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AI bots flooded 2023 UK government consultation on disposable vapes ban

Three-quarters of all responses were machine-generated in failed attempt to stop bill from passing into law, research finds

AI bots flooded a government consultation with tens of thousands of fake responses in a failed attempt to stop the UK’s ban on disposable vapes.

Three-quarters of all the responses to the 2023 consultation on the tobacco and vapes bill were machine-generated, in what is thought to be the first coordinated attempt to use AI to derail health policymaking in the UK.

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© Photograph: Tim Parker/Getty Images

© Photograph: Tim Parker/Getty Images

© Photograph: Tim Parker/Getty Images

Coalition MP ejected from question time after swearing at PM – as it happened

Online hate is spilling into the real world, AFP warns

AFP Commissioner Krissy Barrett began her late-night appearance at the Senate estimates hearing noting “a heaviness that hangs across Australia” after the alleged attack on independent MP Helen Haines.

Lone actors are being motivated by a convergence of personal grievances, mental health vulnerabilities and ideological concerns …

What helped keep us safe in recent times, such as our geography, analogue systems and far away criminals, has been impacted by fully integrated technology, social media and artificial intelligence.

We hear about the devastating impacts of racism from communities every day. But many experiences go unreported or uncounted, and our systems often do not capture the full picture.

This is not about collecting more data to prove racism exists. We already know it does. It is about making inequality visible, holding institutions to account and giving communities greater agency over their data to drive real change.

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© Photograph: Mick Tsikas/AAP

© Photograph: Mick Tsikas/AAP

© Photograph: Mick Tsikas/AAP

Immigration Judges Will No Longer Be Able to Shelve Deportation Cases: U.S. Supreme Court

27 October 2026 at 19:35

The decision favors Trump’s effort to end a practice that has benefited about 360,000 migrants since 1990.

On Tuesday, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against reinstating a regulation that allowed immigration judges to suspend certain deportation proceedings.

RELATED:

Over 2,000 Immigrants Have Been Arrested in New York Since July

Issued in a brief, unsigned opinion, the justices’ decision favors President Donald Trump’s administration, which opposes maintaining a practice that President Joe Biden formalized.

“In 2024, Biden’s administration adopted a regulation that formally codified administrative closure procedures, concluding that it lets judges efficiently manage their caseloads and promote the fair treatment of immigrants. That regulation replaced a prior rule adopted in 2020 during Trump’s first term in office that had been judicially blocked,” Reuters reported.

When Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, however, he announced that he would no longer allow administrative closure of cases as a mechanism for reducing workloads in immigration courts.

The family of Renee Good, one of two US citizens fatally shot by federal immigration agents in Minneapolis in January,have sued the Trump administration, saying there had been "no accountability" for her killing during deportation sweeps.

Good, 37, was shot dead in her car by… pic.twitter.com/h0KmryA3Z1

— TRT World (@trtworld) October 2, 2026

Texas had already challenged that policy in a federal court, arguing that the rule lets immigration judges “effectively grant indefinite amnesty to aliens illegally present in this country.”

Three cities with large immigrant populations — Baltimore, Maryland; Columbus, Ohio; and New Haven, Connecticut — along with an immigrant rights advocacy group, filed a lawsuit seeking to preserve Biden’s decision. The courts rejected these requests, bringing the matter before the Supreme Court.

Administrative closure of deportation proceedings, however, has been practiced for decades. According to government statistics, the rule has benefited about 360,000 migrants since 1990.

teleSUR/JF

Sources: EFE – Reuters

The Populism-to-Paperwork Pipeline

27 October 2026 at 18:15
A blue background with a black and white hand reaching for a yellow and red house. A red slash runs diagonally across the image. | Feverpitched/Vivian Seefeld/Flas100/Dreamstime/Fatima Ruiz

Happy Tuesday, and welcome to another edition of Rent Free. This week's newsletter includes stories on: 

  • The Treasury Department's proposed rule for restricting large investor ownership of single-family housing. 
  • The land use angle in the Texas Senate race. 
  • Salt Lake's middle housing reforms.

The Populism-to-Paperwork Pipeline

Last Thursday, the U.S. Treasury issued a proposed rule that restricts large institutional investors from acquiring new single-family rental homes. 

The proposed regulations are intended to implement large investor restrictions passed by Congress as part of its bipartisan housing bill, the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act, that generally bans entities that already own 350 single-family rentals from buying new ones. 

As I covered last week, the new rule primarily proposes definitions left of the text of ROAD and adds additional details about when large corporate buyers' build-to-rent and renovate-to-rent projects are exempt from the new restrictions.

Wonks and interest groups are digging through the details of the sprawling proposed regulations, but there doesn't seem to be major new policy shifts in the rule. It's mostly a bunch of paperwork requirements.

That's not how the Trump administration has framed the new proposed rule. 

Hear Vice President J.D. Vance tout the new rules as saving the American dream of homeownership from "private equity barons."

The American Dream doesn't belong to Wall Street. It belongs to the American people.

