The closure of Novaya Gazeta, one of Russia’s last independent newspapers is a chilling reminder that authoritarian governments have always understood the danger posed by journalists who refuse to toe the official line.

There are few more revealing characteristics of an authoritarian regime than its determination to silence independent journalism. Governments confident in their legitimacy do not need to fear awkward questions, investigative reporting or newspapers which challenge the official narrative. Those which seek to control every aspect of public life, however, understand that an independent press represents a threat to their authority.

The announcement that Russia’s celebrated independent newspaper, Novaya Gazeta, is to cease operations is therefore about considerably more than the disappearance of another media organisation. It represents another deeply disturbing milestone in President Vladimir Putin’s systematic dismantling of what remains of independent public life in Russia.

For more than three decades, Novaya Gazeta stood as one of the most important remaining symbols of independent Russian journalism. Established in 1993, with financial support from former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, it emerged during a brief period of optimism following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Its journalists investigated corruption, exposed abuses of power, documented human rights violations and challenged the increasingly authoritarian direction of Russian politics. It was never an entirely comfortable publication for the Kremlin. That, of course, was precisely its purpose.

Now, editor-in-chief Sergei Sokolov, a beacon of independent journalism in a country where professional courage increasingly carries extraordinary personal risks, has announced that the newspaper can no longer continue.

The editorial team has attributed its demise to sustained pressure from Russian authorities and security services. Sokolov has said that on November 9 the newspaper will switch off its servers, leave its historic premises and bring its operations to an end.

The timing and manner of the closure are particularly significant. This was not simply a newspaper struggling commercially or losing its readership. According to the newspaper, its ability to function had been progressively dismantled: its media registration was revoked, its websites blocked, its printing facilities taken away, its financial support disrupted and its journalists subjected to searches, detention and criminal investigations.

In September, the entire editorial team was designated as foreign agents. In October, Sokolov’s home was searched and he was questioned by investigators. Journalist Oleg Roldugin had already been arrested and placed under house arrest. The newspaper was also ordered to vacate its historic Moscow headquarters.

One does not have to agree with every editorial position taken by Novaya Gazeta to recognise the significance of what has happened. Indeed, that is the very essence of press freedom: journalists must be free to investigate, question and criticise without first obtaining the approval of those they are investigating.

Sergei Sokolov deserves particular recognition. In an increasingly hostile environment, he continued to lead a newsroom whose journalists understood that reporting the truth was not merely a professional obligation but a responsibility to Russian society. His determination to keep the publication operating, even after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, deserves admiration.

He inherited a formidable legacy. Former editor Dmitry Muratov, who shared the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize for his defence of freedom of expression, had helped establish the newspaper’s reputation as a fearless investigative publication. Six of its journalists and contributors were murdered, including the internationally renowned investigative reporter Anna Politkovskaya, whose reporting exposed alleged abuses committed during Russia’s wars in Chechnya.

Their deaths remain a terrible indictment of the dangers confronting journalists who challenge powerful interests in Russia. Sokolov’s decision to keep working despite intimidation and the threat of prosecution is a reminder that journalism is sometimes an act of extraordinary personal courage.

Yet the significance of this closure extends far beyond one newspaper and its employees. It illustrates a familiar pattern in authoritarian politics: first discredit independent journalists, then restrict their funding, impose increasingly punitive regulations, criminalise inconvenient reporting and ultimately remove the institutions themselves.

The terminology is often carefully chosen. Journalists become foreign agents. Investigations become threats to national security. Criticism becomes disinformation. Opposition to government policy is portrayed as disloyalty to the nation. It is an approach familiar from the darkest chapters of European history.

An authoritarian regime’s fear of the truth

Putin’s Russia is hardly alone in understanding the political usefulness of controlling information. Throughout history, authoritarian governments have sought to monopolise the means by which citizens receive information.

The Soviet Union perfected the practice through censorship, state-controlled newspapers and the persecution of journalists who refused to conform. Independent thought was treated as a political offence, while propaganda was presented as patriotism.

There is an uncomfortable historical irony in the fact that Novaya Gazeta emerged from the relative openness of the post-Soviet period, only to be extinguished under a Russian president who has increasingly embraced the methods of the political system that preceded it.

The newspaper’s closure is also part of a much wider campaign. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, independent Russian journalists have faced increasingly restrictive censorship legislation, prosecutions and intimidation. Many have fled abroad. Others have been imprisoned or forced into silence.

The Kremlin has not simply sought to influence the national conversation. It has sought to determine which conversations Russians are permitted to have.

A government which controls the media can attempt to control the historical record, the public understanding of military failures, the exposure of corruption and, ultimately, the political choices available to its citizens. Without independent reporting, the public is left increasingly dependent upon information supplied by the very institutions whose actions require scrutiny.

Europe’s responsibility

There should be no complacency in European capitals about what this means.

Freedom of expression is not an optional extra in a democratic society. Nor is it a privilege which governments can withdraw when reporting becomes politically inconvenient.

