The EU’s border force Frontex is getting overhauled next Tuesday (27 October) by a European Commission determined to give the Warsaw-based agency a larger role in deportations, more resources, and more agility to deploy.
The Brussels-executive has already proposed increasing the agency’s budget to €12bn, spread out over seven years. The money is being discussed as part of a larger drawn out EU budget fight among EU states.
Budget tussles aside, the commission has already dropped clues into what it wants from the new agency, following demands from its political masters at the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP).
The EPP had wanted to expand the border force to 30,000 from the proposed 10,000. But it is unlikely the 30,000 will be met given the difficulty of finding recruits.
Frontex currently has around 1,250 officers, who are directly employed by the agency. Its standing corps also includes officers provided by member states on long- and short-term assignments. That means they are not all on the Frontex payroll.
European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, ahead of this month’s EU summit, instead spoke of a “substantial increase” of the Frontex standing corps, without committing to a number.
She also called for European Border and Return Reserve, a Quick Reaction Force for crisis deployment, a Return Coordination Centre to accelerate and improve returns including from foreign states, and social media snooping to gauge any possible Ceuta-like mass arrivals.
The ruling largely blocked homeland security agents from carrying out field interviews in nine states, including California, as part of a sprawling effort to find noncitizens registered to vote.
California officials are calling for an investigation into the actions of federal immigration officers after they allegedly injured and detained a U.S. citizen. Ricardo Gonzalez's detainment comes as an investigation by ProPublica found that more than 500 citizens have been caught up in the administration's immigration operations. William Brangham discussed more with ProPublica's Nicole Foy.
Boomer and Gen X 'progressives' have been conditioned to view mass immigration through the outdated lens of 1980s race politics and much smaller 20th century flows, preventing constructive debate, says Andrew Devine.
Nationalist leaders are framing unrest as consequence of failed liberal governance and open borders
Europe’s far-right leaders have jumped on the violence that rocked numerous cities last weekend, framing it as the inevitable consequence of failed liberal governance and open-border policies and insisting only they can restore law and order.
Months away from key elections in Spain, France and Italy, authoritarian nationalists are eager to weaponise the wave of street unrest, originating in peaceful protests over the cost of living and deteriorating public services but hijacked by violent rioters.
The Battle of Ideas was filled with speakers who were sharp, well-informed and willing to say things you rarely hear said out loud about the state of the country, says Pete Dalton. What we need now are solutions.
Thousands of small, often obsolete dams are blocking fish migrations across the United States. In this piece, Ben Goldfarb explores the growing movement to remove these barriers—despite political, economic, and emotional obstacles. He asks, “Can government agencies and conservation groups pick up the pace of dam removal while fish are still around to benefit?”
The Eastern Seaboard’s most enthusiastic purger of dams has long been Plymouth, Massachusetts, and one weekend I visited during its Herring Festival, a celebration of the resurgent alewife population that annually runs up Town Brook, the stream at Plymouth’s heart. The day was cool and damp, and I followed a posse of dads in Red Sox sweatshirts and kids in rainboots up the path that paralleled the creek. Someone had chalked “LOOK FISH” on the asphalt, and I glanced streamward to find alewives holding in small pods, weaving around each other in their effortless way.
Twelve migrants, including an infant, have died in two separate incidents involving boats travelling from Turkey towards the Greek islands of Lesbos and Samos, prompting investigations into the circumstances of the deaths and the activities of suspected people smugglers.
The incidents occurred on Monday, 19 October, in the northeastern Aegean Sea. Six people died when a speedboat collided with a Greek coastguard vessel near Lesbos, while another six were killed after a separate boat overturned north of Samos.
The deaths coincided with the publication of new figures from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, showing that irregular crossings into the EU fell by almost one-third during the first nine months of 2026.
According to the latest border monitoring figures, approximately 91,000 irregular crossings were detected between January and September, although the eastern Mediterranean remained the busiest migration route into the Union.
