Diplomacy offers an easy way to peace. But if the West insists on the hard way, then Russia will deliver that way too.

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Diplomacy, as the saying goes, is the art of the possible. A peaceful settlement to the war in Ukraine is possible if all sides were to engage in genuine diplomacy. That’s the easy, more civilized way.

If not, Russia will achieve peace the hard way through complete military victory.

Diplomacy is being prevented because European politicians, in particular, are held hostage by their own twisted ideology and false propaganda.

Ironically, the NATO proxy war in Ukraine was intended to “strategically defeat” Russia. It turns out, however, that it is the NATO axis that is staring at a historic defeat. The chaos surging across Europe is a manifestation of that failure, driven by higher energy prices and reckless, unsustainable militarism.

Thus, peace in Ukraine is concomitant with peace in Europe, and diplomacy would expedite that to obviate more instability and suffering.

But diplomacy is incompatible with parties who possess a diseased mentality of Russophobia.

Diplomatic engagement involves putting pragmatic interests first, ahead of ideological bias. The pragmatic interest of everyone surely should be to find an end to this nearly five-year war that has caused millions of casualties and runs the risk of escalating to a general war in Europe.

The Trump administration appears to be renewing peace efforts by dispatching a presidential envoy to Russia this week. Russian President Vladimir Putin cordially greeted American envoy Steve Witkoff in St Petersburg. It is unimaginable that any European politician or envoy would be capable of that rudimentary courtesy. Putin reiterated that Russia’s door is open for negotiations.

Diplomacy can create a path to peace sooner, as internationally renowned Professor Jeffrey Sachs advocated in an eminently reasonable presentation this week.

Key issues for a peace agreement include: 1) indivisible security for all; 2) permanent neutrality status for Ukraine; 3) an armistice, not a temporary ceasefire, based on current lines of conflict; and 4) a declaration by NATO to halt its eastward expansion.

The framework for peace proposed by Sachs is similar to Russia’s position. It addresses the causes of conflict rather than only its symptoms.

Professor Sachs points out that these are not new principles. They were recognized and agreed upon in the past by the United States, its European allies, and Ukraine. In the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the U.S., Soviet Union, and European states accepted the principle that security is not a zero-sum game. All states must have a mutual right to security.

On the issue of permanent neutrality of Ukraine, that was declared in its constitution when it established independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The seeking of NATO membership for Ukraine overturns that principle. It was the United States under President GW Bush that initiated the drive for NATO membership with the Bucharest Declaration in 2008, which was repudiated by Russia with the warning that it would inevitably lead to conflict, as history proves.

Sachs also points out that the United States and its NATO allies must return to the pledge made to the Soviet Union in 1989 that there would be no eastward expansion of the military bloc. It is basic common sense that the encroachment of NATO forces on Russia’s borders is destabilizing and a source of confrontation. The relentless expansion is a violation of the principle of indivisible security. Would the United States accept a situation where Mexico was installing Russian or Chinese military forces?

As for the cessation of hostilities and the drawing of territorial lines, that is a thorny issue. Moscow claims that it has a historical right to the territories east and south of the Dniper River, including Sumy, Kharkov, Kherson and Odessa, in addition to the Donbass and, of course, Crimea.

What is unrealistic is for Ukraine to claim the total return of territories that Russia has taken since 2022 (and 2014 in the case of Crimea). From Russia’s point of view, and many international historians would concur, the post-1991 composition of Ukraine was an artifice. It arbitrarily incorporated lands that were historically always part of Russia. These lands were donated to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic by Soviet leaders in dubious schemes of demographic manipulation that did not respect the antecedent cultural Russian ties.

In any case, a framework for a permanent peaceful settlement is feasible if all sides engage in honest discussions that recognize the historical background.

When U.S. President Donald Trump met Russia’s Putin in Anchorage back in August 2025, there seemed to be an acceptance by the American side of Russia’s perspective on addressing “root causes”. Subsequently, Trump failed to follow through on what appeared to be a breakthrough meeting in Anchorage. Part of the problem was the Europeans and the Kiev regime thwarting Trump’s initiative and throwing obstacles in the way of negotiations. European leaders insisted on a temporary ceasefire and NATO peacekeepers, and have persisted in treating Russia like a pariah.

The international context has shifted in a way that makes Trump more amenable. His disastrous war with Iran has blown fuel prices sky-high for American consumers. With the mid-term elections only weeks away, the White House needs some good news to prevent a political wipeout for the Republicans.

Trump made a deal with Putin two weeks ago for diesel supplies from Russia to ease the pain at the pump for American voters. Essential to that is for Ukraine to stop air strikes on Russian oil facilities. The corrupt puppet president in Kiev, Vladimir Zelensky, is defying Trump with churlish remarks and threats to keep striking Russian oil refineries and depots.

One positive thing from the rift with Zelensky is Trump viewing him as the obstacle to a peace deal. Trump is now openly castigating the Ukrainian former comedian and calling for a new president in that country.

The cocaine addict Zelensky, with his loathsome war racketeering, is hanging on to power by a thread, and only because of continuing support from European leaders. These elitist European politicians are driven by anti-Russian ideology and servility to the futile geopolitical agenda of strategically defeating Russia. Europe is witnessing a social upheaval bordering on revolution over the fallout from the soaring cost of living, which is, in turn, a consequence of the NATO proxy war in Ukraine. But the elites have no way to address the chaos because they are the problem.

For all his flaws, and there are many, at least Trump is willing to engage in diplomacy. He is not encumbered with hatred of Russia. His understanding of the root causes of the war may be limited. But at least his administration has the basic quality of respecting Russia as an equal and listening to Russia’s perspective. That is a modicum for negotiations and the art of the possible.

By contrast, the European elites and their pet regime in Kiev are incapable of engaging in any diplomacy. They are obsessed with unattainable and sinister ideological prejudices that hark back to Nazi Germany and the belief that Russians are “subhumans” to be conquered. They have no respect for Russia, nor are they capable of any intelligent, honest discussion about the causes of conflict.

Jeffrey Sachs contends that Trump could promptly end the war and create peace if he were to make a clear policy announcement that the United States is returning to a position whereby it respects indivisible security for all, including Russia, accepts permanent neutrality of Ukraine with no future as a NATO member, and declares that NATO ends its eastward expansion. A rational path to peace is possible.

There will be howls of condemnation from the Kiev regime and its European sponsors. There will be howls too from within the U.S. establishment who share the European ideology of demonizing and belligerence towards Russia. Trump may be so weakened by the mid-term elections that it is not politically possible for him to make such a policy announcement.

So be it. Russia will continue to win its military objectives and demand its rightful terms of peace. Diplomacy offers an easy way to peace. But if the West insists on the hard way, then Russia will deliver that way too. The Europeans and Kiev regime will pay an even higher price with their own implosion.

Washington is offering Moscow sanctions relief, commercial opportunities and a possible return to European energy markets. Yet the Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine extend far beyond economic interests, raising questions about whether Vladimir Putin has any intention of accepting a settlement that preserves Ukraine as an independent European state.

The Kremlin has announced plans for renewed negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the United States in Abu Dhabi during the first half of November, reviving a diplomatic process that has repeatedly failed to produce a settlement to Moscow’s war against Ukraine.

Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Friday, 23 October, that the discussions would concentrate on post-war security arrangements. He also left open the possibility of eventual European participation, although the initial meeting is intended to remain trilateral.

The announcement follows talks in St Petersburg between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff. Yet the emerging American proposals reveal a fundamental problem: Washington appears increasingly prepared to offer Russia substantial economic incentives, while Moscow has provided little indication that its political objectives in Ukraine have changed.

The economic bargain taking shape

According to details reported on 23 October, citing The Economist, the American proposals involve Ukraine abandoning its ambition to join NATO in exchange for investment, security arrangements and the prospect of European Union membership.

Russia would receive sanctions relief, renewed commercial relations with American companies and potentially the restoration of natural gas exports to Europe. A demilitarised zone in Donbas is also reportedly under consideration.

The commercial dimension extends beyond theoretical proposals.

American and Russian representatives have discussed investment in the Nord Stream pipeline system and possible arrangements involving Lukoil’s international assets. The negotiations surrounding Russian energy infrastructure suggest that Washington regards commercial cooperation as a potential instrument for securing Moscow’s agreement.

There is no established evidence that Witkoff, Jared Kushner or members of Trump’s family would personally benefit from these arrangements. Nevertheless, the involvement of investors in strategically important Russian assets raises questions about whether economic agreements might advance independently of a settlement acceptable to Ukraine.

The Trump administration has already demonstrated its willingness to relax economic pressure. On 16 October, the president waived major provisions of the Graham sanctions legislation, which he had signed into law only four weeks earlier.

As EU Today previously examined, the decision suspended measures designed to increase the economic costs of Russia’s continuing aggression. Washington justified the waiver on the grounds that sanctions could interfere with negotiations.

Why Putin’s objectives are not primarily economic

The central weakness in a settlement built around commercial incentives is the assumption that Putin’s territorial and political demands can ultimately be exchanged for economic advantages.

Russia’s objectives have never been confined to Donetsk, Luhansk or access to Western markets.

In his July 2021 essay on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians, Putin advanced a conception of the two nations as belonging to a single historical and cultural space. His interpretation, examined by the Centre for Eastern Studies, challenged the legitimacy of Ukraine’s development outside Moscow’s political influence.

These ideas preceded the full-scale invasion of February 2022. They also followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its intervention in eastern Ukraine.

Putin’s demands therefore concern more than military geography. They involve the extent to which Ukraine can exercise independent political authority, determine its international alliances and integrate with Western institutions.

Even a settlement granting Moscow substantial territory could leave this larger objective unresolved.

An independent Ukraine, increasingly integrated into the European economy and protected by Western security commitments, would remain outside Russia’s political control. For a Kremlin leadership that has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s separate historical identity, such an outcome would represent a limitation on its wider ambitions.

Putin reinforced this position on 22 October when he again described Ukrainian territory in Donbas as historically Russian.

The advantages of negotiations without compromise

This creates an apparent contradiction. Why would Moscow return to negotiations if its broader objectives remain incompatible with the proposed settlement?

One explanation is that participation itself offers Russia strategic advantages.

Negotiations can preserve diplomatic engagement with Washington, complicate attempts to introduce additional sanctions and maintain American pressure on Kyiv to accept territorial concessions.

They also provide opportunities to negotiate economic arrangements before fundamental security questions have been resolved.

For Putin, the political timetable in Washington is relevant. Trump’s presidency is constitutionally limited to January 2029. Moscow can seek to exploit the present administration’s interest in a diplomatic agreement while continuing military operations.

None of this establishes that Putin has definitively rejected compromise. However, the Kremlin’s willingness to attend negotiations is not equivalent to a willingness to abandon its demands.

Russia continues attacking Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure. As EU Today reported on 22 October, Russian forces launched 21 ballistic missiles against Kyiv shortly after Witkoff’s discussions with Putin.

The simultaneous pursuit of diplomatic engagement and military pressure allows Moscow to negotiate while attempting to alter conditions on the battlefield.

Europe cannot be treated as an economic bargaining chip

The proposed return of Russian gas exposes another contradiction in Washington’s approach.

The European Union has already adopted binding legislation to phase out Russian gas imports, with full restrictions taking effect during 2027.

The European Commission reiterated on 19 October that it had no plans to reverse its position. Reopening Nord Stream would also face sanctions, infrastructure and political obstacles, particularly in Germany.

Consequently, Washington cannot independently promise Moscow renewed access to European energy markets.

Nor can it guarantee Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Membership requires agreement among the existing member states, completion of accession negotiations and ratification of the relevant treaty.

A settlement negotiated primarily between Washington and Moscow would therefore depend on European decisions over which neither government has unilateral authority.

This helps explain the significance of Peskov’s remarks about possible European participation. Moscow needs European cooperation to secure meaningful sanctions relief and access to markets, even while seeking to negotiate Europe’s security arrangements principally with Washington.

The unresolved question

Trump’s approach rests on the proposition that economic incentives can make a settlement more attractive to Moscow than continued warfare.

Putin’s position presents a different calculation. The Russian president must weigh the benefits of restored commercial relations against the political implications of recognising Ukraine’s durable independence and Western orientation.

Those objectives may prove incompatible.

A settlement that restores Russian energy revenues without credible guarantees against renewed aggression could reduce Moscow’s economic constraints while leaving the causes of the war unresolved.

The decisive test in Abu Dhabi will therefore not be whether negotiators can agree on investment, pipelines or sanctions relief. It will be whether Russia is prepared to accept a Ukrainian state whose sovereignty, political direction and future European integration remain beyond Moscow’s control.

Until that question is answered, renewed negotiations may offer Washington the prospect of a diplomatic achievement while allowing the Kremlin to pursue objectives it has not publicly abandoned.

Dans ce sixième numéro de Moreau Décrypte, Xavier Moreau analyse la grande désillusion qui s’empare d’une partie des Ukrainiens. À Kiev, beaucoup observent avec inquiétude l’évolution de la position américaine, marquée par une priorité croissante accordée aux négociations et à un rééquilibrage des relations avec les grandes puissances, tandis que des discussions diplomatiques impliquant Washington, Moscou et d’autres acteurs internationaux

Publié à l’origine par divergencepolitique.fr

Austria has ordered four Russian diplomats to leave the country after security authorities identified activities incompatible with their diplomatic status, in a further deterioration of relations between Vienna and Moscow.

The Austrian foreign ministry announced the expulsions on Friday, 23 October. Three of the officials were accredited to the Russian embassy in Vienna, while the fourth served at Russia’s mission to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), where the diplomat worked on military security and arms control. All four have been declared persona non grata.

The decision follows findings by Austria’s security authorities, according to the details of the foreign ministry announcement. Officials have not publicly disclosed the activities involved or brought criminal charges in connection with the announcement. Moscow has indicated that it will retaliate, although the nature of its response has not yet been specified.

Vienna’s diplomatic position

The expulsions are particularly significant because Vienna hosts numerous international organisations and remains one of Europe’s principal diplomatic centres. In addition to the OSCE, the city accommodates United Nations offices and organisations dealing with nuclear policy, international development and arms control.

That concentration of diplomatic missions gives Austria a distinctive position in European security affairs. Foreign delegations enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity, while the Austrian authorities retain the power to withdraw recognition from representatives whose conduct they consider unacceptable.

Austria’s constitutional commitment to military neutrality has not prevented successive governments from supporting European Union sanctions against Russia or condemning Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Neutrality limits participation in military alliances; it does not require Vienna to remain politically neutral over the conduct of a war.

Russian missions to international organisations also have a particular role. The OSCE brings together European, North American and Central Asian states, including Russia and Ukraine, and provides a forum for discussions on military transparency and conflict prevention. Its proceedings have become more contentious since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Repeated expulsions

Friday’s decision brings the reported number of Russian diplomats expelled by Austria since 2020 to 18. In May 2026, Vienna expelled three Russian diplomats amid security concerns involving antenna installations on Russian diplomatic buildings. Those concerns added to wider scrutiny of possible intelligence-gathering activity in the Austrian capital.

Diplomatic expulsions are a familiar response when governments suspect espionage but do not pursue ordinary criminal proceedings. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a receiving state can declare a diplomat persona non grata without publicly explaining the underlying evidence. The sending state must then recall the official or terminate their functions.

The mechanism is politically consequential but is not in itself a criminal judgment. A declaration of persona non grata establishes that the host government will no longer accept the diplomat’s accreditation; it does not establish guilt in a court of law.

Moscow has regularly responded to expulsions of its diplomatic personnel from European countries with reciprocal measures. Such retaliation can reduce the number of diplomats available for routine consular work and political dialogue, even when wider bilateral relations remain formally intact.

European security implications

The new Austrian action comes as European countries face continuing questions about Russian intelligence networks, attempts to gather military information and suspected interference activities. The circumstances of individual cases vary, and intelligence allegations cannot automatically be treated as proven simply because diplomats have been expelled.

The latest episode nonetheless illustrates how Russia’s war against Ukraine has affected the functioning of diplomacy in European capitals. Vienna must balance its international hosting responsibilities and established channels of communication with the security obligations arising from suspected abuses of diplomatic status.

The decision also comes against the background of wider European efforts to strengthen protection against strategic vulnerabilities and an expanding debate about hybrid threats to critical infrastructure.

For now, Austria has confirmed the expulsions but has not published an account of the conduct attributed to the four officials. The next diplomatic development will be Russia’s response and whether it affects Austrian representatives in Moscow.

