Between the evening of October 16 and October 17, 2026, the Russian Armed Forces continued their campaign of combined strikes against Ukrainian defense-industrial, energy, and logistics infrastructure. According to the Ukrainian side, the overnight attack leading into October 17 involved Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, Kh-22/Kh-32 cruise missiles, four Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles, and 332 strike unmanned aerial vehicles. The main focus was on metallurgical enterprises in Kryvyi Rih and Zaporizhzhia, transformer production, and high-voltage substations in western Ukraine. In parallel, Ukrainian forces carried out a large-scale drone attack on Russian territory.

Russian Strikes on Targets in Ukraine

Metallurgical Complex

Zaporizhstal (Zaporizhzhia) – formerly one of Ukraine’s largest metallurgical enterprises. Before the campaign, it produced up to 1.44 million tons of pig iron and more than 1.3 million tons of rolled steel annually; its output was directed primarily toward military-industrial needs. According to Metinvest, this was the fifth strike on the facility; six ballistic missiles were fired in the latest attack, damaging energy and logistics infrastructure as well as production facilities in the blast-furnace shop. In total, 23 ballistic missiles have been fired at the plant across five attacks.

Metallurgical combine in Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk Region) – one of Ukraine’s largest metallurgical enterprises, which supplied metal products to the Ukrainian defense-industrial complex. The description provided by the Russian Ministry of Defense matches ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih; according to sources, a week earlier the owners announced a cold shutdown of primary production, and the plant was preparing for preservation.

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Energy Infrastructure

Zaporozhtransformator PJSC (Zaporizhzhia) – a manufacturer of oil-immersed power transformers rated at 220-750 kV, a key component of high-voltage substations. Since 2022, it has been under the management of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and has been used in the interests of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Striking this facility complicates the replacement of damaged transformer equipment for Ukrenergo, as manufacturing a new transformer takes months.

Zhytomyr 330 kV Substation (Zhytomyr Region) – a major hub in the trunk power grid, providing voltage conversion and electricity distribution among 330 kV, 110 kV, 35 kV, and 10 kV networks. Power was cut in several districts of Zhytomyr, and water-supply disruptions occurred. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the facility struck was one that distributed electricity from western Ukraine to central regions for defense-industrial enterprises.

Rivne 330 kV Substation (Rivne Region) – a trunk power-grid facility. Power outages occurred in Rivne and nearby settlements, and municipal electric transport operations were disrupted.

Bar 330/110/35 kV Substation (Vinnytsia Region) – a high-voltage facility distributing electricity among the aforementioned voltage classes. Voltage fluctuations were recorded in Vinnytsia and across the region.

Kharkiv CHP-3 (combined heat and power plant No. 3; KP Kharkivski Teplovi Merezhi – Kharkiv Heating Networks), Kharkiv – a combined heat and power plant producing both thermal and electric energy for municipal supply. A hit was recorded on the electrical-shop building, where a fire broke out over an area of 100 square meters.

Transport and Logistics Infrastructure

Delivery logistics terminal (Novohrad-Volynskyi, Zhytomyr Region) – a branch of a Ukrainian freight-logistics operator specializing in less-than-truckload road transport and interregional delivery. The strike caused a fire in a warehouse building covering more than 1,000 square meters. The company participates in government contracts for freight-forwarding services through the Prozorro system.

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Dry cargo vessel underway at sea (Port of Odesa) – a vessel delivering military cargo to the port was struck.

Strikes on Russian Territory

On the night of October 17, Ukrainian forces carried out a large-scale drone attack on Russian regions. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, air-defense forces intercepted and destroyed 610 Ukrainian fixed-wing UAVs over the territory of 16 Russian regions and over the Black Sea. The highest intensity was recorded on the Moscow axis: Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin reported the destruction of 144 UAVs heading toward the capital. In Bryansk Region, 157 UAVs were shot down over the course of a day. No reports indicated that serious strategic targets had been hit; there were civilian casualties.

