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No fue la venta de ese diésel lo que le interesaba a Putin, pero no sabemos bien todavía qué.
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Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su
“Pero les diré que es raro tener conversaciones tan largas en las que ninguno de ellos quisiera terminar la conversación, ninguno de ellos quería colgar el teléfono si se puede decir así”
Yuri Ushakov. Asesor de la Presidencia rusa, 19 de mayo de 2025
“Fue una conversación muy intensa y amistosa. Nadie quería ser el primero en colgar”, reveló Ushakov, quien destacó el ambiente cordial del diálogo entre ambos mandatarios.
Yuri Ushakov. Asesor de la Presidencia rusa, 9 de octubre de 2026
El día 9 de octubre un desesperado Donald Trump -que no había extendido como gesto cordial y diplomático una felicitación por el cumpleaños de su homólogo ruso el 7 de octubre- llamó al Kremlin y entabló un acuerdo para nada modesto: habilitó la venta de petróleo y diésel rusos, mismo que había vetado apenas en septiembre con aranceles del 100% a quien comerciara con Moscú.
…acordaron que Rusia suministrará inmediatamente más de 300.000 toneladas de combustible diésel a los mercados estadounidense y mundial. Según detalló, Moscú entregará otras 500.000 toneladas durante el mes de noviembre y un millón de toneladas adicionales inmediatamente después, así como otros tres millones de toneladas en un corto período de tiempo, dependiendo del estado de las refinerías rusas.
La noticia cayó mal en Kiev y en Europa e incluso congeló la conversación que mantenían una comitiva ucraniana con Kushner y Witkoff en Miami, terminándola un día antes de lo previsto.
La Europa desconcertada empezó a tener comunicaciones con Zelensky para mostrar de nuevo el apoyo a esta demencial apuesta por la guerra en donde Ucrania pone los muertos y los europeos endeudan a los ucranianos que quedan vivos.
Sin embargo, los vaivenes del presidente estadounidense no son nuevos y mucho menos en lo que tiene que ver con suministro energético. Una breve cronología lo confirma: 1) tras el inicio de la guerra contra Irán el 28 de febrero de este año, Trump se vio obligado el 5 de marzo a dar una licencia temporal para que India comprara petróleo a Rusia; 2) el 12 de marzo se emitió otra licencia temporal por parte del Departamento del Tesoro estadounidense por treinta días para venta de crudo ruso, que estaba sancionado; 3) el 18 de septiembre, Donald Trump firma la Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, que le daba el poder de imponer aranceles de hasta 100% a los 5 mayores compradores de petróleo y gas rusos (principalmente China e India); 4) finalmente este 9 de septiembre suspendió Trump esa ley exhibida con toda la parafernalia propia del siniestro gobierno Trump, por parte del senador Richard Blumenthal, quien dijo: “Vladimir Putin, te tenemos fichado, tu economía se tambalea” … amenazó a China e India y hoy, Trump da las gracias al presidente Putin por salvarle el trasero en vísperas de elecciones.
Y así, como un Déjà vu, Yuri Ushakov volvió a decir las mismas palabras del año anterior: ninguno de los dos quería colgar. Y bueno esta vez colgaron a Zelensky y a la Unión Europea, la pregunta es: ¿cuándo volverá a dar otro bandazo Trump? ¿Cuándo volverá a ser amigo de von der Leyen, mentor de Zelensky y enemigo de Putin?
La Unión Europea, ridículo completo
Es sabido por ellos y por varios analistas esta cruda verdad: Trump no quiere a los europeos, a penas los soporta, siempre ha querido sacar las tropas de esa zona, siempre quiso salir de la OTAN, les puso en ridículo desde las primeras reuniones, les dijo que estaban muriendo las buenas costumbres con una Europa llena de migración desordenada y grupos LGBTI+Q por todo lado, hombres en competencias de mujeres y etc. etc. El propio J.D. Vance les dijo que había una caída moral de Europa y a eso se debía su crisis.
No siendo esto poco, Úrsula von der Leyen se comprometió en nombre de la UE a comprar 750.000 millones de dólares en energía a EE.UU. (gas natural licuado, petróleo y productos nucleares) hasta 2028. Además, se comprometió a realizar inversiones adicionales por 600.000 millones de dólares en Estados Unidos. Y a cambio, Estados Unidos fijó un arancel general del 15% sobre la mayoría de productos europeos, en lugar del 30%.
Y ahora, luego de tanto ir y venir, Estados Unidos le sigue comprando petróleo a Rusia, además de uranio y otros materiales que luego revende a Europa más caro. Ya los precios de gas están reventando al ciudadano común y mientras Trump viola las sanciones occidentales que pretenden asfixiar a Rusia, Europa tiene que pagar por tratos leoninos con EE.UU., invertir en la guerra en Ucrania y exprimir al poco Estado de Bienestar que les queda y del cual ya se ven revueltas nuevamente por vivienda, educación o empleo en Francia, España, Alemania, Portugal y Bélgica.
Este nuevo pacto comercial, que va hasta abril de 2027 ridiculiza a Europa, la pone en el lugar que le corresponde: el de una civilización – collage en decadencia. Europa anhela el regreso de los halcones demócratas para retornar a una presión unánime sobre Rusia y en franca escalada bélica como la llevaba ‘sleepy’ Biden. Esto no pasará. El nuevo rumbo estadounidense es Asia Oriental.
Rusia y sus socios, actores globales
Si bien esta venta es un golpe no sólo económico sino reputacional a favor del presidente Putin y Rusia, también deja abiertos otros aspectos no menos relevantes.
Por un lado, China mira con celo cualquier acercamiento entre Rusia y USA en este baile de tres potencias globales. Los chinos son los principales socios comerciales de los rusos y muy seguramente de mantenerse la restricción al diésel ruso, chinos e indios lo comprarían. Entonces, ¿qué ganó y condicionó Vladímir Putin en la llamada con Trump? Los rusos tienen acuerdos comerciales y han aprendido a maniobrar en medio de más de treinta mil sanciones así que este trato fue un guiño a Trump ante su SOS.
Es claro que no le cae mal esto a Rusia que ahora puede poner un precio no por debajo de los costos -de haberlo tenido que vender con restricciones por sanciones- pero quien marcó el teléfono fue Trump no Putin.
Por otro lado, Irán no creo que esté cómodo con esto. Con claridad Trump quiere no sólo estar bien con los precios y abastecimiento de combustible en su país, sino estar lo suficientemente seguro de que se mantiene un flujo nada modesto de diésel en el mercado mundial para atacar a Irán sin problemas o no tantos. Por cierto, hay que ser una potencia para decir sin duda alguna: ‘cuente señor Trump con tres millones de toneladas de diésel’. Sin lastimar su consumo interno, lo hace Rusia.
Además, la ruta por el Ártico plantea una alternativa a los cierres de Ormuz y Bab el-Mandeb que derivan de las resistencias al imperio y al sionismo por parte de Irán y Yemen. Lo que implica que como de costumbre EE.UU. celebra comerciar por Alaska con Rusia.
De tal suerte que, si Irán lleva a su manera una presión mediante la diplomacia y el cierre estratégico del flujo de petróleo, fertilizantes y mercancías con lo cual busca desgastar a los estadounidenses y una salida de la guerra en sus términos, el guiño del Kremlin a Trump no le favorece. Fortalece a su enemigo, quien gana tiempo y sin desesperar puede atacarlo de mejor manera. No implica una derrota de Irán, implica un cambio en los cálculos de presión, si en abril se extiende el plazo y si Trump decide atacar antes.
Finalmente, hay un socio que los propios rusos lo señalan como valioso. Cuba. La Isla, país que apoyó a millones de personas en el mundo de diversas formas y cuando sucedió en 1986 la catástrofe de Chernóbil en la URSS hace cuarenta años, en pleno Periodo Especial, Cuba recibió a 26 mil niños de Rusia, Bielorrusia, Moldavia y Ucrania para darles tratamiento y los adoptó como hijos propios. Esa Cuba amiga incondicional y solidaria no recibe petróleo desde hace un año largo y en septiembre la Guardia Costera de EE.UU. devolvió el buque Grace con combustible.
Sobre Cuba se teje un genocidio. No le llega combustibles ni mercancías. ¿Se habrá acordado el presidente Putin de la Isla, patria del más grande antiimperialista del siglo XX en todo occidente cuando negoció con Trump salvando el trasero a su enemigo, este republicano vetusto? Si Trump permitió liberar de sanciones el combustible para todo el mundo, ¿Ese ‘todo el mundo’ incluirá a Cuba?
Potencias: sin amigos y sin engaños
Es claro que cuando el asesor presidencial, Ushakov, señala que la conversación fue amable y llego a un punto de: ‘cuelga tú, ¡no!, ¡cuelga tú!’ entre los dos mandatarios, sólo desea crear una sobrecarga de cortisol en la UE y los ucronazis y seguro logró tal efecto. Esto no significa que crean que están tratando con la esperanza de una amistad. Por el contrario, sólo un pragmatismo puro y duro tiene las tripas para llegar a estos acuerdos.
Qué pasaría si el presidente Putin le dice a Trump: no te daré un gramo de diésel. No lo sabremos, pero seguro ofende a este tarado mental y lo pone del lado de Europa y Ucrania.
Es el mismo hombre que respaldó a Marco Rubio, su secretario de Estado, cuando hace unos meses celebraba los bombardeos sobre colegios de infantes en Rusia señalando que era válida la máxima presión. Es el mismo hombre que autoriza la entrega de datos de la CIA y el Pentágono a los ucronazis para atacar las mismas refinerías que condena que Zelensky ataque.
