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Lula vence Flávio Bolsonaro com 70,5% dos votos na China continental

O presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) venceu o segundo turno da eleição presidencial entre os brasileiros que votaram na China continental, neste domingo (25), com 70,5% dos votos totais. O senador Flávio Bolsonaro (PL) recebeu 25,2%. A votação ocorreu em Pequim, Xangai e Cantão, sem incluir Hong Kong.

Lula recebeu 375 votos, enquanto Flávio somou 134. Também foram registrados dois votos em branco e 21 nulos, que representam 4,3% do total. Ao todo, 532 brasileiros compareceram às urnas, cerca de 23% a mais do que no primeiro turno, quando 432 eleitores votaram.

O comparecimento aumentou apesar da abstenção continuar elevada. Dos 1.503 eleitores aptos nas três cidades, 64,6% não votaram, ante 71% na primeira rodada.

Resultado por cidade

Em Xangai, cidade com o maior eleitorado brasileiro na China continental, Lula recebeu 182 votos, equivalentes a 68,9% do total. Flávio teve 66 votos, ou 25%. Dos 740 eleitores aptos, 264 compareceram às urnas.

Em Pequim, Lula alcançou sua maior vantagem proporcional, com 126 votos, ou 84,6%. Flávio recebeu 22 votos, equivalentes a 14,8%. A capital chinesa registrou o maior comparecimento proporcional entre as três cidades, com 149 dos 344 eleitores aptos, o equivalente a 43,3%.

Em Cantão, Flávio obteve seu melhor resultado, com 46 votos, ou 38,7%. Lula recebeu 67 votos, correspondentes a 56,3%. Dos 419 eleitores aptos, 119 participaram da votação, com comparecimento de 28,4%.

Os resultados foram apurados a partir dos boletins de urna das três cidades e abrangem exclusivamente a China continental.

Comparação com o primeiro turno

Na primeira rodada, Lula também venceu na China continental, com 62% dos votos totais, contra 23% de Flávio. O petista recebeu 268 votos, enquanto o senador somou 98.

Na ocasião, 432 brasileiros votaram nas três cidades, em um universo de aproximadamente 1.500 eleitores aptos. A abstenção chegou a 71%.

A comparação indica crescimento da votação de Lula e de Flávio em números absolutos, além do aumento da participação dos eleitores brasileiros na segunda rodada.

Voto no exterior

A votação para presidente e vice-presidente da República no exterior foi organizada pela rede diplomática brasileira. Na China, as urnas foram abertas às 8h de domingo (25), no horário local, equivalente às 21h de sábado (24), em Brasília.

Os brasileiros com domicílio eleitoral no país puderam votar em Pequim, Xangai e Cantão, além de Hong Kong, região administrativa especial chinesa.

A China reúne 2.189 eleitores brasileiros cadastrados, segundo os dados apresentados no levantamento. Desse total, 55% são homens. Eleitores com ensino superior completo representam 49%, e a faixa etária mais numerosa é a de 40 a 44 anos, seguida pela de 25 a 29 anos.

Em todo o exterior, 918,9 mil brasileiros estavam aptos a votar. O eleitorado brasileiro fora do país supera o número de eleitores de Roraima, Amapá e Acre. Nessas localidades, o voto no exterior é permitido apenas para os cargos de presidente e vice-presidente.

Os Estados Unidos concentram o maior número de eleitores brasileiros no exterior, com 265,4 mil, seguidos por Portugal, com 134,8 mil, e Japão, com 88,4 mil.

The post Lula vence Flávio Bolsonaro com 70,5% dos votos na China continental appeared first on Diário da Manhã - O Jornal do leitor Inteligente.

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Primeiro filme de IA da China chega às salas. Estão vazias

Nem no maior viveiro mundial de vídeos feitos por IA as pessoas estão dispostas a pagar bilhete para a ver. O primeiro filme chinês inteiramente gerado por inteligência artificial estreou  na sexta-feira, no que promete ser um teste difícil nas bilheteiras para a indústria tecnológica em expansão do país. Mas a venda antecipada de bilhetes está a ficar aquém do esperado. Segundo a plataforma de bilhetes Maoyan, estão marcadas para sexta-feira mais de 10.000 sessões do thriller de ficção científica “Sanxingdui: Future Past“. A recetividade do público tem sido reduzida. As receitas do filme aproximavam-se dos 290.000 yuans (38 mil

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Nem no maior viveiro mundial de vídeos feitos por IA as pessoas estão dispostas a pagar bilhete para a ver. O primeiro filme chinês inteiramente gerado por inteligência artificial estreou  na sexta-feira, no que promete ser um teste difícil nas bilheteiras para a indústria tecnológica em expansão do

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I Mentioned Taiwan, but I Didn’t Get Away With It!

