Presented on Tuesday, 20 October, by the European Commission and EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, the strategy proposes a maritime security hub, expanded satellite surveillance, greater icebreaker capacity and improved military mobility across northern Europe.
The document marks a departure from the EU’s 2021 Arctic policy, which placed greater emphasis on climate change, environmental protection and scientific cooperation. The revised framework treats the region as an increasingly important component of European security and economic policy.
Russia’s expanding military infrastructure in the High North is a principal concern behind the policy revision.
Moscow has reopened Soviet-era military installations, strengthened its northern forces and maintained substantial nuclear capabilities on the Kola Peninsula. The region contains strategically important naval bases used by Russia’s Northern Fleet, including facilities supporting its submarine-based nuclear deterrent.
Russian operations in the Arctic also have implications for maritime access between the Atlantic and the Barents Sea, an area increasingly important to NATO’s northern defence arrangements.
The EU intends to work more closely with NATO and its northern partners, including Norway, Iceland, Britain, Canada and the United States, while developing capabilities that complement existing military structures.
Kallas said the Arctic’s security environment had deteriorated significantly since 2021, with geopolitical competition increasingly affecting a region previously associated principally with environmental and economic cooperation.
The EU’s revised priorities reflect concerns extending beyond conventional military deployments, particularly the exposure of undersea communications networks and energy infrastructure to sabotage and disruption.
A central proposal involves establishing an EU Maritime Security Hub to improve information-sharing between member states and partner countries operating in Arctic waters.
The system would strengthen monitoring of maritime movements and support the identification of suspicious activity near critical infrastructure.
Brussels also proposes an Arctic Cable Hub, initially concentrating on the protection, monitoring and repair of submarine communications cables across the North Atlantic and Arctic.
Such infrastructure carries international data traffic and supports communications between Europe, Greenland and North America. Damage to cables could interrupt telecommunications, financial services and government networks.
The Commission’s new Arctic policy framework also supports the proposed Pan-Arctic Cable connecting Greenland directly with Europe, together with secure satellite communications through the EU’s IRIS² programme.
Further measures envisage expanded use of Copernicus satellite surveillance, improved maritime intelligence and closer monitoring of vessels associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.
These measures form part of a broader attempt to improve European surveillance capabilities without relying exclusively on military assets provided by individual NATO members.
The strategy also addresses Europe’s limited capacity to operate in extreme northern conditions.
The Commission wants to support additional icebreaker capabilities, which are essential for maintaining access to Arctic waters, conducting emergency operations and supporting scientific and logistical activity.
Russian icebreaker capabilities remain considerably more extensive than those available to most European countries, providing Moscow with operational advantages along the Northern Sea Route.
European investment would also support ports, railways, energy terminals and digital infrastructure capable of serving both civilian and security requirements.
The emphasis on dual-use infrastructure reflects the growing importance of military mobility across northern Europe, particularly following Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO.
Improved transport links could facilitate the movement of equipment and personnel while also supporting economic development in sparsely populated northern regions.
However, the Commission has not provided a comprehensive financial allocation for the proposed security measures, leaving important questions about funding, procurement and implementation.
The revised strategy also introduces a significant change in the EU’s position on Arctic fossil fuel development.
In 2021, Brussels proposed pursuing an international legal commitment to prohibit further oil, gas and coal extraction in the Arctic.
The new strategy maintains the EU’s opposition to environmentally damaging fossil fuel development but no longer includes the explicit ambition to secure a multilateral legal prohibition.
The adjustment follows sustained disagreement with energy-producing countries and recognition that an international agreement would be difficult to achieve under current geopolitical conditions.
Norway has argued that continued exploration in parts of the Barents Sea remains important for European energy security, particularly as production from mature Norwegian fields is expected to decline.
EU Today previously reported on Brussels’ opposition to Norwegian Arctic drilling plans and the disagreements between environmental objectives and Europe’s long-term energy requirements.
The latest strategy does not represent an endorsement of new Arctic drilling. It does, however, acknowledge the limitations of the EU’s previous diplomatic approach.
Greenland occupies a prominent position in the revised strategy because of its location, mineral resources and importance to transatlantic communications.
The Commission wants to expand cooperation on digital connectivity, critical raw materials, research and infrastructure investment, while recognising the responsibilities of Greenland’s own institutions and the Kingdom of Denmark.