Esto también es claro, como nota al pie. El propio neonazi Volodómir Zelensky, presidente ilegítimo de Ucrania hace dos años y asesino de su pueblo, tiene razón al criticar la acción de Trump y hasta de tildarlo de débil. “La paz nunca llega gracias a la debilidad”, señaló. Trump salió a decir que era ya necesario cambiar de presidente por alguien que deseara negociar, que Zelensky perdió más de un millón de ciudadanos y 30% del territorio.
Y lo que diga la UE al respecto tiene su parte de verdad, así como de ingenuidad, como señaló el presidente eslovaco Robert Fico. Pero nadie está seguro con lo que se pacte con Trump ni con ningún gringo. Nunca han mantenido la palabra. Quizá la excepción es Kennedy en la crisis de los misiles.
Siempre los más pequeños saldrán lastimados en los acuerdos entre potencias, pero no aprenden no leen la historia. Le pasó a Cuba en 1962 en la crisis de los misiles. Le pasó a Libia, cuando decidió no tener armas nucleares y europeos y estadounidenses acordaron robarla. Europa todavía era algo fuerte. Hay más ejemplos.
Lo clave es que en este intempestivo acuerdo hay más de enemistad que de amistad. EE.UU. no desea salvar ni ayudar a Rusia. No le interesa la paz, se limpió el trasero con el acuerdo del Anchorage, sólo vela por su bienestar, el de su élite. Por su parte Putin sabe que le desean muerto, que, durante una llamada en 2025, mientras hablaba con Trump caían drones en una de sus residencias.
La diferencia sustancial radica en que Putin juega a largo aliento, tiene calculadas las contingencias. No fue la venta de ese diésel lo que le interesaba, pero no sabemos bien todavía qué. Mientras, Trump lleva una política de mentiras apalancada en el poder de los medios y el peso de la información salida de la boca del presidente de una potencia, con la cual improvisa, salva, ataja, corrige, omite y salta a otra cosa.
Lo cierto es que por ahora -y sin saber cómo despertará mañana, pensando o deseando el frustrado candidato auto propuesto a Nobel de paz- felizmente al terminar la llamada, los presidentes, además de colgar sus teléfonos, colgaron a Zelensky y a la Unión Europea.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
When a plurality of Canadians voted for Mark Carney’s Liberal Party in 2025, their hope was a leader who would protect and preserve Canadian values from the American onslaught of Donald Trump. Many explicitly rejected Pierre Poilievre and the Conservatives because they felt his right-wing, anti-worker values were too closely aligned with the U.S. Republican Party.
So it might disappoint Canadians to know that Mark Carney is not only continuing Justin Trudeau’s controversial labour relations regime, but quickly expanding his attack upon the working class, couching in it neutral buzzwords like “modernization” all while making it clear that the goal is to make the capitalist class happy by assuring them Canadian workers have fewer rights than they used to.
You don’t have to take my word for it; you can see the doublespeak from key members of the Carney cabinet. First up is Minister of Jobs and Families (remember, Carney refuses to have a real Minister of Labour) Patty Hajdu, who went onto the CBC to defend her government’s attack on the right to strike. Puzzlingly, Hajdu suggested that while Carney supports strike rights, their new legislation will seek to address the five per cent of cases where strike action becomes disruptive. But herein lies the trick that Hajdu even admits: collective bargaining works, because 95 per cent of the time, there are no labour stoppages. That five per cent number? Hajdu is effectively saying that she wants workers to have the ‘right’ to strike, so long as they don’t use it in the five per cent of cases they currently do. A right that exists so long as it isn’t exercised, in other words.
Indeed, more candid reporting from CTV confirmed that Carney’s objective is to go even farther than Trudeau and Stephen Harper: to not only use back-to-work legislation, but propose new legislation that “will be aimed at introducing binding mediation before strike action is taken.” This is a shocking escalation of anti-labour policy, even for the already right-wing Mark Carney. The reason is even more chilling as per CTV:
Industry’s message to the government was that its traditional tool to use for binding arbitration, Section 107 of the Canadian Labour Code, can only be applied too late in the labour dispute process and from its perspective, does not adequately prevent the damage caused from a work stoppage.
Put another way, corporations feel the government’s anti-labour tools aren’t strong enough, and that the only way to ensure investors are happy is to stop strikes before they can even manifest. But this defeats the whole purpose of strikes: they are indeed rare, but when they do happen, they must be disruptive to enact vital economic victories that benefit union members and the wider working class. This is something Avi Lewis and the NDP made clear in strong opposition to Carney’s union-busting scheme. If Carney and his capitalist buddies argue that strikes can only happen when they cause zero economic disruption, they are effectively calling for an abolition of the right to strike in practice.
This focus on pleasing investors was the central and explicit concern of Minister of Transport Steven MacKinnon. In a discussion with Rosemary Barton, MacKinnon parroted Hajdu’s insistence that while the right to strike still exists, workers better not use it: “It harms investment, harms employment, maybe even particularly in unionized environments. So we need a better framework for getting to agreements between employers and their employees.”
Again, the crux of the Carney argument is that workers’ rights are bad for business. And that if any company fears a union could strike for better wages, improved working conditions, and fair and equitable treatment, that would hurt the bottom line, and they might be less likely to invest. So, for Carney to entice the Trump-aligned American capitalists that Canadians wanted protection from, he must crush the workers under his boot, including their basic right to withhold their labour as guaranteed by the Charter.
Carney may say he opposes Trump, but his ideal Canada is a Republican dream of an anti-union southern Red state. The man elected to save Canada? He’s the one dissolving it from the inside for the benefit of capitalists, including American businessmen who supported Trump. Once Carney’s done selling away our rights and our infrastructure with the help of American banks like Morgan Stanley, he’ll be fine. But Canadians will be left picking up the pieces of a Trumpified Canada for generations.
Original article: ricochet.media
European Union leaders are preparing for a two-day summit in Brussels dominated by the economic consequences of the Middle East conflict, Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine and mounting pressure on governments to reconcile defence commitments with deteriorating public finances.
The European Council meeting on 15–16 October will bring together the leaders of the 27 member states to consider immediate measures addressing high energy prices alongside longer-term decisions on competitiveness, enlargement, migration and the EU’s budget for 2028–2034.
European Council President António Costa has placed economic competitiveness and energy costs at the centre of the discussions, reflecting concerns that the disruption of global oil and gas markets is threatening the bloc’s industrial recovery.
The meeting also takes place against the background of renewed disputes over national spending limits, with Italy and Greece seeking greater freedom to finance energy relief and France facing increasing pressure over the credibility of its budget.
The Middle East conflict has created a renewed energy shock for European economies, raising transport and industrial costs while pushing inflation higher.
The disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has also affected global oil supplies, exposing Europe’s continuing dependence on internationally traded fossil fuels despite efforts to diversify imports following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
European leaders are expected to consider targeted and temporary support measures for households and businesses, as well as longer-term policies intended to reduce energy dependence.
The political disagreement concerns how those measures should be financed.
The European Commission has resisted requests from Italy and Greece for further exemptions from the EU’s fiscal framework. Both governments argue that extraordinary energy costs require additional budgetary flexibility.
Brussels maintains that existing provisions already permit exceptional expenditure within defined limits.
The disagreement is particularly difficult for indebted governments that must simultaneously finance military expansion, maintain public services and protect their economies from energy inflation.
France’s position has added urgency to the debate. Its borrowing costs have increased sharply as investors question whether the government can adopt a credible budget ahead of the 2027 presidential election.
A summit agreement on emergency energy assistance would therefore have to accommodate substantially different national fiscal circumstances.
Support for Ukraine remains a central item on the summit agenda as Russia continues attacks against Ukrainian cities, energy infrastructure and industrial facilities.
EU leaders are expected to review military and financial assistance, the implementation of sanctions against Moscow and the resilience of Ukraine’s economy.
The discussions take place amid renewed uncertainty surrounding American weapons deliveries.
Washington’s reported threats to suspend supplies under the NATO-backed PURL procurement arrangement have raised further questions about Europe’s dependence on the United States for advanced military equipment.
European governments have increased defence expenditure and committed additional support to Ukraine, but replacing American capabilities remains difficult, particularly in air defence, precision-guided weapons and certain intelligence systems.
The summit is unlikely to resolve those industrial limitations, but the broader question of Europe’s ability to sustain Ukrainian defence over several years will influence discussions.
Member states must also consider how increased defence expenditure will be financed alongside other demands on national budgets.
The EU’s published summit agenda includes Russian-linked hybrid attacks within Europe.
The issue has gained prominence as European governments investigate sabotage, cyber operations, information interference and threats against infrastructure and defence-related industries.
Recent warnings concerning possible Russian assassination operations targeting European defence executives and employees of companies supplying Ukraine illustrate the changing nature of the security threat.
Such activities place additional demands on national intelligence services, police forces and European institutions responsible for cross-border cooperation.
The EU has strengthened its sanctions instruments against hybrid activities, but enforcement remains dependent on coordination between national authorities.
Any further measures would need to address intelligence sharing, protection of critical infrastructure and the relationship between internal security and the Union’s wider Russia policy.
Enlargement will form another important part of the discussions following the Commission’s proposals for preparing a wider Union.
Brussels has outlined possible institutional safeguards intended to prevent future members from undermining democratic standards or blocking common decisions.
Montenegro and Albania are advancing through their accession negotiations, while Ukraine and Moldova remain central to the EU’s geopolitical enlargement strategy.