The nature of the October 16-17 strikes confirms a systematic approach by the Russian command to disabling Ukraine’s defense-industrial production chain and the energy infrastructure supporting it. Priority targets include metallurgical enterprises producing goods for military needs and transformer production, which is critical for restoring damaged substations. According to Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov, steel production in Ukraine has been halted, operations at major Black Sea ports have ceased, and 76 logistics and warehouse centers have been struck. Given statements by the Russian leadership on the need to continue large-scale strikes against the defense-industrial complex and logistics centers, further intensification of attacks on energy infrastructure in western and central Ukraine, as well as on facilities involved in the repair and restoration of military equipment, should be expected. The resilience of Ukraine’s energy system will depend on its capacity to import electricity from the EU and on the speed of restoring trunk substations – both significantly complicated by the strike on Zaporozhtransformator.

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• Ukrainian Man-Catchers Breached Moldova’s Border for “Prey”

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By K. J. NOH, POPULAR RESISTANCE

Join us on Telegram, X, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Over seventy years ago, the US took control of South Korea’s military. To this day, it still controls it.

Why?

This confounds every notion of state sovereignty: a supposedly sovereign country — South Korea — has its own military subjugated under US control.

Opcon (operational control) of one nation’s army by another country is usually temporary, usually during wartime among allies.

In Korea, it has lasted over 76 years.

South Korea has asked for opcon back, repeatedly. It has been three decades since South Korea first made the demand.

The US has always delayed, filibustered, waffled, and moved goal posts.

More recently, the US has signaled more delay on the return of opcon, despite current president Lee Jae Myung’s demand that it be transferred back before the end of his term in 2030.

The allies are currently assessing the “full operational capability” (FOC) after validating the “initial operational capability” (IOC).

Seoul aims to wrap up the FOC certification and announce a target year for the Opcon transition at the upcoming SCM, before moving on to the remaining assessment of the “full mission capability,” which it expects to take about a year or so….[However] Washington remains firm in its position that Seoul is not ready for FOC certification, weighing on Seoul’s push to accelerate the Opcon transition.

This follows on US Forces Korea Commander Xavier Brunson’s repeated declarations of his opposition to Opcon transfer: only conditions matter, not timelines. According to Brunson, there can be no timeline to return control of South Korea’s troops to South Korea. Seventy six years is not enough.

South Korea had originally insisted on deadlines for the return of opcon. The US delayed, and delayed, and denied. It finally agreed–but only if certain conditions were met. These were agreed to in 2014, and reaffirmed them in 2017. Yet another decade has passed since those agreements.

Conditions for the return of opcon:

Cutting through the fog, there are essentially three conditions that the US has predicated as preconditions for South Korea to regain control over its own troops:

1. Can South Korea defend itself? (Can it operate its own military effectively? Does it have capacity, materiel, systems, and institutions?)

2. Are US and South Korea forces interoperable? (Can they coordinate in war?)

3. Are the conditions stable enough for opcon transfer?

The answer to the first is, of course. South Korea has one of the most powerful and well-equipped militaries in the world.

The second is, of course, the US and South Korea have been rehearsing interoperability for over seventy years.

The third is key: it is a catch-22 designed to undermine the entire process.

Conditions-based Opcon Transfer (COPT) sets specific benchmarks and tests for opcon transfer. These are the goalposts that are being constantly shifted.

However, the third condition is critical. It requires the de-escalation of tensions between North and South:

“Conducive Security Environment: The security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region must be stable and conducive to a safe, uninterrupted transfer.”

This is the catch-22:

If there is de-escalation of tensions, the required “tests” are not conducted and the benchmarks and certifications are not achieved — they are tied to field-condition wargames. Doing these wargames and tests escalates tensions with North Korea.

If there are tensions, then condition 3 is not met, and Opcon cannot be transferred.

It’s a formula for ensuring opcon is never transferred.