Two incidents under investigation
According to information released by the Greek authorities, the first fatal incident occurred near Agrilia on Lesbos when a speedboat carrying migrants struck a coastguard patrol vessel before overturning.
Six people died, while eight survivors were taken to hospital. The authorities subsequently arrested a 37-year-old Turkish national, identifying him as the suspected operator of the migrant boat.
Greece’s Maritime Affairs Minister Vassilis Kikilias said the available evidence indicated that the speedboat had struck the left side of the coastguard vessel. The precise circumstances remain under investigation.
In the second incident, approximately four nautical miles north of Samos, a boat reportedly overturned after making a sudden manoeuvre while being pursued by the coastguard.
Five men and one woman died, while 14 people were rescued. An Iranian national was arrested on suspicion of involvement in migrant smuggling.
The arrests do not establish criminal responsibility, and the circumstances surrounding both incidents remain subject to investigation.
Greek authorities have attributed the dangers of the crossings to trafficking networks operating between Turkey and the Aegean islands. The government has reiterated its policy of pursuing smugglers and restricting unauthorised maritime arrivals.
Fewer crossings, continued fatalities
Frontex recorded approximately 31,800 detections along the eastern Mediterranean route during the first nine months of this year, representing a decline of around 15 per cent compared with the equivalent period in 2025.
Across the European Union’s external borders, the agency reported an even larger reduction, with overall detections down by almost one-third.
The Central Mediterranean route experienced a particularly substantial fall, while the Western Mediterranean recorded an increase, reflecting changes in departure points and migration patterns.
These figures count detected border crossings rather than individual migrants and do not necessarily capture every unauthorised arrival.
The latest data also have to be considered alongside exceptional developments elsewhere on Europe’s borders. In July, large-scale movements through Spain’s Ceuta enclave created additional pressures on Spanish authorities and raised questions about the application of the EU’s new asylum arrangements.
The eastern Mediterranean figures encompass several routes, including crossings from Libya towards Crete, movements through the Aegean islands and arrivals across the land border with Turkey.
Consequently, the total recorded for the wider region should not be interpreted solely as the number of people arriving on the Greek islands.
Greece remains central to European border policy
Greece has occupied a central position in EU migration policy since the 2015–2016 crisis, when hundreds of thousands of people arrived from Turkey, many travelling onwards through the Balkans.
The subsequent EU–Turkey migration arrangements were intended to reduce unauthorised crossings and establish procedures for returning certain migrants who did not qualify for protection.
Athens has also faced persistent criticism from human rights organisations concerning allegations of unlawful returns at sea and land borders. Greek authorities deny operating an unlawful pushback policy and maintain that their border operations respect domestic and international law.
The EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, which entered into application in 2026, has introduced common procedures for screening arrivals, processing asylum claims and managing people who do not have permission to remain.
Its implementation has placed greater emphasis on border identification, biometric registration and cooperation between national authorities and Frontex.
However, the two disasters demonstrate the continued risks associated with maritime crossings, even during a period of declining arrivals.
Investigators must now establish precisely how both boats overturned, whether criminal offences were committed and what occurred during the encounters with coastguard vessels.
The findings will be relevant not only to the prosecutions of those arrested, but also to continuing scrutiny of maritime enforcement along one of the European Union’s principal external borders.
More than 100,000 people from Ukraine and Sudan can stay in the United States without immediate risk of deportation, the Department of Homeland Security said, in what amounts to a temporary reprieve after their right to stay in the country was set to expire on Monday.
Temporary protected status was set to end on Monday for about 101,000 Ukrainians and 1,800 Sudanese. But the DHS said an announcement “will be made at the appropriate time”. Until then, the department said in a written statement, Ukrainians and Sudanese in the US covered by those temporary measures “retain protection”. The department did not indicate how long they could stay or when a final announcement would be made on their status.