The European Union has repeatedly condemned Russia’s persecution of independent journalists. In 2022, the then EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell specifically highlighted the intimidation which had forced Novaya Gazeta to suspend its activities. The European Court of Human Rights also ruled against Russia in cases involving restrictions on the newspaper and other journalists.

Those commitments must now translate into practical support for independent Russian journalism operating in exile and for those journalists who continue to take extraordinary risks inside Russia. The continued existence of Novaya Gazeta Europe, established by journalists who left Russia following the invasion, is encouraging. But it cannot replace the work of an independent newsroom reporting from Moscow itself.

Europe must also remember that defending press freedom means defending the principle universally, including when journalists publish opinions with which European governments or their supporters strongly disagree.

The newspaper may disappear. Its legacy will not.

There is something particularly tragic about the departure of Novaya Gazeta. Its journalists continued working long after many would reasonably have concluded that the personal and professional risks had become intolerable.

Sergei Sokolov deserves to be remembered among those journalists who refused to surrender their professional principles when confronted by an increasingly powerful and intolerant state. His newspaper’s closure should not be interpreted as a victory for the Kremlin. It is, rather, an admission of how profoundly threatened an authoritarian government can feel by the simple act of independent reporting.

Putin may be able to close the offices, disable the servers and remove the newspaper’s name from Russia’s media landscape. He cannot, however, erase the investigations, the testimony, the historical record or the courage of those who produced them. The six journalists who lost their lives because of their work deserve to be remembered. So do those who remain in prison, those forced into exile and those who continue to report despite intimidation.

A government that fears its journalists has something to hide. A government that silences them has something to fear. The disappearance of Novaya Gazeta is not merely a Russian tragedy. It is a warning to every democracy that takes freedom of expression for granted.

And it is a reminder that when independent journalism dies, democracy is invariably among its victims.

Bernardo Valente, o professor de relações internacionais na Universidade de Lisboa, considera que o Putin não aceita uma reunião presencial com Zelensky, porque acha vai vencer a guerra na Ucrânia.

Kiev sugeriu, várias vezes, um encontro pessoal entre os dois líderes, mas o Kremlin tem recusado e sugerido a ida de Zelensky a Moscovo. A Ucrânia teme tentativa de "fuga de responsabilidades".

© POOL/AFP via Getty Images

The planned resumption of trilateral negotiations between Ukraine, Russia and the United States in Abu Dhabi in early November is already being presented in several Western capitals as evidence that diplomacy has regained its momentum, but a return to the negotiating table should not be confused with genuine progress toward

If Western nations keep attempting to "inflict a strategic defeat" on Moscow they may get a war instead, Putin threatened. 

The post Putin Warns Russia is Ready For War With Europe, Would Turn Baltic Sea Into Second Strait of Hormuz appeared first on Breitbart.

The Kremlin is seeking to avoid a face-to-face meeting between President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin by proposing they speak by phone instead, the Kyiv Independent has learned.

The apparent move comes as Kyiv insists the two leaders should meet in person to address the most pressing issues

Bruno Cardoso Reis alerta que o Trump não possui qualquer estratégia clara de saída do conflito. O historiador afirma que a diplomacia exige lidar com inimigos e não só com os amigos. 

The evacuation of civilians from Russian-occupied Oleshky offers a rare humanitarian breakthrough in a war that has produced precious few. Yet behind the diplomatic congratulations and carefully managed publicity lies a striking contradiction: Moscow is receiving international recognition for helping rescue people whose suffering is inseparable from its own occupation. For Vladimir Putin, it is an opportunity to appear conciliatory without changing his military objectives. For Donald Trump, it is a diplomatic achievement conveniently timed ahead of the American congressional elections.

In Oleshky, the humanitarian convoys have finally arrived. So have the television cameras. After more than four years of Russian occupation, hunger and isolation, the surviving inhabitants of this devastated Ukrainian town have suddenly found themselves at the centre of international diplomacy.

Their predicament has acquired a political significance extending far beyond the immediate question of how to get food into Oleshky and its people out.

On Friday, 30 October, Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office, confirmed that humanitarian assistance had reached the town and transport was ready for residents wishing to evacuate to Ukrainian-controlled territory.

Ukraine’s Human Rights Commissioner, Dmytro Lubinets, is coordinating the operation. Twenty-five buses, capable of transporting 750 passengers, together with ambulances for vulnerable residents, have been prepared.

The temporary ceasefire, which began on 27 October, is scheduled to expire on 1 November.

The number of evacuees remains uncertain. Ukraine’s prime minister withdrew an earlier estimate, explaining that the figures were changing and that premature disclosures could compromise the mission.

For civilians who have endured years of occupation, the operation offers something considerably more valuable than diplomatic recognition: a chance to survive.

For the governments involved, however, the calculations are rather different.

The concession that costs Putin remarkably little

The White House announced the agreement on 23 October, crediting Melania Trump with securing the humanitarian ceasefire.