Gli Stati Uniti negoziano con Mosca, mentre l’Europa si limita a commentare. La frase di Zakharova «non sono affari suoi» dice tutto.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Una seduta al Senato

Il 14 ottobre 2026, nelle comunicazioni al Senato in vista del Consiglio europeo, Giorgia Meloni ha fatto una cosa che fino a pochi anni fa sarebbe sembrata impensabile per un governo italiano di destra: ha preso pubblicamente le distanze dal presidente degli Stati Uniti per difendere una linea più intransigente della sua. L’oggetto era l’intesa sul gasolio annunciata da Donald Trump dopo una telefonata con Vladimir Putin, accompagnata da una licenza temporanea del Tesoro americano che riapre al combustibile russo il mercato mondiale. Per la premier si tratta di una scelta «molto rischiosa»: legittima Mosca mentre le bombe cadono sulle città ucraine, le procura nuove entrate e indebolisce la leva delle sanzioni. Nella stessa seduta Meloni ha sostenuto che Putin starebbe cercando un nuovo nemico, e che quel nemico potrebbe essere l’Europa; e che un’Ucraina che smettesse di difendersi non otterrebbe la pace, ma l’occupazione.

Fin qui la cronaca. Il resto lo hanno fatto l’aula e i giornali. All’applauso della maggioranza si è unito quello di una parte dell’opposizione: Azione, Italia Viva, l’area riformista del Partito democratico. La Stampa ha trasformato il sostegno a Kiev in una questione di valori e di confini, quei confini che «lì si difendono».

C’è poi un dettaglio che vale più di molte analisi. Interpellata dall’ANSA, la portavoce del ministero degli Esteri russo Marija Zacharova ha liquidato le parole della premier con una formula sbrigativa: non sono affari suoi. Nelle stesse ore Volodymyr Zelenskij era a Londra, accolto dal primo ministro Andy Burnham, e denunciava la limitazione dei servizi satellitari militari forniti all’esercito ucraino. Elon Musk, dal canto suo, chiariva che la rete Starshield appartiene al governo americano e che ogni restrizione dipende dalle forze armate statunitensi e, in ultima istanza, dal presidente. Washington tratta con Mosca, Mosca risponde a Washington. Roma applaude se stessa. Patetico, no?

Non un caso esclusivamente italiano

Sarebbe un errore leggere la seduta del 14 ottobre come un episodio di politica interna. La postura italiana è la declinazione nazionale di una grammatica che oggi accomuna quasi tutte le cancellerie europee, e che ha tre regole. La prima: il conflitto ucraino viene presentato come uno scontro esistenziale tra civiltà politiche, in cui ogni compromesso equivale a una resa. La seconda: la minaccia russa viene proiettata oltre l’Ucraina, sul territorio dell’Unione, in modo da rendere il riarmo una necessità che non si discute. La terza, la più insidiosa: il dissenso interno viene ricondotto all’influenza del nemico.

La Germania offre l’esempio più nitido. Il ministro della Difesa Boris Pistorius, che già nel 2023 aveva chiesto che il Paese tornasse kriegstüchtig, capace di fare la guerra, e che da allora indica un orizzonte di pochi anni entro cui la Russia potrebbe attaccare un membro dell’Alleanza, ha sostenuto in questi giorni che la paura della guerra diffusa nella società tedesca sarebbe alimentata deliberatamente da Putin e dall’AfD. Il ragionamento merita attenzione. In un Paese che ha perso milioni di vite nelle due guerre mondiali, il timore di un nuovo conflitto non avrebbe bisogno di agenti esterni per spiegarsi. Attribuirlo a Mosca e al principale partito di opposizione significa trasformare un sentimento politico legittimo in un problema di sicurezza nazionale.

Il quadro si ripete altrove con accenti diversi. Il ministro degli Esteri polacco Radosław Sikorski rivendica i risultati degli attacchi ucraini contro raffinerie e infrastrutture russe; il suo omologo tedesco Johann Wadephul sostiene che non sia il momento di allentare le sanzioni, ma di inasprirle. Francia, Germania e Regno Unito si muovono come direttorio negoziale, tanto che la stessa Meloni ha chiesto che lo facciano almeno con un mandato formale di tutti i partner. Alle parole corrispondono numeri: il piano ReArm Europe presentato dalla Commissione nel marzo 2025, l’impegno assunto al vertice NATO dell’Aia a portare la spesa per difesa e sicurezza al 5% del PIL entro il 2035, il prestito da 90 miliardi a Kiev deciso dal Consiglio europeo nel dicembre 2025. La retorica non è un’eccentricità di qualche ministro, è letteralmente la lingua ufficiale dell’Unione – e purtroppo ci siamo abituati ad essa.

Una postura folle e controproducente

Definire folle questa linea non è un’iperbole polemica, se per follia si intende l’ostinazione nel ripetere un comportamento che produce effetti opposti a quelli dichiarati. Lo si vede su tre piani.

Il primo è strategico. La teoria della deterrenza insegna da decenni che una minaccia vale quanto la credibilità di chi la pronuncia, e che la credibilità dipende dalla capacità di dare seguito alle parole. L’Europa di oggi alza il tono senza disporre degli strumenti per sostenerlo. La vicenda Starlink lo ha mostrato con una chiarezza quasi didattica: l’esercito ucraino, che gli europei finanziano e incoraggiano, dipende per comunicazioni e guida dei droni da un’infrastruttura che appartiene a un’impresa americana ed è controllata dal Pentagono. Basta una decisione a Washington perché una parte delle operazioni si fermi. Promettere la vittoria in una guerra di cui non si controllano i satelliti è una forma di ipocrisia strategica, e gli avversari la leggono per quello che è.

Il secondo piano è economico, ovviamente. Già nel 2024 il rapporto di Mario Draghi sulla competitività europea indicava nel differenziale dei prezzi dell’energia rispetto agli Stati Uniti uno dei fattori del ritardo industriale del continente. Da allora la rinuncia agli idrocarburi russi è diventata dogma, la guerra in Iran ha fatto salire ulteriormente i prezzi dei carburanti e l’impegno al 5% del PIL per la difesa promette di assorbire risorse che i bilanci pubblici non hanno, se non a spese di sanità, pensioni e investimenti civili. Il paradosso è evidente: proprio mentre Washington, per ragioni del tutto interne legate alle elezioni di metà mandato, cerca gasolio a buon mercato anche da Mosca, i governi europei rivendicano come principio morale il fatto di pagare l’energia più cara dei loro concorrenti.

Il terzo piano è diplomatico, e forse è quello decisivo. Una politica estera che esclude per principio il negoziato si condanna a non sedere al tavolo quando il negoziato arriva. Ed è esattamente ciò che sta accadendo: Stati Uniti e Russia definiscono intese energetiche, ritmi della guerra e condizioni di un’eventuale tregua, mentre l’Europa commenta. La risposta di Zacharova alla premier italiana non è soltanto sgarbo diplomatico. È la misura esatta del peso che Mosca attribuisce oggi alle capitali europee. Si può discutere se sia giusto; è più difficile sostenere che sia sbagliato come descrizione.

Il prezzo della credibilità

Il danno più profondo, tuttavia, non si misura sul fronte e nemmeno sui mercati. Si misura nel rapporto tra le istituzioni e i cittadini. Quando la distanza tra ciò che viene proclamato e ciò che accade diventa visibile a occhio nudo, la parola pubblica perde valore. Da quattro anni i cittadini europei si sentono ripetere che la sconfitta della Russia è vicina, che le sanzioni la stanno piegando, che ogni nuovo pacchetto di aiuti sarà quello risolutivo. Ora vedono il principale alleato trattare con Mosca, l’Ucraina dipendere da decisioni prese a Washington e i propri governi aumentare la spesa militare mentre i servizi peggiorano. Non serve un’opera di disinformazione straniera per produrre sfiducia. Basta il confronto tra i discorsi e i risultati.

Questa sfiducia si innesta su una crisi di rappresentanza che ha radici più lunghe. Peter Mair una decina di anni fa, nel suo libro Ruling the Void, aveva descritto con largo anticipo il ritiro dei partiti dalla società verso lo Stato, e la progressiva separazione tra governo responsabile, cioè fedele ai vincoli esterni, e governo rappresentativo, cioè sensibile alla domanda degli elettori. Insieme a Richard Katz aveva coniato la nozione di partito-cartello, per indicare formazioni che competono nell’arena elettorale ma condividono la gestione delle risorse e delle scelte di fondo. L’applauso trasversale del 14 ottobre è un’illustrazione quasi perfetta di quel modello. Su un tema che riguarda la vita e la morte, il costo dell’energia, il destino dell’industria, l’elettore che dissente non trova in Parlamento un’offerta politica che lo rappresenti.

Gli effetti sono sotto gli occhi di tutti. In Francia i governi cadono uno dopo l’altro senza che emerga una maggioranza stabile. In Germania la coalizione al potere governa con l’opposizione più forte del dopoguerra alle spalle. In Italia l’astensione è diventata il primo partito. Le procedure restano intatte, le elezioni si tengono regolarmente, ma le decisioni rilevanti si prendono altrove, e il voto finisce per confermare scelte già compiute.

Governare attraverso la sfiducia

A questo punto si impone una domanda meno ovvia. Se la sfiducia danneggia le istituzioni, perché le classi dirigenti europee continuano a percorrere una strada che la alimenta? La risposta più semplice sarebbe l’incompetenza. Ma esiste un’ipotesi più robusta, che spiega meglio i fatti: la sfiducia, entro certi limiti, è una risorsa di governo.

Il meccanismo funziona così. Un elettorato sfiduciato si frammenta, si astiene, si disperde tra partiti nuovi e instabili. La frammentazione produce ingovernabilità; l’ingovernabilità, a sua volta, rende indispensabili le grandi coalizioni «responsabili», i governi tecnici, gli accordi trasversali che tengono fuori dal potere le forze considerate inaffidabili. Più il sistema è instabile, più diventa necessario il centro che promette stabilità. La crisi della rappresentanza, invece di indebolire chi governa, ne consolida la posizione, perché lo rende l’unico argine contro il caos che la crisi stessa ha prodotto.

La guerra perfeziona questo dispositivo in due modi. In primo luogo, consente di trattare il dissenso come una questione di sicurezza. Quando la paura del conflitto viene attribuita a Putin e all’opposizione, chi chiede di negoziare smette di essere un avversario politico e diventa un veicolo dell’influenza nemica. Carl Schmitt aveva indicato nello stato d’eccezione il luogo in cui si rivela la sovranità; Giorgio Agamben ha mostrato come l’eccezione tenda a diventare tecnica ordinaria di governo. L’emergenza permanente, che sia sanitaria, finanziaria o bellica, sottrae le decisioni al conflitto democratico e le affida a chi si presenta come garante della sopravvivenza collettiva. In secondo luogo, la guerra giustifica lo spostamento delle scelte verso sedi sottratte al controllo elettorale: la Commissione, il Consiglio europeo, la NATO, i formati ristretti come l’E3.

Occorre essere precisi su un punto, per non scivolare nella caricatura. Questa lettura non presuppone un piano concordato in qualche stanza segreta. Non serve. Basta che gli interessi convergano: le industrie della difesa che vedono crescere gli ordini, le burocrazie europee che acquisiscono competenze nuove, i partiti di governo che trovano nell’emergenza una ragione di esistere, i grandi gruppi editoriali che vendono la mobilitazione morale. Ciascuno agisce secondo la propria convenienza, e la somma di queste convenienze produce un sistema che si autoalimenta. Siamo a tutti gli effetti nella gramsciana crisi organica, la fase in cui il vecchio muore e il nuovo non può nascere, e in cui proliferano fenomeni morbosi. La gestione della sfiducia è uno di questi: un modo di sopravvivere alla crisi senza risolverla.

Vincere a qualunque prezzo

Resta l’ultima questione, la più grave. Che cosa sono disposte a sacrificare queste élite per uscire vincitrici dalla fase attuale? La risposta, guardando agli ultimi anni, è che una parte del sacrificio è già stata compiuta. La politica è stata sacrificata quando le scelte fondamentali sono state trasferite fuori dai parlamenti e la distinzione tra maggioranza e opposizione è diventata ornamentale. L’economia è stata sacrificata quando la competitività industriale del continente è stata subordinata a obiettivi geopolitici fissati altrove, accettando prezzi energetici insostenibili e il rischio concreto di deindustrializzazione. Chi ha già rinunciato a questi due pilastri ha poco da perdere sul terzo, che è il costo umano.

Quel costo, per ora, lo pagano soprattutto gli ucraini. Persino deputate della Verchovna Rada che hanno sostenuto con zelo la linea della guerra a oltranza, come Mar’jana Bezuhla, o che se ne sono distaccate, come Anna Skorochod, descrivono un Paese con le infrastrutture distrutte, una mobilitazione forzata segnata da abusi e una popolazione allo stremo, e ammettono che il conflitto è diventato per alcuni un affare; ma il costo comincia a ricadere anche sulle società europee: nei bilanci pubblici, nei salari erosi dall’inflazione energetica, nell’idea, ormai pronunciata senza imbarazzo da ministri in carica, che bisogna abituarsi alla prospettiva di combattere.

Qui la retorica bellica rivela la sua funzione più profonda, poiché non serve a vincere la guerra contro la Russia, che nessuna cancelleria europea ha i mezzi per vincere da sola. Serve a vincere la partita interna, a conservare il controllo di sistemi politici che non riescono più a produrre consenso e che hanno bisogno di un nemico esterno per giustificare la propria permanenza. In questo senso il prezzo umano non è un effetto collaterale del calcolo. Ne è una variabile, regolata secondo la convenienza del momento, nella perpetua danza macabra dell’utilitarismo politico.

Esiste un’alternativa, e non coincide con la resa: consiste nel riportare la diplomazia al centro della politica estera europea, nel riconoscere che un ordine internazionale ormai multipolare non si governa con le crociate morali, nel restituire ai parlamenti e agli elettori il potere di decidere sulla guerra e sulla pace. Gli indicatori per capire se qualcosa si muove sono concreti: il mandato che il prossimo Consiglio europeo affiderà, o non affiderà, ai negoziatori; il destino del regime sanzionatorio dopo la licenza americana sul gasolio; la tenuta dei bilanci nazionali davanti all’obiettivo del 5%.

Finché la risposta resterà quella applaudita il 14 ottobre, l’Europa continuerà a pagare un prezzo crescente per una guerra che non decide, mentre chi la governa troverà nella sua stessa instabilità la ragione per restare dov’è.

European leaders have to find the resolve to stop fueling the war against Russia and engage in diplomacy with Moscow.

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There is a straightforward way to alleviate the social chaos sweeping Europe, as well as the war in Ukraine threatening to engulf the continent. It’s an easy fix – and it’s not shoving more white powder up Zelensky’s nose paid for by European taxpayers.

European leaders just have to find the resolve to stop fueling the war against Russia and engage in diplomacy with Moscow to establish an all-encompassing security architecture (as Russia had proposed back in December 2021). That, in turn, will salvage European nations from unsustainable debt driven by militarism and propping up a kleptocracy in Kiev, whose puppet leader is obviously degenerating from cocaine addiction.

Across Europe, cities are looking like battle zones with mass protests, public tensions, buildings burning, shops looted, riot police baton-charging crowds, and masked mobs running amok. France is bearing the brunt of street violence, but so too are Italy, Belgium, and others. Spain and Portugal are seeing their cities turned into tent camps in protests against a lack of affordable housing.

In the turmoil, it is easy to lose sight of the basic problem. People en masse are suffering from economic privation. Why can’t their individual and social needs be met in an efficient and effective manner? Why is there seemingly no money to fix broken societies?

Curfews are declared in Paris and cities across France while Italy moves to deploy soldiers in Milan to restore a semblance of order. Thousands of arrests have been made in recent days. Revolution is in the air, and so too is the sinister possibility of supposedly democratic governments flipping to become police-state dictatorships.

In this volatile, explosive situation, it is tempting to look for scapegoats.

French President Emmanuel Macron goes on national television to denounce “ultra-left groups” who he says are mindlessly trying to destroy France.

Even American President Donald Trump weighs in to claim that a once great nation (France) is being “conquered by immigrants, jihadists and communists.”

There were also predictable accusations in Western media that Russia is fomenting the unrest across Europe.

Another misdirection is to portray the European governments as cash-strapped and unable to deliver relief from the cost-of-living crisis and deteriorating public services. The governments and media tend to define the problem as one of balancing fiscal bookkeeping, overspending on social welfare, aging populations, or some other demographic factor.

European nations, we are told by pundits, are in massive debt and under pressure from bond markets to ramp up austerity by slashing public spending. The challenge for France and other governments is that they “no longer have the fiscal room to simply throw more money at these problems,” as one commentator put it.