On a lecture tour of China, John Macnab finds that even one slide mentioning Taipei is enough to get organisers sweating and warning of consequences for his hosts. If this is his last column, you'll know what has happened.

The post I Mentioned Taiwan, but I Didn’t Get Away With It! appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

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A TSMC está a tentar escapar ao aperto chinês nas terras raras

Os controlos de exportação impostos por Pequim ameaçam a produção dos semicondutores mais avançados do mundo. Uma eventual escassez de componentes pode afetar setores estratégicos, da inteligência artificial à defesa. A solução: motores sem terras raras. A taiwanesa TSMC está a estudar alternativas aos componentes de terras raras no equipamento das suas fábricas, disseram à Reuters três pessoas a par do assunto. O objetivo é reduzir o risco de que os controlos de exportação de Pequim perturbem as operações nas unidades que fabricam os chips mais avançados do mundo. Esta decisão, noticiada agora pela primeira vez, mostra como o domínio

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Pentagon designates Chinese cultural centers national security threat

RT | October 24, 2026

The Pentagon has designated cultural programs linked to China’s Confucius Institute as a national security threat, according to US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth. He claims that the centers, which largely offer Chinese language courses on American college and university campuses, serve as a front for Beijing’s “propaganda” campaign – an allegation Chinese officials have previously denied.

In a video posted on Facebook on Friday, Hegseth said that while the US Congress had previously “banned” the Confucius Institutes from American educational institutions, they “came back disguised in new forms” and under new names.

Hegseth was apparently referring to several measures passed by Congress in recent years that stripped universities that hosted Confucius Institutes of federal funding. The pressure from the lawmakers has led to the closure of multiple centers on US soil.

According to Hegseth, over the past two months, the Department of War has “systematically dismantled” 80 new Chinese-backed cultural centers across 30 universities, adding “these sleeper organizations to our list of institutions that threaten our national security.”

The official alleged that the targeted entities had sought to “steal intellectual property and to infiltrate the minds of American students,” but stopped short of providing any concrete evidence.

Back in 2020, the US Department of State designated Confucius Institutes as a “foreign mission of the People’s Republic of China,” requiring the institutions to regularly provide information regarding their Chinese personnel, recruitment, funding, and operations to the US government. The US Department of State characterized the China-funded cultural centers as “part of Beijing’s multifaceted propaganda efforts.”

Later that year, then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo alleged that the centers were working to recruit “spies and collaborators” at US colleges, and expressed hope that “we will get them all closed out.”

China’s Foreign Ministry at the time accused Pompeo of deliberately undermining cultural and educational exchanges “by discrediting Confucius Institutes… [out of] ideological bias and political expediency.”

Beijing urged Washington to “abandon the Cold War zero-sum mentality… [and to] stop interfering with normal people-to-people and cultural exchanges.”

Confucius Institutes have similarly come under government pressure in several other Western countries in recent years.

Last year, Australian media reported that six local universities had shut down Beijing-backed cultural centers amid government scrutiny, reducing the number of such entities in the country by half.

In 2020, several media outlets, including The Times, claimed that Sweden had become the first European nation to close all Confucius Institutes and related classrooms.

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North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits China to inaugurate a new cross-border bridge

Kim's visit to China is his latest move in an increasingly assertive foreign policy as he seeks to align Pyongyang with Beijing and Moscow in a united front against the United States under what he portrays as a "new Cold War." It's his first visit in a year.

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Three Earthquakes Strike Near Tibet After Deadly 7.0 Quake

Earthquake damage and rescue operations in Tibet following a magnitude 7.0 earthquake and subsequent tremors in China.

Three tremors struck near the epicenter of a deadly earthquake in Tibet as rescue teams continued relief efforts amid severe weather.


Three earthquakes measuring magnitudes 4.5, 4.1 and 4.2 struck near the epicenter of a magnitude 7.0 earthquake in China’s Tibet region between Friday night and Saturday morning, according to the China Earthquake Networks Center. The main quake has killed 16 people and injured 76, while rescue operations continue amid harsh weather and warnings of further tremors.

RELATED: Powerful 7.0 Earthquake in China’s Tibet Kills at Least 16 People

The first tremor struck Zaduo County in western China’s Qinghai province at 10:14 p.m. local time on Friday, at a depth of 10 kilometers. Two more earthquakes hit the same area and at the same depth on Saturday, at 6:39 a.m. and 8:07 a.m.