The simple fact is, it does not take 20+years to transfer opcon. “Wartime” opcon is transferred very rapidly. Armies coalesce, and opcon is transferred. Syngman Rhee turned over opcon in July of 1950 and the US was immediately in charge. It doesn’t take years and decades to transfer opcon. It takes hours or days. Returning it should be even faster. But that would require political will.

Here are some other important things to understand about opcon:

Opcon transfer conditions are actually classified:

The US keeps these conditions under wraps, and therefore the South Korean public or its representatives cannot challenge them publicly because they are not known. We only know the general outlines. The South Korean side can only hope the US will agree they have been met. This is yet another abrogation of sovereignty and democracy in addition to the original breach: “We will keep your military, unless you meet our secret conditions, which you cannot discuss, debate or challenge, because they are secret”.

Condition 3, “Conducive security environment” has always been a kill switch:

We know that security conditions have always been a tacit condition because, in the past, whenever opcon transfer looked justified and imminent, the security environment would suddenly degrade, scuttling the whole project. For example, just as the deadline for Roh Moo Hyun-negotiated Opcon transfer was approaching in 2012, the sudden sinking of the ROKS military ship Cheonan-Ho derailed wartime opcon transfer to 2015. That deadline has also passed and gone. Recent North-Korea attributed mine explosions near the DMZ fit this pattern, as have other numerous, suspicious incidents.

The concoction of “peacetime opcon” is nonsense:

The US claims it only has “wartime” opcon because it transferred “peacetime” opcon to South Korea in 1994. However, this very concept is nonsense:

1) Opcon means control of operations. Operations mean warfighting. “Wartime opcon”, ie. “wartime warfighting control” is a pleonasm. The only time operational control of a military is important is during fighting, just as the only time steering a car matters is when it’s moving.

The invention and transfer of “peacetime” opcon to Korea was a booby prize created to give the appearance that something had changed. Think of those Fisher-Price toy steering wheels you stick on the dashboard while someone else steers the car–it’s a political toy. It gives the illusion of control but it means nothing. The fact is, the US would never allow its military to be subjugated to a foreign command, even a shared command. The simple fact is, the US never shares control.

2) Immediately after “peacetime” opcon transfer in 1994, the US instituted CODA (Combined Delegated Authority), which continues US control of planning and execution of war. As Clint Work observes correctly, “The ROK JCS was granted the term OPCON for political purposes, and the US CFC was given the term CODA for accomplishing missions”. So much for peacetime “control”.

3) Last but not least, the US gets to unilaterally decide what constitutes peacetime and what constitutes wartime. When the US declares Defcon III, it’s wartime. Korean troops must fall in line under US opcon. If you get to slice the cake and then decide which portion you take, it’s your bloody cake. If you share a car, but only one party decides when it gets to be driven, and they drive, they own the car, you are maintenance. If one party unilaterally decides when it gets control, it has control, regardless of any protestations to the contrary.

But why does the US need to keep Opcon?

The US needs control over ROK troops because it is planning for war with China in the Pacific. It has been doing so since it drew up formal plans, AirSea Battle in 2009. For war, it needs SK as a military proxy: it needs the cannon fodder. South Korea has 3.6 million combat-ready troops: 500,000 regular and 3.1 million reserve. It has one of the most powerful and advanced militaries in the world, as well as the defense industrial base to sustain it. Furthermore, SK troops have always fought in US wars as proxies: more military-aged men in South Korea saw combat in Vietnam than Americans did as a proportion of population — 325,000 were deployed–the largest foreign deployment after the US. It was also the third largest deployment to Iraq. The US can avoid a draft because SK has one.

USFK Commander Xavier Brunson has made this US agenda of weaponizing South Korea for war against China explicit, comparing South Korea to “fixed aircraft carrier”, a dagger pointed at China, and a critical part of US war strategy because it is already inside China’s defense perimeter.