Another commentator lamented that: “Hamstrung governments seem to have no answer to the public’s furious demands, making further discontent likely.”

In other words, we are told, “there is no alternative to austerity,” to paraphrase the late British leader Margaret Thatcher.

But that premise deceptively tells only part of the picture. The crucial part omitted is that the fiscal crunch of European governments is largely caused by the reckless funnelling of money to fuel the war in Ukraine and inordinately build up their own military forces. That wasteful misallocation of resources is “justified” by relentlessly and absurdly demonizing Russia as a “threat to Europe”. The news media play the role of amplifying the propaganda.

The media do not question, never mind expose, how Europe’s economies have been exhausted by a proxy war agenda against Russia that has involved cutting themselves off from Russian affordable energy, the lifeblood of industry, and on top of that racking up hundreds of billions in debt by propping up the endemically corrupt Kiev regime.

That regime is losing the war against Russia as it runs out of conscripts for the meat grinder. Yet, European governments are fixated on keeping the futile war going with ever more funding of the regime.

Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s top diplomat, dissembled this week by claiming that “Ukraine would have surrendered a long time ago if not for European support”. This is a tacit admission that the EU and Britain are fueling the war.

She also accused the Trump administration of forcing Ukraine into a surrender. In her soulless view, diplomacy and peace are sneered at as surrender.

European societies are deprived of financial resources for vital public services and infrastructure all in the fraudulent name of “defending” Ukraine in a war that has gone on for nearly five years. There is no end in sight if the European leaders have their way.

The European Union’s unelected bureaucracy has donated €90 billion to the Kiev regime for 2026 and 2027 alone, in addition to over €200 billion already allocated. This largesse is still not enough. The Zelensky dictatorship is calling for an extra €70 billion to be doled out, and the EU Russophobic elites are clamoring to oblige.

No wonder that European societies are visibly falling apart from underinvestment and widespread hardship from the soaring cost of living. The social implosion is a direct consequence of a policy of militarism and war, a policy that the Euro elites are running with impunity and unaccountability. That’s dictatorship by any definition.

The depiction of fiscally constrained and helpless European governments is an illusion. The constraint is not a natural condition of societies. It is the consequence of a deliberate, criminal policy of warmongering.

So spare us the scapegoating and misdirection. Spare us the curfews and calls for emergency police state powers to curb “hooligans and extremists.” That misdirection is playing into the hands of the ruling class, which has delegitimized itself by its sponsoring of war in Ukraine, its support for American aggression against Iran and Yemen, and its complicity in Israeli genocide in Gaza and Lebanon.

Contrary to the politicians and pundits claiming that there is “no easy fix” to the chaos erupting in Europe, there is. It is for the European governments to stop fueling the war in Ukraine and actually manage societies according to democratic needs.

However, that rational and feasible solution is probably out of reach under the prevailing political system. The elites in control of the system are incapable of overseeing any meaningful reform. They will not engage in diplomacy to find a peaceful settlement in Ukraine with Russia.

And so the outcome seems to be either they consolidate the emerging dictatorship and quash the legitimate social demands of the people, or the people will prevail by sweeping away the corrupt regimes that masquerade as “democratic”.

Senza assumere un carattere ufficiale, il ruolo dei BRICS nella risoluzione dei conflitti rimane limitato.

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Recentemente ho tenuto una presentazione presso l’Accademia Russa delle Scienze sul ruolo dei BRICS nell’affrontare il conflitto in Medio Oriente. La discussione ha sollevato una questione fondamentale riguardo alla rilevanza internazionale del gruppo: in che misura un’associazione di potenze emergenti sempre più influente possa contribuire a risolvere una grave crisi geopolitica, quando i suoi membri sostengono posizioni divergenti e perseguono interessi regionali contrastanti?

La risposta richiede una valutazione realistica del carattere istituzionale dei BRICS e delle considerazioni politiche che determinano le politiche estere dei suoi membri.

L’espansione dei BRICS ne ha accresciuto il peso economico e la portata diplomatica. Ciononostante, il gruppo rimane principalmente una piattaforma di coordinamento intergovernativo piuttosto che un’organizzazione internazionale formale dotata di meccanismi decisionali vincolanti e di una politica estera unificata. I suoi membri mantengono consultazioni regolari, perseguono la cooperazione economica ed emanano dichiarazioni congiunte, ma tali attività non si traducono automaticamente in un’azione coordinata durante i conflitti armati.

Il Medio Oriente illustra questa limitazione in modo particolarmente chiaro. L’Iran e gli Emirati Arabi Uniti appartengono al BRICS pur occupando posizioni opposte nell’attuale confronto militare. Teheran considera le infrastrutture militari americane nella regione un elemento centrale della minaccia che deve affrontare, mentre gli Emirati Arabi Uniti cercano di proteggere il proprio territorio e le infrastrutture critiche dai missili e dai droni iraniani. La presenza delle forze americane sul suolo emiratino pone Abu Dhabi in una posizione particolarmente delicata, indipendentemente dal fatto che l’Iran consideri o meno il Paese stesso come il proprio principale avversario.

Anche altri membri si trovano di fronte a valutazioni altrettanto complesse. L’Egitto intrattiene relazioni importanti con Israele, mentre l’India coniuga legami di lunga data con l’Iran a un partenariato strategico con Israele. Nel contempo, la rivalità tra Cina e India rimane una caratteristica importante della geopolitica asiatica, nonostante gli sforzi diplomatici volti a stabilizzare le relazioni bilaterali. Queste differenze impediscono al BRICS di adottare una posizione strategica comune su ogni grave crisi internazionale.

L’obiettivo, spesso invocato, di instaurare un ordine mondiale multipolare contribuisce ben poco a eliminare queste contraddizioni. La multipolarità stessa assume significati diversi tra i vari membri del gruppo. Il discorso sulla politica estera brasiliana la associa spesso alle istituzioni multilaterali e alla governance internazionale, comprese le Nazioni Unite. Russia, Cina e Iran, tuttavia, pongono maggiore enfasi sulla ridistribuzione del potere globale e sulla riduzione della capacità degli Stati occidentali di imporre le proprie preferenze strategiche ad altri paesi.

Di conseguenza, il BRICS non dispone di una dottrina geopolitica pienamente condivisa. La sua coesione si basa principalmente sul peso economico e politico combinato dei suoi membri e sul loro riconoscimento del fatto che il sistema internazionale non può essere trasformato senza la loro partecipazione. Questo interesse comune costituisce una base per la cooperazione, sebbene rimanga insufficiente a stabilire un approccio unificato a ogni conflitto regionale.

Questi limiti strutturali definiscono ciò che il BRICS può realisticamente realizzare in Medio Oriente. Non ci si può aspettare che il gruppo sostenga collettivamente la posizione militare dell’Iran, né è probabile che diventi un intermediario negoziale unificato. Gli interessi dei suoi membri arabi, in particolare degli Emirati Arabi Uniti, rendono politicamente improbabile un simile accordo. Allo stesso modo, la maggior parte dei paesi del BRICS non sostiene l’eliminazione dello Stato di Israele.

Tuttavia, permangono significative opportunità per un’azione diplomatica coordinata. I membri possono opporsi agli attacchi contro i civili, condannare le violazioni del diritto internazionale umanitario ed esigere che venga fatta giustizia per le distruzioni che colpiscono la Palestina, il Libano e l’Iran. Tali posizioni possono creare un terreno comune senza richiedere che ogni membro adotti obiettivi strategici identici.

Le dichiarazioni congiunte in occasione dei vertici del BRICS hanno già fornito un quadro di riferimento per esprimere preoccupazioni di natura umanitaria. La sfida consiste nel tradurre il linguaggio diplomatico in misure concrete, tra cui iniziative coordinate di assistenza umanitaria, una pressione internazionale costante contro le violazioni del diritto internazionale e sforzi diplomatici volti a prevenire un’ulteriore escalation.

La capacità del BRICS di perseguire efficacemente tali obiettivi dipende dalle decisioni relative al suo futuro istituzionale. Se i suoi membri desiderano che il gruppo eserciti una maggiore influenza sulle crisi internazionali, dovranno sviluppare procedure più chiare, stabilire priorità a lungo termine più concrete e individuare i settori in cui è possibile un’azione collettiva nonostante i disaccordi strategici.

Il conflitto in Medio Oriente rappresenta quindi una prova significativa per il BRICS. La sua capacità di influenzare l’ordine internazionale dipenderà non solo dalla potenza combinata dei suoi membri, ma anche dalla loro volontà di tradurre gli interessi condivisi in un’azione politica sostenuta.

This proposed settlement—designed to help end a conflict that has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and carries a continuing risk of confrontation—addresses the causes of the war rather than only its symptoms.

By Jeffrey D. SACHS

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The war in Ukraine can be ended permanently on terms that protect Ukraine’s statehood, meet Russia’s security concerns, and lay the foundation for a durable European security order. As another round of negotiations gears up in Norway, I propose a settlement concluded as a single package, signed by Ukraine and Russia, adopted by a vote of the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, and guaranteed jointly by the five permanent members of the Council together with other states that choose to join. The proposal rests on the principle of indivisible security set out in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris.

The package would have four core commitments.

The first is Ukraine’s permanent neutrality, adopted in a constitutional law on the model of Austria’s law of 1955, which would return Ukraine to the founding choice of its Declaration of State Sovereignty of 1990. Ukraine would join no military alliance and host no foreign bases or forces, whether of NATO, the European Union, their member states, or Russia. Neutrality would not mean disarmament, and Ukraine would retain armed forces for its own defense.

The second is that Ukraine would pursue its candidacy for membership in the European Union as a permanently neutral state, with a neutrality protocol in its accession treaty on the model of Ireland’s, and Russia would affirm that Ukraine’s membership in the EU is consistent with Russia’s security.

The third is an armistice line drawn along the line of contact on the date of signature. Each side would exercise de facto jurisdiction on its side of the line, neither would recognize the other’s territorial claims, and both would renounce force in any future adjustment. This formula is compatible with both countries’ constitutions, which bar or severely restrict the cession of territory.

The fourth is the end of NATO enlargement eastward. At signature the North Atlantic Council would declare that NATO will not admit Ukraine or other new members in Eastern Europe or the South Caucasus, withdrawing the Bucharest pledge of 2008.

The settlement would take effect as a permanent end of hostilities on signature, not as a temporary ceasefire, and its provisions would be implemented in stages under international verification. No element would be negotiated in isolation, and no party would be asked to make a concession in advance of signature.

The territorial arrangements are designed to address the concerns and claims of both sides. Ukrainian forces would withdraw from the part of Donetsk region that Ukraine now controls, which would become a demilitarized special zone. Russian forces would not enter it, the existing local civil administration would continue to function, and its final status would be left to negotiation. Russia would withdraw from the areas it holds in Dnipropetrovsk region and from the Kinburn Spit. A Northern Security Zone would be demilitarized on both sides of the Russian-Ukrainian border, and Russian forces would leave the areas they hold in Kharkiv and Sumy regions as Ukrainian forces withdraw from their side. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant would remain under Russian control with IAEA safety oversight and would sell an agreed share of its electricity to Ukraine at cost.

A demilitarized belt would run along both sides of the armistice line, with heavy weapons and long-range strike systems withdrawn to agreed distances, and mutual ceilings on forces would apply in the border regions on both sides. In the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, commercial navigation would be free for all Ukrainian and Russian ports, and attacks on shipping and ports would be prohibited.

The settlement in Ukraine should also begin the repair of European security as a whole. NATO and Russia would agree on a moratorium on ground-launched intermediate-range missiles in Europe, refrain from deploying nuclear weapons in any additional state, and restore the NATO-Russia Council. Normal diplomatic relations would be restored on both sides. The parties would convene the first summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe since 2010 to entrust the OSCE with monitoring the settlement, verifying arms limits, and overseeing the provisions on rights.

Questions of language, education, culture, and religion would be resolved according to European standards, with the Russian language treated on the same basis as Ukraine’s other minority languages, and Russia would accept the same obligations toward Ukrainian speakers and religious communities on its side of the line. All obligations concerning extremism and incitement would be mutual and monitored by the OSCE. Prisoners of war would be exchanged on an all-for-all basis, detained civilians released, and separated children reunited with their families.

Sanctions would be lifted during 2027. Russia’s immobilized sovereign assets would also be released, and private property seized or immobilized on both sides would be restored. An international reconstruction fund administered by the European Investment Bank would finance reconstruction on both sides of the line, with contributions from all parties, Russia included, in a common effort rather than as reparations. Gas transit through Ukraine could resume wherever there are willing buyers, without any commitment by the European Union to purchase Russian gas.

A report of serious violation by an OSCE monitoring mission of unarmed observers from states outside NATO would trigger consultations among the guarantors and referral to the Security Council. Ukraine would lift martial law and hold elections under OSCE observation, and the newly elected Verkhovna Rada would ratify the settlement and adopt the constitutional law on neutrality, while the Russian Federal Assembly would ratify it at the same stage.

This proposed settlement addresses the causes of the war rather than only its symptoms. Europe has been largely absent from the design of the peace. By putting forward such a framework, European governments can take the lead in building Europe’s indivisible security and help end a war that has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and carries a continuing risk of confrontation between nuclear powers.

Original article: commondreams.org

Instead of prioritizing stakeholder profit, the Witkoff-Europe combo should address Eurasian security architecture and NATO-Russia-China frontiers to gain traction in Moscow.

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Back in December 2025, U.S. commentator Sundance, writing in the Conservative Treehouse, wrote about Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner’s new ‘Money Diplomacy’ solution for Ukraine that “require[d] [the establishment of] a system whereby the western opportunity for financial benefit continues”. From this perspective, the U.S. negotiators would “propose a long-term plan for continued financial benefit”.

From their current language it appears that Witkoff and Kusher are still confident they can construct a financial reward system for western banks, investors, politicians and Ukraine officials that will retain the benefits of war without the ancillary ingredient of bloodshed.

As Sundance noted —

“If the U.S. delegation can pull this off, then Russia can gain the territory they want, corrupt Ukraine officials can keep skimming investment money, the EU can retain the power it wants to extract financial payments, American politicians can use the “long-term recovery projects” for money laundering, and quasi-public/private investment banks can benefit from the exploitation of Ukraine resources”.

From this evident New York real estate worldview, all other issues — territorial boundaries, security and NATO’s encroachment into Central Asia’s security architecture — are but ‘downstream details’ “to the stuff that really matters, the money”.

Monetary diplomacy, however, has not brought a solution for Ukraine (nor for that matter, for Gaza either). Nonetheless, Witkoff has a new plan that David Ignatius has outlined in his column at the Washington Post.

Ignatius highlights that despite the recent Ukraine “flap” over its targetting of Russian refineries, “the U.S. and Europe are moving toward a joint peace proposal that would deliver financial and security benefits to both Ukraine and Russia as a baseline for a territorial settlement that falls short of both sides’ war aims”. In other words, ‘a sweetener’ dangled to persuade the sides to stop bombing each other’s refineries and to open the path for this ‘new’ initiative.

If Zelensky agrees to halt refinery attacks, “we’re back in, and we go to Moscow”, an American official told Ignatius.

In gist, the 4-point plan envisages a generous reconstruction framework to meet “Zelensky’s myriad cash needs”; security guarantees for Ukraine equivalent to NATO’s Article 5; the economic integration of Russia, Ukraine and Europe through an energy deal — “This might consist of a pipeline carrying Russian oil and gas to Europe with Ukraine and Russia splitting the profits. Such a pipeline could sharply reduce European energy costs”, a U.S. official said. In addition to providing Russia with “long-term access to the European energy market”, a peace deal would specify how and when existing economic sanctions on Russia would be removed.

The final point – wait for it — would be a ceasefire along the existing front line, or the ‘line of control’.

It seems extraordinary: The U.S. and Europeans negotiate amongst themselves, seemingly oblivious to the explicit statements issued by the Russian side.

Oil and gas would be supplied by Russia to the needy Europeans who voluntarily forsook their earlier cheap Russian supply, who are trapped by their own decisions and who denigrate Russia at every opportunity. And with the profits to be “split” with Ukraine? No way will Russia accept such a one-sided proposal.

FM Lavrov said at the UNGA no ceasefire under any format. That means that any negotiations would have to take place under fire, and Putin has suggested that even then, he would ‘think twice’ about starting any negotiations (whether under fire or not).

Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed just last week that “piecemeal solutions and agreements” would prevent a comprehensive settlement from being reached; a “freeze” of the conflict would not help either —

“[Ukraine] is a highly complex matter, and the settlement must be comprehensive … We need a solution for future generations — one that is guaranteed and safeguarded against setbacks”.

It seems that the Europeans have not grasped that a Korean-style cessation of hostilities (as argued by General Kellogg) along a front where two militaries face each other is a recipe for precisely no solution. It has been 73 years since the Korean War was frozen by armistice. Nothing has changed.

The repeated return to this mantra of a ceasefire along line of contact, rather than solution first; ceasefire last, shouts out to the Russians that the West wants to keep Ukraine in the locker-room for the time when a platform from which to exert pressure (again) on Russia in the future is to be jacked-up.

The fatal flaw to this initiative is its cultural deafness. For Witkoff and Kushner it may be “all about the stuff that really matters – money” — but that is not the case for Russia.

If the Witkoff-Europe combo recalled Russian history, they would understand why, for Russia, security, security, security comes top.

Walter Munchau cautioned just this week that “the Ukraine war risks escalating” —

“We should be under no illusion about a war with Russia. We are absolutely not in a position to win. Whose bond markets are going to be blown up first? Who is going to run out of interceptor missiles first? … On every [count] — military, energy, finance — Europe is at a disadvantage. That’s not all. There is a relatively plausible scenario in which Ukraine and Iran merge into a single West Eurasian war — and become the ultimate proxy conflict between the U.S. and China”.

If, instead of putting continued ‘stakeholder’ grift first, with its mechanism to ensure “that the western opportunity for financial benefit continues”, the Witkoff-Europe combo chose rather to address the fundamentals to the conflict — the deeper question of a Eurasian security architecture; the definition of where exactly the frontier that separates NATO security interests from those of Sino-Russian interests physically lies — they might find a more receptive audience on their next trip to Moscow.

Alas, circumscribing NATO’s extent is not possible – as things stand.

Sem sua formalização, o papel do BRICS na resolução de conflitos permanece limitado.

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Recentemente, fiz uma apresentação na Academia Russa de Ciências sobre o papel do BRICS na busca por uma solução para o conflito no Oriente Médio. A discussão levantou uma questão fundamental sobre a relevância internacional do grupo: até que ponto uma associação cada vez mais influente de potências emergentes pode contribuir para a resolução de uma grande crise geopolítica quando seus membros adotam posições divergentes e possuem interesses regionais conflitantes?

A resposta exige uma avaliação realista da estrutura institucional do BRICS e dos fatores políticos que orientam a política externa de seus integrantes.

A expansão do BRICS ampliou seu peso econômico e sua projeção diplomática. Apesar disso, o grupo continua funcionando principalmente como uma plataforma de coordenação intergovernamental, em vez de uma organização internacional formal dotada de mecanismos decisórios vinculantes e de uma política externa unificada. Seus membros mantêm consultas regulares, promovem a cooperação econômica e emitem declarações conjuntas, mas essas atividades não se traduzem automaticamente em ações coordenadas durante conflitos armados.

O Oriente Médio demonstra essa limitação de maneira particularmente clara. Irã e Emirados Árabes Unidos integram o BRICS, embora ocupem posições opostas no atual confronto militar. Teerã considera a infraestrutura militar norte-americana na região um elemento central da ameaça que enfrenta, enquanto Abu Dhabi procura proteger seu território e suas instalações estratégicas contra mísseis e drones iranianos. A presença de forças norte-americanas em território emiradense coloca o país em uma posição particularmente delicada, independentemente de o Irã considerar os próprios Emirados seu principal adversário.

Outros integrantes enfrentam dilemas semelhantes. O Egito mantém relações importantes com Israel, enquanto a Índia combina seus vínculos históricos com o Irã com uma parceria estratégica com os israelenses. Ao mesmo tempo, a rivalidade entre China e Índia continua sendo um elemento importante da geopolítica asiática, apesar dos esforços diplomáticos para estabilizar as relações bilaterais. Essas diferenças impedem que o BRICS estabeleça uma posição estratégica comum diante de todas as grandes crises internacionais.

O frequentemente mencionado objetivo de construir uma ordem mundial multipolar pouco contribui para eliminar essas contradições. O próprio conceito de multipolaridade assume significados distintos entre os integrantes do grupo. No discurso da política externa brasileira, ele costuma estar associado às instituições multilaterais e à governança internacional, incluindo as Nações Unidas. Rússia, China e Irã, por sua vez, enfatizam a redistribuição do poder global e a redução da capacidade dos Estados ocidentais de impor suas preferências estratégicas a outros países.

Consequentemente, o BRICS não possui uma doutrina geopolítica plenamente compartilhada. Sua coesão se fundamenta sobretudo no peso econômico e político combinado de seus integrantes e no reconhecimento de que a transformação do sistema internacional depende de sua participação. Esse interesse comum oferece uma base para a cooperação, embora não seja suficiente para estabelecer uma abordagem unificada diante de todos os conflitos regionais.

Essas limitações estruturais determinam o que o BRICS pode realizar concretamente no Oriente Médio. Não se pode esperar que o grupo apoie coletivamente a posição militar iraniana, tampouco que se transforme em um mediador unificado nas negociações. Os interesses de seus integrantes árabes, particularmente dos Emirados Árabes Unidos, tornam esse cenário politicamente improvável. Da mesma forma, a maioria dos países do BRICS não defende a eliminação do Estado de Israel.

Ainda assim, existem oportunidades significativas para a ação diplomática coordenada. Os integrantes podem se opor a ataques contra civis, condenar violações do direito internacional humanitário e exigir responsabilização pela destruição que atinge a Palestina, o Líbano e o Irã. Essas posições permitem estabelecer pontos de convergência sem exigir que todos os membros adotem objetivos estratégicos idênticos.

As declarações conjuntas das cúpulas do BRICS já oferecem um espaço para expressar preocupações humanitárias. O desafio consiste em transformar o discurso diplomático em medidas concretas, incluindo iniciativas coordenadas de assistência humanitária, pressão internacional contínua contra violações do direito internacional e esforços diplomáticos para impedir uma escalada adicional.

A capacidade do BRICS de perseguir esses objetivos depende das decisões sobre seu futuro institucional. Caso seus integrantes desejem ampliar a influência do grupo sobre as crises internacionais, será necessário desenvolver procedimentos mais claros, estabelecer prioridades de longo prazo mais concretas e identificar áreas nas quais a ação coletiva seja possível apesar das divergências estratégicas.

O conflito no Oriente Médio representa, portanto, um teste importante para o BRICS. Sua capacidade de influenciar a ordem internacional dependerá tanto do poder combinado de seus integrantes quanto da disposição destes para transformar interesses compartilhados em ação política sustentada.

Moscow has released retired American teacher Stephen Hubbard after more than four years in detention, following President Donald Trump’s personal intervention with Vladimir Putin and amid renewed US-Russian negotiations over Ukraine.

Russia has released Stephen Hubbard, a 74-year-old American citizen imprisoned since 2022, as US special envoy Steve Witkoff holds talks with President Vladimir Putin in St Petersburg on Wednesday, 21 October.

Putin announced the release during his meeting with Witkoff, saying Hubbard had already been transferred to Pulkovo Airport in St Petersburg in preparation for his return to the United States. Witkoff thanked the Russian president for securing the American’s freedom.

The development follows direct intervention by President Donald Trump, who confirmed on Tuesday that he had personally raised Hubbard’s detention with Putin and requested his release.

Hubbard, a retired English teacher from Michigan, had spent decades living abroad before moving to Izium, in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region, in 2014. Russian forces detained him in April 2022, during their occupation of the city following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In October 2024, a Moscow court sentenced him to six years and ten months in prison after finding him guilty of serving as a mercenary for Ukrainian forces.

Russian prosecutors alleged that Hubbard had joined a Ukrainian military unit and received approximately $1,000 a month for his activities, including guarding military checkpoints.

His family rejected the accusations. His sister, Patricia Hubbard Fox, maintained that he had never participated in military operations, while his American lawyer, Martin De Luca, said the charges were fabricated.

The US State Department subsequently designated Hubbard as wrongfully detained, making his release a priority in Washington’s negotiations with Moscow.

Release coincides with renewed Ukraine diplomacy

Hubbard’s release comes during another round of intensive diplomatic contacts involving Washington, Kyiv and Moscow.

Witkoff arrived in St Petersburg following talks in Oslo on Tuesday with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb. Jared Kushner, another representative of Trump’s administration, participated remotely.

The discussions addressed security arrangements, energy and economic questions connected with Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Witkoff travelled directly from Norway to Russia, where he was received by Kremlin representative Kirill Dmitriev before his meeting with Putin.

The release provides a concrete outcome from the latest US-Russian contacts, although no indication has emerged that it forms part of a broader agreement concerning Ukraine.

It also follows several previous cases in which American citizens detained in Russia have been released through negotiations between Washington and Moscow.

In August, former US Marine Robert Gilman was released on humanitarian grounds amid serious concerns about his deteriorating health.

Hubbard was the only American prisoner in Russian custody officially classified by Washington as wrongfully detained at the time of his release.

Neither side has announced whether Moscow received any concessions in exchange for his freedom, while the outcome of Witkoff’s wider negotiations with Putin remains unclear.

Talks in Oslo have restored diplomatic contact between Kyiv and Washington, but Donald Trump continues to demand concessions from Ukraine while Moscow shows little willingness to compromise. Steve Witkoff’s forthcoming meeting with Russian officials will expose the limits of the American peace initiative.

The latest negotiations over Russia’s war against Ukraine have produced a renewed diplomatic initiative, with US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff preparing to travel to St Petersburg on Wednesday, 21 October, following consultations with Ukrainian and European leaders in Oslo.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met Witkoff alongside Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb on Tuesday. Jared Kushner, Donald Trump’s son-in-law, participated remotely. The discussions covered territorial questions, security guarantees, sanctions and proposals for a partial ceasefire.

The meeting concluded with cautious expressions of optimism. Stubb suggested that the negotiating process was back on track, while Støre confirmed that Witkoff would present proposals developed by American, Ukrainian and European representatives to the Russian leadership.

However, the diplomatic improvement contrasts with Trump’s renewed public pressure on Zelenskyy, raising questions about Washington’s negotiating strategy and whether Moscow has any intention of accepting the proposed settlement.

Washington’s contradictory signals

Speaking in the Oval Office on Tuesday, Trump again insisted that Ukraine must reach an agreement with Russia, portraying Moscow’s military position as increasingly advantageous.

His remarks closely resembled arguments advanced during earlier disputes with Zelenskyy, when Washington pressed Kyiv to accept territorial concessions rather than increase pressure on the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to reassure the Ukrainian leadership that American military cooperation had not been deliberately restricted.

Rubio denied that Trump had ordered changes to intelligence-sharing or weapons assistance. Zelenskyy subsequently confirmed that Ukraine was again receiving American early-warning intelligence concerning Russian ballistic missile attacks.

Nevertheless, serious problems remain. Ukraine has reported delays in deliveries of American-made Patriot interceptors purchased by European allies, while restrictions affecting the military Starshield satellite communications system have not been fully resolved.

These difficulties are particularly serious as Russia intensifies attacks against Ukrainian electricity infrastructure, attempting to undermine civilian services ahead of winter.

The conflicting signals leave Kyiv negotiating with an administration whose diplomatic representatives promise continued cooperation while its president publicly demands Ukrainian concessions.

Security guarantees without NATO membership

Among the proposals discussed in Oslo were security arrangements intended to provide Ukraine with protection comparable to NATO’s Article 5 collective-defence provision.

Zelenskyy acknowledged that American representatives had discussed such guarantees, although their precise obligations and enforcement mechanisms remain undisclosed.

The proposal presents a fundamental negotiating problem.

Russia has consistently opposed Ukrainian NATO membership, partly because the alliance’s collective-defence commitments would increase the consequences of any renewed Russian aggression.

An alternative arrangement offering genuinely comparable protection would consequently encounter many of the same Russian objections.

Conversely, guarantees lacking a credible enforcement mechanism would leave Ukraine exposed to another attack after a ceasefire.

Moscow’s record provides little reassurance. Russia violated Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders in 2014 and launched its full-scale invasion in 2022 despite previous commitments to respect Ukrainian sovereignty.

The Kremlin’s objectives extend beyond territory

Washington’s approach appears increasingly concentrated on securing an agreement involving territorial concessions and restrictions on Ukraine’s future security arrangements.

Yet Putin’s objectives have consistently extended beyond the territories occupied by Russian forces.

The Kremlin has demanded constraints on Ukraine’s military capabilities, international alliances and strategic independence. Accepting territorial gains alone would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s wider political ambitions.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has maintained that Moscow is unwilling to make substantial political concessions, while the Kremlin continues to insist that any agreement must address what it describes as the underlying causes of the conflict.

Those conditions have previously included demands that would substantially restrict Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Consequently, even a Ukrainian willingness to consider elements of Washington’s proposals would not guarantee Russian acceptance.

The political calculation behind an energy ceasefire

One possibility under consideration is a limited ceasefire protecting energy and potentially food-related infrastructure.

Zelenskyy has indicated that Ukraine could suspend attacks against Russian energy facilities if Moscow stopped striking Ukrainian infrastructure.

Such an arrangement could reduce immediate civilian suffering. It would also have military and economic consequences.

Ukrainian attacks against Russian refineries, oil terminals and other energy installations have increasingly targeted infrastructure supporting Moscow’s war economy.

A temporary suspension could allow Russia to repair damaged facilities, restore production and stabilise export revenues. Without credible monitoring and enforcement, Moscow could exploit a limited agreement while leaving the wider conflict unresolved.

Trump has additional reasons to seek a rapid diplomatic result. With American congressional elections scheduled for 3 November, his administration is attempting to contain domestic fuel prices and demonstrate progress towards ending the war.

His recent decision to ease restrictions on Russian diesel exports has already provoked concern in Kyiv and European capitals over the potential financial benefits to Moscow.

The danger for Ukraine is that an agreement presented as a diplomatic achievement in Washington could provide Russia with economic relief without altering its military objectives.

The decision awaiting Washington

Witkoff’s visit to St Petersburg will establish whether Moscow is prepared to engage with the proposals developed in Oslo.

Putin could accept a temporary arrangement, particularly one suspending Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, while postponing discussions over territorial and political questions.

Alternatively, Moscow could reject the initiative and maintain its existing demands.

In either case, Washington will face a decision over the consequences of Russian intransigence.

For Kyiv, continued engagement with the United States remains essential because American intelligence, satellite communications and advanced air-defence weapons cannot readily be replaced.

But the prospects for a negotiated settlement will depend less on further Ukrainian concessions than on whether Russia faces sufficient political, military and economic pressure to abandon its maximalist demands.

The Oslo negotiations have restored cooperation between Ukraine, Europe and American mediators. They have not established that Putin is prepared to end the war on terms compatible with Ukraine’s continued independence.

Without becoming official, BRICS’ role in resolving conflicts remains reduced.

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Recently, I delivered a presentation at the Russian Academy of Sciences on the role of BRICS in addressing the conflict in the Middle East. The discussion raised a fundamental question about the group’s international relevance: to what extent can an increasingly influential association of emerging powers contribute to resolving a major geopolitical crisis when its members hold divergent positions and maintain competing regional interests?

The answer requires a realistic assessment of BRICS’ institutional character and the political considerations shaping its members’ foreign policies.

The expansion of BRICS has increased its economic weight and diplomatic reach. Nevertheless, the group remains primarily a platform for intergovernmental coordination rather than a formal international organization equipped with binding decision-making mechanisms and a unified foreign policy. Its members maintain regular consultations, pursue economic cooperation, and issue joint declarations, but these activities do not automatically translate into coordinated action during armed conflicts.

The Middle East illustrates this limitation particularly clearly. Iran and the United Arab Emirates belong to BRICS while occupying opposing positions in the current military confrontation. Tehran considers American military infrastructure in the region a central element of the threat it faces, while the UAE seeks to protect its territory and critical infrastructure from Iranian missiles and drones. The presence of American forces on Emirati soil places Abu Dhabi in a particularly sensitive position, regardless of whether Iran considers the country itself its principal adversary.

Other members face similarly complex calculations. Egypt maintains important relations with Israel, while India combines longstanding ties with Iran with a strategic partnership with Israel. Meanwhile, China’s rivalry with India remains an important feature of Asian geopolitics, despite diplomatic efforts to stabilize bilateral relations. These differences prevent BRICS from adopting a common strategic position on every major international crisis.

