Volkswagen has reported a quarterly operating loss of €5.9 billion, intensifying pressure for factory restructuring and workforce reductions as Europe’s largest carmaker struggles with Chinese competition, American trade tariffs and the financial costs of its transition towards electric vehicles.
Volkswagen Group has announced a €5.86 billion operating loss for the third quarter of 2026, marking another deterioration in the financial performance of a company long regarded as one of the foundations of German industrial strength.
The result, published on 29 October, compares with an operating loss of €1.3 billion in the corresponding period last year.
Quarterly revenue declined by 6.3 per cent to €75.3 billion, while vehicle deliveries fell by 14.3 per cent to approximately 1.89 million.
The figures highlight the scale of the challenges facing the automotive group, which includes Volkswagen, Audi, Porsche, Škoda and several other major European brands.
They also increase pressure on management to accelerate a restructuring programme involving substantial reductions in costs, employment and production capacity.
Porsche Writedown Weighs on Results
A substantial part of Volkswagen’s reported loss was attributable to exceptional charges, including a multibillion-euro reduction in the assessed value of its Porsche interests.
According to Volkswagen’s financial results, the group’s operating result for the first nine months of 2026 was just €71 million, compared with €5.4 billion during the equivalent period of 2025.
Excluding special items, the company recorded an operating profit of €8.8 billion for the nine-month period.
The distinction is important.
The latest results do not indicate that every part of Volkswagen’s underlying business is generating operating losses. However, they expose the financial consequences of weakened profitability, changes in business strategy and previous investment decisions.
The group’s operating margin before special items stood at 3.8 per cent.
Finance chief Arno Antlitz said this was insufficient to sustain the investment needed for future competitiveness.
Volkswagen’s difficulties have also coincided with pressure on Porsche, whose premium positioning has not insulated it from changing demand and competition in international markets.
China Becomes an Increasingly Difficult Market
China has been central to Volkswagen’s international business for decades, providing a major source of sales and earnings.
That position is increasingly challenged by domestic manufacturers offering competitive electric vehicles, advanced digital features and lower prices.
Chinese companies have expanded rapidly in their home market, often developing new models more quickly than established European manufacturers.
Volkswagen is therefore confronting a problem that extends beyond a cyclical slowdown in demand.
Its historical advantages in manufacturing scale, distribution and brand recognition no longer guarantee the same competitive position in a market undergoing technological transformation.
The company has acknowledged that the Chinese market is shrinking while competitive pressure in Europe is increasing.
American tariffs have created another complication, raising costs and constraining profitability in a market where the group already faces substantial competition.
Together, these developments have weakened the assumptions underpinning Volkswagen’s global manufacturing strategy.
Electric Vehicles Present a Financial Dilemma
Volkswagen has invested heavily in electrification, software development and new vehicle platforms.
Demand for its electric models in Europe remains significant.
The company reported that battery-electric vehicles account for 40 per cent of its European order book, while its Electric Urban Car Family has attracted approximately 150,000 orders.
However, increasing electric vehicle sales do not automatically produce higher profits.
Volkswagen acknowledges that its electric vehicles currently generate lower earnings than comparable combustion-engine models.
This creates a difficult financial transition.
The company must invest in technologies required to remain competitive while maintaining sufficient profitability to finance those investments.
At the same time, established European manufacturers face competition from Chinese producers with different cost structures and supply-chain arrangements.
The resulting pressure is not confined to Volkswagen. It affects suppliers, component manufacturers and other companies dependent on the European automotive industry.
Factory Closures and Employment Reductions
Volkswagen’s deteriorating results have strengthened management’s argument for reducing production costs.
Reuters reported that chief executive Oliver Blume’s wider restructuring proposals could involve as many as 100,000 job reductions across the group, with up to four German factories potentially facing closure.
These remain restructuring proposals rather than completed measures.
Volkswagen’s own Future Plan 2030 includes a cost-reduction programme worth approximately €31 billion, combining €20 billion in operational savings with €11 billion in lower overhead costs.
The company is also seeking an additional reduction of 12,000 positions at Volkswagen AG by 2030, with negotiations covering the proposed measures.
Management and the IG Metall union have agreed to begin talks on 24 November at the Emden plant, followed by another round in Zwickau on 15 December.
The negotiations are likely to prove consequential for industrial relations in Germany, where Volkswagen operates within a system of employee representation and collective bargaining that gives workers considerable influence over restructuring decisions.
A Wider Test for Europe’s Industrial Strategy
Volkswagen’s difficulties reflect several pressures facing European manufacturing.
High energy costs, international trade restrictions, technological competition and the expense of industrial transformation are affecting the profitability of established producers.
Europe’s automotive industry also supports extensive supplier networks, research facilities and skilled employment across several EU countries.
A sustained contraction in German vehicle production would therefore have implications beyond Germany itself, particularly for neighbouring economies integrated into automotive supply chains.
For EU policymakers, the challenge is to reconcile industrial competitiveness with decarbonisation objectives and the need to preserve manufacturing investment.
Volkswagen’s latest results do not determine the future of European car production. They do, however, demonstrate that the transition towards new technologies is taking place under considerably more difficult commercial conditions than many manufacturers anticipated.
The group’s restructuring negotiations will provide an early indication of how those costs are to be distributed between shareholders, employees and the industrial regions that depend on its factories.
Since 2021, average prices at lower-powered public chargers have risen by 69% after inflation, while higher-powered charging prices have increased by 94%
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Hyundai sale al quarto posto tra i brand auto nella classifica Interbrand 2026, con un valore di 25 miliardi di dollari e 17 anni di crescita
Hyundai si posiziona al 29° posto nella classifica “Best Global Brands 2026” di Interbrand, con un valore del brand che raggiunge 25 miliardi di dollari. Il marchio guadagna due posizioni tra i brand automobilistici, passando dal sesto posto del 2025 al quarto, e raggiunge il 17° anno consecutivo di crescita del proprio valore.
La crescita riflette il rafforzamento della gamma, i progressi nelle tecnologie che guideranno la mobilità del futuro, dall’intelligenza artificiale fisica ai Software-Defined Vehicles, e la capacità di creare un legame più forte con il pubblico attraverso grandi eventi sportivi e campagne creative globali.
José Muñoz, President e CEO di Hyundai, attribuisce il risultato alla fiducia dei clienti e all’impegno dei team e dei concessionari. Secondo Muñoz, il quarto posto riflette sia la forza della gamma attuale sia il valore delle tecnologie su cui il marchio sta costruendo il futuro, dai Software-Defined Vehicles all’intelligenza artificiale fisica.
La qualità della gamma Hyundai ha ricevuto riconoscimenti internazionali. La nuova Palisade è stata nominata “2026 North American Utility Vehicle of the Year” a gennaio 2026. IONIQ 9, SUV elettrico ammiraglia del marchio, ha conquistato il titolo di “World’s Best Large SUV” ai Women’s Worldwide Car of the Year Awards 2026.
IONIQ 9 ha inoltre ottenuto il riconoscimento IIHS TOP SAFETY PICK+ 2026, riservato ai modelli commercializzati negli Stati Uniti, e il massimo punteggio nei test Euro NCAP. Sono risultati che rafforzano la reputazione di Hyundai sul fronte della sicurezza.
Anche la TUCSON Hybrid ha contribuito alle performance globali del marchio, sostenendo la crescita delle vendite dei modelli elettrificati. Dopo aver favorito l’espansione delle ibride nel 2025, il modello ha contribuito al record trimestrale registrato nel primo trimestre del 2026. Su queste basi, Hyundai ha presentato la nuova TUCSON con sistema ibrido di nuova generazione.
Nel 2025 Hyundai ha venduto complessivamente 961.812 veicoli elettrificati nel mondo, il 27% in più dell’anno precedente, tra cui 275.669 veicoli elettrici e 634.990 ibridi. Nel primo trimestre del 2026 le vendite di modelli elettrificati sono cresciute del 14,2% su base annua, raggiungendo 242.612 unità.
Gli elettrificati hanno rappresentato il 24,9% delle vendite globali del marchio e gli ibridi il 17,8%, in entrambi i casi nuovi record trimestrali. Il dato conferma che la strategia di elettrificazione sostiene la crescita anche nei volumi.
Il marchio continua a investire nella Physical AI e nella robotica. Nel gennaio 2026 Hyundai Motor Group ha presentato una strategia di AI Robotics incentrata sull’uomo, con una roadmap di commercializzazione a medio-lungo termine.
Nel settembre 2026 il Gruppo ha mostrato le attività di training di Atlas presso il Robotics Metaplant Application Center, in vista dell’introduzione nello stabilimento Hyundai Motor Group Metaplant America, prevista dal 2028. La partnership con NVIDIA prosegue nello sviluppo di soluzioni produttive basate sull’intelligenza artificiale fisica.
Le tecnologie robotiche hanno ottenuto riconoscimenti internazionali. Atlas è stato premiato come “Best Robot” ai CNET Group Best of CES 2026, mentre MobED ha ricevuto il CES 2026 Best of Innovation Award e, a maggio 2026, il Red Dot Award per il design di prodotto.
Sul fronte della mobilità autonoma, Motional ha avviato a marzo 2026 a Las Vegas un servizio pilota di robotaxi basato su IONIQ 5. Il progetto pone le basi per la futura commercializzazione di soluzioni di Livello 4.
Il software è un altro asse della crescita. Dopo la presentazione di Pleos nel 2025, nel 2026 il Gruppo ha svelato la versione di serie di Pleos Connect, introdotta per la prima volta sulla New Grandeur in Corea. L’obiettivo è portare il sistema su circa 20 milioni di veicoli entro il 2030.
Sul piano sportivo, Hyundai è partner FIFA dal 1999 e per la FIFA World Cup 2026 ha messo a disposizione la flotta di veicoli ufficiali più ampia mai fornita nella storia della competizione. La campagna globale “Next Starts Now” collega una nuova idea di calcio al futuro della mobilità.
Altre partnership rafforzano la presenza nei mercati strategici. Dal dicembre 2025 Hyundai è Premier Partner dell’ICC nel cricket, e prosegue la sponsorizzazione ufficiale della CONMEBOL Libertadores, consolidando la visibilità in America Latina.
