Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has convened an emergency government meeting following two days of violent unrest in Milan and other northern cities, where demonstrators clashed with police, looted shops and damaged public property during protests over living costs and deteriorating public services.

Police brought 271 people to police headquarters following Sunday’s disturbances in Milan, including 220 minors. Of those detained, 32 were formally arrested and another 28 were reported to the judicial authorities, according to figures released on Monday, 19th October.

The violence has prompted the Italian government to consider further restrictions on those involved in violent demonstrations, potentially introducing additional powers directed at organised disorder and juvenile offenders.

Milan city centre hit by looting

The disturbances began during demonstrations on Saturday, 17th October, organised amid growing dissatisfaction over household expenses, public services and wider political grievances.

Although the protests initially included peaceful participants, groups of masked individuals subsequently confronted riot police in central Milan. Officers used tear gas and water cannon as demonstrators erected burning barricades and threw objects at security personnel.

The unrest continued on Sunday, when shops were attacked close to Piazza del Duomo, one of Milan’s principal commercial and tourist areas.

Among the premises targeted were branches of Decathlon, Arc’teryx and Vodafone. Television footage showed damaged shopfronts, overturned street furniture and burning rubbish containers.

According to police figures reported on Monday, 174 of those taken to police headquarters were subjected to preventive detention measures introduced under recent Italian security legislation.

Fourteen members of the security services were reported injured during Sunday’s disturbances, including ten police officers and four members of the municipal police.

The judicial authorities are examining the conduct of individuals suspected of taking part in attacks on businesses and confrontations with officers. Prosecutors have sought custodial measures against several adults accused of offences including devastation, looting and aggravated resistance.

The large proportion of minors among those detained has become a central issue in the political response.

Violence spreads across northern Italy

Milan was not the only city affected by disorder. Saturday’s demonstrations also produced confrontations in Turin, Bologna, Brescia and Bergamo.

Italian police reported arrests across the affected cities, while the scale and organisation of the disturbances have raised questions about whether different groups were acting independently or using demonstrations as opportunities for coordinated violence.

There is not yet sufficient publicly established evidence to attribute the disorder to a single organisation or political movement.

The clashes coincided with major protests in neighbouring France, where similar concerns over living costs and public administration have contributed to increasingly confrontational demonstrations.

Although the grievances overlap, the Italian and French movements have different political backgrounds and organisational structures.

Government considers emergency legislation

Following a meeting at Palazzo Chigi on Monday, Meloni’s government indicated that it was considering a legislative response, potentially through an emergency decree.

According to details of the government discussions, proposals under examination include additional measures against violent offences, changes to preventive policing and possible restrictions addressing road blockages.

Some measures could be drawn from security legislation already under consideration in the Italian Senate. Ministers have also discussed the need for more effective intervention against juvenile offenders.

The meeting included Deputy Prime Ministers Matteo Salvini and Antonio Tajani, Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi, Defence Minister Guido Crosetto and senior officials from the police, Carabinieri and intelligence services.

The government has stressed that peaceful demonstrations must remain protected while arguing that violence and organised destruction require a stronger response.

No final legislative text had been adopted at the conclusion of Monday’s meeting. A decree could be considered by the Council of Ministers as early as Tuesday, although the precise content remains subject to further examination.

Dispute over responsibility for policing

The unrest has also produced a dispute between Milan’s municipal authorities and the national government.

Mayor Giuseppe Sala questioned the adequacy of the policing arrangements, arguing that the number of officers initially deployed was insufficient to control the disturbances.

Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi rejected that criticism, while senior government figures accused local political leaders of failing to condemn the violence unequivocally.

The disagreement reflects a wider question over how responsibility for anticipating and containing serious public disorder should be divided between local administrations and national security authorities.

Italy’s opposition has also challenged the government’s handling of the disturbances. Former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi criticised Meloni and Piantedosi over their failure to prevent the violence, calling for a change in leadership at the Interior Ministry.

The political argument is likely to intensify if the government proceeds with emergency legislation. Supporters of stronger police powers argue that the existing framework is insufficient to deal with rapidly organised disturbances, while opponents will scrutinise the proportionality of new restrictions and their effect on peaceful protest.

The immediate test for the government will be whether additional legal powers can improve public-order operations without replacing effective policing, intelligence gathering and judicial enforcement.

As protests ripple through big cities across the continent, a quieter, more forgotten population at Europe’s edge sits through weeks of strikes and blockades, while largely ignored. 

Italy’s southern regions of Puglia, Calabria, Sicily, Molise and Basilicata are facing empty supermarket shelves and plummeting fuel supplies since transport and agriculture workers have been protesting against climbing costs of living. 

Entire sectors have been put on pause due to the excessive costs it now takes to run them, from delivering food goods to producing them, for unbalanced competition with foreign suppliers and sustained neglect from Rome. 

While protestors in large cities like Milan and Bologna joined a European choir of protests fighting unaffordable housing last weekend, truck drivers from Bari to Palermo have joined in blocking roads to important ports and highways connecting isolated southern regions, and denouncing the outrageous costs of fertilisers, seeds, and fuel for tractors and transport for over two weeks.

“For us, and for the community, it’s become impossible to face the costs of fuel,” Luigi Di Benedetto, manager of an agriculture company in Caltagirone, Sicily, told EUobserver. 

“Italy import products that do not meet legal specifications,” he said, echoing the worries of his colleagues and fellow protestors, since the market was flooded with cheaper foreign imports, which have left them unable to pay the bills.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

If the State considers itself to be at war, why does it not state so where the Constitution requires it to do so?

Join us on Telegram, X, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The Ravenna case

It all begins in Ravenna, a historic city and major Italian port on the Adriatic coast. The port of Ravenna is a civilian port: bulk cargo, fertilizers, containers, cruise ships. Yet in a brief filed this summer with the Council of State, the State Attorney General’s Office attributed “military significance” to it within the country’s maritime defense system. The reason lies in a single sentence: making certain data public would pose an unacceptable risk because “a ‘piecemeal’ and ‘hybrid’ world war is underway, involving, among others, Italy as well.”

The data did not consist of routes, schedules, or ship names. They were aggregate figures: the amount of military equipment that left the port in 2025, broken down by four-month period and categorized as exports or transit. Journalist Linda Maggiori had requested this information in January under the general right of access to public information—Italy’s equivalent of the FOIA—which does not require justification. On October 13, Il Fatto Quotidiano turned the statement into a national issue. On October 16, the Sixth Section of the Council of State rejected the Customs Agency’s appeal.

In February, the Customs Agency, which reports to the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), denied the request entirely, citing national security, public order, and commercial confidentiality. Maggiori, represented by attorney Andrea Maestri, filed an appeal with the Emilia-Romagna Regional Administrative Court (TAR), which on July 1 partially upheld the appeal: the quantities must be made public because the numerical data is “neutral,” while the destinations may remain confidential. Customs, represented by the State Attorney’s Office, filed an appeal. The Council of State upheld the Regional Administrative Court’s ruling: the administration failed to demonstrate either the necessity or the concrete nature of the harm. It also noted “apparently contradictory” conduct, as the Livorno Customs Office had previously provided similar data without objection.

In February 2025, approximately 13 metric tons of forged parts bound for an Israeli defense company were seized in Ravenna without export authorization; the proceedings are ongoing, and the presumption of innocence applies. It appears that on October 14 of this year, another 4 metric tons were at the port.

What does “war” mean, who decides, and the arms law

The word has three meanings, and memory confuses them. The first is constitutional. Article 11 establishes that Italy “rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means of resolving international disputes.” Article 78 entrusts the Chambers with the authority to declare a state of war and to grant the necessary powers to the government; Article 87 assigns the declaration of war to the President of the Republic. In the history of the Republic, a state of war has never been declared: neither in 1991, nor for Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Libya.

The second meaning is international: under international humanitarian law, armed conflict exists de facto, but supplying weapons to a belligerent party—according to prevailing legal opinion and that of the International Committee of the Red Cross—does not make one a party to the conflict. The third issue is political-strategic. “Hybrid warfare” (cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation below the threshold of armed conflict) and “proxy war” are analytical tools, not legal categories. In a judicial ruling, therefore, a political term was used to justify an exception to a legal right. The Council of State rejected the postponement.

