Key developments on Oct. 28:
A planned meeting between Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S. in Abu Dhabi will focus on de-escalating Russia's war, President Volodymyr Zelensky told reporters on Oct. 27, as Moscow seemingly agreed to resume talks with Kyiv after a pause of more than eight months.
Although Ukrainian officials do
Talks are aimed at reopening strait of Hormuz and lifting sanctions on Iran, and for Houthis to withdraw in Yemen
A multipronged peace deal to reopen the strait of Hormuz within four days of sanctions being lifted and for the Houthis to withdraw substantial forces inside Yemen are at the heart of Gulf states’ plans to avert what they regard as a disastrous renewal of war between Iran and the US.
The US is aware of the talks’ progress but is holding out for a concession that European powers suggest could involve Iran allowing UN weapons inspectors back into the country.
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© Photograph: Amirhosein Khorgooi/AP
© Photograph: Amirhosein Khorgooi/AP
© Photograph: Amirhosein Khorgooi/AP
Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday, 27 October, marking an unusual direct diplomatic engagement between Moscow and two European NATO members since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
The conversation, initiated by the two Nordic leaders from Helsinki, was followed by a separate call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. According to a joint statement released by the Norwegian government, the initiative had been prepared in consultation with Kyiv.
The objective was to communicate directly with Putin about efforts to end the war and the forthcoming negotiations involving Ukraine, Russia and the United States.
Stubb described the exchange as frank and substantive, arguing that Finland and Norway had particular reasons to participate in discussions concerning European security.
“We are neighbouring countries to Russia,” he said, adding that the war’s outcome would directly affect European security.
Both leaders reaffirmed their governments’ continuing support for Ukraine while calling for renewed negotiations. Støre emphasised the humanitarian and economic consequences of the conflict and the need for de-escalation.
Importantly, their statement specified that they were acting as national leaders rather than representatives of Europe collectively.
Following the conversation with Putin, Stubb and Støre spoke with Zelenskyy, who confirmed the exchange in a statement issued by his office.
The Ukrainian president thanked them for their detailed briefing and diplomatic engagement.
According to Zelenskyy, the two leaders had communicated Ukraine’s demand for concrete steps to reduce attacks against its energy facilities and other infrastructure.
The discussion also covered preparations for trilateral negotiations involving Ukrainian, American and Russian delegations, provisionally planned for November.
Kyiv’s confirmation that it had been consulted before the Putin conversation is significant. Ukraine has consistently maintained that decisions concerning its sovereignty, territory and security cannot be negotiated without its participation.
Tuesday’s telephone diplomacy followed a meeting in Oslo on 20 October involving Zelenskyy, Stubb, Støre and representatives of US President Donald Trump.
American special envoy Steve Witkoff participated in person, while Jared Kushner joined remotely. European and NATO representatives also attended related discussions.
According to the Ukrainian presidency’s account, the consultations addressed possible steps towards ending the war and establishing security arrangements after a settlement.
Witkoff subsequently travelled to St Petersburg on 21 October for discussions with Putin.
The diplomatic contacts have produced plans for another round of talks in Abu Dhabi, expected after 4 November, although the precise date and representation remain subject to confirmation.
The European Commission has also sought involvement. During its 21 October press briefing, the Commission confirmed its participation in the Oslo consultations, which addressed territorial questions, security guarantees and post-war economic arrangements.
As EU Today previously reported, discussions about appointing a European representative to negotiations have exposed disagreements over who should speak for European governments and what authority such a representative would possess.
The Kremlin’s account of Tuesday’s conversation offered little indication of a change in Russia’s principal demands.
According to reports citing the Kremlin’s statement, Putin insisted that a lasting settlement would require what Moscow described as full recognition of Russia’s legitimate interests.
He also accused NATO and European Union countries of pursuing confrontational policies that prolonged the conflict.
These statements indicate that the reopening of direct communication has not, by itself, resolved the differences between the negotiating parties.
Russia continues to seek arrangements concerning Ukrainian territory and the European security order, while Kyiv maintains that its sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected.
The initiative has also revealed differences among European governments over direct engagement with Moscow.
Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen criticised the Finnish-Norwegian approach, saying it had not been coordinated with Denmark and warning against individual European countries pursuing separate diplomatic initiatives.
Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson also expressed reservations about contacts that might undermine a common European position.
Their objections highlight a distinction between consultation with Ukraine and agreement among European governments on the organisation of negotiations.
For Finland and Norway, both of which share borders with Russia, the outcome of the conflict carries direct implications for security in the Baltic Sea region and the High North.
The immediate question is whether their intervention can facilitate substantive negotiations without weakening coordination between Kyiv and its European partners.