This week, editors Peter Suderman, Katherine Mangu-Ward, Nick Gillespie, and Matt Welch discuss the riots engulfing France and whether the country's increasingly unsustainable welfare state has made it ungovernable. They examine competing claims that immigration and austerity are fueling the unrest, the political gains being made by the French right, and why even modest pension reforms provoke fierce resistance.
The conversation turns to the United States, where President Donald Trump's tariffs are losing support among blue-collar voters and Republicans are struggling in traditionally conservative areas like Ohio. The panelists then discuss the abrupt departure of White House press secretary Katie Zacharia after just five days on the job. Later, they examine Sen. Elizabeth Warren's (D–Mass.) opposition to a proposed $45 billion merger involving McCormick and Unilever. Finally, a listener asks why libertarians don't follow the Democratic Socialists of America's example by trying to reshape the Republican Party from within.
0:00—France's riots and the imploding welfare state
21:29—Trump's tariffs lose support among blue-collar voters.
29:41—Zacharia's tenure as White House press secretary
35:45—Listener question on libertarian influence strategy
45:52—Warren's corporate merger opposition
57:07—Weekly cultural recommendations
Cato Innovation Project: Design your own full-time, paid role at Cato. If we fund your idea, you spend two years executing it. Apply here: cato.org/reason
Katherine Mangu-Ward appears on the left. Nick Gillespie appears on the right. An image of a car that's been set on fire by protesters appears in the center. Bold text across the top of the screen reads "FRANCE RIOTS."
Professor David Betz has warned that Britain is drifting towards civil war. No, says P.K. O'Sullivan: the war has already started, one broken friendship, family row and motorway blockade at a time.
Energy Secretary Miatta Fahnbulleh has attacked Shabana Mahmood's migrant crackdown, saying making foreign nationals wait threatens "integration", deepening the split within Andy Burnham’s Cabinet about border controls.
The BBC has suspended a placement scheme for civil servants amid an outcry over impartiality after it was revealed that Whitehall staff were tasked with fact-checking contentious issues such as immigration and Covid.
In late August, President Donald Trump's administration carried out its first deportation flight to Haiti since the Supreme Court allowed it to end temporary protected status (TPS) for the embattled country in June. "There are no extraordinary and temporary conditions in Haiti that prevent Haitian nationals…from returning in safety," the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) claimed in its TPS revocation, describing a country the State Department warns Americans not to visit "for any reason."
The Trump administration has eroded America's humanitarian avenues, including TPS, which shields migrants from deportation. As a result, many noncitizens may become undocumented and could be forced to return to unsafe places.
The DHS secretary may grant TPS for countries facing armed conflicts, natural disasters, or other disruptive events. TPS designations last anywhere from six to 18 months and may be extended. The government has designated 29 countries for TPS since Congress established the status in 1990, offering protection to Salvadorans fleeing a 12-year civil war, Haitians fleeing the 2010 earthquake, and millions of others. The Biden administration repeatedly made and extended TPS designations, but the Trump administration has been working to terminate them.
There were 1.3 million people living in the U.S. under TPS in March 2025, according to the Pew Research Center. By August 2026, the Trump administration had ended TPS for 13 countries, leaving 1 million people without its protections. Once someone loses TPS, he reverts to his previous immigration status, which is often undocumented. Over 600,000 Venezuelans, 330,000 Haitians, 170,000 Salvadorans, and 100,000 Ukrainians had TPS protections as of March 2025, according to the Congressional Research Service.
Critics often point out that TPS isn't really "temporary." That's frequently true: Although some designations have been brief, others have been decades-long. Designations for Haiti, Syria, Honduras, Nepal, Somalia, and El Salvador have all lasted at least 14 years, according to the Migration Policy Institute (MPI).