Parliament declares a state of war, authorizes missions (Law 145/2016), and receives the annual report on exports. The government authorizes exports through the UAMA of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Prime Minister is the sole custodian of state secrets (Law 124/2007), under the oversight of COPASIR. The President of the Republic chairs the Supreme Defense Council. The Ministry of Defense signs the classified aid packages for Ukraine. The State Attorney’s Office, which reports to the Prime Minister’s Office, defends government agencies in court: its briefs are legal documents, not foreign policy statements. No minister has yet clarified whether they agree with the statements made therein.

Moreover, the information has never been classified as a state secret. Customs authorities have invoked the relevant provisions of Article 5-bis of the Transparency Decree (Legislative Decree 33/2013), which allow for a refusal only if necessary to avoid “concrete harm” to national security, defense, or international relations.

Law No. 185 of 1990 prohibits the export and transit of arms to countries engaged in armed conflict in violation of Article 51 of the UN Charter, to countries whose policies conflict with Article 11, to countries under embargo, or to those responsible for serious human rights violations. However, it excludes government-to-government transfers and transits for NATO forces. The annual report to Parliament (Art. 5) lists authorizations by country and company, not by port: no public document specifies how much passes through a single port. This is the gap that the Ravenna petition sought to fill. According to the Peace and Disarmament Network, the government’s reform bill, approved by the Senate in 2024 (A.C. 1730), would reduce the data included in the report; based on the sources consulted, it has not yet been definitively approved.

Those who defend confidentiality argue that harmless data—aggregated and cross-referenced with maritime tracking data—could reveal supply routes: this is the argument used by the Trieste Customs Office to deny an identical petition. Also important are obligations to allies and corporate confidentiality. Those advocating for transparency point out that Law 185 stems from the idea that arms require more public oversight, not less, because they pertain to Article 11 and, in the case of free transfers, involve public funds. An annual total does not enable hostile actions, and data published in Livorno does not become dangerous simply because it is in Ravenna.

Secrecy has a legitimate place. The Constitutional Court has linked it to national security since Ruling 86/1977 and reaffirmed this in the Abu Omar case (106/2009). Secrecy becomes problematic when it loses its criteria: concrete evidence of harm, proportionality, a time limit, consistency among agencies, and oversight by a judge or Parliament. The argument of a “piecemeal world war” failed on all counts. It did not identify any harm, rejected the Regional Administrative Court’s (TAR) compromise solution, treated data from a past year as if it were an ongoing operation, and contradicted the Livorno ruling. If merely invoking a widespread conflict suffices, then that justification applies to any data and indefinitely: hybrid wars, as described in official documents themselves, have no declared beginning nor anticipated end.

That language has a specific origin: the Ministry of Defense’s non-paper from November 2025, according to which Italy is already embroiled in a hybrid conflict. Committees and unions believe that part of Ravenna’s cargo is destined for Haifa and Ashdod: the withheld data would make it possible to verify this.

The political paradox

The government states in Parliament that Italy is not at war; one of its agencies writes the same in court to conceal a figure. The case was successfully closed, but only thanks to a journalist willing to pursue the matter through two levels of appeal. Yet, even with the case closed, the gravity of what was stated remains.

If the state deems the international situation serious enough to restrict the right to information, that assessment cannot be confined to a customs office or a legal brief. The logic of Article 78 applies even on a small scale: whoever invokes the exception must answer for it before Parliament. All that is needed is the uniform publication of quantities for each port—as requested by the Ravenna Region and Municipality—their inclusion in the report on Law 185, and a review of the classifications by COPASIR, with predefined deadlines.

An emergency becomes permanent when no one declares it and no one revokes it. One question remains for Parliament: if the State considers itself to be at war, why does it not state so where the Constitution requires it to do so? And if it does not consider itself to be at war, by what authority does one of its bodies write as much?

Five people have been arrested in Cyprus, Germany and Italy as part of a European investigation into an alleged €114 million VAT fraud operation involving the cross-border smartphone trade.

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) announced on 16th October that three suspects had been detained in Cyprus, one in Germany and one in Italy following an investigation coordinated by its Munich office.

Investigators believe the suspects established and controlled a network of companies designed to exploit the tax treatment of goods traded between EU member states.

The alleged operation involved smartphone transactions through businesses and so-called missing traders operating in Germany, Albania and Sweden. Prosecutors estimate that the activities caused VAT losses of approximately €80 million in Sweden and €34 million in Germany.

According to the official announcement of the arrests, the operation forms part of a wider investigation known as Midas, which is examining organised cross-border tax fraud.

Searches across several countries

The arrests were accompanied by searches and seizures in Cyprus, Greece and Italy, conducted with the assistance of national police, financial investigators and tax authorities.

Prosecutors said 12 searches had been carried out at premises connected with the suspects and companies under investigation.

Assets of up to €80,000 were frozen, while investigators also seized or took action against bank accounts, vehicles and property.

The operation involved cooperation between Germany’s tax authorities, Cyprus’s financial intelligence and cybercrime units, the Greek financial police and Italy’s Guardia di Finanza.

The suspects are believed to have played leading roles in organising and controlling the alleged scheme, although prosecutors have not publicly established their individual criminal responsibility.

The investigation remains subject to proceedings before the competent German courts. All suspects are presumed innocent unless proven guilty.

How the alleged fraud operated

The case concerns a form of tax evasion known as missing-trader intra-community fraud, commonly described as carousel VAT fraud.

Under the EU’s VAT system, qualifying business-to-business transactions involving goods transported between member states are generally exempt from VAT in the country of dispatch.

The purchaser accounts for VAT under the rules applicable in the destination country, while subsequent domestic sales normally involve VAT being charged to the buyer.

Fraudsters can exploit those arrangements by establishing companies that purchase goods through cross-border transactions before reselling them domestically.

A missing trader collects VAT from the purchaser but fails to remit it to the relevant tax authority. Other companies in the transaction chain may then seek deductions or refunds.

The same goods can pass through several businesses and, in some arrangements, move repeatedly between countries, allowing the fraud to be repeated.

Smartphones and electronic equipment are particularly attractive because they are relatively expensive, easily transported and can be traded in large volumes.

The complexity of the arrangements makes investigations difficult when businesses are established in several jurisdictions and transactions move rapidly between companies.

A wider European problem

The latest arrests follow another substantial VAT fraud operation announced earlier this month.

On 7th October, the EPPO reported that 62 suspects had been detained in a separate investigation involving alleged losses of at least €410 million.

That operation, known as Hermes, involved searches across eight countries and allegations concerning the sale of mobile phones and other electronic devices.

Although separate from Midas, the investigation illustrates the scale and organisation of suspected VAT fraud involving internationally traded consumer electronics.

According to the EPPO‘s 2025 annual report, prosecutors were handling 3,602 active investigations at the end of last year, with estimated potential damage exceeding €67 billion.

Of that amount, more than €45 billion related to suspected VAT and customs fraud.

Those figures concern estimated losses under investigation, rather than sums established by final court judgments or amounts that have already been recovered.

Protecting European tax revenues

The financial consequences extend beyond the immediate losses attributed to individual schemes.

VAT is a major source of revenue for national governments and forms part of the system used to calculate certain contributions to the EU budget.

Fraudulent transactions can also distort competition by allowing dishonest operators to offer prices that legitimate businesses cannot match.

The Commission’s 2025 VAT gap report estimated that EU countries failed to collect approximately €128 billion in expected VAT revenue in 2023.

That broader figure includes losses arising from several causes, including administrative errors and insolvency, and cannot be attributed entirely to criminal fraud.

The latest arrests also demonstrate the importance of cross-border investigative cooperation when suspected financial offences involve companies, transactions and assets located in different countries.

In the Midas investigation, prosecutors must now establish the precise roles of the suspects, prove the alleged transactions and determine whether criminal proceedings can result in convictions and financial recovery.

The arrests represent another stage in the investigation, not a judicial finding that the alleged €114 million fraud has been proved.

In today’s newsletter: Violent riots and looting have dominated the headlines, but the unrest gripping the country and beyond reflects deeper public anger over everyday issues

Good morning. I bet your weekend was better than Emmanuel Macron’s. On Friday, the evening before mass protests that were planned across France, he attended a Céline Dion concert in Paris with his wife, Brigitte, prompting comparisons to Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette. On Sunday evening, he was forced to give a televised speech condemning the “unbridled violence” and riots that erupted in French cities over the weekend.