Anche la creatività è un punto di forza. Nel giugno 2026 la campagna “Coquí Alarmed” ha conquistato il Grand Prix nella categoria Audio & Radio al Cannes Lions, il secondo consecutivo per il marchio dopo “Night Fishing” nel 2025.
La classifica “Best Global Brands” di Interbrand valuta tre dimensioni: la performance finanziaria generata dal marchio, il suo ruolo nelle decisioni di acquisto e la Brand Strength, cioè la capacità di creare fedeltà e sostenere la crescita nel medio-lungo periodo.
Jihun Moon, Global Managing Partner di Interbrand Group, sostiene che la presentazione della strategia nell’AI Robotics abbia ampliato il raggio d’azione del marchio verso l’intelligenza artificiale fisica. Secondo Moon, i risultati nella robotica e nell’elettrificazione hanno rafforzato distintività e fiducia, elementi chiave per la crescita del valore.
DIA included the higher-resolution image of the Chinese spaceplane in a new unclassified report on global security challenges outside of the Earth’s atmosphere, which was released yesterday. A satellite belonging to Maxar Technologies (now Vantor) captured the image, but when exactly remains unclear. It does have a 2024 copyright date.
The image shows a miniature space shuttle-like design with small wings and twin vertical tails. It also has upward-opening doors above a central payload bay. There is also an extension at the tail end with solar panels seen deployed on either side. There are what look to be side-by-side ventral bays, which are likely for the main gear in a tricycle landing gear configuration. Overall, the core design is extremely similar to that of the U.S. X-37B, which also features tricycle landing gear and can also be fitted with an extended payload module at the tail. One major difference is that the wings on the Chinese design have a much longer chord compared to the X-37B.
A side-by-side comparison of the on-orbit shot of the experimental Chinese reusable spaceplane (at left) and a U.S. X-37B fitted with an extended payload module being prepared for launch (at right). Vantor/U.S. Space ForceAnother look at an X-37B, seen here sitting on its tricycle landing gear after returning from a mission in space. USAF The X-37B used on the OTV-6 mission on the flight line at the Kennedy Space Center after its return to Earth on November 12, 2022. USAF
“A key capability for reusable space activities are spaceplanes like this PRC [People’s Republic of China] Spaceplane captured by Maxar. Spaceplanes can launch into orbit to place objects in space or even test them and return to earth [sic],” reads the caption to the picture in DIA’s report.
As noted, the basic fact of the existence of this image is not new. U.S. Space Force Col. John Patrick, then head of U.S. Space Forces-Korea (SPACEFOR-KOR), included a much lower-resolution version in a presentation at the Open Space Forum in South Korea in 2024. It was also not immediately clear at that time whether or not the picture simply showed an X-37B. TWZ had reached out at the time to the U.S. Space Force and Maxar for more information, and both had declined to comment. Two X-37Bs were built, and they have been sent on eight orbital missions, in total, since 2010. The Orbital Test Vehicle 8 (OTV-8) mission was launched on August 22, 2025.
China is understood to have conducted four separate orbital spaceplane missions using the same experimental vehicle since 2020. Three of those missions had concluded before Col. Patrick gave his presentation. The most recent launch occurred on February 7 of this year, and the vehicle has not yet returned, at least as far as we are aware.
On the third mission, which lasted from December 14, 2023, to September 6, 2024, the Chinese spaceplane was observed releasing multiple smaller objects into orbit. What those payloads may have been remains unknown, but they could have been released from the main payload bay, which is seen open in the on-orbit image. The bay could have opened without any subsequent release of objects on either of the two prior missions, as well.
DIA’s report also says that “China has two primary spaceplane models: the Shenlong and Tengyun,” but does not specify which one is seen in the image. The name Shenlong has been commonly used to refer to the spaceplane China has been experimenting with to date. Images said to show a prototype or test article of this design slung underneath an H-6 bomber for testing purposes had emerged in 2007.
Images that emerged in 2007 of a reusable spaceplane prototype, or a related test article, referred to as Shenlong, underneath an H-6 bomber. Chinese internet
Images showing wind tunnel testing of a Chinese two-stage-to-orbit concept. Chinese internet
There have been other spaceplane developments in China in recent years. This includes designs from the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) subsidiary Chengdu. The design from Chengdu is called Haolong and has been in development officially as an option for resupplying the country’s Tiangong space station.
In general, “spaceplanes are … reusable and feature enhanced maneuverability, making them more suitable for certain missions than traditional satellites,” DIA’s report notes.
As we often mention in the context of the X-37B, spaceplanes also have distinct advantages when it comes to rendezvousing with and maneuvering very close to other objects in space. They can execute course changes and other maneuvers in ways that traditional satellites cannot. All of this only underscores their potential as weapon systems, as well as for gathering intelligence. The fact that a Maxar (now Vantor) satellite took an on-orbit picture – a service the company is known to offer – of a Chinese spaceplane further highlights the kind of cat-and-mouse games that are increasingly emerging in space. The general risks posed by these kinds of activities were recently thrust into the public eye by the unprecedentedly close shadowing of a commercial radar imaging satellite tied to Ukraine by another satellite belonging to Russia.
China has been making massive investments, in general, in new space-based intelligence and other capabilities in recent years. Chinese space developments have now also extended into reusable space launch rocket boosters. Space launch company LandSpace became the first in China to achieve a successful recovery of a reusable space launch rocket booster on land in August. That followed CASC’s successful recovery of a reusable space launch rocket booster at sea using a specially configured ship the month before.
In general, “access to space traditionally requires expendable spacecraft: single-use launch vehicles, satellites, and one-time use capsules designed to maximize performance. Reliance on expendable vehicles has made access to space expensive and exclusive,” DIA’s report explains. “Reusable technologies, while even more difficult and expensive to develop and build, stand to greatly reduce the cost of spaceflight by recovering, refurbishing, and reusing rocket stages, fairings, and capsules.”
Chinese spaceplanes, one of which we have not definitively gotten a view of in orbit, look set to become an increasingly important part of this growing ecosystem.
Update: 6:32 PM ET –
Vantor has now provided an additional copy of the image of the Chinese spaceplane, elements of which look to be redacted, and some additional details. The company has confirmed it was taken on May 28, 2024, by the WorldView-3 satellite at a range of just under 56 miles (90 kilometers).
“There is a separate satellite docked to the aft section of the vehicle whose structure and solar arrays are visible,” Vantor also told us. “The spacecraft’s payload bay doors are visibly open.”
The U.S. Air Force has handed Lockheed Martin a $694 million contract for the production of AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) hypersonic missiles. In 2023, the service had moved to cancel ARRW, which had been in line to be the U.S. military’s first operational hypersonic weapon. At the time, we had reservations about the service’s intent and speculated the missile could make a major comeback or continue development in a classified setting. The program has since made an incredible turnaround, and there are already plans for another variant that will be able to use an all-new seeker to hit moving targets, including enemy warships.
The ARRW contract was awarded on September 29, but only announced today. It is not immediately clear how many missiles are to be built under this deal or when the Air Force expects to start taking delivery of them. The Air Force has previously disclosed plans to integrate the missiles onto its B-52 and B-1 bombers. Other aircraft with sufficiently large payload capacities and physical space to carry outsized stores could potentially carry AGM-183As, or variants thereof, in the future.
A B-1 bomber seen carrying an ARRW missile, or a relevant test article, on an external pylon during a flight test. USAF capture
“The contract was executed under the Department of War’s Enterprise-Wide Agile Acquisition Contract to modernize America’s Arsenal of Freedom,” according to an Air Force press release. “This milestone marks the formal transition of the boost-glide hypersonic missile program from prototyping and flight testing into production, solidifying the Air Force’s commitment to fielding standoff, high-speed strike options.”
As noted here, the AGM-183A is a so-called boost-glide vehicle-type hypersonic weapon, which uses a rocket booster to bring it first to an optimal speed and altitude. The nose cone on ARRW then breaks away, and a wedge-shaped unpowered boost-glide vehicle concealed within is released.
A rendering depicting an ARRW hypersonic missile’s nose cone breaking away to reveal the unpowered boost-glide vehicle inside. Lockheed Martin
The vehicle then glides to its target along a relatively shallow flight path within the Earth’s atmosphere at hypersonic speed, defined as anything above Mach 5. It is capable of maneuvering along the way, sometimes erratically. The mix of speed, flight trajectory, and maneuverability creates significant challenges for opponents in terms of spotting and tracking the glide vehicle, let alone attempting to intercept it. As a result, hypersonic weapons of this type offer particular benefits for piercing enemy air defenses to very rapidly strike time-sensitive and otherwise high-value targets.
The ARRW production contract “is a turning point in our advanced weapons roadmap,” Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink said in a statement accompanying today’s release. “By moving ARRW from test to production, we’re providing our combatant commanders with a credible, high-speed strike weapon capable of penetrating the most advanced anti-access and area-denial systems.”
“Fielding ARRW enhances our ability to hold targets at risk anywhere around the world,” Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach said in his own statement. “This hypersonic weapon provides the Joint Force a flexible and rapid response option for highly contested environments.”
A graphic offering a very general comparison of the typical flight trajectories of hypersonic boost-glide vehicle weapons and air-breathing hypersonic cruise missiles, as well as aeroballistic (or quasi-ballistic) missiles and traditional ballistic missiles. GAO
There had already been steady signs in recent years that ARRW’s fortunes were changing and that it had not actually been axed, despite the Air Force’s stated plans to do so. The Air Force’s 2026 Fiscal Year budget request last year confirmed that the service had fully rebooted the program and was seeking new funding to procure actual missiles.
The service’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request, released earlier this year, revealed further plans “to begin [ARRW] INC 2 [Increment 2] technology efforts such as but not limited to integrating pre-planned product improvements, design, trade studies, hardware upgrades, facilitization, affordability initiatives, and testing.”
A live AGM-183A ARRW missile seen under the wing of a B-52 bomber at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam ahead of a test in 2024. USAF
A request for $296 million would support “the design, test, and evaluation of Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) Increment 2 with terminal seeker and data link capability and other cost reduction production initiatives into ARRW,” those same documents added.