With the next US-mediated talks expected in November, Tuesday’s contacts establish another channel of communication with Moscow. Whether that channel produces movement on territorial disputes, security guarantees or an eventual ceasefire remains unresolved.
President Nikos Christodoulides on Tuesday said that both he and Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhurman have agreed to make “no further statements” on matters of substance related to the Cyprus problem ahead of the forthcoming arrival on the island of United Nations envoy Maria Angela Holguin on the island.
“It was a very good and constructive discussion, which will continue during Holguin’s presence in Cyprus. For this reason, we have agreed not to make further statements regarding specific issues, and we also agreed that no joint statement would be issued,” he said after meeting Erhurman in the morning.
Both leaders had also met the bicommunal technical committees on cultural heritage and on youth, as well as the civil society steering committee, following their one-on-one meeting.
Of those meetings, Christodoulides said that they were “constructive” and that “various views and suggestions were put forward” by committee members.
He added that those suggestions will be discussed by himself and Erhurman going forward.
Holguin is expected to arrive on the island on Thursday, and will hold meetings with both Erhurman and Christodoulides, before holding a tripartite meeting with both leaders at the end of her stay.
Prior to Tuesday’s meeting, Christodoulides had stressed that his proposal to open and repopulate the fenced-off area of Varosha under the United Nations’ administration and open the port of Famagusta under the European Union’s control is “mutually beneficial”.
“I believe this is a mutually beneficial proposal. It creates a positive situation for both sides and serves as a practical test of whether we are truly committed to moving forward, specifically by taking bold confidence-building measures which also send a strong message to society as a whole,” he said.
Erhurman had said last week that he had rejected the proposal, lamenting that it fell short of an entry into force of the European Union’s direct trade regulation.
“Is this the entry into force of the direct trade regulation? No, it is not the entry into force of the regulation, but since [the port] would be under EU control, direct trade would begin,” he said.
As such, he said, the proposal was unbalanced.
The direct trade regulation is a pending EU regulation which would allow Turkish Cypriot goods, as certified by the Turkish Cypriot chamber of commerce, to be exported directly into Europe via the Green Line, and given preferential treatment inside the European single market as European goods.
It was proposed in July 2004, three months after the rejection of the Annan plan to reunify Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot side in a referendum, and shortly after the Republic of Cyprus’ accession to the EU.
Previously, Greek Cypriot chief negotiator Menelaos Menelaou had said that a dispute over the routing of the planned transit road between Athienou and the Nicosia suburb of Aglandjia “has been overcome”.
He said that the outstanding dispute now remains over the question of whether a planned crossing point to connect Louroujina, the southernmost Turkish Cypriot village, with nearby Lymbia, will open at the same time.
The Turkish Cypriot side’s position is that the road between Athienou and Aglandjia constitutes two crossing points, one in Athienou and one in Aglandjia, and that they are part of a package of four alongside plans for a crossing point in the eastern Nicosia suburb of Mia Milia, and one in Louroujina.
However, the Greek Cypriot side treats the road between Athienou and Aglandjia as one crossing point, counterweighted by the Mia Milia crossing point, and is therefore of the view that the Louroujina crossing point should only be opened if a second transit road, through the Turkish Cypriot Kokkina exclave in the Tillyria region, also be opened.
President Volodymyr Zelensky's planned Oct. 26 trip to Brussels descended into a diplomatic guessing game, with conflicting signals from his own team leaving EU and NATO officials scrambling to establish whether he was coming — and who was supposed to meet him.
At the center of the confusion
Ukraine, the US, the EU, and NATO plan to meet in Brussels this week to discuss security for Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told Ukrainian TV. The meeting would follow last week’s talks in Oslo and a US envoy’s visit to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Guarantees are what would oblige Ukraine’s allies to act if Russia attacks again. The Paris Declaration laid plans for that commitment in January. Kyiv had a briefing from the Americans, and now the partners want a broad discussion of security and guarantees, Zelenskyy said. Brussels comes ahead of three-way talks with Russia, which the Kremlin says Putin is ready in principle to resume in mid-November.
The meeting is planned for Tuesday or Wednesday, 27 or 28 October, Zelenskyy said in the interview, aired on 25 October. The EU would take part at the presidential level and NATO at the level of its secretary general. He did not know whether anyone else would join. He also said Ukraine’s neutrality and limits on its army are not up for discussion.
Earlier, on 20 October, Zelenskyy met US special envoy Steve Witkoff in Oslo, with Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre present. According to Zelenskyy, a wider round there included national security advisers from Germany, the UK, France, and Italy, the chief of staff of the European Commission president, and NATO representatives.
A day later, Witkoff met Putin in St. Petersburg and said he had brought papers setting out possible paths to a settlement. He told Putin the Oslo talks had been productive. However, Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov claimed the new ideas from the Europeans and Kyiv that Witkoff relayed held little of use for a settlement.
