Vladimir Putin’s insistence that Ukraine surrender its remaining positions in Donetsk is not simply a dispute over territory. It is a demand that could dismantle Ukraine’s principal defensive barrier in the east, hand Moscow a military advantage it has struggled to achieve through years of fighting, and establish a precedent for further territorial concessions. The latest diplomatic contacts with European leaders have brought this question back to the centre of negotiations.
There are two ways for Russia to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held cities of Donbas. One is to fight its way through heavily fortified defensive positions, accepting substantial casualties, equipment losses and an uncertain timetable. The other is to secure their evacuation through diplomatic negotiations.
The second would achieve an important Russian military objective without requiring Moscow to bear the full cost of a prolonged offensive.
This distinction helps explain why Vladimir Putin continues to insist that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remaining government-controlled territory of Donetsk region before a comprehensive settlement can be negotiated.
It also raises a more consequential question: would surrendering Donbas bring the war closer to an end, or would it improve Russia’s position in any subsequent confrontation?
A diplomatic opening without a strategic concession
The issue returned to prominence on 27 October when Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a rare telephone conversation with Putin.
According to the Finnish president’s official statement, the call followed discussions in Oslo on 20 October involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff.
The Nordic leaders sought to advance preparations for renewed American-mediated negotiations, expected in Abu Dhabi in November. They emphasised that they were acting on behalf of their respective countries rather than representing Europe collectively.
Stubb described the exchange as “frank and substantive”, arguing that direct communication with Moscow was necessary to address the security consequences of the war.
However, the Kremlin’s account offered little indication of movement on the fundamental disagreements.
Moscow insisted that any durable peace must fully accommodate Russian interests. A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that Putin had reiterated his refusal to compromise on the objective of controlling the entire Donbas.
Following the conversation, Zelenskyy confirmed that the Nordic leaders had briefed him and stressed to Putin the need for concrete measures to reduce attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
The diplomatic process has therefore resumed without resolving the territorial dispute at its centre.
The military significance of the remaining Donbas
The territory Russia is demanding includes some of Ukraine’s most important surviving defensive positions.
Since fighting began in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Ukrainian forces have constructed and reinforced an extensive defensive system centred on Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka.
Known as the fortress belt, this network combines urban areas, industrial facilities, transport infrastructure, prepared defensive positions and terrain that complicates offensive operations.
The military importance of this system extends far beyond the administrative boundaries of Donetsk.
According to the Institute for the Study of War, surrendering these positions would allow Russian forces to occupy heavily defended territory without undertaking the prolonged operations otherwise required to capture it.
In its 26 October battlefield assessment, the institute continued to identify the capture of this defensive belt as Russia’s principal military objective in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces retained positions in parts of Kostiantynivka, while Russian operations towards other major cities remained contested.
The implications of a negotiated Ukrainian withdrawal would be substantial.
Russia could occupy the fortified urban corridor, reorganise its forces, establish new logistics routes and potentially redirect formations towards other sectors.
Ukraine, meanwhile, would have to construct or reinforce defensive positions further west, potentially under pressure and in less favourable terrain.
The resulting military imbalance would not necessarily lead to another Russian offensive. But it would change the conditions under which any renewed hostilities might take place.
That is why territory cannot be assessed solely by its surface area. A relatively small section of the front can possess strategic value disproportionate to its size.
Why Moscow prefers a negotiated withdrawal
Russia’s insistence on Donetsk also reflects the limits of what its military has achieved.
Despite years of fighting, Moscow has not secured complete control of the region. Successive offensives have produced territorial gains, but at considerable cost and without the rapid breakthrough originally anticipated.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently acknowledged the central importance of the remaining Ukrainian-held territory.
In an interview published by the US State Department, Rubio characterised the dispute as centred on territory Russia wants but has been unable to capture militarily, while recognising Ukraine’s sovereignty and long-term security concerns.
His remarks demonstrate how Donbas has become the principal territorial obstacle in Washington’s diplomatic calculations.
For Moscow, however, concentrating negotiations on this specific demand offers an additional advantage.
If Ukraine refuses to withdraw, the Kremlin can argue that Kyiv is preventing progress towards peace. If Ukraine agrees, Russia obtains strategically valuable territory without the military costs associated with conquering it.
The demand therefore serves a dual purpose: it establishes a public explanation for the absence of an agreement while offering Russia an immediate military benefit should negotiations succeed on its terms.
The problem with treating Donbas as the final concession
The central weakness in any settlement built around a Ukrainian withdrawal is the assumption that control of Donbas represents the limit of Russia’s territorial ambitions.
Moscow’s previously declared objectives suggest a more complicated picture.
In June 2024, Putin demanded Ukrainian withdrawal from four regions claimed by Russia: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Moscow does not fully control these regions, despite claiming to have annexed them in September 2022.
Russia has also demanded restrictions on Ukraine’s military capabilities and future security relationships.
As EU Today previously reported, renewed diplomatic engagement has not produced a clear abandonment of the Kremlin’s wider objectives.
Consequently, transferring the remaining territory of Donetsk would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s other demands.
There is a significant difference between conceding territory as part of an enforceable settlement and withdrawing from defensive positions as a precondition for negotiating one.
In the first case, territorial arrangements form part of a wider agreement establishing obligations, verification procedures and security guarantees.
In the second, one party makes a potentially irreversible military concession before knowing whether an agreement will ultimately be reached.
This asymmetry is particularly important where the proposed concession directly affects the withdrawing country’s ability to defend itself.