Thanks to President Trump and Scott Bessent, families don't have to worry about getting out-bid on their dream homes by private equity barons. And we're making those same big investors give…

— JD Vance (@JDVance) October 22, 2026

Also chiming in was Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D–Mass.), who had proposed much more sweeping restrictions on institutional investors when the ROAD Act was still working its way through Congress. 

Our bill to stop private equity from buying up homes is now law.

Despite Donald Trump's refusal to sign it, his Administration must now implement it.

We'll be watching closely to ensure it's done right. https://t.co/aQyqYdSViC

— Elizabeth Warren (@SenWarren) October 22, 2026

Despite the implication in Warren's post, Trump's decision to not sign the ROAD Act was not because of his apathy about the investor restrictions in it. On the contrary, the president had urged Congress to enact institutional investor ownership of single-family homes. 

(His decision had more to do with his displeasure at Congress not passing the SAVE Act.) 

As housing policy watchers will know, the backlash to corporate ownership of single-family rental housing has been a bipartisan populist concern for a while now. 

Both right-wing Republicans and left-wing Democrats have argued that Wall Street investors are a primary cause of high housing costs and low housing availability. They are allegedly outbidding individual owner-occupiers for homes, thus condemning ordinary families to a life of perpetual renting.

It was notable that perhaps the only thing that Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz and Vance agreed on in their 2024 vice presidential debate was that "Wall Street" needed to be kept out of owning single-family homes. 

Criticisms of restricting institutional investor ownership of single-family rentals are legion. The arguments generally boil down to the assessment that they are a small but beneficial presence in the single-family market.

The vast majority of new home sales still go to owner-occupiers. Families that can't get, or don't want, a mortgage but do want to live in a single-family home have the option of renting from one of the big guys. And large investors also add to the housing stock through build-to-rent developments and their renovation of dilapidated existing units. 

Those arguments were convincing enough to get a much more sweeping institutional investor ban initially included in ROAD (which would have required investors to proactively sell off their portfolios and effectively kill the build-to-rent sector in the process) pared back into something far more modest. 

The final result is the paperwork requirements the Treasury released last Thursday. 

One can see that as a positive development. The housing market would have been made much worse if Congress had decided to kill build-to-rent housing. 

On the other hand, we're still left with a bunch of bureaucratic busywork requirements that will add compliance costs to the business of single-family rentals but don't make anyone better off. 

Populist backlashes typically target large, seemingly alien institutions that are allegedly crushing ordinary people, big bureaucracies, large capitalists, etc. 

It's a bit ironic then that the new investor restrictions informed by that populist backlash and outlined in the Treasury's proposed rule largely leave the capitalists and bureaucrats in place while requiring them to shuffle a lot of paperwork between themselves. 


The Data Center Angle in the Texas Senate Race

A long-time electoral advantage for the Texas GOP has been the state's status as a growth machine under its rule. 

Over the past three decades, Republicans have won every statewide race in the Lone Star State partially on the argument that they've delivered a remarkable degree of economic growth. 

Yet this year, in a political environment that's exceptionally bad for Republicans, Democrat James Talarico appears poised to best Republican Ken Paxton in the Texas Senate race and finally turn the state blue. 

There are a lot of reasons that could explain why the polls are giving Talarico a slight edge over Paxton. One that I explore in my new profile of Talarico (which was published today) is that a backlash to data center development is souring Texas voters on economic growth generally and the party that claims to have delivered it. 

There's not much about housing in the profile. But there are a couple of interesting housing-adjacent themes explored in it that Rent Free readers might find interesting. 

The first is that loose land use controls are a primary reason that Texas has become a major location for data center development. The second is that even places with very pro-growth political cultures and policy regimes can still experience sudden, sweeping anti-growth backlashes. 

Public support for "abundance" of new housing or new commercial development can't ever be taken for granted. 


Salt Lake City Waters Down Zoning Reforms

Last week, the City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah, proposed paring back a set of zoning reforms that are intended to allow more smaller homes to be built in existing single-family neighborhoods. 

Under the original proposal, property owners would have been allowed to add accessory dwelling units on more parcels. Relaxed lot size, height, and setback requirements would have also allowed builders to add smaller homes and duplexes in single-family neighborhoods. 

These are all pretty standard "middle housing" reforms. They provoked the standard criticism that quiet, tidy single-family neighborhoods would be swamped by out-of-scale development. 

Now the city council is considering pairing the zoning liberalization with an owner-occupancy requirement. Anyone attempting to use the reforms to build new housing would also have to live on-site.

Owner-occupancy requirements often act as a major "poison pill." They effectively exclude professional developers from buying up parcels and adding new housing on them. Instead, homeowners (most of whom are not professional builders) will be the only ones who can make use of the new rules. 

If the council does include an owner-occupancy requirement in its zoning reforms, it can expect a lot fewer units to be built.


