Lombardia Regione d’Onore e premi a personalità di spicco tra cui Sebastian Maniscalco, Anthony Capuano e Pierroberto Folgiero

The Trump administration’s reported proposal to restore Russian gas supplies to Europe through Ukraine marks a reversal of Washington’s longstanding energy policy. Behind the promise of an economic incentive for peace lies a more consequential question: whether Europe is being asked to restore the very dependence on Moscow that it has spent four years dismantling.

The administration of US President Donald Trump is considering the restoration of Russian natural gas supplies to Europe, including through Ukraine’s pipeline network, as part of a proposed settlement to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. The initiative would offer Moscow renewed energy revenues while potentially opening opportunities for American investors to participate in the trade.

According to a New York Times investigation published on 17 October, presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have raised the proposal with Ukrainian and European officials, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The White House has confirmed that economic incentives for Russia and Ukraine form part of its peace diplomacy, although no agreement on renewed gas transit has been announced.

The proposal would require Ukraine to reopen a transit route that ceased operating for Russian exports in January 2025, while European governments would be expected to resume purchases they have spent years reducing. American negotiators reportedly regard the prospect of renewed commercial revenues as an incentive for President Vladimir Putin to reach a settlement.

There is, however, a considerable difference between offering Russia a commercial opportunity after a verified peace agreement and restoring a source of revenue and political influence before Moscow has demonstrated any willingness to abandon its territorial objectives.

From opposition to Russian gas to facilitating its return

The reported initiative represents a reversal of Trump’s earlier position on European energy security.

During his first presidency, Trump repeatedly warned Germany that its dependence on Russian energy exposed it to political pressure from Moscow. Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2018, he accused Berlin of becoming dangerously dependent on Russian supplies. Members of the German delegation visibly smiled at his remarks.

The episode acquired renewed significance after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Germany had developed an extensive commercial relationship with Gazprom, while the Nord Stream pipelines were intended to facilitate Russian gas deliveries directly to Germany, bypassing traditional transit countries, including Ukraine.

Trump maintained his opposition to those energy relationships well into his second presidency. As EU Today reported in September 2025, he told European governments that continuing to purchase Russian energy amounted to financing the war against themselves.

Washington is now reportedly considering precisely the commercial relationship that Trump previously identified as a strategic danger.

The change cannot be explained solely by the objective of ending the war. It also coincides with discussions about a substantially different economic arrangement, in which American commercial interests could participate in infrastructure and transactions previously dominated by Russia and European energy companies.

American investors and the economics of peace

On 8 October, Reuters disclosed negotiations involving Kushner and Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s investment envoy, concerning possible American investment in the Nord Stream pipelines.

The discussions included the prospect of US investors profiting from renewed Russian gas deliveries to Europe. Separate negotiations have involved assets belonging to the Russian energy company Lukoil.

The White House has denied that Nord Stream was a subject of recent discussions and has said any agreements must benefit American taxpayers and companies. There is no established evidence that Witkoff, Kushner or members of Trump’s family would personally profit from the proposed gas arrangements.

Nevertheless, the possibility of American participation changes the commercial equation. Russian gas returning to Europe through infrastructure involving US investors would no longer be exclusively a Russian-European business relationship.

That distinction matters financially, but it does not necessarily resolve the underlying security problem. American ownership of transit infrastructure would not eliminate Moscow’s ability to influence production, supply volumes or export decisions.

The European Union has already confronted the consequences of allowing an energy relationship to become a source of geopolitical leverage. Introducing American intermediaries would not, by itself, remove that vulnerability.

Europe’s legal and political obstacles

The proposal also conflicts with legislation already adopted by the European Union.

In January 2026, the Council formally approved a regulation phasing out Russian natural gas imports. The restrictions began taking effect in March, with the remaining long-term LNG imports scheduled to end in January 2027 and pipeline imports in autumn 2027.

Consequently, restoring substantial Russian supplies would require changes to existing EU policy or the use of legally available exceptions. Neither Washington nor Moscow can make that decision on Europe’s behalf.

Germany has already opposed the reported American initiative. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s security adviser, Günter Sautter, reportedly objected during discussions in Florida, while former economy minister Robert Habeck warned against recreating dependence on an unreliable supplier.

