Pentagon officials have in recent weeks asked several NATO countries to tone down their rhetoric regarding the threat posed by Russia, arguing that some statements by European leaders and officials have undermined continental security, four people familiar with the matter said.

Among the nations that have received messages urging them to keep public statements in check are Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, said the people, who spoke on condition of anonymity. It was not clear if the messages, which were delivered in bilateral meetings, were conveyed to other European governments.

The US requests come as the Trump administration restarts an effort to press for a negotiated end to the full-scale war in Ukraine, now well into its fifth year. The latest push has blended incentives for Russia – including sanctions relief – with pressure on Ukraine to halt its attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.

Asked for comment, a Pentagon official said: “Private conversations among allies are just that, so we will not comment on these allegations.”

Among the comments that have drawn US officials’ attention are suggestions by European leaders that Russia is cornered and resorting to increasingly desperate measures as its invasion of Ukraine slows to a crawl, one of the people said.

Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby, a key figure in an ongoing review of US troop levels in Europe, was one of the US officials delivering the message, the people said. Reuters could not determine what other officials were involved.

None of the people, who include three European officials and a US official, suggested the advice was communicated in a confrontational manner.

US urges allies not to provoke Moscow

The US messages reflect a debate within NATO regarding how to publicly address the threat of an increasingly assertive Russia.

Some Western officials have argued that emphasizing the threat posed by Moscow could play into the hands of the Kremlin, which they say seeks to sow fear and undermine support for Ukraine.

Others argue European governments must be transparent to show their electorates that sacrifice and resources are needed to keep Moscow at bay. That is especially true as Russia appears to accelerate a covert campaign of sabotage throughout the continent.

Russia has denied that it is pursuing such a campaign.

Baltic states face pressure over public warnings

One of the people familiar told Reuters that Colby told a Baltic official recently that there should be no “poking” directed at the Russians.

The person said Colby pointed to Europeans publicly suggesting that Russia was “cornered like a rat” as an example of unhelpful rhetoric.

It was not clear what specific statement Colby was referring to. However, Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal referred to Putin as a “rat in a corner” in late September, suggesting the Russian leader was resorting to sabotage efforts in Europe as Russia had become increasingly bogged down in Ukraine.

“We are helping you. The Americans are there,” said a separate European official, describing the Pentagon’s recent private messaging. “Just don’t be loud. Don’t make noise.”

In a separate recent meeting, the Pentagon urged an Estonian delegation to be “measured” in its communications, according to a person briefed on the encounter, though the person did not say Pentagon officials complained about any specific statement.

The defense ministries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia did not respond to requests for comment, while NATO declined to comment.

Russian sabotage fears divide NATO allies

One of the European officials said that the Pentagon’s advice, while cordial, was baffling, given that intelligence services in the Baltic states have in recent months consistently played down the probability of Russia testing NATO’s mutual defense provisions.

Other NATO intelligence services, by contrast, have publicly warned that Russia could dramatically ramp up its sabotage campaign in the near future.

The Pentagon messages to NATO officials come at a fraught time for European security.

Moscow has recently intensified its campaign of deniable attacks on NATO countries, Western intelligence officials have said.

On Wednesday, German prosecutors said two Belarusians were arrested for allegedly planning to set ​fire to a building or critical infrastructure facility ⁠in the Nuremberg area. In September, the German government blamed Russia for an attempted drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport, allegations Moscow has denied.

At the same time, US officials have been discussing potential business deals with Russia as part of the Trump administration’s push for peace in Ukraine. Those efforts have drawn mixed reactions from European officials, many of whom are pushing for the Kremlin’s continued economic isolation.

US reviews military presence in Europe

Pentagon planners, meanwhile, are reviewing Washington’s force posture in Europe, a process that could see a sharp drawdown in America’s troop presence on the continent.

US officials have said European NATO members need to assume more responsibility for their own defense, particularly as the US focuses on threats in the Middle East, Latin America and East Asia.

Santiago de Chile, 30 oct (Prensa Latina) El Campeonato Nacional de Fútbol de primera división de Chile arranca hoy su etapa decisiva, cuando faltan cinco jornadas para el cierre y el líder Colo Colo carece aún de la ventaja necesaria que le otorgaría la corona.

The post Torneo de fútbol de Chile entra a su fase decisiva first appeared on Noticias Prensa Latina.

Moscow has indicated that European governments will not participate in the next round of negotiations over the war in Ukraine, despite their central role in financing Kyiv, supplying military assistance and shaping the continent’s security arrangements. The Kremlin’s position raises questions about whether any agreement negotiated principally by Washington, Moscow and Kyiv could be implemented without substantial European involvement.

Russia has ruled out European participation in the next round of trilateral talks with Ukraine and the United States, while suggesting that the negotiations could be delayed by developments on the battlefield and the continuing conflict in the Middle East.

Yuri Ushakov, foreign policy adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, said on 29 October that Moscow had not agreed to a specific date for further consultations and that European representatives were not being considered for inclusion.

Ushakov maintained that preparations concerned representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the United States.

His remarks followed statements by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicating that the next round could take place in Abu Dhabi between 6 and 10 November.

The Kremlin has not confirmed those dates.

The disagreement comes as European governments seek a more substantial role in diplomatic efforts concerning a conflict whose eventual settlement would have direct consequences for their security, defence expenditure and relations with Russia.

Moscow Sets Its Conditions

Ushakov’s position was particularly explicit when discussing European participation.

Speaking to Russian media on 28 October, he suggested that European representatives were free to travel to the proposed venue but would not be invited to join the negotiations.

His remarks were subsequently reinforced by a statement that European involvement was not under consideration.

The Kremlin adviser also linked the timing of the next meeting to developments in the Middle East, where the US-Israeli conflict with Iran has complicated Washington’s diplomatic and military priorities.

Ushakov said that conditions on the Ukrainian battlefield would also influence when negotiations could resume.

These explanations give Moscow considerable latitude over the timetable while leaving uncertainty about the practical arrangements for the next meeting.

They do not, however, establish that Washington and Kyiv have accepted Russia’s preferred arrangements for every subsequent stage of negotiations.

Technical consultations between three parties and broader discussions over a European security settlement are not necessarily the same diplomatic process.

Europe Wants a Place at the Table

The Russian position contrasts with statements from the leaders of Britain, France and Germany, who have maintained that European governments must participate in discussions concerning Ukraine’s future security.

Their argument rests partly on the responsibilities that European countries would be expected to assume after any agreement.

European states have provided substantial financial, military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

They have also introduced successive sanctions against Russia, expanded defence expenditure and debated arrangements for security guarantees intended to discourage renewed hostilities.

Any settlement that required changes to European sanctions, military deployments or financial assistance would therefore depend on decisions taken by European governments and institutions.

Neither Moscow nor Washington could independently commit the European Union to lifting sanctions or authorise European states to deploy forces.

This distinction limits the practical significance of excluding European officials from a negotiating session.

An agreement could be discussed without European participation, but implementing provisions that require European action would demand further negotiations.

The Donbas Question Remains Unresolved

The principal obstacle continues to concern territory and the conditions under which military operations would end.

Russia has maintained its demand that Ukraine relinquish territory in the eastern Donbas region, including areas remaining under Ukrainian control.

Kyiv has rejected the surrender of territory as a precondition for ending the war.

The proposed negotiations are consequently expected to concentrate on technical issues where limited agreements may be more achievable.

These include possible arrangements concerning energy infrastructure, maritime security, the exchange of prisoners and the return of Ukrainian children taken to Russia or Russian-controlled territory.

Such measures could produce humanitarian or economic benefits without resolving the central territorial dispute.

However, their implementation would require monitoring arrangements and sufficient confidence that the parties would honour their commitments.

The temporary humanitarian ceasefire around Oleshky, in the Kherson region, offers a narrowly defined example of cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian representatives.

It does not demonstrate that a broader political agreement is within reach.

The American Role

Washington remains the principal external mediator in the current negotiating format.

That position reflects American diplomatic influence and its capacity to engage directly with both Moscow and Kyiv.

However, the United States is simultaneously managing military commitments in the Middle East and domestic political pressures ahead of the 3 November congressional elections.

