Ignazio La Russa annuncia un’azione giudiziaria contro una storica per un intervento in tv sull’ultimo decreto Sicurezza e sul passato politico della seconda carica dello Stato. Il presidente del Senato ha dato mandato ai legali di querelare Michela Ponzani che a Otto e mezzo, su La7, ha rievocato il Giovedì nero di Milano del 12 aprile 1973: una manifestazione dell’estrema destra non autorizzata durante la quale una bomba a mano uccise l’agente di polizia Antonio Marino, 22 anni. Con le nuove norme approvate dal governo Meloni, il succo, non avremmo La Russa presidente del Senato perché quel giorno si mise a capo della manifestazione. Pd e Movimento 5 Stelle chiedono che La Russa ritiri la querela.

Il 12 aprile 1973, a Milano, i vertici del Msi organizzarono una manifestazione nonostante il divieto imposto dalle autorità per ragioni di ordine pubblico. Tra i protagonisti anche La Russa, allora responsabile cittadino del Fronte della Gioventù. Il corteo degenerò in violenze e scontri con le forze dell’ordine. Furono lanciate due bombe a mano: una ferì un passante e un poliziotto, l’altra colpì mortalmente l’agente. Per l’omicidio furono condannati in via definitiva i militanti neofascisti Vittorio Loi e Maurizio Murelli. Per Emiliano Arrigo, portavoce di La Russa, dagli atti giudiziari risulterebbe “non soltanto l’assenza di qualsiasi sua responsabilità in relazione a quella tragica vicenda, ma persino alla semplice ipotesi di manifestazione non autorizzata”. A conferma di ciò, aggiunge, il presidente del Senato può vantare “un certificato penale intonso”.

“Invito il presidente La Russa a ritirare la querela annunciata”, chiede Giuseppe Conte. “Chi ha ruoli di grande responsabilità istituzionale non può scagliarsi contro una storica che esprime un giudizio negativo sull’ennesimo decreto sicurezza partorito dal Governo ed espone un più ampio ragionamento evocando il Giovedì nero di Milano. I fatti sono peraltro accertati da tempo: a capo del corteo non autorizzato che si tenne il 12 aprile 1973, a Milano, c’era anche Ignazio La Russa, all’epoca leader del Fronte della Gioventù di Milano, insieme ai vertici del Msi. Quella parata divenne l’occasione per compiere atti di aggressione e di teppismo da parte dei gruppi più estremisti della destra eversiva, in un clima sociale fortemente incandescente”. Il ‘potere di turno’, aggiunge l’ex premier, “lasci al dibattito storico, oltreché politico, la libertà di discutere liberamente senza subire intimidazioni. La conversione alla democrazia va dimostrata nei fatti!”.

Solidarietà alla storica arriva anche dal Pd. I senatori Dario Parrini, Francesco Verducci e Walter Verini definiscono l’annuncio della querela “un atto grave e infondato” e ricordano che la libertà di ricerca e di discussione pubblica è un principio fondamentale della democrazia. “È un triste giorno quello nel quale il Presidente del Senato annuncia una querela contro una storica di valore” che “ha ricordato, correttamente, una pagina buia della storia italiana. Anche il gruppo dem alla Camera contesta l’iniziativa: “La seconda carica dello Stato dovrebbe essere la prima a tutelare la libertà di ricerca e di espressione“.

Al fianco di Ponzani si schiera infine Differenza Donna, che denuncia il rischio di intimidazioni nei confronti di chi ricostruisce pagine scomode della storia italiana. “La ricerca storica non può essere sottoposta al controllo delle autorità politiche”, afferma l’associazione. “Come associazione femminista e transfemminista, conosciamo i meccanismi attraverso i quali si tenta di delegittimare la parola delle donne quando esercitiamo la libertà di parola esprimendo i saperi, quando interroghiamo il potere e mettiamo in discussione le narrazioni dominanti. La democrazia fondata sull’antifascismo ha il dovere di custodire la memoria, non di sottrarla al confronto pubblico”. La conclusione: “La storia non si querela”.

L'articolo La Russa querela la storica Ponzani per un intervento in tv. Conte: “Ritiri, i fatti sono accertati”. Pd: “Dovrebbe tutelare la libertà di espressione” proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

A country with a population of 1.3 million announces that it can strangle the commercial lifeline of the world’s leading nuclear power in a matter of hours.

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A string of provocations, but it’s all just cheap jewelry

Certain statements should be read twice – the second time aloud – to be sure you didn’t dream them. The one that Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna gave to The Times on October 7 falls into this category. Estonia, the minister informs us, would be able to assemble a force of 50,000 experienced soldiers “in a matter of hours” and, again within a few hours, block Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea, which he describes as a vital artery of the Russian economy. For Moscow, that sea is a matter of survival, he added, especially since the Black Sea, he claims, is already closed off. Then, with a sense of timing that no playwright would have dared to imagine, Tsahkna called it “absurd” to describe NATO as an offensive organization.

The minister’s outburst did not come out of the blue. It comes at the end of an autumn that Tallinn has methodically shaped. In mid-September, the government announced it was ready to seal the border if a general mobilization were declared in Russia; on October 1, it banned the transit of Russian and Belarusian wheat; around the same time, the Financial Times reported on elite units being deployed to the border and the purchase of weapons capable of striking deep into Russian territory. The defense budget for 2026 stands at 2.4 billion euros, or 5.4% of gross domestic product. We are looking at a country of 1.3 million people that has chosen to live in a state of constant readiness and to let the world know, every week, just how prepared it is to fight.

The minister was careful to specify that the blockade would be triggered only after a Russian attack capable of invoking Article 5. The clause is about as reassuring as a “friendly dog” sign hanging on the gate of a kennel. Publicly announcing a plan to choke off a nuclear power’s main energy export route remains a deliberate political act, regardless of any qualifying conditions attached to it. Under customary international law, a naval blockade is an act of war; and in the age of severed cables, stateless drones, and oil tankers in the so-called “shadow fleet,” the threshold for what constitutes an “attack” has become elastic. Who decides when it has been crossed? The very same government that denounces a new provocation every morning?

The math of fifty thousand

Let’s focus on the numbers, which are the most entertaining part. According to public data from the Estonian armed forces, the wartime strength is just over 43,000. Of these, only 4,200 are on permanent standby; the rest are reservists and volunteers from the Defense League – brave people who train in the woods on weekends. So, there are no 50,000 “experienced” soldiers in a matter of hours. Unless you count those from other countries.

And that is exactly how the figure should be interpreted. Tsahkna’s 50,000 do not speak Estonian. They are the British contingent stationed in Tapa with its French reinforcements, the navies of Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, the aircraft of a few allies on rotation, and the Americans when they have time. A dozen or so flags, each with its own chain of command, its own parliament, its own public opinion, and its own election calendar. The Estonian minister disposes of that army the way a condominium manager disposes of the residents’ savings: in words, with great nonchalance. Could some assistant please explain to him how to do his job?

Let’s try to imagine the first missile. In London, the cabinet meets and seeks a legal opinion. Paris launches a strategic review, which requires a document and a conference. Berlin awaits the Bundestag’s vote and the blessing of its less-than-convinced coalition partner. Rome seeks clarification at the Atlantic Council; Budapest puts its reservations on record; Washington is busy elsewhere. Article 5, after all, doesn’t force anyone to fire a shot: it obligates each ally to take the action it deems necessary, and “necessary” can mean anything from an aircraft carrier to a note of protest. The oldest debate in any coalition would immediately begin: who steps in first, who withdraws last, who covers whose flank, and who pays for the fuel. Meanwhile, the Estonians would be there counting down the minutes.

European history is all too familiar with this scenario. In September 1939, France and Great Britain had guaranteed Poland’s security with the same solemnity with which Tallinn is guaranteed today. They declared war, and then spent eight months behind the Maginot Line simply watching: the French called it the drôle de guerre, the “phoney war.” Warsaw, meanwhile, had long since stopped laughing.

Let’s now set aside arithmetic for geography, which isn’t swayed by interviews – someone should tell the Minister that! About eighty kilometers of sea lie between Tallinn and Helsinki: it is along this narrow passage that the minister would like to close off the Gulf of Finland. From the Estonian capital to the Russian border at Narva, there are just over two hundred kilometers. Russia’s GDP, in nominal terms, is more than fifty times that of Estonia. The Baltic Fleet is based in Kronstadt, at the far end of the Gulf, and in Baltiysk, in the Kaliningrad exclave; which means, incidentally, that a substantial portion of that fleet is already outside the “plug” that Tallinn dreams of inserting.

Strategists carefully distinguish between three things that Estonian politicians happily confuse: guarding a passage, making its use risky for the adversary, and maintaining stable control over it. The first is possible; the second is costly; the third, against Russia, has never succeeded for anyone. Those who lay mines may fall victim to them; those who deploy coastal anti-ship batteries become, in turn, fixed targets, surveyed down to the meter.