The tremors occurred near the epicenter of Thursday’s main earthquake in Baqing County, in Nagqu, Tibet. Seismological authorities have not yet confirmed whether the latest events are formally part of the same seismic sequence.

M5.3 likely aftershock – 223 km ENE of Nagqu, China

Oct 24 16:39 local time (18m ago)
Depth 10 kmhttps://t.co/A49zlMJPzH pic.twitter.com/PkqRxfBva0

— Earthquakes (@NewEarthquake) October 24, 2026

The official toll from the magnitude 7.0 earthquake remains at 16 dead and 76 injured. Authorities have also reported 339 homes destroyed or severely damaged, along with damage to 20 livestock facilities.

More than 5,000 personnel have been deployed to affected areas to conduct search and rescue operations and provide medical care and logistical support, state news agency Xinhua reported. Rescue teams have completed three rounds of house-to-house inspections without finding anyone reported missing.

Authorities have evacuated 12,489 residents and established at least 18 temporary shelters as a precaution.

🔊 A magnitude 7.0 earthquake hit Tibet, killing at least 16 and forcing thousands from their homes. It’s the strongest quake to hit China in nearly three years. More on the Reuters World News podcast https://t.co/dFVrexO5K2 pic.twitter.com/fu21iIGcM5

— Reuters (@Reuters) October 23, 2026

The emergency response is unfolding at an altitude of about 4,800 meters, where severe weather threatens to hamper relief efforts. China’s meteorological authorities forecast scattered snowfall for Saturday, with temperatures expected to fall as low as minus 9 degrees Celsius. Strong winds could further complicate travel and the installation of emergency shelters.

Chinese seismologists have warned that further perceptible aftershocks are likely in the coming days. Emergency teams are also monitoring secondary hazards, including potential rockfalls.

The magnitude 7.0 earthquake was the first of that strength recorded in China this year. It follows a January 2025 earthquake in Dingri County, Tibet, that killed at least 126 people.

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China bets refitted destroyers can hold line in US numbers race

Recent midlife upgrades to China’s older surface combatants highlight an ongoing debate over whether preserving naval fleet mass provides an operational edge over purely qualitative technological modernization in naval warfare. This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has carried out an extensive midlife refit of its […]

The post China bets refitted destroyers can hold line in US numbers race appeared first on Asia Times.

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Sodium, the new white gold?

For decades, lithium has been the most coveted element in energy storage. It has been called “white gold,” a label that has brought major problems, including soaring prices, fragile supply chains and a geopolitical dependence that worries both governments and industry. Enter sodium: abundant, cheap and a major promise for a more sustainable energy revolution.

Seguir leyendo

The recyclability factor

When we talk about more sustainable batteries it’s important to ask how their recycling works. “[Sodium batteries] are much easier to recycle, but also much less interesting from an economic perspective,” says Jon Ajuria of CIC energiGUNE. They typically contain fewer high-value metals, so technologically there is less need to recover materials for second use. Paradoxically, that also means recovering less money from recycling. “This makes it especially important to design batteries from the outset to be easy to disassemble and recycle,” says Professor José Luis Tirado, although Ajuria says policies that truly promote recycling will be essential.

© Tetra Images / GETTY IMAGES (EL PAÍS)

Sodium is abundant and cheap in nature.
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Da Machado a Pillay: il Nobel che manda su tutte le furie Trump e Netanyahu

Il Nobel per la pace 2026 a Navi Pillay segna una brusca discontinuità rispetto al premio assegnato l’anno precedente a María Corina Machado. La reazione di Donald Trump e Benjamin Netanyahu rivela quanto il nodo del diritto internazionale sia divenuto terreno di scontro geopolitico.

Segue nostro Telegram.

A distanza di appena un anno, il Premio Nobel per la pace sembra aver cambiato completamente direzione. Nell’ottobre 2025, il Comitato norvegese aveva scelto María Corina Machado, principale esponente dell’opposizione venezuelana, premiandola «per il suo instancabile lavoro nella promozione dei diritti democratici del popolo venezuelano e per la sua lotta per ottenere una transizione giusta e pacifica dalla dittatura alla democrazia». Lo scorso 9 ottobre, lo stesso riconoscimento è invece andato alla giurista sudafricana Navanethem “Navi” Pillay «per i suoi sforzi nel promuovere la pace e il diritto internazionale». Dietro la somiglianza delle formule ufficiali, tuttavia, si nascondono due messaggi politici quasi opposti.