The strategy of incremental gains
One interpretation of Moscow’s approach is that it reflects a strategy of incremental territorial expansion rather than an attempt to achieve all its objectives through a single decisive offensive.
After Russia failed to capture Kyiv in 2022, its military campaign increasingly concentrated on taking territory through successive, often prolonged operations.
The diplomatic equivalent would involve securing one concession, consolidating the resulting advantage and subsequently presenting additional demands.
Under such a scenario, Russia could obtain control of the remaining Donetsk territory, establish new positions closer to Dnipropetrovsk region and later argue that further territorial or security arrangements were necessary to protect its newly acquired frontier.
Moscow has already used the language of protective buffer zones to justify military operations elsewhere in Ukraine.
There is no evidence establishing that such a sequence would inevitably follow a Donbas settlement. Nevertheless, the possibility must be considered when assessing the military consequences of a withdrawal.
The concern is not merely that Russia might violate a future agreement. It is that the agreement itself could alter the strategic balance in ways that make renewed military pressure more effective.
There is also an internal Ukrainian dimension.
An agreement requiring the evacuation of cities defended for years would create substantial political controversy. Disagreements over territorial concessions, security guarantees and the credibility of Western commitments could complicate domestic political stability.
For Moscow, such divisions might provide another means of influencing Ukraine without immediate military escalation.
Donbas and the wider question of Ukrainian sovereignty
Donbas has considerable political significance for Putin beyond its military value.
The conflict in eastern Ukraine began in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Donetsk and Luhansk became central to the Kremlin’s justification for intervention, and their incorporation into Russia was later proclaimed as part of the 2022 annexations.
Control of the entire region would allow Putin to present a tangible achievement after years of warfare.
Yet the Kremlin’s objectives have never been confined exclusively to Donbas.
Putin has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s historical and political independence, while Russian negotiating demands have extended to the country’s military posture, international alliances and internal political arrangements.
These positions suggest that territorial control forms part of a broader attempt to determine Ukraine’s strategic orientation.
A settlement that ends fighting in Donetsk without resolving these wider disagreements might therefore suspend the conflict rather than settle its underlying causes.
What the next negotiations must establish
The planned talks in Abu Dhabi will test whether Moscow is prepared to distinguish between its territorial demands and the conditions necessary for a sustainable ceasefire.
An immediate halt to hostilities along existing lines would preserve the military status quo while allowing negotiations to proceed.
Russia has resisted this approach, arguing that a temporary ceasefire could enable Ukraine to rebuild its forces without resolving the conflict.
Ukraine, by contrast, argues that withdrawing from fortified territory without credible guarantees would expose it to renewed attack.
Neither side can be expected to disregard the military implications of the proposed arrangements.
For European governments, the principal question is consequently not simply whether Ukrainian and Russian representatives can be brought back to the negotiating table.
It is whether any agreement can prevent the territorial settlement from becoming the starting position for another war.
Stubb and Støre’s conversation with Putin demonstrated that diplomatic communication remains possible. It did not establish that Moscow is prepared to abandon its existing territorial objectives.
The distinction matters.
Putin’s demand for Donbas offers Russia two potential advantages: a justification for continuing the war if Kyiv refuses, and a substantial military gain if Kyiv accepts.
That does not prove the Kremlin has already decided to resume hostilities after a negotiated withdrawal. It does, however, explain why the terms, sequencing and enforceability of any agreement are as consequential as the territory itself.
The essential question facing negotiators is therefore not only whether Russia can obtain Donbas through diplomacy rather than force.
It is whether the price of that concession would be a lasting peace — or a weaker Ukrainian defensive position if peace fails.
Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre have spoken directly with Vladimir Putin before briefing Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The initiative, undertaken in consultation with Ukraine, comes ahead of planned negotiations in Abu Dhabi but has drawn criticism from other Nordic leaders.
Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday, 27 October, marking an unusual direct diplomatic engagement between Moscow and two European NATO members since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
The conversation, initiated by the two Nordic leaders from Helsinki, was followed by a separate call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. According to a joint statement released by the Norwegian government, the initiative had been prepared in consultation with Kyiv.
The objective was to communicate directly with Putin about efforts to end the war and the forthcoming negotiations involving Ukraine, Russia and the United States.
Stubb described the exchange as frank and substantive, arguing that Finland and Norway had particular reasons to participate in discussions concerning European security.
“We are neighbouring countries to Russia,” he said, adding that the war’s outcome would directly affect European security.
Both leaders reaffirmed their governments’ continuing support for Ukraine while calling for renewed negotiations. Støre emphasised the humanitarian and economic consequences of the conflict and the need for de-escalation.
Importantly, their statement specified that they were acting as national leaders rather than representatives of Europe collectively.
The Ukrainian president thanked them for their detailed briefing and diplomatic engagement.
According to Zelenskyy, the two leaders had communicated Ukraine’s demand for concrete steps to reduce attacks against its energy facilities and other infrastructure.
The discussion also covered preparations for trilateral negotiations involving Ukrainian, American and Russian delegations, provisionally planned for November.
Kyiv’s confirmation that it had been consulted before the Putin conversation is significant. Ukraine has consistently maintained that decisions concerning its sovereignty, territory and security cannot be negotiated without its participation.
Oslo talks establish new diplomatic channel
Tuesday’s telephone diplomacy followed a meeting in Oslo on 20 October involving Zelenskyy, Stubb, Støre and representatives of US President Donald Trump.