Quick Links

  • President Donald Trump has issued a new housing affordability executive order, which largely attempts to make mortgages obtained or secured by federal programs cheaper for borrowers. 
  • Singer Stevie Wonder is attempting to evict a woman who's lived in a home he's owned rent-free for nearly 40 years. 
  • D.C. Councilmember Robert White has proposed a pilot program that would have delinquent tenants go to mediation with their landlords if they owe less than three months of rent. 
  • Americans for Prosperity has a new analysis of a Massachusetts ballot initiative that would allow homes to be built on smaller lots. 

The post The Populism-to-Paperwork Pipeline appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Why Putin Demands Donbas: The Territorial Ultimatum That Could Shape Ukraine’s Next War

27 October 2026 at 18:07

Vladimir Putin’s insistence that Ukraine surrender its remaining positions in Donetsk is not simply a dispute over territory. It is a demand that could dismantle Ukraine’s principal defensive barrier in the east, hand Moscow a military advantage it has struggled to achieve through years of fighting, and establish a precedent for further territorial concessions. The latest diplomatic contacts with European leaders have brought this question back to the centre of negotiations.

There are two ways for Russia to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held cities of Donbas. One is to fight its way through heavily fortified defensive positions, accepting substantial casualties, equipment losses and an uncertain timetable. The other is to secure their evacuation through diplomatic negotiations.

The second would achieve an important Russian military objective without requiring Moscow to bear the full cost of a prolonged offensive.

This distinction helps explain why Vladimir Putin continues to insist that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remaining government-controlled territory of Donetsk region before a comprehensive settlement can be negotiated.

It also raises a more consequential question: would surrendering Donbas bring the war closer to an end, or would it improve Russia’s position in any subsequent confrontation?

A diplomatic opening without a strategic concession

The issue returned to prominence on 27 October when Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a rare telephone conversation with Putin.

According to the Finnish president’s official statement, the call followed discussions in Oslo on 20 October involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff.

The Nordic leaders sought to advance preparations for renewed American-mediated negotiations, expected in Abu Dhabi in November. They emphasised that they were acting on behalf of their respective countries rather than representing Europe collectively.

Stubb described the exchange as “frank and substantive”, arguing that direct communication with Moscow was necessary to address the security consequences of the war.

However, the Kremlin’s account offered little indication of movement on the fundamental disagreements.

Moscow insisted that any durable peace must fully accommodate Russian interests. A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that Putin had reiterated his refusal to compromise on the objective of controlling the entire Donbas.

Following the conversation, Zelenskyy confirmed that the Nordic leaders had briefed him and stressed to Putin the need for concrete measures to reduce attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

The diplomatic process has therefore resumed without resolving the territorial dispute at its centre.

The military significance of the remaining Donbas

The territory Russia is demanding includes some of Ukraine’s most important surviving defensive positions.

Since fighting began in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Ukrainian forces have constructed and reinforced an extensive defensive system centred on Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka.

Known as the fortress belt, this network combines urban areas, industrial facilities, transport infrastructure, prepared defensive positions and terrain that complicates offensive operations.

The military importance of this system extends far beyond the administrative boundaries of Donetsk.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, surrendering these positions would allow Russian forces to occupy heavily defended territory without undertaking the prolonged operations otherwise required to capture it.

In its 26 October battlefield assessment, the institute continued to identify the capture of this defensive belt as Russia’s principal military objective in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces retained positions in parts of Kostiantynivka, while Russian operations towards other major cities remained contested.

The implications of a negotiated Ukrainian withdrawal would be substantial.

Russia could occupy the fortified urban corridor, reorganise its forces, establish new logistics routes and potentially redirect formations towards other sectors.

Ukraine, meanwhile, would have to construct or reinforce defensive positions further west, potentially under pressure and in less favourable terrain.

The resulting military imbalance would not necessarily lead to another Russian offensive. But it would change the conditions under which any renewed hostilities might take place.

That is why territory cannot be assessed solely by its surface area. A relatively small section of the front can possess strategic value disproportionate to its size.

Why Moscow prefers a negotiated withdrawal

Russia’s insistence on Donetsk also reflects the limits of what its military has achieved.

Despite years of fighting, Moscow has not secured complete control of the region. Successive offensives have produced territorial gains, but at considerable cost and without the rapid breakthrough originally anticipated.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently acknowledged the central importance of the remaining Ukrainian-held territory.

In an interview published by the US State Department, Rubio characterised the dispute as centred on territory Russia wants but has been unable to capture militarily, while recognising Ukraine’s sovereignty and long-term security concerns.

His remarks demonstrate how Donbas has become the principal territorial obstacle in Washington’s diplomatic calculations.

For Moscow, however, concentrating negotiations on this specific demand offers an additional advantage.

If Ukraine refuses to withdraw, the Kremlin can argue that Kyiv is preventing progress towards peace. If Ukraine agrees, Russia obtains strategically valuable territory without the military costs associated with conquering it.

The demand therefore serves a dual purpose: it establishes a public explanation for the absence of an agreement while offering Russia an immediate military benefit should negotiations succeed on its terms.