The rioters that burned makeshift barricades of bicycles in Paris, destroyed the steeple of Limoges’ town hall and set fire to Lyon’s tourism office were described as “LE CHAOS” on the front page of La Tribune Dimanche, and “SCENES D’INSURRECTION” on Le Parisien Dimanche. By Sunday, protests had also taken place in Spain, Portugal and Italy.

The Vatican | Pope Leo told a crowd gathered in St Peter’s Square on Sunday that he would “gradually resume” his activities, at his first appearance before the faithful since undergoing an operation to remove a cancerous tumour from his lung.

UK news | A “well-known individual” is trying to secure a permanent injunction against the Guardian and ITN to prevent them from publishing details of serious allegations made against him.

US politics | Donald Trump fired his immediately embattled new press secretary, Katie Zacharia, on Friday evening after just five days in the job. The conservative commentator becomes the shortest serving occupant of the role in US history.

Reform | A Reform UK mayor is under police investigation for allegedly showing “naked and sexualised” images of himself to a female member of staff. Luke Campbell, a former Olympic boxing champion, is understood to have been questioned under caution by Humberside police.

Energy | The development of a huge AI datacentre hailed by the UK government has received a fresh setback after Microsoft pulled out of the project over concerns about power supplies.

Monday | The two-week biodiversity summit, Cop17, begins in Yerevan, Armenia, as countries come together to seek to protect nature.

Tuesday | The Covid-19 inquiry publishes its report on the adult social care sector.

Sunday | Incumbent Lula da Silva takes on Flavio Bolsonaro in the run-off of the Brazil general election.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Pascal Lachenaud/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Pascal Lachenaud/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Pascal Lachenaud/AFP/Getty Images

Dalle strade del Sud arriva una domanda che riguarda tutto il Paese: chi decide quanto costa produrre in Italia, e chi ne paga il prezzo quando la decisione viene presa altrove.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Una mappa che segue l’energia

A metà ottobre, per un camionista siciliano, tenere il mezzo fermo nel piazzale costa meno che metterlo in strada. Con il gasolio intorno ai 2,40 euro al litro sull’isola, il Comitato autotrasportatori siciliani stima fra 700 e 900 euro di perdita al giorno per ogni camion. Il coordinatore Salvatore Bella l’ha detto senza giri di parole: «Oggi lavorare in perdita con il gasolio a 2,40 al litro non è più possibile». Ne è nato il fermo che va dalla mezzanotte del 16 ottobre al 20, senza cortei: i tir restano nelle aziende, i semirimorchi non vengono ritirati dai porti. In Calabria Fedralog ha fermato i mezzi negli stessi giorni, mentre la sezione trasporti di Confindustria Catania ha deliberato all’unanimità uno stop fino al 22.

Il fermo arriva dopo settimane di mobilitazione. Il 1° ottobre agricoltori e autotrasportatori hanno bloccato lo svincolo di Pizzo sulla A2; il 12 i trattori hanno presidiato le portinerie del polo industriale tra Augusta e Melilli, rallentando il carico delle autobotti, per iniziativa degli stessi produttori e senza sigle sindacali alle spalle. In Puglia i blocchi hanno impedito l’accesso delle autocisterne alla raffineria Eni di Taranto, a ridosso dell’ex Ilva, i cui lavoratori sono in sciopero dal 12 ottobre. Gli olivicoltori sommano al caro carburante il calo del prezzo dell’olio. Il 22 toccherà ai pescatori: giornata di sciopero nazionale e cento pescherecci a chiudere simbolicamente lo Stretto di Messina.

La geografia dei presìdi dice qualcosa che i comunicati non dicono. Raffinerie, porti, svincoli autostradali, lo Stretto: chi protesta va a colpire i nodi da cui passa l’energia, come se sapesse bene dove nasce il problema. E c’è un paradosso evidente. Il Sud ospita Augusta, Priolo, Taranto, cioè una parte rilevante della capacità di raffinazione del Paese, ma i produttori che vivono a pochi chilometri da quegli impianti non riescono più a pagarne il prodotto.

La guerra arriva alla pompa

Queste proteste sono la coda italiana di una crisi aperta lontano. I rincari sono partiti con la guerra in Iran e con le difficoltà di approvvigionamento dal Golfo: già a fine marzo, nel Siracusano, il gasolio agricolo era salito da 0,88 a 1,45 euro al litro.  A settembre la media nazionale del gasolio superava i 2,16 euro, 35 centesimi più di febbraio; il 12 ottobre il self costava in media 2,252 euro. La crisi di Hormuz, che finora abbiamo letto soprattutto come stress test per le petromonarchie e per i flussi finanziari del Golfo, ha anche una trasmissione verso il basso. Lungo la catena, ogni anello scarica il costo su quello successivo, finché arriva a chi non ha nessuno a valle: il piccolo autotrasportatore che non può ritoccare le tariffe, l’agricoltore che vende a prezzi fissati dalla grande distribuzione.

Le isole pagano due volte. Al carburante si sommano i noli marittimi, appesantiti dalle nuove regole ambientali sul trasporto navale, e i ritardi del Sea Modal Shift, l’ex Marebonus che dovrebbe compensare il costo del passaggio via mare da e per la Sicilia e la cui prima annualità non è stata pagata entro giugno. Le risposte arrivate finora agiscono sul prezzo alla pompa (tagli temporanei delle accise, il tetto annunciato da Eni sulla propria rete dal 28 settembre) e quasi mai sulla struttura dei costi. Per un trattore che brucia 300 euro di gasolio a mattina, uno sconto di 15 centesimi non cambia i conti.

Letta con gli strumenti dell’analisi dei sistemi-mondo, la vicenda ha una forma riconoscibile: gli shock esterni attraversano il centro e si depositano sulla periferia, che ha meno margini per assorbirli. Il Mezzogiorno funziona da periferia interna dell’Europa. Importa energia a prezzi di mercato globale, esporta prodotti agricoli in competizione con importazioni soggette a standard diversi, dipende da una logistica strada-mare che nessun incentivo pagato in ritardo riesce a rendere sostenibile. Su questo si innestano fragilità di lungo periodo come il credito difficile, lo spopolamento e l’arretramento dei servizi, che l’autonomia differenziata rischia di accentuare.

La copertura nazionale ha registrato i blocchi come cronaca del traffico più che come fatto politico. È una scelta che pesa: una protesta trattata come disagio stradale non obbliga nessuno a rispondere sul merito. Eppure il merito è chiaro. Un Paese che importa gli effetti delle guerre altrui senza strumenti propri per governare il costo dell’energia finisce per trasferirli sui territori e sulle categorie più deboli.

Per le prossime settimane gli indicatori da seguire sono pochi e osservabili: un intervento specifico sul gasolio agricolo e da autotrazione, il pagamento del Sea Modal Shift, l’eventuale proroga dei fermi oltre il 20 e il 22, la saldatura con lo sciopero dei pescatori. In assenza di misure, gli stessi promotori siciliani hanno già prospettato di proseguire. Se accadrà, sarà difficile continuare a chiamarla una vertenza di categoria.

Dalle strade del Sud arriva una domanda che riguarda tutto il Paese: chi decide quanto costa produrre in Italia, e chi ne paga il prezzo quando la decisione viene presa altrove.

Schools in north-eastern Italy have banned pork products in school meals to make them acceptable to Muslim migrants, meaning traditional dishes like prosciutto, porchetta and pasta all’amatriciana are off the menu.

The post Pork Banned in Italy’s New Muslim-Friendly School Meals appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

Italy has extended checks on travellers from Spain for another week, but talks between Giorgia Meloni and Pedro Sánchez have opened the way for an end to reciprocal restrictions imposed after the migration crisis in Ceuta.

Italy and Spain have agreed to work towards ending their reciprocal Schengen border controls following discussions between Prime Ministers Giorgia Meloni and Pedro Sánchez at the European Council summit in Brussels. Rome nevertheless extended its restrictions for another seven days on Friday, 16 October, as the two governments consider how to bring their respective measures to an end.

The decision marks a possible turning point in a dispute that has disrupted travel between two of the European Union’s largest countries since the summer. According to the notifications recorded by the European Commission, the restrictions concern air and sea connections between Italy and Spain, which do not share a land border.