American special envoy Steve Witkoff participated in person, while Jared Kushner joined remotely. European and NATO representatives also attended related discussions.
According to the Ukrainian presidency’s account, the consultations addressed possible steps towards ending the war and establishing security arrangements after a settlement.
Witkoff subsequently travelled to St Petersburg on 21 October for discussions with Putin.
The diplomatic contacts have produced plans for another round of talks in Abu Dhabi, expected after 4 November, although the precise date and representation remain subject to confirmation.
The European Commission has also sought involvement. During its 21 October press briefing, the Commission confirmed its participation in the Oslo consultations, which addressed territorial questions, security guarantees and post-war economic arrangements.
As EU Today previously reported, discussions about appointing a European representative to negotiations have exposed disagreements over who should speak for European governments and what authority such a representative would possess.
Moscow maintains its negotiating position
The Kremlin’s account of Tuesday’s conversation offered little indication of a change in Russia’s principal demands.
According to reports citing the Kremlin’s statement, Putin insisted that a lasting settlement would require what Moscow described as full recognition of Russia’s legitimate interests.
He also accused NATO and European Union countries of pursuing confrontational policies that prolonged the conflict.
These statements indicate that the reopening of direct communication has not, by itself, resolved the differences between the negotiating parties.
Russia continues to seek arrangements concerning Ukrainian territory and the European security order, while Kyiv maintains that its sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected.
Denmark questions independent Nordic diplomacy
The initiative has also revealed differences among European governments over direct engagement with Moscow.
Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen criticised the Finnish-Norwegian approach, saying it had not been coordinated with Denmark and warning against individual European countries pursuing separate diplomatic initiatives.
Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson also expressed reservations about contacts that might undermine a common European position.
Their objections highlight a distinction between consultation with Ukraine and agreement among European governments on the organisation of negotiations.
For Finland and Norway, both of which share borders with Russia, the outcome of the conflict carries direct implications for security in the Baltic Sea region and the High North.
The immediate question is whether their intervention can facilitate substantive negotiations without weakening coordination between Kyiv and its European partners.
With the next US-mediated talks expected in November, Tuesday’s contacts establish another channel of communication with Moscow. Whether that channel produces movement on territorial disputes, security guarantees or an eventual ceasefire remains unresolved.
Anziché dare priorità ai profitti delle parti interessate, la coppia Witkoff-Europa dovrebbe concentrarsi sull’architettura di sicurezza eurasiatica e sui confini tra NATO, Russia e Cina per guadagnare terreno a Mosca.
Già nel dicembre 2025, il commentatore statunitense Sundance, scrivendo sul Conservative Treehouse, aveva parlato della nuova soluzione di “diplomazia finanziaria” proposta da Steve Witkoff e Jared Kushner per l’Ucraina, che “richiedeva [l’istituzione di] un sistema in cui l’opportunità occidentale di trarre benefici finanziari potesse continuare”.
Da questa prospettiva, i negoziatori statunitensi «proporrebbero un piano a lungo termine per garantire benefici finanziari continui».Dal loro attuale linguaggio sembra che Witkoff e Kushner siano ancora fiduciosi di poter costruire un sistema di ricompense finanziarie per le banche occidentali, gli investitori, i politici e i funzionari ucraini che consenta di mantenere i benefici della guerra senza l’ingrediente accessorio dello spargimento di sangue.Come ha osservato Sundance —«Se la delegazione statunitense riuscirà a portare a termine questa impresa, allora la Russia potrà ottenere il territorio che desidera, i funzionari ucraini corrotti potranno continuare a sottrarre fondi dagli investimenti, l’UE potrà mantenere il potere di cui dispone per esigere pagamenti finanziari, i politici americani potranno utilizzare i “progetti di ricostruzione a lungo termine” per il riciclaggio di denaro e le banche d’investimento di natura mista pubblico-privata potranno trarre vantaggio dallo sfruttamento delle risorse ucraine».
Da questa evidente visione del mondo del settore immobiliare newyorkese, tutte le altre questioni — i confini territoriali, la sicurezza e l’ingerenza della NATO nell’architettura di sicurezza dell’Asia centrale — non sono che «dettagli secondari» «rispetto a ciò che conta davvero, il denaro».
La diplomazia monetaria, tuttavia, non ha portato una soluzione per l’Ucraina (né, del resto, per Gazaneppure). Ciononostante, Witkoff ha un nuovo piano che David Ignatius ha delineato nella sua rubrica sul Washington Post.
Ignatius sottolinea che, nonostante il recente «trambusto» in Ucraina riguardo ai suoi attacchi alle raffinerie russe, «gli Stati Uniti e l’Europa si stanno orientando verso una proposta di pace congiunta che garantirebbe benefici finanziari e di sicurezza sia all’Ucraina che alla Russia come base per una soluzione territoriale che non soddisfi pienamente gli obiettivi bellici di entrambe le parti». In altre parole, un «incentivo» offerto per persuadere le parti a smettere di bombardare le raffinerie avversarie e ad aprire la strada a questa «nuova» iniziativa.
Se Zelensky acconsentisse a sospendere gli attacchi alle raffinerie, «torneremo in gioco e ci recheremo a Mosca», ha dichiarato un funzionario americano a Ignatius.