The economic attraction remains understandable. European industry faces substantial energy costs, and cheaper pipeline gas could offer relief to some consumers and manufacturers. Yet commercial prices do not account for the wider costs associated with supply disruption, strategic exposure and the potential use of energy exports as political leverage.

Europe’s decision to reduce Russian gas imports was therefore not simply a change of supplier. It was a response to the security implications of its previous energy model.

The consequences for European politics

The initiative also intersects with divisions inside European politics, particularly in Germany.

Alternative for Germany (AfD) has repeatedly advocated restoring Russian energy imports, arguing that sanctions and expensive replacement supplies have damaged German industry. Sahra Wagenknecht’s left-wing BSW has advanced similar arguments concerning energy prices and relations with Moscow.

The overlap extends beyond energy policy. On 14 October, AfD and BSW representatives supported a motion in Saxony-Anhalt calling for an end to military assistance for Ukraine.

A US-backed proposal to restore Russian gas could give these parties an additional argument against the federal government’s existing approach. They would be able to point to Washington’s own negotiations when questioning the economic and strategic rationale for maintaining restrictions on Russian energy.

This does not establish that the Trump administration’s gas initiative is intended to strengthen particular European political movements. It does demonstrate how the same policy could serve several objectives simultaneously: commercial rapprochement with Russia, a negotiating incentive for Moscow and a change in the European debate over sanctions.

A peace incentive that could restore Russian leverage

The central uncertainty concerns the relationship between renewed revenues and Russian military objectives.

Washington’s argument assumes that the prospect of substantial future gas income could persuade Putin to accept a settlement. Yet negotiations over commercial cooperation have so far produced no demonstrated change in Moscow’s fundamental territorial demands.

Meanwhile, Russia continues attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. On 18 October, Zelenskyy reported 76 Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy, oil and gas facilities during the preceding week, despite Trump’s announcement of an energy ceasefire that neither Kyiv nor Moscow had confirmed.

There is also an unresolved contradiction in Washington’s wider sanctions policy. Having previously demanded that Europe stop financing Russia through energy purchases, Trump has recently suspended additional American sanctions against Moscow while his representatives explore new economic arrangements.

For Ukraine, renewed transit could restore revenue lost when the previous gas agreement expired. For Russia, however, the potential benefits extend beyond immediate export earnings. Access to European markets would restore commercial relationships and a degree of political influence that Moscow lost after the invasion.

The distinction is fundamental. A peace settlement that permits carefully regulated economic cooperation after Russian withdrawal and enforceable security guarantees would be different from an agreement that restores Moscow’s commercial advantages in anticipation of concessions that have not yet been secured.

The question for European governments is therefore not merely whether Russian gas could once again become cheaper than alternative supplies. It is whether restoring that trade would leave Europe better protected against another confrontation with Moscow, or recreate the vulnerabilities that became apparent in 2022.

Washington’s proposed economic bargain cannot answer that question on Europe’s behalf.

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During their visit to Kyiv in September, US President Donald Trump’s envoys urged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to consider restarting the pipelines that once carried Russian gas to Europe, The New York Times reported on 17 October. They presented it as part of a peace deal with Russia. In the weeks that followed, they pressed the idea with European officials, while Washington freed Russian diesel and spared Russia’s oil buyers from new US penalties.

Energy sales fund Russia’s war, and Ukraine’s halt of transit in January 2025 left TurkStream as Gazprom’s only pipeline route into the EU. Meanwhile, Russia has kept bombing Ukraine’s grid through the energy truce Washington declared on 11 October.

The pitch in Kyiv

Envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner put the idea to Zelenskyy when they met him in Kyiv, the newspaper reported, citing people familiar with the talks. Trump officials argued that transit fees, which Ukraine gave up at about $1 billion a year, would benefit Kyiv, and that European voters would eventually want cheaper energy. Russia’s share of EU gas imports had fallen from 45% in 2021 to 13% last year.

The envoys presented renewed Russian gas sales as one of the economic incentives in a wider settlement covering Russia’s relationship with NATO, security guarantees for Ukraine, and territorial control. Some European and Ukrainian officials suspected Washington would seek a cut of the profits. The White House denied that the Nord Stream pipeline had been a subject of recent discussions. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov claimed that resuming energy cooperation is in Russia’s interest and, right now, even more in Europe’s.