The problem with treating Donbas as the final concession

The central weakness in any settlement built around a Ukrainian withdrawal is the assumption that control of Donbas represents the limit of Russia’s territorial ambitions.

Moscow’s previously declared objectives suggest a more complicated picture.

In June 2024, Putin demanded Ukrainian withdrawal from four regions claimed by Russia: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Moscow does not fully control these regions, despite claiming to have annexed them in September 2022.

Russia has also demanded restrictions on Ukraine’s military capabilities and future security relationships.

As EU Today previously reported, renewed diplomatic engagement has not produced a clear abandonment of the Kremlin’s wider objectives.

Consequently, transferring the remaining territory of Donetsk would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s other demands.

There is a significant difference between conceding territory as part of an enforceable settlement and withdrawing from defensive positions as a precondition for negotiating one.

In the first case, territorial arrangements form part of a wider agreement establishing obligations, verification procedures and security guarantees.

In the second, one party makes a potentially irreversible military concession before knowing whether an agreement will ultimately be reached.

This asymmetry is particularly important where the proposed concession directly affects the withdrawing country’s ability to defend itself.

The strategy of incremental gains

One interpretation of Moscow’s approach is that it reflects a strategy of incremental territorial expansion rather than an attempt to achieve all its objectives through a single decisive offensive.

After Russia failed to capture Kyiv in 2022, its military campaign increasingly concentrated on taking territory through successive, often prolonged operations.

The diplomatic equivalent would involve securing one concession, consolidating the resulting advantage and subsequently presenting additional demands.

Under such a scenario, Russia could obtain control of the remaining Donetsk territory, establish new positions closer to Dnipropetrovsk region and later argue that further territorial or security arrangements were necessary to protect its newly acquired frontier.

Moscow has already used the language of protective buffer zones to justify military operations elsewhere in Ukraine.

There is no evidence establishing that such a sequence would inevitably follow a Donbas settlement. Nevertheless, the possibility must be considered when assessing the military consequences of a withdrawal.

The concern is not merely that Russia might violate a future agreement. It is that the agreement itself could alter the strategic balance in ways that make renewed military pressure more effective.

There is also an internal Ukrainian dimension.

An agreement requiring the evacuation of cities defended for years would create substantial political controversy. Disagreements over territorial concessions, security guarantees and the credibility of Western commitments could complicate domestic political stability.

For Moscow, such divisions might provide another means of influencing Ukraine without immediate military escalation.

Donbas and the wider question of Ukrainian sovereignty

Donbas has considerable political significance for Putin beyond its military value.

The conflict in eastern Ukraine began in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Donetsk and Luhansk became central to the Kremlin’s justification for intervention, and their incorporation into Russia was later proclaimed as part of the 2022 annexations.

Control of the entire region would allow Putin to present a tangible achievement after years of warfare.

Yet the Kremlin’s objectives have never been confined exclusively to Donbas.

Putin has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s historical and political independence, while Russian negotiating demands have extended to the country’s military posture, international alliances and internal political arrangements.

These positions suggest that territorial control forms part of a broader attempt to determine Ukraine’s strategic orientation.

A settlement that ends fighting in Donetsk without resolving these wider disagreements might therefore suspend the conflict rather than settle its underlying causes.

What the next negotiations must establish

The planned talks in Abu Dhabi will test whether Moscow is prepared to distinguish between its territorial demands and the conditions necessary for a sustainable ceasefire.

An immediate halt to hostilities along existing lines would preserve the military status quo while allowing negotiations to proceed.

Russia has resisted this approach, arguing that a temporary ceasefire could enable Ukraine to rebuild its forces without resolving the conflict.

Ukraine, by contrast, argues that withdrawing from fortified territory without credible guarantees would expose it to renewed attack.

Neither side can be expected to disregard the military implications of the proposed arrangements.

For European governments, the principal question is consequently not simply whether Ukrainian and Russian representatives can be brought back to the negotiating table.

It is whether any agreement can prevent the territorial settlement from becoming the starting position for another war.

Stubb and Støre’s conversation with Putin demonstrated that diplomatic communication remains possible. It did not establish that Moscow is prepared to abandon its existing territorial objectives.

The distinction matters.

Putin’s demand for Donbas offers Russia two potential advantages: a justification for continuing the war if Kyiv refuses, and a substantial military gain if Kyiv accepts.

That does not prove the Kremlin has already decided to resume hostilities after a negotiated withdrawal. It does, however, explain why the terms, sequencing and enforceability of any agreement are as consequential as the territory itself.

The essential question facing negotiators is therefore not only whether Russia can obtain Donbas through diplomacy rather than force.

It is whether the price of that concession would be a lasting peace — or a weaker Ukrainian defensive position if peace fails.