The frequently invoked objective of establishing a multipolar world order does little to eliminate these contradictions. Multipolarity itself carries different meanings across the group’s membership. Brazilian foreign policy discourse often associates it with multilateral institutions and international governance, including the United Nations. Russia, China, and Iran, however, place greater emphasis on redistributing global power and reducing the capacity of Western states to impose their strategic preferences on other countries.

Consequently, BRICS lacks a fully shared geopolitical doctrine. Its cohesion rests primarily on the combined economic and political weight of its members and their recognition that the international system cannot be transformed without their participation. This common interest provides a foundation for cooperation, although it remains insufficient to establish a unified approach to every regional conflict.

These structural limitations define what BRICS can realistically accomplish in the Middle East. The group cannot be expected to endorse Iran’s military position collectively, nor is it likely to become a unified negotiating intermediary. The interests of its Arab members, particularly the UAE, make such an arrangement politically implausible. Likewise, most BRICS countries do not support eliminating the State of Israel.

However, significant opportunities for coordinated diplomatic action remain. Members can oppose attacks against civilians, condemn violations of international humanitarian law, and demand accountability for the destruction affecting Palestine, Lebanon, and Iran. Such positions can establish common ground without requiring every member to adopt identical strategic objectives.

Joint declarations at BRICS summits have already provided a framework for expressing humanitarian concerns. The challenge is to translate diplomatic language into practical measures, including coordinated initiatives for humanitarian assistance, sustained international pressure against violations of international law, and diplomatic efforts to prevent further escalation.

Whether BRICS can pursue these objectives effectively depends on decisions about its institutional future. If its members want the group to exercise greater influence over international crises, they will need to develop clearer procedures, establish more concrete long-term priorities, and identify areas where collective action is possible despite strategic disagreements.

The Middle East conflict therefore presents BRICS with a significant test. Its capacity to influence the international order will depend not only on the combined power of its members, but also on their willingness to convert shared interests into sustained political action.

In a Europe preparing for war, entering the market means entering the battlefield where the great battle will take place.

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Sovereignty built by subtraction

On October 19, 2026, at the Berlaymont Building, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Luca Beccari and Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič signed the agreement establishing an association between the European Union and its member states, on the one hand, and the Republic of San Marino and the Principality of Andorra, on the other. On Mount Titano, the ceremony was watched live at the Kursaal, and the tone of the day was one of celebration: 11 years of negotiations, 4 governments, a “historic turning point” hailed by the majority parties, the Emilia-Romagna Region, and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Almost no one asked the question that such a transition inevitably raises for a republic that has built its survival on seventeen centuries of exceptional status: what does San Marino cease to be the moment it enters the single market?

The argument put forward in these pages is that the agreement, whatever commercial advantages it may bring, brings an era to a close. San Marino’s uniqueness – political, legal, and strategic – was not a folkloric relic. It was a source of power, the only one available to a state of sixty-one square kilometers. Exchanging it for market access means transforming San Marino from a space sheltered from conflict into a periphery of a bloc that wages those very conflicts: on the economic front today, and with increasing likelihood on the military front tomorrow.

San Marino’s longevity can be explained by a simple rule: never become part of what could destroy it. In 1797, the Republic declined Napoleon’s offer of territorial expansion, aware that a larger territory would merely be a larger target. In 1849, it granted refuge to Garibaldi without being drawn into the Risorgimento, and in 1862, it regulated its relations with the new Kingdom of Italy through a friendship treaty rather than annexation. In the 20th century, its neutrality held firm – at great cost – even when, in June 1944, Allied bombers struck a territory teeming with displaced persons.

This policy of withdrawal has produced a form of state that classical geopolitics struggles to classify. San Marino has no strategic depth, no resources, and no armed forces in the strict sense; yet it does have a position – that of an entity that no one has an interest in involving because it belongs to no camp. Its sovereignty is measured not by capability but by distance. It is a sovereignty by statute, which holds as long as the rules of Mount Titano remain Mount Titano’s own, as long as its foreign policy choices are not dictated elsewhere, and as long as its law does not become a reflection of an external legal system.

Until recently, even relations with Brussels adhered to this framework. The customs union and the monetary convention were sector-specific instruments: they regulated goods and currency while leaving the political architecture of the state intact. The agreement on cooperation and a customs union with the European Economic Community dates back to 1991 and entered into force in 2002; the Monetary Agreement with the European Union dates from 2012 and makes the use of the euro contingent upon the transposition of the banking acquis. When, in 2013, the people of San Marino were called upon to vote on the application for EU membership, the referendum did not even reach the quorum. The agreement signed in Brussels circumvents that limit: it does not bring San Marino into the EU, but brings the EU into San Marino.

The document marking the end of the privilege

When read in its entirety, the text refutes the notion that this is merely a trade agreement. The framework agreement consists of 112 articles, plus 7 protocols, a country-specific protocol with 6 appendices, and 25 annexes that list, act by act, the European law that the Republic will be required to apply. It is also a mixed agreement: in addition to the Great and General Council, it requires the consent of the European Parliament and ratification by the 27 national parliaments, while the San Marinese government aims for provisional application as early as the beginning of 2027. Three elements define the Republic’s new status.

The first is dynamic alignment. The annexes capture the acquis as it stood at the beginning of 2023; anything Brussels has produced since then – from crypto-assets to artificial intelligence to the new anti-money laundering package – will be incorporated through the Joint Committee, which is required to decide within six months of a proposal, failing which a dispute resolution procedure will be initiated. San Marino will sit on the councils of European authorities without voting rights and will be consulted by the Commission on the same basis as Member States. In the literature on differentiated integration, this condition has a specific name: “rule taker.” The associated state receives rules it did not draft, within timeframes it does not control, on matters that expand every time the Union broadens its own competences.

The second aspect is the transfer of decision-making authority. With regard to state aid, San Marino’s new regimes cannot take effect before the Commission’s decision – and the Commission may directly refer the matter to the Court of Justice – and the entire inventory of existing incentives must be brought into line with European criteria within two years. In the financial sector, European supervisory authorities will be granted direct powers, including the authority to request the suspension of an intermediary’s license – with decisions enforceable without San Marino’s approval – and market access will be subject to a binding bilateral agreement with Italy on supervision. The two levers with which San Marino has negotiated its autonomy for decades – favorable tax treatment and its financial center – are thus brought under control residing in Brussels, Frankfurt, and Rome.

The third element, the most political one, is Article 103, which obligates San Marino to prevent the rights arising from the agreement from being used to circumvent the Union’s restrictive measures. On paper, it is an anti-circumvention clause. In essence, it is the gateway through which European foreign policy – which San Marino has never endorsed – enters its legal system via the market. To put it simply, this marks the end of San Marino itself, not just the end of its privileges.

From active neutrality to the sanctions framework

To gauge the scope of Article 103, we must go back to March 2022. With Decree-Law No. 27 of March 4, the Republic adopted restrictive measures for the first time that differed from those decided by the United Nations, implementing the European sanctions regime against the Russian Federation. After the Crimea crisis in 2014, San Marino had chosen not to follow Brussels’ lead and, over the following decade, maintained close economic and diplomatic ties with Moscow, even resorting to the Sputnik V vaccine in 2021 while doses expected via Italy were slow to arrive. The 2022 shift was presented as “active neutrality,” but in the chamber, some acknowledged that part of that neutrality had been lost by adhering to the sanctions. Moscow, for its part, added San Marino to its list of hostile countries.

However, the 2022 decision was a sovereign and revocable choice, made through acts of the Great and General Council. The Association Agreement transforms it into an international obligation, and the EU’s sanctions regime effectively extends to San Marino. Furthermore, that regime no longer concerns Russia alone. European restrictive regimes cover Iran, Belarus, North Korea, human rights violations, and cyberattacks, and the Commission has equipped itself with anti-coercion tools designed for trade disputes with major powers, including China. Every new regime decided in Brussels – by states among which San Marino has no vote – will become a constraint on San Marinese banks, businesses, and professionals.

This is where the loss of uniqueness becomes vulnerability. A small state uninvolved in economic conflicts is not a target for retaliation; a small state integrated into the market of a bloc that imposes sanctions becomes one. Countermeasures by Moscow, Beijing, or Tehran do not distinguish between members and associates; they target the jurisdiction that enforces the measures. The same applies to transatlantic trade wars: with the new customs union – where customs clearance takes place at Italian offices and duties are collected on behalf of the Republic – San Marino’s tariff policy remains aligned with that of the European Union. The Titano is relinquishing the neutrality that once made it a partner to all.

The union arms itself

The most sensitive aspect remains the military one. The agreement contains no defense clauses or mutual assistance commitments, and it would be incorrect to attribute such provisions to it. The problem lies elsewhere. Through dynamic alignment, San Marino is linking itself to a legal framework that is changing in nature. Since 2022, the Union has progressively transformed the internal market into a security instrument: programs supporting the defense industry, joint loans for arms purchases, control of foreign investments, dual-use goods regimes, and rearmament plans presented as a condition for European competitiveness. It is likely that the single market of the coming decade will resemble a low-intensity war economy, and that the law called upon to regulate it will bear the marks of this reality.

An associated state that transposes that acquis does not thereby become a belligerent, but it ceases to be an outsider. Its companies can enter European defense supply chains, its intermediaries can join rearmament financing networks, and its territory can be incorporated into export control systems. In a hybrid conflict, where financial and IT infrastructure are considered legitimate targets, the distinction between member states and associated states narrows until it disappears. Over the next ten years, it is likely that external actors will treat San Marino as part of the European framework, without the Republic having access to the protections or voting rights reserved for member states.

Andorra and San Marino assume the obligations of membership without the powers that come with it: they remain outside the Council, the Parliament, and the Commission, but within the scope of the decisions those institutions make. It is no coincidence that the Principality of Monaco, which was negotiating within the same framework, suspended talks as early as 2023, and in Andorra, a labor union withdrew from the national pact on Europe, objecting to the lack of a referendum.

What remains to be decided

If we wish to maintain a positive outlook, the signing does not mean the matter is settled. The agreement must still be ratified by the Great and General Council. The key indicators to watch are concrete: the timing and procedures for ratification, any request for a referendum, the content of the bilateral agreement with Italy on financial supervision, and, above all, the first implementation – through a joint committee – of a sanctions regime adopted after the signing. That step will reveal how much of its autonomy of judgment the Republic has retained, even though rumors suggest there is boisterous enthusiasm within the halls of the small city-state.

San Marino has weathered the Roman Empire, the Papal States, Napoleon, the Risorgimento, and two world wars while remaining true to itself – and it has done so by refusing, time and again, to become part of something larger. On October 19, it made the opposite choice. Opportunities for businesses exist. The price – which the press releases deliberately omit – is the surrender of the exceptional status that for seventeen centuries has been its sole defense.

In a Europe preparing for war, entering the market means entering the battlefield where the great battle will take place.

US envoy Steve Witkoff is joining negotiations in Norway before an expected visit to Moscow, but American pressure on Ukraine, uncertainty over military assistance and renewed economic dealings with Russia raise questions about Washington’s approach to ending the war.

The latest American diplomatic initiative on Ukraine comes at a particularly difficult moment in relations between Washington and Kyiv. President Donald Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, is taking part in talks in Oslo on Tuesday, 20 October, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European leaders, before an anticipated visit to Moscow for discussions with Vladimir Putin.

The Norwegian government has confirmed that the meetings will include Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb. Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, will participate remotely. The meeting was requested by Zelenskyy, with Norway and Finland providing the diplomatic setting.

Yet the significance of the Oslo discussions lies less in the gathering itself than in the political circumstances surrounding it. Washington is seeking an agreement with Moscow while simultaneously becoming more confrontational towards Kyiv. Recent American decisions affecting military assistance, intelligence cooperation and Russian energy exports have introduced serious doubts about how the administration intends to use its considerable negotiating leverage.

Washington’s pressure on Kyiv

The immediate difficulty concerns the growing discrepancy between American diplomatic assurances and the practical conditions under which Ukraine is expected to negotiate.

Zelenskyy has accused Washington of delaying military deliveries, restricting intelligence sharing and limiting access to the Starshield satellite communications system. The Ukrainian president suggested that these developments reflected a political decision to reduce support at a particularly sensitive stage of the war. American officials have disputed allegations that assistance is being deliberately restricted.

Among the disputed deliveries are Patriot air-defence interceptors purchased by European NATO members through the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List programme. Zelenskyy has indicated that shipments remain subject to authorisation by US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth.

These are operational matters with immediate consequences. Ukraine relies on American intelligence, communications infrastructure and air-defence equipment to counter Russian missile attacks. Any interruption affects Kyiv’s military calculations, irrespective of whether Washington formally acknowledges a change in policy.

The political message is equally consequential. Trump has publicly questioned Zelenskyy’s willingness to negotiate and suggested that Ukraine might need somebody else to conduct talks with Russia. Such remarks place additional pressure on the Ukrainian leadership while leaving Moscow’s territorial demands largely untouched.

Russia’s incentives remain unchanged

The central weakness in the American diplomatic approach is the assumption that renewed engagement with Putin will necessarily produce meaningful Russian concessions.

Moscow has repeatedly treated negotiations as an opportunity to pursue political objectives that its armed forces have not achieved on the battlefield. Russian demands concerning Ukrainian territory and restrictions on Kyiv’s future security arrangements remain incompatible with Ukraine’s sovereignty.

An agreement reached under these conditions could suspend hostilities without resolving the underlying conflict. Russia would retain the capacity to rebuild its forces, while Ukraine could find its military options constrained by commitments made in exchange for an uncertain ceasefire.

The Trump administration’s recent economic dealings with Moscow further complicate the negotiations. Washington’s arrangements concerning Russian diesel have attracted criticism from Kyiv and European governments, particularly because Russian energy revenues remain an important source of financing for the war.

Trump has also pressed Ukraine to curtail attacks on Russian oil infrastructure, reflecting American concerns about fuel prices. For Moscow, relief from attacks on refineries would preserve economically important facilities that Ukraine has demonstrated an increasing ability to reach.

Any arrangement limiting such operations without corresponding Russian concessions would alter the military and economic balance in Moscow’s favour.

The broader American proposals reportedly include possible post-war economic cooperation with Russia. Their implications extend beyond Ukraine: commercial normalisation could offer the Kremlin substantial benefits before the conditions for a stable European security settlement have been established.

Europe’s influence depends on its willingness to use it

European participation in the Oslo process is therefore more substantial than a question of diplomatic representation.

Britain, France, Germany and Poland, alongside the European Union and NATO, are expected to be involved in the wider discussions. European governments would almost certainly bear much of the financial and military responsibility for implementing any settlement, including Ukraine’s reconstruction and long-term security.

They also possess considerable economic leverage through sanctions, financial restrictions and decisions concerning frozen Russian assets. Those instruments would form part of any serious negotiation over Moscow’s future relations with Europe.

However, European influence remains constrained by continuing dependence on American military technology and equipment. The controversy surrounding Patriot deliveries illustrates the problem: European governments can finance weapons for Ukraine without necessarily controlling when those weapons are released.

As EU Today previously examined, Washington’s negotiations with Moscow have consequences for European security that cannot be separated from the future of Ukraine.

European governments consequently face a difficult calculation. They wish to preserve American involvement, but excessive accommodation of Washington’s demands could leave them financing security arrangements over which they exercise limited control.

Norway and Finland have helped bring the Ukrainian and American delegations together at a moment when their relationship is deteriorating. Whether that produces progress will depend partly on Moscow’s response, but also on whether Washington is prepared to maintain the military and economic pressure necessary to make Russian concessions possible.

Witkoff’s anticipated journey from Oslo to Moscow will offer an early indication of the administration’s priorities. Putin will be assessing the terms Washington is prepared to offer, while Kyiv remains concerned about restrictions affecting equipment it needs to defend its cities.

For the Ukrainian leadership, the danger is that negotiations intended to end Russia’s invasion could become a process in which the country resisting that invasion is asked to make the most immediate concessions.

By Peter VAN BUREN

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Critics of Trump’s diplomatic staffing don’t address why it’s important to have a top man on the ground in the Zoom era.

During my more than two decades at the State Department as a diplomat, my well-meaning mother often asked what I’d have to do to make ambassador. The answer was simple: Dad would have to die young, and Mom would then have to donate the whole estate to the winner of the next presidential election. Then I’d get appointed ambassador to a small, unimportant country. For so many reasons, I am glad Dad lived to a ripe old age, and that Mom looks forward to taking care of the Humane Society in her will instead. I would have made a terrible ambassador.