Germany pushes back

At Ukraine talks the envoys hosted in Florida last week, Günter Sautter, security adviser to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, forcefully opposed the idea. German lawmakers have called a return to Russian deliveries a disaster for European security, even treason, as the far-right AfD courts Gazprom to bring the gas back. Former Economy Minister Robert Habeck, who steered Germany off Russian gas after 2022, said Trump “seems to have more sympathies with Vladimir Putin than he has with the Ukrainians.”

One concession after another

Rather than pressure Putin or strengthen Ukraine, the administration has spent much of its peace effort on economic incentives for Russia, the newspaper wrote. The US Treasury cleared imports of Russian diesel on 9 October. On 16 October, Trump waived the penalties on Russia’s oil buyers that Congress had passed in the Graham Act. Washington is also weighing relief for sanctioned shadow fleet tankers. And the White House ordered limits on the military satellite service Ukraine’s forces rely on, Reuters reported.

Putin’s economic envoy Kirill Dmitriev claimed the ice had broken and more joint initiatives would follow, including data centers powered by Russian nuclear energy. The talks also cover the sale of Lukoil’s foreign assets to a group that includes the US government, the newspaper reported earlier this month. Zelenskyy, who had heard the pitch in Kyiv, alluded to it in a Financial Times interview this week.

“The question will be when will the next deal be? Maybe it will be gas. Definitely it will be gas,” he said.

Reopening the pipelines could hand Moscow back significant revenue and strengthen its sway over Europe’s energy market, Liga noted. Each new concession lowers the price Russia pays for continuing the war.

More than half a million people took part in demonstrations across France on Saturday, 17 October, as protests over living costs and education deteriorated into riots, looting and attacks on public buildings in several major cities.

France is assessing extensive damage following nationwide demonstrations on Saturday, 17 October, that brought hundreds of thousands of people onto the streets and resulted in more than 1,200 arrests. Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu said 150 police officers and gendarmes were injured as violent groups attacked public buildings, looted businesses and confronted security forces.

According to figures released by the French authorities, approximately 550,000 people participated in 110 marches across France, including 110,000 in Paris. Organisers, including trade unions and student associations, placed nationwide participation at 800,000.

The demonstrations represented a considerable escalation of the movement that began in September over deteriorating conditions in French secondary schools. The protests have since expanded into a broader campaign against rising living costs, public spending restrictions and the government’s economic policies.

Violence spreads beyond Paris

In the French capital, confrontations erupted around Place de la République, where masked groups threw paving stones, fireworks and other projectiles at police. Security forces responded with tear gas and water cannon as vehicles and rubbish bins were set alight.

Businesses along Boulevard Magenta and neighbouring streets were targeted, with shops broken into and goods stolen. Several central Paris Métro stations were closed as authorities attempted to restrict access to sensitive government locations.

Although the main authorised procession remained largely peaceful, violence continued elsewhere in the capital into Saturday evening.

The disturbances extended well beyond Paris. In Limoges, the historic town hall suffered extensive fire damage, with parts of its roof collapsing. Regional authorities described the destruction of the 143-year-old building as a major loss to the city’s architectural heritage.

In Marseille, groups forced their way into the town hall after using street barriers to ram its entrance. Municipal premises were vandalised before police regained control.

Further incidents were reported in Lyon, where a tourist office was attacked and a fire started, and in Bordeaux, where the official residence of the Gironde prefect was ransacked. Police also reported attacks or attempted break-ins at public buildings in Lille, Calais and Brest. The scale of the disturbances placed security forces under considerable pressure.

Government blames organised extremist groups

Lecornu accused organised far-left groups of deliberately instigating violence in several French cities. Nuñez similarly attributed much of the destruction to radical groups and individuals exploiting the demonstrations to loot businesses.

President Emmanuel Macron condemned attacks on public property and commercial premises, promising that those responsible would face prosecution.

The government has not announced a state of emergency, although authorities are reviewing the scale of the damage and the security response.

The mayor of Paris, Emmanuel Grégoire, described the destruction across parts of the capital as extensive and distinguished the peaceful protest movement from those responsible for vandalism.

Student unrest becomes a national movement

Saturday’s demonstrations followed several weeks of disruption across France’s education system.