In sintesi, il piano in quattro punti prevede un generoso quadro di ricostruzione per soddisfare «le innumerevoli esigenze finanziarie di Zelensky»; garanzie di sicurezza per l’Ucraina equivalenti all’articolo 5 della NATO; l’integrazione economica di Russia, Ucraina ed Europa attraverso un accordo energetico — «Questo potrebbe consistere in un oleodotto che trasporti petrolio e gas russi verso l’Europa, con Ucraina e Russia che si dividono i profitti. Un oleodotto di questo tipo potrebbe ridurre drasticamente i costi energetici europei», ha affermato un funzionario statunitense. Oltre a garantire alla Russia «un accesso a lungo termine al mercato energetico europeo», un accordo di pace specificherebbe come e quando verrebbero revocate le attuali sanzioni economiche contro la Russia.
L’ultimo punto – udite udite – sarebbe un cessate il fuoco lungo l’attuale linea del fronte, ovvero la «linea di controllo».
Sembra incredibile: gli Stati Uniti e gli europei negoziano tra loro, apparentemente ignari delle dichiarazioni esplicite rilasciate dalla parte russa.
Petrolio e gas verrebbero forniti dalla Russia agli europei bisognosi che hanno volontariamente rinunciato alle precedenti forniture russe a basso costo, che sono intrappolati dalle loro stesse decisioni e che denigrano la Russia in ogni occasione. E con i profitti da «dividere» con l’Ucraina? La Russia non accetterà mai una proposta così unilaterale.
Il ministro degli Esteri Lavrov ha dichiarato all’Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite che non ci sarà alcun cessate il fuocoin nessuna forma. Ciò significa che eventuali negoziati dovrebbero svolgersi sotto il fuoco nemico, e Putin ha suggerito che, anche in tal caso, «ci penserebbe due volte» prima di avviare qualsiasi trattativa (sotto il fuoco nemico o meno).
Il portavoce di Putin, Dmitry Peskov, ha confermato proprio la scorsa settimana che «soluzioni e accordi frammentari» impedirebbero il raggiungimento di una soluzione globale; nemmeno un «congelamento» del conflitto sarebbe d’aiuto —
«[L’Ucraina] è una questione estremamente complessa e la soluzione deve essere globale… Abbiamo bisogno di una soluzione per le generazioni future — una soluzione garantita e protetta da eventuali battute d’arresto».
Sembra che gli europei non abbiano compreso che una cessazione delle ostilità in stile coreano (come sostenuto dal generale Kellogg) lungo un fronte in cui due eserciti si fronteggiano sia la ricetta per non giungere a nessuna soluzione. Sono trascorsi 73 anni da quando la guerra di Corea è stata congelata dall’armistizio. Nulla è cambiato.
Il ripetuto ricorso a questo mantra di un cessate il fuoco lungo la linea di contatto, anziché «prima la soluzione, poi il cessate il fuoco», grida ai russi che l’Occidente vuole tenere l’Ucraina in serbo per il momento in cui sarà necessario creare una piattaforma da cui esercitare (nuovamente) pressione sulla Russia in futuro.
Il difetto fatale di questa iniziativa è la sua sordità culturale. Per Witkoff e Kushner può anche trattarsi «di ciò che conta davvero: il denaro» — ma non è così per la Russia.
Se la coppia Witkoff-Europa ricordasse la storia russa, capirebbe perché, per la Russia, la sicurezza, la sicurezza, la sicurezza viene prima di tutto.
Walter Munchau ha messo in guardia proprio questa settimana che «la guerra in Ucraina rischia di intensificarsi» —
«Non dovremmo farci illusioni riguardo a una guerra con la Russia. Non siamo assolutamente in grado di vincere. Quali mercati obbligazionari saranno i primi a crollare? Chi esaurirà per primo i missili intercettori? … Sotto ogni [aspetto] — militare, energetico, finanziario — l’Europa è in svantaggio. E non è tutto. Esiste uno scenario relativamente plausibile in cui l’Ucraina e l’Iran si fondano in un’unica guerra nell’Eurasia occidentale — e diventino il conflitto per procura definitivo tra Stati Uniti e Cina».
Se, invece di dare la priorità alla continua «truffa degli stakeholder», con il suo meccanismo volto a garantire «che l’opportunità occidentale di trarre benefici finanziari continui», la coppia Witkoff-Europa scegliesse piuttosto di affrontare gli aspetti fondamentali del conflitto — la questione più profonda di un’architettura di sicurezza eurasiatica; la definizione di dove si trovi esattamente, dal punto di vista fisico, la frontiera che separa gli interessi di sicurezza della NATO da quelli sino-russi — potrebbe trovare un pubblico più ricettivo nel suo prossimo viaggio a Mosca.
Purtroppo, circoscrivere l’estensione della NATO non è possibile — allo stato attuale delle cose.
President Volodymyr Zelensky's planned Oct. 26 trip to Brussels descended into a diplomatic guessing game, with conflicting signals from his own team leaving EU and NATO officials scrambling to establish whether he was coming — and who was supposed to meet him.
Ukraine, the US, the EU, and NATO plan to meet in Brussels this week to discuss security for Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told Ukrainian TV. The meeting would follow last week’s talks in Oslo and a US envoy’s visit to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Guarantees are what would oblige Ukraine’s allies to act if Russia attacks again. The Paris Declaration laid plans for that commitment in January. Kyiv had a briefing from the Americans, and now the partners want a broad discussion of security and guarantees, Zelenskyy said. Brussels comes ahead of three-way talks with Russia, which the Kremlin says Putin is ready in principle to resume in mid-November.
