Há uma injustiça fiscal que o país se tem habituado a tolerar. Duas pessoas com rendimentos semelhantes pagam impostos muito diferentes porque uma sempre viveu cá e outra chegou há pouco tempo.
O regime dos residentes não habituais trouxe investimento e receita. Mas também desigualdade. Em 2024, a despesa fiscal estimada atingiu 1.741 milhões de euros. E nunca houve uma avaliação global dos custos e benefícios. Um pequeno detalhe, tratando-se de milhares de milhões.
Na crise de habitação que vivemos, foi mais uma variável de pressão sobre os preços nos grandes centros urbanos. Não criou a crise, mas ajudou a agravá-la.
Entretanto, o contribuinte português paga IRS, IVA e contribuições sociais. E, quando o SNS não responde ou a escola pública falha, paga outra vez no privado. Depois abre o Instagram e descobre que Portugal é um paraíso: tudo barato, tudo maravilhoso, tudo excecional. Com rendimentos internacionais e impostos reduzidos, até dá vontade de concordar.
Mas a culpa não é de quem aproveita a lei. É de quem a fez. E esta medida tem muitos pais, muitas madrastas e demasiados órfãos de responsabilidade.
Por exemplo, o Bloco de Esquerda, a coletividade política mais representada na “vanguarda” da acampada, denunciou esta injustiça e propôs acabar com o regime. Mas, quando negociou os Orçamentos, outras prioridades prevaleceram. A injustiça era suficientemente grave para os discursos, não para ser condição indispensável dos acordos.
O regime foi revogado, mas os benefícios sobrevivem e outros lhes sucederam. Atrair talento e investimento é desejável. O que não é aceitável é transformar a exceção fiscal numa política permanente, enquanto quem cá vive e trabalha continua a suportar a regra. A competitividade fiscal não pode fazer-se à custa da justiça fiscal.
É tempo de rever os benefícios e aliviar quem trabalha e paga impostos em Portugal. Comecemos, no curto prazo, pela habitação, onde esta desigualdade também deixou marcas. Porque o país barato dos influenciadores é, para muitas famílias portuguesas, um país cada vez mais caro. E a justiça fiscal não pode continuar a ser um benefício reservado a alguns.
L’Iran non intende compiere nuovi passi verso un accordo con gli Stati Uniti finché Washington non avrà soddisfatto integralmente le sette condizioni poste da Teheran. A riferirlo è una fonte iraniana informata ad Al Mayadeen, che ha definito le richieste una «linea rossa» dalla quale la Repubblica Islamica non è disposta a retrocedere. Al centro della vicenda anche uno scambio di messaggi tra il vicepresidente statunitense JD Vance e Mohsen Rezaei, segretario del Consiglio supremo di sicurezza nazionale iraniano. La ricostruzione fornita dal presidente Donald Trump, secondo cui la comunicazione USA sarebbe stata una risposta a una richiesta iraniana di medicinali e attrezzature, viene respinta da Teheran come completamente falsa.
L'Iran nega inoltre che lo scambio rappresenti un segnale di cedimento o un progresso concreto nei negoziati. Secondo fonti iraniane, il ricorso alla corrispondenza diplomatica rifletterebbe piuttosto l'incapacità di Washington di raggiungere i propri obiettivi attraverso altri strumenti. L'ex ambasciatore iraniano in Libano, Mojtaba Amani, sostiene che Trump abbia bisogno di un'intesa per salvare la faccia in vista delle elezioni di metà mandato. La posizione iraniana è netta: le sette condizioni dovranno essere soddisfatte tutte contemporaneamente, senza applicazioni graduali. Fino ad allora, Teheran esclude sia la riapertura dello Stretto di Hormuz sia l'avvio di nuovi negoziati. Le richieste comprendono la cessazione delle operazioni militari e delle ostilità su tutti i fronti, incluso il Libano; lo sblocco degli asset iraniani congelati; la fine del blocco navale e petrolifero; la revoca delle sanzioni economiche e politiche; il ritiro delle forze navali e aeree statunitensi dalle aree vicine all'Iran; il risarcimento dei danni di guerra e la cessazione delle minacce e degli insulti rivolti a Teheran.
Particolarmente delicato resta il dossier nucleare. L'Iran accusa Washington di voler utilizzare la questione per privarlo della propria capacità di deterrenza e presentare il conflitto come un successo statunitense. Teheran teme inoltre che un eventuale trasferimento all'estero del materiale nucleare arricchito possa aprire la strada a una nuova aggressione anziché garantire la fine della guerra. Un messaggio è rivolto anche ai mediatori: l'Iran non accetterà che il loro ruolo si riduca a trasmettere le richieste statunitensi e a esercitare pressioni sulla Repubblica Islamica. La mediazione, sostiene Teheran, deve rispettare principi di imparzialità e non trasformarsi in uno strumento per imporre la volontà di Washington.
Infine, sul fronte regionale, l'Iran avverte che qualsiasi utilizzo delle basi statunitensi nei Paesi del Golfo per lanciare attacchi contro interessi iraniani provocherà una risposta proporzionata alla natura dell'aggressione. Una linea dura che segnala come Teheran non sembri intenzionata a concedere aperture unilaterali. La partita diplomatica resta aperta, ma la Repubblica Islamica vuole negoziare da una posizione di forza, senza accettare che la pressione militare ed economica statunitense determini i termini di un eventuale accordo.
LA NOTIZIA CHE HAI LETTO FA PARTE DE "Il MONDO IN 10 NOTIZIE" - LA NEWSLETTER CHE OGNI GIORNO ALLE 7.00 DEL MATTINO ARRIVA NELLE EMAIL DEI NOSTRI ABBONATI.
SCOPRI COME ABBONARTI A L'ANTIDIPLOMATICO E SOSTENERE LA NOSTRA LUNGA MARCIA
Mentre l’Unione Europea continua a presentarsi come protagonista della politica internazionale, la realtà diplomatica racconta una storia diversa. Il presidente finlandese Alexander Stubb e il primo ministro norvegese Jonas Gahr Støre hanno avuto un colloquio telefonico di un’ora e mezza con Vladimir Putin, senza il coinvolgimento di Kaja Kallas, l’Alta rappresentante dell’UE per la politica estera. Una conversazione inizialmente prevista per appena venti minuti, che i due leader scandinavi hanno definito franca e approfondita. Il dato politicamente più significativo è che a dialogare con il Cremlino non sia stata la rappresentante della diplomazia europea, bensì i leader di due Paesi che hanno scelto di muoversi in autonomia, senza parlare a nome dell’intera Unione.
L’episodio mette in luce le profonde contraddizioni della politica estera comunitaria. Da quattro anni, sottolinea il premier norvegese, l’UE non è riuscita a elaborare un messaggio comune né una strategia condivisa nei confronti della Russia. Una frammentazione che indebolisce la capacità negoziale europea proprio mentre si discute di come porre fine al conflitto in Ucraina. La stessa Kallas aveva ammesso in precedenza che Bruxelles non può svolgere pienamente il ruolo di mediatore tra Mosca e Kiev, dal momento che l’Occidente sostiene militarmente e politicamente l’Ucraina. Una constatazione che solleva interrogativi sulla sua capacità di rappresentare gli interessi diplomatici dell’Unione. Nel frattempo, la russofoba Kallas ha criticato le iniziative negoziali promosse dagli inviati statunitensi Steve Witkoff e Jared Kushner, senza però riuscire a conquistare un ruolo centrale nei successivi incontri diplomatici.