As EU Today reported earlier this month, between 400 and 500 secondary schools faced partial or complete closures as students protested against teacher shortages, overcrowded classrooms and deteriorating facilities.

The subsequent confrontations with police intensified political tensions, with student organisations accusing authorities of using excessive force and police representatives complaining of inadequate protection.

A further controversy emerged on Saturday after a 17-year-old demonstrator in Saint-Étienne suffered a serious hand injury. An investigation was opened into the incident and assigned to France’s police inspectorate, the IGPN. Reports linked the injury to a grenade thrown by police; the precise circumstances remain under investigation.

The latest demonstrations also marked a revival of the Gilets Jaunes, or Yellow Vest, movement, which emerged in 2018 in opposition to fuel taxation and subsequently developed into a wider challenge to Macron’s economic programme.

Trade unions, including the CGT, joined calls for higher wages and pensions, lower consumer prices and increased investment in public services.

Political consequences for Macron and Lecornu

The unrest presents another challenge for Lecornu’s government as it attempts to manage France’s public finances ahead of the 2027 presidential election.

The demands for increased spending on education, wages and public services come as ministers face pressure to reduce the budget deficit and control public debt.

The political implications are already apparent. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of the hard-left France Unbowed movement, has supported the student protests while opposing looting and destruction. Marine Le Pen has condemned the rioters and accused Mélenchon’s party of helping to legitimise the unrest.

The latest disturbances also follow growing criticism of the government’s policing strategy, particularly the use of riot-control weapons during demonstrations involving minors.

With municipal authorities calculating the cost of damage to public buildings and commercial premises, Lecornu has instructed ministers to support affected businesses. The immediate challenge is to restore public order while addressing a protest movement that has expanded considerably beyond its original demands for improvements in French schools.

Por Juan Manuel de Prada La obsesión psicologista ha impulsado muchos «diagnósticos clínicos» sobre el doctor Sánchez, donde el personaje aparece pintado con rasgos de «psicopatía» o «narcisismo» extremo; a…

O advogado Willer Tomaz, investigado por fraudes contra a Previdência e amigo do candidato Flávio Bolsonaro (PL), recebia minutas de decisões do STJ (Superior Tribunal de Justiça) e de manifestações do MPF (Ministério Público Federal) antes da publicação, aponta investigação da Polícia Federal, segundo reportagem do UOL.

A reportagem afirma que o procurador aposentado Antônio Carlos Simões Soares era um dos interlocutores de Tomaz. Em 2019, Soares era citado pelo entorno do então presidente Jair Bolsonaro (PL) como favorito para ser indicado à Procuradoria-Geral da República e como ligado a Flávio, o que o procurador negava.

Segundo o UOL, os investigadores suspeitam que Tomaz recebeu documentos vazados do STJ por meio de Soares, além de outros interlocutores.

Ainda de acordo com a reportagem, a apuração da PF aponta que o escritório alterava a estratégia conforme os documentos que recebia.

Em nota, Tomaz negou “categoricamente ter tido acesso irregular ou não autorizado a decisões judiciais ou a pareceres do Ministério Público Federal, bem como ter interferido em manifestações”. “Sua atuação sempre observou a legislação e as prerrogativas da advocacia, valendo-se exclusivamente das vias institucionais e processuais legítimas. As insinuações divulgadas são infundadas, distorcem o exercício regular da profissão e configuram desinformação”, afirmou o advogado.

Tomaz também disse que “causa estranheza” que um material sigiloso, “ignorado até mesmo pela defesa, venha a público de forma seletiva em pleno período eleitoral e mencione terceiros sem nenhuma relação com os fatos investigados”. “Serão adotadas as providências cabíveis para obter acesso ao relatório, demonstrar a improcedência das alegações e identificar a origem do vazamento”, afirmou.

A campanha de Flávio também foi procurada, mas ainda não se manifestou sobre as suspeitas contra Tomaz. A reportagem não conseguiu ainda localizar Soares.

Viagens de Flávio Bolsonaro

Reportagem da Folha de S.Paulo publicada na quinta (15) mostrou que uma holding de apostas online de Willer Tomaz pagou voos entre Portugal e França em 2025 para o candidato à Presidência pelo PL, de acordo com uma investigação da Polícia Federal.