And this is where physics comes in. Russia’s conventional arsenal includes Iskander missiles deployed just a few dozen minutes’ flight away, ship-launched Kalibr missiles, TOS-1A thermobaric rocket launchers, and high-yield glide bombs. There’s no need to bring up nuclear warheads, which remain the favorite bogeyman of Western talk shows. The coastal batteries, depots, command centers, and docks from which our dear friends in Tallinn intend to block the Gulf would go from a solid to a gaseous state in the time between launch and impact. And with them, the solidity of Estonia’s political stance would evaporate, long before an agreement on the statement is reached in Brussels. We’re not writing this to be smug. We’re writing this because, in that scenario, ordinary Estonians would be the first to pay the price, used as pawns by a ruling class that’s playing with fire in its own living room.

Creative accounting for oil

There remains the issue of the “lifeline.” Tsahkna attributes about 60% of Russian oil exports by sea to the Baltic route. Estimates from the Polish think tank OSW – which cannot be suspected of sympathizing with Moscow – put the figure at about one-third of crude oil and nearly half of refined products; and Reuters data from February show that oil continued to ship out from Russian ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, despite the sea being “already closed.” Inflating figures is an age-old rhetorical technique: it serves to make the threat seem more deadly than it is and one’s own position stronger than it actually is.

Moreover, a blockade would not affect only Moscow. Neutral shipowners, insurance companies, freight rates, refineries, and energy prices would all suffer the consequences, and Europe – which in recent years has already paid dearly for its economic war against Russia – would once again bear the cost. There’s even a grotesque detail: in 2025, Estonia sold goods worth approximately 252 million euros to Russia. They’re threatening to cut off their neighbor’s lifeline, but in the meantime, business as usual continues.

Why, then, all the fuss? The answer lies in the role the Estonian ruling class has carved out for itself within the Alliance: that of the permanent vanguard, the most zealous member of the eastern flank, the top student who raises their hand before the teacher finishes the question. It’s a source of privilege. It guarantees attention, funds, allied troops on its territory, and invitations to summits. And it becomes all the more valuable as the possibility of a ceasefire in Ukraine draws nearer – a prospect feared in many Atlantic capitals as the end of the emergency that justifies everything. So the fever must be kept high: a statement every week, a ban every month, a threat of a blockade every fall.

In 1955, Leonard Wibberley published a satirical novel, *The Mouse That Roared*, in which the tiny Grand Duchy of Fenwick declared war on the United States with the sole purpose of losing it and collecting reconstruction aid. The difference with Tallinn lies in the ending. The Grand Duchy counted on losing to a generous power, an ocean away. Estonia is threatening a neighboring power – one that has forgotten nothing since 1991 – and is entrusting its fate to a coalition that has never fought a real war together against an opponent of equal strength.

From apotheosis to casus belli?

Let’s recap. A country with a population of 1.3 million announces that it can strangle the commercial lifeline of the world’s leading nuclear power in a matter of hours. To do so, it relies on soldiers it doesn’t have – lent by allies it hasn’t consulted – based on oil figures that Western sources themselves downplay. It ties all of this to a war that its rhetoric makes a little more likely every day, and in the same breath accuses those who see NATO as something offensive of absurdity. If there is such a thing as the apotheosis of the absurd, it can be found at the Foreign Ministry in Tallinn.

Moscow, to tell the truth, doesn’t even need to respond. Geography does it, the balance of power does it, and the history of European coalitions – which have always found it easier to make promises than to keep them – does it. Deterrence that turns into permanent provocation ceases to dissuade and begins to seek its own casus belli. The Baltic Sea deserves mature diplomacy among the coastal states that will have to share it anyway. For now, it must settle for – a minister who roars – and an audience of allies who, at the first real blow, will look around wondering who should answer the phone.

European leaders are considering appointing a senior representative to negotiate with Russia over Ukraine. But the search exposes a more fundamental problem: whether Europe can transform its economic strength, military resources and political influence into an independent capacity to shape its own security.

Europe is searching for someone capable of negotiating with Vladimir Putin. Yet the question confronting European capitals is considerably more difficult than identifying a politician with sufficient experience, authority and diplomatic skill. It is whether Europe possesses the political unity and strategic independence to negotiate with Moscow on equal terms.

According to diplomatic accounts published on 22nd October, five European leaders have emerged as possible representatives: Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Czech President Petr Pavel, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre.

No appointment has been announced, and a group of negotiators may ultimately prove more acceptable than a single representative. The initiative reflects concern that Washington’s negotiations with Moscow could produce arrangements affecting European security without sufficient European influence over their terms.

The European Commission insists that the EU is already participating in diplomatic consultations, including discussions held in Oslo on 20th October. But participation in preliminary meetings is not the same as possessing the authority to determine the outcome.

The paradox of European power

Europe’s predicament contains an extraordinary contradiction. The European Union is among Ukraine’s principal financial supporters. Its governments provide military assistance, maintain sanctions against Russia and control decisions affecting Moscow’s future access to European markets. Nevertheless, European capitals remain concerned that the decisive political framework for ending the war could be negotiated principally between Washington and Moscow.

This anxiety has intensified under President Donald Trump, whose transactional approach increasingly treats diplomatic settlements as exchanges of economic concessions and strategic advantages.

As EU Today recently examined, proposals involving sanctions relief, renewed energy cooperation and commercial opportunities raise the possibility of arrangements that depend upon European consent but are negotiated elsewhere.

Washington can discuss reopening economic relations with Russia. It cannot independently reverse European sanctions, guarantee Ukraine’s accession to the EU or decide the continent’s future security arrangements. The European Council explicitly reaffirmed this distinction in its conclusions of 16th October, insisting that decisions affecting the Union’s security and responsibilities belong to Europe itself.

The central issue is therefore not whether Europe has influence, but whether it can organise that influence into a coherent negotiating position.

Why Ukraine must help choose Europe’s representative

An equally important weakness would arise if European governments selected their representative without making Kyiv an integral participant in the decision.

Ukraine is not merely the geographical subject of negotiations. Its government controls whether a proposed settlement can acquire political legitimacy, while its armed forces determine much of what can be implemented on the ground.

A negotiated agreement rejected by Kyiv could neither reliably end the war nor provide the security arrangements that Europe seeks.

European security, moreover, can no longer be considered independently of Ukraine’s military capabilities. Ukrainian forces possess extensive operational experience against Russia, including in drone warfare, electronic warfare and long-range strikes.

Any future continental defence architecture that excludes this experience would disregard one of Europe’s most consequential military assets.

An effective European representative would therefore require a mandate developed jointly with Ukraine, rather than simply endorsed by European governments after the event.

The danger of negotiating without leverage

The proposed candidates illustrate the difficulty of combining political authority with negotiating credibility. Meloni possesses a working relationship with Trump and considerable influence within European conservative politics. Stubb combines experience of Russia’s immediate neighbourhood with access to Washington. Pavel brings military expertise and an understanding of NATO’s command structures. Yet none could independently commit Europe’s governments to financial, military or territorial-security obligations.

This is the fundamental weakness of the proposed office. A negotiator requires more than access to powerful leaders. The ability to make commitments, withhold concessions and impose costs is what gives diplomatic representation substance.

Europe possesses potentially significant instruments: sanctions, industrial capacity, financial assistance and growing defence expenditure. But these remain distributed across institutions and national governments with differing strategic priorities.

Poland, the Baltic states and Nordic governments approach Russian security threats differently from several Western and Southern European capitals. Reconciling those positions is not an administrative exercise. It is a prerequisite for meaningful diplomacy.

The historical shadow of Yalta

The search also reflects European concern about a return to great-power bargaining over the continent’s political geography.

The historical comparison frequently invoked is Yalta in 1945, when Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed Europe’s post-war settlement. Munich in 1938 offers another warning about negotiating territorial concessions at the expense of directly affected states. Neither precedent precisely describes the present situation.

Unlike the countries subjected to Soviet domination after the Second World War, today’s European states possess established institutions, substantial economic resources and collective defence arrangements. Ukraine, meanwhile, has demonstrated that Russia cannot simply dictate its political future through military superiority.

Nevertheless, the danger lies in accepting the underlying principle that powerful states possess a privileged right to determine the sovereignty and security choices of their neighbours.

Moscow’s demands concerning NATO, Ukrainian territory and Europe’s wider security arrangements extend beyond any conventional ceasefire negotiation.

A European representative would have to challenge that premise rather than merely negotiate the geographical limits of Russian influence.

From diplomatic representation to strategic authority

The debate inevitably leads to Europe’s military dependence upon the United States. An American withdrawal from NATO is not inevitable. Indeed, US legislation restricts unilateral presidential withdrawal. But Washington could substantially reduce its military commitments without formally abandoning the alliance.

Europe must therefore consider how much independent military capacity it requires to support its diplomatic positions. That entails coordinated procurement, integrated military planning, sustainable defence production and deeper cooperation with Britain, Norway, Canada and Ukraine. Recent security challenges in the Black Sea illustrate the difficulty of converting European diplomatic commitments into effective collective action.