It was an unusual intervention by an American First Lady, and one that Ukrainian officials have publicly welcomed.

But the limited scope of the arrangement deserves attention.

Moscow has agreed to suspend hostilities temporarily, permit humanitarian deliveries and facilitate civilian evacuations. It has not agreed to withdraw its forces, reconsider its territorial demands or substantially alter its conduct of the wider war.

The political return, meanwhile, could be considerable.

Russia can demonstrate cooperation with Washington. The Trump administration can point to a negotiated outcome. The First Lady receives international recognition for a humanitarian initiative.

All this comes just days before the American congressional elections on 3 November, offering the White House a visible diplomatic success without requiring the Kremlin to sacrifice anything strategically important.

Whether the operation will actually deliver Republican votes is another matter. There is no evidence that it will materially influence electoral preferences.

But the publicity value is unmistakable.

For Putin, the arrangement offers something perhaps more useful than an electoral favour to Trump: an opportunity to cultivate the image of a reasonable negotiating partner while preserving Russia’s freedom of military action.

The occupying power as humanitarian benefactor

There is a deeper irony in Russia’s new role as a partner in Oleshky’s rescue.

Before the invasion, approximately 24,000 people lived in the town. Today, an estimated 1,700–2,000 remain.

The survivors have endured Russian occupation since 2022, widespread destruction, restrictions on movement and severe shortages of basic necessities. The catastrophic flooding following the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in June 2023 compounded their predicament.

Yet Moscow can now present itself as a participant in relieving the humanitarian catastrophe.

The transformation is politically convenient.

Images of Russian officials accompanying aid convoys may help construct a narrative of humanitarian responsibility, particularly for international audiences unfamiliar with the town’s recent history.

Facilitating an evacuation does not, however, absolve an occupying power of its obligations towards civilians.

Nor should cooperation on a single humanitarian operation be mistaken for evidence that Moscow has reconsidered the policies that produced the crisis.

When survivors become instruments of propaganda

The information campaign surrounding Oleshky is particularly revealing.

On 7 October, Ukraine’s Security Service warned that Russian military personnel were allegedly preparing interviews in which residents would blame Ukrainian forces for their suffering while praising Russian troops.

These allegations require independent scrutiny. But they raise an uncomfortable question: how much weight should be attached to political declarations made by people emerging from years of occupation?

Fear can produce silence. It can also produce conformity.

Civilians dependent upon the authorities controlling their territory may repeat the language of those authorities, whether from conviction, intimidation or self-preservation.

Some residents may genuinely support Russia. That does not make them less entitled to humanitarian assistance.

There is a fundamental distinction between holding pro-Russian political opinions and actively collaborating in crimes against Ukraine.

A state defending its sovereignty need not demand ideological conformity from citizens it seeks to protect.

Indeed, rescuing them irrespective of their political sympathies is a more meaningful demonstration of democratic principles than any carefully staged declaration of gratitude.

Melania Trump and the choreography of compassion

The American dimension introduces its own peculiarities.

The White House has portrayed the ceasefire as an achievement of the First Lady’s personal diplomacy. Yet Washington was not the only party attempting to secure an agreement.

On 16 October, a week before the White House announcement, Pope Leo XIV appealed directly to Putin for a ceasefire in Oleshky to permit food deliveries, medical assistance and voluntary evacuations.

Three days later, the pontiff raised the same issue with Volodymyr Zelensky.

The Vatican’s documented intervention does not negate Melania Trump’s involvement, which Ukrainian and Russian officials have acknowledged. It does, however, complicate the suggestion that the breakthrough was exclusively an American diplomatic achievement.

In the meantime, the publicity surrounding the operation has assumed a conspicuous political character.

On 29 October, Melania Trump announced that four journalists from Newsmax, a broadcaster closely associated with Trump’s conservative constituency, would accompany the mission as neutral observers.

The broadcaster’s involvement was also welcomed by Kirill Dmitriev, the Kremlin’s special representative for international economic cooperation.

The interests converge rather neatly.

Washington obtains images of successful humanitarian diplomacy. Moscow gains an opportunity to appear cooperative before an American audience. The First Lady receives recognition for an initiative that has produced tangible results where much broader diplomatic efforts have struggled.

None of this diminishes the importance of saving civilians. But the political presentation risks becoming an achievement in its own right, potentially obscuring the question of why those civilians required rescuing in the first place.

The ceasefire ends at Oleshky

The military reality provides a rather less reassuring picture.

Oleshky lies on the Russian-controlled eastern bank of the Dnipro, opposite Ukrainian-held Kherson.

According to reporting by Le Monde, Ukrainian officials fear that Russian forces could exploit the temporary pause to replenish supplies and prepare further operations around Kherson.

Such concerns do not establish that a new offensive is imminent. Nevertheless, they highlight the distinction between a local humanitarian agreement and a genuine reduction in military confrontation.

The evacuation route reflects these security sensitivities.