These competing priorities may affect the pace of diplomatic engagement.

For Russia, a negotiating framework centred on Washington offers the possibility of addressing wider bilateral issues alongside the conflict in Ukraine.

For Ukraine, American participation remains important because US decisions concerning military assistance and security commitments could influence the durability of any settlement.

Europe’s position is more complicated. Its governments possess substantial economic leverage, but their influence over the negotiating agenda depends on coordination with Washington and Kyiv.

Negotiating Without Europe Has Practical Limits

The immediate dispute concerns who participates in the next round of talks.

The longer-term question is which parties would be responsible for implementing a settlement.

A ceasefire might initially involve arrangements agreed by military and diplomatic representatives of Russia and Ukraine, supported by the United States.

A more comprehensive agreement could involve sanctions, reconstruction finance, security guarantees, troop deployments and Ukraine’s future relationship with European institutions.

Those issues cannot be settled on behalf of European governments without their consent.

Moscow’s attempt to restrict participation may therefore succeed at the level of an initial negotiating format while proving more difficult to sustain during discussions about implementation.

For the moment, neither the date nor the outcome of the proposed Abu Dhabi meeting is certain.

What has become clearer is the divergence between Russia’s preferred negotiating structure and Europe’s determination to influence the security arrangements that would follow the war.

VTM

Cerca de 60 expositores e feirantes participaram na segunda edição da Feira Berço D’Ouro, em Santa Marta de Penaguião. Os dados são da autarquia e apenas das inscrições a dois dias da iniciativa.

Entre os participantes esteve António Gonçalves, agricultor da região, que levou cebolas, nabiças e feijão, produtos cultivados na sua própria horta. Foi a primeira vez que participou numa feira deste género e a expectativa era conseguir algum rendimento adicional. “Aproveitamos para ganhar aqui mais alguma coisinha”, explicou à VTM, num contexto em que, segundo referiu, a venda das uvas também não tem compensado como desejava.

Amélia Prior, residente no concelho, apresentou produtos caseiros, como marmelada e bolos, enquanto a sua prima disponibilizou roupa em segunda mão e trabalhos de Natal. Para a participante, a feira é uma oportunidade para quem produz em pequena escala e para os consumidores que procuram preços mais acessíveis. “É bom para todos, para o concelho e para nós, que fazemos as coisas”, considerou, defendendo a continuidade da iniciativa.

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The post Feira Berço D’Ouro reuniu cerca de 60 expositores appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

Three maritime drones struck a container ship sailing in the Black Sea off the coast of Bulgaria on Wednesday, the country's defense minister said, the latest in a string of such incidents on NATO's eastern flank

The post Drone Attack Hits Container Ship Off Bulgaria’s Black Sea Coast appeared first on Breitbart.

Confronto vivace a Battitori liberi, su Radio Cusano, tra il leader di Futuro Nazionale, Roberto Vannacci, e Savino Balzano, conduttore della trasmissione insieme a Gianluca Fabi. A far scattare il battibecco è la posizione dell’ex generale sull’Unione europea e sull’euro: a Balzano che lo incalza sulle sue dichiarazioni contestandogli una posizione poco incisiva rispetto alle aspettative del suo elettorato, Vannacci replica con tono piccato, respingendo la ricostruzione del saggista (“Sbagliato, è una falsificazione”) e chiarendo che l’uscita dall’Ue e dalla moneta unica resta una possibilità, anche se non figura tra gli obiettivi programmatici del suo partito.

Il politico invita Balzano a leggere il programma di Futuro Nazionale: “Né nel programma né nelle nostre intenzioni c’è quella di mettere in piano un’uscita dall’Ue e dall’euro come punto programmatico del partito. Abbiamo sempre avuto un approccio critico nei confronti di questa Unione europea e di questa Unione monetaria, che vogliamo cambiare”. L’obiettivo, spiega, è “andare a ridiscutere i trattati principali dell’Unione europea”. E cita AfD in Germania, Rassemblement National in Francia, Vox in Spagna e altre forze politiche europee che, a suo giudizio, possono favorire una revisione degli accordi di Maastricht. Poi precisa: “Non escludiamo tuttavia, nel caso di impossibilità di cambiare questa Unione dall’interno, la possibilità anche di uscire“.

Una risposta che non convince Balzano: “Mi sembra una posizione un po’ vaga”.
Vannacci replica: “Non è vaga. È una questione di tempi, di fattibilità e di possibilità di intervenire”.
Ma il conduttore torna alla carica: “Io parlo da cittadino. Mi sembra una posizione vaga. Alla fine questa Unione europea non piace a nessuno, non piaceva neanche al Pd. Pure il Pd vuole cambiare l’Unione europea. Uno da lei si aspetterebbe una posizione più tranchant”.
Il leader di Futuro Nazionale rivendica allora la differenza tra il proprio progetto politico e quello dei democratici: “Il mio partito non si chiama Italexit, quindi già uno se ne dovrebbe essere accorto prima. Il Pd vuole cambiare questa Unione europea nel senso di una maggiore integrazione. Noi invece vogliamo l’Europa delle patrie, delle nazioni e dei popoli sovrani, che è una cosa ben diversa”.

Per Vannacci, tentare di modificare l’Unione dall’interno è una strada più praticabile rispetto all’uscita immediata attraverso l’articolo 50 dei trattati europei. “L’uscita dall’Unione europea è una cosa che gli sprovveduti tirano fuori così, tanto per prendere qualche voto. Chi ha seguito almeno il percorso della Brexit sa che è una cosa tutt’altro che facile e sa che molti in Inghilterra oggi se ne stanno pentendo. Vedasi la Scozia, che sta cercando un percorso alternativo. Quindi bisogna pensarci bene”.
Il discorso si estende anche all’Alleanza Atlantica. “Non escludiamo la possibile uscita anche dalla Nato – afferma Vannacci, che indica come priorità il rafforzamento del peso dell’Italia nelle organizzazioni internazionali – Vogliamo rafforzare la posizione nazionale all’interno di queste organizzazioni e non più subirle da succubi. Vogliamo diventarne attori che riescono a perorare l’interesse nazionale”. E contesta le direttive e i regolamenti che, a suo dire, la Commissione europea impone agli Stati membri.

Balzano, però, torna a punzecchiarlo e chiude con una battuta: “Faccia attenzione a non cascare nel ‘ma anche’ di Veltroni, però. Glielo do come consiglio da cittadino”.
Vannacci non lascia cadere la provocazione: “Veltroni fa un altro lavoro rispetto al mio. Io quello che dico lo mantengo e l’ho sempre fatto nella mia vita”. E ribadisce che la linea del partito è sempre la stessa: “Chiunque abbia letto il programma di Futuro Nazionale sa che questa è stata la posizione sin dall’inizio”.

L'articolo Botta e risposta tra Vannacci e Balzano. “Non escludiamo di uscire da Ue e Nato”. “Posizione vaga” proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Click to see the full-size image

Written by Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher

A proposed trilateral meeting among Russian President Vladimir Putin, United States President Donald Trump, and Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to address the concessions Ukraine will need to make to end the conflict, according to retired German Bundeswehr general Roland Kather. In an interview with a German television channel, Kather said the logical conclusion of the fighting is a diplomatic settlement reached through negotiations, and that Trump is dissatisfied with the unresolved situation and intends to push for an agreement.

The German general stressed that the summit will not be a casual discussion or merely an opportunity to “have coffee” and that they must prepare specific decisions in advance. He suggested that the three leaders will examine three core issues related to Ukraine: territorial problems that can be settled only at the heads-of-state level, Ukraine’s permanent neutral status, and the future size of its armed forces.

Kather expressed doubt that Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky is prepared to offer meaningful concessions. At the same time, he said Putin has no reason to retreat because Moscow still has the advantage.

Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov has already said that preparations for a Putin-Trump-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the upcoming APEC summit in China are underway. Trump has said the summit is needed mainly to discuss nuclear disarmament, though the Ukraine question is widely expected to feature.