Russia is ready to resume three-way talks with Ukraine and the US, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in an interview with Pavel Zarubin of state broadcaster VGTRK, published on 22 October. He said they should settle security for both countries after a final peace deal, not a brief pause.
Putin spoke a day after he hosted US envoy Steve Witkoff in St. Petersburg and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he would accept freezing the war along the front line. In May, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov named Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donbas and Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts as the only condition for peace. Any new round would start from that gap: Kyiv offers to stop where the armies stand, while Moscow’s last stated terms demanded more land.
Putin stated that Moscow and Washington had agreed Russia was ready to resume trilateral contacts. He added that he generally agreed with a US point that European security architecture should also be discussed.
On 21 October, Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov stated that the sides had settled on mid-November, with Abu Dhabi as the likely venue.
In a 21 October Fox News interview, asked about a freeze leaving Ukraine 75% or more of its land, Zelenskyy answered: “Yes, right now, we have to freeze.”
Asked about the land Ukraine would give up, Putin replied that the occupied regions were not Ukraine’s but "historical Russia." He claimed their residents had voted for independence and then to join Russia, and called any talk of territorial losses inappropriate.
Putin linked Russia’s readiness to negotiate to Ukrainians being a people very close to Russians. He claimed the latest genetic studies show they are one people. Independent outlet Meduza noted it is unclear which studies he meant. Putin’s 12 July 2021 essay on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians made the same case, which Ukraine’s national memory institute rebutted.
He closed that answer by asserting Russia would achieve all the goals of what the Kremlin calls its special military operation. He made a similar vow on 17 December 2025.
Multinational ‘anti-war bloc’ uses Istanbul summit to call for a diplomatic solution to Middle East crisis
Foreign ministers at a summit of eight European and Middle Eastern countries have urged the US and Israel not to renews their attacks on Iran, warning a fresh outbreak of fighting would spread conflict and push oil prices even higher.
The development of a new multinational “anti-war bloc” represents a challenge to the increasingly open plans by the US and Israel to relaunch strikes on Iran while talks on Tehran’s nuclear programme remain deadlocked.
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© Photograph: Massimo Percossi/EPA
© Photograph: Massimo Percossi/EPA
© Photograph: Massimo Percossi/EPA
The Kremlin has announced plans for renewed negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the United States in Abu Dhabi during the first half of November, reviving a diplomatic process that has repeatedly failed to produce a settlement to Moscow’s war against Ukraine.
Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Friday, 23 October, that the discussions would concentrate on post-war security arrangements. He also left open the possibility of eventual European participation, although the initial meeting is intended to remain trilateral.
The announcement follows talks in St Petersburg between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff. Yet the emerging American proposals reveal a fundamental problem: Washington appears increasingly prepared to offer Russia substantial economic incentives, while Moscow has provided little indication that its political objectives in Ukraine have changed.
According to details reported on 23 October, citing The Economist, the American proposals involve Ukraine abandoning its ambition to join NATO in exchange for investment, security arrangements and the prospect of European Union membership.
Russia would receive sanctions relief, renewed commercial relations with American companies and potentially the restoration of natural gas exports to Europe. A demilitarised zone in Donbas is also reportedly under consideration.
The commercial dimension extends beyond theoretical proposals.
American and Russian representatives have discussed investment in the Nord Stream pipeline system and possible arrangements involving Lukoil’s international assets. The negotiations surrounding Russian energy infrastructure suggest that Washington regards commercial cooperation as a potential instrument for securing Moscow’s agreement.
There is no established evidence that Witkoff, Jared Kushner or members of Trump’s family would personally benefit from these arrangements. Nevertheless, the involvement of investors in strategically important Russian assets raises questions about whether economic agreements might advance independently of a settlement acceptable to Ukraine.
The Trump administration has already demonstrated its willingness to relax economic pressure. On 16 October, the president waived major provisions of the Graham sanctions legislation, which he had signed into law only four weeks earlier.
As EU Today previously examined, the decision suspended measures designed to increase the economic costs of Russia’s continuing aggression. Washington justified the waiver on the grounds that sanctions could interfere with negotiations.
The central weakness in a settlement built around commercial incentives is the assumption that Putin’s territorial and political demands can ultimately be exchanged for economic advantages.
Russia’s objectives have never been confined to Donetsk, Luhansk or access to Western markets.
In his July 2021 essay on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians, Putin advanced a conception of the two nations as belonging to a single historical and cultural space. His interpretation, examined by the Centre for Eastern Studies, challenged the legitimacy of Ukraine’s development outside Moscow’s political influence.
These ideas preceded the full-scale invasion of February 2022. They also followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its intervention in eastern Ukraine.