Rubio responds to Machado return: Can’t ‘street-protest your way into a democracy’

27 October 2026 at 18:01
Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a warning to Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado on Monday, without explicitly naming her after the exiled Nobel Peace Prize winner returned to her home country. “You’re not going to street-protest your way into a democracy,” Rubio told reporters, according to Axios. He also praised her return, saying…

US military says strike on alleged drug vessel in eastern Pacific kills five people

US military says it carried out an airstrike on an alleged drug-trafficking boat in latest attack in region

The US ⁠military ⁠said on ​Tuesday ⁠it killed ⁠five ​people ‌after ‌an airstrike on a ‌suspected drug-trafficking vessel in ​the ⁠eastern Pacific.

Tuesday’s strike was among more than 70 such attacks since the beginning of Donald Trump’s second presidency, according to media tallies. Collectively, they have killed more than 240 people.

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© Photograph: US Southern Command via X

© Photograph: US Southern Command via X

© Photograph: US Southern Command via X

Israel Votes Today: What the Election Means for Americans and How Netanyahu’s Rivals Differ

Israelis are voting Tuesday in the first national election since the Oct. 7, 2023, attack and the war in Gaza. Polls close at 4 pm Eastern Standard Time. A winner is unlikely to be clear Tuesday night, and coalition talks will likely take weeks… A roundup of election news from diverse sources

Israeli media analysis: 2 Paths to War With Iran Loom Over Israel’s Election

Behind the scenes, Netayahu has been waging a fight against Israel’s defense establishment & the US administration. He recently made a huge effort to reignite the war with Iran, which sparked a direct clash with the Israel Defense Forces' top brass… If Netanyahu's opponents win they must make it clear that they won't allow the outgoing government to embark on any last-minute military adventures and embroil the country in more wars before a well-thought-out strategy has been developed…

Finland’s Stubb and Norway PM call Putin in break with previous European stance

27 October 2026 at 15:07
The leaders of Finland and Norway initiated a direct call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday morning amid broader diplomatic efforts to wind down Russia’s yearslong war with Ukraine.  Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre noted in a joint press release that they did not speak on behalf of…

Finland and Norway Hold Direct Talks with Putin Ahead of Ukraine Peace Negotiations, Exposing European Divisions

27 October 2026 at 14:00

Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre have spoken directly with Vladimir Putin before briefing Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The initiative, undertaken in consultation with Ukraine, comes ahead of planned negotiations in Abu Dhabi but has drawn criticism from other Nordic leaders.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday, 27 October, marking an unusual direct diplomatic engagement between Moscow and two European NATO members since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The conversation, initiated by the two Nordic leaders from Helsinki, was followed by a separate call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. According to a joint statement released by the Norwegian government, the initiative had been prepared in consultation with Kyiv.

The objective was to communicate directly with Putin about efforts to end the war and the forthcoming negotiations involving Ukraine, Russia and the United States.

Stubb described the exchange as frank and substantive, arguing that Finland and Norway had particular reasons to participate in discussions concerning European security.

“We are neighbouring countries to Russia,” he said, adding that the war’s outcome would directly affect European security.

Both leaders reaffirmed their governments’ continuing support for Ukraine while calling for renewed negotiations. Støre emphasised the humanitarian and economic consequences of the conflict and the need for de-escalation.

Importantly, their statement specified that they were acting as national leaders rather than representatives of Europe collectively.

Zelenskyy briefed after discussions with Moscow

Following the conversation with Putin, Stubb and Støre spoke with Zelenskyy, who confirmed the exchange in a statement issued by his office.

The Ukrainian president thanked them for their detailed briefing and diplomatic engagement.

According to Zelenskyy, the two leaders had communicated Ukraine’s demand for concrete steps to reduce attacks against its energy facilities and other infrastructure.

The discussion also covered preparations for trilateral negotiations involving Ukrainian, American and Russian delegations, provisionally planned for November.

Kyiv’s confirmation that it had been consulted before the Putin conversation is significant. Ukraine has consistently maintained that decisions concerning its sovereignty, territory and security cannot be negotiated without its participation.

Oslo talks establish new diplomatic channel

Tuesday’s telephone diplomacy followed a meeting in Oslo on 20 October involving Zelenskyy, Stubb, Støre and representatives of US President Donald Trump.

American special envoy Steve Witkoff participated in person, while Jared Kushner joined remotely. European and NATO representatives also attended related discussions.

According to the Ukrainian presidency’s account, the consultations addressed possible steps towards ending the war and establishing security arrangements after a settlement.

Witkoff subsequently travelled to St Petersburg on 21 October for discussions with Putin.

The diplomatic contacts have produced plans for another round of talks in Abu Dhabi, expected after 4 November, although the precise date and representation remain subject to confirmation.

The European Commission has also sought involvement. During its 21 October press briefing, the Commission confirmed its participation in the Oslo consultations, which addressed territorial questions, security guarantees and post-war economic arrangements.

As EU Today previously reported, discussions about appointing a European representative to negotiations have exposed disagreements over who should speak for European governments and what authority such a representative would possess.

Moscow maintains its negotiating position

The Kremlin’s account of Tuesday’s conversation offered little indication of a change in Russia’s principal demands.

According to reports citing the Kremlin’s statement, Putin insisted that a lasting settlement would require what Moscow described as full recognition of Russia’s legitimate interests.