Willer é investigado sob a acusação de fazer repasses financeiros de dinheiro obtido em fraudes contra a Previdência no escândalo do INSS. Junto com Jorge Barbosa Dias, ele é dono da Rede Loto, a primeira bet a conseguir uma licença de operação no país ainda em 2023, emitida pelo governo fluminense.

Questionado pela Folha de S.Paulo sobre as viagens, Flávio Bolsonaro disse que sua relação com Willer é exclusivamente de amizade.

Segundo a investigação, ao menos três trechos de viagem em jato executivo foram contratados para Flávio e Willer por meio da Cathedral, empresa registrada na Ilha da Madeira. Única acionista da Rede Loto, a Cathedral tem como sócios Willer e Dias.

The post PF suspeita que Willer Tomaz recebia decisões sigilosas do STJ appeared first on Diário da Manhã - O Jornal do leitor Inteligente.

DUBAI, Oct 17 (Reuters) – Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Navy said on Saturday that two oil tankers had caught fire after hitting naval mines while crossing the Strait of Hormuz, the official Iranian news agency...

EU leaders have failed to settle their differences over the 2028–2034 budget, with Germany demanding further reductions to the proposed spending framework and the European Council taking charge of negotiations ahead of a difficult December deadline.

European Union leaders have ended their Brussels summit without agreement on the bloc’s next seven-year budget, after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz rejected the scale of spending envisaged under the latest compromise proposal and demanded deeper cuts.

The discussions on 15–16 October exposed the continuing division between governments determined to contain national contributions and those seeking to protect agricultural subsidies, regional development and new European investment programmes. The dispute now threatens the political timetable for approving the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, the budget that will determine the Union’s spending priorities over the next seven years.

In their formal summit conclusions, leaders invited European Council President António Costa to take negotiations forward towards a timely agreement. No new spending settlement was endorsed, despite the Irish presidency having presented revised figures immediately before the summit.

Germany rejects the compromise

The European Commission originally proposed a framework approaching €2 trillion in current prices, arguing that Europe needed greater financial capacity to meet its growing responsibilities in defence, competitiveness, technological development, migration and external security.

Ireland, which holds the rotating Council presidency, submitted a revised negotiating document on 10 October intended to narrow the differences between governments. The latest proposal includes substantial reductions compared with the Commission’s initial ambitions while seeking to preserve financing for established EU programmes.

Those concessions have not satisfied Berlin. Merz argues that the Union must recognise the difficult fiscal position facing national governments and that the proposed increases in common spending remain excessive.

Germany, the largest contributor to the EU budget in absolute terms, has been working with other budget-conscious governments to seek reductions from the original Commission proposal.

EU Today reported on the proposed €141 billion in reductions, including the implications for defence and competitiveness funding.

The Irish compromise has done little to bridge the divide. The revised framework seeks to combine greater financial restraint with protection for agricultural and cohesion policies, while retaining significant investment in security, research and competitiveness.

Yet every attempt to rebalance the proposed spending exposes another political conflict.

Agriculture, cohesion and defence compete for funding

The Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion funding remain among the largest and most politically sensitive components of the EU budget. Agricultural payments support farmers across the Union, while cohesion programmes finance infrastructure, regional investment and economic development, particularly in less prosperous territories.

Governments benefiting heavily from those programmes are reluctant to accept reductions, particularly when national finances are already under pressure.

France, Italy and other countries defending traditional EU expenditure have therefore resisted attempts to transfer the burden of budget restraint disproportionately onto agriculture and regional support.

At the same time, the Commission has argued that the EU cannot simply preserve the spending structure of previous decades while promising a stronger role in European defence, industrial development and economic security.

The contradiction is increasingly apparent. European governments demand greater independence from external suppliers, stronger military capabilities and sustained financial support for Ukraine, yet remain unwilling to agree on the larger common budget that might help deliver those objectives.

Cuts to research, innovation, cross-border infrastructure or defence-industrial programmes would not necessarily produce immediate political costs. Their consequences would emerge later, through investments postponed, capabilities not developed and projects left dependent on national budgets.

Conversely, reducing agricultural payments or regional investment would produce more immediate resistance from farmers, local authorities and national governments.

The demands of 17 EU governments seeking to protect farm and cohesion spending illustrate the growing tension between established programmes and the Union’s newer strategic priorities.