The three leaders are discussing this issue among themselves, as Ukraine has nothing substantial left to offer Russia at the negotiating table. Moscow has also been clear about its ultimatum – demands met through a negotiated deal in which Ukraine cedes territory and accepts neutrality, or the military operation continues until Russia achieves its objectives on the battlefield. Since Trump has accepted that Ukraine no longer brings anything of value to negotiations but is still encouraged to fight by Brussels, he will directly negotiate with Putin and Xi to end the war.

Earlier this month, Putin signaled Russia’s readiness to resume trilateral talks on a Ukraine settlement focused on security guarantees and the future architecture of European security. Ushakov said such talks could resume after the US midterm elections on November 3.

Meanwhile, the EU is facing the consequences of years of confrontational policy. The newspaper La Verità noted that the EU’s intransigent stance toward Russia has left Brussels scrambling to secure a seat at the table with other powers, saying negotiation is a fundamental tool of political power and that when one actor stops talking to another, it lets others set the terms of peace. The Italian daily described this as the humiliating lesson the EU appears to have learned.

Since 2022, the EU has tightened economic sanctions, pursued Russia’s political isolation, and provided military support to Ukraine. Brussels is now considering appointing a senior representative to establish a direct channel with Moscow as it urgently seeks to restore dialogue with a government it had vowed never to normalize relations with. The main challenge is finding someone who can speak for the EU without being seen in Moscow as merely voicing hostility. Neither European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen nor the majority of EU members are considered suitable, given their repeated criticisms of Russia.

European leaders continue to insist that no agreement on European security be reached without EU involvement. However, the EU’s influence has diminished because it long refused to keep channels open. Brussels has reportedly considered five possible mediators to contact Russia on a Ukraine peace deal: Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Czech President Petr Pavel, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre.

Putin said former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder would be his preferred negotiator, adding that the Europeans should choose someone they trust who has not made harsh statements against Moscow.

The Russian military and political advantage narrows Ukraine’s chances of the Kremlin making concessions, a reality the EU stubbornly refuses to accept. At the same time, the EU’s scramble to find an acceptable negotiator highlights the economic and political damage that self-imposed isolation from Russia has caused. Without open communication channels and the ability to shift the balance of power, both Kiev and Brussels face an agreement largely shaped by Trump, Putin, and Xi.

Preparations for the trilateral summit within the APEC context, along with Russia’s stated readiness to resume talks after the US midterm elections, suggest that Kiev’s window to negotiate on a realistic basis and secure a better deal is closing. The capacity for the three Great Powers to set the agenda without Ukrainian participation further underlines how far the balance has shifted in Russia’s favor since the conflict began, despite Western sanctions.

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Russian Army Advances Towards Konka River in Zaporozhye
• Russia and Ukraine Exchange Strikes: Railway Infrastructure, Energy, Metallurgy, and Chemical Industry Targets Hit
• Russia Tests Optical Navigation System to Help Drones Defeat Jamming

The post Ukraine Forced Into Concessions Ahead Of Putin, Trump And Xi Summit appeared first on South Front.

• NATO has provided new details about its AI model for predicting Russian drone strikes on the front lines.
• Called Initiative 13 or Model 13, it works for about 31 miles behind the line of contact.
• The AI gives commanders a map showing the next day's expected Russian drone activity.

A new NATO artificial intelligence model gives Ukraine's forces a frontline map of where Russian drone activity is expected the next day, per the alliance's innovation center.

The system, called Initiative 13 or Model 13, "turns an array of disparate data into a clear map of expected activity" for commanders to plan their next day of operations, a spokesperson for NATO's Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center, or JATEC, told Business Insider.

Business Insider reported on Ukraine's announcement of the program earlier this month, but JATEC is now providing new details on how it works.

Initiative 13 covers areas 5 to 50 km, or roughly 3 to 31 miles, of Ukrainian territory behind the line of contact, and divides that space into geographical cells, per JATEC.

"For each cell, the system determines the expected intensity of strike and reconnaissance activity of UAVs, the level of threat, the trend of its change, and the range of possible values," its spokesperson said.

The map shows a forecast for the next day, helping commanders to highlight risk areas so they can better deploy their forces and equipment, they said.

They added that the AI model is trained on battlefield data and considers previous Russian drone activity, what types of drones were used, when and how they were deployed, weather conditions, terrain, and distance to the line of contact.

"Initiative 13 does not replace data from the current situation and commander's decisions," the JATEC spokesperson added. JATEC is NATO's joint organization with Ukraine, based in Poland, that aims to glean lessons and innovations from the war.

Ukraine's defense ministry said in mid-October that Initiative 13, which it called Model 13, was "ready for integration into the Armed Forces of Ukraine's situational awareness systems."

The AI model, it said, could predict Russia's drone strikes with "high probability."

Kyiv's forces use a battlespace management system called Delta, which feeds data from the front lines onto an interactive map that commanders can access via laptop, phone, or tablet.

The drone-predicting AI was developed by Ukraine's forces and NATO's Allied Command Transformation, with support from JATEC.

Ukraine's defense ministry said in its initial announcement that another AI model, dubbed No. 32, for planning artillery deployments was also in the works but is still in prototype stages.

Artificial intelligence has increasingly been making its way into Ukraine's war, from helping mid-range attack drones identify and strike targets to sending uncrewed ground vehicles to autonomously complete supply runs.

Washington has selected Poland to host a European servicing centre for PAC-3 interceptors, strengthening the country’s role in NATO’s air defence infrastructure. The investment comes as wars in Ukraine and the Middle East expose the difficulties of sustaining missile stocks during prolonged conflicts.

Poland has been selected to host a major European maintenance centre for Patriot air defence interceptors, marking a further expansion of the country’s role in NATO’s military infrastructure and the transatlantic defence industry.

The decision, announced on 27 October by the United States government and American defence manufacturer Lockheed Martin, will establish a dedicated facility for PAC-3 missiles used in Patriot air and missile defence systems.

The investment is estimated at approximately one billion zlotys, equivalent to around €227 million.

Poland secured the project following competition with Germany, the Netherlands and Norway.

The facility is intended to provide maintenance, repair, refurbishment and technical recertification services to European operators of PAC-3 interceptors.

Its importance extends beyond the immediate economic benefits for Poland.

The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have exposed pressure on the availability of advanced air defence missiles, raising questions about Europe’s ability to sustain military operations when demand for interceptors exceeds existing supply.

A new role for Poland’s defence industry

Deputy Defence Minister Magdalena Sobkowiak-Czarnecka announced the selection of Poland as the location for the maintenance centre.

According to Lockheed Martin’s official announcement, the facility will support NATO allies operating PAC-3 interceptors through repairs, lifecycle maintenance, refurbishment and recertification.

The centre will also provide testing capabilities intended to improve operational readiness and reduce the time required to return missiles to service.

The exact location and final implementation arrangements remain subject to further negotiations.

Polish officials have indicated that the centre could become operational in approximately a year, although the schedule will depend on the conclusion of agreements and construction or adaptation of the necessary facilities.

The project is expected to create specialised employment and increase opportunities for Polish defence suppliers.

It also reinforces Poland’s position as a manufacturing and logistics centre on NATO’s eastern flank.

Maintenance is not missile production

An important distinction concerns the facility’s actual purpose.

The Polish centre will maintain and service PAC-3 missiles. It is not being presented as a new production line capable of manufacturing large quantities of additional interceptors.

Modern air defence missiles contain complex guidance systems, propulsion components and other equipment requiring specialised inspection and maintenance.

Their operational availability depends not only on the number produced but also on the ability to store, test, maintain and recertify existing stocks.

When these services are concentrated outside Europe, operators may face lengthy transport and servicing arrangements.

Locating maintenance capacity closer to European users should reduce some of those delays.

However, the facility will not independently resolve shortages caused by the consumption of missiles during military operations.

Additional manufacturing capacity, access to components and long-term procurement agreements remain necessary to increase overall inventories.

Ukraine and the Middle East increase demand

Patriot systems have become particularly important because of their role in defending military facilities, population centres and critical infrastructure against aircraft and missiles.

Ukraine has repeatedly requested additional Patriot interceptors to protect cities and energy installations from Russian attacks.

At the same time, the conflict in the Middle East has increased demand for advanced air defence capabilities.