Rather than crossing the Dnipro directly, residents wishing to reach Ukrainian-controlled territory are expected to travel through Russia and Belarus.

The arrangement avoids an immediate frontline crossing but creates separate concerns about possible coercion, screening and freedom of movement.

Meanwhile, Russia has made clear that its willingness to negotiate humanitarian pauses does not imply a willingness to suspend its broader offensive.

The distinction is critical. Moscow can cooperate over evacuation buses while continuing to launch missiles elsewhere in Ukraine.

What Europe should take from Oleshky

For European governments, the danger lies in confusing limited cooperation with strategic change.

The Kremlin has demonstrated that it can make a carefully circumscribed humanitarian concession, receive international recognition and retain its fundamental negotiating position.

The wider implications are significant.

A diplomatic process that rewards Moscow for temporary gestures while leaving its military objectives untouched risks producing the appearance of progress rather than progress itself.

Europe’s interest is not merely in securing occasional humanitarian agreements, valuable though they are. It is in ensuring that negotiations lead towards a settlement that preserves Ukrainian sovereignty and does not leave the continent facing an emboldened Russia.

For now, Oleshky offers no evidence that Moscow has moved substantially closer to such an outcome.

The humanitarian mission may save hundreds of Ukrainian lives. If it succeeds, those who negotiated and implemented it deserve recognition.

But political recognition should not become historical absolution.

The occupying power has agreed to help evacuate civilians from a town it continues to occupy. Washington has secured a diplomatic achievement that places few constraints on Russia’s military ambitions.

The cameras will eventually leave Oleshky. The temporary ceasefire will expire.

And unless something more substantial changes, Russia’s occupation — and the war that made the evacuation necessary — will continue.

When Americans vote in the November 3 midterm elections, Europeans will be anxiously awaiting the results. After nearly two years of abuse by the Trump administration, they are understandably eager for a change of course. A strong Democratic showing will send an important signal politically, including the desire to improve ties with scorned allies. Yet Europeans should have measured expectations about what will change for them practically, as it will take time to repair the damage.

Seguir leyendo

El jefe de la diplomacia rusa, Serguéi Lavrov, estará presente este viernes y sábado en la reunión de ministros de Exteriores del G-20 en Atlanta (Georgia, Estados Unidos). Y su presencia en esta cita anual, por primera vez desde el comienzo de la guerra en Ucrania en 2022, con la consternación de los representantes europeos y sin la participación de su homólogo ucranio —Kiev no forma parte del grupo de países con las mayores economías del mundo, pero había estado invitada a este tipo de citas en años previos—, agita un encuentro que comenzó este viernes para tratar asuntos como ese conflicto y la ofensiva contra Irán. El rechazo europeo al ministro de Exteriores de Rusia ha impedido hacer la tradicional foto de familia de este tipo de citas, prevista en principio para la mañana de este viernes. Eliminada de la agenda, se desconoce si habrá algún tipo de imagen paralela, excluido Lavrov.

Seguir leyendo

© Megan Varner (REUTERS)

O jornal independente russo Novaya Gazeta anunciou nesta sexta-feira (30) que encerrará suas atividades após o que descreveu como uma campanha incessante das autoridades do governo de Vladimir Putin contra o veículo.

A ofensiva incluiu ações de promotores contra alguns de seus principais jornalistas e deixou o jornal sem apoio financeiro e sem sede.

O periódico, frequentemente crítico às autoridades, existe há mais de três décadas e já enfrentou sérios problemas no passado. Seis de seus jornalistas, incluindo a repórter investigativa Anna Politkovskaya, foram assassinados em diferentes circunstâncias.

O editor-chefe e cofundador da publicação, Dmitry Muratov, ganhou o Prêmio Nobel da Paz de 2021 por “esforços para salvaguardar a liberdade de expressão.”

Assim como outros veículos de comunicação independentes do Estado, o Novaya Gazeta passou a sofrer pressão cada vez maior das autoridades depois que a Rússia lançou sua invasão em grande escala da Ucrânia, em 2022, e introduziu amplas regras de censura.

As normas preveem longas penas de prisão para quem desacreditar o Exército russo ou divulgar informações que as autoridades considerem notícias falsas.

“Em 9 de novembro, apagaremos as luzes da casa onde vivemos por 30 anos, desligaremos nossos servidores e partiremos. O jornal não existe mais. As autoridades russas e os serviços de segurança do país obrigaram nossa equipe editorial a encerrar suas atividades”, afirmou o Novaya Gazeta em comunicado.

“Mais de 30 anos de nossas vidas compartilhadas com nosso país e seus cidadãos chegarão ao fim, deixando-nos sem lar, sem meios de subsistência e sob constante ameaça de repressão. Continuamos enquanto pudemos, mas fomos expulsos de nossa casa, e a plataforma de doações que nos permitia receber apoio financeiro de nossos leitores foi fechada. Fomos privados de todos os nossos recursos”, acrescentou o jornal.