The two governments have instructed their interior ministers to consider alternative arrangements over the coming week. Although neither side has formally withdrawn its measures, the agreement to coordinate their removal suggests that both capitals are seeking a way out of an increasingly uncomfortable confrontation over migration and internal European security.

How the Ceuta crisis reached Schengen

The dispute began after an extraordinary influx of migrants from Morocco into Spain’s North African enclave of Ceuta in late July. More than 72,000 people crossed the border, prompting serious questions about the management of the EU’s external borders and the possibility of onward movements into other member states.

Italy responded by introducing checks on passengers arriving from Spain, arguing that the situation created risks for public order and internal security. Rome also raised concerns about the possible movement of individuals presenting security threats, although the extent of any such movement remained disputed.

Madrid rejected the justification and introduced reciprocal measures. What began as an emergency response to events on an external border consequently developed into a disagreement about whether one Schengen member could impose restrictions on another on the basis of anticipated migration movements.

EU Today examined the original Spanish retaliation in August, when the dispute first threatened to turn temporary border controls into an instrument of political pressure.

The wider consequences of the Ceuta incident have raised questions about the vulnerabilities exposed at the EU’s external border and the effectiveness of common European migration and crisis-response policy.

The limits of temporary border controls

Schengen is built on the principle that people can travel between participating countries without routine internal border checks. Member states nevertheless retain the right to reintroduce temporary controls in response to serious threats to public policy or internal security, subject to the requirements of EU law.

The difficulty lies in determining when those exceptional powers are justified. Italy has maintained that the Ceuta crisis warranted precautionary action. Spain has argued that controls imposed specifically on travellers from its territory were unjustified and discriminatory.

These opposing positions matter beyond the two countries. If concerns over irregular arrivals in one member state become sufficient grounds for another to introduce sustained checks, the distinction between Europe’s external borders and its internal travel area becomes increasingly difficult to maintain.

The operational results have also entered the political argument. Italian figures cited during the dispute indicate that nearly half a million passengers were checked during the first month, with 31 refused entry. Those numbers demonstrate that the measures were substantial, but do not by themselves establish whether the original security concerns were proportionate to the restrictions imposed.

Madrid, meanwhile, has maintained that migrants involved in the Ceuta influx had not moved onwards to mainland Spain in the manner suggested by Italian concerns.

Meloni and Sánchez seek a practical compromise

The latest discussions offer both governments a route towards de-escalation without formally conceding their underlying positions. Meloni can present the additional week of controls as a continuation of Italy’s security precautions, while Sánchez can point to an agreement to prepare their coordinated removal.

The two prime ministers remain politically divided on migration. Meloni has consistently argued for stronger border enforcement and deterrence, while Sánchez has defended an approach incorporating legalisation and labour-market integration for migrants already living in Spain.

Those disagreements were also visible during the Brussels summit, where European leaders returned to the question of migration management and the consequences of national decisions for the wider Union.

For Brussels, the immediate concern is whether the two governments can replace competing national restrictions with arrangements that address security concerns without unnecessarily interrupting movement between Schengen countries.

A coordinated end to the controls would not resolve the underlying problems exposed by Ceuta. It would, however, remove one of the more unusual internal consequences of that crisis and demonstrate that political negotiations can still prevent emergency border measures from becoming semi-permanent.

The decisive period is now the coming week. Whether the controls expire as planned will depend on the discussions between the Italian and Spanish interior ministries and their ability to agree practical alternatives.

A 500-year-old religious triptych by Andrea Previtali has been brought together for the first time in almost two centuries. The reunion forms the centrepiece of a new exhibition examining the painter’s place in the Venetian Renaissance.

Three panels of a Renaissance altarpiece, separated for almost 200 years, have been reunited in Italy for an exhibition opening on Saturday, 17th October, offering visitors a rare opportunity to see a work by Andrea Previtali in its original arrangement.

The painting, created around 1515 for the Church of the Annunciation in Serina, near Bergamo, has been reconstructed through cooperation between the Diocese of Bergamo and the Museo Villa Bassi Rathgeb in Abano Terme, close to Padua. One panel, depicting a bishop saint, belongs to the museum’s permanent collection, while the remaining two have been brought together for the exhibition.

The reunion was confirmed on 16 October by Italy’s Ministry of Culture heritage authority. It forms the central attraction of Andrea Previtali: Disciple of Giovanni Bellini, which runs until 7th February 2027 and examines the career of a painter who worked between two important artistic centres of Renaissance Italy.

Reconstructing a Renaissance Altarpiece

The three panels originally formed a triptych, a type of religious painting consisting of a central image flanked by two wings. Such works were commissioned for churches and private chapels, where they served as devotional objects and demonstrations of the artistic ambitions of their patrons.

Over succeeding centuries, many Renaissance altarpieces were dismantled, removed from their original settings or dispersed among private collections and museums. Their individual panels could subsequently be displayed as independent works, losing much of the relationship between the images originally intended by the artist.

The Previtali triptych provides an example of how those connections can be recovered.

The Museo Villa Bassi Rathgeb holds the panel depicting a bishop saint as part of the collection assembled by Roberto Bassi Rathgeb, an art historian and collector who contributed to renewed scholarly interest in Previtali.

His collection, donated to the municipality of Abano Terme between 1972 and 1980, contains important examples of painting from the Bergamo and Brescia schools.

The collaboration with the Diocese of Bergamo has now made it possible to display the bishop saint alongside the two surviving companion panels from the original altarpiece. Their reunion allows the work to be studied as a complete composition rather than as three separate paintings.

It also offers an opportunity to reassess Previtali’s decisions concerning the relationship between figures, religious symbolism and the architectural arrangement of devotional paintings.

A Pupil of Giovanni Bellini

Andrea Previtali was born around 1480 in Valle Imagna, in the territory of Bergamo, before moving to Venice, where he entered the workshop of Giovanni Bellini.

Bellini was among the most influential painters of the Venetian Renaissance, known for his treatment of colour, light and religious subjects. His workshop trained artists who would help establish the distinctive visual language of sixteenth-century Venetian painting.

Previtali’s connection to his master is documented in an inscription on his 1502 painting Madonna and Child with Donor, now held by the Musei Civici di Padova.

The artist described himself as a pupil of Giovanni Bellini, a declaration that has become an important piece of evidence for reconstructing his early career.

The new exhibition explores that relationship by displaying works by Previtali alongside paintings associated with the artistic environment in which he trained.

Among the loans is Bellini’s Saint Justina, from the Museo Bagatti Valsecchi in Milan. Although painted before Previtali’s mature career, it demonstrates the treatment of sacred figures, colour and composition that influenced succeeding generations.

The exhibition also includes works connected with Francesco Bissolo, Girolamo da Santacroce, Palma il Vecchio and Giovanni Busi, known as Cariani.

Together, they illustrate the movement of artistic ideas between Venice, Bergamo and Brescia during a period in which painters increasingly travelled between workshops, cities and patrons.

Venice, Bergamo and the Changing Renaissance

Previtali’s career developed at a time when the artistic traditions of northern Italy were undergoing considerable change.

The Venetian school placed particular emphasis on colour and atmosphere, while painters working in Lombardy drew on different approaches to portraiture, religious narrative and landscape.

Previtali’s paintings reflect both traditions. His subjects included Madonnas, religious gatherings, portraits and landscapes, often combining carefully observed human figures with detailed natural backgrounds.

After returning to Bergamo, he encountered the work of Lorenzo Lotto, whose approach to portraiture and religious painting introduced further stylistic developments.

The exhibition therefore examines Previtali not simply as a follower of Bellini, but as an artist whose work developed through exchanges between different regional schools.

It also includes Renaissance portraits, among them a painting on loan from the Accademia dei Concordi in Rovigo.

A separate section examines the practical techniques employed in Renaissance workshops, using physical and digital displays to explain how artists prepared, constructed and completed their paintings.

Such research has become increasingly important in the study and preservation of Europe’s Old Master paintings, allowing historians to reconstruct relationships between works that have survived in different institutions.

The restoration and presentation of historic collections also forms part of the wider debate about protecting Europe’s cultural heritage.

The Previtali exhibition has been organised by the municipality of Abano Terme in cooperation with the University of Padua and the Italian heritage authorities. It is curated by Raffaele Campion and Barbara Maria Savy.

Visitors will be able to see the reunited triptych at the Museo Villa Bassi Rathgeb from 17th October until 7th February 2027. The exhibition provides a rare chance to examine the three panels together and to understand how a religious commission created more than five centuries ago fitted into the artistic culture of Renaissance northern Italy.