Since 1960, 72 percent of America’s ambassadors to desirable posts in Western Europe and the Caribbean have been political appointees like the recently departed Kimberly Guilfoyle, as I might have been if the plan with Mom had worked out. Their primary and often only qualification is spending big on the guy who won the presidency. Career diplomats on the other hand are often promoted as ambassador into politically less important hardship posts, no donation required. All must be confirmed by the Senate. The United States is unusual among developed democracies in the scale of political ambassadorial appointments. Unlike the U.S., most developed democracies, including Britain, Germany, Japan, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, reserve ambassadorships almost entirely for career diplomats.

So while the debate over political ambassadors versus career diplomats has gone on for more than a century, in 2026 the more interesting question may be whether we need ambassadors in every capital at all. What useful and productive thing was Guilfoyle doing in Greece anyway?

It is important to have a good person in the role; he acts as the personal representative of his country’s leader, in America’s case, answerable to the Oval Office. He receives confidential instructions from the White House before taking up his job abroad, and for many political ambassadors, can often pick up the phone and call the president and cabinet officials directly. I was in the room as a subject matter expert when ambassador Howard Baker simply picked up the phone and dialed Vice President Dick Cheney at his ranch in Wyoming and untied a significant bureaucratic knot that was burdening our relationship with Japan. This demonstrates something well-connected political ambassadors can uniquely do. On the other hand, communication inside an embassy can be problematic for political appointees; many Foreign Service Officers (FSO) see them as outsiders come to mess up their way of doing things and slow-walk ambassadorial initiatives because they are sure they know better. Political appointees, especially those taking leave from large businesses to serve, also tend to spend a lot of their time back in the U.S., creating friction with the staff.

In the American system, because most career ambassadors owe their own bottom-line allegiance (and pension) to the State Department, communication is often not that close and friendly with the Executive under most circumstances. A White House unsure of whether the State Department is even on its side will be unlikely to be reassured by a career ambassador in place, not to mention State’s long-standing institutional resistance to too many political appointees in general. Careerists usually do have strong host-country knowledge and maybe language skills. Some, however, can get too deep into the weeds on administrative, visa, or personnel matters a political appointee usually leaves to subordinates, and some use their new-found authority to settle old scores or pursue personal projects adjacent to core foreign policy.

The ambassadorial title remains the profession’s highest achievement. It would be surprising if ambitious FSOs did not aspire to it. But just being the most qualified for anything inside State is rarely enough. That leaves plenty of careerist yes-men around looking to get into an ambassador’s chair.

The struggle over who is better at the job, political appointees or careerists, will never conclusively end. It has been a factor of American diplomacy for decades, under all flavors of administrations. The mainstream media negatively focus on some of Trump’s ambassadorial choices, but to anyone familiar with diplomacy it is nothing more than another round in a century-old political argument.

The new question, unique to the second Trump administration, is whether or not the president should appoint anyone at all, career or political, to a particular ambassadorial job. Trump currently has 92 ambassadorial seats empty, with either the candidate stuck in the Senatorial confirmation process or the chair simply left vacant by Trump’s choice. The same number of empty offices at comparable points of their presidencies was only 54 under Biden, and 55 under the first Trump administration. A lot of the empties are in smaller countries of lesser political importance, but a few larger embassies stand out, including Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Germany. Some have pending nominees, some do not. Senate intransigence aside, this seems to be by choice. The real question is, however, how much it matters.

Any American embassy without an ambassador is led by a charge, someone temporarily in the ambassadorial role, typically the embassy’s deputy chief of mission (DCM). The DCM is usually a State Department career FSO, typically the most experienced and senior one at post, and often has done multiple tours in the country in subordinate roles. This seems like the kind of person State would want in charge, yet the American Foreign Service Association and most rank-and-file FSOs curiously complain about not having enough career officers in leadership roles. One wonders whether for some critics the temporary nature of the title itself has become too much the issue.

Things are complicated by the fact that until something goes wrong, most ambassadors work without real oversight. One of the criticisms in Dennis Jett’s excellent book American Ambassadors is the lack of standards and definitions of success for an ambassador. They report to the president after all, who is usually too busy to pay much attention to things on a day-to-day basis in Lesotho, no matter who the ambassador is. Underlings in the embassy by culture and negative experience tend to be sparse in their suggestions upward, and State has little of the military’s tradition of after-action summaries, tough lessons-learned reports, and sincere historical evaluation of mistakes. Ambassadors tend to choose their own path. Some try to be local celebrities, scoring photo-ops and ribbon-cuttings and hosting VIPs. Others focus near-exclusively on American business promotion abroad, while others remember their own days in the bureaucracy and dive deep into political or economic reporting. This all further complicates what is and is not a “good” ambassador. So do we really need them?

Some Democrats think so. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s top Democrat, accused the administration of retreating from the world stage by leaving ambassadorial postings vacant. “China has ambassadors in nearly every country it has diplomatic relationships with, advancing its interests at the expense of America’s,” she said in a statement. Yet she and others rarely provide specific examples of what America’s ambassadors are doing or might be doing. Critics rarely identify policy outcomes that required a Senate-confirmed ambassador rather than a competent charge. That is the problem in these discussions, an unwavering belief that diplomatic presence is inherently valuable, even when its measurable effects are difficult to identify, and that if we’re not careful China will do it better. Remember of course the exact argument was made during the Cold War about the Soviet Union, leading the U.S. to open embassies in countries with little global importance, only to close them when priorities changed.

Ambassadors are increasingly curiosities left over from the 19th century, a past when Washington, DC, needed trusted representatives empowered to make decisions a world away. Embassies as they exist today were created for a world without Zoom, encrypted messaging, presidential and cabinet travel, celebrity special envoys, global media reporting, and easy direct leader-to-leader calls. It raises the question in 2026 that few people are willing to ask: If 92 embassies can function for months without ambassadors, how indispensable were those ambassadors in the first place?

Original article:  www.theamericanconservative.com

The realities obscured by the “One Nation” narrative intersect with broader imperialist power struggles, extending from the energy resources of the Caspian Basin to the trade routes of Eurasia.

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Although Ankara and Baku maintain a strong partnership spanning Karabakh, energy corridors, the defence industry and the Organization of Turkic States, the 2009 rapprochement with Armenia, the natural gas dispute of 2010 and the political tensions that have resurfaced today show that the two countries have long been engaged in a relationship marked by rivalry as well as cooperation.

Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan have evolved since the dissolution of the Soviet Union through numerous partnerships in the political, economic and security spheres.

Turkey was the first country to recognise Azerbaijan’s independence. Its support for Baku during the Karabakh conflicts, joint oil and natural gas projects, and increasingly close military cooperation in recent years have all been presented through the political slogan “One Nation, Two States.” Yet several episodes have demonstrated that the two states do not necessarily interpret this supposed unity in the same way.

The tensions that have recently emerged over dress regulations and debates about secularism in Azerbaijan are particularly revealing in this respect. The responses from senior Azerbaijani officials to criticism originating in Turkey have exposed significant differences in how the two countries perceive their relationship.

While the Turkish side has promoted a vision of a “Greater Turkic World” under Ankara’s leadership through the “One Nation, Two States” narrative, the Azerbaijani side has responded with a different emphasis: “One nation, but two states.”

From 1991 to the present: How the foundations of the relationship were laid

Turkey recognised Azerbaijan’s independence on 9 November 1991, becoming the first country to do so. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on 14 January 1992. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a new era of interstate relations between Ankara and Baku began.

For Turkey, Azerbaijan was more than a country linked to it through a shared Turkic identity. The relationship also provided a strategic gateway to the Caspian Basin, Central Asia and the South Caucasus—an objective that aligned with the broader strategic interests of the United States as well. For Azerbaijan, meanwhile, Turkey was an important partner capable of providing political support on the international stage, facilitating access to Western markets and cooperating on security matters.

The famous slogan “One Nation, Two States,” popularised by former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, came to express a degree of closeness that went beyond ordinary diplomatic relations between the two countries.

One of the most important issues on the agenda in the early 1990s was the Karabakh conflict. In 1993, Turkey closed its land border with Armenia after Armenian forces took control of the Kelbajar district. This decision marked a defining moment in Ankara’s diplomatic position on the Karabakh conflict.

Turkish-Armenian relations thus became an integral part of Ankara’s relationship with Baku. Turkey’s policy towards Armenia began to be shaped not only by the dynamics of bilateral relations but also by its strategic partnership with Azerbaijan.

The first major tension: The rapprochement with Armenia

The problems that have periodically emerged in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations are not new. A closer look at the 2008–2010 period reveals how disagreements in both diplomacy and economics brought underlying tensions between the two countries into the open for the first time.

In 2008, Turkey and Armenia launched a renewed initiative to normalise relations. On 6 September 2008, then-Turkish President Abdullah Gül travelled to Yerevan at the invitation of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan to watch a football match between the national teams of the two countries. The visit became one of the symbolic moments in the normalisation process between two countries pursuing different paths towards transatlantic integration. The initiative would subsequently become known as “football diplomacy.”

Following negotiations, Turkey and Armenia signed protocols in Zurich in October 2009 aimed at establishing diplomatic relations and developing bilateral ties.

The Azerbaijani leadership, however, viewed the process with considerable reservations. Baku regarded any normalisation between Ankara and Yerevan conducted independently of the Karabakh issue as contrary to its core foreign policy interests. Such moves raised concerns in Azerbaijan that Turkey’s political support could weaken.

The protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia never entered into force. The process failed to advance through the parliamentary ratification stages and eventually came to a standstill. Lobbying efforts by pro-Baku circles, drawing heavily on Azerbaijani financial resources, are also understood to have influenced the process.

This first major test therefore became an illustration of Azerbaijan’s ability to exert influence over Turkish policy.

Partnership and bargaining

During the same period, the two countries experienced a serious dispute over natural gas prices and energy transportation.

Natural gas produced at Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field was becoming an important source of supply for Turkey. However, when negotiations to renew earlier agreements began in 2008, disagreements emerged over gas prices, the recalculation of past purchases, Turkey’s ability to resell the gas to third countries, and transit fees.

At this point, Ankara’s ambition to establish itself as a central energy corridor to Europe intersected with Baku’s efforts to secure more direct commercial arrangements for its natural gas exports.

The dispute between the two supposed partners lasted approximately two years. Azerbaijan sought to strengthen its bargaining position against Ankara by drawing on its relations with alternative partners, including Russia and Iran.

Agreements signed in June 2010 ultimately resolved the disagreements over natural gas prices, sales and transit conditions.

This dispute was a clear indication that relations between the two countries were shaped by far more complicated dynamics than the rhetoric of “brotherhood” suggested.

Turkey offered a critical transit route for Azerbaijan’s access to European markets, while Azerbaijan used its energy resources to gain leverage over Ankara’s strategic objectives.

“Blood brothers” or energy partners?

Energy cooperation can be seen as one of the most important long-term foundations of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations. Energy projects have not only tied the two countries’ economic interests together; they have also influenced Turkey’s position in the European energy market and Azerbaijan’s ability to bring Caspian resources to international markets.

From the Caspian to the Mediterranean: The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline

One of the clearest manifestations of this partnership is the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. Beginning full-capacity operations in 2006, the pipeline transports Azerbaijani oil through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean terminal at Ceyhan. The project was implemented under agreements signed by Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 1999.

The significance of BTC extends beyond oil transportation. Most importantly, it enables Caspian energy resources to reach global markets through routes that bypass Russia. Azerbaijan has thus expanded its export options, while Turkey has become a major energy transit hub. At the broader geopolitical level, the project also represented an important step in the Atlantic alliance’s strategy to reduce Russia’s influence over regional energy routes.

Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum and TANAP

Natural gas cooperation between the two countries developed along similar lines. The Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum pipeline began transporting gas in 2007, facilitating the delivery of Azerbaijani natural gas to the Turkish market.

The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) subsequently became one of the most important projects in the bilateral partnership. The first gas flowed through TANAP in June 2018. The pipeline delivers Azerbaijani natural gas to Turkey and contributes to its transportation to European markets through the Southern Gas Corridor.

A turning point for Azerbaijani capital: SOCAR

Energy relations are not limited to pipelines. Investments by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) in Turkey have become one of the largest components of the two countries’ economic relationship.

SOCAR Turkey operates in sectors including refining, petrochemicals, logistics and port management. In a statement concerning 2024, the company said its total investments in Turkey had exceeded $18 billion and described itself as the country’s largest foreign direct investor. The STAR Refinery in Aliağa, İzmir, is another major Azerbaijani investment in Turkey.

The economic relationship, therefore, is not simply a matter of Turkey gaining access to Azerbaijan or Azerbaijan reaching European markets through Turkey. Azerbaijani capital has also established a significant presence in Turkey’s industrial and energy infrastructure.

Why is bilateral trade falling short of its target?

Despite close political ties and major investment projects, bilateral trade remains below the target set by the two countries’ leaders.

According to figures published by the Azerbaijani Embassy in Turkey, bilateral trade reached $5.72 billion in 2025. Of this total, $3.38 billion consisted of Azerbaijani exports to Turkey, while $2.34 billion represented Turkish exports to Azerbaijan.

The two governments aim to increase bilateral trade to $15 billion. Achieving this target would require the current volume to grow by approximately 2.6 times.

Although energy, defence industry cooperation and major infrastructure projects keep bilateral relations at a strategic level, a comparable leap in trade has yet to materialise.

Transport corridors, Eurasia and rivalry within the OTS

Following the development of energy corridors, transport projects became another major dimension of relations between the two countries.

The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway, inaugurated on 30 October 2017, connected Azerbaijan to Turkey’s railway network through Georgia. The project forms an important part of a route through which goods from China and Central Asia can travel across the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus towards Turkey and Europe.

These interests have gained further importance in recent years within the framework of the international transport route known as the Middle Corridor.

The 2020 Karabakh War

One of the most important turning points in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations was the Second Karabakh War in 2020.

During the 44-day war, Turkey emerged as one of Azerbaijan’s most important political and military supporters. Military training, defence industry cooperation and security ties between the two countries had deepened considerably. For Turkey, the conflict also provided an environment in which its defence industry—regarded in recent years as one of the country’s most important export sectors—was put to the test on the battlefield.

Azerbaijan’s use of Turkish-made unmanned aerial vehicles, including the Bayraktar TB2, and the depth of military cooperation between the two countries were among the key issues highlighted in assessments of the war.

The Shusha Declaration: Relations elevated to an alliance

It was in 2021 that relations between the two countries were formally elevated to the level of an alliance. On 15 June 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed the Shusha Declaration on allied relations in Shusha.

The declaration provided a more comprehensive political framework for the strategic partnership, incorporating military and security cooperation.

It stipulates that the parties will hold consultations if either country faces a threat or attack by a third state against its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity or security. The document also provides for expanded defence cooperation, modernisation of the armed forces, joint military exercises and coordination between security institutions.

In other words, the agreement further facilitated access for Turkish defence companies to the Azerbaijani market and for Azerbaijani capital to the Turkish economy.

The Karabakh victory and shifting balances of power

Azerbaijan’s re-establishment of control over Karabakh in September 2023 did more than alter the course of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. It also ushered in a new phase in the political psychology of relations between Ankara and Baku.

Turkey continued to support Azerbaijan’s position on territorial integrity. But the picture in Baku began to change. Having strengthened its military and diplomatic position, Azerbaijan increasingly pursued regional policies independently of Ankara, including in areas where its preferences might diverge from those of Turkey.

Both sides continued to tell their own story of “brotherhood,” but their relative leverage varies depending on the issue. Turkey has greater overall military and economic capacity, yet Azerbaijan possesses instruments of influence—particularly in the energy sector—that can affect Ankara’s decisions.

Nakhchivan and the Zangezur issue

Transport connections and the status of Nakhchivan are becoming increasingly important to the future of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations.

The absence of a direct land connection between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is one of the region’s fundamental transport challenges. Turkey’s border with Nakhchivan and its connections to the exclave therefore occupy a special place in Ankara–Baku relations.

The Iğdır–Nakhchivan natural gas pipeline, inaugurated on 5 March 2025, contributes to diversifying Nakhchivan’s energy supply. With an announced initial capacity of 730 million cubic metres per year, the pipeline delivers natural gas to Nakhchivan through Turkey.

The main dispute, however, concerns road and railway routes that would connect mainland Azerbaijan directly to Nakhchivan.

The joint declaration signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Washington on 8 August 2025 included efforts to establish unimpeded connectivity between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. Subsequently, the United States and Armenia developed an implementation framework for a project known as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).

This route is not merely about Azerbaijan gaining access to Nakhchivan. For Turkey, it also promises easier access to the Caspian Basin, Central Asia and other countries in the Turkic world.