E anche qualora Bruxelles dovesse ottenere un posto al tavolo delle trattative, secondo la ricostruzione proposta dal testo, la delegazione potrebbe essere guidata da figure vicine alla presidente della Commissione Ursula von der Leyen, lasciando ancora una volta Kallas ai margini. Il problema, tuttavia, va oltre la singola figura politica. Le ambizioni di Bruxelles di assumere la guida del cosiddetto Occidente si scontrano con le divisioni interne, l’assenza di una linea condivisa e una strategia sempre più identificata con il confronto e la pressione su Mosca. Il risultato è un’Europa che proclama la propria centralità geopolitica, ma fatica a incidere sui processi diplomatici più importanti.
Mentre alcuni leader cercano canali diretti con il Cremlino, la diplomazia comunitaria rischia di restare spettatrice di decisioni che determineranno il futuro della sicurezza europea.
LA NOTIZIA CHE HAI LETTO FA PARTE DE "Il MONDO IN 10 NOTIZIE" - LA NEWSLETTER CHE OGNI GIORNO ALLE 7.00 DEL MATTINO ARRIVA NELLE EMAIL DEI NOSTRI ABBONATI.
SCOPRI COME ABBONARTI A L'ANTIDIPLOMATICO E SOSTENERE LA NOSTRA LUNGA MARCIA
The United States has privately warned Middle Eastern allies to prepare for renewed military operations against Iran following the 3 November congressional elections, according to diplomatic sources. Although President Donald Trump has not authorised further strikes, the warnings have heightened concerns about regional escalation, energy infrastructure and the consequences for European economies already facing rising fuel costs.
American officials have advised several governments in the Middle East to prepare for possible new military strikes against Iran after next week’s US midterm elections, raising the prospect of another escalation in a conflict that has already disrupted international energy markets.
According to an Associated Press investigation published on 29 October, two diplomats familiar with the warnings said US officials had urged regional allies to consider the possibility of Iranian retaliation against energy facilities and other critical infrastructure.
The diplomats emphasised that President Donald Trump had not made a final decision to resume military operations.
Nevertheless, Washington’s warnings suggest that preparations are being discussed for a potential campaign extending over several days.
Regional governments are concerned that retaliatory action by Iran or organisations aligned with Tehran could prolong the fighting beyond the duration initially envisaged by the United States.
The White House and American officials declined to comment on the reported communications.
Military Preparations and Political Timing
The warnings come as Trump approaches the final days of campaigning ahead of the 3 November elections.
The president has repeatedly suggested that further military action against Iran could follow the vote, although he has also claimed that the conflict may be approaching its conclusion.
During a campaign appearance in Texas, Trump said the war could end within weeks, while reiterating his insistence that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons.
The timing of possible military action remains uncertain.
The Pentagon has increased its regional military presence, including the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and additional amphibious forces.
Approximately 9,000 military personnel were associated with the deployment announced in September.
However, the movement of forces does not establish that an attack has been authorised or that particular targets have been selected.
American military preparations can also serve as deterrence, signalling and contingency planning.
The distinction is important because the political consequences of renewed strikes would depend on their scale, objectives and Iranian response.
Tehran Maintains That Diplomacy Remains Possible
Iran has indicated that it remains willing to pursue negotiations.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on 28 October that Tehran was continuing to consider diplomatic proposals and wanted elements of its earlier ceasefire initiative to form the basis for renewed discussions.
That proposal had previously been rejected by Washington.
The continuing disagreement concerns both the conditions for ending military operations and wider questions about Iran’s nuclear programme.
The United Arab Emirates has urged the parties to seek political solutions and avoid returning to large-scale fighting.
Regional governments face a particularly difficult position because they may be exposed to retaliation even when they are not directly involved in American military operations.
Energy facilities, airports, ports and other infrastructure could become targets during an escalation.
Such attacks would also affect civilian populations and commercial activity beyond the immediate combatants.
The Conflict Has Already Spread
The war involving Iran, the United States and Israel began in late February and has subsequently affected other parts of the Middle East.
Iran-aligned Houthi forces have carried out attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and airports, prompting retaliatory operations by a Saudi-led coalition against targets in Yemen.
These developments have complicated attempts to contain the conflict geographically.
The United States has not conducted a strike against Iran since early September, according to the reporting available on 29 October.
However, the absence of recent American attacks has not removed the risk of renewed operations.
Regional governments are therefore considering a range of possible developments, including limited strikes, a longer military campaign or retaliatory attacks preceding any American operation.
None of these scenarios should be treated as inevitable.
Europe Faces Another Energy Risk
For the European Union, a renewed confrontation would have implications extending well beyond diplomatic relations with Washington.
The Middle East remains a major source of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies.
The Strait of Hormuz is particularly important to international energy shipping, connecting producers in the Persian Gulf with markets in Europe and Asia.
An increase in attacks on shipping, production facilities or export terminals could place further pressure on global energy prices.
The consequences would not necessarily be confined to countries purchasing oil or gas directly from the region.
European consumers compete in internationally connected markets, meaning supply disruptions can influence prices even where import arrangements have been diversified.
The EU has substantially reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas since 2022, but growing reliance on liquefied natural gas creates exposure to fluctuations in international supply and demand.
A further Middle Eastern escalation could therefore complicate Europe’s efforts to rebuild gas reserves and contain industrial energy costs before winter.
Higher fuel prices would also affect transport, food production and household expenditure.
The Strategic Dilemma for European Governments
European governments must balance several interests.
They support efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, maintain relations with the United States and preserve stability in the Middle East.
At the same time, they have a direct economic interest in avoiding prolonged disruption to maritime trade and energy production.
A new American military campaign could revive debates concerning the legality, necessity and proportionality of military action, particularly if diplomatic alternatives remain available.
European governments may also face decisions about the protection of their nationals, regional diplomatic missions and commercial shipping.
The immediate significance of Washington’s warnings lies in the possibility of renewed hostilities, not in confirmation that such hostilities have been ordered.
With the American elections approaching, governments across the Middle East and Europe are preparing for developments that remain contingent on decisions in Washington and Tehran.
Whether the warnings lead to military action or renewed diplomacy will determine the next phase of a conflict whose economic effects are already being felt far beyond the region.
Photo: Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Kaylianna Genier / US Navy / Wikimedia Commons (Public Domain).
A temporary ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine has held for a third day around the occupied town of Oleshky, allowing preparations for food deliveries and civilian evacuations. The agreement, mediated with the involvement of US First Lady Melania Trump, represents a limited diplomatic development in a war where attempts to establish broader ceasefires have repeatedly failed.
Russia and Ukraine have maintained a localised ceasefire around Oleshky in the southern Kherson region, creating an opportunity to deliver humanitarian assistance to civilians who have spent months effectively isolated from regular supplies of food, medicine and drinking water.
Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets said on 29 October that neither side had reported violations of the agreement and that teams were continuing to clear mines from roads intended for humanitarian convoys.
According to Associated Press, the six-day arrangement began on 27 October and is expected to remain in force until 1 November.
The first substantial humanitarian delivery is scheduled for Friday, 30 October.