Não houve comentário imediato das autoridades.

O Kremlin, no entanto, que acusa serviços de inteligência estrangeiros de tentar estimular o descontentamento na sociedade russa, já afirmou anteriormente que algum nível de censura é necessário em um momento em que a Rússia enfrenta o que descreve como uma luta existencial contra o Ocidente por causa da Ucrânia.

Entenda o que está por trás da tensão entre Trump e Zelensky

 

Education binds generations. But “provided sovereignty” is ambivalent – can you build it for someone else?

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Reflection and outlook

The speech delivered by Vladimir Putin on October 28, 2026, at the Gostiny Dvor in Moscow, at the opening of the plenary session of the Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum, lends itself to two interpretations. The first, the most immediate, reduces it to a catalog: wheat, fertilizers, hydroelectric power plants, scholarships, mobile laboratories, and language models. The second takes it for what it is: a programmatic text that would be translated the following day into the 2027–2029 Partnership Action Plan. The summit is the third in the series, following those in Sochi and St. Petersburg. The continuity of the format already speaks volumes: the Russian-African relationship has moved beyond the phase of declarations and is seeking a framework.

Moscow does not offer Africa a volume of resources capable of competing head-to-head with Beijing or Brussels, and it knows this; instead, it offers a set of infrastructures related to sovereignty – food, energy, finance, digital technology, and education – whose political value exceeds its accounting value. The geopolitical value of this cooperation lies in this gap. Its limitations, which do exist, lie in the very same point.

The word that underpins the entire discourse is “sovereignty.” Putin uses it about twenty times, but what matters is the definition he provides halfway through the text. It is no longer merely about control over territory and borders: sovereignty encompasses the political and financial stability of the system, the availability of food, water, and energy, reliable transportation and communications, and a distinct cultural identity. Added to this list is a further layer: jurisdiction over data, platforms, and artificial intelligence models.

This expanded definition has a precise logical consequence. If sovereignty consists of material and technical elements, then it can be built – and if it can be built, it can also be provided by a partner. Sovereignty thus becomes, in the Kremlin’s discourse, something to be exchanged: Russia provides the technical means by which African countries can reduce their dependence on other suppliers. It is no coincidence that Putin concludes by announcing a “platform for the sovereign development of African states,” designed in Russia and presented at a dedicated exhibition. This formula carries an obvious ambivalence, which we will return to.

The second theme is that of anti-colonial memory. The quote from Thomas Sankara on debt as a form of neocolonialism – in which the colonizers have transformed themselves into “technical assistants” – is no mere ornament. Sankara is a figure who speaks to the new leadership in the Sahel – particularly in Ouagadougou – and whom urban African youth know well. Invoking him in Moscow means situating Russia within an African, not a Soviet, genealogy. The next passage makes the strategy explicit: the continent’s infrastructure was built to export raw materials to the metropolises; manufacturing value-added remains below 2 percent; and intra-African trade accounts for barely 15 percent of a total trade volume of 1,500 billion dollars. This diagnosis is the same as that found in African literature on structural dependence. Moscow embraces this analysis and presents itself as the means to overcome it.

The scale of trade

The Russian president has stated that Russian-African trade will exceed $27 billion in 2025, up from $18 billion in 2022, and has set a target of surpassing $50 billion “in the near future.” This growth is real and, considering that it occurred under the most extensive sanctions regime ever imposed on a G20 economy, politically significant. It indicates that a substantial number of African governments have chosen not to align with Western measures and have paid the price for this choice in terms of diplomatic pressure. Putin openly acknowledges this when he thanks his partners for their “firm and principled stance.”

This is a market thatcan still grow – if that is the goal. China’s trade with the continent is in the range of $300 billion, as is that of the European Union. Russia’s trade is less than one-tenth of either of those figures. Not only that: the balance is highly asymmetrical. Russian agricultural exports to Africa reached 13 million metric tons in the first nine months of 2026, while imports of African agricultural products totaled about $4 billion – 8 percent of Russia’s needs. Putin himself admits that the figure is low and that it will have to grow. This admission is significant because it touches on the most sensitive point of anti-colonial rhetoric: a partner that sells grain, fertilizers, and weapons but buys very little replicates, in numerical terms, the very structure that the discourse denounces.

This leads to an initial assessment. Russia competes in niches where it enjoys comparative advantages that are difficult to replicate: grains and fertilizers, civil nuclear power, hydroelectric power, mining, higher education, and military cooperation. These are sectors in which the quantity of capital matters less than its strategic nature. A country that depends on Russia for wheat and on Russia for its nuclear power plant has a closer tie to Moscow than the monetary value of trade would suggest.