Italy and five other member states have failed to secure a further postponement of the EU’s new carbon market for heating and transport fuels, although European leaders have ordered a fresh assessment of its impact on households and businesses.

European Union leaders have resisted demands for another postponement of carbon pricing for road transport and building fuels, exposing deep disagreements over climate policy, industrial competitiveness and the burden of energy costs on European households.

At the European Council summit in Brussels on 15–16 October, the Visegrad countries — Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic — pressed for the second European Emissions Trading System, known as ETS2, to be delayed until 2030. Italy and Greece joined calls for greater flexibility over carbon costs, although Rome also sought a national exemption from aspects of the energy-price regime rather than simply a uniform delay. No further postponement was agreed.

The European Council conclusions call on the European Commission to update its assessment of ETS2, particularly its design and safeguards. Leaders also demanded action to reduce volatility in the existing carbon market and limit the effect of carbon prices on electricity costs.

The outcome stops short of the further postponement sought by several governments, but demonstrates how far energy affordability has moved towards the centre of European climate negotiations.

The growing rebellion over ETS2

ETS2 is designed to extend the principle of carbon pricing to fuels used for heating buildings, road transport and certain smaller industrial activities. Unlike the existing Emissions Trading System, which covers large industrial installations and power generation, the new mechanism reaches sectors closely connected to everyday household expenditure.

Under the scheme, fuel suppliers must purchase allowances corresponding to the emissions associated with the fuels they sell. Households and motorists will not buy allowances themselves, but suppliers may pass those additional costs through to customers.

That distinction is fundamental. A policy designed to encourage investment in cleaner heating systems and vehicles may initially appear to consumers as an increase in petrol, diesel and domestic heating bills.

The current legislative timetable provides for ETS2 to become operational in 2028, following an earlier one-year postponement. The latest demands from several Central European governments would push that date back to 2030.

Their argument is that consumers and smaller businesses cannot reasonably be expected to absorb another source of energy-price pressure while European economies continue to contend with geopolitical uncertainty, expensive fuel and comparatively weak industrial competitiveness.

Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has been particularly outspoken in his criticism, arguing that carbon pricing risks weakening Europe’s industrial base and making everyday life more expensive.

Italy has supported calls for greater flexibility, with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni presenting the discussion as part of a wider attempt to restore competitiveness and make the transition more affordable.

Why other governments opposed another delay

The initiative encountered resistance from governments concerned that repeatedly postponing established climate legislation would weaken investment certainty and reduce confidence in European policy.

The Nordic member states have been particularly reluctant to reopen the timetable. Their position reflects a broader concern that businesses investing in clean technologies need credible long-term rules, rather than legislation liable to be revised whenever political opposition intensifies.

Carbon pricing is intended to change economic incentives gradually. Higher costs for carbon-intensive fuels are supposed to make alternatives such as better-insulated buildings, electric vehicles and cleaner heating more financially attractive.

Critics of further postponement argue that delaying implementation would also delay those incentives, potentially increasing the eventual cost of reaching the Union’s emissions-reduction targets.

Yet the opposition has exposed a weakness in that argument: consumers cannot always respond quickly to price signals. A household relying on an older heating system or a worker with no practical alternative to driving may face higher costs long before affordable low-carbon options become available.

That issue has been central to earlier discussions over ETS2. EU Today reported on stronger carbon-price safeguards in June, when European institutions moved to provide additional market intervention if allowance prices rose sharply.

Commission ordered to reassess the economic impact

Rather than endorsing a new delay, European leaders have asked the Commission to review ETS2’s economic impact and safeguards.

The summit also urged faster progress on adjustments to the Market Stability Reserve, the mechanism intended to help manage the supply of carbon allowances and prevent excessive price volatility.

Under the existing scheme, market interventions can increase or reduce allowance availability in response to defined conditions. For ETS2, safeguards are especially politically sensitive because the cost of carbon allowances may ultimately be reflected in household transport and heating expenditure.

The European Commission’s updated auction arrangements already envisage auctions of ETS2 allowances beginning in 2027, ahead of the system’s operational launch in 2028.

That timetable gives governments a relatively narrow window to settle the remaining political disputes and put protective measures into effect.

A central part of the response is the Social Climate Fund, intended to support vulnerable households, transport users and small businesses through investments in energy efficiency, cleaner heating, improved transport and temporary financial assistance.

EU Today previously examined the European Investment Bank’s €3 billion advance financing initiative, which aims to accelerate support for households before the new carbon market becomes fully operational.

The central practical question is whether such assistance reaches consumers quickly enough to offset rising costs, particularly in member states where incomes are lower and households remain heavily dependent on fossil fuels.

Climate commitments meet industrial reality

The ETS2 dispute is connected to a broader argument over Europe’s existing carbon market and its effects on energy-intensive industries.

Manufacturers already face substantial costs arising from electricity, fuel, regulatory requirements and international competition. Governments concerned about deindustrialisation argue that European climate policy must account more directly for these pressures.

The summit conclusions acknowledged those concerns by demanding a predictable carbon market that limits price volatility and protects industry against the relocation of production to jurisdictions with less demanding environmental rules.

At the same time, leaders reaffirmed the importance of maintaining carbon pricing as an incentive for investment and emissions reduction.

For the governments seeking a postponement, the Commission’s new assessment offers an opportunity to maintain pressure for further concessions. For governments defending the existing timetable, it provides an alternative to another politically damaging delay.

The immediate result is therefore a compromise over scrutiny rather than a change in law. ETS2 remains scheduled for 2028, while Brussels must demonstrate that its safeguards can withstand both market volatility and political opposition.

The next phase will be determined less by arguments about long-term emissions targets than by the ability of EU institutions and national governments to show households and businesses how the transition can be financed without placing disproportionate costs on those least able to adjust.

Excavations at the ancient Roman city of Altinum have revealed the probable remains of an early Christian cathedral and bishop’s palace, offering new evidence about the origins of Venice and the transformation of its lagoon settlements.

Archaeologists working near Venice have identified what they believe to be the remains of a 1,600-year-old cathedral and an adjoining episcopal palace, resolving a longstanding question about the location of one of the region’s earliest Christian centres.

The discovery was announced on 15 October by Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, following excavations at Altinum, an important Roman settlement on the mainland near the Venetian lagoon. The foundations of a substantial religious complex have emerged from an area where ancient written accounts had long indicated the existence of a cathedral, although its precise location had remained unknown.

The findings suggest that the church was constructed between the late fourth and early fifth centuries AD, making it the earliest Christian church so far identified archaeologically in the Venetian territory. The researchers believe the complex provides physical evidence of the period when Christianity was becoming an important political and administrative force in the declining Roman Empire.

A Cathedral Hidden Beneath a Roman City

The newly identified church was a rectangular structure approximately 30 metres long and 20 metres wide, without an apse and orientated towards the east. Its layout differs from the surrounding Roman street grid, reflecting the religious requirements of the early Christian community.

The architectural arrangement resembles early churches in the northern Adriatic region, particularly those associated with Aquileia, which was an important centre of Christianity during late antiquity.

An adjoining building, distinguished by its substantial foundations and a complex arrangement of internal rooms, has been provisionally identified as the bishop’s palace. Archaeologists believe it may have stood two storeys high, with residential accommodation for senior clergy above rooms potentially associated with privileged burials.

Among the most revealing discoveries is the extensive reuse of stone paving blocks taken from the Roman streets. These materials were incorporated into the foundations of the ecclesiastical buildings, providing evidence of how the city was being physically reorganised during the transition from Roman to Christian administration.

The university’s researchers suggest that the removal of public paving materials may also indicate the authority exercised by the bishop over urban infrastructure. This interpretation would place the emerging Church at the centre of the city’s political transformation.

Ancient Written Accounts Supported by Archaeology

The existence of an early Christian cathedral at Altinum had been documented in letters written by Saint Jerome, one of the most influential Christian scholars of the late Roman period.

Writing in AD 396, Jerome referred to the religious activities of Nepotian, a priest associated with Heliodorus, the first bishop of Altinum. His descriptions included the maintenance of church furnishings, walls, floors and sacred vessels, suggesting an established and relatively prosperous Christian institution.

Until now, however, archaeologists had struggled to connect those accounts to a particular building.