An estimated 1,700 to 2,000 civilians remain in Oleshky, many of them elderly residents whose health, mobility or personal circumstances have prevented them from leaving.
The town is situated on the Russian-occupied eastern bank of the Dnipro River, opposite Ukrainian-controlled Kherson.
Its geographical position has made it particularly vulnerable to the consequences of the fighting, while damaged infrastructure, mines and military restrictions have complicated access for humanitarian organisations.
Melania Trump’s Unusual Diplomatic Role
The agreement has attracted attention because of the involvement of US First Lady Melania Trump.
In a White House statement issued on 23 October, her office announced that she had worked with Russian and Ukrainian representatives to secure arrangements for a temporary cessation of military activity.
The statement described her as the intermediary in the negotiations, covering the timing of the ceasefire, humanitarian access, evacuation procedures and operational coordination.
Lubinets subsequently acknowledged her involvement and said communication with his Russian counterpart, Yana Lantratova, had helped maintain the arrangement.
The White House originally announced 29 October as the starting date, but Ukrainian officials later reported that the ceasefire had taken effect at 3am on 27 October.
By Thursday, both sides were describing the agreement as holding without recorded violations.
The participation of the American First Lady is an unusual feature of international humanitarian diplomacy, which is more commonly conducted through governments, international organisations or specialist humanitarian agencies.
However, the immediate significance of the agreement will be determined by whether assistance reaches residents and whether those wishing to leave can do so safely.
A Town Cut Off from Essential Supplies
Oleshky has experienced prolonged humanitarian difficulties under Russian occupation.
The town suffered extensive disruption following the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in June 2023, which caused severe flooding across communities along the Dnipro.
Subsequent fighting, damage to infrastructure and restrictions on movement further complicated access to essential goods.
According to Ukrainian officials, normal deliveries of food to the town have been effectively interrupted since late May 2026.
Residents have faced shortages of medicines and clean water, while the presence of mines has made movement beyond residential areas hazardous.
The remaining population is believed to consist largely of older people and residents requiring medical attention.
For these civilians, humanitarian access is not simply a matter of replenishing household supplies.
It may determine whether individuals can receive essential treatment, obtain prescription medicines or leave areas where normal medical and social services have ceased functioning.
The Evacuation Challenge
The ceasefire provides for humanitarian teams to assess residents’ needs and arrange transport for those who wish to leave.
The White House has indicated that residents should be able to choose their destination, including Ukrainian-controlled territory or Russia.
Ensuring that such decisions are genuinely voluntary is particularly important in occupied territory.
International humanitarian law provides protections for civilians under occupation, including restrictions concerning forcible transfers and deportations.
A credible evacuation process therefore requires clear information, freedom from coercion and practical arrangements allowing residents to travel safely.
The presence of journalists accompanying the mission may provide additional documentation, although media access does not replace independent humanitarian monitoring.
Russian and Ukrainian representatives have also been coordinating mine clearance along routes intended for humanitarian vehicles.
Until those routes are confirmed safe, the delivery of assistance and movement of civilians remain dependent on operational conditions.
A Ceasefire That Does Not Extend Beyond Oleshky
The agreement remains geographically limited.
Russian strikes continued elsewhere in Ukraine on 29 October, killing civilians in several cities, including Dnipro.
The continuing attacks demonstrate that the localised humanitarian arrangement does not represent a broader change in Russian military operations or the strategic direction of the war.
Nevertheless, the pause has also brought some relief to residents of nearby Ukrainian-controlled Kherson, where repeated attacks have disrupted daily life.
The absence of reported violations around Oleshky suggests that the two sides retain the ability to coordinate narrowly defined humanitarian measures when political and operational arrangements are in place.
That does not necessarily imply an increased willingness to compromise over territory or broader security questions.
What Happens After 1 November?
The agreement is scheduled to expire on 1 November, leaving only a limited period for delivering aid and facilitating departures.
Its effectiveness will depend on the quantities of assistance delivered, the number of residents reached and whether evacuation arrangements operate as intended.
It will also be necessary to establish what protection, if any, is available to civilians who remain after the ceasefire ends.
A successful operation could provide a model for similarly limited humanitarian arrangements elsewhere along the front.
However, extending such cooperation would require further political consent and practical security guarantees.
For Oleshky’s remaining residents, the immediate question is more urgent: whether several days without fighting can provide the assistance and safe passage that months of war have denied them.
Moscow has indicated that European governments will not participate in the next round of negotiations over the war in Ukraine, despite their central role in financing Kyiv, supplying military assistance and shaping the continent’s security arrangements. The Kremlin’s position raises questions about whether any agreement negotiated principally by Washington, Moscow and Kyiv could be implemented without substantial European involvement.
Russia has ruled out European participation in the next round of trilateral talks with Ukraine and the United States, while suggesting that the negotiations could be delayed by developments on the battlefield and the continuing conflict in the Middle East.
Yuri Ushakov, foreign policy adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, said on 29 October that Moscow had not agreed to a specific date for further consultations and that European representatives were not being considered for inclusion.
Ushakov maintained that preparations concerned representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the United States.
His remarks followed statements by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicating that the next round could take place in Abu Dhabi between 6 and 10 November.
The Kremlin has not confirmed those dates.
The disagreement comes as European governments seek a more substantial role in diplomatic efforts concerning a conflict whose eventual settlement would have direct consequences for their security, defence expenditure and relations with Russia.
Moscow Sets Its Conditions
Ushakov’s position was particularly explicit when discussing European participation.
Speaking to Russian media on 28 October, he suggested that European representatives were free to travel to the proposed venue but would not be invited to join the negotiations.
His remarks were subsequently reinforced by a statement that European involvement was not under consideration.
The Kremlin adviser also linked the timing of the next meeting to developments in the Middle East, where the US-Israeli conflict with Iran has complicated Washington’s diplomatic and military priorities.
Ushakov said that conditions on the Ukrainian battlefield would also influence when negotiations could resume.
These explanations give Moscow considerable latitude over the timetable while leaving uncertainty about the practical arrangements for the next meeting.
They do not, however, establish that Washington and Kyiv have accepted Russia’s preferred arrangements for every subsequent stage of negotiations.
Technical consultations between three parties and broader discussions over a European security settlement are not necessarily the same diplomatic process.
Europe Wants a Place at the Table
The Russian position contrasts with statements from the leaders of Britain, France and Germany, who have maintained that European governments must participate in discussions concerning Ukraine’s future security.
Their argument rests partly on the responsibilities that European countries would be expected to assume after any agreement.
European states have provided substantial financial, military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.
They have also introduced successive sanctions against Russia, expanded defence expenditure and debated arrangements for security guarantees intended to discourage renewed hostilities.
Any settlement that required changes to European sanctions, military deployments or financial assistance would therefore depend on decisions taken by European governments and institutions.
Neither Moscow nor Washington could independently commit the European Union to lifting sanctions or authorise European states to deploy forces.
This distinction limits the practical significance of excluding European officials from a negotiating session.
An agreement could be discussed without European participation, but implementing provisions that require European action would demand further negotiations.
The Donbas Question Remains Unresolved
The principal obstacle continues to concern territory and the conditions under which military operations would end.
Russia has maintained its demand that Ukraine relinquish territory in the eastern Donbas region, including areas remaining under Ukrainian control.
Kyiv has rejected the surrender of territory as a precondition for ending the war.