In general, the U.S. Air Force has historically framed hypersonic weapons, including ARRW and HACM, as being especially critical for success in future conflicts, especially high-end fights, such as one in the Pacific against China. This was underscored by the launch of an AGM-183A with a live warhead from a B-52 flying from Andersen Air Force Base on Guam in 2024. The future anti-ship variant could be even more relevant in a Pacific context.
“…the Guam test sent clear signals to China. The Air Force has made no secret of how important it views the development and fielding of hypersonic weapons as part of larger preparations for a potential future high-end fight against the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Pacific. This is further underscored by the fact that the mention of the ‘terminal seeker and data link capability’ for Increment 2 of ARRW is actually contained in the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) section of the Pentagon’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget request.”
A low-quality image of an ARRW after launch during a previous live-fire flight test. USAF
“In the context of a major conflict in the Pacific, there would also be a very high demand for prompt, long-range anti-ship capability. The ability to conduct those strikes even in the face of dense anti-air defenses would be even more attractive for engaging very high-value vessels, such as China’s growing fleets of aircraft carriers or big deck amphibious assault ships. The PLA Navy’s (PLAN) combat fleets, overall, continue to grow in scale and scope at a prodigious rate, as well. This, in turn, has put additional emphasis on the development and fielding of new and improved anti-ship capabilities that can be air-launched, as well as employed from the maritime and ground domains, across the U.S. military in recent years. Increment 2 ARRWs could also offer another means to strike mobile, high-value targets on land, such as ballistic missile transporter-erector-launchers.”
China’s aircraft carriers Shandong, at left, and Liaoning, at right, sail together, along with various escorts, as elements of their air wings fly overhead, in 2024. Chinese state media
If nothing else, after moving to cancel the ARRW three years ago, the Air Force has now fully reversed course and has placed its first order for production examples of this hypersonic missile.
The European Parliament has taken another step towards revising the European Union’s 2035 vehicle-emissions framework, after lawmakers from three major political groups agreed amendments offering manufacturers greater flexibility in meeting carbon dioxide reduction targets.
The compromise, approved on 22 October by Parliament’s Transport and Industry committees, proposes an 87.5 per cent reduction in average emissions from new passenger cars by 2035, compared with the 2021 baseline. This is less stringent than the European Commission’s proposed 90 per cent reduction and represents a further departure from the existing 100 per cent reduction in tailpipe emissions for new cars and vans.
The changes have not become law. They remain subject to parliamentary procedures and negotiations with EU governments. Nevertheless, the committee agreement shows how concerns over manufacturing competitiveness, production costs and technological choices are reshaping European climate legislation.
A fundamental revision of the 2035 framework
The original 2035 target, adopted in 2023 as part of the EU’s Fit for 55 legislation, required manufacturers to achieve a 100 per cent reduction in average tailpipe carbon dioxide emissions from new cars and vans. It effectively directed the market towards battery-electric and other zero-emission vehicles.
Manufacturers have argued that the transition is taking place under difficult commercial conditions. Competition from Chinese producers, costs of developing new platforms and batteries, and uncertainty over charging infrastructure contributed to demands for regulatory flexibility.
In December 2025, the European Commission responded with an automotive package proposing a 90 per cent reduction requirement by 2035. It would permit manufacturers to compensate for some remaining emissions using mechanisms involving low-carbon steel produced in the EU and qualifying renewable fuels.
The latest parliamentary compromise would lower the target further, to 87.5 per cent, while allowing low-carbon steel credits to count towards compliance. For light commercial vehicles, lawmakers also proposed reducing the 2035 target to 80 per cent and the 2030 target to 35 per cent.
Why low-carbon steel matters
A notable feature of the compromise is the connection between car-emissions rules and European steelmaking. Steel production is a major industrial source of carbon dioxide, and companies face investment requirements to replace conventional production processes with lower-emission alternatives.
Regulatory credits for carmakers using qualifying European low-carbon steel could create demand for cleaner industrial materials and encourage domestic investment. But emissions avoided during production are not equivalent to reductions in exhaust emissions. The accounting mechanism therefore creates a distinction between cutting tailpipe output and compensating for some remaining emissions through materials and manufacturing.
The compromise also connects vehicle rules with a broader industrial-policy debate about European-made products. As EU Today previously reported, vehicle decarbonisation has increasingly become part of the discussion about European industrial competitiveness.
Electric vehicle sales continue to increase
The debate comes despite growth in electric vehicle registrations. According to figures from the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association, battery-electric cars represented 22.7 per cent of new EU passenger car registrations in the first nine months of 2026, against 16.1 per cent during the same period of 2025.
Approximately 1.93 million battery-electric cars were registered between January and September, with considerable growth in Germany and France. Hybrid-electric vehicles nevertheless remained the largest single powertrain category at 36.3 per cent, while petrol and diesel together represented 28.2 per cent, down from 36.9 per cent a year earlier.
The figures show that electrification is progressing, but combustion engines still account for a substantial share of sales. Manufacturers must make investment decisions across several technologies while anticipating changing legislation.
Disagreements over industrial strategy
The parliamentary compromise follows discussions between France and Germany about the relationship between car-emissions rules and measures favouring European production. Paris has emphasised domestic industrial capacity; Berlin has pressed for greater technological flexibility.
Supporters of looser standards argue that manufacturers need time to adjust investment and respond to consumer demand. Critics warn that weakening the target could delay investments in electric vehicles, batteries and charging networks by making future demand less certain.
The eventual legislation will determine not only which vehicles may be sold after 2035, but also how the EU balances emissions reduction, international competition and the position of its manufacturing industry.
Captured Russian soldiers have a rule for one stretch of the Kupiansk front: go anywhere, but not there.
That stretch is the “safety corridor” the “Orion” unit of Ukraine’s Offensive Guard brigade “Pomsta” says it has built for its ground robots. The zone is so lethal that, by the unit’s count, 88% of attacking Russians are killed before they reach their positions, and Russian armor cannot get within 25 kilometers, the military outlet ArmyInform reports.
Behind that shield, the unit says its ground robots have run dozens of fully autonomous missions through the most dangerous ground on the axis, with a success rate of 99.57%. The results made Orion the top-ranked unit for effectiveness on the South-Kupiansk axis in September within Ukraine’s battlefield management system, DELTA.
“You can go anywhere, just not into the Orion zone”
The claim that the Russians now avoid the sector, the unit says, comes from them themselves.
“Prisoners admit in interviews: 'You can go anywhere, just not into the Orion zone.' Eighty-eight percent of the enemy is destroyed before reaching their positions, and Russian equipment cannot approach closer than 25 kilometers,” the unit says.
That is what opens the corridor. Where a human supply run would be a death sentence, a robot can cross, and cross again.
The quiet blood of the front
The point, the unit says, is to take the soldier out of the deadliest job on the front: carrying ammunition and the wounded across open fire.
“We broke the stereotype that supplying the army takes truck convoys and hundreds of soldiers under targeted fire. Our robotic systems are the ‘quiet blood’ of the front,” Vladyslav Zolotarov, an officer in the unit’s staff control group, says.
When Russia thinks our positions are depleted, a tracked platform quietly comes in at night and brings in a ton of ammunition.
In September alone, the unit says, its wheeled and tracked robots ran 85 of the hardest combat missions and hauled more than 30,000 kilograms of cargo. Its evacuation record is the line it is proudest of: four missions pulling wounded soldiers out by robot, all four successful, not one man lost.
Ukraine has bet heavily on this kind of machine, aiming to field 50,000 ground robots to keep its troops out of the drone-ruled kill zone.
France and Germany have teamed up to press the EU to relax its looming combustion car ban. It’s the latest sign the EU's climate agenda is running on empty, says Ben Pile – and the UK isn't far behind.
Registrations of fully electric cars across 17 European markets increased by 70.3 per cent in September, according to industry figures published on Monday, 19 October, as France and Germany seek to ease the European Union’s emissions requirements for new vehicles.
The data show that 300,202 battery-electric cars were registered during the month, accounting for 32.6 per cent of new passenger-car registrations in the markets surveyed.
The figures emerge three days after Paris and Berlin announced a joint position on the future of Europe’s automotive industry, proposing greater flexibility in the EU’s 2035 emissions regime while introducing measures intended to favour vehicles manufactured in Europe.
Electric vehicles gain market share
The latest figures, compiled by E-Mobility Europe, New Automotive and Fier Automotive, indicate that electric vehicle demand accelerated sharply during September.
According to the industry data published on 19 October, approximately 1.98 million battery-electric cars have been registered across the 17 markets during the first nine months of 2026, an increase of 38.1 per cent compared with the equivalent period last year.
Higher oil prices, government incentives and the introduction of more affordable electric models have all contributed to demand.
The figures represent a substantial change in the composition of European new-car sales, although they cover selected markets rather than constituting a complete statistical account of the EU’s 27 Member States.
France recorded 65,243 battery-electric registrations in September, representing 41.7 per cent of its new-car market. Germany registered 88,724 electric vehicles, giving the technology a market share of 34.6 per cent.
Both countries have substantial automotive manufacturing industries and are directly involved in negotiations over Europe’s future emissions legislation.
Significant differences between European markets
Despite the overall increase, electric vehicle adoption remains uneven across the continent.
Norway retained its position as Europe’s most electrified new-car market, with battery-electric vehicles accounting for 98.8 per cent of registrations in September.
Denmark followed with 88.8 per cent, while Finland recorded 62.7 per cent and Sweden 49 per cent.
Electric models also accounted for approximately half of new-car registrations in Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland and Portugal.
At the other end of the market, battery-electric vehicles represented only 11.2 per cent of registrations in the Czech Republic, 7.6 per cent in Italy and 6.2 per cent in Poland.
These differences illustrate the difficulty of establishing a uniform European transition timetable.
Household incomes, purchase incentives, vehicle prices and charging infrastructure differ substantially between countries. The availability of affordable electric cars is particularly important in markets where buyers are more sensitive to the initial purchase price.