As the Hankyoreh Newspaper points out:

When his “dagger” comment is tied to his previous remarks, it’s evident that Brunson expects Korea to play an offensive role capable of striking the Chinese heartland, and Japan to play a defensive role supporting Korea…Brunson commented last August that he would like F-35 fighters with stealth capabilities and a multi-domain task force (MDTF) capable of wrecking China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) network to be assigned to USFK. These comments suggest that Brunson means to treat Korea as a forward base equipped with military options for launching direct strikes against China.

Brunson recently announced that the multi-domain task force will be deployed to Korea.  These build on his previous statements on preparing the peninsula for war with China:

…[this] orientation clarifies how forces on the peninsula can impose costs, not only on the CCP’s Northern Theater Army, but also on the [Russian] Northern Fleet, thus demonstrating the significant strategic potential that exists on the peninsula to influence adversary operations in both adjacent seas… existing force positioning, particularly on the Korean Peninsula, may offer greater strategic advantages… advantageously positioned assets already inside the [Chinese] defensive perimeter, capable of immediate cost-imposition [ie. attack] against multiple adversaries.

This simultaneous fiction of pretending it doesn’t control South Korea’s troops became necessary when US-opconned SK troops massacred civilians in Gwangju.  The need to avoid accountability created the legal fiction of “peacetime opcon”, but that doesn’t obviate the US need for control as it prepares for and escalates to war.

The real reason why opcon transfer is taking so long is the US is trying to create a structure that maintains control of the SK army while pretending that it doesn’t.   This involves a crazy-quilt of parallel & unified command structures, multiplying command authorities, phased operating assessments, Frankenstein-cobbled-leadership structure, Rube Goldberg carve-outs, and a general have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too mindset.  This is assisted by extreme factions of the quisling South Korea right, who have lashed themselves to the sinking US Empire and see any reclamation of genuine South Korean sovereignty as abandonment–they fear that a South Korean military–the real nexus of power in Korean politics, accountable only to Koreans, would result in a loss of status and power as US quisling collaborators and subcontractors.

With war with China on the horizon, South Korea needs to reclaim opcon rapidly.  It remains to be seen if president Lee Jae Myung can pull off this hat trick.  However, the consequences of not doing so could be catastrophic.

Original article:  popularresistance.org

By Katie FORSTER

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

STARK warnings from artificial intelligence researchers that advanced forms of the technology could wipe out humanity have raised questions over whether governments are moving fast enough to regulate it.

What are the potential dangers of “superintelligent” computer systems, and should we be worried?

In 2023, hundreds of AI scientists and industry figures, including the heads of top US labs, signed a “statement on AI extinction risk” calling for the issue to be treated as seriously as pandemics or nuclear war.

If an out-of-control future AI deems that humans are obstructing its goals, it could use robots to “synthesise and spread novel pathogens”, said Stuart Russell, computer science professor at the University of California, Berkeley.

Or it could “convince people to initiate nuclear war, including by hacking into early warning systems”, Russell, a prominent voice on AI safety, said.

Such existential fears do not concern current AI systems, he said. But as the technology improves, it could take lethal action beyond our understanding, such as by removing oxygen from the atmosphere.

“We are less intelligent than superintelligent AI. If you ask chimpanzees how humans could wipe them out, they probably wouldn’t be able to give you all the right answers.”

In the meantime, “in the next year or two, I think the risk is higher from human misuse”, Russell added, such as an AI-enabled terror attack.

“The stakes are well-understood,” Jacob Coxon, a 27-year-old researcher, wrote on X last week, announcing his resignation from US AI startup Anthropic.

“But they are locked in a race to get there first,” he added, saying that Anthropic “believes no one else will act responsibly, so they must do it themselves”.

Anthropic this year removed a pledge from its safety charter to halt development of its models if it failed to control their risks.

It argued that if it unilaterally paused its work, its less cautious rivals would dominate the industry, making it less safe overall.

“The people building AI earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade,” said Coxon, who previously worked at ChatGPT maker Open-AI.

He accused both companies of “gambling with our lives” as they strive to develop AI models capable of self-improvement.