The proposed negotiations are consequently expected to concentrate on technical issues where limited agreements may be more achievable.
These include possible arrangements concerning energy infrastructure, maritime security, the exchange of prisoners and the return of Ukrainian children taken to Russia or Russian-controlled territory.
Such measures could produce humanitarian or economic benefits without resolving the central territorial dispute.
However, their implementation would require monitoring arrangements and sufficient confidence that the parties would honour their commitments.
It does not demonstrate that a broader political agreement is within reach.
The American Role
Washington remains the principal external mediator in the current negotiating format.
That position reflects American diplomatic influence and its capacity to engage directly with both Moscow and Kyiv.
However, the United States is simultaneously managing military commitments in the Middle East and domestic political pressures ahead of the 3 November congressional elections.
These competing priorities may affect the pace of diplomatic engagement.
For Russia, a negotiating framework centred on Washington offers the possibility of addressing wider bilateral issues alongside the conflict in Ukraine.
For Ukraine, American participation remains important because US decisions concerning military assistance and security commitments could influence the durability of any settlement.
Europe’s position is more complicated. Its governments possess substantial economic leverage, but their influence over the negotiating agenda depends on coordination with Washington and Kyiv.
Negotiating Without Europe Has Practical Limits
The immediate dispute concerns who participates in the next round of talks.
The longer-term question is which parties would be responsible for implementing a settlement.
A ceasefire might initially involve arrangements agreed by military and diplomatic representatives of Russia and Ukraine, supported by the United States.
A more comprehensive agreement could involve sanctions, reconstruction finance, security guarantees, troop deployments and Ukraine’s future relationship with European institutions.
Those issues cannot be settled on behalf of European governments without their consent.
Moscow’s attempt to restrict participation may therefore succeed at the level of an initial negotiating format while proving more difficult to sustain during discussions about implementation.
For the moment, neither the date nor the outcome of the proposed Abu Dhabi meeting is certain.
What has become clearer is the divergence between Russia’s preferred negotiating structure and Europe’s determination to influence the security arrangements that would follow the war.
O Governo aprovou hoje em Conselho de Ministros o decreto-lei que altera o Código do IRS para reduzir as taxas dos primeiros seis escalões sobre os rendimentos de 2026, de acordo com a autorização dada pelo parlamento ao executivo.
No final da reunião, o ministro da Presidência, António Leitão Amaro, lembrou que o desagravamento tem efeitos retroativos a janeiro e que irá refletir-se nas retenções na fonte de novembro.
A alteração ao Código do IRS é feita através de um decreto-lei, porque o executivo de Luís Montenegro (PSD/CDS-PP), quando apresentou ao parlamento a proposta de lei para descer as taxas do 1.º ao 6.º escalões entre 0,3 e 0,5 pontos percentuais, submeteu um pedido de autorização para ser o próprio Governo ajustar a legislação, em vez de haver uma alteração direta por lei.
Depois de obter essa autorização pela lei n.º 64-B/2026, de 22 de outubro, o executivo formalizou hoje esse passo.
A autorização legal permitiu ao executivo “alterar o n.º 1 do artigo 68.º do Código do IRS, reduzindo as taxas normais aplicáveis aos primeiros seis escalões de rendimento coletável para 12,20%, 15,20%, 20,70%, 23,60%, 30,60% e 34,60%, respetivamente, e procedendo ao correspondente ajustamento das taxas médias”.
Antes de o concretizar, o ministro de Estado e das Finanças, Joaquim Miranda Sarmento, assinou em 13 de outubro um despacho que ajusta as tabelas de retenção na fonte de novembro reduzindo o valor da cobrança do IRS desse mês em 50% para a generalidade dos salários e pensões.
O despacho prevê que o valor da retenção sobre os “rendimentos do trabalho dependente e de pensões pagos ou colocados à disposição entre 01 e 30 de novembro de 2026” é calculado normalmente, segundo as tabelas de IRS que se encontram em vigor desde o início do ano, mas aplicando-se nesse mês apenas 50% do valor.
O alívio procura traduzir, com efeitos retroativos ao início do ano, a descida das taxas de IRS nos primeiros seis escalões.
O mecanismo das retenções na fonte adapta a cobrança mensal ao alívio intercalar, concentrando o desagravamento num só mês, tanto no vencimento ou pensão mensal, quanto no subsídio de Natal, que é alvo de retenção na fonte de forma autónoma em relação ao salário ou à reforma.
Em dezembro, voltam a aplicar-se as tabelas normais – as que vigoram desde janeiro -, não se aplicando nessa altura o corte de 50% decidido para novembro.
O despacho prevê ainda que se excetuam do corte de 50% na retenção alguns salários e pensões mais altos, ficando de fora quem tem rendimentos que excedem o limite superior do penúltimo escalão das tabelas de retenção – valores acima de 20 mil euros mensais (no caso dos trabalhadores por conta de outrem) ou acima de cerca de 18 mil euros (no caso dos pensionistas).
As taxas de retenção não correspondem de forma direta às taxas dos escalões de rendimento, funcionando como um mecanismo de cobrança regular do imposto, para os contribuintes pagarem IRS de forma fracionada ao longo dos 12 meses.
O Estado fica com o valor do seu lado e, no momento do cálculo final do IRS sobre todos os rendimentos de 2026, o fisco faz o acerto de contas, ficando a saber-se se a pessoa recebe um reembolso, se ainda tem de entregar mais algum montante ao fisco ou se nada há a entregar ou a receber.
A taxa do 1.º escalão passa de 12,50% para 12,20%.
A do 2.º degrau desce de 15,70% para 15,20%.
A do 3.º baixa de 21,20% para 20,70%.
No 4.º degrau há um desagravamento de 24,10% para 23,60%.
A taxa da 5.ª fatia de rendimento passa de 31,10% para 30,60%.
No 6.º degrau, a taxa recua de 34,90% para 34,60%.
Nos degraus seguintes, as taxas mantêm-se iguais: 43,10% no 7.º, de 44,60% no 8.º e de 48,00% no 9.º.
While Saudi Arabia sits at the negotiating table as a mediator, it also features on conflict maps as a military ally, financier, and patron of regional power blocs.
Between these two roles lies a striking paradox in Saudi policy across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. By day, Riyadh calls on warring parties to cease fire; by night, it chooses its allies and backs them politically and militarily, leveraging its financial and security clout to reshape the balance of power in ways that serve its own interests.
From Port Sudan to Mogadishu, by way of Yemen and Eritrea, the question is no longer limited to whether Saudi Arabia can mediate between adversaries. It now extends to the kingdom’s position within the conflicts themselves, and then to its control over the balance of power around the Red Sea and its securing of ports and strategic corridors. Thus the image of the neutral mediator recedes in the face of the reality of a state seeking to build an axis of influence spanning both shores of the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia sponsored the Jeddah talks between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces in 2023, presenting itself as a party working to end the war and protect civilians. But its subsequent political stance showed a growing bias toward the army led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.
In January 2026, Reuters revealed negotiations over a $1.5 billion Pakistani arms deal for the Sudanese army, covering aircraft, drones and air defense systems, with a Saudi role in mediating it.