This says more about the U.S. immigration system and presidential power than it does about TPS. "In the absence of Congress acting to legalize what has become a long-settled unauthorized immigrant population, Republican and Democratic administrations, lawmakers, immigrants, and foreign governments had come to tacitly rely on TPS despite its nominally temporary nature," notes the MPI. Immigration policy is increasingly subject to presidential whims, and due to lengthy processing times and narrow qualifications, more durable immigration pathways such as asylum and refugee status are often inaccessible to eventual TPS beneficiaries. An immigrant-friendly president may use TPS designations to temporarily shield noncitizen populations, but an anti-immigrant successor can also revoke those protections. In either scenario, a TPS holder faces uncertainty.
In a rare bipartisan immigration effort last February, Reps. Laura Gillen (D–N.Y.) and Mike Lawler (R–N.Y.) introduced a bill to extend TPS for Haiti for three years. It passed the House this April and has been languishing in the Senate since. Its future, too, is uncertain.
Seven Tory MPs who skipped a vote on leaving the ECHR also belong to the pro-Net Zero 'Conservative Environment Network'. Coincidence? Paul Homewood thinks not and reckons Kemi Badenoch has a serious problem on her hands.
Europe's political class loves democracy – right up until voters choose the wrong people. From Sweden to Germany and Britain, Steven Tucker says the establishment has found plenty of ways to keep the public in its place.
The BBC has been accused of using its Bitesize website to push open borders, Net Zero and woke ideology on children as young as 11, teaching them that more immigration is great and anyone who disagrees is likely a bigot.
Italy has extended checks on travellers from Spain for another week, but talks between Giorgia Meloni and Pedro Sánchez have opened the way for an end to reciprocal restrictions imposed after the migration crisis in Ceuta.
Italy and Spain have agreed to work towards ending their reciprocal Schengen border controls following discussions between Prime Ministers Giorgia Meloni and Pedro Sánchez at the European Council summit in Brussels. Rome nevertheless extended its restrictions for another seven days on Friday, 16 October, as the two governments consider how to bring their respective measures to an end.
The decision marks a possible turning point in a dispute that has disrupted travel between two of the European Union’s largest countries since the summer. According to the notifications recorded by the European Commission, the restrictions concern air and sea connections between Italy and Spain, which do not share a land border.
The two governments have instructed their interior ministers to consider alternative arrangements over the coming week. Although neither side has formally withdrawn its measures, the agreement to coordinate their removal suggests that both capitals are seeking a way out of an increasingly uncomfortable confrontation over migration and internal European security.
How the Ceuta crisis reached Schengen
The dispute began after an extraordinary influx of migrants from Morocco into Spain’s North African enclave of Ceuta in late July. More than 72,000 people crossed the border, prompting serious questions about the management of the EU’s external borders and the possibility of onward movements into other member states.
Italy responded by introducing checks on passengers arriving from Spain, arguing that the situation created risks for public order and internal security. Rome also raised concerns about the possible movement of individuals presenting security threats, although the extent of any such movement remained disputed.
Madrid rejected the justification and introduced reciprocal measures. What began as an emergency response to events on an external border consequently developed into a disagreement about whether one Schengen member could impose restrictions on another on the basis of anticipated migration movements.
EU Today examined the original Spanish retaliation in August, when the dispute first threatened to turn temporary border controls into an instrument of political pressure.
The wider consequences of the Ceuta incident have raised questions about the vulnerabilities exposed at the EU’s external border and the effectiveness of common European migration and crisis-response policy.
The limits of temporary border controls
Schengen is built on the principle that people can travel between participating countries without routine internal border checks. Member states nevertheless retain the right to reintroduce temporary controls in response to serious threats to public policy or internal security, subject to the requirements of EU law.
The difficulty lies in determining when those exceptional powers are justified. Italy has maintained that the Ceuta crisis warranted precautionary action. Spain has argued that controls imposed specifically on travellers from its territory were unjustified and discriminatory.
These opposing positions matter beyond the two countries. If concerns over irregular arrivals in one member state become sufficient grounds for another to introduce sustained checks, the distinction between Europe’s external borders and its internal travel area becomes increasingly difficult to maintain.