These developments would not automatically create a European army or replace NATO. They could, however, give European governments greater freedom to act if American priorities diverge from their own.

The relationship between military capability and diplomacy is particularly important in dealing with Moscow. European representatives cannot expect Russia to revise its demands simply because Brussels has selected a more prominent interlocutor.

Russia would have to conclude that continued aggression carries greater costs than a settlement respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty. Europe’s diplomatic standing would then derive not from the personality of its representative but from the collective resources and political commitments behind that individual.

The immediate search for a negotiator may appear a limited diplomatic initiative. Its implications are considerably larger.

For decades, European security rested upon an arrangement in which American military power compensated for Europe’s fragmented strategic authority. The present negotiations are exposing the limitations of that model. The decisive question is not whether Meloni, Stubb, Pavel or another European leader can secure a place at the negotiating table. It is whether Europe can establish a common position, backed by Ukraine’s consent and by sufficient economic and military power, that neither Washington nor Moscow can disregard.

Without those foundations, a European envoy risks becoming a participant in decisions made by others. With them, the appointment could mark the beginning of a substantially different European role in international security.

Crimea strikes cause water and power cuts; war game designed to show how Nato countries could be defended amid fears of Russian aggression. What we know on day 1,705

A Ukrainian attack led to water and power cuts in occupied Crimea on Saturday, as a barrage of drones in several regions inside Russia left several dead, according to Russian authorities. Sergei Aksyonov, the Moscow-installed head of the Crimean peninsula, wrote on Telegram that due to the drone attack on local power grids “restrictions on the supply of electricity and water have been put in place”. He did not specify how many households had been affected in Crimea, which is home to more than 2.5 million people. The peninsula, which was seized from Ukraine by Russia in 2014, is a regular target for Ukrainian attacks.

A separate Ukrainian strike in part of the north-eastern Kharkiv region held by Russia killed at least three people and gravely wounded another on Saturday, the Moscow-backed authorities said.

Drones also rained down inside Russia. The country’s defence ministry said 616 of them had been shot down overnight across more than 20 regions of the country. During the day, drones hit Russia’s south-western Bryansk border region, killing at least three people, regional acting governor Yegor Kovalchuc said on Telegram.

In Ukraine, authorities said that at least five people died in several Russian drone and missile strikes in the country’s east. Dnipropetrovsk regional governor Oleksandr Ganzha on Saturday evening said three people were killed and at least 12 wounded when a Russian drone strike hit the town of Synelnykove, setting the fourth floor of a high-rise building on fire. Authorities in Sumy meanwhile said a Russian drone hit a farm, killing a 31-year-old woman and injuring four others.

Thousands of British and French troops have taken part in a military training exercise that included one of Britain’s largest airborne operations in two decades, the UK government said on Sunday. The war game is designed to show how Nato countries could be defended against a modern-day attack and comes during fears about Russian aggression in Europe amid Moscow’s war against Ukraine.

About 2,500 troops were involved in the seven-week exercise, in which 600 British and French paratroopers dropped from four RAF A400M Atlas transport aircraft over Germany. The exercise called Rhino Titan, held at the Sennelager military training centre in Germany, has been testing British troops’ ability against an enemy equipped with drones and electronic warfare. “The threats we face in the 21st century require an updated, modern approach to warfare – and our adaptable armed forces are preparing accordingly,” British defence minister Wes Streeting said in a statement.

Ukraine’s military has a “stable connection to Starlink”, the Ukrainian government said, 10 days after its ability to use the satellite communications system was suddenly restricted. But hours after the announcement, SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, whose company owns Starlink, accused the Ukrainian military of violating ⁠the company’s terms. Neither Musk nor the US government, which operates Starshield using Starlink technology, took responsibility for imposing the curbs.

Bulgarians will vote ​in presidential elections on Sunday as Russia’s war in Ukraine spreads to the waters off Bulgaria’s Black Sea coast. Polls place acting president Iliana ⁠Iotova and ex-caretaker prime minister Andrey Gyurov as leaders in a race of 27 candidates. While the presidency is largely ceremonial, Sunday’s vote has taken ⁠on added significance after a series of drone attacks on merchant ships off Bulgaria’s Black Sea ​coast that likely killed about two-dozen international ‌seafarers.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) announced the detention of a German citizen who, according to the agency, served as a sniper in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). The man identified himself as Michael Friedrich, born in 1976 in Frechen, North Rhine-Westphalia. His testimony was released in a video distributed by the FSB.

According to Friedrich, he is an active-duty member of AFU unit A4024, holding the rank of corporal and serving as a sniper. “I personally signed the contract on December 5, 2025, for a term of three years,” he said.

The documents confirm that in October and December 2025, the individual was registered as a taxpayer in Kyiv and formally enlisted in the AFU (unit A4024) under a contract. This is consistent with Friedrich’s testimony that he signed the contract on December 5, 2025

The detainee said he served in the Bundeswehr from 1996 to 2008. “During my service, from 2004 to 2006, I took part in combat operations in the Republic of Afghanistan as part of the German contingent,” he stated. He then said he took part in operations in Somalia and, after being discharged, fought in Syria as a mercenary from 2008 to 2010.

He first arrived in Ukraine in 2016 and served in the 25th Territorial Defense Battalion until 2018.

“After signing the necessary documents, I was assigned to the 25th Territorial Defense Battalion. I was on the line of contact in the area of the city of Donetsk,” he said. According to his statement, he did not receive any additional training.

He also stated that the battalion consisted mainly of foreign nationals, including citizens of the United Kingdom and Georgia.

“For participating in combat operations, I received the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) participant award – for sacrifice and love for Ukraine,” he added.

After his first contract ended, he left for Switzerland. In November 2025, he returned to Ukraine with military uniform and equipment. In Kyiv, he claims, he signed a new contract with the AFU.

“After signing the contract, I was promised a payment of 100,000 hryvnias. However, I never received the money and was forced to flee from the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” the detainee said.

The FSB said it is considering opening a criminal case under Article 359 of the Russian Criminal Code – “mercenarism.” The article provides for a prison term of seven to fifteen years.

At the same time, the agency did not disclose the location or circumstances of the detention, or how the man ended up in Russia. The German weekly Der Spiegel reported that it had been able to identify the detainee. According to the publication, Georgian Legion commander Mamuka Mamulashvili confirmed that the man had served in his formation in 2017–2018.

Click to see the full-size image

Click to see the full-size image

Click to see the full-size image

Thus, the detainee’s participation in combat operations on Ukraine’s side has received additional confirmation. However, his claims of service in the Bundeswehr and participation in operations in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Syria remain unconfirmed.

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• THE M-FILES: SF Launches Mercenary Database
• Geography of Losses: Citizens of Eleven Countries Among the Mercenaries Killed in Ukraine
• Foreign Mercenaries And NATO Personnel In Ukraine Yet To Learn Their Lesson

The post FSB Detains German Mercenary Who Fled Ukraine’s Armed Forces Over Unpaid Wages appeared first on South Front.

Strategic Culture Foundation | October 23, 2026

Diplomacy, as the saying goes, is the art of the possible. A peaceful settlement to the war in Ukraine is possible if all sides were to engage in genuine diplomacy. That’s the easy, more civilized way.

If not, Russia will achieve peace the hard way through complete military victory.

Diplomacy is being prevented because European politicians, in particular, are held hostage by their own twisted ideology and false propaganda.

Ironically, the NATO proxy war in Ukraine was intended to “strategically defeat” Russia. It turns out, however, that it is the NATO axis that is staring at a historic defeat. The chaos surging across Europe is a manifestation of that failure, driven by higher energy prices and reckless, unsustainable militarism.

Thus, peace in Ukraine is concomitant with peace in Europe, and diplomacy would expedite that to obviate more instability and suffering.

But diplomacy is incompatible with parties who possess a diseased mentality of Russophobia.

Diplomatic engagement involves putting pragmatic interests first, ahead of ideological bias. The pragmatic interest of everyone surely should be to find an end to this nearly five-year war that has caused millions of casualties and runs the risk of escalating to a general war in Europe.

The Trump administration appears to be renewing peace efforts by dispatching a presidential envoy to Russia this week. Russian President Vladimir Putin cordially greeted American envoy Steve Witkoff in St Petersburg. It is unimaginable that any European politician or envoy would be capable of that rudimentary courtesy. Putin reiterated that Russia’s door is open for negotiations.

Diplomacy can create a path to peace sooner, as internationally renowned Professor Jeffrey Sachs advocated in an eminently reasonable presentation this week.

Key issues for a peace agreement include: 1) indivisible security for all; 2) permanent neutrality status for Ukraine; 3) an armistice, not a temporary ceasefire, based on current lines of conflict; and 4) a declaration by NATO to halt its eastward expansion.

The framework for peace proposed by Sachs is similar to Russia’s position. It addresses the causes of conflict rather than only its symptoms.

Professor Sachs points out that these are not new principles. They were recognized and agreed upon in the past by the United States, its European allies, and Ukraine. In the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the U.S., Soviet Union, and European states accepted the principle that security is not a zero-sum game. All states must have a mutual right to security.