The latest excavations, combining evidence collected during the 2025 and 2026 campaigns, have provided what researchers consider a convincing identification of the ecclesiastical complex.

The excavation is directed by Diego Calaon of Ca’ Foscari University and co-directed by Elisa Possenti of the University of Trento. Their work has brought together earlier archaeological records and newly examined foundations, including sections exposed during investigations in previous decades.

Researchers have also identified a burial area dating from the sixth and seventh centuries. Many graves were disturbed when construction materials were removed from the abandoned complex, but surviving human remains offer opportunities for further scientific investigation.

Radiocarbon dating, anthropological examinations and additional geophysical surveys are planned to establish a more detailed chronology and search for other elements of the religious complex, including its baptistery.

What the Discovery Reveals About Venice’s Origins

The historical importance of Altinum extends beyond the cathedral itself.

The ancient settlement was an important Roman commercial centre with connections to the waterways of the northern Adriatic. As political, environmental and demographic conditions changed during late antiquity, its population and institutions gradually shifted towards settlements within the lagoon.

One of the most important destinations was Torcello, which later became an early centre of Venetian civilisation.

Traditional accounts have often portrayed the creation of lagoon settlements as a response to barbarian invasions, with mainland inhabitants fleeing to isolated islands for protection.

The latest archaeological findings support a more complicated process.

Research at Altinum and Torcello indicates that the movement of people, religious institutions and construction materials was gradual and organised rather than the consequence of a single catastrophic event.

The cathedral appears to have been systematically dismantled during the first half of the seventh century, with substantial quantities of its stone and brick transferred to developing lagoon communities.

A surviving inscription records the establishment of Torcello’s cathedral in AD 639, providing an important chronological reference for the movement of ecclesiastical authority.

The findings add to the wider study of Europe’s surviving archaeological and architectural heritage, particularly the transformation of Roman settlements into medieval urban centres.

They also demonstrate how archaeological evidence can challenge historical narratives constructed centuries after the events they describe.

Much of the late-antique landscape at Altinum disappeared because of centuries of agricultural activity and the systematic removal of reusable building materials. In many cases, the excavators are studying trenches left by the extraction of foundations rather than surviving walls.

Further investigations may determine the complete extent of the episcopal complex and clarify the chronology of its abandonment.

For the first time, however, researchers can locate the religious buildings associated with Altinum’s earliest Christian bishops and trace their connection to the communities from which medieval Venice eventually emerged.

On the night between Oct 7-8, 2026, in the Porto Vecchio area of Sanremo, a 13-year-old boy of Tunisian origin poured gasoline on a sleeping homeless man and set him on fire in an attempt to steal his backpack.

The incident took place in Piazzale Vesco. According to reports based on surveillance footage, the boy first filled a bottle with gasoline at a nearby pump, approached the man while he slept, poured the fuel on him — primarily on the legs, according to multiple accounts — and ignited it with a match. The goal was reportedly to take the backpack containing the victim’s belongings.

Suspected migrant killer targeting homeless in deadly concrete slab attacks arrested in France

The man’s screams alerted personnel from the Coast Guard. Carabinieri and emergency medical services also responded. The victim, described in reports as a foreign man of approximately 40 years of age, with one account referring to a French man in his sixties, sustained burns to his legs. He was hospitalized for two days at Sanremo’s Ospedale Hospital before being discharged, according to Il Giornale media outlet.

Surveillance cameras operated by the Capitaneria and the Municipality of Sanremo recorded much of the incident. 

Somali man stabs a homeless man in Germany, then cuts off his head

Investigators identified the 13-year-old, who had initially fled the scene. He was located in a community facility where he lives with his mother.

Under Italian law, anyone under the age of 14 is subject to an absolute presumption of non-imputability. This means the boy cannot be held criminally responsible or subjected to ordinary criminal punishment, regardless of the severity of the act. The juvenile prosecutor’s office in Genoa is handling the case and can consider protective or rehabilitative measures focused on the minor’s situation.

Syrian man sentenced to life in Germany for setting ex-fiancée’s 17-year-old sister on fire with gasoline

Some coverage has described the migrant youth having prior contact with authorities in Sanremo, though details remain limited as the matter falls under juvenile proceedings.

The post Italy: 13-year-old Tunisian sets sleeping homeless man on fire to steal his backpack, not criminally liable due to age appeared first on Remix News.

Europe is heading into an electoral moment without recent precedent. Four of its five most populous member states, Spain, France, Italy and Poland, are due to vote within the next 12 months – starting with Spain on 29 November.

If voters move further right, the combined effect could reshape the Union far more profoundly than any single national election.

Two shifts stand out. First, the firewall between the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and the hard-right is crumbling, even in Germany, its last bastion.

Hard-right parties sit in the governments of Italy, Czech Republic, Finland, Slovakia and Croatia, while Slovenia’s government relies on outside support from one.

Second, competition from the far-right is pushing established radical-right parties to harden their positions.

In Catalonia, Aliança Catalana is challenging Vox; in France, Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête, despite scoring single digits, is pressing on Marine Le Pen’s National Rally; in Italy, Roberto Vannacci’s National Future is challenging Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy; and in Poland, Grzegorz Braun’s Confederation of the Polish Crown is cannibalising the Confederation.

Under pressure, established conservatives tend to move towards these parties rather than hold the line, as Spain’s Partido Popular and France’s Les Républicains illustrate. Positions once on the margins become mainstream.

The implications go beyond immigration.

Le Pen and Vox leader Santiago Abascal advocate “national priority” in access to welfare and public services. Under pressure from the League and National Future, Meloni’s government has introduced a 30-percent cap on first-year classrooms for pupils without Italian citizenship, based on their birthplace or prior schooling.

A leaked AfD strategy paper reportedly goes further, proposing that national constitutions override EU law and reducing the Court of Justice to a forum for disputes between governments.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below:

Do you remember the Yellow Vests movement that shook France 2018? On TikTok, a young user has called for a national mobilisation on the seventeenth of October against the cost of living, and the video quickly went viral. So could the Yellow Vests make their big return?

“Please, give us a date, we’re ready to protest! We young people are struggling. We just can’t make a living anymore,” that’s what Justine, a TikToker from Normandy in France has posted a few weeks ago, while wearing a fluorescent yellow vest.

The reference to the 2018 Yellow Vests is unmistakable. The French movement, which began in protest at rising fuel prices, has been widely revived on social media in recent weeks, especially by younger users.

Our colleague Romane Lizée from StreetPress, a fellow member of the Sphera Network alongside Europod, spoke to some of them: young people reviving a protest movement they only knew from a distance.

Yves, a 24-year-old TikToker with over 80,000 followers, made a video called “Survival Guide for the Yellow Vests 2026”. He gives would-be protesters practical advice, such as bringing thick ski goggles or writing a lawyer’s phone number on a piece of paper.

So why is the movement resurfacing now? For many, the movement has come to stand for a general sense of being fed up, something they still feel today.

 “Eight years ago, France put on the yellow vest because petrol hit 1.50 euros a litre, and now we’re almost at three euros and nothing is happening!” That’s how Saïd, a 23-year-old delivery driver, sees it.

The economic context is indeed worse than it was eight years ago. The price of fuel is now almost 2.40 euros a litre.

Throughout September, a series of protests followed one another, called by different professions and for different reasons: climate action, firefighters, a public-sector strike, the law on sexual violence, and finally the student blockades.

High school students have been protesting for a few weeks now, blockading their schools to demand better conditions. We talked about this in a previous Briefed episode. You can find the link in the description.

Now, will the protest be as big and long-lasting as the one in 2018?

Online, a petition launched by the website 17octobregiletjaune, which calls for the protest, has gathered more than 21,000 signatures. Over a thousand actions across the country have been identified on a map by the same website: mostly protests in several cities, but also actions on roundabouts and at petrol stations.

Youth organisations, students’ unions and education staff have already answered the call. More importantly, the CGT, one of France’s main labour unions, has backed it, as have some political figures, like Marine Tondelier, the Green candidate for the presidential election. Still, the true extent of the movement is difficult to predict.

In other European countries, protests are also multiplying, especially among young people. In Spain, huge demonstrations for the right to housing have been taking place in several cities since mid-September. They went quite far: they pushed Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez to call snap elections.