The most important levers: food, energy, currency

The first lever is food security. Over forty African countries import Russian wheat and fertilizers, and for some, supplies have multiplied. This data must be viewed alongside the demographic trends mentioned in the same speech: over 2.5 billion inhabitants by 2050, 70 percent of whom will be under thirty, according to United Nations projections. For a continent with this demographic trajectory, the price of bread is a key factor in political stability, and whoever guarantees the continuity of supply gains a form of credit that does not appear on any trade balance. Putin, however, adds a new element: the provision of seeds, machinery, logistics, and processing capabilities to support African agricultural self-sufficiency within the framework of the African Union’s program. On the surface, this offer reduces dependence on Russian wheat; in practice, it shifts dependence from the product itself to the technological supply chain.

The second lever is energy. The reference to the 55th anniversary of the Aswan Dam serves as historical proof of reliability. The present is entrusted to RusHydro, to modular power generation for isolated areas, and above all to civilian nuclear power, which was mentioned among the forum’s topics. Putin speaks of over thirty energy projects in sixteen countries. Nuclear power has a distinctive feature that makes it geopolitically more significant than any other sector: a power plant binds supplier and customer together for sixty or seventy years, encompassing fuel, maintenance, staff training, and waste management. It is a form of cooperation that outlasts governments.

The third lever – the least spectacular – is probably the most important from a structural standpoint. Putin proposes consolidating settlements in national currencies, expanding banking correspondent networks, opening cross-border branches, and linking Russia’s SPFS to the Pan-African PAPSS. The PAPSS (Pan-African Payment and Settlement System) was developed by Afreximbank in collaboration with the AfCFTA Secretariat and launched commercially in January 2022. The SPFS is the Bank of Russia’s financial messaging system, operational since 2014 as an alternative to SWIFT. The stated goal is to reduce transaction costs and shield payments from “politically motivated interference.” Then comes a sentence that, in the report, goes almost unnoticed: some countries do not have their own financial systems and are tied to European ones, which limits their sovereignty. The reference is to the CFA franc zone. This is the first time, in a speech of this caliber, that the monetary issue has been linked so directly to the question of African sovereignty. The message is directed primarily at the governments of the Alliance of Sahelian States, which have turned the monetary issue into a political one.

This third point warrants careful consideration. The link between the SPFS and the PAPSS, if established, would create a payment circuit between Russia and Africa entirely outside Western infrastructure. The significance of this circuit, however, would depend on the liquidity circulating within it, and liquidity depends on trade volumes, which, as we have seen, remain modest. It is more likely, in the medium term, that the PAPSS will gain significance as an intra-African infrastructure and that the Russian connection will be one component among others, alongside those from China, India, and the United Arab Emirates. Even so, it would be a success for Moscow: there is no need to dominate an alternative circuit; it is enough to contribute to making it possible.

But also technology

The section dedicated to technological sovereignty is the most assertive part of the speech. Putin claims a complete value chain for generative artificial intelligence, two national language models, banking and healthcare platforms, and digital administration systems that he offers to African partners. More than two hundred officials from twenty countries have already participated in skills-transfer programs on digital administration.

Here, the ambivalence of “provided sovereignty” becomes evident. An e-government system, a healthcare data platform, or a language model are not neutral assets: whoever controls the code, updates, and hosting retains the ability to access and influence them. The problem does not concern Russia alone – and applies even more to U.S. and Chinese platforms already entrenched on the continent – but the speech does not address this. From an African perspective, the advantage lies in diversification: having a third provider increases bargaining power vis-à-vis the other two. This is the logic of multi-alignment that many African foreign ministries have been practicing for years, and which Russia supports rather than opposes.

Education is the area where continuity with the Soviet experience is most pronounced. Forty thousand African students are enrolled in Russian universities – a 50 percent increase since 2020 – with 5,500 government scholarships for the 2026–2027 academic year, the Russian-African University Network with over seventy universities in seventeen countries, consortia specializing in mineral resources and transportation, and fifty-eight open education centers in twenty-nine countries. The Patrice Lumumba University remains the symbolic reference point. This is the slowest-moving component of the strategy, and also the one that yields the greatest returns. The engineers, doctors, and civil servants being trained today in Moscow and St. Petersburg will, in fifteen or twenty years, hold decision-making positions in African governments and businesses, bringing with them language skills, technical standards, and personal networks. The generation of African professionals trained in the USSR sustained a significant portion of Russian-African relations for decades, even after 1991.

The same applies to the media. The call to build a “common media space” – through the expansion of regional offices of Russian news agencies and a greater presence of African journalists in Russia – is a response to a narrative competition that Moscow considers an integral part of the game. The African continent is today one of the main arenas where the ability to produce competing interpretations of the international order is put to the test.

Africa is becoming polarized, and Russia is facilitating the process

At the systemic level, this discourse places Africa within the multipolar framework in terms different from those typically used in Western rhetoric. The continent is not viewed as a recipient of aid but as one of the emerging poles of the global economy and politics, represented by three members in the BRICS. The reference to the BRICS’ share of global GDP – which exceeds that of the G7 – must be contextualized, but the political point is clear: Africa is being encouraged to view its demographic and economic growth as a source of power rather than merely a development challenge.