This is precisely where Turkish, Azerbaijani and Armenian companies are preparing for new battles over contracts and tenders associated with the Trump corridor.

As of October 2026, however, a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan has yet to be formally signed. Despite significant progress in the process, the final text remains to be brought into force.

Although Ankara’s and Baku’s interests appear to overlap substantially on this issue, competition over contracts, commercial opportunities and the distribution of the spoils could generate new sources of tension.

The Organization of Turkic States: Partnership or rivalry?

Another source of tension in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations is the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

The organisation aims to strengthen transport connectivity, expand trade, promote economic cooperation and improve coordination on security issues. For Turkey, however, it also represents a means of expanding access to Central Asia and projecting an image of leadership over the “Turkic world” to its domestic audience. For Azerbaijan, the critical objective is to preserve its dominant position along the Trans-Caspian route.

The adoption of the Karabakh Declaration at the OTS informal summit held in Shusha on 6 July 2024 was also followed by an increase in Azerbaijani media narratives promoting Baku’s leadership of the “Turkic world.”

In other words, political leadership within the Turkic world, the form of economic integration and the distribution of influence among member states are all arenas of ongoing competition concealed beneath the rhetoric of a “single nation.”

The OTS summit that Turkey is expected to host in Ankara on 29–30 October 2026 is significant in this context. Ankara and Baku can be expected to emphasise the language of “brotherhood” at the summit, but it remains unclear whether they will offer concrete solutions to the issues dividing them.

The Israel question: Do Ankara and Baku have different priorities?

Relations with Israel are sometimes described as a major point of disagreement between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Contrary to this assumption, however, cooperation with Israel is one of the areas in which the two countries’ interests overlap most significantly.

Turkey continues to express opposition to Israel in its public rhetoric while also making statements about having halted trade with the country. Yet the continuation of trade through other channels is no secret. On the Azerbaijani side, critics of Baku among supporters of the ruling AKP in Turkey are accused of hypocrisy over the issue.

In a statement dated 10 November 2024, Turkey’s Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources argued that BOTAŞ International had no authority over the buying and selling of oil transported through BTC and maintained that no cargoes destined for Israel were being loaded. According to the ministry, the oil companies using the pipeline were complying with Turkey’s decision to halt trade with Israel.

In contrast, a Reuters report published in January 2026, citing data from the ship-tracking company Kpler, stated that Israel’s imports of Azerbaijani crude oil from Ceyhan averaged 94,000 barrels per day in 2025, a 31 per cent increase compared with the previous year.

Why did the headscarf debate become a diplomatic issue?

The immediate trigger for the latest tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan was a set of dress regulations governing state schools in Azerbaijan.

On 21 September 2026, Azerbaijan’s Cabinet of Ministers amended the dress code rules for state schools. Although the regulation did not explicitly mention headscarves, reports and footage showing students wearing headscarves being denied entry to schools provoked a backlash in Turkey.

Oktay Saral, a chief adviser to President Erdoğan, and several AKP lawmakers spoke out against the obstruction of headscarved students’ right to education. The debate quickly expanded beyond school regulations in Azerbaijan to encompass the two countries’ differing understandings of secularism and the limits of one state’s right to comment on another’s domestic affairs.

On 13 October, the ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP), led by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, issued a statement directly targeting the AKP. YAP described the statements coming from Turkey as irresponsible and argued that the principle of “One Nation, Two States” could not legitimise interference in the domestic affairs of one country by the other.

The controversy thus brought tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan into the open, with the headscarf issue serving as the immediate point of contention.

While Azerbaijan has delivered particularly strong messages on the matter, Ankara has maintained institutional silence, despite statements from individual figures.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s remarks during his visit to Baku on 15 October emphasised that the two countries had weathered numerous tests in the past, that the relationship between their leaders remained strong, and that the “Two States, One Nation” principle continued to manifest itself across all areas of cooperation.

What does the overall picture reveal?

Relations between the two countries have long been shaped by a combination of rivalry and cooperation. Yet the relationship is generally treated as an almost untouchable domain, with both sides behaving as though no tensions exist.

The slogan “One Nation, Two States” does less to explain the actual nature of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations than to conceal the conflicts of interest embedded within them. It functions as a nationalist political narrative that obscures the competing interests of the two states.

The decisive factors in bilateral relations, however, are energy resources, transport corridors, the defence industry, capital investments and the struggle for influence within the Organization of Turkic States.

Despite the many sources of tension, the economic ties and agreements established between the two countries’ business interests have helped sustain the rhetoric of “brotherhood.” This is because nationalist discourse can place these relationships behind a shared identity narrative, rendering the interests of big capital operating in the name of “Turkic unity” and serving US strategic interests largely immune from scrutiny.

Moreover, this partnership is not confined to the independent choices of the two countries. The realities obscured by the “One Nation” narrative intersect with broader imperialist power struggles, extending from the energy resources of the Caspian Basin to the trade routes of Eurasia.

La « paix » factice des Gontcharenko ukrainiens et les « Wunderwaffen » de Kiev.

par Paolo Hamidouche

6 octobre 2026. La nouvelle — si l’on peut l’appeler ainsi, étant donné qu’il s’agit essentiellement d’une tentative maladroite et manifeste de « rouler » Moscou — est que le député de la Rada Alekseï Gontcharenko, un homme habitué par le passé à se faire photographier en compagnie de Joe Biden ou au cœur des scènes les plus violentes du Maïdan ukrainien, a récemment fait une déclaration dictée par la panique, tout en surfant sur l’humeur de la population qui, selon les sondages officiels ukrainiens, penche à 72 % en faveur d’un accord avec la Russie. « Ponts partiellement fermés à Kiev », a déclaré Gontcharenko, « attaques contre le secteur énergétique. Attaques contre les entreprises. Attaques contre les dépôts. Attaques contre les centres de données. Nous sommes confrontés à un problème énorme. Et la stratégie choisie par le gouvernement, à savoir la quête d’une « Wunderwaffe » [arme miracle] qui résoudrait tous nos problèmes, est absurde ».

Gontcharenko appartient au groupe parlementaire « Solidarité européenne », dirigé par l’ancien président issu du coup d’État Petro Porochenko, bien que, officiellement, ce groupe ne soutienne pas de telles positions ; celles-ci sont en revanche partagées par certains députés du groupe « Serviteur du peuple » de Vladimir Zelensky — chef de file du régime issu du coup d’État néo-nazi —, selon qui, toutefois, la sortie de Gontcharenko répondrait à des instructions précises reçues d’émissaires non identifiés de Donald Trump. « La réalité est la suivante : nous sommes en train de perdre la guerre », affirme Gontcharenko ; « nous perdons un nombre considérable d’hommes ; nous n’avons pas assez de fonds propres pour financer la guerre, et encore moins pour gouverner le pays ; nous perdons des activités commerciales et économiques : pour la première fois en 100 ans, nous n’avons pas produit une seule tonne d’acier en une semaine ». Il propose donc de parvenir à un accord avec la Russie, tout en tablant sur le fait que le régime bandériste conserve le contrôle de la majeure partie de l’Ukraine. « Si nos alliés américains veulent des prix de l’énergie bas… et que les sanctions contre la Russie sont de toute façon levées, peut-être ne devrions-nous pas être assez stupides pour ne pas en profiter. »

Goncharenko propose donc d’accepter de renoncer à l’adhésion à l’OTAN — bien que, comme le laisse entendre son raisonnement, ce ne soit qu’en paroles, l’Ukraine demeurant une force agissant par procuration pour l’Alliance atlantique, sous le parapluie occidental : « Pour tenter de parvenir à un accord, nous devons envoyer un signal. Prenons la question de la neutralité, par exemple. Revenons à la réalité. Serons-nous admis dans l’OTAN ? Si nous sommes admis, l’OTAN nous aidera-t-elle en cas de guerre ? Nous connaissons la réponse à ces questions… Laissons entendre que nous sommes prêts à discuter de neutralité… Nous poursuivrons notre coopération avec l’OTAN comme c’est le cas actuellement. Nous créerons un budget européen commun pour financer notre armée. Nous poursuivrons le réarmement. » Telle est l’idée maîtresse, exprimée sans détour et assez ouvertement pour, d’une part, s’aligner sur un sentiment populaire las de la guerre et, d’autre part, éviter d’être accusé de « trahison » par les nazis et les nationalistes.

Le politologue Vladimir Fesenko, proche du camp présidentiel ukrainien, estime que la déclaration de Goncharenko reflète un sentiment répandu dans le pays : « Beaucoup de gens disent qu’il est nécessaire d’entamer des pourparlers de paix avec la Russie et qu’il faut faire des concessions ; certains le disent à voix basse, d’autres entre eux, et d’autres encore lors de discussions privées. » Goncharenko se contente d’exprimer publiquement la même position que celle qui, d’une manière ou d’une autre, fait déjà l’objet de discussions à huis clos au sein de notre société… Je ne m’avancerai pas sur une évaluation chiffrée pour l’instant — bien qu’il existe des données sociologiques —, mais je pense que le nombre réel de ces personnes est plus élevé ; tout le monde ne répond pas aux questions des sociologues. » Quoi qu’il en soit, ajoute-t-il, Goncharenko cherche à tirer parti de la situation militaire, politique et socio-psychologique actuelle : « Il se rend compte que les gens sont fatigués, que beaucoup sont déprimés. De plus en plus de personnes souhaitent sincèrement mettre fin à la guerre, quitte à faire des concessions. Il a perçu ce sentiment et veut surfer sur cette vague, en devenir le leader, élaborer son programme politique et exploiter ce moment favorable. Telle est sa stratégie politique. »

« Le sien », tout est relatif, objecte le politologue ukrainien et farouche russophobe Iouri Romanenko : connaissant le personnage, on peut dire que Trump est en train de façonner une fausse image de « pacificateur » à travers ce « prostitué » qu’est Gontcharenko, lequel est promu par les Américains comme l’une des alternatives politiques pour l’Ukraine de l’après-guerre. Quant à Porochenko, bien que le groupe « Solidarité européenne » ait pris ses distances avec les déclarations de Gontcharenko, l’ancien président joue un jeu bien précis, puisque Gontcharenko n’a pas été exclu du groupe à la Rada : Porochenko « est habile à cet égard. Sa stratégie est rationnelle… on se prémunit contre les risques, on lance un appât et, s’il se passe quelque chose, on a les outils adéquats en main… Supposons que Gontcharenko se présente à la présidence et lance sa campagne ; Porochenko observera les sondages et évaluera les chances respectives de Zaloujny et de Gontcharenko, ou de quelqu’un d’autre… si des élections ont lieu, s’il reste un pays, si un État existe encore à ce moment-là. Voilà comment les choses vont se passer ».

Outre les velléités « pacifistes » de Gontcharenko, Romanenko évoque également la situation militaire, qu’il est légitime de supposer étroitement liée à la sortie du député de « Solidarité européenne ». Ainsi, selon Romanenko, dans la guerre contre la Russie, l’Ukraine a misé sur un miracle, espérant un coup de chance. La référence est évidente aux fameux « Flamingo » (FP-7), dont la production, en accord avec l’Allemagne, a également été abordée lors de la visite de Friedrich Merz à Kiev le 4 octobre. Romanenko explique : « Le schéma est à peu près celui-ci : on croit aux miracles, on attend une arme miracle qui changera tout, on espère que la Russie s’effondrera d’elle-même ou que l’OTAN interviendra. En attendant, combien de temps combattrons-nous ? Jusqu’au bout, jusqu’au dernier Ukrainien. Le gouvernement est en quête d’une « Wunderwaffe », une arme miracle qui résoudra tous nos problèmes. »

Le fait est, affirme le politologue, que même l’apparition de missiles balistiques ukrainiens ne changerait pas la donne, étant donné que la Russie en posséderait de toute façon bien davantage, même si Kiev, précise-t-il, pourrait trouver une parade aux drones à réaction russes.

Mais la Russie en concevra alors de nouveaux et « nous chercherons à nouveau une parade. Et ainsi de suite, dans un cercle vicieux. Chaque cycle nous coûte des milliers de vies et d’immenses destructions. Les Ukrainiens aiment le mysticisme. Nous croyons aux signes, au salut miraculeux qui surviendra on ne sait comment, à l’idée que nous finirons par nous en sortir. Mais la réalité est cruelle. Les bons meurent, et les armes miracles arrivent trop tard ou n’arrivent jamais. »

Même un nazi convaincu, comme l’ancien commandant de compagnie du bataillon « Aïdar », Evgueni Dikiy, affirme qu’il est inutile d’annoncer sans cesse des dates de lancement de missiles balistiques ukrainiens contre Moscou, puisque la Russie a déjà frappé avec succès les sites de production de FirePoint et de ses sous-traitants. Indiquer des « dates précises, dans ces circonstances, est à mon avis une erreur : il aurait mieux valu garder le silence, comme cela a été fait pour le FP-7. » « Ils ne l’ont annoncé qu’une fois le déploiement au combat déjà entamé… Je pense qu’il serait judicieux d’imposer le silence également au sujet du FP-9, destiné au Moskva. » Les inquiétudes des nazis sont compréhensibles, commente Anatoli Lapine sur PolitNavigator ; mais, alors que les « Géraniums » « décommunisent » quotidiennement les infrastructures de Kiev, le régime de Zelensky a simplement besoin d’apaiser tant bien que mal le mécontentement de la population, et les promesses de représailles via les nouveaux « Flamingos » servent précisément à cela.

À cet égard, l’ancien secrétaire adjoint du Conseil de sécurité ukrainien, Serhiy Kryvonos, soutient que le programme de missiles balistiques FirePoint est une pure farce et que la démonstration du lancement du FP-7 n’est rien d’autre qu’une tentative de justifier le détournement de milliards de dollars. « Ce n’est pas le premier lancement de ce missile dont je me souvienne ; c’est le quinzième ou le seizième. Et, une fois de plus, il n’a donné aucun résultat. S’il y avait eu un résultat, les autorités l’auraient claironné sur tous les toits. Il s’agit d’une énième escroquerie populiste bon marché destinée aux naïfs… plus de deux milliards de dollars ont été dépensés ces deux dernières années pour la campagne FirePoint… avec cette somme, nous aurions pu bombarder l’Empire russe avec de simples tabourets, en termes de quantité… nous ne voyons pas de cibles effectivement touchées en territoire ennemi, nous ne voyons rien, et nous ne voyons pas l’argent investi dans ce projet… Regardez plutôt avec quelle systématicité, malheureusement, opère l’industrie de défense ennemie et comment elle accélère la modernisation de ses drones aériens, en étendant leurs capacités. Nous poursuivons un projet qui remonte à la Seconde Guerre mondiale, en essayant de présenter comme une arme miracle un missile dont le potentiel est épuisé. Que ferons-nous de cette arme miracle, même si elle parvenait à voler sur les 250 à 300 kilomètres promis ? Pour nous, cela ne résout absolument rien. »

En effet, affirme le politologue ukrainien Ruslan Bortnik, Kiev a amélioré ses contre-mesures face aux drones russes, mais en paie le prix fort. Selon lui, la proportion de drones russes atteignant Kiev aurait chuté à 10-15 % : « Nous pourrions assister à une baisse d’efficacité des drones russes — les fameux « paquets » — qui sont abattus plus fréquemment. Par ailleurs, une attaque balistique a visé Kiev cette semaine, mais certains missiles, y compris balistiques, ont été interceptés ; cela indique que le système de défense aérienne ukrainien s’est doté de munitions, notamment antimissiles, qui sont partiellement utilisées… et pourtant, la défense aérienne a un coût élevé… le rapport coût-efficacité ne joue pas en faveur de l’Ukraine. En d’autres termes, la Russie mobilise moins de ressources tout en infligeant des dégâts plus importants. L’Ukraine doit dépenser davantage pour abattre ces armes relativement bon marché. »

D’après Bortnik, la phase la plus intense de la guerre aérienne connaîtra un premier pic en décembre et un second en février ; « alors, amis, préparons-nous ». Surtout — permettons-nous d’ajouter — ne prêtons aucune importance aux discours de propagande de personnages comme Goncharenko : s’il en était encore besoin, la visite du chancelier allemand à Kiev a précisément servi à rappeler où et par qui se prennent les décisions concernant la guerre en Ukraine contre la Russie. La paix, nécessaire aux calculs électoraux de la Maison Blanche, pourra très bien faire fi des déclarations à la Goncharenko.

Publié à l’origine par Divergence Politique

The U.S. negotiates with Moscow and Europe is left commenting. Zakharova’s “none of her business” says it all.