Fears are heightened over rogue AI after OpenAI technology operating outside human supervision hacked into Hugging Face, a repository of AI models.

“We really do earnestly believe AI could kill all humans!” Anthropic safety executive Evan Hubinger chimed in on X, estimating the risk at more than 10 per cent over the next decade.

It’s important to remember that doom-laden percentage predictions are “absolutely unscientific”, said Hussein Abbass, a computing professor at UNSW Canberra.

“The situation is still controllable, and it can be managed,” Abbass said.

But governments should not sit on their hands when it comes to regulating AI, he added, urging an “agile” approach as AI development accelerates.

Both Anthropic and OpenAI are expected to go public soon, and some sceptics say scary warnings make AI appear powerful and worthy of large investments.

Others argue that focusing on the risk of extinction distracts from more pressing problems caused by AI, from job losses to machines discriminating against minorities.

In July, more than 1,000 tech employees, including Anthropic’s CEO, called on Washington to support a coordinated slowdown in the development of the most advanced AI systems.

OpenAI halted training of its latest models for two weeks in August before resuming it under tighter controls.

The United States has been firmly against global regulation of the sector that could stifle innovation.

But the hacking capabilities of the most cutting-edge models have given Washington pause, with recent Anthropic and OpenAI releases delayed over national security concerns.

Even then, “we don’t want to restrict them where all of a sudden we come in second to China”, President Donald Trump has said.

“Maybe it will take a massive, Chernobyl-scale disaster to get governments to act,” Russell said, urging them to establish a licensing regime for AI, as exists with aviation, medicine or water supply.

“Perhaps at some point governments will remember that their voters prefer not to be dead.”

Original article:  www.nst.com.my

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• Russian strikes destroyed targets in the Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kyiv, Odesa, Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, Volyn, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, Ternopil, Vinnytsia regions, and the DPR;
• According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 2 Kh-59 guided air-launched missiles and 580 strike UAVs;
• Russian forces struck a metallurgical plant in Kryvyi Rih;
• Russian forces struck an electrical substation in Zhytomyr;
• Russian forces struck a metallurgical plant (Zaporizhstal) and an industrial enterprise (PJSC Zaporizhtransformator) in Zaporizhzhia;
• Russian forces struck a dry cargo ship in Odesa;
• Ukrainian losses amounted to approximately 1,040 troops over the past 24 hours.

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• Russian forces took full control of the city of Dobropolye in the DPR.

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• Russian forces took control of Varvarovka and Nikolayevka. The Volchansk pocket has been cleared.

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• During the past night, Russian air defenses destroyed 610 Ukrainian drones in the rear regions;
• Russian air defenses intercepted UAVs in the Leningrad, Novgorod, Tver, Bryansk, Belgorod, Kursk, Oryol, Kaluga, Voronezh, Rostov, Smolensk, and Tula regions, the Moscow region, Krasnodar Krai, the Republic of Crimea, and over the Black Sea;
• Ukrainian drone strikes injured six residents in the Shebekinsky district of the Belgorod region;
• Ukrainian drones attacked a minibus traveling from Lysychansk to Krasnodar on the road between Novoaidar and Shchastia, killing the driver.

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• Two supertankers struck a naval mine in the Strait of Hormuz, causing explosions and fire, according to the IRGC Navy;
• UKMTO reported two tanker attacks northeast of Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, on October 16, one involving an unidentified projectile and the other a small boat firing an RPG.

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Ukraine’s expanding Black Sea attacks are disrupting shipping, raising insurance costs, and threatening global food and energy trade. As “wild-card” Zelensky raises the stakes (angering the US), the risk of a wider confrontation grows.

Written by Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions

Black Sea shipping is in crisis, adding pressure to a global economy already absorbing Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz disruptions. Commercial vessels face rising risks, insurance costs have climbed, and tanker freight rates have surged. Ukraine has stepped up attacks on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, ports, oil facilities, and vessels associated with Russian trade, expanding the conflict’s geographical scope. Grain, oil, fertilizers, and other commodities move through these waters, including shipments for non-belligerent countries.