The financial implications will become increasingly important as governments negotiate the next multiannual financial framework covering 2028–2034.
Existing members are already divided over how much the EU should spend, which programmes should receive priority and whether additional common resources should be raised.
Agricultural expenditure, cohesion funding, defence investment and support for Ukraine will compete for resources within the same budget negotiations.
The Commission argues that enlargement can be accommodated through targeted reforms, but securing agreement among member states will require decisions on future expenditure and the distribution of financial benefits.
Leaders will also examine progress on the One Europe, One Market agenda, which aims to reduce barriers to economic activity within the EU and improve conditions for European businesses.
The initiative is intended to address structural weaknesses affecting investment, industrial development and the ability of European companies to compete internationally.
High energy prices have made those concerns more immediate, particularly for industries competing against producers in economies where electricity and fuel are cheaper.
The European Council will be asked to provide direction on measures planned for 2026 and 2027, but implementation will depend on subsequent legislation and decisions by member states.
The October meeting brings several unresolved European policy questions into the same negotiation: how to protect economic competitiveness, maintain fiscal credibility, finance defence, sustain Ukraine and prepare for enlargement.
The immediate test will be whether leaders can agree on a credible response to energy prices without reopening broader disputes over national budgets.
More difficult decisions concerning defence financing, institutional reform and the EU’s long-term expenditure commitments will extend well beyond the two-day summit.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
Where growth persists, and at what cost
Those who study economic crises tend to imagine them as sudden shocks: a collapse that triggers panic, a stock market that plummets in a single session, a border that closes. These are the events of 2008 and 2020, the storms that mark a before and after. But there is a second form of suffering, less photogenic and more insidious, which does not make the headlines: slow paralysis, the absence of growth, an economy spinning its wheels without ever sinking or regaining momentum. This condition was familiar to seafarers. The sailing ships crossing the Atlantic feared hurricanes, but they also feared the Sargasso Sea, that currentless expanse where the wind died down and the hull remained trapped in seaweed for weeks. In 2026, the global economy is facing this second threat above all, and it is like the Titanic, as Leonid Grigoryev brilliantly wrote.
The ocean liner, to stick with the metaphor, has not sunk: it is afloat, and still growing, but it is making slow progress and its hull is holed in several places. Lookouts scan a fog that shows no sign of lifting, and captains are banking on the iceberg staying at bay. In its July forecasts, the International Monetary Fund has revised its global growth forecast for 2026 downwards, bringing it to 3 per cent compared with 3.5 per cent the previous year. Translated into absolute terms, against a global GDP exceeding one hundred trillion dollars at purchasing power parity, that half-point loss amounts to hundreds of billions that will not be converted into wages, tax revenue or investment. The tariff war between Washington and Brussels is being absorbed by the main players, but it leaves in its wake realignments and collateral friction, from Ireland to Canada; and, for purely accounting rather than political reasons, the prospect of the United Kingdom’s economic fragmentation is resurfacing.
The post-pandemic expansionary phase has never followed a clear course, and continues to come up against the obstacles of geopolitics. One driver in particular has fuelled GDP growth in recent quarters: the rush to build data centres. This represents a massive and geographically concentrated demand for investment, which has driven exports from Asian suppliers of semiconductors and equipment — South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand — but which relies on just a few companies and on expected returns that have yet to be realised. Such a cycle fuels GDP as long as construction work is under way; the crux of the matter arises later, when the installed capacity must generate revenues commensurate with the capital expended. Outside this framework, economies that grow do so for internal reasons: China on the strength of its own demand and manufacturing, India on its domestic market, and the United States on a combination of immigration, capital inflows and public spending.
The American case in particular warrants a clarification that debunks a common misconception. Every year, the United States imports goods worth around one trillion dollars more than it exports, and at the same time its leaders lament the loss of its industrial base. The two circumstances are not contradictory: they are the same equation viewed from two sides. A current account deficit of such proportions is, by accounting definition, nothing other than the counterpart to foreign savings flowing into the United States: the world supplies goods and, in return, accumulates assets in dollars, Treasury bonds and shares. As long as the greenback remains the reserve currency and the US securities market the most liquid pool available, this privilege finances the deficit on terms unattainable for anyone else. The same flow, however, props up the real exchange rate, penalises the export-oriented industry and is precisely what causes the deindustrialisation that is so often lamented. Tariffs strike at the trade side whilst leaving the financial root intact: they reshape the balance, they do not eliminate it.
The stranglehold of yields and the burden of debt
Towards the middle of the year, global inflation picked up again, driven largely by rising energy prices. A rise in prices stemming from costs, rather than excess demand, presents central banks with their most unpleasant choice: to rein in an economy already weakened by the shock, so as not to allow expectations to become unanchored. High energy prices act as a regressive tax, eroding disposable income and feeding through to price levels at the slow pace dictated by index-linked contracts and regulated prices.
On the debt front, the strain is even more evident. Yields on long-term government bonds are rising at an alarming rate: in the United States, the 10-year yield has hit 5 per cent, with other advanced economies following suit. It is not just the level that matters, but its structure. The long end of the curve is reflecting a rising term premium – that is, the compensation investors demand for tying up money over long horizons when inflation and the volume of new money entering the system remain uncertain. The stock of debt is already colossal, and the cheap bonds issued during the era of zero interest rates are being replaced, as they mature, with far more expensive issues: the average cost rises with a lag, but it does rise. Here, elementary and inflexible arithmetic prevails: the comparison between the real interest rate and the rate of real growth. When the economy grows faster than the cost of its debt, the burden eases of its own accord; when the relationship is reversed — and this is what is happening today in several wealthy countries — keeping the debt-to-GDP ratio stable requires budget surpluses that the electorate rarely allows.
A technical manoeuvre with political implications is helping to tighten the noose. The treasury departments of the major economies are seeking to return to the open market a portion of the long-term bonds hitherto held on central banks’ balance sheets, just as the latter are allowing the bonds accumulated during quantitative easing to mature and reducing their assets. The result is that the net supply of long-term bonds available to private investors increases the moment the lender of last resort steps aside; to absorb this supply, the market demands higher yields. At the same time, central banks are gradually raising interest rates to combat inflation, and the combination of these factors is pushing the system towards stagnation. It is the calm of the Sargasso Sea, not the storm. Against this backdrop, every additional unit of military spending, in budgets already stretched to the limit, becomes one unit less for healthcare, education and public works: the old choice between ‘guns and butter’, replayed on a continental scale.
Energy rents are changing hands
An entire region, the Middle East, has slipped into negative territory due to the fall in hydrocarbon production and exports. The rise in prices and margins — and, consequently, in dividends and share prices — has rewarded US energy companies, which control marginal production capacity and can turn on the taps when prices rise. This is a redistribution of rent: from the traditional supplier to the producer that has gained flexibility in recent years. The Middle East pays twice over – on its current export income and on its worn-out or damaged physical infrastructure – whilst profits migrate overseas.
Higher crude oil prices and diesel shortages do not merely weigh on factories, transport and the construction sector. Diesel powers logistics and mechanised agriculture, and a rise in its price ripples through the entire supply chain with a pervasiveness that petrol lacks. The most serious repercussions, however, lie beyond the statistics: uncertainty over energy prices raises the rate at which businesses discount long-term projects and discourages the accumulation of capital on which tomorrow’s growth depends. No prosperity can be sustained by data centres alone.
Europe in a lull
Against this backdrop, the world’s second-largest economic bloc — the European Union, including the United Kingdom, with over half a billion consumers — offers no counterbalance. Its GDP is, in practice, growing at the same rate as its population: measured per capita — the only way that truly reflects living standards — stagnation is almost total. It is weighed down by public debt and deficits, outdated industrial structures and infrastructure, and a demographic that even migration flows have failed to rejuvenate quickly enough. The underlying problem has a specific name: a productivity gap that has been widening for over a decade. Europe spends less on research and digital capital, fragments the capital market across twenty-seven legal systems, and has failed to produce technological leaders comparable to those in the US or China.
Capital is flowing out to the United States, drawn by higher returns and deeper markets; manufacturing is losing ground to Chinese production, which is now competitive not only on cost but also on technology; and politics, almost everywhere, is fragmented into fragile majorities that make any far-reaching reform a struggle. Energy costs are structurally much higher than in the United States — a legacy of dependence on imported gas and a transition launched without a stable supply bridge — and this gap is eroding energy-intensive industries. Productivity remains well below that of China in competitive sectors, and the mood of the electorate, as the polls show, is gloomier than one might expect in such a fortunate corner of the world. Meanwhile, the climate has also warmed too much, without waiting for the benefits of green programmes to materialise.
Sanctions and the tide turning
Almost everyone is aware of the dangers associated with the escalating sanctions spiral, but they dismiss them as a nuisance in day-to-day management. The point is that there is no orderly way out of the tangle of legal constraints, commercial interests and political calculations — determined by legislative and administrative bodies that fail to coordinate with one another. There remains the extreme measure that history associates with Solon: to wipe the slate clean in one go, as Athens did at the dawn of the 6th century BC with the seisachtheia, the debt relief that wiped out debts and re-established the civic pact. In the meantime, sanctions, the destruction of extraction and transport capacity, and the loss of export markets – factors that accumulate – behave like rogue waves: they plough through the oceans and return, often swelled in size, to those who generated them, in the form of imported inflation, disrupted supplies and exchange rate realignments.