Brussels also intends to strengthen scientific cooperation and support Arctic communities adapting to rapid environmental change.
The Arctic is warming nearly four times faster than the global average, creating new commercial opportunities while imposing substantial costs on local populations and infrastructure.
The EU’s proposals therefore combine security measures with investment in transport networks, research facilities and economic diversification.
For Brussels, implementation will require agreement between member states with different geographical interests, defence capabilities and budgetary priorities. Cooperation with NATO will also require careful coordination to avoid duplicating existing military arrangements.
The Commission has established a significantly broader Arctic agenda than the one adopted five years ago. Its practical impact will depend on whether member states finance the surveillance systems, vessels and infrastructure that the new strategy envisages.
As glaciers melt and permafrost thaws, Longyearbyen, on the remote Arctic islands of Svalbard, faces climate-induced problems from tap water to housebuilding to landslides
• Heavy metals make Norwegian village’s tap water toxic
On a rugged mountain plateau of snow-dusted rocks, in the remote archipelago of Svalbard, a glaciologist, Andy Hodson, points out the “ears” of ice, white against the rock, that gave Foxfonna glacier its name, after the arctic fox.
The small glacier, on a mountain 8 miles (15km) outside the Norwegian village of Longyearbyen, is a popular summer hike for tourists who come here seeking the Arctic experience.
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© Photograph: Image Professionals GmbH/Alamy
© Photograph: Image Professionals GmbH/Alamy
© Photograph: Image Professionals GmbH/Alamy
The U.S. military has successfully demonstrated a new lower-cost receiver that could form part of a future over-the-horizon (OTH) radar. The testing also raises the question of whether the High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) research site in Alaska, which the U.S. Air Force transferred away more than a decade ago, could be repurposed for operational use in this role. A new radar of this kind would help the United States plug critical gaps in surveillance coverage over the ever-more strategic Arctic region. Canada is notably already pursuing a multi-billion-dollar OTH radar project in cooperation with Australia for this exact purpose.
The U.S. military put out a press release yesterday regarding the testing of the newly developed receiver array, which occurred between September 7 and September 11. This was the culmination of a series of “Arctic air domain awareness” experiments conducted cooperatively by U.S. and Canadian authorities over the past three years.
The final round of experimentation last month “examined whether an existing high-frequency transmitter [HAARP], paired with a newly developed, low-cost [16-element high-frequency] receiver array, could detect aircraft beyond the coverage of current long-range radar sites,” according to the release. “The effort focused on improving awareness across a region where vast distances, harsh weather and limited infrastructure present challenges for air surveillance.”
“Researchers used the University of Alaska Fairbanks’ High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program [HAARP] facility and a receiver array in Cold Bay developed by MITRE to collect data on participating aircraft over the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea,” the release added. “MITRE also supported the effort throughout the three-year experiment series and designed and executed the field experiment in partnership with government, scientific, and operational participants.”
The remote HAARP site was built in the 1990s as part of a joint U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy effort. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was also involved. The central component of the 33-acre facility is an array of 180 crossed-dipole antennas, which can transmit up to 3.6 megawatts of radio frequency energy, according to the Air Force.
The primary purpose of HAARP was to provide U.S. government and independent researchers with a state-of-the-art facility to explore ionospheric phenomena. On the U.S. military side, work was focused on improving long-range surveillance and communications capabilities, including ways to communicate with submerged submarines. Over the years, HAARP has also been the subject of several entirely unsubstantiated conspiracy theories.
In 2014, the U.S. Air Force announced that it would shutter the HAARP site and dismantle it. However, the following year, the decision was instead made to transfer it to the University of Alaska Fairbanks, which has continued to operate it as a civilian research facility.
“During an experimental air domain awareness initiative, HAARP served as a high-power illuminator, transmitting signals toward the ionosphere to support the detection of airborne targets over Alaska’s maritime approaches,” according to the captions of several pictures that accompanied the release yesterday. “The experiment evaluated bistatic over-the-horizon detection methods to explore potential improvements in long-range surveillance and air domain awareness across Alaska’s maritime approaches.”
The most common types of OTH radars are so-called ‘skywave’ or ‘backscatter’ designs. They usually consist of two large and geographically separated arrays of antennas. The ‘illuminator’ array pumps out signals that are bounced off the ionosphere, the ionized layer of Earth’s upper atmosphere, at a specific angle so that they return to the ‘receiver’ array. Objects of interest (in the air and/or on the surface depending on the specific configuration) are detected in the process. As TWZ has previously written:
“Commonly, radars are limited by line of sight due to the curvature of the Earth in relation to the altitude they are operating at. OTHRs overcome this critical limitation, but with some major drawbacks.”