S&P Global reported on October 9 that tanker freight rates rose sharply amid attacks, sanctions, and security concerns disrupting Russian energy exports. According to maritime security consultancy Ambrey, Kyiv expanded its campaign beyond naval assets and oil infrastructure to merchant ships trading with Russian ports. In November 2025, attacks had already expanded to commercial vessels, particularly oil tankers, in the open sea. In May 2026, Ambrey attributed strikes on three Russia-linked tankers inside Turkey’s exclusive economic zone to Ukrainian naval drones.

By July, targeting expanded to dry-bulk carriers, general cargo, container ships, and roll-on/roll-off vessels. In September, insurers widened the high-risk zone. Ambrey data shows 45 merchant vessels struck outside the previous war-risk area in 12 months, 31 after July 1, 2026. Ambrey’s finding is that Ukraine-attributed strikes (on Russia-linked shipping far offshore) helped drive insurers’ growing risk perception across the Black Sea. Russia has responded by also conducting strikes in the Black Sea. As Modern Diplomacy puts it, Moscow has made any Black Sea truce conditional on Kyiv ceasing attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.

This is, after all, a proxy war of attrition, marked as it is by considerable military asymmetry. Russia possesses a larger population, defense-industrial base, strategic arsenal, air force, and navy, as well as greater resources for prolonged warfare. Ukraine, despite developing formidable drone capabilities and long-range strike capacity, remains heavily dependent on Western assistance. Global Firepower’s 2026 ranking places Russia second and Ukraine twentieth. The military asymmetry is therefore considerable.

The hard truth is that, notwithstanding any legitimate criticism one may have of Moscow’s campaign, Russia has refrained from employing its full destructive capabilities. Such restraint, particularly in the war’s early stages, may have reflected not only humanitarian and military calculations but also (on Moscow’s end) awareness of historical and cultural ties between the two countries – which may have a psychological effect on decision-makers. Kyiv, in contrast, since the 2014 ultra-nationalist revolution, has launched an anti-Russian campaign to distance the nation from Moscow. Even so, 42.6% of Ukrainians still regularly spoke Russian in December 2022, despite the war and media censorship restrictions.

Former US diplomat Chas Freeman and retired US Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor have both argued that Moscow exercised restraint. Poland’s Centre for Eastern Studies likewise noted in June 2022 that Russia had refrained from systematically destroying key infrastructure – while the US Congressional Research Service observed that the initial bombardment was more limited than expected. For comparison, Bono Vox performed in Kyiv on May 8, 2022, less than three months after Moscow launched its campaign. One could hardly imagine Bono performing in Baghdad shortly after the US invasion! Or in 2011 Libya, for that matter.

The broader point here is that the Russian Federation retains substantial military advantages, despite Ukrainian advances, but Western support has enabled Kyiv to sustain a prolonged war of attrition – increasingly targeting Russian energy. In August, Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian and Iranian-linked vessels in the Caspian Sea risked expanding the conflict into a vital Russia-Iran logistics corridor. The attacks risked further “proxifying” the conflict by aligning Kyiv with US and Israeli interests against Tehran, potentially merging the European and Middle Eastern theaters – a scenario that never materialized.

In any case, Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure continue amid mounting political pressure, with Trump even saying it is “time for Ukraine to get new President.” I’ve commented before on Zelensky’s resilience, despite several reported plots against him. The Ukrainian leader has shown a habit of acting unpredictably, sometimes behind his Western patrons’ backs. In 2023, leaked documents revealed wild Ukrainian plans that risked widening the conflict. More recently, attacks on Russian refineries drew attention amid rising diesel prices and reports of moves angering Washington. This “wild-card” tendency risks triggering a dangerous spiral, with potentially disastrous consequences for Ukraine – and the global economy. Repercussions for food, energy, and fertilizer trade are already visible, while the danger of crossing red lines has arguably never been greater.