The operational results have also entered the political argument. Italian figures cited during the dispute indicate that nearly half a million passengers were checked during the first month, with 31 refused entry. Those numbers demonstrate that the measures were substantial, but do not by themselves establish whether the original security concerns were proportionate to the restrictions imposed.
Madrid, meanwhile, has maintained that migrants involved in the Ceuta influx had not moved onwards to mainland Spain in the manner suggested by Italian concerns.
Meloni and Sánchez seek a practical compromise
The latest discussions offer both governments a route towards de-escalation without formally conceding their underlying positions. Meloni can present the additional week of controls as a continuation of Italy’s security precautions, while Sánchez can point to an agreement to prepare their coordinated removal.
The two prime ministers remain politically divided on migration. Meloni has consistently argued for stronger border enforcement and deterrence, while Sánchez has defended an approach incorporating legalisation and labour-market integration for migrants already living in Spain.
Those disagreements were also visible during the Brussels summit, where European leaders returned to the question of migration management and the consequences of national decisions for the wider Union.
For Brussels, the immediate concern is whether the two governments can replace competing national restrictions with arrangements that address security concerns without unnecessarily interrupting movement between Schengen countries.
A coordinated end to the controls would not resolve the underlying problems exposed by Ceuta. It would, however, remove one of the more unusual internal consequences of that crisis and demonstrate that political negotiations can still prevent emergency border measures from becoming semi-permanent.
The decisive period is now the coming week. Whether the controls expire as planned will depend on the discussions between the Italian and Spanish interior ministries and their ability to agree practical alternatives.
Yesterday, in United States v. City of New York, yet another federal court ruled against the Trump administration in a sanctuary city case. "Sanctuary" jurisdictions are state and local governments that restrict their law enforcement agencies and other employees from assisting federal immigration enforcement and deportation efforts in various ways. In this case, Judge Reyes of the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York upheld New York City laws restricting local law enforcement information-sharing and other assistance to federal immigration enforcers.
The court ruled that federal law does not preempt these policies, and that if if it did, there would be a violation of the anti-commandeering requirements of the Tenth Amendment:
Even were the Court to find that the United States has standing and the challenged provisions are preempted—both answered in the negative above—United States' claims would still fail because the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States precludes relief.
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X….
The United States argues it is "not seeking to compel participation in immigration enforcement … but rather to remove Defendants' express and implicit obstacles to the Executive's duty to carry out its immigration enforcement duties…." New York City replies "if accepted, [the United States' claims] would require the City to affirmatively assist the federal government in enforcing immigration laws in violation of the Tenth Amendment's anticommandeering doctrine…." New York City is correct, at least partially.
The United States seeks injunctive and declaratory relief to preempt the challenged provisions… If the challenged provisions were struck, while New York City would not be obligated to carry out federal immigration enforcement, they would be barred from prohibiting their agencies and employees from engaging in federal immigration enforcement by expending personnel, property, and other resources to (1) detain individuals and (2) implement inter-agency information-sharing, including disclosing personally identifiable information, all potentially in violation of state law. And of course, there is nothing within federal law that obligates states to participate in federal immigration enforcement or compels states to comply therewith.
The United States' preemption arguments amount to nothing more than a backdoor around the Tenth Amendment and rest on a false distinction between (a) compelling local governments' participation in federal immigration enforcement and (b) prohibiting local governments from dictating how their personnel and other resources may be utilized towards federal immigration enforcement….. "
The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies" to commands for "affirmative action" and the imposition of "prohibitions." Murphy [v. NCAA], 584 U.S. at 455 (citation modified). If states cannot remain free to control their agencies and employees to resist federal immigration enforcement, which is within states' constitutional prerogatives, the Tenth Amendment anticommandeering doctrine means nothing.