Putin’s demands therefore concern more than military geography. They involve the extent to which Ukraine can exercise independent political authority, determine its international alliances and integrate with Western institutions.
Even a settlement granting Moscow substantial territory could leave this larger objective unresolved.
An independent Ukraine, increasingly integrated into the European economy and protected by Western security commitments, would remain outside Russia’s political control. For a Kremlin leadership that has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s separate historical identity, such an outcome would represent a limitation on its wider ambitions.
Putin reinforced this position on 22 October when he again described Ukrainian territory in Donbas as historically Russian.
This creates an apparent contradiction. Why would Moscow return to negotiations if its broader objectives remain incompatible with the proposed settlement?
One explanation is that participation itself offers Russia strategic advantages.
Negotiations can preserve diplomatic engagement with Washington, complicate attempts to introduce additional sanctions and maintain American pressure on Kyiv to accept territorial concessions.
They also provide opportunities to negotiate economic arrangements before fundamental security questions have been resolved.
For Putin, the political timetable in Washington is relevant. Trump’s presidency is constitutionally limited to January 2029. Moscow can seek to exploit the present administration’s interest in a diplomatic agreement while continuing military operations.
None of this establishes that Putin has definitively rejected compromise. However, the Kremlin’s willingness to attend negotiations is not equivalent to a willingness to abandon its demands.
Russia continues attacking Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure. As EU Today reported on 22 October, Russian forces launched 21 ballistic missiles against Kyiv shortly after Witkoff’s discussions with Putin.
The simultaneous pursuit of diplomatic engagement and military pressure allows Moscow to negotiate while attempting to alter conditions on the battlefield.
The proposed return of Russian gas exposes another contradiction in Washington’s approach.
The European Union has already adopted binding legislation to phase out Russian gas imports, with full restrictions taking effect during 2027.
The European Commission reiterated on 19 October that it had no plans to reverse its position. Reopening Nord Stream would also face sanctions, infrastructure and political obstacles, particularly in Germany.
Consequently, Washington cannot independently promise Moscow renewed access to European energy markets.
Nor can it guarantee Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Membership requires agreement among the existing member states, completion of accession negotiations and ratification of the relevant treaty.
A settlement negotiated primarily between Washington and Moscow would therefore depend on European decisions over which neither government has unilateral authority.
This helps explain the significance of Peskov’s remarks about possible European participation. Moscow needs European cooperation to secure meaningful sanctions relief and access to markets, even while seeking to negotiate Europe’s security arrangements principally with Washington.
Trump’s approach rests on the proposition that economic incentives can make a settlement more attractive to Moscow than continued warfare.
Putin’s position presents a different calculation. The Russian president must weigh the benefits of restored commercial relations against the political implications of recognising Ukraine’s durable independence and Western orientation.
Those objectives may prove incompatible.
A settlement that restores Russian energy revenues without credible guarantees against renewed aggression could reduce Moscow’s economic constraints while leaving the causes of the war unresolved.
The decisive test in Abu Dhabi will therefore not be whether negotiators can agree on investment, pipelines or sanctions relief. It will be whether Russia is prepared to accept a Ukrainian state whose sovereignty, political direction and future European integration remain beyond Moscow’s control.
Until that question is answered, renewed negotiations may offer Washington the prospect of a diplomatic achievement while allowing the Kremlin to pursue objectives it has not publicly abandoned.
The hardest part of ending Russia's war is making sure it cannot start it again. As the peace talks have escalated ahead of the US elections, Ukraine is weighing three options for its postwar security.
Among them are NATO membership, direct US guarantees modeled on NATO’s Article 5, and a European “Coalition of the Willing” backed by Washington, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says, according to UNIAN. But none of them have been agreed to yet.
Zelenskyy describes the guarantees as a single package, with each layer still under discussion with partners. All of it, he says, rests on a strong Ukrainian army, in both numbers and quality.
Everyone counts on NATO, Zelenskyy says, but Kyiv is also negotiating direct guarantees from the US, including an Article 5-style collective-defense clause, alongside the European Coalition of the Willing that would act together with Washington. The arithmetic, he said, is already done.
“Our colleagues in Europe and America know this. We have already calculated everything: both the financing and the corresponding number of our soldiers, so that our state can be at peace,” he states.
He went further, arguing that NATO membership would serve not only Ukraine and the Alliance but also Russia.
“I think, honestly, the Russians need our accession to NATO too, because for them that is more security than Ukraine outside NATO,” he claims.
The talks come as Washington pushes toward negotiations. Zelenskyy says he expects signals from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio within a day or two, as well as a call with envoy Steve Witkoff. He adds that Jared Kushner, on his way to Kyiv in November, told him Russia supports a trilateral meeting of the US, Ukraine, and Russia, at the level of technical teams.
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