…
“While they offer much lower fidelity than many of their line-of-sight counterparts in most cases, they make up for it in huge range, hundreds of miles to thousands of miles (1,500 miles is common, for instance, for powerful military sky wave/backscatter OTHR systems) and a large coverage area. The sky wave type of OTHRs achieve this by bouncing their radio waves off the ionosphere to a coverage area where they hit targets and return the same way to the receiving station. The angle at which the radio waves hit the ionosphere dictates the range, and that angle is limited to a specific envelope or the waves won’t properly bounce back toward Earth. As such, placing the radar in the right place in relation to the targeted surveillance area or areas, to begin with, is key.”
In the testing last month, Air Force E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) radar planes, HC-130J Combat King II rescue aircraft, and KC-135 aerial refueling tankers “served as cooperative targets, providing known positions against which researchers could compare the experimental data,” according to the official release. “The team successfully completed testing, meeting or exceeding its test execution objectives. Initial results show the system was successfully able to achieve full skywave (beyond line of sight) detections of aircraft and correlation to truth flights. Thorough data analysis is ongoing.”
The release also says that the tests “explored how existing infrastructure and emerging technology could complement current surveillance capabilities.” This raises the possibility that the HAARP site, specifically, might be utilized as part of a new OTH radar. Whether or not this is actually under consideration is still unclear, and TWZ has reached out for more information.
Regardless, OTH radars have been experiencing something of a renaissance in recent years in the United States and elsewhere globally. Separate reports just in the past day or so have highlighted what appears to be significant progress on at least one part of a long-planned OTH radar in Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave.
Outside of Alaska, the U.S. military has been working to establish a Tactical Mobile Over-the-Horizon Radar (TACMOR) site in the South Pacific archipelago nation of Palau. The originally stated goal had been to finish work on this facility in 2026, but the project has faced legal challenges.
As already mentioned, OTH radars have also been part of U.S. plans to improve surveillance coverage in the Arctic. Like the recent testing in Alaska, there has been significant cooperation with Canada in this regard over the years, including through the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
Today, NORAD relies heavily on a network of ground-based radars called the North Warning System (NWS) to provide aerial surveillance coverage in the High North. The radars that make up the NWS are also all pointed northward, and none of them provide the kind of wide-area long-range coverage that an OTH design would offer.
The NWS reflects a long-standing focus on monitoring for aerial threats heading across the North Pole toward North America, especially possible nuclear strikes from Russia (and the Soviet Union before it). However, new avenues for geostrategic competition in the Arctic with Russia, as well as China, over natural resources, from oil and natural gas to fish and other sealife, as well as trade routes have emerged in recent years amid receding ice and other impacts of global climate change. This, in turn, has only prompted growing demand for surveillance coverage.
“We need a layered sensing grid, from [the] seafloor to the space layer. And we have no choice. It has to be layered and deep, a defense in depth, from a sensing point of view,” Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Maj. Gen. Chris McKenna, head of 1 Canadian Air Division and the Canadian NORAD Region, also said during a panel discussion at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) annual Warfare Symposium in 2025, at which TWZ was in attendance. “And I will say I suffer from an insufficiency of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] in the Arctic on a daily basis. And I am fighting for information.”
McKenna was responding at the time to a direct question about gaps in so-called “domain awareness” in and around the Arctic and how to address them.
“I think there’s an importance here of not just air domain, but also space domain, and having a sufficiency of ISR in the Arctic to actually build you the [domain awareness] picture,” he added. “I haven’t really touched on over-the-horizon radar, but I certainly can get into it. I think that’s a really important capability given the austerity of the Arctic and the need for it to cue other things.”
For its part, Canada is now building its own new Arctic Over The Horizon Radar (A-OTHR), at an estimated cost of more than $4 billion. In an announcement last year that caught many off guard, the Canadian government announced that it would be leveraging technology originally developed for Australia’s Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) to support this development. It is also important to note here that relations between Canadian authorities and the Trump administration have been and continue to be heavily strained over a variety of issues, which has prompted broad concerns about future defense and security cooperation.