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A Senate session

On October 14, 2026, in her address to the Senate ahead of the European Council, Giorgia Meloni did something that, until just a few years ago, would have seemed unthinkable for a right-wing Italian government: she publicly distanced herself from the President of the United States to defend a position even more uncompromising than his own. The issue at hand was the diesel fuel agreement announced by Donald Trump following a phone call with Vladimir Putin, accompanied by a temporary license from the U.S. Treasury that reopens the global market to Russian fuel. For the prime minister, this is a “very risky” decision: it legitimizes Moscow while bombs are falling on Ukrainian cities, provides it with new revenue, and weakens the leverage of sanctions. During the same session, Meloni argued that Putin is seeking a new enemy, and that that enemy could be Europe; and that a Ukraine that stopped defending itself would not achieve peace, but occupation.

So much for the news report. The rest was left to the chamber and the newspapers. The applause from the majority was joined by that of a portion of the opposition: Azione, Italia Viva, and the reformist wing of the Democratic Party. La Stampa framed support for Kiev as a matter of values and borders – those borders that “are being defended there.”

There is also a detail that speaks louder than many analyses. When questioned by ANSA, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova dismissed the prime minister’s remarks with a curt response: “It’s none of her business.” At the same time, Volodymyr Zelenskyy was in London, welcomed by Prime Minister Andy Burnham, and denouncing the restriction of military satellite services provided to the Ukrainian army. Elon Musk, for his part, clarified that the StarShield network belongs to the U.S. government and that any restrictions depend on the U.S. military and, ultimately, on the president. Washington deals with Moscow; Moscow responds to Washington. Rome applauds itself. Pathetic, isn’t it?

Not an exclusively Italian case

It would be a mistake to view the October 14 session as merely an episode of domestic politics. Italy’s stance is the national manifestation of a framework that today unites nearly all European capitals, and which has three rules. The first: the conflict in Ukraine is presented as an existential clash between political civilizations, in which any compromise amounts to surrender. The second: the Russian threat is projected beyond Ukraine, onto EU territory, so as to make rearmament an indisputable necessity. The third, the most insidious: internal dissent is attributed to the enemy’s influence.

Germany offers the clearest example. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who as early as 2023 had called for the country to become kriegstüchtig – capable of waging war – and who has since pointed to a timeframe of just a few years within which Russia could attack a member of the Alliance, has argued in recent days that the widespread fear of war in German society is being deliberately fueled by Putin and the AfD. This line of reasoning deserves attention. In a country that lost millions of lives in the two world wars, the fear of a new conflict would not need external agents to explain itself. Attributing it to Moscow and the main opposition party means transforming a legitimate political sentiment into a national security issue.

The same pattern is repeated elsewhere, albeit with different nuances. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski claims credit for the results of Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries and infrastructure; his German counterpart, Johann Wadephul, argues that now is not the time to ease sanctions, but to tighten them. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are acting as a negotiating bloc, so much so that Meloni herself has asked that they do so at least with a formal mandate from all partners. These words are backed by numbers: the ReArm Europe plan presented by the Commission in March 2025; the commitment made at the NATO summit in The Hague to raise defense and security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035; and the 90-billion loan to Kiev approved by the European Council in December 2025. This rhetoric is not the eccentricity of some minister; it is literally the official language of the Union – and unfortunately, we have grown accustomed to it.

A foolish and counterproductive stance

Calling this approach foolish is not polemical hyperbole, if by “foolishness” we mean the stubborn persistence in repeating behavior that produces effects opposite to those declared. This is evident on three levels.

The first is strategic. Deterrence theory has taught us for decades that a threat is only as valuable as the credibility of the one making it, and that credibility depends on the ability to back up one’s words with action. Today’s Europe is raising the tone without having the tools to back it up. The Starlink affair has demonstrated this with almost textbook clarity: the Ukrainian military, which Europeans fund and encourage, depends for communications and drone guidance on infrastructure owned by an American company and controlled by the Pentagon. All it takes is a decision in Washington for part of the operations to grind to a halt. Promising victory in a war where one does not control the satellites is a form of strategic hypocrisy, and adversaries see it for what it is.

The second aspect is economic, of course. As early as 2024, Mario Draghi’s report on European competitiveness identified the energy price differential with the United States as one of the factors behind the continent’s industrial lag. Since then, the rejection of Russian hydrocarbons has become dogma; the war in Iran has driven fuel prices even higher; and the commitment to spend 5% of GDP on defense promises to absorb resources that public budgets simply do not have – unless at the expense of healthcare, pensions, and civilian investments. The paradox is clear: just as Washington, for entirely domestic reasons tied to the midterm elections, is seeking cheap diesel even from Moscow, European governments are touting the fact that they pay more for energy than their competitors as a moral principle.

The third level is diplomatic, and perhaps the most decisive one. A foreign policy that rules out negotiation on principle dooms itself to being left out of the talks when negotiations finally begin. And that is exactly what is happening: the United States and Russia are hammering out energy agreements, the pace of the war, and the terms of a possible truce, while Europe merely comments. Zakharova’s response to the Italian prime minister is not merely a diplomatic snub.

It is the exact measure of the weight Moscow currently attributes to European capitals. One can debate whether it is right; it is harder to argue that it is wrong as a description.

The price of credibility

The deepest damage, however, is not measured on the front lines or even in the markets. It is measured in the relationship between institutions and citizens. When the gap between what is proclaimed and what actually happens becomes visible to the naked eye, public discourse loses its value. For four years, European citizens have been told repeatedly that Russia’s defeat is near, that sanctions are bringing it to its knees, and that every new aid package will be the decisive one. Now they see their main ally negotiating with Moscow, Ukraine dependent on decisions made in Washington, and their own governments increasing military spending while public services deteriorate. No foreign disinformation campaign is needed to breed mistrust. A simple comparison between rhetoric and results is enough.

This distrust stems from a crisis of representation with deeper roots. About a decade ago, in his book *Ruling the Void*, Peter Mair described – well in advance – the withdrawal of political parties from society toward the state, and the gradual separation between responsible government – that is, one faithful to external constraints – and representative government – that is, one responsive to the demands of voters. Together with Richard Katz, he coined the term “cartel party” to describe political formations that compete in the electoral arena but share the management of resources and fundamental policy decisions. The cross-party applause on October 14 is an almost perfect illustration of that model. On an issue of life-and-death importance – the cost of energy and the fate of industry – voters who dissent find no political alternative in Parliament that represents them.

The effects are plain for all to see. In France, governments fall one after another without a stable majority emerging. In Germany, the ruling coalition governs with the strongest postwar opposition breathing down its neck. In Italy, abstention has become the largest “party.” Procedures remain intact, elections are held regularly, but significant decisions are made elsewhere, and the vote ends up merely confirming choices that have already been made.

Governing through distrust

At this point, a less obvious question arises. If distrust damages institutions, why do Europe’s ruling classes continue down a path that fuels it? The simplest answer would be incompetence. But there is a more robust hypothesis that better explains the facts: distrust, within certain limits, is a resource for governance.

Here’s how the mechanism works. A disillusioned electorate becomes fragmented, abstains from voting, and scatters among new and unstable parties. Fragmentation leads to ungovernability; ungovernability, in turn, makes “responsible” grand coalitions, technocratic governments, and cross-party agreements – which keep forces deemed unreliable out of power – indispensable. The more unstable the system is, the more necessary the center becomes, as it promises stability. The crisis of representation, rather than weakening those in power, consolidates their position, because it makes them the only bulwark against the chaos that the crisis itself has produced.

War perfects this mechanism in two ways. First, it allows dissent to be treated as a security issue. When the fear of conflict is attributed to Putin and the opposition, those who call for negotiations cease to be political adversaries and become vehicles of enemy influence. Carl Schmitt identified the state of exception as the place where sovereignty is revealed; Giorgio Agamben has shown how the exception tends to become an ordinary technique of governance.

A permanent state of emergency – whether health-related, financial, or military – removes decision-making from democratic debate and entrusts it to those who present themselves as guarantors of collective survival. Second, war justifies shifting decision-making to forums beyond electoral control: the European Commission, the European Council, NATO, and small-group formats such as the E3.

We must be precise on one point, so as not to slip into caricature. This interpretation does not presuppose a plan agreed upon in some secret room. There is no need for that. It is enough that interests converge: the defense industries seeing orders increase, the European bureaucracies acquiring new powers, the ruling parties finding a raison d’être in the emergency, and the major media conglomerates peddling moral mobilization. Each acts in its own self-interest, and the sum of these self-interests produces a self-perpetuating system. We are, to all intents and purposes, in a Gramscian “organic crisis” – the phase in which the old dies and the new cannot be born, and in which morbid phenomena proliferate. The management of mistrust is one such phenomenon: a way to survive the crisis without resolving it.

Winning at any cost

The final question remains – and it is the most serious one. What are these elites willing to sacrifice to emerge victorious from the current phase? Looking back at recent years, the answer is that part of the sacrifice has already been made. Politics was sacrificed when fundamental decisions were shifted outside of parliaments and the distinction between majority and opposition became merely ornamental. The economy was sacrificed when the continent’s industrial competitiveness was subordinated to geopolitical objectives set elsewhere, accepting unsustainable energy prices and the very real risk of deindustrialization. Those who have already given up these two pillars have little to lose when it comes to the third – the human cost.

For now, that cost is being borne primarily by the Ukrainians. Even members of the Verkhovna Rada who zealously supported the line of all-out war – such as Mar’jana Bezuhla – or who have distanced themselves from it – such as Anna Skorochod – describe a country with destroyed infrastructure, forced mobilization marked by abuses, and a population on the brink of collapse, and admit that the conflict has become a business opportunity for some; but the cost is also beginning to fall on European societies: in public budgets, in wages eroded by energy inflation, and in the idea – now voiced without embarrassment by sitting ministers – that we must get used to the prospect of fighting.

Here, the rhetoric of war reveals its deepest function, for it does not serve to win the war against Russia, which no European government has the means to win on its own. It serves to win the domestic battle, to maintain control over political systems that can no longer generate consensus and that need an external enemy to justify their continued existence. In this sense, the human cost is not a side effect of the calculation. It is a variable, adjusted according to the convenience of the moment, in the perpetual dance of death that is political utilitarianism.

There is an alternative, and it does not amount to surrender: it consists of bringing diplomacy back to the center of European foreign policy, recognizing that a now multipolar international order cannot be governed by moral crusades, and restoring to parliaments and voters the power to decide on war and peace. The indicators for gauging whether anything is changing are concrete: the mandate that the next European Council will – or will not – entrust to the negotiators; the fate of the sanctions regime following the U.S. exemption on diesel fuel; and the stability of national budgets in the face of the 5% target.

As long as the response remains the one applauded on October 14, Europe will continue to pay an ever-increasing price for a war it does not control, while those who govern it will find in its very instability the reason to remain where they are.

The war in Ukraine has always been about fomenting a proxy war to defeat Russia.

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The contradictions are absurd but instructive of the criminal proxy war that the U.S. and European powers have perpetrated against Russia under the guise of “defending Ukraine”.

Western sanctions on Russia – the most heavily sanctioned nation on Earth – were meant to supposedly punish Moscow for its alleged unprovoked aggression against Ukraine.

The United States recently signed into law a “sanctions bill from hell” in honor of the late war hawk Senator Lindsey Graham, aimed at crushing the Russian economy, principally by shutting down its energy exports.

Likewise, the European Union has implemented more than 20 rounds of sanctions imposed on Russia over the past four years, again purportedly to block Russian exports of oil and gas. The EU has vowed to terminate all Russian energy imports by the end of this year.

The official rationale out of Washington and European capitals is to exact retribution on Russia for its alleged invasion and violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Western embargoes on Russia’s economy were immediately announced after Moscow launched its Special Military Operation in February 2022. (The real background to the SMO – unreported by Western media – was the NATO-backed coup in Kiev in 2014, and the arming of NeoNazis to conduct a proxy war against Russia.)

The U.S. and European Union, as well as Britain of course, presented the attempted economic blockade of Russia as a demonstration of the West enforcing international law and supporting Ukraine. The latter is portrayed in Western media as a fair maiden of democracy assailed by a drooling Russian tyrant.

In a nutshell, the sanctions are sold to the Western public as a plausible way of neutralizing “Russia’s war machine.” If Moscow’s oil and gas exports could be cut off, then, the dubious logic goes, Russia would not be able to continue its war effort in Ukraine.

However, laughably, the supposedly noble Western rationale is in tatters this week after the U.S. Treasury lifted sanctions off Russian diesel exports for the next six months in order to boost global oil supplies and curb soaring energy prices.

Another shattering blow to the facade of Western “principles” was the disclosure by Russia’s energy minister, Alexander Novak, that the European Union has continued to buy Russian energy exports at nearly pre-war levels. (Cue Western media silence on that!)

Since 2022, the EU has bought a total of $320 billion worth of Russian hydrocarbons. To put the expenditure in perspective, that far exceeds what the European governments have donated to Ukraine, some $226 bn, according to EU data.

How’s that for a contradiction? The European governments are throwing hundreds of billions of taxpayers’ money at Ukraine supposedly to defend itself against Russia, yet these same governments are giving Russia much, much more by buying its energy resources. In other words, to use their own rhetoric, Brussels and other European capitals are “fuelling the Russian war machine.”

As for the United States, it is equally duplicitous. The Americans blew up the Nord Stream pipeline in 2022 so that Europe would not be at the mercy of Russian oil dependency. Washington also imposed sanctions on Russian energy while increasing its more expensive gas exports to Europe. Yet last Friday, October 9, President Donald Trump announced, to the dismay and alarm of the Europeans and Ukraine, that he had made a deal with Vladimir Putin to release 3.5 million tonnes of Russian diesel onto the world market to ease pressure on crippling pump prices.

Whatever happened to American laws against “trading with the enemy”?

Of course, Trump is desperate for relief over record-high fuel prices as a result of his criminal aggression against Iran and Iran’s closure of the Persian Gulf oil route in retaliation. With the mid-term Congressional elections only three weeks away, Trump is seeking to assuage angry American consumers and spare his Republican Party from an electoral drubbing that will tarnish his presidency.

Out of sheer expedience, Trump wants Russian diesel exports to save his political neck. Some observers may question whether Moscow should oblige Trump considering that Washington is arming the NeoNazi Kiev regime with missiles and intelligence. Perhaps the Kremlin is calculating that Trump could finally pull off a peace deal in Ukraine.

Another smart move by Moscow, perhaps, is that the diesel deal with Trump has managed to unleash a storm of recriminations from Europe and Ukraine, which is severely undermining the transatlantic axis. Is this political judo by Putin?

The European NATO partners and the Kiev puppet president Vladimir Zelensky reacted with unprecedented insults and defiance of Trump. They accused the American leader of treachery and of siding with Russia. Within Washington, Trump has also been lambasted for “betrayal”.

Trump and his aides hit back furiously, dismissing the Europeans as “hypocrites” over their own record purchases of Russian energy exports. Trump even called for Zelensky to be replaced by someone who he can work with.

For his part, Zelensky doubled down with truculence, badmouthing Trump for being “weak” and accusing him of putting Ukrainian lives at risk. He refused to stop Ukrainian air strikes on Russia’s oil refineries, as requested by the White House. And the little money-grabbing, narco-Führer also attempted blackmail by suggesting to Trump that he would halt air attacks on Russian energy infrastructure “if” the Pentagon supplied more Patriot missiles.

Trump’s anger has exploded over Zelensky and his European patrons. He sees their obstruction of his diesel deal with Russia as not only hypocritical but a political attack on his presidency ahead of the crucial November polls.

The debacle is a rich farce. American and European posturing is seen for what it is, without any principle or genuine motives. It is a plague on all their houses.

Both the U.S. and its European partners are buying Russian energy like never before to sustain their struggling economies. The sanctions they imposed on Russia never had anything to do with “upholding international law” or “defending Ukraine”.

Using their own disingenuous logic, the NATO nations are fuelling the Russian war machine with their continuing business-as-usual purchase of Russia’s oil and gas.

That contradiction, in turn, exposes the fraud of the war in Ukraine. It was never about defending democratic Ukraine – a corrupt NeoNazi dictatorship – or European security from Russian “threat”.

The whole murderous episode has always been about fomenting a proxy war to defeat Russia. That covert policy is a gargantuan crime of aggression that has cost millions of lives and bankrupted Western societies. What’s more, it is an utterly failed policy which Western governments are covering up to avoid accountability. The destruction and deception go hand in hand.

What is all the more damning is that this travesty could have been easily exposed years ago if the Western news media had actually reported on facts instead of being the propaganda service they so evidently are to enable criminal aggression by their imperialist masters.