A timetable becoming difficult to defend

The Council’s budget negotiations had been intended to deliver a political agreement before the end of 2026. That would leave 2027 for the European Parliament and member states to complete the legislation required for the new financial framework to operate from January 2028.

Failure to reach that timetable would not immediately stop EU expenditure. It would, however, compress the period available for completing the detailed legal arrangements underpinning individual programmes and could complicate the uninterrupted delivery of funding at the beginning of the next budget cycle.

The political environment is hardly favourable. Several governments face difficult domestic debates over public spending, taxation and the demands of European integration. In France, the approach of the 2027 presidential election adds another complication to negotiations requiring sensitive national concessions.

Agreement on the seven-year framework requires unanimity among member states, followed by the consent of the European Parliament. The latter has already argued that the EU needs sufficient financial resources to match the responsibilities its governments have assigned to it.

Costa now faces the task of converting competing national positions into a financial settlement that all 27 governments can accept. That will require decisions not only about the overall ceiling but also about the balance between national allocations and programmes managed at European level.

The Brussels summit has demonstrated that the principal disagreements remain unresolved. The next negotiating round will determine whether governments are prepared to compromise on spending priorities or whether their ambitions for a more capable European Union will once again run ahead of their willingness to finance it.

Italy has extended checks on travellers from Spain for another week, but talks between Giorgia Meloni and Pedro Sánchez have opened the way for an end to reciprocal restrictions imposed after the migration crisis in Ceuta.

Italy and Spain have agreed to work towards ending their reciprocal Schengen border controls following discussions between Prime Ministers Giorgia Meloni and Pedro Sánchez at the European Council summit in Brussels. Rome nevertheless extended its restrictions for another seven days on Friday, 16 October, as the two governments consider how to bring their respective measures to an end.

The decision marks a possible turning point in a dispute that has disrupted travel between two of the European Union’s largest countries since the summer. According to the notifications recorded by the European Commission, the restrictions concern air and sea connections between Italy and Spain, which do not share a land border.

The two governments have instructed their interior ministers to consider alternative arrangements over the coming week. Although neither side has formally withdrawn its measures, the agreement to coordinate their removal suggests that both capitals are seeking a way out of an increasingly uncomfortable confrontation over migration and internal European security.

How the Ceuta crisis reached Schengen

The dispute began after an extraordinary influx of migrants from Morocco into Spain’s North African enclave of Ceuta in late July. More than 72,000 people crossed the border, prompting serious questions about the management of the EU’s external borders and the possibility of onward movements into other member states.

Italy responded by introducing checks on passengers arriving from Spain, arguing that the situation created risks for public order and internal security. Rome also raised concerns about the possible movement of individuals presenting security threats, although the extent of any such movement remained disputed.

Madrid rejected the justification and introduced reciprocal measures. What began as an emergency response to events on an external border consequently developed into a disagreement about whether one Schengen member could impose restrictions on another on the basis of anticipated migration movements.

EU Today examined the original Spanish retaliation in August, when the dispute first threatened to turn temporary border controls into an instrument of political pressure.

The wider consequences of the Ceuta incident have raised questions about the vulnerabilities exposed at the EU’s external border and the effectiveness of common European migration and crisis-response policy.

The limits of temporary border controls

Schengen is built on the principle that people can travel between participating countries without routine internal border checks. Member states nevertheless retain the right to reintroduce temporary controls in response to serious threats to public policy or internal security, subject to the requirements of EU law.

The difficulty lies in determining when those exceptional powers are justified. Italy has maintained that the Ceuta crisis warranted precautionary action. Spain has argued that controls imposed specifically on travellers from its territory were unjustified and discriminatory.

These opposing positions matter beyond the two countries. If concerns over irregular arrivals in one member state become sufficient grounds for another to introduce sustained checks, the distinction between Europe’s external borders and its internal travel area becomes increasingly difficult to maintain.

The operational results have also entered the political argument. Italian figures cited during the dispute indicate that nearly half a million passengers were checked during the first month, with 31 refused entry. Those numbers demonstrate that the measures were substantial, but do not by themselves establish whether the original security concerns were proportionate to the restrictions imposed.

Madrid, meanwhile, has maintained that migrants involved in the Ceuta influx had not moved onwards to mainland Spain in the manner suggested by Italian concerns.