In Brussels, on October 9th, thousands of protesters, including rail workers, teachers, and university and secondary school students, marched against the federal government’s policies, in particular its socio-economic measures. Here again, precarity is a central grievance.

In Italy, on October 8th, students called for mobilisation, notably by camping in front of universities across the country to protest against the sharp rise in tuition fees and student rents.

The triggers behind these protests are not all the same, and the mobilisations take different forms from country to country. But the goal is broadly the same: to call for better living conditions and to defend basic social rights. And young people are particularly mobilised.

Tucked among the Greek temples that made Agrigento famous, on the south coast of Sicily, there is a narrow valley of orange and olive trees. An international team has been digging there for three years. The third season in the Kolymbethra valley and on the Case Montana plateau ends on October 24. According to the […]

The European Commission has approved Italy’s revised defence investment plan worth slightly more than €8 billion under the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) programme, bringing Rome closer to receiving European-backed loans intended to accelerate military procurement and strengthen the continent’s defence industry.

The decision was confirmed in Brussels on Tuesday, 13th October, by Commission spokesman Thomas Regnier, who said the updated Italian proposal had received the executive’s approval. The plan must now obtain the Council’s endorsement before the loan agreement can be signed and the first payment released.

Under the procedure outlined by the Commission, Italy would become eligible for an initial disbursement amounting to 15 per cent of its approved loan following completion of the remaining formalities. For a package worth approximately €8 billion, that would represent around €1.2 billion in initial financing.

The approval comes as European governments seek to translate commitments to increased military expenditure into procurement contracts, industrial production and operational capabilities.

Italy’s position in European defence industry

Italy is among the EU’s principal defence manufacturing countries, with substantial industrial capabilities in aerospace, naval construction, electronics, military vehicles and weapons systems.

Companies including Leonardo and Fincantieri occupy important positions in multinational defence programmes, while smaller manufacturers contribute specialised equipment, components and technologies.

The Commission has emphasised Italy’s industrial importance in explaining its support for the revised plan.

Nevertheless, approval of the financing proposal does not establish precisely how the money will be distributed among manufacturers or procurement programmes. Individual contractual arrangements will depend on the projects included in the approved national plan and the relevant purchasing decisions.

Italy had previously been associated with a substantially larger indicative SAFE allocation, but its updated application concerns approximately €8 billion.

The revised amount illustrates the distinction between the borrowing capacity initially made available to member states and the financing they ultimately seek through their national investment proposals.

How SAFE financing operates

SAFE was established in May 2025 as part of the EU’s wider effort to improve defence readiness following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The programme provides up to €150 billion in long-term loans financed through borrowing by the European Union on international capital markets.

Unlike grants from the EU budget, these loans must be repaid by the borrowing member states. Their attraction lies principally in the financing conditions available through the Union’s borrowing arrangements.

SAFE is intended to support the procurement of equipment including ammunition, missiles, artillery systems, drones, air and missile defence systems, maritime capabilities and military mobility infrastructure.

An important feature is its emphasis on cooperation between European purchasers rather than exclusively national acquisition programmes.

Under the applicable regulation, joint procurement is generally intended to involve at least two eligible participating countries, although temporary provisions allow certain purchases by individual member states.

The rules also impose requirements concerning the geographic origin of components, reflecting the programme’s objective of increasing industrial capacity within Europe and eligible partner countries.

At least 65 per cent of component costs must originate within the permitted European and Ukrainian industrial base.

European production remains the central challenge

European governments have substantially increased defence expenditure, but higher budgets do not automatically resolve shortages in manufacturing capacity.

Production lines for ammunition, missiles and complex weapons systems require specialised machinery, skilled workers, component suppliers and sufficiently predictable orders to justify expansion.

Many defence companies have traditionally operated against fragmented national requirements. Different governments have purchased equipment in relatively small quantities, often imposing separate technical specifications and procurement conditions.

This fragmentation can increase costs and complicate maintenance, training and interoperability.

Brussels hopes that the combination of common financing and joint procurement will encourage member states to coordinate orders, giving manufacturers more predictable demand.

The challenge is particularly acute in air defence and precision-guided weapons, where European forces face both urgent requirements and lengthy production cycles.

SAFE can provide financing for eligible purchases, but the speed at which industry delivers equipment depends on existing capacity and the ability to expand production.

The next steps for Rome

Italy’s plan now moves to the Council, where the required approval must be secured before the Commission and Italian authorities can conclude the financing agreement.

The Commission’s statement on Tuesday made clear that the initial payment is conditional upon completion of these procedures.

Once the agreement is signed, the first tranche will provide financing for investment under the programme, with subsequent payments governed by the relevant arrangements.

The scale of Italy’s participation gives the decision significance beyond its immediate financial value.

As one of the EU’s largest manufacturing economies, Italy will be an important test of whether European defence financing can generate procurement cooperation across national borders while strengthening existing industrial capacity.

The effectiveness of the programme will ultimately be measured through signed contracts, production increases and the delivery of equipment to European armed forces, rather than the headline amount of approved borrowing.

Italy’s Deficit to Rise Again as Rome Uses EU Fiscal Flexibility

The European Commission has rejected demands from Italy and Greece for additional exemptions from EU spending rules as the Middle East energy crisis drives inflation higher, exposing renewed divisions over how much financial assistance European governments can provide.

The European Commission has rejected requests from Italy and Greece for greater freedom to increase public spending in response to the energy crisis, resisting pressure from two member states that argue existing budget restrictions are limiting their ability to protect households and businesses.

The decision, confirmed on 8 October, follows renewed appeals from Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis for measures recognising the exceptional financial burden imposed by higher energy prices.

Meloni wants Brussels to take greater account of unexpected inflation when assessing national budgets and to permit additional tax revenue generated by rising prices to be used for energy relief. Mitsotakis has sought the exclusion of temporary support measures for consumers and businesses from the expenditure limits agreed under the EU’s fiscal framework.

Economic Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis rejected the argument for further concessions, maintaining that the existing arrangements already take inflation into account and provide mechanisms for responding to exceptional circumstances.

The disagreement comes as Europe’s governments confront the economic consequences of the Middle East conflict, including higher fuel costs, inflationary pressures and increased demands for state intervention.

Italy’s increasingly difficult budget choices

For Italy, the dispute adds to a fiscal problem that has been developing throughout the year.

The government expects its budget deficit to rise to 3.4 per cent of GDP in 2027, reversing an earlier objective of reducing borrowing below the EU’s three per cent reference value.

As EU Today reported earlier this month, Rome plans to use additional fiscal room for defence and energy-related expenditure, while public debt is projected to remain close to 138 per cent of GDP.

The new request concerns the treatment of inflation and the financial support required to offset its effects.

Energy inflation creates an unusual budgetary problem. Governments can receive additional nominal tax revenue as prices rise, particularly through consumption taxes, while simultaneously facing public pressure to compensate consumers for higher living costs.

Meloni argues that such unexpected revenue should be available for targeted assistance without forcing equivalent reductions elsewhere in national expenditure.

Brussels is reluctant to accept arrangements that could turn temporary increases in tax receipts into an opportunity for permanent spending expansion.

Italy’s position also reflects the political competition between defence spending and domestic economic support. Rome has accepted the need for higher military expenditure but faces immediate pressure from households and energy-intensive industries.

That competition was already apparent when the government chose to prioritise energy relief over the full use of defence-spending flexibility.

Greece seeks different treatment for emergency support

Greece’s request is more narrowly focused on the treatment of temporary assistance under the EU’s expenditure rules.

Athens argues that measures intended to help businesses and households manage exceptional energy costs should not be counted against the normal spending limits.

The Greek government faces an economic environment in which higher imported energy prices threaten household purchasing power and business profitability, particularly in sectors dependent on transport and fuel.

Excluding temporary relief from expenditure calculations would give Athens additional room to intervene without breaching its agreed fiscal trajectory.

The Commission, however, has resisted establishing further exemptions beyond those already provided in the fiscal framework.

Its objection is institutional as well as financial. If additional categories of emergency expenditure are repeatedly excluded from fiscal calculations, the system becomes increasingly difficult to enforce consistently across the Union.

The limits of Europe’s reformed fiscal rules

The EU revised its fiscal governance framework in 2024, introducing nationally agreed expenditure paths intended to provide greater flexibility while maintaining sustainable public finances.

The Commission’s rules on exceptional circumstances permit member states to depart temporarily from normal requirements under specified conditions.