Zelenskyy: meeting planned for Tuesday or Wednesday
The meeting is planned for Tuesday or Wednesday, 27 or 28 October, Zelenskyy said in the interview, aired on 25 October. The EU would take part at the presidential level and NATO at the level of its secretary general. He did not know whether anyone else would join. He also said Ukraine’s neutrality and limits on its army are not up for discussion.
After Oslo, Witkoff briefed Putin in St. Petersburg
Earlier, on 20 October, Zelenskyy met US special envoy Steve Witkoff in Oslo, with Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre present. According to Zelenskyy, a wider round there included national security advisers from Germany, the UK, France, and Italy, the chief of staff of the European Commission president, and NATO representatives.
A day later, Witkoff met Putin in St. Petersburg and said he had brought papers setting out possible paths to a settlement. He told Putin the Oslo talks had been productive. However, Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov claimed the new ideas from the Europeans and Kyiv that Witkoff relayed held little of use for a settlement.
The gas project was part of an energy deal discussed by U.S. peace envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner during their September visit to the Kremlin, sources told the New York Times.
Russia is ready to resume three-way talks with Ukraine and the US, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in an interview with Pavel Zarubin of state broadcaster VGTRK, published on 22 October. He said they should settle security for both countries after a final peace deal, not a brief pause.
Putin spoke a day after he hosted US envoy Steve Witkoff in St. Petersburg and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he would accept freezing the war along the front line. In May, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov named Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donbas and Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts as the only condition for peace. Any new round would start from that gap: Kyiv offers to stop where the armies stand, while Moscow’s last stated terms demanded more land.
Talks in November
Putin stated that Moscow and Washington had agreed Russia was ready to resume trilateral contacts. He added that he generally agreed with a US point that European security architecture should also be discussed.
On 21 October, Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov stated that the sides had settled on mid-November, with Abu Dhabi as the likely venue.
"Historical Russia"
In a 21 October Fox News interview, asked about a freeze leaving Ukraine 75% or more of its land, Zelenskyy answered: “Yes, right now, we have to freeze.”
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Asked about the land Ukraine would give up, Putin replied that the occupied regions were not Ukraine’s but "historical Russia." He claimed their residents had voted for independence and then to join Russia, and called any talk of territorial losses inappropriate.
Putin linked Russia’s readiness to negotiate to Ukrainians being a people very close to Russians. He claimed the latest genetic studies show they are one people. Independent outlet Meduza noted it is unclear which studies he meant. Putin’s 12 July 2021 essay on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians made the same case, which Ukraine’s national memory institute rebutted.
He closed that answer by asserting Russia would achieve all the goals of what the Kremlin calls its special military operation. He made a similar vow on 17 December 2025.
The peace discussions will begin at the technical level with negotiation teams, Zelensky said. If those efforts prove productive, then meetings between Zelensky, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and U.S. President Donald Trump will be held.
Washington is offering Moscow sanctions relief, commercial opportunities and a possible return to European energy markets. Yet the Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine extend far beyond economic interests, raising questions about whether Vladimir Putin has any intention of accepting a settlement that preserves Ukraine as an independent European state.
The Kremlin has announced plans for renewed negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the United States in Abu Dhabi during the first half of November, reviving a diplomatic process that has repeatedly failed to produce a settlement to Moscow’s war against Ukraine.
Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Friday, 23 October, that the discussions would concentrate on post-war security arrangements. He also left open the possibility of eventual European participation, although the initial meeting is intended to remain trilateral.
The announcement follows talks in St Petersburg between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff. Yet the emerging American proposals reveal a fundamental problem: Washington appears increasingly prepared to offer Russia substantial economic incentives, while Moscow has provided little indication that its political objectives in Ukraine have changed.
The economic bargain taking shape
According to details reported on 23 October, citing The Economist, the American proposals involve Ukraine abandoning its ambition to join NATO in exchange for investment, security arrangements and the prospect of European Union membership.
Russia would receive sanctions relief, renewed commercial relations with American companies and potentially the restoration of natural gas exports to Europe. A demilitarised zone in Donbas is also reportedly under consideration.
The commercial dimension extends beyond theoretical proposals.
American and Russian representatives have discussed investment in the Nord Stream pipeline system and possible arrangements involving Lukoil’s international assets. The negotiations surrounding Russian energy infrastructure suggest that Washington regards commercial cooperation as a potential instrument for securing Moscow’s agreement.
There is no established evidence that Witkoff, Jared Kushner or members of Trump’s family would personally benefit from these arrangements. Nevertheless, the involvement of investors in strategically important Russian assets raises questions about whether economic agreements might advance independently of a settlement acceptable to Ukraine.
The Trump administration has already demonstrated its willingness to relax economic pressure. On 16 October, the president waived major provisions of the Graham sanctions legislation, which he had signed into law only four weeks earlier.
As EU Today previously examined, the decision suspended measures designed to increase the economic costs of Russia’s continuing aggression. Washington justified the waiver on the grounds that sanctions could interfere with negotiations.
Why Putin’s objectives are not primarily economic
The central weakness in a settlement built around commercial incentives is the assumption that Putin’s territorial and political demands can ultimately be exchanged for economic advantages.
Russia’s objectives have never been confined to Donetsk, Luhansk or access to Western markets.
In his July 2021 essay on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians, Putin advanced a conception of the two nations as belonging to a single historical and cultural space. His interpretation, examined by the Centre for Eastern Studies, challenged the legitimacy of Ukraine’s development outside Moscow’s political influence.
These ideas preceded the full-scale invasion of February 2022. They also followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its intervention in eastern Ukraine.