In April, the agency reported that Pakistan had suspended the deal after a Saudi objection and Riyadh’s withdrawal of its funding, according to security and diplomatic sources. On the same day, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received al-Burhan in Jeddah. Here the glaring paradox emerges: how can a mediator maintain an image of neutrality while being tied to a track of military support for one party to the conflict?
If Sudan reveals the overlap between mediation and partisanship, Yemen offers the clearest picture of Saudi military intervention. Since March 2015, Riyadh has led a military coalition, carried out air operations, and supported government forces and local armed groups, in addition to providing economic aid to the internationally recognized government.
Its presence has not been limited to confronting the Houthis. Saudi Arabia has become an influential party in the conflicts within the anti-Houthi camp, particularly as its dispute with the Southern Transitional Council has escalated. In early January 2026, Saudi aircraft struck Transitional Council positions in Hadramawt, while Riyadh-backed forces advanced to retake control of southern areas.
This came at a time when Saudi Arabia was calling on Yemeni parties to engage in dialogue, which reveals the duality of the tools in use: military pressure to alter the balance of control, followed by a political track to arrange the outcomes.
Riyadh’s relationship with the Yemeni Islah Party reveals a further paradox. The Carnegie Center documented Saudi Arabia’s reliance on forces linked to the party in confronting the Houthis, and its provision of military and financial support to them, despite Riyadh’s declared position toward the Muslim Brotherhood, to whose political current Islah belongs.
So in Yemen the picture is clear: Saudi Arabia does not appear to be an observer of the course of the war, but one of the forces that helped shape it, determine its allies, and influence its maps of control.
On the African shore of the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia has built close security ties with Eritrea that date back to the years of the war in Yemen, when Eritrean territory and ports were used within the coalition’s military arrangements. Political and security coordination between Riyadh and Asmara continued through 2025 and 2026, coinciding with rising tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia over access to the Red Sea. Regional analyses report that Saudi Arabia and Egypt lean toward supporting the Eritrean position against Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, while Addis Ababa views the rapprochement between Riyadh, Cairo and Asmara with concern.
The irony is that Saudi Arabia had sponsored the 2018 peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, before its own regional security relationships became part of the balancing calculations between the two sides. This reveals Riyadh’s shift from sponsoring reconciliation to building strategic partnerships with one of the two parties to the tension.
In Somalia, the Saudi presence took a more explicit course during 2026. After Riyadh announced its support for Somalia’s territorial integrity and its rejection of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Saudi Arabia and Mogadishu signed a military cooperation memorandum in February, alongside continued Saudi development and humanitarian assistance.
The agreement comes in a region witnessing escalating competition over ports and military influence, especially near Bab al-Mandab, where the interests of Gulf states, regional powers and international powers intersect. Regional studies read the Saudi-Somali rapprochement as part of Riyadh’s efforts to strengthen its security presence on the African shore of the Red Sea.
However, the military agreement in itself does not mean Saudi participation in Somalia’s internal war. Its political significance lies in adding Mogadishu to the network of Saudi security partnerships and strengthening Riyadh’s ability to influence the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.
Any reading of Saudi policy is incomplete without pausing at the historical controversy over the financing of extremist groups through Saudi donors and institutions. Diplomatic cables from the U.S. published by WikiLeaks in 2010 revealed Washington’s concerns about financial flows from Saudi donors to extremist groups. The UN Security Council also placed branches of the Al-Haramain Foundation on sanctions lists linked to al-Qaeda, while Saudi Arabia and the United States took part in measures targeting specific institutions and financiers.
In Syria, we should read the lawsuits brought by the families of the victims of the September 11 attacks with the same eyes. Judicial developments have allowed accusations concerning individuals linked to Saudi Arabia to continue to be heard. The importance of this file is that it keeps past Saudi policies and the financing networks tied to individuals and institutions under continuing scrutiny, even as Riyadh seeks to present itself as a partner in counterterrorism and regional stability.
It is true that Saudi Arabia’s tools differ from one arena to another, but a political thread runs through them all: one meant to secure allies capable of protecting Riyadh’s interests in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
In Sudan, there is political backing for the army and a role attributed to Saudi Arabia in arranging its armament. In Yemen, the intervention takes a direct military form. In Eritrea, the relationship rests on security partnership and regional alignment. As for Somalia, it represents an expansion of the Saudi military cooperation network.
None of these facts mean that Saudi Arabia is fighting five direct wars, but they undermine its portrayal as a neutral party in all of these conflicts. Mediation can coexist with interests, but it loses its claim to neutrality when the mediator becomes part of the balance of power it is trying to manage.
Here the mask of the neutral mediator falls, not because Riyadh has stopped hosting negotiations, but because in a number of arenas it has become an influential party in determining who negotiates, who holds power, and who keeps the territory. From Port Sudan to Mogadishu, Saudi Arabia appears less concerned with standing outside the conflicts and more engaged in shaping their outcomes. A mediator who takes part in making the balance of war cannot ask others to treat him as a mere referee between the disputants.
Thirty-seven United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) workers are being held captive by Iran-backed Houthi terrorists in Yemen, the agency's new executive director told Fox News Digital on Wednesday. Many have been detained for two years.
Luke J. Lindberg's remarks come as WFP workers face growing threats in some of the world's most dangerous conflict zones, where hundreds have died risking their lives to save others, he said.
"Right now in Yemen, we have 37 colleagues of ours who are currently detained," Lindberg said.
"These folks are out there to provide basic humanitarian services. They're not there to influence the political outcomes of a conflict. And so we need to protect them, and we need to get our detained colleagues released."
"All detainees are Yemeni nationals employed locally by the WFP, Lindberg clarified, before stating that some have been separated from their families for "nearly two years," he clarified.
"It's a really complex political environment," Lindberg continued before adding that there are no current Americans in that pool.
"They are all locally employed Yemenis," he clarified.
Just three days into his tenure, Lindberg raised the detentions with U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz, underscoring the urgency of securing the workers' release.
"Ambassador Waltz is aware, and the State Department team has done a great job of taking this seriously and also, it's a priority for them as it is for us to get these folks released."
"It's been almost two years," Lindberg said. "Away from their families. It breaks my heart."
The detentions come amid Yemen’s crippling civil war between the internationally recognized government and Iran-backed Houthis, which has devastated the economy and left millions dependent on humanitarian aid.
More than 18 million people face acute food insecurity, including more than two million children under age five suffering from acute malnutrition.
"Our team operates in the most impossible and challenging conditions you can imagine around the world," Lindberg said.
"People like me, we're not out in the field, literally handing food to people and literally cooking food for people so that they get the nourishment. It's the wonderful people, the people that choose to go out and do this work that are the real heroes of this equation."
Lindberg said the WFP must now balance reaching vulnerable populations with protecting employees from unacceptable risks.
"And so there are areas where we will go into, areas where you can't go into. Again, the goal is the end of the conflict and allow humanitarian resources to flow into those areas.
"And until that happens, there are areas where we do not operate so that our staff can remain protected and that they can do their job safely."
The dangers extend beyond Yemen, with Lindberg saying conflict drives roughly two-thirds of acute food insecurity worldwide, with an estimated 266 million people facing severe hunger.
"It means the most challenging levels of hunger we can imagine," Lindberg said.
The crisis has intensified pressure on humanitarian organizations to deliver food in some of the world's most dangerous and inaccessible regions.
"But the World Food Programme really has a great team operating in over 120 countries around the world, doing this hard work each and every day," he explained.