He also accused NATO and European Union countries of pursuing confrontational policies that prolonged the conflict.

These statements indicate that the reopening of direct communication has not, by itself, resolved the differences between the negotiating parties.

Russia continues to seek arrangements concerning Ukrainian territory and the European security order, while Kyiv maintains that its sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected.

Denmark questions independent Nordic diplomacy

The initiative has also revealed differences among European governments over direct engagement with Moscow.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen criticised the Finnish-Norwegian approach, saying it had not been coordinated with Denmark and warning against individual European countries pursuing separate diplomatic initiatives.

Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson also expressed reservations about contacts that might undermine a common European position.

Their objections highlight a distinction between consultation with Ukraine and agreement among European governments on the organisation of negotiations.

For Finland and Norway, both of which share borders with Russia, the outcome of the conflict carries direct implications for security in the Baltic Sea region and the High North.

The immediate question is whether their intervention can facilitate substantive negotiations without weakening coordination between Kyiv and its European partners.

With the next US-mediated talks expected in November, Tuesday’s contacts establish another channel of communication with Moscow. Whether that channel produces movement on territorial disputes, security guarantees or an eventual ceasefire remains unresolved.

Ceasefire brokered by Melania Trump takes effect in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine town

27 October 2026 at 13:53
A localized ceasefire agreement between Ukraine and Russia took effect on Tuesday after first lady Melania Trump announced last week she secured a temporary humanitarian agreement for the border city of Oleshky.  The Russian-occupied town is located in southern Ukraine, and residents have faced shortages in food and medicine amid the ongoing war. The pause…

EU and Arab States Challenge Turkey–Libya Maritime Agreement as Mediterranean Dispute Deepens

27 October 2026 at 11:30

A dispute over maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean has entered a new phase after the European Union joined Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in formally rejecting an agreement between Turkey and Libya.

The six parties issued a joint declaration at the United Nations on 26 October, following the decision by Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives to approve a maritime delimitation memorandum originally signed with Ankara in 2019.

The declaration, delivered by Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis, argued that the agreement disregards the maritime rights of other coastal states and cannot establish boundaries affecting countries that are not parties to it.

Turkey has rejected the criticism, maintaining that its agreement with Libya complies with international law and protects the legitimate interests of both countries.

The competing positions concern more than the interpretation of a maritime boundary. They affect offshore energy exploration, relations between Turkey and its neighbours, and the political balance within Libya itself.

Why Libya’s decision changes the dispute

The original memorandum was signed in November 2019 between Turkey and Libya’s then internationally recognised Government of National Accord, based in Tripoli.

It established a claimed maritime boundary extending across part of the Eastern Mediterranean, where Greece maintains that the maritime entitlements of its islands, including Crete, must be taken into account.

The agreement was opposed by Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, while Libya’s rival eastern authorities initially rejected it.

That division appeared to weaken the political foundations of the arrangement, even though Ankara continued to defend its validity.

However, on 20 October 2026, Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives reversed its previous opposition and approved the memorandum.

The decision reflects changes in relations between Turkey and eastern Libya, where military commander Khalifa Haftar has exercised considerable influence.

Turkey has expanded contacts with authorities in Benghazi despite having previously been associated primarily with the rival administration in Tripoli.

Approval by the eastern parliament consequently gives the agreement broader political acceptance within Libya than it enjoyed in 2019, although it does not resolve the country’s institutional divisions or the objections raised by neighbouring states.

A dispute over geography and maritime rights

The central disagreement concerns the legal principles used to determine maritime boundaries.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states possess rights within exclusive economic zones, while the delimitation of overlapping claims is intended to produce an equitable solution.

Greece argues that Turkey and Libya cannot establish the maritime boundary claimed in their memorandum without disregarding the legal entitlements of Greek islands situated between their coastlines.

The Greek Foreign Ministry’s response maintains that geography and the law of the sea cannot be changed through parliamentary approval of a bilateral agreement.

Turkey takes a different position on the weight that islands should carry when continental shelves and maritime jurisdictions are delimited, and is not itself a party to UNCLOS.

The dispute therefore involves competing interpretations of international maritime law as well as disagreements over the boundaries shown on maps.

The European Union has aligned itself with Greece and Cyprus.

In a statement issued on 21 October, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas described the memorandum as incompatible with the law of the sea and incapable of producing legal consequences for third states.

The latest declaration extends that position into a broader diplomatic coalition involving governments from the Gulf and North Africa.

Ankara rejects the criticism

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan responded on 26 October by arguing that objections from the EU and other parties had no legitimate basis.

According to his remarks on the agreement, Turkey was not seeking an advantage at the expense of other Mediterranean countries.

Ankara’s position is that its maritime arrangements with Libya reflect the interests of two sovereign states and should not be invalidated by objections from outside parties.

This creates a diplomatic complication for the EU.

Turkey remains a NATO member and an important partner on migration, regional security and Black Sea affairs, while Greece and Cyprus are EU member states whose maritime claims Brussels supports.