Both theatres place pressure on supply chains whose production capacity cannot be expanded immediately.

Manufacturing sophisticated interceptors involves specialised components, qualified suppliers, extensive testing and demanding certification procedures.

The result is a gap between the speed at which missiles can be expended during sustained operations and the time required to replace them.

The United States has undertaken efforts to accelerate PAC-3 production.

Lockheed Martin announced that it had received a major US government contract in 2026 to support further expansion of PAC-3 MSE manufacturing.

The planned maintenance centre in Poland represents a complementary investment, intended to improve the availability of missiles already held by European forces.

A transatlantic industrial project

Although Poland will host the facility, the project has a wider European dimension.

Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are expected to participate in important elements of supply-chain integration.

These countries were among the original participants in the industrial cooperation arrangements alongside Poland and the United States.

The structure reflects NATO’s increasing emphasis on dispersing critical maintenance and logistical capabilities across allied territory.

A geographically distributed system can reduce dependence on individual sites and make it easier to sustain equipment during periods of disruption.

It can also help European defence companies develop technical expertise through cooperation with American manufacturers.

However, the arrangement will remain part of a transatlantic supply chain, with significant industrial and technological responsibilities retained by the United States.

The project therefore illustrates both Europe’s expanding defence-industrial role and its continuing dependence on American missile technology.

Poland’s expanding air defence network

The decision complements Poland’s broader investment in integrated air and missile defence.

Under the Wisła programme, Warsaw has been acquiring Patriot systems and associated interceptors as part of a wider modernisation of its armed forces.

Two Patriot batteries reached operational readiness in December 2025, according to Euronews’ reporting on the project.

Poland has also ordered additional batteries and substantial quantities of PAC-3 MSE missiles, with deliveries continuing through the remainder of the decade.

These investments are intended to improve protection against aircraft, cruise missiles and ballistic missile threats.

The maintenance centre should complement those acquisitions by strengthening technical support for the interceptors.

Readiness depends on more than procurement

The Polish investment demonstrates how NATO’s air defence priorities are changing.

For many years, procurement discussions concentrated primarily on purchasing new weapons systems.

The experience of prolonged conflicts has placed greater emphasis on ammunition availability, repair facilities, spare parts, storage and industrial capacity.

Those supporting capabilities determine how long military forces can sustain operations.

The new centre will not eliminate the need for additional missiles, but it could reduce servicing delays and improve the readiness of European stocks.

Its effectiveness will ultimately depend on the scale of operations, access to components and the speed with which maintenance services can be delivered.

For Poland, hosting the facility strengthens its position within NATO’s defence-industrial network.

For the Alliance, it represents an attempt to address one of the practical weaknesses exposed by recent conflicts: acquiring advanced weapons is only part of the challenge; keeping them available for use is equally important.

Romanian intelligence services say a Russian-directed network was responsible for a fire near an arms manufacturing facility in Brașov. Investigations involving Germany and Poland have exposed what authorities describe as a wider operation targeting military and industrial defence infrastructure across Europe.

Romania has accused Russia of coordinating a cross-border sabotage network responsible for an industrial fire near an arms manufacturing facility, prompting a diplomatic confrontation with Moscow and investigations involving several European countries.

Romanian intelligence and prosecutors announced on 26th October that they had identified three foreign nationals allegedly involved in the operation, which caused a fire on an industrial site in Brașov on 14th September.

The suspects, two Belarusian nationals and one Ukrainian, are alleged to have participated in a network directed by individuals operating from Russia.

Two suspects have been detained in Germany, while a third has been located in Poland.

Romania is seeking their extradition as investigators examine possible connections to other attempted attacks against military and industrial installations.

Russia has rejected the allegations.

The case has drawn attention to the security of European defence production facilities at a time when NATO governments are seeking to increase military manufacturing capacity and sustain assistance to Ukraine.

Fire near a Romanian arms manufacturer

The investigation concerns an industrial complex in Brașov, a city with an established defence manufacturing sector.

The fire occurred on 14th September at premises situated close to CARFIL SA, a subsidiary of Romania’s state-owned defence company ROMARM.

According to the Romanian Intelligence Service, the incident was caused by individuals belonging to a sabotage network coordinated from the Russian Federation.

The fire damaged premises occupied by several commercial businesses.

Although the industrial site is associated with the CARFIL complex, authorities have not established publicly that the arms manufacturing facility itself sustained damage.

That geographical distinction is important when assessing the consequences of the operation.

CARFIL manufactures military equipment and ammunition and has pursued partnerships involving drones, explosives and other defence technologies.

Its proximity to the incident has heightened concerns about the security of industrial facilities supporting Romania’s armed forces.

Suspects identified in three countries

Romania’s Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism, known as DIICOT, says the evidence connects three individuals to the incident.

According to Romanian national news agency AGERPRES, the Bucharest Court of Appeal issued European arrest warrants following the investigation.

Two suspects were detained in Germany while allegedly preparing similar operations.

The third was located in Poland, where authorities received a further European arrest warrant issued on 26 October.

Romanian prosecutors are pursuing extradition procedures.

The nationalities of the suspects do not establish responsibility on the part of Belarus or Ukraine. Romanian authorities attribute the alleged coordination to individuals based in Russia.

The investigation also indicates that the Brașov incident may not have been an isolated operation.

Romanian intelligence claims the network’s potential targets included government-owned and private arms manufacturers, military-related facilities and other strategic industrial sites in several European countries.

Those claims remain subject to ongoing criminal investigation.

Bucharest summons Russian ambassador

The Romanian government escalated the matter diplomatically on 27th October.

Foreign Minister Dan Neculăescu summoned Russia’s ambassador, Vladimir Lipaev, to deliver a formal protest concerning the alleged operation.

According to the Romanian Foreign Ministry’s account reported by AGERPRES, Bucharest stated that evidence gathered during the investigation demonstrated Russian responsibility.

The ministry described the operation as part of a broader pattern of hostile activity affecting European states.

President Nicușor Dan also condemned the alleged sabotage, linking it to attempts to undermine European security and solidarity.

Moscow rejected the accusations.

The Russian Embassy maintained that the allegations were unfounded and disputed Romania’s account of the evidence presented during the diplomatic meeting.

The conflicting positions mean the attribution remains contested, notwithstanding the conclusions announced by Romania’s intelligence authorities.

A recruitment model designed for deniability

The Romanian Intelligence Service has provided details about how it believes the wider network recruits and directs participants.

According to its statement, recruitment can begin through social media with offers of payment for apparently minor activities, such as photographing or observing particular locations.

Subsequent assignments may become more serious, involving property destruction, arson or other acts of violence.

Individuals may be targeted because of financial difficulties or other personal vulnerabilities.

The service also identified methods allegedly used to conceal movements, payments and communications.

These include encrypted messaging applications, telephone numbers registered outside the country of operation and accommodation or transport arrangements booked under other identities.

Such methods can complicate investigations because the individuals physically carrying out an operation may have limited knowledge of the organisers.

Romanian authorities emphasised that individual indicators should be assessed in context and do not themselves prove involvement in sabotage.

Defence factories become a security concern

The case has implications beyond Romania.

European governments are investing in ammunition production, air defence systems and military technologies, partly in response to the continuing war in Ukraine.

The resulting expansion of manufacturing capacity creates additional infrastructure requiring protection.

Industrial sites may be vulnerable not only to direct attacks but also to disruption affecting nearby businesses, transport networks, power supplies and specialist contractors.

The Brașov investigation illustrates how an incident outside a defence factory’s perimeter can nevertheless raise questions about the security of the wider industrial complex.

It also demonstrates the importance of cooperation between European intelligence services and criminal investigators.

The detention of suspects in Germany and the identification of another in Poland show that investigations into alleged sabotage may cross several jurisdictions.

The wider European response

Romania’s allegations come amid growing concern over hostile activities involving cyberattacks, disinformation, surveillance and physical sabotage.

Attributing such incidents to a foreign government requires intelligence assessments, criminal evidence and international cooperation.

The public allegations against Russia do not replace the judicial process concerning the three suspects.

However, the investigation has already prompted a diplomatic response and additional scrutiny of industrial security.