Il Nobel a Machado si inseriva infatti in maniera pressoché naturale nel quadro della pressione esercitata da Washington contro il governo venezuelano. L’oppositrice di Nicolás Maduro era da tempo sostenuta apertamente dagli Stati Uniti e da governi latinoamericani allineati con Washington. La scelta del Comitato norvegese rafforzava quindi, indipendentemente dalle intenzioni dichiarate dai suoi membri, una delle parti di un conflitto politico interno sul quale gli Stati Uniti esercitano da anni una forte pressione attraverso sanzioni economiche, riconoscimenti politici selettivi e tentativi di isolamento internazionale del governo bolivariano.

Il rapporto personale fra Machado e Trump rese ancora più evidente questa convergenza. Il giorno stesso dell’assegnazione del premio, nell’ottobre 2025, Trump riferì che la dirigente venezuelana gli aveva telefonato affermando di accettare il Nobel anche in suo onore. Nel gennaio successivo, Machado arrivò poi a consegnare al presidente statunitense la propria medaglia del Nobel, nel tentativo di consolidare il sostegno di Washington alla propria strategia politica in Venezuela. Lo stesso Trump, pochi giorni prima dell’annuncio del premio 2026, ricordava pubblicamente quell’episodio come una sorta di riconoscimento indiretto della propria presunta attività di pacificatore.

Il Nobel 2026 ha prodotto invece un effetto praticamente opposto. Navi Pillay, infatti, non rappresenta un movimento politico sostenuto dagli Stati Uniti contro un governo avversario, ma una tradizione giuridica che rivendica almeno formalmente la possibilità di sottoporre anche le grandi potenze e i loro alleati alle norme del diritto internazionale.

La biografia della nuova vincitrice contribuisce a spiegare la portata della scelta. Sudafricana di origine tamil, Pillay iniziò la propria attività professionale durante l’apartheid, difendendo oppositori politici e battendosi per i diritti di Nelson Mandela e degli altri detenuti del regime segregazionista. Dopo la fine dell’apartheid divenne la prima donna non bianca a sedere nell’Alta Corte sudafricana. In seguito, fu giudice e presidente del Tribunale penale internazionale per il Ruanda, giudice della Corte penale internazionale dal 2003 al 2008 e Alto Commissario delle Nazioni Unite per i diritti umani dal 2008 al 2014. Oggi opera inoltre come giudice ad hoc presso la Corte internazionale di giustizia nel procedimento relativo alle accuse di genocidio contro il Myanmar.

Ma è soprattutto il genocidio del popolo palestinese a Gaza, perpetrato impunemente dal regime nazisionista israeliano, ad aver trasformato il Nobel a Pillay in un caso politico internazionale.

Pillay, infatti, ha presieduto la Commissione internazionale indipendente d’inchiesta istituita dal Consiglio dei diritti umani delle Nazioni Unite sui Territori palestinesi occupati, compresa Gerusalemme Est, e Israele. La Commissione ha concluso nel 2025 che Israele aveva commesso atti costitutivi di genocidio nella Striscia di Gaza, facendo riferimento, tra gli altri elementi, alle enormi perdite civili, alle restrizioni agli aiuti umanitari, alla distruzione sistematica delle strutture sanitarie, all’impatto delle operazioni sui bambini e alle dichiarazioni rese da esponenti politici e militari israeliani.

Da questo punto di vista, l’assegnazione del Nobel non poteva che provocare una reazione particolarmente violenta a Tel Aviv. Netanyahu ha affermato che il Comitato Nobel avrebbe «perso la propria bussola morale», definendo Pillay una persona intollerante che avrebbe costruito la propria carriera diffondendo quelle che il premier israeliano ha definito «calunnie di sangue» contro Israele. Il ministero degli Esteri israeliano ha adottato toni ancora più estremi, arrivando a evocare Joseph Goebbels e sostenendo che il propagandista nazista starebbe «applaudendo dall’inferno» alla decisione del Comitato (mentre, a nostro avviso, applaudirebbe piuttosto gli odiosi crimini commessi dal regime nazisionista).

La risposta israeliana, inoltre, non si limita a contestare le conclusioni della Commissione o l’interpretazione giuridica adottata da Pillay, ma tende a delegittimare l’intero meccanismo internazionale chiamato a giudicare l’operato del regime nazisionista. È una dinamica già emersa nei rapporti con la Corte penale internazionale, che ha emesso un mandato d’arresto contro Netanyahu per presunti crimini di guerra e crimini contro l’umanità, e con la Corte internazionale di giustizia, che ha dichiarato illegale la presenza israeliana nei Territori palestinesi occupati nell’ambito del suo parere consultivo del 2024.