Among the most urgent crises, he said, are those in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, where conflict, displacement and climate-related disasters have pushed vulnerable communities toward famine.
Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has displaced millions and triggered famine conditions in parts of the country, with Lindberg saying Sudan will be his first field destination as executive director, reflecting the urgency of the crisis.
"Right now, we are approaching famine levels in three countries, predominantly in the Africa region, in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia," he said.
"And so those are flash points for me that are incredibly important for us to focus on, find the resources that should be available to help us meet those needs specifically."
Other humanitarian emergencies include Gaza, where fighting, damaged infrastructure, restricted access and funding shortages have complicated food deliveries, and Haiti, where gang violence has disrupted aid access.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, fighting involving armed groups has displaced millions, while the war in Ukraine has also disrupted agricultural production and global food supply chains.
But Lindberg said one of the most disturbing consequences of these conflicts is the rising death toll among humanitarian workers with hundreds killed worldwide in recent years.
"Unfortunately, in the past couple of years, we've lost over 700 humanitarians around the world in their active duty.
"To me, that's the worst possible outcome. It's really unacceptable. And so yes, many of our World Food Programme colleagues have unfortunately been caught up in those circumstances as well.
"It's my commitment to call each one of those family members should that happen, but it's primarily my goal to not let that happen anymore."
Lindberg's appointment comes as the WFP confronts major humanitarian emergencies and funding pressures, while also bringing the agency a direct connection to President Donald Trump.
A South Dakota native, Lindberg previously served as undersecretary of agriculture for trade and foreign agricultural affairs at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, overseeing international agricultural assistance programs, including the McGovern-Dole Food for Education and Food for Progress programs.
Lindberg succeeds Cindy McCain, who stepped down this year, with Deputy Executive Director Carl Skau serving in the interim. Since 1992, six executive directors were American.
U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres and Food and Agriculture Organization Director-General Qu Dongyu appointed Lindberg after consulting the WFP Executive Board.
Lindberg said Trump personally called to ask him to serve as the U.S. nominee for the position, a conversation he described as evidence of the president's commitment to humanitarian efforts.
"When I was nominated to lead the World Food Program by the United States, President Trump personally took the time to call me and offer me this opportunity," Lindberg said.
"And to me, that shows his heart for this work. He is somebody that believes in peace around the world. And for me to have the opportunity to speak with him about how the World Food Programme can.
"To play an important role alongside the U.S. in addressing these humanitarian needs was a special moment that I'll never forget."
That said, Lindberg is adamant that his new job at the World Food Programme comes with a clear mission: "show up no matter what."
Sudan’s expanding drone war is killing civilians far beyond the front lines, raising urgent questions about the foreign suppliers sustaining it. Among them is Turkey, whose weapons have strengthened the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) while advancing Ankara’s interests around the Red Sea. The relationship connects a devastating civil war to a wider contest for influence, commercial opportunities and strategic access.
The immediate concern is the scale of civilian harm. On October 23rd, UN human rights chief Volker Türk condemned an escalation in drone attacks that had killed at least 306 people and injured hundreds during the first three weeks of the month. Strikes attributed to both the SAF and its opponent, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), hit homes, markets, hospitals, displacement sites and essential infrastructure. Drones, Türk warned, already accounted for most conflict-related civilian deaths in Sudan this year.
The SAF’s operations demand particular scrutiny. Between October 6th and 10th, alleged SAF drone strikes on shelters for displaced people in Ghubeish and El Nuhud, West Kordofan, killed at least 25 civilians and injured 31, including women and children. These were places where people had sought protection after fleeing earlier fighting.
The danger extends beyond immediate casualties. A UN fact-finding mission reported in September that foreign-supplied drones and loitering munitions had expanded the SAF’s long-range strike capabilities. Both sides could increasingly attack distant civilian areas, while damage to electricity, water and healthcare compounded the consequences for survivors.
Turkey’s contribution is substantial. A March 2025 Washington Post investigation, drawing on documents, communications and flight records, reported that Baykar supplied the Sudanese army with at least $120 million in weapons during 2024, including eight Bayraktar TB2 drones and hundreds of warheads. Baykar personnel also travelled to Sudan to support the deliveries. The company is co-owned by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s son-in-law.
The transaction was therefore more than an equipment sale: technical assistance helped turn imported weapons into operational capability. The central question is what suppliers knew about the weapons’ use and whether continued assistance adequately addressed the risks to civilians.
Ankara’s interest in Sudan predates the war. During Erdoğan’s 2017 visit, Turkey agreed to restore Suakin, a former Ottoman port on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Sudan’s foreign minister also announced plans for a dock servicing civilian and military vessels. Agriculture and oil-exploration agreements followed in 2018, demonstrating that the relationship combined historical symbolism with economic and maritime ambitions.
Supporting army leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan offers Turkey a route to preserving those interests. Al-Monitor reported this year that Ankara was strengthening engagement with the SAF as battlefield gains created opportunities to consolidate its Red Sea position and deepen alignment with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This makes Sudan both a bilateral partner and part of a broader regional calculation.
Somalia illustrates the wider approach. Turkey’s extensive footprint there includes prominent construction projects, while its first overseas deep-sea oil-exploration mission began off Somalia in April. Taken together, these activities suggest a strategy linking security partnerships, commercial investment and long-term political influence across the Horn of Africa and adjoining waters.
For Sudanese civilians, however, strategic ambition offers little protection. The issue is not whether drones can strike precisely, but whether those using and supplying them respect civilian life. Türk has called for an end to arms transfers used in manifest disregard of humanitarian law. For Turkey, the test of its regional leadership is therefore also one of accountability: whether influence is measured only in access and contracts, or in restraints on the violence its partnerships enable.
Sen. Flávio Bolsonaro, who lost Brazil's presidential election to leftist incumbent Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on Sunday, declared himself the country's leader after arriving in Florida on Wednesday.
Bolsonaro fled his country after Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes ordered his passports to be seized less than a day after Lula won the election.
"I want to say, not only to my 60 million voters but to the Brazilian people, that I am the leader and that the criminals who stole Brazil’s election are part of a criminal organization that has established a tyranny," he said in an open letter posted on X.
According to Reuters, Bolsonaro initially declared himself "the elected president" in a since-deleted post. He then sent out an updated letter on X, which included calling himself the rightful "leader" of Brazil.
Bolsonaro, who lost the runoff election by a 3.58% margin, was served with an order to forfeit his passports and not to leave the country on Monday.
"I was ordered right on the street to hand over my passports, and I'm also prohibited from leaving the country," Bolsonaro said, according to a Fox News Digital translation of a video he posted to his social media channels Monday.
The order was signed by de Moraes, who Bolsonaro supporters accuse of being a staunch ally of Lula.
Bolsonaro landed at Opa Locka Executive Airport just north of Miami with his family Wednesday morning after President Donald Trump granted Bolsonaro and his family visas.
When asked Wednesday if he would approve of Bolsonaro coming to the U.S. following his defeat, Trump told reporters he would, adding, "I think they’re fine people."
"The election was very strange," Trump continued. "And I thought it was terrible. It’s gotten bad reviews. You look at what happened to their market."
Brazil's stock market plummeted Monday after Lula's victory. Its benchmark index, the Ibovespa, closed down nearly 14% on the first day of post-election trading. The Brazilian real also suffered one of its steepest drops in history, losing nearly 11% of its value relative to the U.S. dollar.