On the issue of permanent neutrality of Ukraine, that was declared in its constitution when it established independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The seeking of NATO membership for Ukraine overturns that principle. It was the United States under President GW Bush that initiated the drive for NATO membership with the Bucharest Declaration in 2008, which was repudiated by Russia with the warning that it would inevitably lead to conflict, as history proves.

Sachs also points out that the United States and its NATO allies must return to the pledge made to the Soviet Union in 1989 that there would be no eastward expansion of the military bloc. It is basic common sense that the encroachment of NATO forces on Russia’s borders is destabilizing and a source of confrontation. The relentless expansion is a violation of the principle of indivisible security. Would the United States accept a situation where Mexico was installing Russian or Chinese military forces?

As for the cessation of hostilities and the drawing of territorial lines, that is a thorny issue. Moscow claims that it has a historical right to the territories east and south of the Dniper River, including Sumy, Kharkov, Kherson and Odessa, in addition to the Donbass and, of course, Crimea.

What is unrealistic is for Ukraine to claim the total return of territories that Russia has taken since 2022 (and 2014 in the case of Crimea). From Russia’s point of view, and many international historians would concur, the post-1991 composition of Ukraine was an artifice. It arbitrarily incorporated lands that were historically always part of Russia. These lands were donated to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic by Soviet leaders in dubious schemes of demographic manipulation that did not respect the antecedent cultural Russian ties.

In any case, a framework for a permanent peaceful settlement is feasible if all sides engage in honest discussions that recognize the historical background.

When U.S. President Donald Trump met Russia’s Putin in Anchorage back in August 2025, there seemed to be an acceptance by the American side of Russia’s perspective on addressing “root causes”. Subsequently, Trump failed to follow through on what appeared to be a breakthrough meeting in Anchorage. Part of the problem was the Europeans and the Kiev regime thwarting Trump’s initiative and throwing obstacles in the way of negotiations. European leaders insisted on a temporary ceasefire and NATO peacekeepers, and have persisted in treating Russia like a pariah.

The international context has shifted in a way that makes Trump more amenable. His disastrous war with Iran has blown fuel prices sky-high for American consumers. With the mid-term elections only weeks away, the White House needs some good news to prevent a political wipeout for the Republicans.

Trump made a deal with Putin two weeks ago for diesel supplies from Russia to ease the pain at the pump for American voters. Essential to that is for Ukraine to stop air strikes on Russian oil facilities. The corrupt puppet president in Kiev, Vladimir Zelensky, is defying Trump with churlish remarks and threats to keep striking Russian oil refineries and depots.

One positive thing from the rift with Zelensky is Trump viewing him as the obstacle to a peace deal. Trump is now openly castigating the Ukrainian former comedian and calling for a new president in that country.

The cocaine addict Zelensky, with his loathsome war racketeering, is hanging on to power by a thread, and only because of continuing support from European leaders. These elitist European politicians are driven by anti-Russian ideology and servility to the futile geopolitical agenda of strategically defeating Russia. Europe is witnessing a social upheaval bordering on revolution over the fallout from the soaring cost of living, which is, in turn, a consequence of the NATO proxy war in Ukraine. But the elites have no way to address the chaos because they are the problem.

For all his flaws, and there are many, at least Trump is willing to engage in diplomacy. He is not encumbered with hatred of Russia. His understanding of the root causes of the war may be limited. But at least his administration has the basic quality of respecting Russia as an equal and listening to Russia’s perspective. That is a modicum for negotiations and the art of the possible.

By contrast, the European elites and their pet regime in Kiev are incapable of engaging in any diplomacy. They are obsessed with unattainable and sinister ideological prejudices that hark back to Nazi Germany and the belief that Russians are “subhumans” to be conquered. They have no respect for Russia, nor are they capable of any intelligent, honest discussion about the causes of conflict.

Jeffrey Sachs contends that Trump could promptly end the war and create peace if he were to make a clear policy announcement that the United States is returning to a position whereby it respects indivisible security for all, including Russia, accepts permanent neutrality of Ukraine with no future as a NATO member, and declares that NATO ends its eastward expansion. A rational path to peace is possible.

There will be howls of condemnation from the Kiev regime and its European sponsors. There will be howls too from within the U.S. establishment who share the European ideology of demonizing and belligerence towards Russia. Trump may be so weakened by the mid-term elections that it is not politically possible for him to make such a policy announcement.

So be it. Russia will continue to win its military objectives and demand its rightful terms of peace. Diplomacy offers an easy way to peace. But if the West insists on the hard way, then Russia will deliver that way too. The Europeans and Kiev regime will pay an even higher price with their own implosion.

• A NATO drone maker is partnering with a Ukrainian firm to manufacture drone parts underground.
• ORQA says the partnership offers lessons in keeping factories running during wartime.
• Western companies often overlook Ukraine's experience in manufacturing under attack, it says.

A NATO drone maker is teaming up with Ukraine's defense industry and building drone parts underground. The company's CEO said it's seeking to learn lessons in wartime production that could prove critical for Western defense companies in a crisis.

Croatian drone technology company ORQA and Ukrainian drone maker General Cherry are jointly developing and manufacturing interceptor drones, components, and other counter-drone systems in both countries. As part of the partnership, they are building an underground factory in Ukraine to make components.

Working amid Ukraine's wartime risks teaches the company valuable lessons in manufacturing while under attack, ORQA CEO Srđan Kovačević told Business Insider. Producing components in Ukraine is also more efficient than making them in NATO and shipping them to the Ukrainian military, he said.

Kovačević said his company is "learning from Ukraine," where industry is "under constant threat."

"They were also compelled to go underground, to go wide, to de-risk their assets in distribution," he said. "So I think that's the way forward for any critical capabilities."

Ukrainian defense firms are splitting their manufacturing across multiple sites, frequently relocating, and moving some work underground to avoid being targeted by Russian attacks. It's less efficient, but more resilient to attacks. Some Western officials and companies warn that it's time for European industry to learn these practices amid concerns about Russian aggression.

"Distributed systems are much more resilient to any disruption than concentrated systems, centralized systems," Kovačević said. "It's simply about not having a single point of failure."

Ukraine has "this immensely valuable lived experience of building and scaling under fire," the ORQA CEO said, "that's being often abstracted and neglected by Western companies." That, however, is starting to change, he said.

"I think the thinking is really shifting on the European side as well, that this distributed nature actually reinforces resilience even though there are economic downsides to it."

Raivis Melnis, the defense minister of Latvia, told Business Insider that NATO companies work in a far more concentrated way than Ukrainian ones do, and "the question is whether we are ready to produce the systems in different locations, dispersed, and how we organize that."

He wants Latvian and Ukrainian defense industries to work together in part so they can learn how Ukrainian companies maintain production during a war.

Davyd Aloian, the deputy secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, told Business Insider earlier this year that defense companies within parts of NATO should "definitely" start breaking up their production more.

Some defense industry figures have voiced similar concerns about the state of production in the West. Karmo Saar, the head of sales for Estonian drone maker Krattworks, told Business Insider that in a war with Russia, if European companies don't disperse more, "I think we're going to be punished."

Dispersing production is not without trade-offs, though. Achi, CEO of the Ukrainian-Estonian defense technology company and ground robot maker Ark Robotics, told Business Insider that such defensive steps are "necessary," but "not ideal." Operations would be easier with everything in one place.

Choosing Ukraine despite the danger

Some Ukrainian companies have begun setting up production in NATO countries, both to better share their expertise with partner nations and to operate without the risk of Russian attacks.

But Kovačević, whose company makes drones as well as drone technology, including controllers, receivers, goggles, video equipment, and flight simulators, said that building in Ukraine comes with upsides.

The company, which supplies 24 NATO allies, could have done all of its work with General Cherry in Croatia, but instead, they are spreading their joint work across both countries.

Kovačević said building components in Europe and then importing them into Ukraine is "more inefficient than actually doing it in Ukraine." It's also more expensive, and Ukraine has shown its ability to produce in large volumes.

Localizing the supply chain also means that all parties can "exchange information more efficiently," including about what's happening and what's needed on the battlefield.

He said he understands why some Ukrainian companies are building gear on NATO soil, but he sees value in partnering with General Cherry in Ukraine. He said the Ukrainian company, one of the country's largest drone makers, has "a high operational excellence in running their own manufacturing operations in a safe manner, even under constant threat."

The partnership also offers lessons beyond manufacturing. He said that while the West "has a very deep technology expertise," it lacks "this lived experience of taking that technology and applying it to the operational reality of the 21st-century warfare."

The goal is to both supply Ukraine and to equip NATO with weapons shaped by Ukraine's battlefield experience and expertise. In Croatia, the partners are establishing a joint serial-production facility for co-developed interceptor drones and other counter-drone systems destined for NATO, while in Ukraine, they intend to create drone components, including electronics and communications systems, which General Cherry says it will supply to "all our partners in Ukraine," not just use itself.