This reasoning is correct. And it is notable that this ruling - like many others protecting sanctuary cities - relies heavily on the Supreme Court's 2018 anti-commandeering decision in Murphy v. NCAA, written by Justice Samuel Alito (probably the Court's most conservative justice), and joined by all the other conservatives then on the Court. In that case, the Court emphasized that the anti-commandeering doctrine bars Congress from dictating the actions of state and local legislatures, regardless of whether the dictation takes the form of an affirmative mandate, or a prohibition against legalizing or barring something under state law.
Judge Reyes also rejects the administration's argument under the "intergovernmental immunity" doctrine, which bars states and localities from directly regulating federal agencies or "discriminating" against them. Like the court in the recent case of United States v. New Jersey, he correctly emphasizes that there can be no discrimination when there is no other comparable activity that gets more favorable treatment under the sanctuary jurisdiction's policies:
"Differential treatment is critical to a discrimination-based intergovernmental immunity claim." New York, 814 F. Supp. 3d at 282….; "[A] comparator is necessary." New York, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 353. The United States discrimination claim fails for lack of a comparator.
The United States does not and cannot identify a similarly situated entity. State and local agencies and their officers do not enforce immigration law, nor do members of the public… As the United States concedes, the Federal Government holds the "exclusive charge of enforcing immigration law…." Not only are other federal law enforcement agencies with different charges differently situated, "[f]or a state law to unconstitutionally discriminate against the federal government, it must treat comparable classes of federal and non-federal employees differently, not different classes of federal employees." Illinois, 796 F. Supp. 3d at 534
I would add that, as I explained in a recent post, the entire antidiscrimination element of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine is dubious, and should probably be overturned by the Supreme Court:
[T]he whole doctrine of intergovernmental immunity strikes me as bogus, judge-made law. There is no provision in the Constitution requiring it. And the federal government is not some historically oppressed minority group protected by the antidiscrimination provisions Fourteenth Amendment. Where state and local governments are otherwise free to refuse to help the feds, that autonomy should not be forfeited merely because they choose to support potentially similar activities by state or local governments, or by the private sector. Obviously, a district court cannot refuse to obey Supreme Court precedent in this field. But I hope the Supreme Court might someday reevaluate that precedent.
This is just the most recent of a long line of defeats for Trump in sanctuary city cases, in both his first and second administration. Judge Reyes cites close to a dozen such cases over the last year alone. I summarized this jurisprudence more fully in a post covering three other recent sanctuary cases, last month:
In cases where the administration has tried to directly coerce states and localities into cooperating, courts have rightly ruled this violates the Supreme Court's "anti-commandeering" precedents, a series of decisions reached primarily by conservative justices, which hold that the federal government may not force state and local governments to help enforce federal law or carry out under federal purposes. In cases where Trump has sought to withhold federal funds from sanctuary jurisdictions, courts have (also rightly) ruled that the executive cannot impose conditions on federal grants that were not authorized by Congress and (in some cases) that the Trump conditions are unconstitutionally coercive. For my analyses of Trump II court decisions on these issues, see here, here, and here.
Yesterday's ruling may be appealed. But if so, it is unlikely to be overturned.
Trump has posted a few rare wins in sanctuary cases with unusual facts, such as in the Contracts Clause case I analyzed in the September post. But, such cases are highly exceptional. And, as explained in the September post, the Contracts Clause decision has various flaws, and would not greatly impede sanctuary jurisdictions even if it survives on appeal.
Overall, Trump has been losing these kinds of cases so much that he might even get tired of losing.
Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen attacked Spanish leader Pedro Sánchez on migration during a summit debate in Brussels on Friday (16 October).
Frederiksen, who despite leading a centre-left party has taken an increasingly hard line on migration, criticised Sánchez for granting renewable one-year legal residence permits to undocumented migrants.