Meloni and Sánchez seek a practical compromise

The latest discussions offer both governments a route towards de-escalation without formally conceding their underlying positions. Meloni can present the additional week of controls as a continuation of Italy’s security precautions, while Sánchez can point to an agreement to prepare their coordinated removal.

The two prime ministers remain politically divided on migration. Meloni has consistently argued for stronger border enforcement and deterrence, while Sánchez has defended an approach incorporating legalisation and labour-market integration for migrants already living in Spain.

Those disagreements were also visible during the Brussels summit, where European leaders returned to the question of migration management and the consequences of national decisions for the wider Union.

For Brussels, the immediate concern is whether the two governments can replace competing national restrictions with arrangements that address security concerns without unnecessarily interrupting movement between Schengen countries.

A coordinated end to the controls would not resolve the underlying problems exposed by Ceuta. It would, however, remove one of the more unusual internal consequences of that crisis and demonstrate that political negotiations can still prevent emergency border measures from becoming semi-permanent.

The decisive period is now the coming week. Whether the controls expire as planned will depend on the discussions between the Italian and Spanish interior ministries and their ability to agree practical alternatives.

More than 25,000 police officers were deployed across New Delhi recently to prevent demonstrations led by India’s new youth-led political movement, the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP). Government authorities had denied the CJP permission to protest on public-order grounds. The ensuing security operation saw the authorities shut one in six metro stations in the capital, barricade […]

The post Can a cockroach movement reverse India’s democratic decline? appeared first on Asia Times.

There is still over an hour before the protagonist appears, but the line already wraps around the block. Dozens of people wait patiently for their turn to see the man who has become the great hope of the Democratic left wing. When he begins to speak, pandemonium breaks out: “My name is Abdul El‑Sayed and I am going to be your next senator in Washington.” Over the next hour, the hundreds gathered in this venue will applaud, laugh, and cheer every word from the mouth of the new star of American politics, who has already made a fitted black T‑shirt and jeans his trademark look. We are in Lansing, Michigan’s capital, where one of the most gripping battles of the midterm elections — just over two weeks away — is being fought.

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A AJA – Associação de Jovens do Algoz organiza o evento ‘Vila Halloween’ no próximo dia 31 de outubro, cuja iniciativa tem início às 19h00 e decorre no Salão do Centro Cultural Luís Augusto Mascarenhas, em Algoz.

O objetivo da associação passa por assinalar a data festiva e fomentar o convívio entre os residentes e visitantes da freguesia numa festa temática.

O programa do evento integra um concurso de máscaras com prémios para os três primeiros classificados, sendo que o vencedor recebe uma garrafa e um desconto de 1.000 euros na aquisição de uma viatura na TS Autodream, o 2.º classificado obtém um bilhete de uma hora no Quantum Park e o 3.º classificado garante dez imperiais.

A animação musical conta com um baile conduzido por Marco Filipe e com a atuação do DJ Diogo Gigante. O recinto dispõe de uma zona de comes e bebes, onde haverá venda de caldo verde a partir da meia-noite. As entradas são livres.

A realização do evento conta com o apoio do Município de Silves e da Junta de Freguesia de Algoz, a parceria do Moto Clube de Algoz e o patrocínio da TS Autodream.

“Esta iniciativa espelha aquilo que pretendemos trazer para a nossa terra. Proporcionar momentos de encontro, envolver a comunidade local e trazer entretenimento diversificado para o Algoz. A imaginação e a criatividade desta associação não tem limites“, afirma a Direção da AJA.

Sobre a AJA – Associação de Jovens do Algoz

A AJA – Associação de Jovens do Algoz é uma associação local dedicada ao desenvolvimento de iniciativas no setor desportivo, pedagógico, cultural e recreativo. A sua missão centra-se na alavancagem dos jovens para a vida em comunidade.

French authorities are preparing for hundreds of demonstrations on Saturday, 17 October, as student unrest converges with protests over living costs, public spending and government policy. Up to 40,000 demonstrators are expected in Paris, where police and organisers remain divided over march routes.

France is preparing for a nationwide wave of demonstrations on Saturday, 17 October, with approximately 500 protest actions under consideration and more than 90 marches being organised, according to the Interior Ministry. The mobilisation brings together high-school students, trade unions, farmers and supporters of the Yellow Vest movement, raising the prospect of further confrontation after nearly a month of unrest.