Those provisions have already been used to accommodate higher defence expenditure, while the Commission has also issued guidance on their application to energy-security investments.

Temporary financial assistance intended to reduce household energy bills, however, is not necessarily treated in the same way as investment in infrastructure that reduces Europe’s long-term dependence on imported fuel.

That distinction has become a source of friction between Brussels and national capitals.

Governments argue that the immediate economic effects of an international crisis require exceptional measures. The Commission is concerned that repeated concessions could weaken the credibility of the spending framework.

A wider dispute over Europe’s economic response

The Commission’s decision also comes as France faces increasing pressure over its debt and budget deficit.

The deterioration in French borrowing conditions has reinforced concerns about the risks associated with heavily indebted governments continuing to expand expenditure.

France, Italy and Greece have different fiscal positions, but the problems confronting them originate partly in the same combination of expensive energy, weak economic growth and competing spending commitments.

The dispute will now feed into preparations for the European Council meeting on 15–16 October, where energy prices and economic competitiveness are prominent agenda items.

EU leaders are expected to consider targeted and temporary measures to reduce the burden on businesses and consumers, alongside longer-term initiatives intended to reduce dependence on fossil fuels.

The Commission’s refusal to provide Italy and Greece with further fiscal exemptions establishes the limits within which those discussions will take place.

National governments remain free to introduce assistance, but Brussels is insisting that they account for its cost within the fiscal rules already agreed.

For Rome and Athens, the question is whether those rules provide sufficient room to respond to an energy crisis whose duration remains uncertain.

Mentre nuovi gruppi di immigrati prendono il posto delle comunità italiane, l’identità italoamericana si trasforma

Near Parabita, a town in the province of Lecce, in the heel of Italy’s boot (the region of Apulia, also spelled Puglia), a limestone cave holds a piece of Ice Age history. Two small bone figurines found there in 1966 belong to the group known as the Palaeolithic Venus figurines. Now a new survey suggests […]

Strategic Culture Foundation | October 9, 2026

The European Union is witnessing a full-blown social revolt. Governing political parties and their economic policies are held in open contempt as public protests and strikes escalate across multiple countries.

Protests, mass marches, and industrial strikes are spreading across the EU in France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, and other countries. The grievances are various, from students and teachers over woeful education services, to healthcare professionals and transportation workers denouncing crumby wages and pension cuts.

But at the core is a warmongering, dehumanizing system of capitalist inequality.

Unbearable living costs for basic needs, from food to housing, are driving millions onto the streets in desperation and anger at the lack of adequate political response to their concerns. As one French student said: “Too young to be listened to, old enough to be tear-gassed.”

The entire political system is being brought into disrepute for its dysfunction and indifference towards meeting rudimentary human needs. Then, infuriating all the more, are lies from the elite rulers and their propaganda media about “national defense and threat of war from Russia.”

In Spain this week, an 87-year-old frail woman known as Maricarmen died in hospital after she was evicted from her Madrid home because she could not pay the extortionate rent increase. Her plight has come to galvanize a nationwide protest against Spain’s housing crisis, a crisis that is repeated across every European country. Protesters shouted furiously that the pitiful old woman was “murdered by the state and corporations.”

In France, the brutality of police against student protests has shocked the nation and the world. Nearly 7,000 young people have been arrested, as riot police tear gas and shoot at largely peaceful rallies. Students gathering at the Place de la Bastille in Paris and other cities vow that they will not back down. One student had his hand blown off by a police stun grenade while another teenager lost an eye from a rubber bullet fired at close range.

The Place de la Bastille is where the French Revolution manifested in 1798 against a hated aristocracy amid abject misery. Today, the tensions are boiling towards another momentous rebellion, this time inspiring again similar movements across Europe.

These protests and the inhumane suffering that underlie them are channeling uprisings all over the EU.

There is a palpable sense that populations en masse have had enough of decades of inequality and chronic deprivation inflicted by capitalist policies that enrich a few and are enforced by governments slavishly serving the interests of capital over the needs of the citizen majority.

Western media reports talk about “cash-strapped” governments under pressure from bond markets to reduce record debt levels while workers, students and pensioners demand more public investment and relief from economic hardship.

That is a misleading partial portrayal of the problem. Omitted is the crucial backdrop that European governments are directing vast economic resources towards militarism and the proxy war in Ukraine against Russia. That is what is causing the “cash-strapped governments.” In other words, their declared fiscal straits are a policy choice, not some mysterious dilemma.

The social crisis sweeping across Europe is also seen in the United States and other Western-aligned nations. The background is a failed economic system that no longer provides a modicum of acceptable living conditions. The problem has been decades in the making from growing inequality and diminishing political representation. Today it is even questionable if Western states are democracies, controlled as they are by corporate oligarchies.

Nevertheless, the social crisis that is unfolding across Europe has been intensified and amplified by European political rulers operating in a relentless war mode against Russia.

The European Union has pumped hundreds of billions of euros into Ukraine over the past four years to prop up a NeoNazi regime run by a corrupt dictatorship – all for the objective of defeating Russia. The EU leaders – many of them unelected, like Ursula von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas and António Costa – are driven by an obsessive Russophobia. But that is only part of the explanation.

Other elected leaders and parties like France’s Macron and Germany’s Merz are also despised for their elitism and delusions of grandeur. Merz declares that he wants to make Germany the strongest military in Europe, in total tin-ear deafness to his nation’s economic and social problems and the sinister historical connotations of resurrecting Nazi Germany. Meanwhile, as his government suffers electoral defeat after defeat, European elites deprecate German voters as being blind because they dare to choose parties that are opposed to war with Russia.

There are many grounds for the Europe-wide contempt of ruling parties. Inequality, poverty, unemployment, soaring living costs, declining wages, deteriorating public services. Uncontrolled immigration amid the pressure on inadequate public resources is another cause for grievance. Europe’s complicity in the Israeli genocidal war on Palestinians, and Europe’s complicity in Trump’s aggression towards Iran, Yemen, Cuba, and so on, are other factors.

However, the bogus narrative that governments are “cash-strapped” is a cause for immense public disgust. There are plenty of economic resources to meet public needs. It’s a question of those resources not being permitted to create just and humane societies under the prevailing capitalist system with its priority of enriching a tiny elite class.

The conditions of “tight budgets” and “austerity for the masses” are created by deliberate policies of militarism and fuelling a proxy war in Ukraine.

European “leaders” and their NATO lobbyists like Mark Rutte demand hundreds of billions of euros to boost military industries while at the same time calling for draconian cuts in public spending and social welfare in order to pay for this reckless militarism. The EU is “lending” an additional €90 billion over the next two years alone just to prop up the corrupt regime in Kiev so that it can keep fighting a futile war with Russia. The perverse priority is driven by the military-industrial complex and its corporate investors. It is also driven by an ideological, propagandized mindset that demonizes Russia as an enemy. President Putin and other Russian voices have repeatedly stated that they do not want war with Europe. They say the conflict in Ukraine has root causes that can be resolved through diplomatic engagement. Why are European politicians implacably opposed to peace?

A major factor is covering for internal political and economic failure of the European system. The EU’s economies, as with those in the U.S. and other Western states, are bankrupt dystopias in terms of delivering on social and democratic needs. The failure has been compounded by the costs of war in Ukraine.

That failure is criminal and fatal for the politicians and governments who have overseen the policies. Thus, the political class, including the propaganda news media, cannot admit their criminal policies.

In the face of their own internal contradictions, the European political elites are seeking a solution by externalizing Russia as an enemy. This is the same modus operandi that European rulers have used for the past century and more, unleashing two world wars as a result.

These criminal politicians and their dysfunctional economic system are again pushing war as their escape plan for survival at the expense of millions of lives and at the risk of starting a third world war, one that this time around could involve catastrophic nuclear nemesis.

It is damning of virtually every European government, including primarily the British, that there are no calls for diplomacy and political settlement with Russia. They are committed to waging war on Russia to absolve themselves from the social devastation they are responsible for.

One positive thing, though, is that increasing numbers of people can see through the chicanery and lies. A German student placard summed it up: “We won’t fight your wars… Education not bombs!”

A day of reckoning is imminent. Criminal political leaders and their warmongering system are exposed like never before and in a way that demands total revolt as a proper solution. The consequences are not to be externalized this time. Chickens are coming home to roost, as Malcom X once said.