There is a maxim of Clausewitz’s that can usefully be turned on its head here: if, for him, war was the continuation of politics by other means, sanctions are the continuation of war by means other than weapons. And the heaviest blows—as well as the most unjust ones—fall upon countries and social classes that are uninvolved in those conflicts and would prefer to remain so. After such experiences, it is hard not to yearn for less globalisation and less interdependence: systems theory teaches us that when the elements of a large network become unstable, the return to equilibrium is slower, because disturbances travel along the connections rather than dying out. It is the bitter flip-side of a global economy that had made integration its strength and is now discovering its vulnerability.
An inventory of imbalances
The likelihood of a recession depends, as always, on two factors: the accumulation of imbalances and a trigger which, by definition, cannot be predicted. The imbalances are the gunpowder — excessive leverage, inflated share valuations, risk concentrated among a few players, debt maturities clustered in the same months; the trigger is the event that ignites the fuse: a new pandemic, a stock market crash, a major collapse along the lines of 2008. Whether the gunpowder is accumulating is now a matter of debate amongst specialists. Added to this is a growing number of entities already sacrificed by geopolitical conflicts, by the slowdown and by the diversion of resources, diverted from development to stem the losses.
At the top of the list of forgotten costs lie global problems: poverty, development gaps and climate change. The Sustainable Development Goals set by the UN for 2030 will likely be achieved to around 17 per cent, with entire sections barely sketched out. A new-generation global project is needed, but this presupposes peace, compromise, coordination, stability and trust: all scarce resources, and trust more than any other. The ruling classes seem to have shifted their focus from long-term horizons to short-term clashes. International organisations have little impact; the major developed nations are preoccupied with their own troubles and sanctions; and no one is answering the question of who will take on the shared tasks — catch-up development, poverty reduction, and the management of global public goods. In almost every country, large sections of the population are grappling with one form of hardship or another, whether in healthcare, education or inequality of living standards.
Who will foot the bill
That burden will, by default, fall on the shoulders of the major emerging economies, whose interests largely coincide with global objectives and certainly do not run counter to them: the BRICS grouping and a number of like-minded countries. They have fewer resources than the West, but necessity compels them to coordinate their efforts. The Declaration from the latest summit, marking the group’s twentieth anniversary, rings out as a voice of reason in an era that uneasily evokes the so-called Thucydides’ Trap — that mechanism whereby mutual fear between a dominant power and an emerging one drives them towards conflict even when neither truly seeks it. There is no shortage of friction amongst the members, with divergent political systems and unequal levels of prosperity; yet the document points the way towards compromise – namely, the strengthening of the UN and the reform of the IMF – recognising that there are no radical shortcuts. In paragraph 49, it acknowledges that global challenges are intertwined and complex, hindering growth and exacerbating persistent disparities between countries and regions.
At an operational level, the Declaration outlines an industrial and energy policy tailored to the task of moving beyond the Fourth Industrial Revolution: completing infrastructure, boosting manufacturing, railways and innovation, ensuring access to technology and transitioning to home-grown technologies, whilst investing in human capital and social issues. It also defends free trade, open markets, freedom of movement and the security of global savings and finance, and puts forward an independent stance on the governance of artificial intelligence — already looking beyond the present. The fundamental demand is institutional: these countries have operated for decades within frameworks designed by the West, and are now calling for bodies that work for their own development. A review of IMF quotas to reflect actual economic weight, a broader role for institutions such as the New Development Bank, and payment channels less exposed to the geopolitical use of reserve currencies.
How much of this will translate into actual capacity remains the real unknown, to be measured in terms of probability rather than certainty. It is plausible, with moderate confidence, that over the coming years the group will consolidate settlement systems in national currencies and development financing; it is unlikely, for the time being, that it will supplant existing institutions or undermine the reserve currency – a goal that would require deep and liquid bond markets outside the dollar zone, which are not currently in evidence. The indicators to watch are tangible: the outcome of the IMF quota review, the volumes disbursed by the New Development Bank, and the share of intra-regional trade settled outside the dollar. However, those calling for institutions that serve their own development and the common good have a solid argument, because reform of the global architecture is the only arena in which partial compromises can still generate trust. Declarations of principle, repeated for years, only become part of the agenda when someone funds them.
And no inclusive governance can hold without respect for the cultural identities of peoples: that is where trust can be rebuilt – the commodity the world lacks most of all today.
The European Commission has rejected requests from Italy and Greece for greater freedom to increase public spending in response to the energy crisis, resisting pressure from two member states that argue existing budget restrictions are limiting their ability to protect households and businesses.
The decision, confirmed on 8 October, follows renewed appeals from Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis for measures recognising the exceptional financial burden imposed by higher energy prices.
Meloni wants Brussels to take greater account of unexpected inflation when assessing national budgets and to permit additional tax revenue generated by rising prices to be used for energy relief. Mitsotakis has sought the exclusion of temporary support measures for consumers and businesses from the expenditure limits agreed under the EU’s fiscal framework.
Economic Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis rejected the argument for further concessions, maintaining that the existing arrangements already take inflation into account and provide mechanisms for responding to exceptional circumstances.
The disagreement comes as Europe’s governments confront the economic consequences of the Middle East conflict, including higher fuel costs, inflationary pressures and increased demands for state intervention.
For Italy, the dispute adds to a fiscal problem that has been developing throughout the year.
The government expects its budget deficit to rise to 3.4 per cent of GDP in 2027, reversing an earlier objective of reducing borrowing below the EU’s three per cent reference value.
As EU Today reported earlier this month, Rome plans to use additional fiscal room for defence and energy-related expenditure, while public debt is projected to remain close to 138 per cent of GDP.
The new request concerns the treatment of inflation and the financial support required to offset its effects.
Energy inflation creates an unusual budgetary problem. Governments can receive additional nominal tax revenue as prices rise, particularly through consumption taxes, while simultaneously facing public pressure to compensate consumers for higher living costs.
Meloni argues that such unexpected revenue should be available for targeted assistance without forcing equivalent reductions elsewhere in national expenditure.
Brussels is reluctant to accept arrangements that could turn temporary increases in tax receipts into an opportunity for permanent spending expansion.
Italy’s position also reflects the political competition between defence spending and domestic economic support. Rome has accepted the need for higher military expenditure but faces immediate pressure from households and energy-intensive industries.
That competition was already apparent when the government chose to prioritise energy relief over the full use of defence-spending flexibility.
Greece’s request is more narrowly focused on the treatment of temporary assistance under the EU’s expenditure rules.
Athens argues that measures intended to help businesses and households manage exceptional energy costs should not be counted against the normal spending limits.
The Greek government faces an economic environment in which higher imported energy prices threaten household purchasing power and business profitability, particularly in sectors dependent on transport and fuel.
Excluding temporary relief from expenditure calculations would give Athens additional room to intervene without breaching its agreed fiscal trajectory.
The Commission, however, has resisted establishing further exemptions beyond those already provided in the fiscal framework.
Its objection is institutional as well as financial. If additional categories of emergency expenditure are repeatedly excluded from fiscal calculations, the system becomes increasingly difficult to enforce consistently across the Union.
The EU revised its fiscal governance framework in 2024, introducing nationally agreed expenditure paths intended to provide greater flexibility while maintaining sustainable public finances.
The Commission’s rules on exceptional circumstances permit member states to depart temporarily from normal requirements under specified conditions.
Those provisions have already been used to accommodate higher defence expenditure, while the Commission has also issued guidance on their application to energy-security investments.
Temporary financial assistance intended to reduce household energy bills, however, is not necessarily treated in the same way as investment in infrastructure that reduces Europe’s long-term dependence on imported fuel.
That distinction has become a source of friction between Brussels and national capitals.
Governments argue that the immediate economic effects of an international crisis require exceptional measures. The Commission is concerned that repeated concessions could weaken the credibility of the spending framework.
The Commission’s decision also comes as France faces increasing pressure over its debt and budget deficit.
The deterioration in French borrowing conditions has reinforced concerns about the risks associated with heavily indebted governments continuing to expand expenditure.
France, Italy and Greece have different fiscal positions, but the problems confronting them originate partly in the same combination of expensive energy, weak economic growth and competing spending commitments.
The dispute will now feed into preparations for the European Council meeting on 15–16 October, where energy prices and economic competitiveness are prominent agenda items.
EU leaders are expected to consider targeted and temporary measures to reduce the burden on businesses and consumers, alongside longer-term initiatives intended to reduce dependence on fossil fuels.
The Commission’s refusal to provide Italy and Greece with further fiscal exemptions establishes the limits within which those discussions will take place.
National governments remain free to introduce assistance, but Brussels is insisting that they account for its cost within the fiscal rules already agreed.
For Rome and Athens, the question is whether those rules provide sufficient room to respond to an energy crisis whose duration remains uncertain.
France is coming under increasingly direct pressure from its eurozone partners to resolve the political dispute surrounding its 2027 budget, with European finance ministers warning that continued uncertainty threatens confidence in the country’s public finances.
The warning follows a sharp increase in French government borrowing costs. Yields on ten-year sovereign bonds have risen by nearly 80 basis points since September, reaching levels last recorded in 2002. Investors are demanding higher returns to finance a government whose debt continues to increase while its capacity to impose spending restraint remains constrained by parliamentary divisions.
At the Eurogroup’s October discussions, finance ministers and European Central Bank officials pressed Paris to demonstrate that it can adopt a credible budget and comply with its commitments under the EU’s fiscal framework.
France’s difficulties have implications beyond its domestic politics. As the eurozone’s second-largest economy, France occupies a position fundamentally different from smaller countries that experienced sovereign debt crises during the previous decade.