The varying national figures also complicate the EU’s industrial calculations, since manufacturers must operate across markets progressing at different rates.
France and Germany reach automotive compromise
On 16 October, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz agreed on a joint approach to changes in European automotive regulations.
Under the proposed compromise, car manufacturers would be required to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from new vehicles by 90 per cent by 2035 compared with the 2021 reference level.
The agreement would also remove a proposed requirement to compensate for the remaining emissions through measures such as the use of low-carbon steel.
The change would create additional opportunities for manufacturers to continue selling vehicles powered by combustion engines beyond 2035, subject to the final legislative framework.
In their joint declaration on the automotive industry’s future, the French and German governments argued that emissions reduction must be combined with industrial competitiveness, investment and European manufacturing capacity.
The agreement also envisages preferential treatment for vehicles produced in Europe under certain public procurement and subsidy arrangements.
Britain could potentially benefit from provisions allowing selected European partners to qualify under the proposed industrial framework.
The Franco-German understanding is not, however, a final EU legislative decision. Changes to the regulatory regime require agreement through the relevant European legislative procedures.
Automotive competitiveness enters the debate
The principal argument advanced by supporters of greater regulatory flexibility is that European manufacturers need additional time to adapt production, protect employment and compete with international rivals.
German manufacturers retain extensive investment in combustion-engine and hybrid technology, while French producers have placed considerable emphasis on electric vehicles and maintaining European supply chains.
The negotiations therefore concern more than emissions limits. They also involve battery production, access to raw materials, manufacturing costs and the ability of European companies to compete with producers in China and other markets.
Supporters of the existing transition timetable argue that weakening long-term requirements could discourage investment in electric manufacturing capacity just as consumer demand is increasing.
Manufacturers seeking greater flexibility maintain that regulatory targets must account for uneven market conditions and the cost of developing new technologies.
September’s sales figures provide evidence that electric vehicle adoption is accelerating, but they do not establish whether the same rate of growth will continue without existing incentives.
The debate now centres on whether regulatory relaxation will preserve Europe’s automotive industry during the transition or slow investment in the technology that is already capturing an increasing share of the market.
Ukrainian company Nodrics has developed MAT1LDA, an eight-wheeled amphibious ground robot that can carry supplies across water, swamps, and rough terrain, robot-maker Tencore said, Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi reported on 17 October. The machine joins Tencore’s new family of ground robots, which the company has also shown in the US.
Ukraine’s ground robots now haul supplies and evacuate wounded soldiers through zones where drones make every move deadly, and the Defense Ministry has launched its first competitive tender for them.
500 kg on land, 400 kg afloat
A petrol engine drives MAT1LDA’s eight wheels, and side pontoons keep it afloat, so it can cross water, marshland, and rough ground without preparation, Militarnyi said. Its makers claim it carries up to 500 kg on land and 400 kg on water, with a range of up to 160 km on land and 50 km on water.
Its open frame lets crews swap equipment quickly to suit the task, fitting cargo containers or evacuation stretchers.
Explore further
Robots won’t replace armored vehicles, says Ukrainian company that builds both. It reveals one job they can’t do
Four robots, one system
MAT1LDA is part of the Tencore Ecosystem, which brings together four classes of ground robots for military and civilian work, Militarnyi reported earlier. Besides the amphibious eight-wheeler, it includes the tracked TerMIT, the wheeled TOR 4×4, and the TRAX Utility firefighting and rescue robot. The company says it has delivered more than 4,000 robots to Ukraine’s armed forces since the full-scale invasion, used across more than 50 brigades.
The amphibious MAT1LDA ground robot. Photo: Tencore
Tencore calls it Ukraine’s first integrated ecosystem of its kind. Putting the platforms into one system is meant to make them easier to use, maintain, and fit with extra equipment. One of the first shared add-ons is AI KIT, a hardware and software module that lets a robot keep to its route or drive back on its own after losing contact with its operator.
Ground robots from Tencore, clockwise: TerMIT, 4×4 TOR, 8×8 MAT1LDA, and TRAX. Collage: Militarnyi
On show in Washington
Tencore displayed MAT1LDA carrying a TerMIT robot at the Association of the US Army’s annual trade show in Washington this month, Breaking Defense reported.
Other Ukrainian makers have built swimming ground robots too: one switches from land to water in seconds, and another can tow 10 tons, its maker says. In April, Tencore formed a joint venture with France’s Shark Robotics.
Janeese Lewis George, a D.C. councilmember and the city's presumptive next mayor, has come out against pending legislation that would allow autonomous ride-share vehicles onto city streets, citing the technology's potential to eliminate the jobs of ride-share human drivers.
"DC is facing a jobs crisis. Rushing the legalization of autonomous vehicles is irresponsible given the anticipated AI-related job displacement and disruptions that put countless workers at risk," she said on X yesterday.
DC is facing a jobs crisis.
Rushing the legalization of autonomous vehicles is irresponsible given the anticipated AI-related job displacement and disruptions that put countless workers at risk.
In a follow-up post, she said that the D.C. Council should delay consideration of a pending bill that would allow Waymo, which is currently testing its technology with human safety operators on District streets, to offer autonomous rides to the public.
Ever since Lewis George won a commanding victory in D.C.'s Democratic mayoral primary earlier this year, pundits and wonks have been trying to read the tea leaves on how the Democratic Socialist will govern.
Lewis George's comments about Waymo suggest the mayor has a deeply mistaken view about the effects and benefits of technological innovation. Contrary to her contention, Waymo legalization is unlikely to exacerbate a "jobs crisis" for at least three reasons.
The first reason she's wrong is that very few D.C. residents work full-time as ride-share drivers. On her Capital Commonsense Substack, Ashley Schapitl reports that, by Lewis George's own estimate, there are only 200 District residents who work full-time as ride-share drivers.
For comparison's sake, the District has a labor force of roughly 400,000 people. So even if Waymo displaced all human drivers in the District, it would be a statistical nonevent.
Few headlines, for instance, reported that D.C.'s labor force shrank by 1,000 people between May and June. Neither did many outlets report that the labor force grew by roughly 600 people between July and August.
Yet here the mayor is talking about a "jobs crisis" over what would be an even smaller change in the number of employed workers in the city.
The second reason not to fear an exacerbated "jobs crisis" as a result of Waymo legalization is that autonomous vehicles (A.V.s) will not completely replace human rideshare drivers in the foreseeable future.
In the cities where Waymo has been active for years, A.V.s are still responsible for a minority of rideshare rides.
That's the case in Phoenix, where Waymo has been offering autonomous commercial service since 2020. In an article from April, Business Insider cites one study that put Waymo's market share at 16 percent of ride-share rides.
In other words, 84 percent of ride-share rides are still being performed by humans a full six years after A.V.s came onto the scene.
That isn't to say the impacts of A.V.s are necessarily positive for human drivers' earnings.
Another study by Gridwise from August 2025 found that A.V.s appeared to be marginally reducing drivers' hourly pay and number of trips per hour. That's evidence of the market for rides becoming more competitive, but it's not, as of yet, evidence of a job apocalypse.
Network design matters too. In places like Los Angeles and San Francisco, Waymo is a standalone competitor to traditional ride-share companies like Uber and Lyft. In Austin and Phoenix, Waymo partners with Uber to offer rides on hybrid human-and-A.V. networks.
A report by EnoTrans, funded by a grant from Lyft, found that the later cities' hybrid networks actually increased human drivers' trips per hour. Their pay-per-hour fell, albeit less steeply than in cities without hybrid networks.
All of that is to say that while Waymo, as a competitor to human-operated ride-share services, shouldn't be expected to have a positive impact on drivers' earnings. It shouldn't be expected to have a catastrophic impact on them either.
The third and final reason that Lewis George is wrong to think that Waymo will worsen a coming "jobs crisis" is that Waymo's employment impacts are not limited to its effect on competing human drivers.
If Waymo earns any market share at all, it'll be because it's offering some travelers a better transportation option than the ones that currently exist. Increased ease of travel within the city would be expected to raise employment levels, not lower them.
If Waymo makes it easier or cheaper for people to get from home to the office or from the office to their kids' school, they might be more willing to live in D.C. over Arlington or Silver Spring. If it's more convenient to get to the movies or dinner, residents will be more willing to patronize local businesses.
None of that even touches on the economic and human benefits of Waymo's likely positive impact on road safety.
The direct effects of Waymo on drivers' employment must be weighed against all the other economic activity that autonomous vehicles will facilitate.
In the long run, the economic effects of autonomous vehicles may well be revolutionary. In the foreseeable future, they'll make the market for for-hire rides slightly more competitive.
A reasonable assumption then is that Waymo will have a modest, but positive, impact on overall economic activity and employment in the District, even if it has a modest, but negative, impact on the small number of full-time ride-share drivers who live here.
If the new mayor can't even tolerate that level of economic disruption, that does not portend good things for D.C.'s economy under a Lewis George administration.
Temporary restrictions on aircraft arrivals and departures were imposed at 27 Russian airports, Deutsche Welle reported on 16 October, citing its own calculations based on reports from Russia’s Federal Air Transport Agency.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned airlines on 1 September that “Russian airspace is becoming completely unsafe.” Overnight, most of the airspace over European Russia was closed.
By morning, more than 200 flights had been canceled or delayed at Moscow airports, Deutsche Welle reported, citing figures compiled by a Russian Telegram channel.
Тим часом у російських аеропортах – справжній апокаліпсис через нальоти дронів останніми днями.
Про це ниють росЗМІ. Було відмінено десятки рейсів, у терміналах – дуже багато людей. Пасажири скаржаться на задуху, дикі черги до туалетів та повну невідомість. pic.twitter.com/ZlXxY5c2mq
The list included airports in the capital. All four Moscow airports temporarily suspended arrivals and departures, the Russian outlet Astra reported on 16 October. Russian authorities said they had shot down dozens of drones, while flights were delayed and diverted to alternate airfields, according to the report.
Massive drone attack on Russia: 644 UAVs in one night, 94 shot down near Moscow
The temporary airport shutdowns were likely a consequence of a massive drone attack on Russia. From 8:00 p.m. on 15 October to 8:00 a.m. on 16 October, Russian air defenses allegedly intercepted and destroyed 644 Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles across 26 Russian regions, occupied Crimea, and the Black Sea, according to Russia’s Defense Ministry.