Trump also said, "I didn’t take sides, but it looked like another rigged election."
Brazilian news outlet MD+ reported that Brazilian Federal Police requested Bolsonaro's passport seizure order just seven minutes after Brazil's Superior Electoral Court confirmed Lula's victory.
Bolsonaro, the son of former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, initially said he would comply with the order, but ultimately chose to leave.
"I have never thought about leaving the country," Bolsonaro said in a social media video on Monday. "I will hand over my passports and defend myself against this travesty, which is a clear attempt to intimidate me."
But Bolsonaro ultimately crossed the border into Argentina, Argentina's National Directorate of Migrations confirmed, saying the Bolsonaro family entered the country "with valid travel documentation and without any legal impediment" Tuesday night. The family then crossed into Ecuador where they boarded a private plane for Florida, according to Time Magazine.
Lula called his decision to leave "a shameful act," recalling his own 2018 arrest for corruption.
Bolsonaro said the order came as a result of a social media post his brother Eduardo made in which he said Flávio should leave the country if he loses the election.
Flávio was under multiple criminal investigations for alleged money laundering, corruption and tax evasion, according to Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo.
According to Reuters, Bolsonaro denied fleeing Brazil, saying he left to protect himself and his family. He said he was avoiding a witch hunt being carried out by Lula and the Brazilian Supreme Court.
"I want to make this clear: I did not flee Brazil," Bolsonaro said. "I left Brazil, but I did not abandon the Brazilian people."
On Tuesday, Brazil's Supreme Court also ordered the Federal Police to open an investigation into alleged illegal foreign funding for Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign, specifically focusing on Rockbridge Network, a conservative donor group co-founded by U.S. Vice President JD Vance.
Flavio Bolsonaro, President Lula da Silva, President Trump and Vice President JD Vance's offices did not immediately respond to Fox News Digital for comment.
In its heyday, Route 66 was a road of opportunities and dreams. Today, it’s a highway of ghosts, a symbol of what once was, although it still attracts visitors. For Current Affairs, Jesse Wright reflects on America’s historic highway in a time of artificial intelligence, when so much land across the country is being bought up, repurposed, and turned into data centers. Wright, who traveled the road from Chicago to Santa Monica, asks: What will these massive centers leave behind?
But what is new, perhaps, is the utter absence of even having been at all. The data centers’ legacy will be nothing. Their absence will be complete. Computer hallucinations leave no room for the dreams of humans. In 100 years, there will be nothing. Nobody will want to spend their vacation touring endless rooms full of rusty server racks.
John Healey delivered a “scattergun” budget that did little to boost living standards and left Britain facing “a painful second half” of the parliament, a leading economic thinktank has warned.
The Resolution Foundation said on Thursday that measures to ease household gas and electricity costs would still leave energy bills higher this year than during the last energy shock.
Le Guardie Rivoluzionarie iraniane hanno annunciato di aver abbattuto un drone statunitense MQ-1 Advanced nello Stretto di Hormuz, precisando che si tratta del quattordicesimo velivolo di questo tipo a essere stato distrutto.
"Recentemente, un drone MQ-1 di ultima generazione è stato intercettato e distrutto nei cieli a est dello Stretto di Hormuz, al largo della costa meridionale di Sirik", ha dichiarato giovedì il Corpo delle Guardie della Rivoluzione Islamica (IRGC) in un comunicato.
Nella nota viene chiarito che l'operazione è stata condotta dal moderno sistema di difesa aerea della Forza aerospaziale delle Guardie Rivoluzionarie, il quale opera sotto il controllo della rete integrata di difesa aerea del Paese.
Fino a questo momento, il Corpo delle Guardie Rivoluzionarie iraniane ha abbattuto 14 droni statunitensi MQ-1 e altri 54 droni MQ-9. Le pesanti perdite di droni MQ-9 registrate durante il conflitto con l'Iran hanno infatti costretto gli Stati Uniti a rimettere in servizio il modello MQ-1, precedentemente ritirato.
Nel corso della guerra d'aggressione avviata da Stati Uniti e Israele contro l'Iran il 28 febbraio 2026, le forze armate iraniane sono riuscite a intercettare e abbattere numerosi aerei da combattimento, missili e velivoli non pilotati nemici, portando a 370 il totale dei velivoli avversari abbattuti.
Gli esperti sottolineano che i missili, i droni e i sistemi di intercettazione di fabbricazione nazionale sono stati determinanti nel permettere all'Iran di sviluppare una solida capacità di deterrenza nei confronti degli Stati Uniti e del regime israeliano. Da parte sua, Teheran ha confermato la propria prontezza a rispondere a qualsiasi ulteriore aggressione impiegando armamenti ancora più avanzati rispetto a quelli utilizzati durante i quaranta giorni di conflitto
Il segretario alla Guerra statunitense, Pete Hegseth, ha licenziato il principale stratega militare del Pentagono, come ha confermato mercoledì un funzionario della difesa.
Si tratta dell'ultimo di una lunga serie di licenziamenti di alto livello, che si verificano nel quadro di una profonda crisi interna al Dipartimento della Guerra degli Stati Uniti durante il conflitto contro l'Iran, mentre il presidente Donald Trump lancia nuove minacce di riprendere gli attacchi in una guerra giunta ormai al suo ottavo mese.
Il tenente generale dell'esercito Brett Sylvia è stato rimosso dal suo incarico di direttore della strategia, della pianificazione e delle politiche presso lo Stato Maggiore congiunto. Sylvia è il secondo generale ad essere sollevato da questo ruolo, noto negli ambienti militari come "J5", sotto la gestione Hegseth. Il suo predecessore, il tenente generale Joseph McGee, era stato costretto al pensionamento nell'ottobre del 2025 in seguito a forti pressioni del segretario, con il quale si era più volte scontrato sulle decisioni strategiche.
La decisione giunge in un momento di estrema tensione nei vertici militari americani. Soltanto lunedì, il segretario dell'esercito statunitense Dan Driscoll ha rassegnato le proprie dimissioni, decisione maturata proprio a causa delle divergenze insorte ai vertici in relazione alla gestione della guerra con l'Iran.
Il funzionario della difesa, che ha rilasciato le dichiarazioni a condizione di anonimato per trattare questioni riservate relative al personale, ha precisato che non è ancora stato individuato un sostituto immediato per Sylvia e che non è stata fornita alcuna motivazione ufficiale per il licenziamento, notizia anticipata dalla testata "The Atlantic".
Di norma, il direttore del J5 e il suo team sono responsabili dell'elaborazione e del coordinamento dei piani militari con il Capo di Stato Maggiore Congiunto, il generale Dan Caine, e con la Presidenza. Secondo le definizioni dello Stato Maggiore, si tratta di un ruolo squisitamente strategico incentrato sulla consulenza ai vertici relativi ai piani di impegno internazionale degli Stati Uniti.
L'uscita di Sylvia allunga la lista degli alti funzionari ed ufficiali del Pentagono estromessi durante il mandato di Hegseth. Tra le uscite eccellenti figura quella del Capo di Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, il generale Randy George, costretto al pensionamento ad aprile, all'indomani dell'annuncio di Trump di voler intensificare il conflitto con Teheran. Nel corso della sua gestione, Hegseth ha rimosso oltre venti alti ufficiali, ha spinto alle dimissioni un segretario della Marina e ha condotto dirette ingerenze nei processi di promozione in tutti i rami delle forze armate.