Within this framework, Russia presents itself as a facilitator of African agency rather than as a hegemonic power, and this role suits it for a practical reason: it lacks the means to be hegemonic. It supports Africa within multilateral institutions, where Moscow proposes strengthening the African voice in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It consolidates this support through its backing of the AfCFTA, which Putin cites in positive terms and which represents the only project capable of addressing the fragmentation of African markets inherited from the colonial era. The calculation can be interpreted in realist terms. A more integrated and autonomous Africa reduces the scope for Western influence – which is Moscow’s primary objective – without requiring Russia to make investments it could not sustain.

The benefit for Moscow is threefold. First, the vote: 54 African states carry weight in the General Assembly, and their abstention or non-alignment on resolutions regarding the conflict in Ukraine has already demonstrated how valuable this is. Second, access: critical mineral resources, outlets for agricultural and energy exports, and markets for Russian technology excluded from Western markets. Third, legitimacy: a summit in Moscow attended by dozens of African delegations effectively refutes the claim that Russia is internationally isolated. And, throughout all this, the summit did not address the important military alliance between Russia and the Sahel, a topic for discussion on other occasions.

The success of Russian-African cooperation will be measured by the ability to truly transfer expertise, to localize the processing of raw materials, and to rebalance trade. Herein lies Russia’s greatest challenge: to help Africa, not to make it dependent. Sankara, whom Putin quoted, warned precisely against those who present themselves as technical advisors. African governments will judge Moscow on this basis, not on the words spoken at Gostiny Dvor.

Una persona è morta a Kiev e circa 350.000 sono rimaste senza elettricità nella regione di Dnipro in seguito a una nuova ondata di attacchi russi nella notte. Lo riferisce il Kyiv Independent, citando le autorità ucraine. La capitale è stata colpita da alcuni missili balistici che hanno provocato incendi e danni a diversi edifici. Secondo il sindaco Vitali Klitschko, nel distretto di Darnytskyi sono stati colpiti alcuni magazzini, mentre nel vicino quartiere di Dniprovskyi i detriti dei missili sono caduti nei pressi di edifici residenziali, danneggiando un negozio, diverse automobili e le finestre delle abitazioni.

Nella regione di Dnipro, gli attacchi contro le infrastrutture energetiche hanno lasciato senza corrente circa 350.000 persone, secondo il governatore regionale Oleksandr Ganzha. Le squadre di emergenza sono al lavoro per ripristinare le forniture. I nuovi bombardamenti arrivano dopo una giornata particolarmente sanguinosa, durante la quale un attacco russo contro una stazione ferroviaria di Dnipro ha provocato almeno 14 morti e altrettanti feriti. Mosca ha intensificato nelle ultime settimane i raid contro la rete energetica ucraina, prendendo di mira centrali elettriche e infrastrutture del gas in vista dell’inverno.

L’Ucraina ha sospeso informalmente gli attacchi contro le raffinerie petrolifere russe dopo settimane di pressioni da parte del presidente americano Donald Trump. Lo riferisce il Wall Street Journal, citando fonti a conoscenza delle operazioni militari. La pausa, iniziata a metà ottobre, dovrebbe proseguire almeno fino alle elezioni di metà mandato negli Stati Uniti di inizio novembre e potrebbe estendersi anche nelle settimane successive. Secondo il quotidiano, Trump avrebbe chiesto ripetutamente a Kiev di interrompere i bombardamenti contro le infrastrutture petrolifere russe, ritenendoli responsabili dell’aumento dei prezzi dei carburanti.

La richiesta sarebbe stata ribadita dall’inviato americano Jared Kushner durante un incontro con Volodymyr Zelensky il 20 ottobre a Oslo, proponendo una sospensione di 30 giorni come gesto di riconoscenza per gli sforzi diplomatici di Washington. Il presidente ucraino ha tuttavia precisato che non esiste alcun ordine formale di fermare gli attacchi e che le forze armate restano libere di riprenderli. La decisione arriva in un momento di forte tensione tra Washington e Kiev, aggravata dalle recenti limitazioni al servizio satellitare Starlink utilizzato dall’esercito ucraino. Secondo il Wsj, anche alcuni alleati europei avrebbero consigliato a Zelensky di sospendere temporaneamente i raid per evitare ulteriori tensioni con Trump. La Russia, intanto, continua a colpire le infrastrutture energetiche e le città ucraine.

La delegazione russa guidata dal ministro degli Esteri Sergey Lavrov è arrivata ad Atlanta, negli Stati Uniti, per partecipare alla riunione dei capi delle diplomazie del G20, in programma oggi e domani. Lo riferisce l’agenzia Tass, precisando che l’aereo governativo è atterrato nella capitale dello stato della Georgia dopo un viaggio da Mosca durato 20 ore e 10 minuti, con uno scalo intermedio. La riunione, ospitata dal segretario di Stato americano Marco Rubio, rappresenta uno dei principali appuntamenti preparatori del vertice dei leader del G20, previsto il 14 e 15 dicembre a Doral, vicino a Miami. Non è ancora stata presa alcuna decisione sull’eventuale partecipazione del presidente russo Vladimir Putin, secondo quanto riferito nei giorni scorsi dal portavoce del Cremlino, Dmitry Peskov.