According to the list of regions published by the Russian Defense Ministry, the drone attacks covered a vast area of Russia, from regions bordering Ukraine to the Moscow region, the Volga region, the country’s northwest and southern regions, as well as occupied Crimea and the Black Sea.
Russian air defenses shot down a total of 94 drones approaching Moscow over the evening of 15 October and overnight, according to calculations by the Russian outlet RBC Radio, citing statements by Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin.
In the Kaluga region, air defenses destroyed 27 drones over the evening and night, the regional governor reported. At 9:27 a.m., he updated the figures, saying another 48 UAVs had been shot down overnight, bringing the total to 75. According to preliminary information, there were no casualties or infrastructure damage.
In the Tula region, air defenses allegedly destroyed a total of 32 Ukrainian drones. There were no casualties, according to regional Governor Dmitry Milyaev in his Telegram channel.
In the Vladimir region in western Russia, authorities repelled drone attacks overnight. In the city of Vladimir, a drone attempted to attack a heating infrastructure facility, but the attack was stopped, Vladimir Region Governor Alexander Avdeyev reported. Minor damage was reported, but there was no information about casualties.
Ukraine has not yet commented on its involvement in the attacks.
The practical consequences of canceled Russian flights
Passengers on flight SU6312 from Kaliningrad to Moscow were unable to land in Moscow because of airspace closure, so the aircraft was diverted to Nizhny Novgorod, Terravia reported. After landing, passengers remained on board for about two hours before being allowed to disembark at 3:30 a.m. Instead of continuing their journey to Moscow by air, they were supposed to be transported by bus, with the trip expected to take about seven hours, the outlet reported.
A Russian Sukhoi Superjet 100 of the IrAero airline. Illustrative photo: TASS
Passengers were not provided with food or drinks, and one woman could not find a seat on the bus, so she purchased a ticket for an early-morning train herself.
Since the beginning of the year, all four Moscow airports have been completely shut down simultaneously at least 19 times, the Russian outlet Agentstvo reported. During the first 14 days of October, the restrictions lasted 101 hours and 38 minutes, compared with 46 hours and 33 minutes in September, according to the report.
While the U.S. military has a wide array of installations where it can test these systems, it’s still not enough. In addition to the massive increase in weapons development and the need for more realistic training, the changing nature of war is outstripping the capacity of existing facilities as future kill webs will extend thousands of miles, not hundreds. There are only so many places with enough space to try out these systems even to a limited degree without butting up against statutes and regulations while also avoiding interference with civilian air traffic and communications, all in an environment remote enough to avoid prying eyes. The need for more and bigger testing grounds is an issue TWZ has long raised.
In addition to the backdrop of the increase in a wide range of weapons testing, much of it aimed at China, Trump’s super range announcement was delivered as the Pentagon and services are specifically creating commands dedicated to autonomous weapons. On Tuesday, during the annual Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) conference in Washington, D.C., attended by TWZ, the acting Army Secretary unveiled one such new command, which we will discuss in greater detail later in this story.
“I’m pleased to inform you and announce that right here in Montana, the Department of War is going to establish a new ”super range” for testing advanced weapons and technologies, technologies including potential autonomous weapons, space, and electronic warfare technology, supersonics and hypersonics,” Trump said during a campaign rally in Kalispell. “Montana will help ensure the American military always reigns supreme.”
.@POTUS: "I'm pleased to inform you and announce that right here in Montana, the @DeptofWar is going to establish a new Super Range for testing advanced weapons and technologies, including potential autonomous weapons, space and electronic warfare technology, supersonics, and… pic.twitter.com/W4YqKfq8X4
Trump provided no additional details about where this new “super range” will be located, when it will come online, exactly which systems will be tested or how much it will cost.
Thursday morning, the office of U.S. Sen. Tim Sheehy noted that he has been “a strong advocate for building an advanced training range in Montana, securing $10 million for a feasibility study in the FY27 National Defense Authorization Act that passed the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year.”
“The 21st-century battlefield is being redefined by new weapons and evolving technical frontiers that require a novel approach to how America will resource its warfighting capabilities,” the senator said in a statement. “Contested spectrum, electronic warfare, hypersonics, space capabilities and enhanced targeting require a new class of testing and evaluation facilities for our military. The U.S. faces a clear choice: adapt and expand our development infrastructure to the realities of modern warfare, or risk falling behind adversaries who iterate faster.”
The Montana Republican highlighted the value of his state’s huge swaths of undeveloped land for this effort.
“By combining our state’s vast landscapes, innovative spirit, and proud tradition of military service, we are the Last Best Place to ensure America’s fighting men and women have the technological edge they need to dominate the battlefield and win the wars of tomorrow,” he explained.
Montana (Google Earth)
Like Trump, Sheehy offered no specifics about exactly where in Montana the “super range” will be located, when it will come online or how much it will cost. We have reached out to the White House, Sheehy and the Pentagon for more details. The Pentagon deferred us to the White House, which referred us back to the Pentagon. We also contacted the office of U.S. Sen. Steve Daines and Gov. Greg Gianforte.
There are already a number of facilities in Montana conducting the kind of military weapons testing described by Trump. One that closely matches what would be needed from such a location is the Montana Spaceport & Test Range and the affiliated Limestone Hills Innovation & Test Campus. A public-private aerospace and defense initiative, it already conducts testing for next-generation space vehicles, hypersonic, supersonic and ballistic weapons, drones and counter-drone systems and electronic warfare equipment.
Another potential site could be an expansion of the Big Sky Autonomous Systems Range (BSASR). Located near Bozeman, it is “the Lobo Institute’s primary training and testing facility for U.S. and allied military, federal, and partner organizations.” Operated under the Lobo Tactical division, BSASR is “a 6,000-acre, fully fenced complex purpose-built for advanced unmanned aerial systems operations, full-spectrum live fire, mounted and dismounted mobility, and full mission profile exercises grounded in the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures from active conflict zones,” according to the Lobo Institute. “The range pairs realistic terrain with the regulatory, infrastructure, and instructor depth required to train against the operational realities of today’s and tomorrow’s battlefields — and it does so in a remote, controlled environment where units can push hard while keeping risk to acceptable levels.”
Training at the Big Sky Autonomous Systems Range in Montana. (BSASR)
We have reached out to both facilities for more details.
The new super range could also leverage existing range space on the ground and in the air. There is also the large Hays Military Operations Area (MOA) which could be expanded for this new test range effort. MOAs are blocks of airspace designated for military training. Malmstrom Air Force Base and its ICBM fields could also potentially be utilized. Overall, it’s possible a number of existing range areas could be interconnected, both digitally and via airspace corridors, to create a larger complex, as well.
The Pentagon has long realized the need to increase the areas where it can test out these systems, especially to evaluate them under combat-like conditions.
“The current open-air range space should be increased and better integrated to support system-of-systems assessments of air, land, and sea combat systems with capability for emerging long-range fires, hypersonic missiles, EMS warfare, unmanned systems, nuclear effects, and directed energy (DE) weapons,” the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) stated in a report last year. “The DoW needs to invest in and coordinate expanding and connecting the airspace available to the open-air ranges enabling testing and training of advanced capabilities.”
DOT&E
The current facilities are inadequate, DOT&E further explained.
“Threat systems and our own capabilities far exceed the current available air space on the open-air ranges,” according to the report. “The ranges need support and assistance to coordinate additional airspace and corridors with the FAA and industry. Expanding and connecting range air space is necessary to facilitate testing and training critical long-range capabilities that our warfighters need and to replicate the threats they will face.”
In addition, the report states that “to test missiles with longer ranges and gather data to support simulation validation, including for hypersonic missiles, the DoW should invest in long-range, overland missile flight test corridors with land-based impact areas and mobile hypersonic-specific range instrumentation to produce the required lethality data against threat-representative targets for terminal area assessments.”
Rendering of an X-51A Waverider hypersonic weapon. Powered by a Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne SJY61 scramjet engine, it is designed to ride on its own shockwaves and accelerate to about Mach 6. (U.S. Air Force)
The Defense Department had largely been conducting the testing of hypersonic weapons — those that can reach speeds of Mach 5 and above — at sea given the need for the long ranges for evaluation. Still, even that was limited. The Pentagon restricted the number and location of hypersonic tests it carried out each year because of the aging fleet of ships it used as its primary data collection assets to track the capabilities while in flight.
Retired Block 20 and Block 30 RQ-4 Global Hawks belonging to the U.S. Air Force, reconfigured as RangeHawks under the SkyRange hypersonic weapon testing infrastructure program, would help address some of those restrictions. You can read more about that in our story here.
However, if testing moves to an overland phase, the need for expanded air corridors could grow increasingly critical. Last year, the Pentagon’s Test Resource Management Center (TRMC) identified three candidate locations to perform those tests, one over Alaska, another at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico and a third in Australia, Defense News reported at the time.
An interceptor launches from an Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) system operated by soldiers assigned to the 1st Battalion, 51st Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 7th Infantry Division (Multi-Domain Command Pacific), during a test at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, on July 28, 2026. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Michael Majors and White Sands Missile Range Public Affairs) Sgt. Michael Majors
The U.S. Air Force’s scramjet-powered Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) has finally reached the flight test phase, with at least one “release” having been carried out so far over a range in Australia. (Raytheon) Raytheon
The military is also looking to expand where it can test electronic warfare systems to help ease the bottleneck at White Sands and a few other locations. Such testing is limited due to U.S. restrictions on jamming, which can interfere with civilian systems.
Before he resigned after tensions with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, former Army Secretary Dan Driscoll in June said the service had plans to set up at least two domestic ranges that mimic realistic conditions on Ukraine’s battlefields, where the electromagnetic spectrum is a highly contested domain. This spectrum would be even more heavily disputed in a fight with China.
“You can have a kind of electronic warfare and all of the contested environment created, and you can have drone manufacturers and counter-drone tool-builders engaging together,” Driscoll told reporters. “Then, we also want soldiers to be able to go there, so that they can strengthen their skills and work hand-in-hand with developers.”