Back in the United States, OTH radar plans are also now tied in with the broader Golden Dome air and missile defense initiative. Golden Dome is seeking to establish new layers of defense around the U.S. homeland against a wide array of threat types, and puts major emphasis on new space-based sensor and interceptor capabilities. Expanded defensive architectures within the Earth’s atmosphere are also part of this plan.
“Adversaries are developing and building advanced nuclear and conventional delivery capabilities,” U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Joseph Jarrard, Vice Commander of the U.S. element of NORAD and Deputy Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), warned at the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in August. This includes “cruise, hypersonic, and ballistic missiles, as well as fractional orbital bombardment systems, or FOBS, to threaten not only Alaska and Hawaii, but the entire continent of the United States.”
Chinese hypersonic and other developments, in particular, enable new modes of attack that “can approach North America from the south, rather than the traditional northerly vector for which our legacy early warning radars were designed,” Jarrard continued. “The Chinese have also been building a conventionally-armed ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles that can range [sic] targets throughout Alaska, providing Chinese leaders strike options against our homeland below the nuclear threshold.”
“Russia’s advanced missiles, like the nuclear-armed Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, are designed to circumvent the ground-based radars used by NORAD and NORTHCOM to detect and characterize an inbound threat, and challenge the ability to provide threat warning and attack assessment,” he added.
New OTH radars positioned in Alaska and elsewhere in the Pacific will not be able to address all of these threat developments alone. At the same time, the recent testing leveraging the HAARP site is another step toward meeting demands for sorely needed expanded long-range radar coverage in the Arctic.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post Alaska’s HAARP Site Now Being Used To Test New Air Force Over-The-Horizon Radar Tech appeared first on TWZ.
The EU “will not drill and will not buy” Arctic oil and gas, EU officials said on Tuesday (20 October), as the European Commission presented its new Arctic strategy.
“Our position on Arctic oil, gas and coal has not changed,” a senior EU official told reporters. “It’s fairly simple. We will not drill in the Arctic, and we will not buy hydrocarbons from the Arctic.”
The strategy follows months of heavy lobbying by Norway’s prime minister Jonas Gahr Støre and his cabinet.
Oslo used the energy supply disruption caused by the Iran war to push the EU to drop its 2021 support for a moratorium on oil and gas drilling in the Arctic, insisting that it was crucial for future energy security.
But EU officials made clear on Tuesday they did not buy that argument. “We do not need Arctic resources to keep our energy supply secure,” the official said.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
Warning for other Arctic communities as residents told not to use water in Longyearbyen in Svalbard, one of the fastest-warming places in the world
Residents of a remote town in Norway that is in one of the fastest-warming places in the world have been told they must no longer drink tap water due to heavy metal contamination that scientists have linked to the thawing permafrost.
Longyearbyen, in the archipelago of Svalbard, gets its main drinking water supply from a 1.5 mile-long (2.5km) dammed lake called Isdammen, or “ice pond”. Higher temperatures as a result of the climate crisis have thawed permafrost, leading to newly exposed bedrock leaching metals into the pond.
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© Photograph: Rimante_Hegland/Getty Images/iStockphoto
© Photograph: Rimante_Hegland/Getty Images/iStockphoto
© Photograph: Rimante_Hegland/Getty Images/iStockphoto
Towns and cities from around the Arctic took part in the launch of an EU-funded Arctic co-operation initiative that will enable more municipal leaders, Indigenous representatives and youth to work together.
The European Union has launched a new initiative gathering 21 towns and cities from across the Arctic to work together on shared priorities. BRIDGE, Building Resilient International Dialogue and Governance for Arctic Engagement, is led by the Arctic Mayors’ Forum (AMF), building on the foundations of the Arctic Regional and Urban Cooperation network (AURC).
“At a time of ever-increasing environmental and geopolitical change, cooperation among Arctic communities is more important than ever,” said Peter M. Wagner, Head of the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, speaking at the EU Arctic Forum 2026 in Brussels. “We are proud to launch a new phase of EU support to Arctic cities forging connections across borders, building local capacity, and delivering tangible benefits for their residents.”
“A safe, resilient and inclusive Arctic isn't a side interest for the EU, it's a shared project,” said Patti Bruns, AMF Secretary General. “I’m excited about our work over the next four years, bringing together communities from Alaska, Canada, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland to strengthen cooperation between local governments who face increasing challenges – and opportunities.”