Police estimates suggest that around 40,000 demonstrators could gather in Paris, with approximately 150,000 more expected elsewhere in France. The figures remain preliminary, while authorities warn that some protests could involve road blockades, disruption to essential infrastructure and violent clashes.

Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez initially outlined preparations for 250 gatherings and 80 marches on Friday morning. Subsequent assessments from his office indicated that as many as 500 actions were being considered, although not all had been formally organised.

Paris Faces Dispute Over Demonstration Routes

The authorities are particularly concerned about developments in the capital, where negotiations between police and protest organisers have failed to produce agreement over the proposed routes.

Paris police prefect Patrice Faure has rejected proposals for marches terminating near the Opéra district or Place de la Concorde, citing security concerns surrounding central government institutions.

According to details of the security preparations, police have proposed an alternative route between Place de la Bastille and Place de Clichy. The CGT trade union and climate campaigners have accepted the proposal, but student organisations and Yellow Vest representatives continue to oppose it.

Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu has convened an interministerial crisis unit to coordinate the government’s response. Security officials have warned that attempts to obstruct major transport routes or critical infrastructure will not be tolerated.

The Interior Ministry has also indicated that stun grenades, whose use was suspended during the student protests, could again be deployed in cases of particularly serious urban violence.

Yellow Vests Return Amid Rising Living Costs

Saturday’s demonstrations are being promoted as a revival of the Yellow Vest movement, which emerged in 2018 following opposition to fuel taxation before developing into a broader protest against living costs, economic inequality and government policy.

The latest mobilisation has gathered support from organisations demanding measures to address rising fuel, energy and food prices. Campaigners are also challenging the government’s proposed 2027 budget and its implications for public services.

The agricultural union Confédération paysanne has called on farmers to join the demonstrations, arguing that rising agricultural fuel costs and deteriorating conditions in rural communities have increased pressure on producers.

The union has also linked its demands to environmental policy, public-service provision and access to affordable food.

The CGT, student unions and climate organisations have similarly expressed support for the protests, while political backing has come from La France Insoumise and the French Communist Party.

Student Protests Enter Their Fourth Week

The mobilisation follows weeks of demonstrations involving secondary-school pupils, teachers and public-sector workers. What began as protests over shortages of teachers, overcrowded classrooms and deteriorating school buildings has developed into a nationwide confrontation over education policy and policing.

As EU Today previously reported, between 400 and 500 secondary schools faced partial or complete disruption earlier this month as students organised blockades and demonstrations.

The movement has subsequently expanded beyond its original educational demands, with student organisations raising concerns about university admissions procedures, police tactics and government spending priorities.

The scale of the unrest has placed considerable pressure on French authorities. According to figures from the Justice Ministry, 6,877 people were placed in police custody during the protests between late September and 8 October, approximately 86 per cent of them minors.

Violence during the demonstrations has resulted in injuries among police officers, students and educational staff. Clashes on 8 October led to 504 arrests and injuries to 48 police officers, according to Interior Ministry figures.

Education Minister Édouard Geffray has announced emergency measures to address teacher shortages, including the deployment of replacement teachers. The ministry says 2,000 of the 3,000 promised replacements have already been assigned, but student organisations maintain that the measures are insufficient.

Growing Pressure on the French Government

The planned demonstrations come as France faces a difficult debate over public spending, taxation and the 2027 budget. Lecornu’s government must balance demands for higher salaries and increased investment in education against mounting pressure to reduce the deficit.

France’s deteriorating public finances have already attracted scrutiny from eurozone partners, while domestic opposition to spending restraint has become a central issue ahead of the 2027 presidential election.

The convergence of student organisations, trade unions and Yellow Vest campaigners could broaden the protests beyond the education sector, particularly if demonstrations over living costs attract participants who have not joined the recent school protests.

However, the extent of that mobilisation remains uncertain. Online protest maps contain substantially more proposed actions than the authorities’ estimates, and participation figures will not be established until Saturday.

For the government, the immediate test will be whether the demonstrations remain peaceful and whether the authorities can prevent disruption to transport networks and public services without provoking further confrontations with protesters.

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