A drone swarm returns from a mission during the XVIII Airborne Corps’ Scarlet Dragon 26-3 at Fort Bragg, N.C., Sept. 15, 2026. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Iliana Lopez) Pfc. Iliana Lopez
Driscoll said there are already places in the U.S. where the Army can test safely, and separately, the service is looking at a global range outside the U.S. to do “much more aggressive testing,” including with hypersonics. When asked, Driscoll declined to say where these ranges would be until planning is farther along.
“At least some of the current counter-drone training for soldiers, like one CBS News saw in April, does not include electronic jamming — in part because the U.S. restricts jamming domestically,” CBS reported.
In August, the Army opened premier test ranges for the use of private industry to conduct internal research and development. Additionally, the service co-hosted a Denied, Disrupted, Intermittent and Limited testing environment, at Camp Grayling in September, and there are three more scheduled for Fiscal Year 2027, an Army spokesperson told us.
(U.S. Army)
Trump’s news about the “super range” was delivered as the Pentagon and the services are working to ramp up the development and production of a range of autonomous systems.
Last month, as we noted earlier in this story, the Pentagon announced plans for a new functional combatant command, very broadly akin to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) or U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM), but for operational activities involving autonomous and robotic capabilities. In addition, Hegseth also announced new initiatives to help further accelerate the fielding of uncrewed systems in the air, at sea, and on land, as well as to explore future warfighting challenges. All of this builds on previous and long-overdue efforts to prioritize the fielding of various tiers of drones, as well as artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies, across domains, but there are questions about how these new efforts will translate into tangible developments.
.@SECWAR “Today, at my direction—we are announcing the creation of Autonomous Warfare Command, or AutoWarCom:
A new 4-star combatant command—with service-like authorities—built to scale autonomous and robotic capabilities across the Joint Force in the fastest peacetime shift in… pic.twitter.com/kYWBxy6Dij
On Tuesday, acting Army Secretary Adam Telle announced the creation of the service’s Futures and Autonomous Systems Command (FASCOM).
“This is our way to make sure that we take all of the great work that’s been happening with the resources that we have today, and we centralize it,” Telle said. “We’re pushing autonomy down into our units, but when it comes to having and making sure that the left hand in the Army knows what the right hand of the Army is doing, this happens at FASCOM; then FASCOM feeds up into AutoWarCom.”
Telle added that FASCOM “will work with the other services to create scale for purchasing power and share best practices on autonomy.”
“It is too soon to speculate about anything related to FASCOM,” the Army told us. “Specifics on structure, command, mission, etc. will be announced at a future dates [and] will require the kind of additional testing facilities that a new Montana super range could provide.”
The use of highly cooperative autonomous weapons platforms that can swarm and operate collectively over large areas will also tax existing ranges beyond their capacity.
Details about the new range proposed by Trump are scant, and it remains to be seen whether it will live up to the hype or even be built. As we noted earlier in this piece, a feasibility study, which hasn’t even been funded yet, is still needed before major work can begin. However, if and when it does come online, a new Montana test range will be welcomed by a military in need of additional places to test out its latest capabilities.
Ukraine’s six-wheeled Frodo ground robot fired on targets during a demonstration in Kharkiv Oblast for the Pomsta (Revenge) Border Guard Brigade, a border guard detachment posted on Facebook. Frodo made its public debut only on 30 September.
Ukraine had contracted more than 22,000 ground robots for 2026 by July, mostly logistics carriers, with combat models the smallest group, the Defense Ministry said. Frodo’s first reported mission was an evacuation. The demo shows its armed version to a fighting brigade, the kind of robot Ukraine has ordered least.
What the armed version carries
The platform completed its tasks at a training ground in near-combat conditions, said the 3rd Border Guard Detachment named after Hero of Ukraine Colonel Yevhenii Pikus. The Buria turret mounted on Frodo can fire either a Mk 19 automatic grenade launcher or a Browning M2 heavy machine gun. It engaged targets at up to 1.3 km (0.8 mile), the detachment said.
Frodo ground robotic vehicle (UGV). Screenshot from a video by the 3rd Border Guard Unit
The 47-kg (104-lb) module has a ballistic calculator, stores up to 256 targets, aims in three seconds, and has a stated autonomous run time of up to 48 hours, the post said. Frodo is rated for up to 150 km (93 miles) on paved roads and 75–80 km (47–50 miles) over rough terrain, the post added. A Frontline Robotics Zoom reconnaissance drone flew reconnaissance during the test.
The developer, Frontline Robotics, describes its core philosophy as arriving fast, doing the job, and leaving very fast—hit and run, the detachment’s post said. Familiarizing the brigade’s soldiers with such systems aims first and foremost to preserve personnel’s lives and health, the detachment said.
A robot first reported as a medevac
Frontline Robotics told Militarnyi at the unveiling that Frodo had passed Defense Ministry codification and was built for logistics, evacuation, and strike missions. The robot reaches 40 km/h (25 mph) and carries up to 200 kg (441 lb) of payload, or 400 kg (882 lb) at most, the company said. A single soldier can swap its batteries.
The 92nd Assault Brigade used an early test unit to evacuate a wounded soldier, Frontline Robotics told Militarnyi. An operator, callsign Tango, named the robot’s speed and its ability to handle complex maneuvers as its main advantages, Militarnyi reported.
Mercedes-Benz chief executive Ola Källenius has warned that excluding British manufacturers from European industrial preference rules would damage automotive production on both sides of the Channel, increasing pressure on Brussels ahead of negotiations over its proposed Industrial Accelerator Act.
The head of Mercedes-Benz has warned that excluding British manufacturers from the European Union’s proposed industrial preference rules would damage the competitiveness of carmakers across Europe, challenging Brussels over legislation intended to protect European production from growing international competition.
Ola Källenius, chief executive of Mercedes-Benz and president of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), criticised the prospect of restricting British participation in the forthcoming “Made in Europe” framework during discussions in Brussels on Wednesday, 14 October.
His intervention comes as European governments negotiate the Industrial Accelerator Act, which would introduce European-content requirements affecting public procurement and certain forms of industrial support.
The proposed legislation is intended to strengthen manufacturing within the EU, but its treatment of production in neighbouring countries has become contentious, particularly in an automotive industry whose factories and suppliers operate across national borders.
European production extends beyond the EU
British manufacturing remains closely integrated with continental European automotive production despite the United Kingdom’s departure from the single market.
Components manufactured in Britain are incorporated into vehicles assembled in EU member states, while British factories depend on engines, batteries, electronics and other parts produced in continental Europe.
The value of this integrated manufacturing system depends on companies being able to source components across borders without unnecessary restrictions.
Källenius warned that excluding the UK from the proposed rules would weaken manufacturers operating on both sides of the Channel.
His position reflects industry concerns that a narrowly defined European-content regime could impose additional costs on companies already facing pressure from Chinese competition, slowing demand and substantial investment requirements.
As EU Today reported in September, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham has been pressing Brussels to recognise the UK as a trusted industrial partner under the emerging framework.
Germany has also supported a broader approach that would allow selected trading partners to qualify under European-content rules where reciprocal conditions are met.
France has favoured stronger preferences for production within the EU itself, reflecting differences among member states over how far European industrial policy should extend beyond the Union’s borders.
Its provisions address public procurement and industrial incentives affecting products including vehicles, steel, aluminium and clean technologies.
The Commission wants European public spending to support local industrial capacity rather than reinforce dependence on imports from major international competitors.
China has become the principal focus of those concerns because of its expanding manufacturing capacity, particularly in electric vehicles and batteries.
However, measures designed to counter Chinese industrial competition could also affect established trading partners whose manufacturers form part of European supply chains.
The United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey occupy different legal positions in their economic relations with the EU, but all maintain important industrial connections with member states.
An approach that treats their production as equivalent to imports from countries with substantially different market conditions could require European companies to reorganise existing supplier relationships.
For manufacturers, replacing a supplier may involve more than simply ordering components from another factory. Production standards, technical certification, logistics and long-term investment arrangements can make changes expensive and difficult.
Industry demands regulatory certainty
Following an ACEA board meeting on Wednesday, European manufacturers called for faster progress on the wider automotive legislative package.
In its 14 October statement, ACEA urged EU institutions to advance negotiations so that the package could be finalised early next year.
The association argues that manufacturers require a predictable regulatory framework to plan investments in electric vehicles, production facilities and new technologies.
Källenius linked the industry’s transition towards zero-emission mobility with the need to preserve employment and strengthen economic security.
European manufacturers are simultaneously investing heavily in electrification while competing against Chinese companies with established battery supply chains and significant production capacity.
The resulting financial pressures are particularly serious for manufacturers that must develop new vehicle platforms while maintaining existing factories and dealer networks.
Additional restrictions on component sourcing could complicate those decisions at a time when companies are seeking to reduce costs.
Britain refuses to follow EU tariffs automatically
The dispute has acquired a further dimension following remarks by British Business Secretary Jonathan Reynolds.
Speaking on Wednesday, Reynolds indicated that Britain would not automatically follow the European Union in imposing tariffs on Chinese vehicles.
The UK government maintains that trade measures must be determined according to British economic interests rather than adopted simply to align with Brussels.
That position complicates London’s attempt to secure favourable treatment under European industrial rules.
EU policymakers have argued that closer alignment on trade defences could support Britain’s claim to be treated as a trusted partner.
British ministers, however, must consider whether restrictions on Chinese imports would benefit domestic manufacturers and consumers.
The disagreement will form part of the broader economic relationship being discussed ahead of the next UK–EU summit, scheduled for 20 November.
The wider implications for EU–UK relations
The automotive dispute follows earlier negotiations over British participation in European defence procurement and other industrial programmes.
In both cases, London wants access to initiatives designed to strengthen European production while remaining outside the EU’s institutional framework.
Brussels must determine how far preferential treatment can extend to non-member countries without undermining the objectives of its industrial policy.
The Commission’s proposals have already revealed disagreements between governments favouring a tightly defined European manufacturing base and those seeking to preserve wider commercial partnerships.