Putin’s demands therefore concern more than military geography. They involve the extent to which Ukraine can exercise independent political authority, determine its international alliances and integrate with Western institutions.
Even a settlement granting Moscow substantial territory could leave this larger objective unresolved.
An independent Ukraine, increasingly integrated into the European economy and protected by Western security commitments, would remain outside Russia’s political control. For a Kremlin leadership that has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s separate historical identity, such an outcome would represent a limitation on its wider ambitions.
This creates an apparent contradiction. Why would Moscow return to negotiations if its broader objectives remain incompatible with the proposed settlement?
One explanation is that participation itself offers Russia strategic advantages.
Negotiations can preserve diplomatic engagement with Washington, complicate attempts to introduce additional sanctions and maintain American pressure on Kyiv to accept territorial concessions.
They also provide opportunities to negotiate economic arrangements before fundamental security questions have been resolved.
For Putin, the political timetable in Washington is relevant. Trump’s presidency is constitutionally limited to January 2029. Moscow can seek to exploit the present administration’s interest in a diplomatic agreement while continuing military operations.
None of this establishes that Putin has definitively rejected compromise. However, the Kremlin’s willingness to attend negotiations is not equivalent to a willingness to abandon its demands.
Russia continues attacking Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure. As EU Today reported on 22 October, Russian forces launched 21 ballistic missiles against Kyiv shortly after Witkoff’s discussions with Putin.
The simultaneous pursuit of diplomatic engagement and military pressure allows Moscow to negotiate while attempting to alter conditions on the battlefield.
Europe cannot be treated as an economic bargaining chip
The proposed return of Russian gas exposes another contradiction in Washington’s approach.
The European Commission reiterated on 19 October that it had no plans to reverse its position. Reopening Nord Stream would also face sanctions, infrastructure and political obstacles, particularly in Germany.
Consequently, Washington cannot independently promise Moscow renewed access to European energy markets.
A settlement negotiated primarily between Washington and Moscow would therefore depend on European decisions over which neither government has unilateral authority.
This helps explain the significance of Peskov’s remarks about possible European participation. Moscow needs European cooperation to secure meaningful sanctions relief and access to markets, even while seeking to negotiate Europe’s security arrangements principally with Washington.
The unresolved question
Trump’s approach rests on the proposition that economic incentives can make a settlement more attractive to Moscow than continued warfare.
Putin’s position presents a different calculation. The Russian president must weigh the benefits of restored commercial relations against the political implications of recognising Ukraine’s durable independence and Western orientation.
Those objectives may prove incompatible.
A settlement that restores Russian energy revenues without credible guarantees against renewed aggression could reduce Moscow’s economic constraints while leaving the causes of the war unresolved.
The decisive test in Abu Dhabi will therefore not be whether negotiators can agree on investment, pipelines or sanctions relief. It will be whether Russia is prepared to accept a Ukrainian state whose sovereignty, political direction and future European integration remain beyond Moscow’s control.
Until that question is answered, renewed negotiations may offer Washington the prospect of a diplomatic achievement while allowing the Kremlin to pursue objectives it has not publicly abandoned.
The hardest part of ending Russia's war is making sure it cannot start it again. As the peace talks have escalated ahead of the US elections, Ukraine is weighing three options for its postwar security.
Among them are NATO membership, direct US guarantees modeled on NATO’s Article 5, and a European “Coalition of the Willing” backed by Washington, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says, according to UNIAN. But none of them have been agreed to yet.
Zelenskyy describes the guarantees as a single package, with each layer still under discussion with partners. All of it, he says, rests on a strong Ukrainian army, in both numbers and quality.
Three guarantees, none of them signed
Everyone counts on NATO, Zelenskyy says, but Kyiv is also negotiating direct guarantees from the US, including an Article 5-style collective-defense clause, alongside the European Coalition of the Willing that would act together with Washington. The arithmetic, he said, is already done.
“Our colleagues in Europe and America know this. We have already calculated everything: both the financing and the corresponding number of our soldiers, so that our state can be at peace,” he states.
Why Zelenskyy says even Russia should want Ukraine in NATO
He went further, arguing that NATO membership would serve not only Ukraine and the Alliance but also Russia.
“I think, honestly, the Russians need our accession to NATO too, because for them that is more security than Ukraine outside NATO,” he claims.
The talks come as Washington pushes toward negotiations. Zelenskyy says he expects signals from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio within a day or two, as well as a call with envoy Steve Witkoff. He adds that Jared Kushner, on his way to Kyiv in November, told him Russia supports a trilateral meeting of the US, Ukraine, and Russia, at the level of technical teams.
For years, Father Joseph Coleman had little ability to influence what happened to his father, Stephen Hubbard, an American retiree imprisoned in Russia after being captured in Izium, a city in Ukraine’s Kharkiv Oblast occupied by Russian forces in 2022.
Fox News host Brian Kilmeade posted a video clip of himself on the social platform X criticizing special envoy Steve Witkoff’s comment calling Russian President Vladimir Putin “a humanitarian.” “The Russians must be laughing their heads off,” Kilmeade said in the video. “That just makes you look naive. A humanitarian? This guy kills his opponents,…
US President Donald Trump has failed to reach an agreement with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin on halting strikes against Ukraine's energy infrastructure. However, Trump is trying to shift the blame for this failure onto President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, he said on The Diary of a CEO podcast.
His words came amid Russia's four record waves of ballistic missile attacks, after US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff described Putin as a "humanitarian." Previously, US officials cut Kyiv off from US intelligence and lowered a speed cap on Starlink to pressure Ukraine into stopping strikes on Russia's oil refineries that bring Moscow revenue for its war.