L'articolo Ucraina, i russi bombardano Kiev e Dnipro: ennesima strage. Incendi e danni: in 350mila senza luce proviene da Affaritaliani.it.

Cuando los estadounidenses voten en las elecciones de mitad de mandato del 3 de noviembre, los europeos esperarán con inquietud los resultados. Es comprensible que, después de casi dos años de abusos del Gobierno de Trump, estén ansiosos por un cambio de rumbo. Un buen resultado de los demócratas transmitirá una señal política importante, incluido el deseo de mejorar las relaciones con los aliados hoy menospreciados. Sin embargo, los europeos harían bien en moderar sus expectativas sobre los cambios que va a haber en la práctica, porque se tardará tiempo en reparar el daño causado.

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The third Russia-Africa Summit concluded in October 29 in Moscow with a final declaration deepening strategic cooperation and a 2027-2029 action plan, as Vladimir Putin framed the partnership as a pillar of a multipolar world free from neocolonial practices.

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The 3rd Russia-Africa Summit concluded on October 29 at the Kremlin, where the plenary session approved the final declaration, a specific agreement on artificial intelligence, and the action plan that will govern the 2027-2029 period, presenting the A7 platform as a sovereign alternative to Western banking.

These documents set out the agreed roadmap for expanding cooperation between Moscow and African states while advancing what both sides describe as a fairer international system. A world order free from hegemonies ultimately summarizes the goal declared by the parties.

RELATED: Moscow Hails Africa as Multipolar Pillar Ahead of Russia-Africa Summit

The final declaration consolidates what the Kremlin describes as steady progress toward a just international system, while the separate statement on artificial intelligence opens a new technological front in the partnership.

Alongside the summit, the Economic and Humanitarian Forum also took place, serving as a platform to deepen bilateral exchange. According to participants, the forum sought a joint response to financial pressures and coercive measures imposed by Western countries.

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Una publicación compartida de teleSUR English (@telesurenglish)

Multipolar Order Takes Shape

Addressing the plenary session, Vladimir Putin stated that bilateral relations rest on a shared history of friendship, which he described as the foundation for a global architecture with multiple centers of power and no double standards. In this sense, the Russian President reaffirmed his country’s commitment to international law, the Charter of the United Nations (UN), and the sovereignty of African nations, which he argued is essential for strengthening their economies and social sectors.

The model currently promoted by Moscow combines technology transfer with sovereign investment. Through this approach, the parties reaffirm their rejection of resource exploitation and their commitment to stronger cooperation across the Global South.

Putin insisted that the Russian business model breaks sharply with the extractivism practiced throughout history by the imperial powers of the collective West. “Their approach is the exact opposite. Far from extracting profits in the manner of the colonial practices once employed by former imperial powers, they reinvest their earnings in the development of their national economies,” the Russian leader said.

This combination of technology transfer and sovereign investment, he argued, underpins the rejection of resource plunder and moves forward the integration of the Global South on more equal terms.

🇷🇺🌍 Putin Pushes for $50B+ Russia–Africa Trade and Alternatives to Western Finance

At the Russia–Africa summit in Moscow, Putin called for doubling bilateral trade, expanding payments in national currencies and sharing Russian technology in energy, AI, agriculture and… pic.twitter.com/JJ8ZaU53v3

— Think BRICS (@RealBRICSnews) October 29, 2026

Sovereign Payment Alternative

Russian President Putin underscored the operational efficiency of the A7 platform, explaining that conversions between currencies, digital ones included, are processed instantly, slashing the costs, delays and financial intermediation that have long made Global South trade more expensive.

“Digital currencies are developing all over the world, both in the United States and here in Russia, but why can’t the African continent connect to this high-tech system?” he asked the international delegates. His answer was unequivocal. “This system is sovereign as well. It is not tied to anyone or anything, and nobody is going to block it,” he stressed.

⚡️Russia showcases payment systems operating beyond Western control

Finance Minister #Siluanov highlighted Russian company A7, which is preparing to offer cross-border payment services in #Africa, with transactions processed "in one click" for a fee of just 0.3% pic.twitter.com/xFlbWGK15b

— Russian Embassy in South Africa 🇷🇺 (@EmbassyofRussia) October 29, 2026

Created in the wake of the Western financial measures introduced in 2022, the A7 platform now processes around 2,000 transactions per day on average. It is being presented to African countries as a mechanism for selling raw materials, purchasing industrial inputs, financing infrastructure projects, and importing food using their own currencies, without relying on Western banking systems or their associated conditions and transaction costs.

The action plan running through 2029 supplies the framework for converting the summit’s pledges into concrete mechanisms over the next three years, consolidating what both parties describe as movement toward a just international system.