The Union must therefore manage a disagreement involving a strategically important partner without retreating from its established legal position.

Energy resources and Libya’s political future

The Eastern Mediterranean contains established and potential offshore gas resources, giving maritime boundaries commercial significance.

Delimitation determines which governments may authorise exploration and exploitation in particular areas, while overlapping claims can discourage investment or provoke disputes over survey vessels and drilling operations.

Greece has already concluded maritime delimitation agreements with Italy and Egypt, including a partial agreement with Cairo in 2020 that overlaps with areas claimed under the Turkish-Libyan arrangement.

The competing agreements illustrate why the issue cannot be settled exclusively through bilateral negotiations that exclude other interested coastal states.

Libya’s internal political structure introduces another uncertainty. The country remains divided between competing institutions, and the European declaration explicitly connects maritime stability with the reunification of Libyan state authorities.

As EU Today previously examined in its coverage of Eastern Mediterranean tensions, disputes over maritime jurisdiction intersect with regional military positioning and the broader relationship between Turkey and European governments.

For the moment, the confrontation remains diplomatic.

The principal question is whether the parties can prevent overlapping legal claims from developing into renewed confrontations over exploration rights while maintaining channels for negotiations with Libya and Turkey.

EU Lawmakers Move to Relax 2035 Car Emissions Rules as Industry Presses for Greater Flexibility

27 October 2026 at 11:11

The European Parliament has taken another step towards revising the European Union’s 2035 vehicle-emissions framework, after lawmakers from three major political groups agreed amendments offering manufacturers greater flexibility in meeting carbon dioxide reduction targets.

The compromise, approved on 22 October by Parliament’s Transport and Industry committees, proposes an 87.5 per cent reduction in average emissions from new passenger cars by 2035, compared with the 2021 baseline. This is less stringent than the European Commission’s proposed 90 per cent reduction and represents a further departure from the existing 100 per cent reduction in tailpipe emissions for new cars and vans.

The changes have not become law. They remain subject to parliamentary procedures and negotiations with EU governments. Nevertheless, the committee agreement shows how concerns over manufacturing competitiveness, production costs and technological choices are reshaping European climate legislation.

A fundamental revision of the 2035 framework

The original 2035 target, adopted in 2023 as part of the EU’s Fit for 55 legislation, required manufacturers to achieve a 100 per cent reduction in average tailpipe carbon dioxide emissions from new cars and vans. It effectively directed the market towards battery-electric and other zero-emission vehicles.

Manufacturers have argued that the transition is taking place under difficult commercial conditions. Competition from Chinese producers, costs of developing new platforms and batteries, and uncertainty over charging infrastructure contributed to demands for regulatory flexibility.

In December 2025, the European Commission responded with an automotive package proposing a 90 per cent reduction requirement by 2035. It would permit manufacturers to compensate for some remaining emissions using mechanisms involving low-carbon steel produced in the EU and qualifying renewable fuels.

The latest parliamentary compromise would lower the target further, to 87.5 per cent, while allowing low-carbon steel credits to count towards compliance. For light commercial vehicles, lawmakers also proposed reducing the 2035 target to 80 per cent and the 2030 target to 35 per cent.

Why low-carbon steel matters

A notable feature of the compromise is the connection between car-emissions rules and European steelmaking. Steel production is a major industrial source of carbon dioxide, and companies face investment requirements to replace conventional production processes with lower-emission alternatives.

Regulatory credits for carmakers using qualifying European low-carbon steel could create demand for cleaner industrial materials and encourage domestic investment. But emissions avoided during production are not equivalent to reductions in exhaust emissions. The accounting mechanism therefore creates a distinction between cutting tailpipe output and compensating for some remaining emissions through materials and manufacturing.

The compromise also connects vehicle rules with a broader industrial-policy debate about European-made products. As EU Today previously reported, vehicle decarbonisation has increasingly become part of the discussion about European industrial competitiveness.

Electric vehicle sales continue to increase

The debate comes despite growth in electric vehicle registrations. According to figures from the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association, battery-electric cars represented 22.7 per cent of new EU passenger car registrations in the first nine months of 2026, against 16.1 per cent during the same period of 2025.

Approximately 1.93 million battery-electric cars were registered between January and September, with considerable growth in Germany and France. Hybrid-electric vehicles nevertheless remained the largest single powertrain category at 36.3 per cent, while petrol and diesel together represented 28.2 per cent, down from 36.9 per cent a year earlier.

The figures show that electrification is progressing, but combustion engines still account for a substantial share of sales. Manufacturers must make investment decisions across several technologies while anticipating changing legislation.

Disagreements over industrial strategy

The parliamentary compromise follows discussions between France and Germany about the relationship between car-emissions rules and measures favouring European production. Paris has emphasised domestic industrial capacity; Berlin has pressed for greater technological flexibility.

Supporters of looser standards argue that manufacturers need time to adjust investment and respond to consumer demand. Critics warn that weakening the target could delay investments in electric vehicles, batteries and charging networks by making future demand less certain.