For European governments seeking to expand their defence industries, the immediate challenge is protecting production facilities and associated infrastructure without allowing relatively small-scale disruptive operations to undermine wider manufacturing programmes.

The outcome of Romania’s criminal proceedings will be important in establishing the responsibility of those accused and clarifying how the alleged network operated across national borders.

Main Image: By MAPN – http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20051020_expomil?page=1, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=14997305

O Timão venceu as seis finais que disputou na história: 2017 (em parceria com o Audax), 2019, 2021, 2023, 2024 e 2025. Em 2020, as alvinegras caíram para o América de Cali (Colômbia) nas semifinais. Dois anos depois, foram surpreendidas pelo Boca Juniors (Argentina) nas quartas de final.

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⚫⚪ As atuais campeãs... 𝑵𝑨 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑨𝑳 𝑴𝑨𝑰𝑺 𝑼𝑴𝑨 𝑽𝑬𝒁! ✔️ @asbrabas https://t.co/fA1SdBnGOz

— CONMEBOL Libertadores Femenina (@LibertadoresFEM) October 28, 2026

O Santa Fe saiu na frente. Aos 28 minutos, a atacante Manuela González lançou a bola desde o campo de defesa e acabou encontrando Daniela Garavito em velocidade, nas costas da marcação. A meia invadiu a área e chutou na saída da goleira Lelê. Anulado inicialmente por um suposto impedimento, o gol foi validado após intervenção da arbitragem de vídeo (VAR).

A resposta corintiana veio aos 36. Na sobra de uma bola afastada por Cristina Motta, após lançamento da também zagueira Thais Ferreira, a meia Letícia Monteiro bateu de primeira, da entrada da área, acertando o cantinho esquerdo da goleira Jimena Ospina.

Na etapa final, o Timão chegou ao gol da virada no melhor momento das adversárias. Aos 30 minutos, Letícia Monteiro acionou a volante Duda Sampaio, que tentou o passe de calcanhar, de primeira, na entrada da área. Motta tentou afastar, mas pegou mal e a bola sobrou livre com a lateral Gi Fernandes, que mandou para as redes, decretando o triunfo alvinegro.

L’isteria crescente delle classi dominanti – e dei mass media da essi finanziati – ormai buttano tutto nel calderone del “nemico interno”: agenti russi, cittadini pagati dai russi, ingerenze islamiche e, ovviamente, i partiti della sinistra e i comunisti.

Segue nostro Telegram.

E’ stato sufficiente che l’edizione di giovedi del giornale Politico.eu scrivesse qualche riga per mettere in moto una valanga, rivelando che l’Unione Europea ritiene di trovarsi di fronte all’escalation delle operazioni ibride russe e che si sta preparando all’eventualità che, prima o poi, queste azioni provochino delle vittime in Paesi Ue o Nato. Insomma quasi un auspicio che da qualche parte ci scappi il morto da poter strumentalizzare ai fini della propaganda di guerra, sia sul fronte esterno che sul fronte interno.

Si tratta di uno scenario che in Italia abbiamo purtroppo visto e subìto spesso: dalla strage di Piazza Fontana in poi. Su questo, nostro malgrado, potremmo tenere delle lectio magistralis a tutti gli altri paesi europei che non hanno sperimentato tragedie e orrori analoghi

Il giornale Politico.eu riferisce di una riunione di diplomatici della Ue a porte chiuse, senza telefonini e senza assistenti ha valutato il rischio di attacchi gravi, “capaci di provocare vittime su larga scala”. Due fonti diplomatiche hanno confermato a Politico che una riunione degli ambasciatori presso l’Ue, svoltasi mercoledì scorso, ha riguardato proprio questo tipo di scenario.

Per una fonte diplomatica citata dal sito, “data la portata e la vastità dell’azione russa, è inevitabile che prima o poi vi siano delle vittime. È pura fortuna che non ce ne siano ancora state”.

“È abbastanza ovvio che, quando la Russia utilizza strumenti sempre più letali per mettere alla prova la nostra preparazione e la nostra volontà di adottare contromisure, a un certo punto ci saranno delle vittime”, ha dichiarato a Politico la finlandese Teija Tiilikainen, direttore del Centro europeo di eccellenza per il contrasto alle minacce ibride. “Prima o poi, intenzionalmente o meno, questo è ciò che accade”.

Se diversi cittadini di Paesi membri dell’UE o della NATO venissero uccisi in quello che sembra essere un attacco, la pressione ad agire sarebbe enorme per entrambe le istituzioni. “Temiamo fortemente che a un certo punto venga tolta la vita a un nostro alleato”, ha affermato un diplomatico della NATO, il che renderebbe la pressione ad agire “molto alta”, riporta ancora Politico.eu.

Ma l’isteria ormai è talmente dilagante che alcuni Paesi membri della Ue, ritengono che debba essere la Nato e non l’Unione Europea la sede opportuna per trattare di questi argomenti e delle possibili soluzioni, soprattutto perché le riunioni della Ue sarebbero troppo “porose” per la fuga di notizie o di informazioni sensibili.

A rendere il tutto ancora più strumentalizzabile ai fini della mera propaganda di guerra esterna ed interna in Europa, vi è anche il tentativo di leggere le proteste giovanili e popolari in Francia come eterodirette o articolazioni di progetti di destabilizzazione. E in questo gioco sporco tutto fa brodo, dalla guerra ibrida della Russia alle ambizioni dell’islam politico.

“Quello che sta accadendo in Francia non è altro che immigrazione di massa fuori controllo“, ha scritto Donald Trump il 6 ottobre sul suo social Truth riferendosi agli scontri e alle manifestazioni che stanno attraversando la Francia. Per il presidente americano “non si tratta delle scuole”, ma dell’”Islam che vuole prendere il controllo di un Paese un tempo grande“.

A fargli eco è subito arrivato l’eurodeputato lepenista Fabrice Leggeri, esponente del gruppo della destra dei Patrioti al Parlamento di Strasburgo, secondo il quale “sulle proteste in Francia Trump non ha del tutto torto”. Perché, ha affermato durante un punto stampa al Parlamento Europeo, “le rivolte in corso, le rivolte dei cosiddetti studenti o presunti studenti, sono di fatto strumentalizzate dall’estrema sinistra e, come sappiamo, l’estrema sinistra è infiltrata da elementi islamisti”.

L’isteria crescente delle classi dominanti – e dei mass media da essi finanziati – ormai buttano tutto nel calderone del “nemico interno”: agenti russi, cittadini pagati dai russi, ingerenze islamiche e, ovviamente, i partiti della sinistra e i comunisti.

Se al posto degli ebrei mettiamo gli islamici, sono esattamente gli stessi nemici messi all’indice in Europa dai nazifascisti negli anni Trenta.

Articolo originale:  contropiano.org

The European Commission has opened talks with oil producers, refiners and NATO over the future of Europe’s fuel industry, exposing growing tensions between decarbonisation, industrial competitiveness and the demands of military preparedness.

The European Union is reconsidering the strategic importance of its oil-refining industry as disruptions to international energy supplies and growing defence requirements force Brussels to examine whether Europe can afford further reductions in domestic fuel production.

On 28 October, the European Commission convened its first high-level dialogue with the European refining industry, bringing together energy companies, technology providers and representatives of NATO.

The meeting was chaired jointly by Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen and Defence and Space Commissioner Andrius Kubilius.

Its significance extends beyond the immediate increase in fuel prices associated with the conflict in the Middle East.

Brussels is confronting a longer-term problem: Europe intends to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, but its transport networks, industrial infrastructure and military forces remain substantially dependent on petroleum products.

The question is no longer simply how quickly the European economy can decarbonise. It is also how much refining capacity must be retained to guarantee essential fuel supplies during a geopolitical crisis.

A strategic industry under pressure

Europe’s refining industry occupies an important position in the continent’s energy system.

According to figures published by the European Commission, EU refineries supply approximately 70 per cent of the jet fuel and 85 per cent of the diesel consumed in Europe.

These products are essential not only for civilian transport and logistics but also for military aviation, armoured vehicles and the movement of equipment.