Källenius’s intervention strengthens the argument that industrial protection cannot be considered separately from the supply chains on which European manufacturers depend.
The final legislation will influence investment decisions, procurement arrangements and the position of British suppliers within the continental automotive industry.
The outcome will also provide an indication of how far the EU is prepared to accommodate its closest trading partners as it attempts to strengthen European manufacturing against growing competition from China.
Rafael USA and Leonardo DRS have presented a capability that would allow fighting vehicles equipped with legacy Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missile launchers to fire Rafael’s Spike LR2 anti-armor missiles. The effort builds on a demonstration dating back to 2021, with the companies now presenting a more mature adapter solution designed to integrate the Israeli-made missile into existing platforms.
Roman Palaria, Rafael’s vice president for marketing and business development in its land and naval division, discussed the system in an interview with TWZ at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention. He explained that the earlier demonstration, part of Project Convergence 2021, used a version of the adapter that had not yet reached its final configuration. Leonardo DRS, Rafael’s U.S. partner, subsequently developed the mechanical and electrical components needed to connect the Spike LR2 to the TOW launcher and the vehicle’s existing systems.
The Rafael/Leonardo adaptor that allows TOW missile launchers to fire Rafael’s Spike LR2 anti-armor missiles. Howard Altman
The approach is intended to avoid replacing the launcher or radically overhauling the vehicle’s gunner station. Instead, the adapter provides the mechanical interface for loading the Spike LR2 missile and the electrical connections needed to communicate with the vehicle. Additional electronic components are installed within the vehicle to support the missile’s functions.
The adaptor configured for TOW (left) and Spike LR2 (right) missiles. Leonardo DRS
“We’re doing minimum changes to the vehicle,” Palaria said, describing the goal of making the integration as seamless as possible for the operator.
The Bradley infantry fighting vehicle is a prominent potential application, although the companies say the capability could extend to other platforms that use TOW launchers. The Army has operated TOW-equipped vehicles for decades, creating a substantial installed base of launch systems that could potentially benefit from the approach. As for the Bradley, the Army effort to replace its TOW missiles has been a long one, but is yet to produce any real results.
A U.S. Army M2A4 Bradley. The TOW launcher can be clearly seen on the side of the turret. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Austin Steinborn
Spike LR2 was successfully test-fired from M2A4 Bradley equipped with Multi-Purpose Missile Launcher (MPML), developed by Rafael and DRS. Adapters allow the system to remain compatible with existing TML/UTML launchers. Spike LR2 has also been proposed for the CCMS-H and XM30. pic.twitter.com/KB9EYwi6BI
After a missile is fired, its launch tube remains in the launcher and can be removed to accommodate another missile.
The central attraction of the system is the ability to combine existing launcher infrastructure with the Spike LR2’s unique engagement capabilities.
During Project Convergence 2021, two Spike missiles were fired from a TOW launcher, and both reportedly hit their intended targets. The adapter now being presented reflects subsequent development work by Leonardo DRS, including refinement of the mechanical interface and vehicle electrical integration.
An M2A3 Bradley uses its twin-tube, turret-mounted launcher to fire a BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missile. U.S. Army photo by Spc. Brandi Frizzell
The system is designed to preserve the vehicle’s existing TOW capability while adding the option to use Spike LR2. That would give commanders another missile option without necessarily requiring wholesale replacement of installed launcher equipment. The extent to which individual vehicles could use both missile types would depend on the completed integration and applicable qualification requirements.
Another view of the Rafael/Leonardo Spike LR2 adaptor. Howard Altman Howard Altman
The Spike LR2 offers capabilities that differ substantially from those of the legacy TOW missile. Palaria cited a maximum range of approximately 5.5 kilometers (3.4 miles) and highlighted the missile’s day/night imaging seeker, which provides video to the operator during flight. The longest-range TOW missile versions max out at around 4.5 kilometers (2.8 miles).
In contrast, Spike LR2’s imaging capability supports engagement of targets beyond the operator’s direct line of sight, as well as observation of the target area during the missile’s approach. Depending on the engagement, the operator can acquire a target through the missile’s seeker, adjust the engagement, or select a different target while the missile is in flight.
These features contrast with the traditional TOW’s semi-automatic command to line-of-sight (SACLOS) guidance, in which the gunner tracks the target through the launcher’s observation system and guides the missile throughout its flight. Spike LR2’s onboard imaging provides a different set of options for engagements in which direct observation is limited or target conditions change after launch. This can also include striking targets behind cover.
Palaria also described the LR2’s two warhead options. The first of these is a tandem-charge anti-tank warhead, which Rafael claims is able to penetrate any modern main battle tank. It consists of a precursor warhead and the main warhead, which are designed to penetrate the reactive armor, and the main armor, respectively.
The second option is a multi-purpose configuration. It has a programmable fuze, which allows the missile to be employed against different target types. Depending on the selected mode, the warhead can be configured for direct-impact or timed-detonation effects, for example, detonating above the ground for anti-personnel missions, or penetrating a building, in which case the first charge will make a hole in a wall, and then the second charge will go inside and explode after a short delay.
The adapter offers a potential route to adding new missile capabilities to existing Army vehicles while limiting changes to their launcher hardware and crew interface.
Operator training would obviously be necessary. Although the gunner would continue using the vehicle’s existing console and displays, Palaria acknowledged that Spike LR2 introduces additional functions, controls, and engagement procedures.
Slovenian soldiers engage targets with a Spike LR anti-tank missile during a live-fire exercise. U.S. Army photo by Visual Information Specialist Davide Dalla Massara/Released
For the Army, the proposition is straightforward: retain a familiar launcher architecture while potentially adding a missile with greater reach, onboard imaging, and more flexible engagement options that exceed line-of-sight tracking. The adapter’s significance lies in making that combination possible without starting from a clean sheet.
Whether that capability becomes a fielded upgrade will depend on the Army’s requirements, testing, integration decisions, and procurement plans. But the widespread uptake of the Spike series of missiles around the globe, combined with the very large existing TOW missile operator base, means the adapter solution could well be of interest to customers outside the U.S. Army, too.
For more than a year, U.S. Army forces in Europe have been experimenting with new counter-drone capabilities, as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures to go with them, under the umbrella of what is dubbed Project Flytrap. In doing so, the service has also been gaining valuable new insights into how uncrewed systems can help shape the battlefield for friendly forces. It is particularly interesting to hear how the Army envisions using uncrewed platforms to open up new avenues for deceiving opponents.
Army Col. Timothy Price, head of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, discussed the use of uncrewed platforms for deception and other operational concepts that have emerged in the course of Project Flytrap during a talk yesterday. Price’s remarks came at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention, at which TWZ is in attendance. 2nd Cavalry Regiment, based in Germany, is a brigade-sized mechanized formation equipped primarily with variants of the Stryker 8×8 light armored vehicle.
Stryker light armored vehicles assigned to 2nd Cavalry Regiment seen configured for a Project Flytrap event. US Army Sgt. Alejandro Carrasquel
Price, by way of introduction, described modern battlefields full of uncrewed platforms in the air and on the ground as presenting new twists on long-standing problem sets. More specifically, he started by describing the typical approach to getting past a minefield or similar obstacle using an established framework called SOSRA, which stands for Suppress, Obscure, Secure, Reduce, Assault.
“If we were going to breach a mined wire obstacle, the first step of SOSRA – suppress – would be the utilization of indirect fires, to get the enemy’s head down, and direct fire systems, so they would not maneuver on you, fix them in place, and you can make a decision about how you’re going to approach the problem,” the 2nd Cavalry Regiment commander explained. “The next step would be to obscure it. In the historical sense, obscurations used is [sic] smoke, to mask your movement to the point of breach, so the enemy doesn’t know what you’re doing. And then, of course, secure would be to establish frontside security, [and] allow your engineers to come up within this local security bubble. They’ll utilize some kind of line charge to open the breach, reduce it – that’s the ‘R’ – and then bring on a follow-on force of assault through.”
“We were brought up around the old traditional mined wire obstacles that we had to physically breach. This is no different,” he added. “It’s just a multi-domain environment. So it’s built up of a combination of electronic warfare, kinetic UAS [uncrewed aerial systems] threats, and then counter-UAS threats, and then the network that holds [that all] together that forms the obstacle, which a unit has to maneuver through in order to maintain the offensive.”
A briefing slide Col. Price showed at AUSA yesterday while talking about SOSRA on the modern ‘multi-domain’ battlefield. Jamie Hunter
Within this environment, Col. Price described the suppression step of SOSRA as having a different kind of probing dimension, particularly to feel out an enemy’s uncrewed capabilities, as well as those in the electromagnetic spectrum. He also noted that brigade-sized formations like this no longer necessarily have all the required tools organizationally to ‘service’ that aspect of the mission. This is in part because what has to be suppressed, including ground control stations for enemy drones, might now be miles behind the front line.
So, “what we have to do is allow the enemy to turn on their systems. How do I suppress them to allow division, or higher, to put an effect on them for suppression? It probably looks like flying small, attritable UAS [sic] into their security area” in the rear, he said. This, in turn, “cause[s] the enemy to do one of two things, either … go from passive to active with their EW [electronic warfare] systems, or to turn on radars to actually figure out what they’re seeing, which then forms the signature which higher headquarters can use to target.”
Though Col. Price did not describe it as such, there is already something of a deception aspect to this step in fooling enemy emitters to switch on and expose themselves. This, as a general tactic, is also hardly new. Stimulating air defenses, in particular, is a key part of operations to gather intelligence on those capabilities, as well as to suppress and destroy them. Once you have categorized and geolocated an emitter, it is a logical step to then target it. The ultimate goal, with data being passed along a more deeply networked kill chain, is for the time it takes for fires to be brought to bear to be almost instantaneous.
In 2020, then-Army Col. Scott Woodward, at the time commander of the 11th Cavalry Regiment, shared this annotated satellite image showing the electronic emissions signature of a battalion-sized element, underscoring how such signals exposed a unit to attack. US Army via X
Regardless, deception comes far more into play in the obscure step, according to the 2nd Cavalry Regiment commander.