Ukraine is already able to make the drones that the partnership will produce in Croatia, but "what they lack is the capacity to build components that go into those systems," Kovačević said, explaining the focus of the Ukrainian facility. He said the project won't disrupt Ukraine's existing supply chains. One of ORQA's priorities is to reduce reliance on Chinese products, and it wants to help Ukraine's industry do the same.

"Now," he said, "it's time to merge the two and emerge better off on both sides of this partnership."

Nearly 4.41 million voters are eligible to participate in Slovakia’s municipal and regional elections on Saturday, 24 October, in a contest that could indicate the political direction of the country ahead of the 2027 parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Robert Fico faces growing pressure over coalition instability, economic policy and his government’s relations with Russia.

Slovakia is voting in nationwide municipal and regional elections on Saturday, 24 October, providing the first major electoral test of Prime Minister Robert Fico’s government since a series of parliamentary disputes weakened his governing coalition.

According to figures released by Slovakia’s national news agency, almost 4.41 million people are eligible to vote across 2,926 municipalities, towns and city districts. Polling stations opened at 7am and will close at 8pm local time.

Voters are choosing mayors, municipal councillors, governors and representatives of Slovakia’s eight self-governing regions. In Bratislava and Košice, they are also electing district mayors and councils.

Although the elections concern local administration, their political significance extends beyond municipal government. They offer an indication of the relative strength of Fico’s governing Smer-SD party and the opposition Progressive Slovakia movement ahead of parliamentary elections due by September 2027.

Bratislava becomes a political battleground

One of the most closely watched contests is in Bratislava, where incumbent mayor Matúš Vallo is seeking another term against Transport Minister Jozef Ráž, who is standing as an independent candidate.

Vallo is supported by an alliance comprising Team Bratislava, Progressive Slovakia, Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) and the Democrats. Ráž, although formally independent, is a minister in Fico’s government.

The contest has acquired a distinctly national character. Vallo and Bratislava regional governor Juraj Droba have campaigned against extending Smer’s influence over the capital and its regional administration.

Bratislava is also politically significant because its electorate has traditionally provided substantial support for liberal and pro-European parties, in contrast to the stronger position enjoyed by Smer in parts of rural Slovakia.

Polls point to an uncertain parliamentary future

The latest national opinion surveys suggest a closely divided electorate.

An Ipsos survey conducted between 15 and 19 October placed Progressive Slovakia first with 18.6 per cent, marginally ahead of Smer-SD on 18.4 per cent. The difference was statistically insignificant.

The nationalist Republika party ranked third on 10.8 per cent, while Fico’s coalition partner Hlas-SD attracted 6.6 per cent. The Slovak National Party (SNS), another governing partner, stood below the parliamentary threshold.

The figures suggest that Fico could struggle to reproduce his present parliamentary majority. However, the opposition is also divided, and current projections do not establish a straightforward route to an alternative governing coalition.

The immediate challenge for Fico is maintaining sufficient parliamentary support to govern until the scheduled election.

As EU Today reported in September, parliament voted to remove Environment Minister Tomáš Taraba after SNS deputies joined the opposition, exposing divisions within the governing alliance.

Those tensions have continued to affect parliamentary business. On 14 October, the government secured approval for its 2027 budget by just 76 votes in the 150-member National Council, the minimum required for an absolute majority.

The budget increases the projected deficit to 4.94 per cent of GDP, despite warnings from Slovakia’s fiscal watchdog about rising public debt. Fico has defended the spending plans as necessary to protect households, pensions and public services.

Relations with Russia remain a dividing issue

The elections are also taking place against a widening disagreement between Fico’s government and much of the European Union over Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Since returning to office in 2023, Fico has ended government-funded military assistance to Kyiv, challenged EU sanctions on Moscow and repeatedly called for negotiations with Russia. Commercial Slovak arms exports to Ukraine have nevertheless continued.

His position has extended to NATO’s collective defence commitments. In September, Fico questioned the prospect of Slovakia becoming involved in a military conflict under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Article 5, however, requires member states to assist an ally subjected to armed attack, while allowing each government to determine the measures it considers necessary. It does not automatically require every member to deploy combat troops.

The latest development concerns Slovakia’s decision to resume formal bilateral consultations with Moscow.

On Monday, 26 October, two days after the elections, Slovak and Russian officials are scheduled to meet in Moscow for discussions covering energy, nuclear cooperation, oil and gas supplies and other economic sectors.

It will be the first meeting of the bilateral intergovernmental commission since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Bratislava maintains that dialogue with Russia is compatible with Slovakia’s EU and NATO obligations. The initiative nevertheless reinforces Fico’s different approach to Moscow at a time when the EU is seeking to reduce Russian energy imports.

Results could shape the 2027 election campaign

Saturday’s vote will not directly determine whether Fico remains prime minister. Local contests involve independent candidates, regional alliances and municipal priorities that do not necessarily correspond to national party preferences.

Nevertheless, results in Bratislava, Košice and the country’s eight regions will provide evidence of the government’s ability to mobilise supporters and the opposition’s capacity to turn favourable opinion polls into electoral victories.

No official exit polls are planned. The Slovak Statistical Office will publish results progressively after polling stations close, with counting expected to continue overnight into Sunday, 25 October.

For Fico, the results will offer an indication of whether his coalition can recover political ground before the next parliamentary election or whether its internal divisions are beginning to translate into losses at the ballot box.

La Camera ha approvato in prima lettura il disegno di legge Locatelli sulla riforma dei vantaggi garantiti ai cosiddetti caregiver, cioè alle persone che si prendono cura di familiari con disabilità o non autosufficienti. La legge prevede un allargamento dei diritti di queste persone e un bonus da 400 euro al mese.

Le risorse però sono limitate e soltanto poche decine di migliaia dei milioni di caregiver italiani potranno accedere ai fondi. La legge non è inoltre ancora ufficialmente in vigore. Dovrà prima essere approvata al Senato e, se ci saranno modifiche, superare un ulteriore passaggio alla Camera.

La nuova legge sui caregiver è stata approvata alla Camera

Sono diversi anni che il Parlamento tenta di riformare i vantaggi che la legge offre ai caregiver. Tra il 2013 e il 2025 sono state presentate una trentina di proposte di legge sull’argomento, tutte finite nel nulla.

La riforma è necessaria perché la Legge 104, che regola buona parte dei benefici delle persone che assistono i propri familiari con disabilità, risale al 1992 e sta mostrando alcune inadeguatezze. Oggi le persone che richiedono assistenza sono moltissime e si calcola che i loro caregiver siano tra i 7 e gli 8,5 milioni.

Chi sono i caregiver secondo la nuova legge

La definizione base di caregiver rimane quella della legge di bilancio per il 2018: una persona che assiste un familiare con disabilità o non autosufficiente in maniera gratuita e non professionale. Il familiare in questione deve essere titolare:

• o dei benefici della legge 104;
• o dell’indennità di accompagnamento.

La nuova legge introduce però anche le cosiddette tutele differenziate. Un modo per allargare la platea dei caregiver, riconoscendo il loro ruolo in base alle ore di assistenza. Oltre a coloro che assistono un familiare per più di 91 ore a settimana, già considerati caregiver, saranno inclusi anche:

• coloro che assistono un familiare tra 30 e 90 ore alla settimana;
• coloro che assistono un familiare tra 10 e 29 ore alla settimana;
• i caregiver non conviventi, con almeno 30 ore alla settimana di assistenza.

Verranno introdotti inoltre nuovi vantaggi per queste categorie:

• i permessi solidali per i dipendenti;
• l’esonero dalle tasse universitarie per gli studenti caregiver;
• i permessi per i giovani che svolgono il servizio civile.

Chi potrà avere bonus da 400 euro al mese

La misura centrale della nuova legge è un bonus da 400 euro al mese esentasse che l’Inps elargirà ad alcuni caregiver. Le rate saranno trimestrali, quindi ogni tre mesi il caregiver riceverà 1.200 euro. Ci son operò requisiti molto stringenti per accedere a questo bonus:

• Isee di massimo 25.000 euro;
• almeno 91 ore di assistenza settimanali da parte del caregiver;
• un reddito non superiore a 3.000 euro l’anno.

I fondi stanziati per questo bonus sono di circa 260 milioni di euro all’anno. La misura partirà dal 2027.

Le critiche alla nuova legge sui caregiver

Le opposizioni hanno votato contro al testo, criticando soprattutto la platea molto ristretta del bonus da 400 euro, che fondamentalmente potrà essere ottenuto da chi vive della pensione di invalidità del familiare assistito. “Misure povere per chi è già povero” le ha definite Alleanza Verdi Sinistra, sottolineando che i 400 euro arriveranno a circa 52mila persone degli almeno 7 milioni di caregiver italiani.

Le associazioni che si occupano dei caregiver sottolineano la mancanza di garanzie sui contributi figurativi per la pensione, che è tra le principali richieste della categoria.