Maintaining adequate production capacity therefore has implications for both economic activity and defence readiness.

Yet European refineries have faced difficult commercial conditions for years.

High energy costs, international competition and declining expectations for long-term fossil-fuel demand have complicated investment decisions.

Refineries require substantial capital expenditure to remain competitive, meet environmental requirements and adapt production processes.

Companies considering whether to modernise facilities must consequently assess the profitability of assets that may be expected to operate in a progressively decarbonising economy.

The resulting uncertainty creates a problem for governments seeking to retain strategically important industrial capabilities.

The Middle East conflict changes the calculation

The immediate catalyst for the Commission’s initiative is the disruption to energy markets caused by the continuing conflict in the Middle East.

Interruptions to supply chains and uncertainty over maritime transport have increased concerns about the availability and cost of refined petroleum products.

Importing crude oil and importing finished fuels are not equivalent from a strategic perspective.

A country with domestic refining capacity can process available crude into the particular products required by its economy.

An economy heavily dependent on imported refined products is additionally exposed to processing capacity, transport availability and commercial decisions outside its jurisdiction.

The distinction becomes particularly relevant when governments must guarantee supplies of diesel and aviation fuel during an emergency.

European policymakers are therefore examining ways to improve output from existing facilities and strengthen the resilience of fuel supply chains.

However, the Commission has not announced a binding production target or a programme to reopen closed refineries.

The 28 October meeting represents the beginning of a policy discussion rather than the adoption of a new industrial strategy.

NATO introduces a different perspective

The participation of NATO gives the initiative a wider security dimension.

Military preparedness requires dependable access to energy products, including during periods when normal commercial supply chains are disrupted.

Aircraft, naval vessels, military logistics and ground operations cannot be reorganised around alternative energy sources at the same pace as some civilian activities.

Furthermore, the ability to sustain prolonged operations depends on reliable industrial production, storage, distribution and transport.

A refinery’s strategic importance may therefore exceed its immediate commercial profitability.

That raises difficult policy questions.

Governments may consider whether critical production facilities require targeted support, whether strategic stockpiles are sufficient and how supply arrangements should function during emergencies.

Any intervention would have to address competition rules, public financing and the risk of subsidising facilities that become commercially unviable.

Decarbonisation remains part of the policy

Brussels has not abandoned its climate objectives.

The Commission has explicitly linked its refining discussions to the development of sustainable biofuels and synthetic fuels, commonly known as e-fuels.

These technologies offer potential alternatives for sectors where direct electrification remains technically difficult, including aviation.

However, their commercial development requires investment, suitable feedstocks, reliable energy supplies and sufficient demand.

Traditional refineries may be able to participate in this transition, although the technical requirements and economic viability vary between facilities.

Jørgensen said the Commission intended to work with industry on a roadmap that would reconcile domestic fuel production with Europe’s longer-term climate ambitions.

The challenge will be translating those objectives into investment decisions.

Europe’s industrial strategy faces a practical test

The initiative illustrates a wider adjustment in European economic policy.

In recent years, the EU has increasingly described industrial capacity as an element of economic security, rather than treating production solely as a commercial activity.

Semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, critical minerals and defence equipment have all attracted attention because of vulnerabilities in international supply chains.

Oil refining is now entering the same discussion.

The Commission must determine how to preserve sufficient capacity for essential civilian and military requirements while continuing to encourage cleaner technologies.

Those objectives are not necessarily incompatible, but they operate over different timescales and involve different commercial incentives.

For European refiners, the central question is whether governments can provide enough regulatory and investment certainty to support modernisation.

For Brussels, it is whether the energy transition can proceed without creating new strategic dependencies.

The outcome of the dialogue will indicate how the EU intends to balance its climate commitments with the industrial demands of a less predictable security environment.

By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | October 28, 2026

The needle may not have moved on ending the Ukraine war but the joint phone call on October 27 by Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre to Russian President Vladimir Putin can be regarded as a defining moment. The two Nordic leaders insisted that their initiative was taken solely in their capacity as neighbours of Russia rather than on behalf of Europe, but the fact remains that their initiative was borne out of their exclusive meeting in Oslo on October 20 with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US special envoy Stephen Witkoff.

Russian expert opinion is that it is unlikely that Oslo and Helsinki acted without the consent of Brussels [EU] and Kyiv. But no one is making an issue of the white lie. Clearly, European countries are attempting to re-establish direct communication channels with Russia. Entry of Finland and Norway in the negotiation process indicates that even Ukraine’s most vocal supporters are shifting their position in favor of dialogue with Russia. According to official data, Norway has provided Kyiv with nearly €17 billion in aid, while Finland has provided €5 billion.

On October 21, Witkoff flew into St. Petersburg from Oslo to transmit some fresh proposals on Ukraine in light of his discussions, which is leading to the first trilateral US-Ukraine-Russia talks since the start of the year, tentatively planned for early November in Abu Dhabi. Zelensky said Stubb and Støre debriefed him after the call to Putin and that he was grateful for their “active support.” Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha remarked that the call had been “the right approach”.

The two Nordic leaders stated that their 90-minute call from Helsinki to Putin was part of “the diplomatic efforts to end the war and promote peace and stability in Europe”; the conversation had been “frank and substantive.” Støre added that there were “big differences in views” with Putin.

European Union is a divided house on how to go about engaging with Russia after riding the high horse all through the tumultuous years since Moscow’s ‘special military operation’ began in February 2022. But they are sensing that the last train is leaving the station and they should be on board.

However, President Donald Trump is estimating from the feedback received from Witkoff on Putin’s reaction to the peace proposals – which followed his own call to Putin on October 9 – that an opportune moment is at hand to advance the peace process. By the way, Trump must be having a ‘feel good’ over the mutually respectful working relationship between the Kremlin and his spouse Melania that resulted in a localized humanitarian ceasefire in the Russian-occupied city of Oleshky in the southern region of Kherson brokered by the US First Lady. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has suggested that the ceasefire in Oleshky could be a model for other areas of the contact line as well – “especially when it comes to the positive, coordinating participation of American negotiators, including First Lady Melania Trump.”

In the downstream of the recent US-Russia Diesel Deal, a payment system needs to be put in place and Trump is reportedly considering the lifting of sanctions on the Russian Direct Investment Fund (an at least $10 billion sovereign wealth fund created by the Russian government to co‑invest in the Russian economy). Suffice it to say, a door is opening for large projects involving American companies in other areas in the Russian economy as well.

Trump has virtually mothballed the Lindsey Graham Act empowering him to sanction Russia’s oil and gas exports. He is reportedly also planning to have an agreement to import large volumes of Russian fertilizer to meet the demands of the American farmers. In political terms, Trump would probably explain all this as a strategy to ‘incentivize’ the Russian side to be flexible at the negotiations but it will no doubt give stability and predictability to the overall Russian-American relationship.

The Kremlin readout of Putin’s phone conversation with the two Nordic leaders made three key points: first, it was emphasised that the thrust of the forthcoming trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine and the US at Abu Dhabi in early November is “intended in particular to discuss ways to ensure the security of both Russia and Ukraine once a complete cessation of hostilities is reached.”

Second, Putin underscored that “a just and lasting peace would be possible only if the interests of the Russian Federation are considered in full and without any conditions attached.” Third, Putin took exception to “the EU and NATO’s confrontational policies which result in prolonging the hostilities.” The reference is to the escalatory moves by European powers.

Of course, the trilateral talks in November are not going to bring the conflict to an end. The EU countries are more focused on their status in a conflict resolution than apply themselves to making constructive proposals in the negotiating process, so their inclusion in the current format is irrelevant not possible for the time being. On the other hand, Moscow would realize that creating a new European security architecture without European participation is impossible.

The Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov previously noted that dialogue with Europe is necessary, as it is the European Union that supports Kyiv. Peskov also previously spoke of openness to negotiations with Europe. There is no question that further developments depend largely on relations between Europe and the US. Most European countries continue to look up to Washington.