More cities co-operating in a permanent structure
BRIDGE integrates AURC’s approaches and methods into AMF’s permanent structure, extending the cooperation to more Arctic mayors and urban practitioners.
Despite variations in size and governance structures, Arctic communities share a surprising range of challenges. Building on AURC achievements, these cities are now identifying common themes for the next four years of peer learning, exchanges, study visits, and collaborative problem-solving.
AURC sparked positive changes in Arctic communities
In 2024, AURC gathered 15 Arctic local authorities from Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Alaska in the United States for the first time to work together on sustainable development. After two years of structured cooperation with expert support, positive local results were already visible.
“Whether it was learning from Tromsø’s approach to community hubs or troubleshooting heavy equipment with our Canadian neighbours, AURC provided us with a roadmap for growth,” says Assisaun Toovak, Mayor of Utqiaġvik, the northernmost town in the United States. “We aren’t just a remote town in Alaska: we’re a key player in a global Arctic community.”
From new international welcome houses and services in Rovaniemi (Finland), Gällivare and Luleå (Sweden) and Tromsø (Norway) to plans for a new Youth Commission in Fairbanks North Star Borough (USA) inspired by peers in Sweden, Norway, Iceland and elsewhere, AURC sparked an array of positive local changes across the Arctic. These span citizen engagement and youth participation; attracting and retaining talent; sustainable tourism; culture and inclusive economic development; and resilience and emergency preparedness.
Arctic connections supporting resilience and sustainability
Beyond these tangible changes on the ground, trusted exchanges between mayors and staff of Arctic local authorities are boosting knowledge, capacity to adapt, and new initiatives. So far, these include cross-border cultural exchanges, focused workshops for sustainable Arctic tourism professionals, and best-practice sharing on wildfire preparedness.
Another major result is a new Interreg Aurora project TALENT NORTH, Attracting and Anchoring Global Talent in the Arctic, developed by the Arctic Six universities alliance and AMF, along with administrations and universities of several Arctic cities.
Erkki Parkkinen, Mayor of Salla, Lapland (Finland), said: “It was the best thing for Salla to join AURC: I can now exchange good practices with friends across the Arctic. It’s very important for our municipalities to stay in touch with each other, for the future of the Arctic, for resilience.”
Read more about positive changes EU-funded cooperation has sparked in Arctic towns and cities.
BRIDGE is funded by the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), working closely with the European External Action Service, the diplomatic wing of the EU, and the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE).
Arctic Mayors’ Forum is pan-Arctic forum representing the voices of Arctic Peoples through elected leaders at the municipal and community level. They provide an open, collaborative platform for their members, including Indigenous Peoples from around the Arctic.
On 1 September in Brussels, Fisheries and Oceans Commissioner Costas Kadis and Intergenerational Fairness, Youth, Culture and Sport Commissioner Glenn Micallef jointly hosted the Youth Policy Dialogue ‘How to make Arctic youth participation more inclusive’.
The ten young participants were selected via the EU-funded project Youth Together for Arctic Futures, a workstream under the EU Arctic Youth Dialogue initiative. During the discussion, they will share their experiences and ideas on how the EU can better support the inclusive participation of Arctic youth in decision-shaping processes on issues that matter to young people. During the dialogue, the Commissioners will also ask for the participants’ opinions on the forthcoming Blue Generational Renewal Strategy, a flagship initiative under the European Ocean Pact aimed at making careers in the maritime sectors more attractive.
The Dialogue took place in the framework of the EU Arctic Forum and the Arctic Youth and Indigenous Peoples’ Dialogues, which took place on 1-2 September opened by International Partnerships Commissioner Jozef Síkela and Kadis. The Forum came at an important moment as the EU is updating its Arctic policy in the context of evolving geopolitical, economic and environmental developments.
The EU Arctic Forum, Arctic Youth and Indigenous Peoples’ Dialogues, which bring together a range of Arctic stakeholders to discuss developments in the region and the future of the EU’s engagement in the Arctic, are integral parts of the EU Arctic policy. Youth Policy Dialogues are part of the European Commission's commitment to mainstream the voice of young people in EU policymaking, as set out in President von der Leyen's Political Guidelines for 2024-2029.
The conscripts are part of the first group recruited under Denmark's expanded military service program.
The post Denmark deploys conscripts to Greenland, fueling fresh Arctic tensions appeared first on BOL News.
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