A series of drone attacks on commercial shipping near Romania and Bulgaria has left sailors dead or missing, bringing Russia’s war against Ukraine closer to NATO territory. The European Parliament is calling for an EU naval mission, while Romania has begun shooting down hostile drones and NATO is preparing additional defensive measures.

The European Parliament has called for the possible deployment of an EU naval operation in the Black Sea following a series of deadly attacks on civilian merchant vessels near the Romanian and Bulgarian coasts. The resolution, adopted on 22 October 2026 by 432 votes to 52, with 88 abstentions, reflects mounting concern over the expansion of maritime threats towards NATO’s south-eastern flank.

The parliamentary resolution urges EU member states to consider establishing a naval mission to protect commercial shipping, while calling on NATO to examine a complementary regional initiative, provisionally described as Black Sea Sentry.

On 23 October, a drone struck the Comoros-flagged cargo vessel Khoryv, approximately 13 nautical miles from Romania’s port of Constanța. The vessel caught fire and sank, leaving one sailor confirmed dead and three missing. Nine crew members were rescued. The ship was carrying 13 Ukrainian and Azerbaijani sailors. According to information attributed to Romanian maritime authorities, difficult weather complicated rescue efforts.

Romanian President Nicușor Dan blamed Russia for the attack, which followed at least seven other strikes on commercial vessels during October. Across the incidents, approximately 30 sailors have been reported dead or missing, although the confirmed death toll is considerably lower.

Civilian Shipping Under Attack

The escalation began on 5 October when the Royad Mammadov, a Turkish-owned grain carrier sailing under the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis, sank in Romania’s exclusive economic zone. Two sailors died and eleven were rescued. The vessel had departed the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail carrying corn destined for Ravenna, Italy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy attributed the sinking to Russian drones, although Romanian authorities did not initially establish responsibility.

The following day, two merchant ships were attacked approximately 70 nautical miles east of the Bulgarian coastal town of Byala. As EU Today reported, the Togo-flagged Alfa Watan sank after sustaining severe damage, while the Palau-flagged Able caught fire. All 18 sailors aboard the latter vessel were rescued, but the crew of the Alfa Watan remained unaccounted for.

The Bulgarian authorities confirmed that both aerial and maritime drones had been involved. Further attacks followed on 13 October, when the HS Dignity sank near Shabla, leaving eleven sailors missing, while the Chelsea-3 was struck near Byala. All 15 crew members of the latter vessel were evacuated.

Two chemical tankers, the Yara J and Wine Trader, were subsequently attacked near the Sulina Canal, a strategically important route connecting the Danube with the Black Sea. The incidents exposed the vulnerability of shipping corridors connecting Ukraine with international markets.

Romania Moves Towards Active Military Defence

Romania has responded by strengthening surveillance and authorising direct military action against drones entering its airspace. On 17 October, two Romanian F-16 fighter aircraft intercepted and destroyed hostile drones over Romanian territorial waters.

According to the Romanian Ministry of National Defence, the aircraft were scrambled from Borcea Air Base after radar systems detected aerial targets approaching from the direction of Snake Island. The drones, identified as jet-powered Geran-family attack aircraft, entered Romanian airspace before being destroyed southeast and east of Sulina.

The ministry disclosed that, during the preceding week, its radar systems had detected eight separate incidents involving aerial targets near the Romanian border, including four brief incursions into national airspace. On 14 October, Spanish F-18 aircraft operating under NATO air-policing arrangements were scrambled after drones approached Romanian airspace.

Bulgaria’s More Cautious Response

Bulgaria has taken a more reserved position concerning responsibility for the attacks. Although Prime Minister Rumen Radev acknowledged their seriousness, his government maintained that investigations must establish the origin of the drones before definitive conclusions could be drawn. Sofia nevertheless strengthened maritime surveillance, deployed rescue resources and requested assistance from European and NATO partners.

In August, a drone crossed into Bulgarian airspace from Romania and exploded near infrastructure associated with the Trans-Balkan Gas Pipeline. According to the Bulgarian government’s account, the aircraft was not detected by either national radar systems or NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre in Torrejón, Spain. The European Parliament has now urged Sofia to accelerate participation in NATO’s counter-drone initiatives.

EU Proposes Maritime Security Operation

The European Parliament’s proposals include establishing an EU naval operation, improving early detection of hostile drones, accelerating the development of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub and providing additional defence funding to Romania and Bulgaria. MEPs have proposed using resources under the EU’s SAFE defence financing instrument to support regional capabilities.

The proposed hub would facilitate intelligence-sharing, maritime surveillance and protection of critical infrastructure. Romania and Bulgaria have requested EU satellite imagery to improve their awareness of maritime threats, while the European Maritime Safety Agency has offered additional support.

At their October summit, EU leaders condemned attacks on civilian shipping and called for safe passage for vessels transporting agricultural products. The European Council’s conclusions addressed Black Sea and Danube shipping routes. However, the parliamentary resolution does not authorise a naval deployment: such an operation would require agreement among EU governments on its mandate, resources and rules of engagement.

NATO Faces an Expanding Security Challenge

NATO has responded by examining additional maritime surveillance and defensive measures, including patrol aircraft, radar systems and unmanned platforms. Romania has proposed stronger regional command arrangements involving NATO’s Black Sea members.

An existing framework provides a basis for cooperation. In July, Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye agreed to expand the responsibilities of their joint mine countermeasures task group to include protection of critical underwater infrastructure. The agreement announced by Romania’s Defence Ministry extended cooperation beyond detecting and neutralising drifting mines.

Protecting commercial vessels against aerial and maritime drones would require broader capabilities. NATO must also operate within the restrictions of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which regulates passage of warships through the Turkish Straits and limits deployments by non-Black Sea countries. Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye would therefore play central roles in any sustained maritime security operation.

Black Sea Security and the Risk of Escalation

Ukraine’s maritime export corridors remain essential to agricultural shipments following repeated Russian strikes on ports and logistics infrastructure. Attacks on commercial vessels can increase insurance costs, discourage shipping companies and disrupt trade even when port facilities remain functional.

The sinking of merchant vessels near allied territory, combined with repeated drone incursions into Romanian airspace, increases the possibility of military confrontation arising from an individual incident. The legal and military circumstances differ depending on whether an attack occurs in territorial waters, an exclusive economic zone or international waters.

The European Parliament’s proposal raises questions extending beyond maritime patrols: how civilian shipping can be protected, what military responses are authorised and how responsibility for attacks will be established. The sinking of the Khoryv on 23 October illustrates how the western Black Sea has become an increasingly exposed part of Europe’s security frontier.

The HighWire with Del Bigtree | October 22, 2026

From military speeches to civil-defense drills, Europe’s leaders are openly preparing their countries for conflict. Jefferey looks at the warnings coming out of Britain and the polling that suggests the public may not be ready to answer the call.

In una stanza bianca e ovattata di Santarcangelo di Romagna, profumata da leggere note d’incenso, forbici precise tagliano lane biellesi e sete comasche per confezionare le vesti sacre di Papa Francesco. A Venezia, tra le acque dell’isola della Giudecca, aghi robusti forano damaschi, velluti e passamanerie per tappezzare gli interni delle gondole e dei taxi acquei. E nel cuore di Milano, mani sapienti modellano pelli pregiate per dare vita a quella stessa borsa-gioiello che ha accompagnato le uscite pubbliche della Regina Elisabetta II. Sono i suoni, i profumi e i gesti di un’Italia laboriosa che opera lontano dai riflettori delle passerelle, ma che da secoli detta le regole dell’eleganza globale. Un universo fatto di telai secolari, banchi da taglio, macchine da cucire e archivi sterminati che il 24 e 25 ottobre torna a spalancare i propri battenti in occasione della decima edizione di ApritiModa.

Da 14 a 100 porte aperte: la rivoluzione di un decennio

Ideata dalla giornalista Cinzia Sasso, la manifestazione è nata dieci anni fa come una scommessa circoscritta a 14 indirizzi milanesi, con l’obiettivo di rendere accessibile al grande pubblico un mondo tradizionalmente esclusivo e blindato. Oggi, ApritiModa è un fenomeno culturale e turistico di respiro nazionale. L’edizione 2026 coinvolge oltre 100 luoghi in ogni regione d’Italia — tra maison internazionali, manifatture di provincia e piccole botteghe d’eccellenza — registrando numeri che certificano una fame di autenticità senza precedenti: dai 16.000 visitatori degli esordi si è passati alle oltre 50.000 richieste di partecipazione dell’ultima edizione, con più di un milione di interazioni sul sito ufficiale. Attraverso una semplice prenotazione, i visitatori possono oltrepassare la linea di demarcazione che separa il consumatore dal creatore, osservando in tempo reale come materie prime grezze si trasformano in abiti, cappelli, occhiali, scarpe, profumi e bottoni.