Trump pins the problem on Kyiv, not Putin
Zelenskyy explained the behavioral pattern behind Trump's recent actions and statements. At first, Putin rejected his proposal for a ceasefire. Then, the US president blamed it all on him, explaining to his people that world fuel prices are rising because of him, which is not true at all, said the Ukrainian leader.
He pointed to the blocked Strait of Hormuz shipping chokepoint, not Ukraine’s refinery campaign, as the driver of higher prices.
He also noted that the volumes of diesel allowed by the US are insufficient to lower global oil prices.
Even so, Zelenskyy said he keeps a working relationship with Trump. What he will not accept is being cast as the villain in Russia’s war: by his account, the US president is rewriting the context, turning Ukraine’s leader into the target for a problem that starts in Moscow.
Earlier, experts said the diesel deal was unlikely to meaningfully lower diesel prices. For Putin, the agreement itself was a win.
A former senior State Department official says it hardly matters whether the fuel arrives, because Putin “has already achieved the result he wants,” with Trump believing he has a pre-election card that could move markets.
Instead of prioritizing stakeholder profit, the Witkoff-Europe combo should address Eurasian security architecture and NATO-Russia-China frontiers to gain traction in Moscow.
Back in December 2025, U.S. commentator Sundance, writing in the Conservative Treehouse, wrote about Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner’s new ‘Money Diplomacy’ solution for Ukraine that “require[d] [the establishment of] a system whereby the western opportunity for financial benefit continues”. From this perspective, the U.S. negotiators would “propose a long-term plan for continued financial benefit”.
From their current language it appears that Witkoff and Kusher are still confident they can construct a financial reward system for western banks, investors, politicians and Ukraine officials that will retain the benefits of war without the ancillary ingredient of bloodshed.
As Sundance noted —
“If the U.S. delegation can pull this off, then Russia can gain the territory they want, corrupt Ukraine officials can keep skimming investment money, the EU can retain the power it wants to extract financial payments, American politicians can use the “long-term recovery projects” for money laundering, and quasi-public/private investment banks can benefit from the exploitation of Ukraine resources”.
From this evident New York real estate worldview, all other issues — territorial boundaries, security and NATO’s encroachment into Central Asia’s security architecture — are but ‘downstream details’ “to the stuff that really matters, the money”.
Monetary diplomacy, however, has not brought a solution for Ukraine (nor for that matter, for Gazaeither). Nonetheless, Witkoff has a new plan that David Ignatius has outlined in his column at the Washington Post.
Ignatius highlights that despite the recent Ukraine “flap” over its targetting of Russian refineries, “the U.S. and Europe are moving toward a joint peace proposal that would deliver financial and security benefits to both Ukraine and Russia as a baseline for a territorial settlement that falls short of both sides’ war aims”. In other words, ‘a sweetener’ dangled to persuade the sides to stop bombing each other’s refineries and to open the path for this ‘new’ initiative.
If Zelensky agrees to halt refinery attacks, “we’re back in, and we go to Moscow”, an American official told Ignatius.
In gist, the 4-point plan envisages a generous reconstruction framework to meet “Zelensky’s myriad cash needs”; security guarantees for Ukraine equivalent to NATO’s Article 5; the economic integration of Russia, Ukraine and Europe through an energy deal — “This might consist of a pipeline carrying Russian oil and gas to Europe with Ukraine and Russia splitting the profits. Such a pipeline could sharply reduce European energy costs”, a U.S. official said. In addition to providing Russia with “long-term access to the European energy market”, a peace deal would specify how and when existing economic sanctions on Russia would be removed.
The final point – wait for it — would be a ceasefire along the existing front line, or the ‘line of control’.
It seems extraordinary: The U.S. and Europeans negotiate amongst themselves, seemingly oblivious to the explicit statements issued by the Russian side.
Oil and gas would be supplied by Russia to the needy Europeans who voluntarily forsook their earlier cheap Russian supply, who are trapped by their own decisions and who denigrate Russia at every opportunity. And with the profits to be “split” with Ukraine? No way will Russia accept such a one-sided proposal.
FM Lavrov said at the UNGA no ceasefireunder any format. That means that any negotiations would have to take place under fire, and Putin has suggested that even then, he would ‘think twice’ about starting any negotiations (whether under fire or not).
Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed just last week that “piecemeal solutions and agreements” would prevent a comprehensive settlement from being reached; a “freeze” of the conflict would not help either —
“[Ukraine] is a highly complex matter, and the settlement must be comprehensive … We need a solution for future generations — one that is guaranteed and safeguarded against setbacks”.
It seems that the Europeans have not grasped that a Korean-style cessation of hostilities (as argued by General Kellogg) along a front where two militaries face each other is a recipe for precisely no solution. It has been 73 years since the Korean War was frozen by armistice. Nothing has changed.
The repeated return to this mantra of a ceasefire along line of contact, rather than solution first; ceasefire last, shouts out to the Russians that the West wants to keep Ukraine in the locker-room for the time when a platform from which to exert pressure (again) on Russia in the future is to be jacked-up.
The fatal flaw to this initiative is its cultural deafness. For Witkoff and Kushner it may be “all about the stuff that really matters – money” — but that is not the case for Russia.
If the Witkoff-Europe combo recalled Russian history, they would understand why, for Russia, security, security, security comes top.