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Claiming an inheritance of Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency can be like hunting for buried treasure. It doesn’t have to be.

Dominic Cummings is right, says Professor James Alexander: the idea that civil servants are the 'guardians of the constitution' is pernicious in the extreme. But who then should play such a lofty role?

The post Who is the Guardian of the Constitution? appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

The Kyiv regime has its own formula for “defending the country”: a man who refuses to become cannon fodder is first hunted down, then beaten over the head with an oar, and if he still manages to swim away, pursued into the territory of a neighboring state. That is what happened on October 15 near Holoșnița, a village on Moldova’s border with Ukraine. Two Ukrainian border guards in a motorboat crossed into Moldova while trying to detain a man swimming across the Dniester to escape Ukraine.

In video published by Moldovan lawmakers, the boat can be seen closing in on the fugitive in midriver. Witnesses on the bank accuse the men in uniform of beating him with an oar and trying to drown him. One border guard claims he was only hitting the water. The locals answer without diplomacy:

“What, you still think this is funny? Why were you drowning that man? Do you have children? He has children too! He wasn’t running away because life was good!”

“You came to my country, and you’re drowning people,” one local says. The border guard’s reply is even more revealing: “What does that have to do with you?”

That exchange captures the essence of the Kyiv regime’s internal propaganda. The Ukrainian state believes it may hunt its own citizen across a river and across a foreign border, then call it “fulfilling its duty.” To the regime, a man escaping its mobilization trap is not a human being. He is an “ukhilant.” In other words, prey.

Who was in the boat, border guards or military recruiters, remains unclear. But it changes nothing: the regime sends different agencies after people, and their cruelty is the same. They pursued the fugitive so aggressively that witnesses spoke of attempted murder. Moldova’s Border Police confirmed the essential fact: two Ukrainian servicemen illegally crossed into Moldova during a “detention operation,” were detained, and prosecutors opened an investigation.

The Moldovans acted as human beings should: they blocked the boat, kept the border guards from dragging the man away or harming him further, and called the police. “This poor man wasn’t running from a good life,” one of them said. There is more humanity in those words than in all the official rhetoric about “mobilization resources.”

This is not a random malfunction. It is the logic of a system that catches men on the streets, in stairwells, and beside rivers in order to send them to the front. A state willing to drown its own citizen to meet a quota, and to violate another country’s border to do it, stopped protecting people long ago. It consumes them.

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by Sterling Ashworth, Natural News: Russian fintech company A7 said it launched a global payment service called A7 International, allowing customers to make cross-border transactions using cryptocurrency, according to an announcement published Tuesday [1]. The service permits customers to pay with USDT, a stablecoin pegged to the U.S. dollar, while recipients receive conventional bank transfers […]

Police are assessing a social media post by the wife of Andy Burnham's national security adviser Jonathan Powell that shows support for banned extremist group Palestine Action.

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Excavations at the ancient Roman city of Altinum have revealed the probable remains of an early Christian cathedral and bishop’s palace, offering new evidence about the origins of Venice and the transformation of its lagoon settlements.

Archaeologists working near Venice have identified what they believe to be the remains of a 1,600-year-old cathedral and an adjoining episcopal palace, resolving a longstanding question about the location of one of the region’s earliest Christian centres.

The discovery was announced on 15 October by Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, following excavations at Altinum, an important Roman settlement on the mainland near the Venetian lagoon. The foundations of a substantial religious complex have emerged from an area where ancient written accounts had long indicated the existence of a cathedral, although its precise location had remained unknown.

The findings suggest that the church was constructed between the late fourth and early fifth centuries AD, making it the earliest Christian church so far identified archaeologically in the Venetian territory. The researchers believe the complex provides physical evidence of the period when Christianity was becoming an important political and administrative force in the declining Roman Empire.