Le novità: dai sarti del Vaticano agli ombrelli della Corona inglese

Il cartellone di questo decennale si arricchisce di tappe che sfiorano l’arte pura e il misticismo. Tra i debutti assoluti spicca LAVS (Laboratorio Atelier di Vesti Sacre), fondato da Filippo Sorcinelli a Santarcangelo di Romagna: un luogo dove l’alto artigianato incontra la liturgia e dove sono stati realizzati i paramenti per Benedetto XVI e Papa Francesco. A Napoli, i riflettori si accendono per la prima volta su Mario Talarico, bottega ferma all’Ottocento con il suo antico tornio ancora in funzione, celebre per aver forgiato ombrelli per la famiglia reale britannica e innumerevoli celebrità storiche. Non meno affascinante è la tappa veneziana da Hydro Mirò, l’esclusivo cantiere della Giudecca specializzato nella tappezzeria nautica, dove il fascino della laguna prende forma tra “pareci” e “dogaresse”. A Milano, invece, Leu Locati (Amato Daniele) svela i segreti delle calzature e delle borsette che rappresentano un omaggio totale all’alto artigianato tramandato da sette generazioni.

I colossi del lusso, i telai di Leonardo e la magia della sposa

Il grand tour di ApritiModa consolida inoltre il legame con i colossi e le istituzioni storiche del settore. Il pubblico potrà passeggiare tra i capolavori di vent’anni di Alta Moda esposti all’Armani/Silos, respirare l’atmosfera cosmopolita ma intima di Casa Cucinelli a Milano, e ammirare la perfezione sartoriale fusa all’arte orologiera negli spazi di Dolce&Gabbana. Accanto a loro, resistono i templi della manualità assoluta: dal laboratorio di Pino Grasso, le cui mani incastonano migliaia di strass e paillettes per le sfilate di Armani e Valentino, fino all’Antico Setificio Fiorentino, che dal 1786 produce broccati per il Cremlino e la Casa Reale svedese utilizzando ancora un orditoio realizzato su un disegno originale di Leonardo da Vinci. Una sezione speciale del decennale è dedicata al mondo “bridal”, con l’apertura di atelier specializzati nella creazione di abiti da sposa come Anna Renzi Brivio a Brescia, Cecilia Gerosa a Bologna, Poesie Sposa a Piacenza e la prestigiosa manifattura di Antonio Riva a Garlate. Un viaggio tra tulle, mikado di seta e cartamodelli per scoprire come la tradizione si rinnova attraverso il design contemporaneo.

Il messaggio: “Un patrimonio condiviso da conservare”

Dietro lo stupore visivo, l’apertura delle fabbriche lancia un messaggio culturale potentissimo: la moda in Italia non è un’industria asettica, ma un tessuto connettivo fondato sul genio umano. “ApritiModa è un’occasione unica per scoprire i luoghi autentici dove nasce la bellezza e si esercita la bravura. Un’esperienza che riempie di ammirazione, orgoglio e amore“, spiega la fondatrice Cinzia Sasso. È un incontro che arricchisce chi guarda e chi crea: “I visitatori sono felici di entrare dietro porte sempre chiuse e i lavoratori sono felici di mostrare al pubblico le loro mani sapienti”. Un ponte gettato tra il lavoro manuale e la società, per ribadire un concetto essenziale: “La moda non è un capriccio per pochi, è un patrimonio condiviso, fatto di saperi, tecniche e creatività che va conosciuto e conservato per quello che è, un tesoro prezioso”.

Come partecipare

La regola è una: prenotarsi su Apritimoda.it. La sezione “Partecipa” offre una mappa intuitiva dell’intero Paese; ogni luogo ha una scheda con descrizione, indirizzo, orari e slot disponibili per sabato 25 e domenica 26 (le disponibilità si aggiornano in tempo reale). Le visite sono guidate e gratuite. Si entra in piccoli gruppi: si ascolta, si guarda, si fanno domande. Si esce, quasi sempre, con un rispetto nuovo per ciò che indossiamo.

L'articolo Il sarto dei Papi, gli ombrelli della Regina Elisabetta e i ricami delle sfilate di Armani e Valentino: viaggio nei laboratori segreti del Made in Italy che aprono eccezionalmente al pubblico con ApritiModa proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 23, 2026

By Glenn Diesen | October 23, 2026

The very public execution of my professorship and reputation continues in Norway. Today’s media article about me makes three claims that are misleading and/or false.

1) The article dismisses my claim that my research is being criminalized as the journalists merely cite the dismissive comments from the university – no arguments are apparently required.

It is not possible for an academic anymore to analyse the policies of rival powers by assessing their security concerns, as it will be smeared by the government, the government’s NGOs and the media as “legitimizing” the enemy and supporting their narratives. The current Defence Minister singled me out with the accusation of spreading propaganda and criticised two podcasters for even speaking with me (as I have already been cancelled by the media in Norway). How was this accusation by the Defence Minister substantiated? I had argued that NATO expansion triggered the war in Ukraine, which the Defence Minister denounced as dangerous “Russian propaganda”, with no need to substantiate his vile accusation. I can cite a sea of evidence and also refer to statements by American and European political leaders, ambassadors, intelligence chiefs, and others to make my case. However, the purpose is not to engage in debate, but to smear, censor, and cancel. By going after an individual academic for challenging official truths, the government has already claimed a monopoly on the truth. Academics should have their arguments scrutinised and criticised, but these are severe personal attacks from the government without the possibility of even defending myself. How is this not criminalising the research of an academic?

I cannot even speak at any events in Norway without the event being cancelled. The last event I agreed to speak at was because I shared the stage with the former CIA officer John Kiriakou. A newspaper had the event at a church cancelled, and when the backup location did not also cancel, the journalist simply printed in the paper that it had been cancelled so people would not show up. Is this normal? I must use my allotted holiday days to attend conferences because any event I attend can be presented as “controversial,” and then the NGOs and journalists will go after the reputation of the university. Is this normal? Every newspaper article about me merely refers to me as “controversial” or “pro-Russian” without ever assigning meaning to these labels or presenting my argument.

I have argued, much like former CIA director Burns, that if the West attempts to pull Ukraine into the NATO orbit, then there would be war and Ukraine would be destroyed. This is considered a “pro-Russian” argument. Arguing that we should respect the will of most Ukrainians who want negotiations to end the war is also considered a “pro-Russian” argument, while in contrast, boycotting diplomacy, deporting Ukrainian refugees, and calling for the conscription of Ukrainian women is “pro-Ukrainian”.

2) To avoid addressing any of my arguments, the journalists go on to uncritically cite personal attacks against me, pointing out that I have been called a propagandist by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee. This is a “non-governmental organisation” financed by the government and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which was set up by Reagan and the CIA director in 1983 to manipulate the civil society of other states. The Norwegian Helsinki Committee has been relentless in its smears on social media to have me fired, writing hit pieces in the media, pushing to cancel my speaking events, writing a letter to my university, and even posting a picture of my house on social media. This is a governmental “human rights organisation” that cites human rights concerns to build the case for war.

3) Lastly, to further avoid addressing my actual arguments, they simply cite the fact that arguments I made at a debate last year have been “wholly or partially debunked” by a fact-check. The state-run media (NRK) invited the state-run military defence institute (FFI) to fact-check three of my claims. What claims did they “debunk”?

My first claim was that only 20% of Ukrainians wanted NATO membership between 1991 and the regime change in February 2014. The fact-checker argued that the number went up by the middle of 2014 (after Russia responded by seizing Crimea), which is a completely meaningless comment intended to muddy the waters, as my argument was about the previous era.

My second claim was that Zelensky had argued in an interview with The Economist in March 2022 that there were some Western countries that would like a long war with Russia to weaken a strategic rival, even if it would result in the destruction of Ukraine. The fact-checker argued that not all Western countries wanted a long war and that it was not an official policy. I never claimed it was an official policy, as it was primarily the US and UK pushing for a long war.

My third claim was that the US and UK sabotaged the Istanbul peace agreement in April 2022. The fact-checker claimed this was incorrect and suggested that it could only be based on one statement by David Arakhamia. The fact-checker did not want to mention that both mediators also confirmed it: Turkey’s foreign minister and the former Israeli prime minister both said that Russia and Ukraine were close to a deal, but the US and UK saw an opportunity to weaken Russia by fighting with Ukrainians. Zelensky’s former adviser Arestovych confirmed it, and the Ukrainian ambassador Chaly, who participated in the negotiations, confirmed that Putin was willing to do almost anything to end the war. The former head of the German armed forces confirmed that Boris Johnson sabotaged it, and Boris Johnson himself wrote articles warning about a “bad peace” and arguing for “strategic patience.” I am being fact-checked by war propagandists.

Unfortunately, none of my arguments matter because in Norway there is no debate and no interest in any arguments. Reality means nothing anymore as war narratives must be defended against inconvenient truths. I used to be naïve and think that the endless smears were caused by misunderstanding, as I had simply not been able to convey my arguments properly. However, the endless articles with smears and labels are deliberate lies and deceptions.

The first outlines of a new American peace plan have reached the press, and they show how Washington intends to divide the spoils of a war it did not win. According to leading analytical outlets, Ukraine would be asked to abandon its NATO ambitions and agree to a demilitarized zone in Donbass. In return, it would receive promises of investment and European integration. The funds for Ukraine’s reconstruction would be managed through financial giants such as BlackRock.