Walter Munchau cautioned just this week that “the Ukraine war risks escalating” —
“We should be under no illusion about a war with Russia. We are absolutely not in a position to win. Whose bond markets are going to be blown up first? Who is going to run out of interceptor missiles first? … On every [count] — military, energy, finance — Europe is at a disadvantage. That’s not all. There is a relatively plausible scenario in which Ukraine and Iran merge into a single West Eurasian war — and become the ultimate proxy conflict between the U.S. and China”.
If, instead of putting continued ‘stakeholder’ grift first, with its mechanism to ensure “that the western opportunity for financial benefit continues”, the Witkoff-Europe combo chose rather to address the fundamentals to the conflict — the deeper question of a Eurasian security architecture; the definition of where exactly the frontier that separates NATO security interests from those of Sino-Russian interests physically lies — they might find a more receptive audience on their next trip to Moscow.
Alas, circumscribing NATO’s extent is not possible – as things stand.
Russia launched 21 ballistic missiles against Kyiv in three successive waves overnight on 21–22 October, striking residential buildings, energy facilities and transport infrastructure just hours after President Vladimir Putin held peace negotiations with US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff in St Petersburg.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed on Thursday morning that at least two people had been killed and 34 injured, including five children, in Russian attacks affecting 12 Ukrainian regions. The capital sustained extensive damage, with strikes reported against railway and metro infrastructure, shopping centres, industrial premises and a monastery.
The bombardment followed a three-hour meeting between Witkoff and Putin on Wednesday, during which the Russian president indicated his willingness to resume trilateral negotiations involving Moscow, Washington and Kyiv. The Russian attacks continued despite the diplomatic initiative, prompting Zelenskyy to call for renewed international pressure on the Kremlin.
Kyiv Under Three Waves of Ballistic Missiles
In a statement published on Telegram, Zelenskyy said Russian forces had launched three waves of ballistic missiles against the Ukrainian capital, causing numerous direct hits and widespread destruction.
The Ukrainian president referred sarcastically to Russia’s supposed humanitarian intentions, an apparent reference to Witkoff’s description of Putin as a humanitarian during their meeting the previous day.
Emergency services were deployed across several districts of Kyiv, where residential and commercial buildings suffered damage. Part of the capital’s metro infrastructure on the Southern Bridge was affected, disrupting traffic, while a strike on an ambulance station in the Pecherskyi district damaged six emergency vehicles. No medical personnel were injured at that location.
According to Ukrainian military and emergency service reports, the overnight assault also involved 210 attack drones and several types of missiles, including Iskander-M, S-400, Zircon and Oniks weapons.
By Thursday morning, Ukrainian air defences had intercepted or suppressed 181 drones. Russian weapons struck 32 locations, while debris from intercepted drones fell at eight others.
The assault followed several consecutive days of Russian attacks against Kyiv, including earlier strikes on hospitals, residential buildings and the capital’s transport network.
Witkoff’s Meeting with Putin
The timing of the latest bombardment placed renewed scrutiny on Washington’s diplomatic engagement with Moscow.
On 21 October, Witkoff met Putin at the Konstantin Palace in St Petersburg, accompanied by Russian officials, including Kirill Dmitriev, the Kremlin’s representative for international economic cooperation. The discussions lasted approximately three hours.
Following the St Petersburg meeting, Witkoff described the discussions as constructive and indicated that negotiations would continue at the technical level between representatives of the United States, Russia and Ukraine.
Putin reportedly expressed agreement in principle to restarting trilateral negotiations, potentially during the first half of November. However, no agreement on a ceasefire or suspension of Russian attacks was announced.
The meeting also attracted controversy after Witkoff praised Putin as a humanitarian following the release of Stephen Hubbard, a 74-year-old American citizen who had been detained in Russia for more than four years.
The remarks prompted criticism from Republican lawmakers in Washington, who questioned the characterisation of the Russian president while Moscow continued its military campaign against Ukraine.
Zelenskyy Calls for Pressure Rather Than Diplomatic Concessions
Zelenskyy characterised the overnight missile attack as evidence that Russia’s participation in negotiations had not produced any substantive change in its conduct.
He argued that diplomatic efforts to end the war should continue but must be accompanied by measures capable of altering Moscow’s military calculations.
Those measures, according to the Ukrainian president, include stronger air defence capabilities, faster deliveries of interceptor missiles, the ability to destroy Russian ballistic missile launchers and continued economic sanctions.
The latest attacks also place Ukraine’s air defence requirements firmly within the ongoing negotiations with Washington. Kyiv has repeatedly sought additional Patriot missiles and more reliable advance warning of Russian ballistic launches, particularly as repeated strikes place increasing demands on its interception capabilities.
For the Trump administration, the immediate question is whether Russia’s stated willingness to negotiate can produce verifiable commitments to reduce hostilities.
The Kremlin has offered the prospect of further talks without announcing a halt to its offensive operations. Kyiv, meanwhile, continues to face missile and drone attacks against civilian infrastructure even as discussions concerning a possible settlement proceed.
The events of 21–22 October leave Washington’s diplomatic initiative moving forward against the background of an expanding Russian aerial campaign, with no indication that Moscow intends to suspend its attacks while negotiations continue.
Russia freed an American imprisoned for the last four years. Stephen Hubbard was captured in Eastern Ukraine and convicted of fighting against Russia. The 74-year-old retired teacher was reportedly freed without a swap. U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff greeted Hubbard in St. Petersburg. He also met with the Russian president and praised Putin in unusually glowing terms. Nick Schifrin reports.
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