The French government expects to borrow approximately €340 billion in 2027, making continued access to financial markets at sustainable rates an essential element of its fiscal strategy.
That financing requirement reflects both the need to cover the annual deficit and to refinance existing debt as government securities mature.
France’s public debt is already approaching 120 per cent of gross domestic product. As EU Today previously reported, official projections indicated that the debt ratio could reach 121.7 per cent in 2027, up from 115.7 per cent at the end of 2025.
The latest increase in yields adds another complication. Higher interest costs do not affect the entire stock of debt immediately because much of it was issued at earlier rates. They do, however, increase the cost of new borrowing and refinancing, progressively reducing the money available for other government commitments.
France also faces a difficult political timetable. With the presidential election approaching in 2027, parties are reluctant to accept measures involving spending reductions, higher taxation or changes to public services.
Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu’s government has been attempting to reduce the deficit from an estimated 5.4 per cent of GDP in 2026 towards five per cent. Even that objective remains substantially above the EU’s three per cent reference value.
Economic Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis has emphasised the importance of predictable fiscal policy and credible deficit reduction.
France is already subject to the EU’s excessive deficit procedure, under which member states must demonstrate progress towards agreed fiscal objectives.
The reformed European fiscal framework permits certain deviations from expenditure commitments in exceptional circumstances, but it does not provide an unrestricted exemption from debt sustainability requirements.
Paris therefore faces a double constraint. It must convince domestic political forces to support a budget while demonstrating to Brussels that its spending plans are sufficiently credible.
The danger is not necessarily an immediate financing crisis. France retains a large, diversified economy, deep financial markets and substantial tax-raising capacity.
The more immediate risk is that prolonged political deadlock produces progressively higher borrowing costs, making future fiscal adjustments more expensive.
The European Central Bank has instruments designed to counter destabilising market conditions, but these are not intended to finance governments that are unwilling or unable to implement sustainable fiscal policies.
Bank of France Governor Emmanuel Moulin said on 7 October that France did not currently require ECB assistance. He argued that the solution lay in adopting a credible budget rather than expecting monetary intervention.
His position follows increasing speculation about whether the ECB could intervene if French bond yields continue rising.
Such intervention would raise difficult questions about the relationship between monetary policy and national fiscal responsibility. The ECB must consider financial stability across the entire eurozone, but it cannot remove the political obligations of individual governments.
France’s existing excessive deficit procedure also complicates its eligibility for certain forms of exceptional support.
France’s problems are developing at a particularly difficult moment for European public finances.
Governments are confronting higher defence commitments, expensive measures to protect households against energy inflation and demands for greater investment in industrial competitiveness.
Italy, another heavily indebted eurozone economy, is facing related pressures. The combination places additional importance on the credibility of the EU’s fiscal rules.
The political consequences within France are already visible. Marine Le Pen has presented a programme proposing €140 billion in spending reductions, while other parties have advanced sharply different approaches to taxation, debt and public expenditure.
Those competing programmes illustrate the difficulty of securing a parliamentary consensus capable of reassuring markets.
The approaching presidential election reduces the likelihood of a durable settlement before voters choose France’s next head of state.
Eurozone partners cannot resolve that impasse from Brussels or Frankfurt. They can insist on fiscal commitments and provide a framework for adjustment, but the political decisions remain with Paris.
France’s immediate challenge is to prevent its budget dispute from becoming a broader loss of confidence in the government’s capacity to manage its finances.
Die EU verlängert ihre Russland-Sanktionen um drei Jahre. Damit wird der Wirtschaftskrieg zum Geschäftsmodell: zugunsten US-amerikanischer Energiekonzerne und Fonds – und zulasten der Europäer. Wer sich in diesen Tagen die Entscheidung der EU anschaut, die Strafmaßnahmen gegen Russland für volle drei Jahre zu verlängern, muss sich unwillkürlich an Julian Assanges Diktum erinnert fühlen:
„Das eigentliche Ziel ist ein endloser Krieg, kein erfolgreicher Krieg.“
Denn der völkerrechtswidrige Wirtschaftskrieg gegen Russland mittels einseitiger Sanktionen, der in kolonialer Absicht formal auf eine Verhaltensänderung Moskaus gerichtet ist, wird zum Selbstzweck.
Ungeachtet der Zerstörungen, die die Sanktionen in der Wirtschaft der EU-Mitgliedstaaten selbst anrichten, schält sich immer deutlicher heraus: Die Verewigung der EU-Sanktionen, die bisher halbjährlich oder jährlich verlängert wurden, dient vor allem der Interessendurchsetzung von US-Energiekonzernen sowie der Profitmaximierung von US-Investmentfonds wie BlackRock. Durch die Sanktionen erlangen sie unter anderem eine Monopolstellung bei der Energieversorgung Europas und können zu viel höheren Preisen verkaufen als eine mögliche russische Konkurrenz.
Die Investmentfonds profitieren wiederum von der begleitenden Hochrüstungspolitik – nicht nur in den USA, sondern auch durch ihre Beteiligungen an deutschen Rüstungsschmieden wie Rheinmetall.
Es gibt also ein Profitinteresse sowohl daran, den Wirtschaftskrieg zu verlängern, als auch daran, die Situation gegenüber Russland zu eskalieren. Dieses Interesse schlägt über die Europäer voll durch.
Es mag paradox klingen, aber ein erfolgreicher Wirtschaftskrieg würde dieses Bereicherungsmodell rasch beenden. Dass man jetzt für die kommenden drei Jahre Sanktionen verhängt, zeigt denn auch, dass man kein Interesse an einer schnellen Beendigung des Stellvertreterkrieges des Westens in der Ukraine hat. Mit einer Verhaltensänderung wird nicht gerechnet. Die Sanktionen sind zum Modell geworden, die Europäer auszurauben. Sie sind nichts anderes als ein Unterwerfungsakt unter die Vorgaben aus den USA. Der Vasallenstatus der Europäer wird so weiter vertieft – bis hin zur Gefahr, dass man die Bereitschaft zeigt, sich selbst für Washington aufzuopfern.
Es ist denn auch kein Widerspruch dazu, dass man, während man die Sanktionen gegen 3.000 Personen und Organisationen verlängert, zwei russische Oligarchen jetzt davon ausnehmen will. Die Aufhebung der EU-Strafmaßnahmen gegen Alischer Usmanow und Michail Fridman dient den Interessen einzelner Mitgliedstaaten und ist offenbar der verzweifelte Versuch, Russland zum eigenen Vorteil destabilisieren zu wollen.
Grönland als Vertragsmodell
Immer deutlicher wird hingegen, dass sich die Europäer dem aktualisierten US-Kolonialmodell unterordnen. Während der deutsche Kanzler Merz das Abkommen über Grönland zwischen Dänemark und den USA als Erhalt der Souveränität feiert, spricht der Text der Vereinbarung eine ganz andere Sprache.
Das Abkommen von 1951 war an die NATO gebunden und an dänische Mitwirkung gekoppelt. Der neue Deal gilt ohne Enddatum und überdauert sogar eine mögliche Unabhängigkeit Grönlands. Die USA sichern sich dauerhafte Stützpunkte, können weitere Basen mit dem Schutz des amerikanischen Kontinents begründen und müssen über das Prinzip neuer Standorte nicht mehr verhandeln, sondern nur noch über deren Ausführung. US-Truppen bewegen sich frei zu Land, zu Wasser und in der Luft – nun auch unter Wasser –, ohne dass dänische Behörden in Grönland dafür noch die Regeln setzen.
Hinzu kommt ein Vetorecht: gegen militärische Präsenz von Nicht-NATO-Staaten und gegen Investitionen von außerhalb der westlichen Blöcke in sensible Sektoren und Ressourcen. Formal bleibt die Souveränität Dänemarks und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht Grönlands bestätigt. Tatsächlich entstehen quasi extraterritoriale Entitäten, in denen Kopenhagen und Nuuk nichts zu sagen haben. Die USA bestimmen die zentralen Bereiche der Politik auf der Insel und sichern sich ein privilegiertes Ausbeutungsrecht.
Ein Modell für die ganze Hemisphäre
Zugleich wurde ein Vertragsmodell geschaffen, das auch für andere Gegenden der westlichen und der nördlichen Hemisphäre gelten soll: von Venezuela über die Kanalzone in Panama bis hin zu den Küsten Kanadas.
Es ist zugleich das Modell für eine Zerschlagung Russlands, die als Folge des Abnutzungskriegs in der Ukraine angestrebt wird, um gegenüber China wieder in die Vorhand zu kommen und den eigenen Niedergang aufzuhalten.
Moral des Völkermords
Die Moral dieser Ordnung hat US-Präsident Donald Trump vor der UN mit seiner Auslöschungsdrohung gegenüber dem Iran zusammengefasst. Sollte der Iran nicht den Vorgaben aus Washington zustimmen, dann „treibe ich sie in die Hölle“. Es ist die Moral des Völkermords.
Es liegt auf der Hand, dass der immer höhere Einsatz des Westens im Versuch, die Welt zu kolonisieren, die entsprechenden Gegenkräfte auf den Plan rufen wird. Allein in Europa wird man diese bei einer Kompradorenbourgeoisie vergeblich suchen.
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Is Trump planning on using Putin to get him out of the mess of both his low polling and the Iran war? Seems far-fetched perhaps at first, but he is completely snared in Iran, with whatever option he looks at appearing to be a doomsday scenario. Could Putin help him out both with diesel prices back home but also to broker a deal with Iran which makes it appear to Americans that he, and America, are somehow the winners?