“Obscuration is different, as well. So instead of trying to hide behind smoke as we maneuver through it, what is the deception plan, right? How am I trying to show the enemy a signature that says I’m going to breach over here when I’m actually going to breach here, right?” he asked rhetorically. “So, that’s probably the implementation of UGVs [uncrewed ground vehicles] with some kind of decoy emitter on top of them to pull the enemy’s eyes, resources, and time to a point that allows me to focus my assets and resources on the point of breach.”
The use of uncrewed platforms as decoys is also not new, and even more complex concepts have emerged within the U.S. military in the past. Uncrewed systems have also been developed for military and other purposes over the years that are designed to mimic something else entirely, including for purposes of deception. This includes masquerading as birds and other animals.
Back in 2019,TWZ was the first to report in detail on a Navy effort to develop and field an entire networked, cooperative electronic warfare ecosystem, at that time referred to as the Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature against Integrated Sensors, or NEMESIS. This was also a drone-heavy cross-domain concept intended to make many types of sensors over vast areas believe they were ‘seeing’ the same false fleets of aircraft and/or ships, and deceive and confuse the enemy on a grand scale. This, in turn, represented a massive leap in electronic warfare capabilities.
An unclassified 2014 briefing slide with details about NEMESIS. Note the inclusion of drone boats among other uncrewed platforms in the associated graphic. USN An unclassified 2014 briefing slide with details about NEMSIS. Note the inclusion of drone boats among other uncrewed platforms in the associated graphic. USN
There is also overlap here with reported sightings of what are now commonly called unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP), and that used to be called unidentified flying objects (UFO). As we have reported on repeatedly over the years, while some UAP sightings remain unexplained, many more have turned out to be drones. Adversaries have been using uncrewed capabilities for intelligence gathering and deception purposes against American interests at home and abroad, likely in part by exploiting UAP stigma for cover. We have talked in the past about how drones will be used in more and more exotic ways to confuse opponents.
I don’t know what this is, or if it’s legit BUT remember we are in a new age of misdirection, decoy and guile. Specifically using low end drone technology. There are more ways to stimulate an enemy air defense system, distract a populous, assess the flow of public info from a… https://t.co/wW7YVlbayB
“It’s also spectral camouflage. So how are we controlling our heat and thermal signatures on our vehicles and our people?” Price continued. “It’s basic soldier discipline issues. It’s how we use our radios. It’s where we’re talking, where we’re not. But that’s what obscuration looks like.”
A Soviet-designed 2S3 self-propelled howitzer as seen through a thermal camera, offering a good example of how heat signatures can put forces at risk. CI Systems
As a reminder, Project Flytrap’s primary focus has been on counter-drone capabilities, which come into play heavily during the secure stage.
“There’s multi-layered assets on top of that to allow that convergence for our success at the point of breach. I’m going to focus on our corner, our part of the battle, right?” he said. “So, I’m looking at active and passive electronic warfare systems – that can either, one, find [threats], let me know that I’ve got some kind of system flying or operating against me and, then, if it’s an active system, take some kind of effect to maybe cut a downlink and disrupt that system – all the way down to the individual soldier with a shotgun.”
As mentioned, the ‘obstacle’ to be ‘reduced’ at the end of this is not necessarily something as simple as a minefield surrounded by barbed wire anymore. Now it could be enemy one-way-attack drone capabilities preventing holding up an advance. Col. Price, in turn, described friendly kamikaze drones as part of the equation for breaching past those threats. Decoys and deception have a continued role to play in this phase.
“This is where, at the brigade level, we introduce one-way attack munitions to try to destroy the C2 [command and control] network that the enemy is using to operate this reconnaissance/strike complex” that is standing in the way, he explained. “There’s layers to it, right? Like they’ve got a close side to this that’s the local part of this reconnaissance/strike complex. They’ve probably got a theater level that the Corps [the U.S. Army’s command echelon above divisions] and higher is trying to target as we are forcing people to turn on systems to communicate. But at the regiment level, I’m looking at one-way attack munitions, focused on C2 nodes, headquarters, and ground control stations that [sic] I can disrupt their ability to put lethal effects on me as we begin to open the breach.”
A member of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment holds a small quadcopter drone in one hand and a simulated bomblet in the other during an exercise in 2025. US Army
During a question-and-answer session that followed his remarks, Col. Price was asked about whether lessons learned and other observations from Ukraine, and specifically that country’s recent Operation Vivaldi counteroffensive, had contributed to this evolving framework.
“In terms of Vivaldi, I’m not an expert, so I’m not going to make any kind of estimations on how that worked or why,” he said in response. “But I will say, if you look at the focus of that operation, you can probably make the assumption that there was convergence of efforts across the different headquarters to enable success. So that’s how I would relate to the two.”
“In order to be successful for a multi-domain breach, the tactical level requires my higher headquarters to be part of that solution to enable me with resources and capabilities that I don’t have in here at the brigade level,” he continued. “I would imagine it’s very similar in the other operational comparisons.”
Though certainly true, in broad strokes, this response in some ways underscores how the U.S. Army continues to lag behind global trends in the use of uncrewed systems, as now typified by the ongoing war in Ukraine. Army leaders have been open about this continued reality in the past, despite efforts to try to reverse it.
“We’re behind. I’ll just be candid. I think we know we’re behind,” Army Lt. Gen. Charles Costanza said during a panel discussion at AUSA last year, in response to a direct question at the panel from our Howard Altman. Costanza was talking about both the employment of drones and counter-drone capabilities, and highlighted work being done then under Project Flytrap, as you can read more about here.
Another 2nd Cavalry Regiment Stryker configured for the counter-drone role seen during a Project Flytrap exercise. US Army
For units like the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, new drone-centric concepts of operations are already taking shape. Beyond using them for surveillance and as one-way-attack munitions, there is also a clear focus emerging on employing expanding uncrewed capabilities to deceive opponents and prevent them from making the best use of their own resources.
General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) has offered the first official look at its proposal to replace the U.S. Army’s Bradley Fighting Vehicles, called the Wolf. The Wolf is one of two designs competing to become the Army’s future XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV). Just earlier today, we published a detailed update on the XM30 competition, including new information about both entrants and the Army’s testing plans, which you can find here.
GDLS is showing the one-eighth-scale model of Wolf, seen at the top of this story and made by a company called KiwiMill, at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention, at which TWZ is in attendance. Wolf is facing off head-to-head against a version of the Lynx from Germany’s Rheinmetall, supplied via the company’s U.S. subsidiary, American Rheinmetall.
It has already been established that Wolf is a further evolution of the GDLS’ Griffin III design, which was first shown publicly at AUSA back in 2018. Griffin III was derived from the ASCOD 2 infantry fighting vehicle, for which Spain was the launch customer, and which is now entering service in Latvia. The U.S. Army’s now-cancelled M10 Booker ‘light tank’ and the British Army’s much-troubled Ajax are also members of this broader family of armored vehicles.
A side-by-side comparison of the model of the Wolf, at left, and the Griffin III demonstrator, at right. GDLS/KiwiMill
The design of the Wolf, at least based on the model, is substantially different from the earlier Griffin III demonstrator.
Wolf’s turret has a broader, flatter, and overall more streamlined shape, which is in line with its remotely-operated design. There is just a single sensor turret on top, along with space for a forward-looking sensor suite to the left of the main 50mm cannon. What may be apertures for additional sensors or other systems are seen elsewhere along the front and sides of the turret. It also has more launchers for smoke grenades around the front edges compared to the Griffin III.
A focused look at the Wolf’s turret as seen on the one-eighth-scale model. GDLS/KiwiMill
Compared to the Griffin III, the Wolf’s hull has also been much revised, including the elimination of a traditional driver’s hatch in front of the turret ring. The vehicle’s commander (who also acts as the gunner) and driver sit side-by-side deeper inside the hull. Up to six passengers can ride in a compartment further at the rear. For comparison, the Bradley has a crew of three, as well as the ability to carry six passengers.
The Wolf’s hull also features side skirts that were not found on the Griffin III demonstrator. A different style of tracks is also depicted on the model. The picture of the model that GDLS shared shows sensors facing outward from a position on the side of the hull toward the front, as well. This makes sense, as the design features a distributed camera system to offer a full 360-degree view of the outside to personnel riding within, the broad benefits of which you can read more about here.
Another look at the hull of the Wolf, as seen on the model. Note the outward-facing sensors positioned toward the front, as well as the lack of any traditional driver’s hatch. GDLS/KiwiMill
“Because we have a reduced crew from the Bradley [which has a commander and gunner in turret] there has to be greater efficiency in how those soldiers execute their tasks,” Geoffrey Norman, GDLS’ director for U.S. Strategy & Growth, previously noted to TWZ. “The software and menu logic are very intuitive.”
Next-generation fire control, sensor, and networking/communications capabilities, as well as improved active and passive defenses, are key requirements for the XM30 program. Both Wolf and American Rheinmetall Lynx-based designs have built-in launchers for loitering munitions, with GDLS having chosen to integrate AeroVironment’s Switchblade 300 more specifically. What we have seen on the Wolf model so far does not appear to explicitly show this particular feature.
Wolf and Lynx both also feature hybrid-electric propulsion, which will bring various benefits, especially in terms of fuel economy and electrical power generation, compared to the diesel-engined Bradley. When it comes to the boost in on-board electrical power, “the emphasis from the Army has really been about having margin on the vehicle for future [system] requirements – directed energy, counter-UAS systems, or fill-in-the-blank,” GDLS’ Norman has also told us in the past.
A rendering of the Lynx-based XM30 design. American Rheinmetall
As it stands now, both GDLS and American Rheinmetall have delivered prototypes of their respective designs to the Army, with initial testing having been conducted at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. Soldier touchpoints and field evaluations are now set to occur at Fort Hood in Texas between February and March of next year. You can read in more detail about both entrants in the XM30 competition and what is known about their features in our past reporting here.
An actual Wolf prototype, seen under wraps, after being delivered to the US Army’s Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland around the end of August 2026. GDLS
In the meantime, we have now gotten clear views of both designs vying to become the Army’s XM30 replacement for the venerable Bradley.
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