In the entire history of the ex-colonial European powers, this week would have been a most humiliating experience, having to go to the Kremlin to engage with Putin whom they used to demonize like nobody’s business till the other day. The two Nordic politicians, according to Ushakov, sheepishly asked Putin whether it is possible for Zelensky to have a meeting with him. These are the first signs that they are disowning and dispossessing Zelensky now that he is becoming a liability. Brussels is having a problem to find money for him to tide over the period till an agreement is reached. No one is willing to contribute – not even Germany – since everyone knows this money is never going to be returned.

The unkindest cut of all is the suggestion from Witkoff and Jared Kushner that EU countries should resume sourcing Russian oil and gas. The two American negotiators gently advised that Nord Stream gas pipeline could be repaired and used. Per European media reports, American companies are talking to the Russians about reviving Nord Stream and selling Russian gas to the European market.

France has deployed a maritime patrol aircraft to Romania following a series of attacks on civilian vessels near NATO territory. The escalating threat has prompted closer cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, raising questions about maritime security and the protection of Europe’s eastern flank.

A series of drone attacks on commercial shipping in the western Black Sea has brought the consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine increasingly close to NATO territory, prompting additional military surveillance and renewed regional defence cooperation.

France has temporarily deployed an Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft to Romania, while NATO members bordering the Black Sea are strengthening arrangements to monitor shipping routes, identify airborne threats and protect critical infrastructure.

The French aircraft began operating from Romania’s Mihail Kogălniceanu airbase on 18 October and is scheduled to continue reconnaissance missions until 6 November.

Its deployment follows repeated attacks on merchant vessels near Romania and Bulgaria, both members of NATO and the European Union.

At least eight cargo ships have been struck in the region during October, with approximately 34 sailors reported dead or missing, according to figures reported by Reuters on 27 October.

The incidents have transformed commercial maritime security into an increasingly urgent issue for European defence planners.

Commercial vessels enter the conflict zone

The latest escalation has centred on shipping routes serving Ukraine’s Danube ports and commercial traffic passing through the western Black Sea.

Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian maritime infrastructure have increased the importance of alternative export routes, including those connecting the Danube to international shipping lanes.

However, recent incidents demonstrate that geographical proximity to NATO territory does not necessarily provide commercial vessels with protection from the effects of the conflict.

On 23 October, a drone struck a Comoros-flagged cargo vessel near the Romanian port of Constanța.

According to maritime security company Ambrey, the vessel was hit approximately 16 nautical miles east of the port and subsequently capsized.

One crew member was reported dead, nine were rescued and three remained missing in the initial casualty figures.

Ambrey assessed it as highly likely that Russian forces carried out the attack, pointing to the vessel’s links with Ukrainian Danube ports.

That assessment represents an attribution by a commercial security organisation, rather than a final determination by an international investigative body.

Other incidents have similarly raised questions over responsibility.

Ukraine has accused Russia of attacking civilian shipping, while Bulgarian authorities have acknowledged difficulties in conclusively identifying the operators of drones involved in some strikes.

France strengthens maritime surveillance

Romania’s Defence Ministry announced on 27 October that the Atlantique 2 deployment followed a request from Bucharest in response to the deteriorating security situation.

The aircraft is conducting surveillance and reconnaissance over the western Black Sea, working with Romanian naval authorities and maritime rescue coordination services.

Its principal responsibilities include identifying hazards to navigation and improving awareness of threats to critical infrastructure within Romania’s exclusive economic zone.

That infrastructure includes offshore energy facilities and maritime installations whose protection is increasingly relevant to European energy security.

The deployment adds to Romanian naval patrols conducted by ships, helicopters and unmanned systems.

Romanian authorities are also providing navigational warnings and recommended routes to commercial vessels.

Nevertheless, additional surveillance does not automatically prevent attacks.

The practical challenge lies in detecting relatively small unmanned aircraft or maritime drones, determining their intentions and responding before they reach civilian targets.

Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey coordinate their response

The security crisis was also discussed at a trilateral meeting of defence ministers in Sofia on 28 October.

Romania’s Defence Minister, Ștefan-Radu Oprea, met his Bulgarian counterpart, Dimitar Stoyanov, and Turkey’s Defence Minister, Yaşar Güler, to examine the consequences of attacks on commercial shipping.

According to the Romanian Defence Ministry, the ministers discussed closer intelligence-sharing, improved maritime surveillance and better coordination between their naval forces.

They also reaffirmed the importance of the existing Black Sea mine-countermeasures initiative involving the three countries.

Maritime mines remain a persistent hazard because they can drift beyond their original deployment areas, endangering civilian vessels irrespective of their destination or ownership.

The trilateral format provides a practical mechanism for neighbouring countries to coordinate activities while retaining responsibility for their respective national waters.

It also gives Turkey a central role in regional discussions, reflecting its position on the Black Sea and its control of access through the Turkish Straits under the Montreux Convention.

The limits of NATO’s maritime protection

The attacks raise a complicated legal and operational question: what responsibilities do NATO members have when civilian ships are attacked near their coastlines?

The distinction between territorial waters and an exclusive economic zone is important.

A coastal state’s territorial sea generally extends up to 12 nautical miles from its baseline, while its exclusive economic zone can extend considerably further and confers particular economic and jurisdictional rights.

An attack within a NATO member’s exclusive economic zone does not automatically constitute an armed attack against that member’s territory.

Nor does every strike on a civilian ship near NATO territory automatically trigger the collective-defence provisions of Article 5.

The circumstances, attribution, location and consequences of an incident would all influence the response.

This creates a security problem in which threats can affect European economic interests without necessarily crossing a threshold requiring collective military action.

Maritime trade and energy infrastructure face increasing risks

The implications extend beyond individual vessels.

Repeated attacks can increase insurance costs, complicate shipping schedules and discourage operators from using particular routes.

They can also affect Ukrainian agricultural exports and the wider commercial networks linking Black Sea ports to European markets.

Offshore energy installations face related vulnerabilities, particularly where surveillance and response capabilities are insufficient.

For NATO, the challenge is therefore to strengthen deterrence and protection without unintentionally escalating the conflict.

France’s reconnaissance deployment and the trilateral cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey indicate that regional governments are moving towards a more coordinated response.

However, the continuing attacks demonstrate the difficulties of protecting civilian maritime activity against comparatively inexpensive unmanned systems.

The longer-term question is whether increased surveillance, counter-drone capabilities and naval cooperation can make western Black Sea shipping sufficiently secure while the war in Ukraine continues.

Europe has already learned to better recognize hybrid threats, which is definitely a good thing, but recognition alone is not enough and doesn't serve as sufficient deterrence.

European officials have grown accustomed to scenarios where a cyberattack disrupts public services and critical infrastructure, drones appear over sensitive sites,

Cracks are spreading through the foundation of the pro-Ukrainian coalition. For four years, the West presented a united front behind Kyiv. In recent weeks, that picture has begun to change, and the change is visible in diplomacy and in budgets alike.

The most striking signs come from Europe itself. On October 27, Vladimir Putin held phone calls with Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre. The talks covered a settlement in Ukraine and European security. According to the Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry, neither leader brought anything new to the conversation. Stubb described the exchange as frank and substantive. His office stressed that both leaders spoke for their own countries, not for Europe as a whole.

Stubb made his own view plain. “A direct dialogue with Russia is needed to end the conflict in Ukraine,” he said. Støre was just as pragmatic. “Norway is a neighbor of Russia. We share an extensive maritime border. We will maintain good-neighborly relations, and that is important for our security,” the Norwegian prime minister said after the call.

The pattern extends beyond the Nordic states. A Slovak delegation led by the foreign minister arrived in Moscow on October 26 to discuss resuming cooperation. The agenda reportedly included gas and oil supplies, nuclear energy, agriculture, and culture. Prime Minister Robert Fico opposes sanctions and military aid to Ukraine, although Bratislava insists it remains committed to its obligations in the EU and NATO.

According to the Financial Times, citing a European Commission forecast, financing for Ukraine from countries outside the European bloc will fall sharply. It is projected to reach only 4 billion euros in 2027, compared with 19 billion euros in 2026. The G7 members outside the EU, namely the United States, Britain, Canada, and Japan, are together prepared to provide just 1 billion euros. Brussels draws the obvious conclusion. “Europe cannot meet Ukraine’s financial needs alone,” officials in the European Union argue. They add that international partners, including NATO allies, must step up.