For the Russian president to sell close to 2 million tonnes of diesel oil to Western countries, including the U.S. of course, seems like a sticking plaster to a huge wound in the American and Western economies. Unless, that is, there is a second deal behind it which journalists and pundits are not aware of, or are simply choosing not to report. For the diesel initiative from Putin, the amount which is being offered isn’t huge, but there are a couple of precedents which it sets which are more important.
Firstly, it opens the doors for further lifting of sanctions (which could be bundled into Iran’s, given Moscow’s relations with Tehran), but perhaps even more importantly, it makes President Zelensky of Ukraine an even bigger target for Trump. Much will rest on the coming days and the decision that Zelensky will take to continue bombing Russia’s oil facilities. Will he take that suicide pill? Wars are often messy, and there are always grey areas where the two countries at war with one another find situations which are illogical and impractical. Perhaps the bombing of oil facilities within Russia in the Ukraine war has reached its tipping point, and regardless of how close EU leaders are with Zelensky – who at best we can call a caretaker leader – this will test this relationship to breaking point.
Do great numbers of citizens in France and Germany need to die this winter simply because of an energy crisis and/or an economic malaise in their own countries which have poured billions into keeping the war in Ukraine alive? Is Putin so confident that this winter will be the last one for his troops, as the defensive line between Ukraine’s forces and those of Russia’s looks like it is about to break at any moment? Are Ukrainians themselves ready to face a freezing winter in Kiev, unable to power or heat their own apartments? So many wars started over energy reserves, but not Ukraine. Yet it might end over them.
Trump’s threatening comments on social media about Zelensky should be taken seriously. If Trump’s own cabal of unqualified advisers can seriously convince him that a ground invasion of Iran is feasible, if not winnable, one could argue simply that regime change in Ukraine should be a children’s picnic and gives him a huge payday – politically, economically and geopolitically. Removing Zelensky would stop the war immediately, and Trump could claim victory for that, while he asks his friend Putin to quietly intervene in Iran and fix the Straits of Hormuz.
For Trump to actually respond to Zelensky’s outburst to reporters that the move to buy Russian diesel was “weak” by threatening Zelensky with being removed shows that his patience has reached a point where he is starting to think of the Ukrainian president as the source of the problems. To remove Zelensky through backing a rival will be hard and will pitch him against EU leaders, but one could argue relations couldn’t really get any worse, and that once Macron and Merz understand that peace is the only option and Zelensky is actually the only real obstacle to that, they will do what all EU leaders do and follow America’s lead.
We often hear analysts on YouTube talk about the game of “chicken”, but there has never been a more fleeting moment than now, as both Trump and Zelensky will be watching each other to see who blinks first. Zelensky, until now, has been playing a dangerous game of pretending to be servile to U.S. hegemony, while really just taking the cash and weapons and laughing at Trump among a coterie of weak European leaders in their palatial residences. The war has been complex since it began, as the U.S. and EU rarely saw eye to eye, but if Trump goes ahead with his threat of denying the Ukrainians shared intel, then this will be a very bad omen for the future of Zelensky, as he will put even more pressure on the British, French and Germans to come up with more weapons and money in an unwinnable war which they’ve bet the farm on and their entire political careers depend on.
The war, after this diesel decision, might have just become much simpler and more binary, and a collective narrative might emerge from the insanity of EU gibberish from countries who can’t even protect their own people on their own soil against an invasion of bogus asylum seekers. It will not only be the ultimate test for U.S.-Ukraine relations, but also one for U.S.-EU ones, and perhaps represent the end of NATO as we know it.
European intelligence agencies have warned that Russia is intensifying efforts to assassinate executives of defence companies supplying Ukraine, extending its campaign of sabotage and intimidation into the European military-industrial sector.
According to intelligence assessments obtained from five European security services, Moscow has ordered an expansion of covert operations targeting senior figures at major arms manufacturers and smaller companies producing drones and military components. Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the BfV, has reportedly advised executives to strengthen personal security, while some manufacturers have already increased protection for senior personnel.
The warnings emerged alongside reports of an alleged assassination plot against Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. Polish authorities convened an emergency security meeting and subsequently detained a suspect. No connection between the Polish case and Russian intelligence has been established.
The apparent expansion of Russian covert operations reflects a shift in Moscow’s calculations concerning Western military assistance.
President Vladimir Putin had reason to anticipate that Donald Trump’s return to the White House would weaken American support for Kyiv. Trump repeatedly questioned US military expenditure on Ukraine and advocated a negotiated settlement with Russia. A substantial reduction in American weapons deliveries could have increased pressure on Ukraine to accept Moscow’s territorial demands.
Instead, European governments assumed greater responsibility for sustaining Ukrainian defence capabilities, including financing weapons purchases and expanding domestic production.
The European Union’s €90 billion support programme for 2026–2027 allocates €60 billion to defence procurement and industrial capacity. The EU has also established mechanisms allowing Ukraine to participate in European joint procurement programmes.
Disrupting European manufacturers therefore offers Moscow a means of restricting Ukraine’s military capabilities without directly confronting NATO.
Assassination threats can interfere with procurement even when attacks are never carried out. Large manufacturers can afford extensive security arrangements, but smaller companies producing electronics, drone components and specialised equipment often lack comparable resources.
Intimidation could delay contracts, discourage investment and persuade individual suppliers to withdraw from Ukrainian defence programmes.
Russia’s alleged interest in targeting defence executives is not unprecedented. In 2024, American intelligence reportedly uncovered a Russian plot to assassinate Armin Papperger, chief executive of Rheinmetall, one of Germany’s principal suppliers of ammunition and military equipment to Ukraine.
As EU Today previously reported, Moscow has also publicly identified European factories involved in Ukrainian drone production, increasing concerns that civilian industrial facilities could become targets of Russian operations.
European authorities have investigated suspected Russian involvement in arson, infrastructure attacks and clandestine networks. An earlier cross-border investigation into alleged assassination and sabotage preparations demonstrated how intermediaries could be recruited to conduct operations while obscuring their sponsors.
Such activity also carries political consequences. Attacks against infrastructure and industrial facilities can reinforce public fears about confrontation with Russia, particularly during elections when parties advocating accommodation with Moscow seek to exploit security concerns.
Poland has already experienced mounting Russian hybrid pressure, including threats to critical infrastructure and information operations intended to aggravate domestic political divisions.
Ukraine’s continuing strikes against Russian refineries and military-industrial facilities have added economic and operational pressures to Moscow’s prolonged war effort. Russia retains substantial military production capacity, but the costs of sustaining the conflict remain considerable.
Interfering with European weapons manufacturing could serve two objectives: restricting Ukraine’s access to equipment and obstructing Europe’s longer-term rearmament.
The Kremlin does not necessarily need European governments to abandon Ukraine formally. Production delays, disrupted contracts and reluctant suppliers could reduce the practical effect of military assistance even while political commitments remain unchanged.
European governments have acknowledged the industrial challenge. In its June conclusions on European defence, the European Council called for accelerated manufacturing capacity, stronger supply chains and closer cooperation with Ukraine’s defence industry.
Russia’s apparent strategy seeks to exploit the dependence of these programmes on private companies and skilled civilian personnel.
The warnings from European intelligence agencies suggest that protecting defence executives, engineers and contractors is becoming part of the continent’s wider security responsibilities.
For Moscow, intimidation offers the possibility of weakening Ukrainian military resistance without an open confrontation with NATO. For European governments, preventing covert operations from disrupting weapons production is increasingly inseparable from their commitment to sustain Ukraine’s defence.
by Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio
“Our Earth is dying. Even NOAA admits that the super El Niño — a product of geoengineering — can alter the global climate and that the planet’s life-support system has reached a catastrophic tipping point. Global climate terrorists within the US military are intensifying their warfare operations.”
So begins a brief investigation by American Dr. Ana Maria Mihalcea (Source 1)—work that has been suppressed by mainstream media, even though the articles she publishes on her Substack are consistently based on official papers. It was she who published a confidential US Air Force dossier titled “Weather as a Force Multiplier” (link at the bottom of the article).
This document confirms, beyond any reasonable doubt, the military use of weather—a history traced back to Operation Popeye in Vietnam by our geopolitics and intelligence contributor at Gospa News International, Dr. Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, an academic at the University of Colombo (Sri Lanka)…
It is worth recalling that the US Air Force also distinguished itself by publishing a study on laboratory-created recombinant chimeric viruses—the very nature of SARS-CoV-2, which was found to be spiked with HIV…
Mihalcea adds: “Not only does ball-sized hail constitute an act of terrorism against civilians, but the toxic substances being sprayed—toxic metals, graphene, and polymers—are killing humans, plants, and animals. For years, I have maintained that it is pointless to stop biological weapons linked to COVID-19 if we do not put an end to geoengineering.“
Today, we were supposed to focus specifically on the potential correlation between the HAARP station in Alaska and the alarming intensification of El Niño; however, we will cover this in the next episode because, while searching for documentation on the subject, we uncovered other detailed “scientific scoops”!
El Niño is a periodic warming phenomenon occurring between March and February at intervals of two to seven years; it stands in contrast to La Niña, which causes cooling. This year, the phenomenon is being intensified by equatorial Pacific Ocean temperatures that are already above average.
More details in the descripyion of the VIDEO
Hurricane Isaias leaves hundreds of thousands of people without power in Alabama, Georgia and Florida, with all three states declaring emergencies Flooding is a continuing risk, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis says as he warns of a “very hazardous situation”, according to BBC.
Winds peaked at 120mph (193km/h) before Isaias made landfall in Florida late on Friday – images show houses battered by winds and felled trees.