The terms for Russia and U.S. business are much more specific. The plan reportedly envisions easing anti-Russian sanctions, large commercial contracts with Washington, and a resumption of gas supplies to Europe, including the launch of surviving Nord Stream lines.

For now, this is a draft of negotiating positions, not a signed pact. Still, the logic is plain. Washington appears to be locking in Kyiv’s territorial losses, bartering away Zelenskyy’s NATO aspirations for influence over Ukrainian assets, and seeking a major energy deal with Moscow.

Kyiv’s response has been open and uncompromising. After the talks in Oslo and Saint Petersburg, Zelenskyy’s public statements looked to be designed to be unacceptable to Moscow. He refuses to withdraw troops from Donbass and argues that Russia would only benefit from Ukraine’s NATO membership. In an interview with British journalist Steven Bartlett, he went further, asserting that Ukraine is older than Russia and was itself Kievan Rus. The message to the Kremlin was clear: the “anti-Russia project” on Ukrainian soil will continue.

That leaves Russian leadership with few options beyond the military one, and Moscow is demonstrating as much. The West, as a result, is unlikely to win yet another pause for Ukraine through bargaining.

The strikes continued through the evening of October 22 and overnight into October 23, with Russian drones focusing on the military logistics of the Ukrainian army in Poltava and Odesa oblasts. Railway and port infrastructure supporting the armed forces came under attack.

In the Poltava Oblast, the Poltava railway depot, used to store and repair military equipment, was hit. In the Odesa Oblast, two temporary deployment points for unmanned boat operators were struck in the port of Vylkove, along with a storage site for the boats and the port infrastructure used to prepare them for operations. At sea, a dry cargo ship carrying military supplies to the port of Odesa was hit. An Mi-24 helicopter was also reported destroyed on the ground.

Washington drafts business deals while Moscow drafts target lists. Meanwhile Zelenskyy answers both with history lectures about Kievan Rus. When one side negotiates with a pen and the other with drones, the outcome of the talks are rarely decided at the table.

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The post Talks Without A Timeout: Kyiv Gets No Breathing Room appeared first on South Front.

Diplomacy offers an easy way to peace. But if the West insists on the hard way, then Russia will deliver that way too.

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Diplomacy, as the saying goes, is the art of the possible. A peaceful settlement to the war in Ukraine is possible if all sides were to engage in genuine diplomacy. That’s the easy, more civilized way.

If not, Russia will achieve peace the hard way through complete military victory.

Diplomacy is being prevented because European politicians, in particular, are held hostage by their own twisted ideology and false propaganda.

Ironically, the NATO proxy war in Ukraine was intended to “strategically defeat” Russia. It turns out, however, that it is the NATO axis that is staring at a historic defeat. The chaos surging across Europe is a manifestation of that failure, driven by higher energy prices and reckless, unsustainable militarism.

Thus, peace in Ukraine is concomitant with peace in Europe, and diplomacy would expedite that to obviate more instability and suffering.

But diplomacy is incompatible with parties who possess a diseased mentality of Russophobia.

Diplomatic engagement involves putting pragmatic interests first, ahead of ideological bias. The pragmatic interest of everyone surely should be to find an end to this nearly five-year war that has caused millions of casualties and runs the risk of escalating to a general war in Europe.

The Trump administration appears to be renewing peace efforts by dispatching a presidential envoy to Russia this week. Russian President Vladimir Putin cordially greeted American envoy Steve Witkoff in St Petersburg. It is unimaginable that any European politician or envoy would be capable of that rudimentary courtesy. Putin reiterated that Russia’s door is open for negotiations.

Diplomacy can create a path to peace sooner, as internationally renowned Professor Jeffrey Sachs advocated in an eminently reasonable presentation this week.

Key issues for a peace agreement include: 1) indivisible security for all; 2) permanent neutrality status for Ukraine; 3) an armistice, not a temporary ceasefire, based on current lines of conflict; and 4) a declaration by NATO to halt its eastward expansion.

The framework for peace proposed by Sachs is similar to Russia’s position. It addresses the causes of conflict rather than only its symptoms.

Professor Sachs points out that these are not new principles. They were recognized and agreed upon in the past by the United States, its European allies, and Ukraine. In the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the U.S., Soviet Union, and European states accepted the principle that security is not a zero-sum game. All states must have a mutual right to security.

On the issue of permanent neutrality of Ukraine, that was declared in its constitution when it established independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The seeking of NATO membership for Ukraine overturns that principle. It was the United States under President GW Bush that initiated the drive for NATO membership with the Bucharest Declaration in 2008, which was repudiated by Russia with the warning that it would inevitably lead to conflict, as history proves.

Sachs also points out that the United States and its NATO allies must return to the pledge made to the Soviet Union in 1989 that there would be no eastward expansion of the military bloc. It is basic common sense that the encroachment of NATO forces on Russia’s borders is destabilizing and a source of confrontation. The relentless expansion is a violation of the principle of indivisible security. Would the United States accept a situation where Mexico was installing Russian or Chinese military forces?

As for the cessation of hostilities and the drawing of territorial lines, that is a thorny issue. Moscow claims that it has a historical right to the territories east and south of the Dniper River, including Sumy, Kharkov, Kherson and Odessa, in addition to the Donbass and, of course, Crimea.

What is unrealistic is for Ukraine to claim the total return of territories that Russia has taken since 2022 (and 2014 in the case of Crimea). From Russia’s point of view, and many international historians would concur, the post-1991 composition of Ukraine was an artifice. It arbitrarily incorporated lands that were historically always part of Russia. These lands were donated to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic by Soviet leaders in dubious schemes of demographic manipulation that did not respect the antecedent cultural Russian ties.

In any case, a framework for a permanent peaceful settlement is feasible if all sides engage in honest discussions that recognize the historical background.

When U.S. President Donald Trump met Russia’s Putin in Anchorage back in August 2025, there seemed to be an acceptance by the American side of Russia’s perspective on addressing “root causes”. Subsequently, Trump failed to follow through on what appeared to be a breakthrough meeting in Anchorage. Part of the problem was the Europeans and the Kiev regime thwarting Trump’s initiative and throwing obstacles in the way of negotiations. European leaders insisted on a temporary ceasefire and NATO peacekeepers, and have persisted in treating Russia like a pariah.

The international context has shifted in a way that makes Trump more amenable. His disastrous war with Iran has blown fuel prices sky-high for American consumers. With the mid-term elections only weeks away, the White House needs some good news to prevent a political wipeout for the Republicans.

Trump made a deal with Putin two weeks ago for diesel supplies from Russia to ease the pain at the pump for American voters. Essential to that is for Ukraine to stop air strikes on Russian oil facilities. The corrupt puppet president in Kiev, Vladimir Zelensky, is defying Trump with churlish remarks and threats to keep striking Russian oil refineries and depots.

One positive thing from the rift with Zelensky is Trump viewing him as the obstacle to a peace deal. Trump is now openly castigating the Ukrainian former comedian and calling for a new president in that country.

The cocaine addict Zelensky, with his loathsome war racketeering, is hanging on to power by a thread, and only because of continuing support from European leaders. These elitist European politicians are driven by anti-Russian ideology and servility to the futile geopolitical agenda of strategically defeating Russia. Europe is witnessing a social upheaval bordering on revolution over the fallout from the soaring cost of living, which is, in turn, a consequence of the NATO proxy war in Ukraine. But the elites have no way to address the chaos because they are the problem.

For all his flaws, and there are many, at least Trump is willing to engage in diplomacy. He is not encumbered with hatred of Russia. His understanding of the root causes of the war may be limited. But at least his administration has the basic quality of respecting Russia as an equal and listening to Russia’s perspective. That is a modicum for negotiations and the art of the possible.

By contrast, the European elites and their pet regime in Kiev are incapable of engaging in any diplomacy. They are obsessed with unattainable and sinister ideological prejudices that hark back to Nazi Germany and the belief that Russians are “subhumans” to be conquered. They have no respect for Russia, nor are they capable of any intelligent, honest discussion about the causes of conflict.

Jeffrey Sachs contends that Trump could promptly end the war and create peace if he were to make a clear policy announcement that the United States is returning to a position whereby it respects indivisible security for all, including Russia, accepts permanent neutrality of Ukraine with no future as a NATO member, and declares that NATO ends its eastward expansion. A rational path to peace is possible.

There will be howls of condemnation from the Kiev regime and its European sponsors. There will be howls too from within the U.S. establishment who share the European ideology of demonizing and belligerence towards Russia. Trump may be so weakened by the mid-term elections that it is not politically possible for him to make such a policy announcement.

So be it. Russia will continue to win its military objectives and demand its rightful terms of peace. Diplomacy offers an easy way to peace. But if the West insists on the hard way, then Russia will deliver that way too. The Europeans and Kiev regime will pay an even higher price with their own implosion.