A Cathedral Hidden Beneath a Roman City

The newly identified church was a rectangular structure approximately 30 metres long and 20 metres wide, without an apse and orientated towards the east. Its layout differs from the surrounding Roman street grid, reflecting the religious requirements of the early Christian community.

The architectural arrangement resembles early churches in the northern Adriatic region, particularly those associated with Aquileia, which was an important centre of Christianity during late antiquity.

An adjoining building, distinguished by its substantial foundations and a complex arrangement of internal rooms, has been provisionally identified as the bishop’s palace. Archaeologists believe it may have stood two storeys high, with residential accommodation for senior clergy above rooms potentially associated with privileged burials.

Among the most revealing discoveries is the extensive reuse of stone paving blocks taken from the Roman streets. These materials were incorporated into the foundations of the ecclesiastical buildings, providing evidence of how the city was being physically reorganised during the transition from Roman to Christian administration.

The university’s researchers suggest that the removal of public paving materials may also indicate the authority exercised by the bishop over urban infrastructure. This interpretation would place the emerging Church at the centre of the city’s political transformation.

Ancient Written Accounts Supported by Archaeology

The existence of an early Christian cathedral at Altinum had been documented in letters written by Saint Jerome, one of the most influential Christian scholars of the late Roman period.

Writing in AD 396, Jerome referred to the religious activities of Nepotian, a priest associated with Heliodorus, the first bishop of Altinum. His descriptions included the maintenance of church furnishings, walls, floors and sacred vessels, suggesting an established and relatively prosperous Christian institution.

Until now, however, archaeologists had struggled to connect those accounts to a particular building.

The latest excavations, combining evidence collected during the 2025 and 2026 campaigns, have provided what researchers consider a convincing identification of the ecclesiastical complex.

The excavation is directed by Diego Calaon of Ca’ Foscari University and co-directed by Elisa Possenti of the University of Trento. Their work has brought together earlier archaeological records and newly examined foundations, including sections exposed during investigations in previous decades.

Researchers have also identified a burial area dating from the sixth and seventh centuries. Many graves were disturbed when construction materials were removed from the abandoned complex, but surviving human remains offer opportunities for further scientific investigation.

Radiocarbon dating, anthropological examinations and additional geophysical surveys are planned to establish a more detailed chronology and search for other elements of the religious complex, including its baptistery.

What the Discovery Reveals About Venice’s Origins

The historical importance of Altinum extends beyond the cathedral itself.

The ancient settlement was an important Roman commercial centre with connections to the waterways of the northern Adriatic. As political, environmental and demographic conditions changed during late antiquity, its population and institutions gradually shifted towards settlements within the lagoon.

One of the most important destinations was Torcello, which later became an early centre of Venetian civilisation.

Traditional accounts have often portrayed the creation of lagoon settlements as a response to barbarian invasions, with mainland inhabitants fleeing to isolated islands for protection.

The latest archaeological findings support a more complicated process.

Research at Altinum and Torcello indicates that the movement of people, religious institutions and construction materials was gradual and organised rather than the consequence of a single catastrophic event.

The cathedral appears to have been systematically dismantled during the first half of the seventh century, with substantial quantities of its stone and brick transferred to developing lagoon communities.

A surviving inscription records the establishment of Torcello’s cathedral in AD 639, providing an important chronological reference for the movement of ecclesiastical authority.

The findings add to the wider study of Europe’s surviving archaeological and architectural heritage, particularly the transformation of Roman settlements into medieval urban centres.

They also demonstrate how archaeological evidence can challenge historical narratives constructed centuries after the events they describe.

Much of the late-antique landscape at Altinum disappeared because of centuries of agricultural activity and the systematic removal of reusable building materials. In many cases, the excavators are studying trenches left by the extraction of foundations rather than surviving walls.

Further investigations may determine the complete extent of the episcopal complex and clarify the chronology of its abandonment.

For the first time, however, researchers can locate the religious buildings associated with Altinum’s earliest Christian bishops and trace their connection to the communities from which medieval Venice eventually emerged.