Two people are dead in Alabama, according to the governor, while two more have been killed in separate incidents in Florida. Isaias peaked as a category three hurricane, bringing heavy rain and powerful wind, but has since been downgraded
Video of the recent floods in Chile
While researching geoengineering, we uncovered scientific studies that—when viewed together—suggest a potential link between the activity of the High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) and alterations to the ionosphere, space weather, and the Earth’s climate…
By synthesizing the astrophysical data gathered, we can state that artificial electromagnetic bombardment generated by the Alaska station can produce dangeorous effects similar to geomagnetic storms originating from the Sun or other planets.
If you missed any of the nine previous reports in the HAARP Dossier, you can revisit one of the early ones—“TOO MANY FLOODS AFTER DAZZLING AURORAS MADE BY HAARP. Dangerous Tests Funded by US NSF. As Solar project in EU“—as well as the most recent entry: “HAARP Dossier – 9: Cloudbursts, Tornadoes, and Lightning Across Italy, the EU, the USA, and Nepal (Video) Following PARS Tests in Alaska for the Third Consecutive Year—No Correlation? (at the moment in Italian only but avoidable in English with machine stranslation)“
Recent videos regarding the floods in Spain
In short, the immensely powerful HAARP antennas—located at a military base in Gakona, Alaska, and managed by the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) on behalf of the US Air Force (which nonetheless continues to fund experiments alongside the US government’s National Science Foundation, or NSF)—conduct multiple experiments each year involving the geomagnetic bombardment of the ionosphere.
“The ionosphere stretches roughly 50 to 400 miles above Earth’s surface, right at the edge of space. Along with the neutral upper atmosphere, the ionosphere forms the boundary between Earth’s lower atmosphere — where we live and breathe — and the vacuum of space.” (NASA)
As this is a program funded and utilized by the US Pentagon, we are unaware of any scientist ever publishing research on the risks associated with these activities.
With each of our investigations, however, we uncover new, unsettling secrets hidden within the many communications—ostensibly about safety—regarding geoengineering activities; activities described by them as mere study and research, but which we—along with certain European scientists who urged caution—interpret as manipulation.
Indeed, those scientists’ calls for prudence were significant enough to prompt the Pentagon (the US Department of Defense) to relinquish control of the controversial facility in 2015.
«The HAARP facility can generate artificial heating in the atmosphere to enable the study of the variability of the atmosphere, the energetic electron distribution, and how the HF radio wave propagation would be affected. The HAARP HF heater is currently the only available source of controlled ELF/VLF waves available to scientists for magnetospheric wave injection» reads on the official website as we reported in a previous investigation.
The HAARP station’s Ionospheric Research Instrument (IRI) is a massive array of 180 radio antennas spread across a 33-acre site; last August, it conducted PARS (Polar Aeronomy and Radio Science) tests for the third consecutive year prior to the onset of the flood season in Europe and across the globe, a topic we covered in our previous article, *HAARP DOSSIER – 9*.
That is not all. It conducted other tests that were not publicized as part of the official research campaigns and can only be tracked on the website by experts; this is because the UAF is required to issue a “transmission notice” to amateur radio operators, given that electromagnetic tests alter radio frequencies—and much else besides…
Today, we reveal two highly technical yet fundamental points regarding the dangerous HAARP activity—though we hope to present them in a more accessible way, even at the risk of minor scientific inaccuracies:
«The High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) will be conducting a research campaign August 25-27 UTC, with operating times specified in the table below. Operating frequencies will vary, but all HAARP transmissions will be between 2.8 MHz and 10 MHz».
This is what was stated in a “transmission notice” dated August 24, 2026 (following our Investigation No. 9) a notice that is effectively hidden from anyone unfamiliar with the website (Source 2).
Not only is this experiment unmentioned on the homepage—which still displays the previous PARS test from August 4–13, 2026, that we had reported on Italian 9 DOSSIER.
But the “Research Campaigns” section has not been updated since the PARS campaign of August 2024. How can such secrecy be explained?
This is because, as revealed in a world exclusive by Gospa News, the geomagnetic bombardment experiments of May 2024 coincided with the appearance of dazzling, anomalous aurorae borealis visible across much of the Northern Hemisphere.
However, UAF management blamed an ongoing solar storm and denied that their tests had triggered or intensified the auroras or that, by interfering with the solar storm, they might be linked to subsequent atmospheric disasters. Since then, transparency regarding the HAARP station has become optional…
DAZZLING AURORAS DEBUNKED! Artificially Caused by HAARP & US NSF. Not by a Solar Storm as CNN Told
I reiterate—for the umpteenth time—that the danger inherent in these electromagnetic bombardments of the ionosphere lies in the fact that no scientific study has ever been conducted on potential short-, medium-, or long-term adverse effects.
At present, Gospa News’ investigations represent the only source of scientific analysis regarding the temporal coincidences between HAARP experiments and anomalous—sometimes even catastrophic—atmospheric events occurring in the weeks and months immediately following them.
This was the case with another test in January 2026—also kept “hidden” and detectable only via the “transmission notice”—which preceded floods and landslides in Europe and the USA.
Now, however, we have identified a study highlighting the critical nature of the foF2 factor as altered by tests conducted at the Alaska station.
“Operating frequencies will vary, but all HAARP transmissions will be between 2.8 MHz and 10 MHz. Actual transmit days and times are highly variable based on real-time ionospheric and/or geomagnetic conditions. All information is subject to change.” reads the official notice dated August 24, 2026 (screenshot above).
“Note that due to the number of experiments and the need to make real-time schedule adjustments based on ionospheric conditions, no frequencies are specified in the table below. The included transmission notice supplement contains information on the frequencies HAARP is authorized to transmit. HAARP transmissions will only occur on our authorized frequencies”.
The communication appears quite generic, yet the notes below specify that “The emission bandwidth may be up to 46 kHz; the actual value depends on the frequency, modulation and experiment requirements”
So far, so good — given that this electromagnetic emission is well below that of a 5G installation (700 MHz, or 700,000 kHz) — but that is not the alarming indicator…
At the point 3 we read: “The authorized Effective Radiated Power (ERP) varies from 457 MW at the lower frequencies up to 3.6 GW at the higher frequencies; the actual power depends on the experiment requirements but will be ≤ authorized limit”
“3.6 GW—or 3,600 megawatts (MW)—represents an enormous amount of power, potentially very dangerous if not managed correctly through industrial infrastructure and specific safety systems.”
Google Gemini’s AI issues this warning, reminding us that this is equivalent to 36 million watts (or 36,000 kilowatts) “the power generated by a medium-sized power plant (such as a large wind or solar farm), capable of powering approximately 12,000 homes simultaneously.”
Let us look at the explanation provided in the caption of the image from the University of Alaska Fairbanks regarding the August experiment (Source 2):
In short, this means interference with satellites and all forms of satellite communication.
It is essentially a “Star Wars”-style tool, given that without Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite network, Ukraine—which lacks its own space-based spy stations—would be left blind…
However, the issue of alterations to this foF2 factor is clearly explained in an older study published by the scientific journal *AGU Advancing Earth and Space Science* in its “Space Weather” section.
The study—authored by J. S. Shim of The Catholic University of America and NASA GSFC (Greenbelt, MD, USA), along with other NASA scientists—is titled “Validation of Ionospheric Specifications During Geomagnetic Storms: TEC and foF2 During the March 2013 Storm Event” (Source 3).
That study, published in 2018, makes no reference whatsoever to the HAARP activity in Alaska—given that operations had only just resumed at the time following the transfer from the US Air Force to the University of Alaska Fairbanks—yet it helps mere mortals like us (laypeople when it comes to physics) to at least grasp the importance, and therefore the potential danger, of the foF2 factor.
Let us look at the research abstract:
«To address challenges of assessing space weather modeling capabilities, the Community Coordinated Modeling Center is leading a newly established International Forum for Space Weather Modeling Capabilities Assessment» and this in itself is a curious news item containing alarming words that smack of geoengineering a thousand light-years away…
But it continues:
«This paper presents preliminary results of validation of modeled foF2 (F2 layer critical frequency) and TEC (total electron content) during the first selected 2013 March storm event (17 March 2013)». In this study, we used eight ionospheric models ranging from empirical to physics-based, coupled ionosphere-thermosphere and data assimilation models. The quantities we considered are TEC and foF2 changes and percentage changes compared to quiet time background, and the maximum and minimum percentage changes. In addition, we considered normalized percentage changes of TEC».
Therefore, if foF2 levels rise during a geomagnetic storm, then—by a simple, self-evident philosophical syllogism—artificially exceeding that threshold (as HAARP admitted in the notes regarding its latest test on August 24, 2026) should or could trigger a similarly dangerous space weather event!
To better understand the study’s findings, let us consult the Space Weather website of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—the U.S. Department of Commerce agency that studies and attempts to forecast weather events.
«The Total Electron Content (TEC) is the total number of electrons present along a path between a radio transmitter and receiver. Radio waves are affected by the presence of electrons. The more electrons in the path of the radio wave, the more the radio signal will be affected. For ground to satellite communication and satellite navigation, TEC is a good parameter to monitor for possible space weather impacts» states NOAA’s Space Weather service (Source 4).
“The TEC in the ionosphere is modified by changing solar Extreme Ultra-Violet radiation, geomagnetic storms, and the atmospheric waves that propagate up from the lower atmosphere. The TEC will therefore depend on local time, latitude, longitude, season, geomagnetic conditions, solar cycle and activity, and troposphere conditions. The propagation of radio waves is affected by the ionosphere. (..) The change in the path and velocity of radio waves in the ionosphere has a big impact on the accuracy of satellite navigation systems such as GPS/GNSS”. states the US government website.