“I have asked the commission to look into whether one country is doing almost everything in the opposite direction of what the others are doing. In other words, you come to a country illegally, and suddenly you’re allowed to be there legally,” Frederiksen said before arriving at the second day of the Brussels summit.
In response, Sánchez told reporters after the meeting with EU leaders that Spain’s regularisation scheme “does not go against the grain” – since there are many countries with similar measures.
In April, Spain approved plans to grant legal status to around 500,000 undocumented migrants and asylum seekers. These so-called regularisations are a common labour-migration policy that other countries have also used, including Italy, which has authorised nearly 500,000 non-EU work visas through 2028.
But at the EU leaders’ summit in Brussels in June, several European leaders used the meeting to criticise Spain’s regularisation.
The criticism resurfaced during this October summit, after the summer’s migrant crisis in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, which some EU governments then weaponised against Spain.
Push for stronger wording
Following a breakfast on Friday (16 October), attended by 16 EU countries backing stricter migration restrictions, Denmark, Poland and Italy had also attempted to link migration to crime in draft EU summit conclusions.
They tried to amend the summit conclusions to call on the commission for extra efforts to monitor national migration measures that can affect other member states, highlight the impact of migration on welfare and public services, as well as avoid “measures that could create incentives for illegal migration”.
However, France and Luxembourg criticised the position of the 16, and leaders had a strategic exchange and agreed to return to the topic at a later date.
According to experts from the Migration Policy Centre, it is hard to conclude whether Spain’s regularisation plans encouraged more migration to the EU.
So-called ‘pull factors’ are difficult to consider in isolation, as migration depends on work opportunities, social networks abroad and other factors, but policies can also play a role.
Regularisation could pave the way to legal work, generating “positive employment and fiscal outcomes over time,” the scholars also said.
Denmark itself is not bound by EU laws (due to an opt-out) on border control, immigration, civil and criminal law, or police cooperation, and therefore cannot vote on them in the Council.
Rhetoric versus facts
It is not the first clash between the two socialist leaders on migration, but the timing matters.
Sánchez faces elections in November, and France heads into presidential elections next spring, where it is feared anti-migrant rhetoric could roll out the red carpet for the far right.
In response to a barrage of criticism from the likes of Austria, Czech Republic and, Sánchez said that the numbers on illegal migration returns speak for themselves.
“See what is happening in Spain – some politicians are willing to replace the population only so they can be … in government,” said Czech prime minister Andrej Babiš ahead of the meeting on Friday. “I am convinced that for some countries, it is too late – and that some day we will have to defend our borders so that migrants don’t come to us from Western countries if it continues like this. And we, of course, are preparing for this.”
“It’s a road to hell,” added Babiš, who belongs to the far-right Patriots for Europe group.
His comments, Sánchez said, resembled the rhetoric of the far-right political party Vox in Spain, now polling close to 20 percent. “One thing is the rhetoric, the blablabla, and another thing is the facts,” he said.
Ceuta crisis
The situation in Ceuta escalated at the end of July 2026, when tens of thousands of people simultaneously attempted to cross over from Morocco to the autonomous enclave.
The Spanish have since deployed additional security measures to regain control over the territory.
A majority of newly arrived migrants were eventually returned to Morocco, but thousands remained in the city of 80,000 people – many of whom are unaccompanied children and teenagers.
The crisis has exposed tensions between Spain, Morocco and the EU on border control and asylum and put into question who is responsible for migrants.
French president Emmanuel Macro previously said: “Spain was the target of an attack. Call it a hybrid attack if you like, but it was an information attack. Traffickers, and probably people seeking to destabilise Spain, led many people living in poverty to believe there was an opportunity, using false information and creating an information bubble.”
Meanwhile Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni previously called for a suspension of the Schengen free movement agreement with Spain.
The whole situation triggered tit-for-tat border closures between Spain and Italy.
On Thursday (15 October), Italy decided not to renew the security checks with Spain, paving the way for a week of negotiations between Madrid and Rome to reach a final agreement.
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