Secondo quanto riportato dalla testata Axios, gli Stati Uniti e Israele potrebbero riprendere i bombardamenti contro l'Iran poco dopo le elezioni di metà mandato statunitensi, qualora non si dovesse raggiungere un accordo dell'ultimo minuto. Funzionari statunitensi e israeliani hanno dichiarato alla testata che l'operazione comporterebbe una settimana di attacchi massicci rivolti contro la leadership iraniana, oltre che contro siti energetici, nucleari e infrastrutturali.
Lunedì, il capo di Stato Maggiore delle Forze di Difesa Israeliane, Eyal Zamir, ha avuto un colloquio con il comandante del Comando Centrale degli Stati Uniti (CENTCOM), Brad Cooper, per coordinare in anticipo le possibili incursioni. Nel frattempo, tre fonti hanno riferito al media che i mediatori regionali, guidati dal Qatar, stanno tentando di favorire una soluzione diplomatica per riavviare i negoziati tra Washington e Teheran ed evitare una ripresa delle ostilità dopo le consultazioni elettorali americane.
A questo scopo, la diplomazia del Qatar si sta adoperando per convincere l'Iran a consentire agli ispettori delle Nazioni Unite l'accesso ai propri impianti nucleari coliti dai raid, proponendo in cambio un allentamento di alcune delle sanzioni economiche imposte dagli Stati Uniti.
Mais de 55% dos portugueses não fazem poupanças para a reforma, de acordo com o primeiro estudo apresentado pelo novo Observatório da Poupança para a Reforma, da ASF.
Brussels is considering unprecedented restrictions on the rights of future EU members, including the possible suspension of voting rights for serious breaches of European values. France and the Netherlands favour stronger safeguards, while Italy and Austria warn that excessive conditions could undermine enlargement.
European Union governments have begun negotiations over proposals that would allow Brussels to impose additional restrictions on future member states, exposing divisions over how to prevent democratic backsliding without discouraging countries seeking accession.
The discussions, held among EU ambassadors on 28 October, concern draft safeguards proposed by the European Commission for inclusion in future accession treaties.
Montenegro, currently the most advanced candidate in the Western Balkans, is expected to become the first country subject to the proposed arrangements.
The measures would potentially allow the EU to suspend certain membership rights, including voting rights, during a transitional period lasting up to 15 years after accession.
However, the negotiations have revealed disagreement not only over the duration of the safeguards but also over the powers that should be granted to the Commission and the legal thresholds for intervention.
The controversy raises a broader question about the nature of EU membership: whether countries that have completed accession negotiations should immediately enjoy the same institutional rights as existing members.
France and the Netherlands seek stronger guarantees
According to Euronews’ reporting on the ambassadors’ discussions, France and the Netherlands have pressed for stronger guarantees that newly admitted states will continue respecting the rule of law and other EU obligations.
Their position reflects concern that the Union’s existing procedures have proved difficult to enforce against governments accused of undermining judicial independence or democratic institutions.
Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union already provides for sanctions, including suspension of certain membership rights, where a serious breach of European values is established.
However, the procedure involves demanding political and voting requirements.
The Commission’s proposed safeguards are intended to provide an additional instrument specifically applicable to newly admitted members.
They would operate during a defined period after accession and could be activated in response to serious breaches of EU values or the principle of sincere cooperation.
For governments supporting the proposal, the objective is to ensure that reforms undertaken during accession negotiations remain effective after membership has been secured.
Italy and Austria warn against excessive restrictions
Not all member states share this approach.
Italy and Austria, among countries supporting faster integration of the Western Balkans, have warned against imposing conditions that could make EU membership appear provisional or unequal.
Their concern is that candidate countries may face an increasingly complicated accession process even after meeting the formal requirements.
The credibility of EU enlargement depends partly on the proposition that successful reforms will eventually lead to full membership.
If new members are subjected to extensive additional restrictions, political leaders in candidate countries could find it more difficult to justify the domestic compromises required by accession negotiations.
The debate is particularly sensitive in the Western Balkans, where prolonged delays have already generated frustration over the pace of integration.
The challenge for Brussels is to strengthen safeguards without creating a permanent distinction between established and newly admitted members.
A proposed 15-year period
The Commission’s draft institutional safeguard would remain available for 15 years following accession.
This period is intended to permit intervention if a new member reverses reforms after joining the Union.
Yet ambassadors have questioned whether such an extended period can reasonably be described as temporary.
The proposed decision-making mechanism has also attracted criticism.
Under the draft, the Commission could propose restrictive measures that would take effect unless a qualified majority of member states rejected or amended them within two weeks.
This would reverse the usual political dynamic by requiring governments to assemble a blocking majority rather than actively secure support for sanctions.
The proposal could therefore make intervention easier than under the existing Article 7 mechanism.
Critics are concerned that the arrangement would give the Commission excessive influence over the institutional rights of newly admitted countries.
Supporters argue that a more effective enforcement mechanism is necessary precisely because existing procedures have proved difficult to use.
Monitoring could begin before accession
The proposed safeguards are not confined to the period following membership.
The Commission also wants stronger monitoring between the signing of an accession treaty and the date on which a country formally joins.
This period can last several years, during which a candidate government may change and reform commitments may weaken.
Under the draft arrangements, monitoring could include regular assessments, reviews involving existing member states and formal warnings.
As a last resort, accession could be postponed if there were clear evidence that a candidate would not meet the required conditions.
The voting procedure for such a postponement remains unresolved.
These provisions would add another stage of oversight to an accession process that already requires extensive negotiations and the implementation of EU legislation.
Montenegro faces a new uncertainty
Montenegro began accession negotiations in June 2012.
Its progress has made the country a leading candidate for the next round of enlargement.
However, its accession treaty may now become the vehicle through which the EU establishes a new framework for future entrants.
The implications extend beyond Montenegro.
Albania, Moldova and Ukraine are also pursuing accession, although they are at different stages of the process.
Any safeguards introduced for Montenegro could influence the terms eventually offered to those countries.
Enlargement becomes a test of EU governance
The Commission’s proposals reflect a wider debate over whether the EU’s institutions can function effectively with substantially more members.
New entrants would participate in decisions concerning the budget, sanctions, foreign policy and the internal market.
Their admission could also affect areas where unanimity remains necessary, potentially increasing the risk of institutional deadlock.
The European Parliament’s research service has identified the proposed safeguards as part of a broader programme addressing decision-making and governance ahead of enlargement.
Negotiations over the draft clauses will continue at the technical level, with ambassadors expected to revisit the matter in November.
The central disagreement remains unresolved.
The EU wants future members to maintain democratic and legal standards, but it must also decide whether those guarantees can be enforced without creating a separate class of membership.
Montenegro’s accession negotiations will provide the first practical test of that approach.
Survivors tell rights group that serving officers who worked as guards administered electric shocks and beatings
Cambodian police and military officers worked as private security guards in scam compounds where thousands were forced to work in the online fraud industry, according to a report by Amnesty International.
The global rights group alleged they worked for security companies as part of a system that enabled slavery and rape in the compounds, with some guards using electric batons to keep people trapped.
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