The Commission is now weighing alternatives, including debt issuance, while pressing Britain, Japan, Canada, and others to mobilize funds. Such efforts reveal how thin the margin has become. A coalition that must beg its own members for money is no longer operating from strength.

Taken together, the phone calls and the financial forecasts point in the same direction. Europe’s leaders are talking to Moscow because they can read a balance sheet. Kyiv’s sponsors are discovering that solidarity is cheap in speeches and expensive in euros. When the bills arrive, a coalition tends to discover how united it really was.

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Via libera del Senato alla legge “garantista” di Enrico Costa. Il capogruppo di Forza Italia alla Camera esulta ovviamente di fronte alla notizia che il Senato, in meno di un’ora di dibattito, ha definitivamente votato la sua proposta di legge sull’obbligo per tutti i media, giornali, siti, tv, di pubblicare “una sentenza di assoluzione, di proscioglimento o di non luogo a procedere, o un provvedimento di archiviazione” se il protagonista del caso, oggetto di un articolo che dava conto del suo coinvolgimento giudiziario, ne fa esplicita richiesta. La notizia è che su una legge che riguarda la giustizia, protagonista in tutta la legislatura di un duro conflitto tra il governo Meloni e le opposizioni, stavolta invece non va così. Scontato il voto favorevole della maggioranza, ma proprio l’opposizione non ne dà uno contrario, ma si astiene, contestando soprattutto il ruolo attribuito al Garante della privacy che, di fronte alla frenata dei media e alla richiesta del soggetto coinvolto, “entro 5 giorni”, quindi un tempo brevissimo, analizza il caso e rende obbligatoria la pubblicazione. Dichiarandolo in aula si astengono M5S, Pd, Avs e Iv. L’unica voce contraria, con meno di un minuto di intervento, è quella del Dem Filippo Sensi che parla “a titolo personale”. Contro il tentativo “di vendicarsi dei giornalisti, del loro lavoro, della libertà di informazione, in un contesto nel quale il giornalismo è sotto attacco, maltollerato e colpito da poteri vari, anche economici, da governi e purtroppo anche dai Parlamenti”.

Ovviamente, dalla Camera, arriva la soddisfazione di Costa, che ha presentato la sua proposta nei primi giorni della legislatura e poi si è battuto, anche con varie “concessioni” all’opposizione, per portarla a casa. “È una norma di civiltà e di giustizia, che tutela concretamente la reputazione delle persone coinvolte in un procedimento penale” dichiara Costa. Che commenta così l’astensione delle opposizioni: “È un segnale importante, visto che sulla giustizia ci sono state spesso divisioni nette”.

Scontata la “ola” di Forza Italia. Perché, mentre resta ancora al palo il ddl Zanettin sugli smartphone, con un duro scontro tra lo stesso Costa e i meloniani favorevoli alle richieste del procuratore nazionale Antimafia Gianni Melillo, passa invece l’obbligo di pubblicare assoluzioni e archiviazioni che entra nel Codice della privacy con il nuovo articolo 144ter. Un legge di due soli articoli, il secondo solo per escludere un carico economico, e che al primo recita così: “Su richiesta della persona nei cui confronti sono stati pronunciati sentenza di assoluzione, di proscioglimento o di non luogo a procedere ovvero provvedimento di archiviazione, il direttore o il responsabile della testata giornalistica, radiofonica, televisiva o telematica che ha dato notizia del procedimento penale o di atti o provvedimenti relativi è tenuto a dare pubblicità, senza oneri per l’interessato, alla notizia dei provvedimenti favorevoli a quest’ultimo, con rilievo adeguato allo spazio già riservato al relativo procedimento penale”. Dunque un obbligo vero e proprio che, in ben due interviste al Fatto quotidiano, secondo l’avvocato Caterina Malavenda già esiste. Per Costa invece, che lo ha ribadito ancora ieri, siamo di fronte a una norma che stabilisce un principio inderogabile: “Oggi nasce una legge profondamente garantista e liberale, perché rimette al centro la persona, la sua dignità, la sua reputazione e il suo diritto a non rimanere prigioniera per sempre di un’accusa dalla quale è uscita completamente estranea”. Per lui il voto definitivo di oggi è “una bella pagina”, di cui è “particolarmente orgoglioso” perché “la legge porta la firma di Forza Italia, a dimostrazione che il garantismo non è solo nel nostro Dna, ma soprattutto che sappiamo declinarlo in provvedimenti concreti”.

Ovviamente d’accordo con lui la capogruppo di Fi al Senato Stefania Craxi che nel voto di oggi vede “una risposta concreta a una questione di civiltà giuridica, perché quando un cittadino viene assolto o la sua posizione viene archiviata non si può consentire che il sospetto sopravviva alla verità giudiziaria”. In aula, durante il dibattito prima del voto, piena soddisfazione di Pierantonio Zanettin, il capogruppo forzista in commissione Giustizia che da venerdì scorso è candidato come laico del Csm proprio dai capigruppo Craxi e Costa, unico caso del genere nella lista degli aspiranti al Csm: “Il ddl Costa è uno dei provvedimenti più significativi dell’intera legislatura”. Perché “interviene sull’autentico paradosso del processo penale dove riceve grande visibilità mediatica l’apertura di un’indagine o un rinvio a giudizio, con conferenze stampa dei pm, spesso con toni altisonanti, sparate in prima pagina a caratteri cubitali. Poi i riflettori si spengono. Quando arrivano a soluzioni, proscioglimenti, archiviazioni l’attenzione è molto minore e non trova spazio sugli articoli di stampa”.

Ma è con il ruolo attribuito al Garante della privacy che si apre il conflitto con le opposizioni. Recita il testo che se la richiesta dell’assolto o dell’archiviato non viene pubblicata “l’interessato può rivolgere una segnalazione al Garante che decide nei cinque giorni successivi e, all’esito di tale procedimento, può ordinare la pubblicazione della notizia dei provvedimenti favorevoli per l’indagato o l’imputato”. Proprio questo dictat viene bocciato, via via nel breve dibattito a Palazzo Madama, da Ilaria Cucchi di Avs, da Ada Lopreiato di M5S, da Walter Verini del Pd. Cucchi insiste anche sull’ostinata indifferenza della maggioranza e dei meloniani sulle querele temerarie. Lopreiato contesta il coinvolgimento del Codice della privacy perché così “il ddl Costa rischia di sovrapporsi a strumenti già esistenti senza chiarire come debbono coordinarsi”. E giudica sbagliato che “le sentenze di assoluzione, di proscioglimento, di non luogo a procedere e le archiviazioni possano essere messe sullo stesso piano”. Ma soprattutto per Lopreiato la norma Costa limita “la libertà di stampa perché introduce un obbligo generalizzato a carico del direttore o del responsabile anche se la prima notizia era stata pubblicata correttamente”. Ma la maggiore criticità è quell’intervento del Garante che decide in soli cinque giorni, con l’ovvio rischio di “una procedura sommaria”.

L’ultima stoccata arriva, con “perplessità fortissime”, dal Dem Walter Verini di fronte a un ddl “delicato” che riguarda “il rapporto della maggioranza con i principi costituzionali della libertà di informazione e del diritto alla privacy”. Principi che proprio la maggioranza ha attaccato. Verini rivendica gli interventi del suo gruppo alla Camera per cambiare il testo Costa e chiude così: “I giornali non sono l’agenzia Stefani, non sono organismi di regime, debbono fare con coscienza il loro lavoro rispettando il principio della libertà di informazione, senza colpire immotivatamente la reputazione delle persone”. Ma vanno fatti i conti con “la pulsione” della maggioranza a tenere occultati i provvedimenti sui colletti bianchi. Quindi l’astensione è frutto di una norma come quella di Costa di cui “inquieta fortemente la ratio”, nonché il contesto delle iniziative di maggioranza sulla giustizia in cui si inquadra”.

L'articolo L’obbligo di pubblicare le sentenze di assoluzione è legge: anche il Senato approva il ddl di Enrico Costa (FI) proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.