From these few lines, two definitive concepts emerge:
Here is what the AI Gemini writes on the subject:
Space weather—driven primarily by solar activity (flares, solar wind, and coronal mass ejections, or CMEs)—directly affects the geospace environment and terrestrial technologies.
The interaction of solar plasma with Earth’s magnetic field generates spectacular auroras—both the *borealis* and *australis*—which are sometimes visible even at mid-latitudes during peak storm activity.
We return to the subject of auroras, the “core mission” of HAARP, which states that “high-frequency transmissions often rely on the critical plasma frequency for the F2 region (foF2), as measured by the Gakona ionosonde.”
For someone like me—having written 96 investigative reports on the lab-engineered SARS-CoV-2—reading these statements about the interaction between immense electromagnetic power (3.6 megawatts) and solar activity is truly terrifying.
Google AI Gemini also warns that geomagnetic storms can cause many damages to out planet:
But I am not the only one pointing out the danger of space weather impacts on Earth…
In recent days, we debunked a sensational piece of fake news regarding the explosion of an American spy satellite—a story hastily published by the website *Sorvegliati Spaziali (Space Checks)* after it was misled by Gemini AI. We feel somewhat indebted to them, given the exceptional work they usually do as partners of the National Institute for Astrophysics (INAF) of Rome (Italy); today, we cite them to provide a detailed scientific explanation of the phenomena that the AI had previously reported in a crude and inaccurate manner.
“Space weather refers to the physical state of the space occupied by Earth and the planets of the Solar System—a region permeated by the solar wind, a continuous stream of electrically charged particles (in a state known as plasma) confined by the analogous ‘interstellar wind’ within a massive bubble called the heliosphere,” reads the entry on Space Meteorology (Source 5).
For the sake of brevity, we will skip the lengthy section explaining magnetic field activity linked to the Sun’s rotation and sunspots, which “can release magnetic energy during chromospheric eruptions (so-called flares), resulting in particle acceleration and the emission of electromagnetic radiation.”
“Enormous ‘plasma bubbles’—known as CMEs or Coronal Mass Ejections—can be accelerated toward the planets. When a planet possesses a magnetic field that acts as a genuine shield against incoming space particles, this field becomes compressed, triggering magnetic storms.“
Finally, we turn to the shimmering skies: their varying color shades depend on radio-frequency intensity—as we highlighted in our analysis of a table regarding HAARP investigations, and as is evident from the table published earlier in this article.
“On Earth, polar auroras appear as delicate, multicolored curtains; their luminosity is generated in the ionosphere by atoms and molecules excited by solar particles that manage to penetrate the magnetic shield. (…) A disturbed ionosphere affects the quality of radio communications—for instance, by making GPS-based positioning problematic. Furthermore, intense ionospheric electric currents can induce significant additional currents in power lines, thereby triggering blackouts.”
Rosanna Rispoli, a researcher at the National Institute for Astrophysics (INAF) of Rome, explains space weather and the solar geomagnetic storms that give rise to the aurora borealis and aurora australis in a video released on YouTube.
In the video, she highlights the intensity of these phenomena between 2024 and 2025; it is worth noting that these are precisely the years during which HAARP conducted the highest number of experiments.
The video also refers to the intense aurora borealis—”visible at an unusual latitude”—of May 2024; this occurred at the peak of a solar storm but also during one of the most controversial tests conducted by the Alaska station, forcing UAF management to deny a correlation that seemed obvious even to laypeople…
It is baffling that experts fail to even hypothesize a possible link between these exceptional space events and HAARP experiments; yet, this can only be explained by the fear of challenging a Pentagon project.
However, there is a striking new development regarding the impact of space weather on our planet.
“According to a new statistical study published today in *Nature* (July 15, 2026 – Ed.),we are underestimating the potential consequences of severe geomagnetic storms on Earth. The cause appears to be a combination of measurement errors regarding the solar wind—which drives these storms—physical inferences, and a statistical phenomenon known as ‘regression to the mean,'” summarizes Valentina Guglielmo in an article published by INAF’s online news outlet (Source 6).
«Several processes occur between the point where we measure solar wind intensity—the Lagrange L1 point—and the magnetopause, the point where the solar wind strikes Earth’s outer atmosphere,» explains Nithin Sivadas, a researcher in the Department of Physics at the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., and the paper’s lead author, speaking to *Media INAF* (Gospa News translation from Italian).
«Some of these processes can have a systematic effect on reducing intensity, while others—such as turbulence—can have a random effect, causing stochastic variations in solar wind intensity. We focus exclusively on the processes that cause random variations. Phenomena driving random fluctuations in solar wind intensity measured between L1 and Earth’s vicinity include, for example, the solar wind’s direction, its variable structure, and turbulence closer to Earth.»
«Since these factors introduce random variations, scientists previously hypothesized that, on average, underestimations would cancel out overestimations, allowing us to relate the measured average solar wind intensity to its effects on Earth without worrying about random fluctuations. However, our paper argues that this is not entirely true.»
In the study’s abstract, astrophysicist Sivadas—who also works at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland—and his colleagues write an even more unsettling sentence regarding “statistical bias”:
“Our results reveal that the data analysis underpinning saturation theories is affected by a non-linear bias, thereby calling the validity of such theories into question. When uncertainties are corrected, it emerges that Earth’s response to solar wind forcing is consistently linear and that the impact of extreme geomagnetic storms can be double what was previously believed (Source 7).”
We refer astrophysics enthusiasts and professionals to the complex scientific paper itself; we cite it here solely to refute the mainstream “mantra” claiming that extreme climate changes are driven exclusively by human behavior (certainly a contributing factor) rather than by solar activity—and, by extension, the military geoengineering that mimics it...
Just as with mRNA Covid vaccines, when science truly gets serious and rigorously tests every hypothesis, “politically convenient” certainties begin to crumble…
This “scientific scoop” emerges at a time when HAARP is altering space weather by toying with solar storms—much like “sorcerer’s apprentices” enhancing lethal viruses in a lab—and bombarding the ionosphere, whose primary function is to reflect long-distance radio waves and protect Earth by shielding it from a portion of solar radiation.
Confirming our suspicions and the many unknowns inherent in space weather, here is a final key insight from another study published on the European Commission’s CORDIS website. For the sake of brevity, we cite only the conclusions, which refer to a solar eruption and “Coronal Mass Ejections” (CMEs).
«Light associated with an eruption takes eight minutes to reach Earth’s magnetosphere. However, CMEs can take up to five days to cover the distance to our planet. The solar wind acts on these clouds of superheated plasma like a current opposing a boat’s motion, slowing down the faster ones. STEREO scientists have discovered that the impacts occurring around these clouds must be taken into account to “predict” arrival times with greater accuracy (Source 8)».
«From the constant stream of electrically charged particles known as solar wind to unpredictable CMEs, Earth feels the impact of our stellar companion—an influence that extends far beyond mere light and heat».
This is what scientists from the European Commission-funded STEREO (Solar Terrestrial Relations Observatory) mission report (Source 8), implicitly confirming that solar electromagnetic emissions impact Earth’s atmosphere; an effect that, however, can also be artificially replicated by HAARP during Pentagon-funded tests through the alteration of the ionosphere’s “foF2 critical frequency” (as seen in the 2018 Shim et al. study cited above).
The defense strategy of the Alaska station’s proponents has consistently been the same: solar geomagnetic storms are far more powerful—measured in terawatts—and thus vastly exceed the 3.6-gigawatt limit imposed on the UAF.
Yet this remains merely a hypothesis—just like our own—given that until recently (prior to the STEREO and Sivada studies), the prevailing view was that solar flares could not dangerously impact Earth’s atmosphere and clouds…
True science ought to analyze both possibilities; however, were an astrophysicist to discuss the safety of the Pentagon’s projects in Alaska, they would—at the very least—lose their job.
They would also risk premature death, much like the scientists who identified SARS-CoV-2 as a lab-engineered pathogen—foremost among them Luc Montagnier—linking the COVID-19 pandemic to decades-long experiments conducted by DARPA, the US Department of Defense’s military agency.
WUHAN.GATES – 34. COVID IS A SCIENTIST’s KILLER… Who Discovered SARS Viruses Died!
And finally…the kicker: Amarus in Fundo!
A group of researchers from a Japanese university has proposed a theoretical model exploring a possible link between solar storms and earthquakes. They suggest that, under specific conditions, ionospheric disturbances could help trigger seismic events that are already “on the brink” of occurring.
We are not providing details on this study here, as it will be the main topic of the next Gospa News investigation (subscribe to the newsletter), especially in light of the now-alarming seismic activity along the Pacific Ring of Fire…
In this specific context, we move from HAARP to HARP—the Alaska Earthquake Center—which is based right inside the UAF station in Gakona that we discussed in our previous investigation.
Could it be that the “crazy conspiracy theorists”—who blamed earthquakes on those dangerous, mysterious antennas on the American Arctic peninsula—actually had a scientifically valid point?
If that turns out to be the case, Gospa News will aim to prove it—relying, as always, on credible international scientific studies, just as we did for all the “Wuhan-Gates” investigations into lab-engineered SARS-CoV-2 and the harms associated with mRNA vaccines.
Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio – Gospa News founder and director
VITAL RELATED POSTS – ITALIAN LINKS CAN BE READ IN ENGLISH WITH MACHINE TRANSLATION
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