The eventual legislation will determine not only which vehicles may be sold after 2035, but also how the EU balances emissions reduction, international competition and the position of its manufacturing industry.

Europe’s Electricity Price Divide Exposes Limits of the Single Energy Market

27 October 2026 at 10:48

Europe’s electricity market recorded substantial regional differences on Tuesday, 27 October, with average wholesale prices ranging from approximately €6 per megawatt-hour in northern Sweden to more than €255 in Romania.

The figures reveal a persistent difficulty for European energy policy: although the continent has an increasingly interconnected electricity market, businesses and consumers remain exposed to very different underlying wholesale costs depending on location.

According to European day-ahead electricity market data, Sweden’s SE2 bidding zone recorded an average of €6.23 per megawatt-hour, while Finland stood at approximately €6.65. Romania reached €255.20, roughly 41 times northern Sweden’s price. Bulgaria registered approximately €254, Hungary €241 and Greece €225. Germany recorded approximately €155, Belgium €160 and France €162.

These are wholesale prices for delivery on 27 October, not final bills for households or businesses. Their differences nevertheless raise questions about how effectively Europe’s electricity networks distribute power from areas of lower-cost generation to those facing greater costs.

Why a common market produces different prices

European electricity trading is organised through interconnected national and regional markets. Cross-border capacity allows relatively inexpensive power to reach regions where demand is greater or local generation is more expensive.

When transmission capacity is adequate, neighbouring prices can converge. Physical networks, however, have limits. Congested interconnectors can prevent additional imports even when large price differences exist.

Other influences include availability of power stations, renewable output, fuel prices, consumption and system stability. Regions with substantial hydropower, nuclear generation or strong renewable production may experience comparatively low prices. Markets relying on gas-fired generation can be more expensive when gas plants are needed to satisfy the final increment of demand.

The result is a market responding to common European conditions but still shaped by local generation and transmission constraints.

Southeastern Europe’s structural constraints

The European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, ACER, has repeatedly examined the causes of regional price divergence. In its 2026 assessment of cross-zonal electricity trade, the agency considered unusually high prices and limited access to lower-cost power in southeastern Europe.

Constraints include available cross-border capacity and shortages of flexible generation able to respond to changing renewable output, especially in the evening. Countries including Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia have encountered substantial regional differences.

Those findings do not prove the cause of each price movement on 27 October. They do, however, explain why disparities can persist despite common market rules. ACER has advocated improved coordination among transmission operators, more effective use of existing networks and additional flexibility through storage and demand management.

Industrial consequences of expensive electricity

Energy-intensive industries, including steel, chemicals and fertiliser production, are particularly sensitive to electricity costs. Where contracts are exposed to wholesale markets, sustained regional price differences can influence output and investment decisions.

The relationship between wholesale prices and bills is not immediate. Firms may hedge prices, use long-term contracts or produce their own power. Network charges, taxes and government support also affect the amount paid. Still, persistent market differences can shape industrial competitiveness.

As EU Today reported, EU energy ministers are due to examine proposed changes to electricity network charges and market administration on 29 October. Network tariffs are distinct from wholesale prices, but both affect total electricity costs.

Renewables and the need for flexible networks

According to ACER’s energy-market monitoring, renewable sources represented around half of EU electricity generation in 2025. Solar energy can reduce prices during the day, but output falls sharply towards evening, sometimes requiring more expensive power stations to increase generation.

This increases the value of storage, flexible production, responsive demand and international connections that can balance surpluses and shortages between regions. Yet major transmission lines can take years to complete owing to planning, permitting, investment and construction requirements.

The priority is therefore not simply to install more renewable capacity. Europe’s grids and supporting technologies must be capable of moving and using that output efficiently.

What the price divide reveals

A single day’s wholesale prices should not be mistaken for long-term average electricity costs or a permanent competitive advantage. Nevertheless, the persistence of regional disparities documented by regulators shows the problem extends beyond isolated daily volatility.

For EU institutions, the question is whether further market integration can make energy more affordable while preserving incentives to invest in generation and transmission. National governments must balance security of supply, infrastructure financing and industrial competitiveness.

Electricity trading across Europe is increasingly integrated. The physical systems supplying it remain considerably less uniform. Until those constraints are addressed, the price of power will continue to reflect geography as well as the underlying cost of energy.

UK officials discussing options including free movement with EU ahead of summit

Business secretary says focus for November summit will be trade and youth mobility, but talks will also include ‘future options for relationship’

British officials have begun discussions with the EU about a long-term relationship that could include a return to free movement, the business secretary has said while promising the British people “are the boss” when it comes to what the UK will accept.

Jonathan Reynolds said the focus for British negotiations was the EU summit in November to seal an agreement to ease some trading restrictions and a youth mobility deal. But he said the prime minister, Andy Burnham, had made it clear he wanted to see a long-term and stable relationship with the bloc.

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© Photograph: Yui Mok/PA

© Photograph: Yui Mok/PA

© Photograph: Yui Mok/PA

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