Burhan’s leadership that’s not happening any time soon, which means that Egypt, for all its talk about supporting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan, will go its own way as it sees fit—even if that includes desperate miners trying to scratch a living from the soil of their own economically devastated country.
Burhan’s response to the miners’ deaths was pusillanimous, tepid at best. On October 12th, he ordered a fact-finding inquiry involving prosecutors, judicial officials and security representatives. His administration said Sudanese and Egyptian authorities were communicating. But there was no condemnation of Cairo or any public demand that Egypt explain what had happened. Preserving the patron’s goodwill appears to be more important to Burhan than demanding answers about the deaths of his own countrymen.
These miners were neither an invading army nor a rival government. They were people digging for survival on ground reported to be their own country’s soil. Their killing demands accountability, not diplomatic discretion. The junta’s tepid response suggests a grim hierarchy of obligations: the survival of its relationship with Cairo first; the lives of Sudanese citizens a distant second.
As for Cairo’s behaviour, this looks decidedly like a war crime. If further investigation were to corroborate eyewitness accounts of the plane making several passes over the area before commencing its attack, then clearly they were having a good look at the facts on the ground. And they dropped their bombs anyway. Hello…? Is that The Hague?
The European Commission has proposed increasing total fishing opportunities by approximately 35 per cent compared with 2026, largely because of improved assessments for several herring stocks and sprat. At the same time, it wants substantial reductions in permitted accidental catches of cod, whose depleted populations have shown little evidence of sustained recovery.
The negotiations, scheduled for 26th and potentially 27th October, will determine how fishing opportunities are allocated between EU member states bordering the Baltic Sea.
According to the Council’s published agenda, ministers are seeking a political agreement on total allowable catches and national quotas for ten commercially significant fish stocks.
The outcome will determine how much fish can be landed legally during 2027, while also influencing the future prospects of coastal communities, processing companies and fishing fleets.
The Commission’s proposal for 2027 fishing opportunities reflects significant differences in the condition of individual stocks.
Brussels recommends increasing the catch limit for central Baltic herring by 49 per cent and for sprat by 44 per cent. Proposed increases for Bothnian herring and Gulf of Riga herring are more modest, at three and 11 per cent respectively.
The improved outlook for sprat follows stronger reproduction in recent years, while scientific assessments suggest some herring populations are beginning to recover.
However, these improvements do not mean the Baltic ecosystem as a whole has returned to a healthy condition.
Central Baltic and Bothnian herring remain below important sustainability reference levels, even though the latest scientific assessments permit increased catches under specified conditions.
For cod, the position is considerably worse.
The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, known as ICES, has advised that there should be no catches of eastern Baltic cod in 2027 or 2028 under its precautionary approach.
Its scientific advice for eastern Baltic cod reflects the continuing failure of the stock to recover sufficiently to support fishing.
Western Baltic cod faces similarly severe restrictions.
The Commission consequently proposes reducing the permitted incidental catch of western Baltic cod by 88 per cent and eastern Baltic cod by 51 per cent.
These allowances are designed to account for fish caught unintentionally during other fishing operations. They do not amount to the reopening of a targeted commercial cod fishery.
The proposed increases in herring and sprat quotas would benefit some fishing operators and processing industries, but the economic effects will vary significantly between countries and fleets.
Larger vessels specialising in pelagic species such as herring and sprat are likely to benefit more directly from increased catch opportunities.
Smaller operators whose activities depend on depleted stocks or mixed fisheries may face continued restrictions.
The Commission also proposes reducing the permitted incidental catch of western Baltic herring by 45 per cent and removing an exemption previously available to certain small-scale coastal fisheries.
That proposal creates a particularly difficult issue for smaller fishing businesses, whose operations may have limited capacity to switch fishing grounds or target different species.
The economic effects will depend not only on the size of the quotas but also on how national governments distribute them among individual operators.
The Baltic Sea’s problems cannot be explained by fishing pressure alone.
Nutrient pollution, changes in oxygen availability, habitat degradation and shifting environmental conditions have contributed to the deterioration of several stocks.
Restrictions on fishing can reduce direct pressure on fish populations, but they cannot independently resolve pollution or other environmental problems affecting reproduction and survival.
This complicates the relationship between scientific advice and political decisions.
Ministers are required to take account of conservation objectives under the Common Fisheries Policy. They must also consider the economic consequences for fishing communities and the viability of fleets operating within the agreed limits.
EU Today previously examined the political compromises surrounding European fishing quotas, including the tension between short-term commercial demands and the recovery of depleted fish populations.
The Baltic negotiations present a particularly concentrated version of that conflict because the condition of individual stocks varies so substantially.
The Commission’s proposed increases are based on the latest assessments rather than a general relaxation of conservation policy.
Indeed, its draft regulation envisages maintaining restrictions on vulnerable stocks while allowing greater exploitation where the scientific evidence supports it.
The proposed overall catch volume is approximately 543,000 tonnes, compared with substantially lower fishing opportunities in 2026.
That figure represents a proposed ceiling, not a confirmed agreement or a forecast of actual landings.
Once ministers reach a political agreement, the Council is expected to adopt the final regulation formally in November, with the principal catch limits applying from 1 January 2027.
The central question is whether governments will preserve the distinction between stocks showing measurable recovery and those for which scientific advisers continue to recommend no fishing.
Their decision will determine both the short-term economics of Baltic fisheries and the pace at which the region’s most vulnerable commercial fish populations may recover.
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