La reazione di Donald Trump è stata diversa nella forma ma altrettanto rivelatrice. Il presidente statunitense, che da tempo conduce una vera e propria campagna personale per ottenere il Nobel, ha definito Pillay una «persona misteriosa» della quale non aveva mai sentito parlare. Ha poi bollato la mancata assegnazione del premio a sé stesso come una decisione «vergognosa e imbarazzante», destinata a lasciare una «macchia indelebile» sulla Norvegia. Secondo Trump, il Nobel sarebbe stato «screditato per sempre» da un gruppo di «ideologi radicali», da lui definiti perfino «nemici della civiltà».

Nelle stesse ore dell’annuncio del Nobel, Washington ha inoltre imposto nuove e molto più ampie sanzioni contro la Corte penale internazionale. L’amministrazione Trump ha annunciato restrizioni destinate a tagliare alla Corte l’accesso a servizi finanziari, tecnologici e commerciali statunitensi, presentando apertamente la misura come parte di un tentativo di indebolirne la capacità operativa. Il segretario di Stato Marco Rubio ha aggiunto che gli Stati Uniti non permetteranno alla CPI di perseguire cittadini statunitensi, definendo la Corte un organismo illegittimo. Dal canto suo, la CPI ha replicato denunciando un attacco allo Stato di diritto e al principio secondo cui nessuno dovrebbe essere posto al di sopra della legge.

Naturalmente, la decisione di assegnare il premio a Navi Pillay non dimostra che il Comitato norvegese sia improvvisamente diventato un organismo estraneo alle logiche politiche occidentali; inoltre, l’assegnazione di un premio non può certo cancellare la lunga storia di selettività che caratterizza l’applicazione del diritto internazionale. Tuttavia, questa volta, il principio riaffermato dal Nobel entra direttamente in collisione con la pretesa delle potenze dominanti di sottrarsi alle stesse regole che esse invocano nei confronti dei propri avversari.

La distanza fra i due premi presi in considerazione mostra dunque anche le contraddizioni interne allo stesso sistema occidentale. Il Nobel a Machado poteva essere perfettamente integrato nella strategia statunitense di pressione sul Venezuela, uno Stato collocato fuori dall’orbita di Washington e legato politicamente ed economicamente a Cina, Russia e ad altri attori del mondo multipolare. Il Nobel a Pillay valorizza invece istituzioni e principi che, quando vengono applicati a Israele o agli stessi Stati Uniti, diventano improvvisamente oggetto di sanzioni, minacce e campagne di delegittimazione.

Le reazioni scomposte di Trump e Netanyahu finiscono così per rafforzare involontariamente il significato politico dell’assegnazione. Entrambi contestano non soltanto la persona di Pillay, ma soprattutto il principio che la sua carriera rappresenta: che la responsabilità per crimini internazionali non dovrebbe dipendere dall’appartenenza a un determinato blocco geopolitico, dalla forza militare di uno Stato o dalla protezione garantita da Washington.

Nel frattempo, la credibilità del diritto internazionale continuerà naturalmente a dipendere dalla capacità di applicare questo principio senza doppi standard. Resta il fatto che, per decenni, le istituzioni occidentali hanno richiamato il diritto internazionale soprattutto nei confronti degli avversari geopolitici, mentre molto più debole è stata la loro capacità di farlo valere quando erano coinvolte le potenze occidentali o i loro alleati. Il caso di Gaza e dei crimini commessi dal regime nazisionista israeliano ha reso questa asimmetria sempre più difficile da occultare.

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A modem from a Russian drone led reporters to its Chinese maker—which invoiced 500 for Russia’s drone plant

Mesh Network XK-F358 modem from the Geran-5 drone

Undercover reporters ordered 500 drone mesh modems from a Chinese firm, which billed them to Russia’s Alabuga drone plant, investigation by The Insider found. The outlet estimates the firm makes about half the high-power mesh modems that let Russia steer its drones deep into Ukraine. The firm’s director also named US company AMD as the source of a key chip, and AMD says it has not sold to the firm.

Geran drones and Banderol drone-missiles have become Russia’s main weapons against Ukraine’s energy grid. Russia began this winter’s strike campaign against that grid in late September, ISW assessed. Ukrainians’ survival this winter depends largely on how fast the West halts mesh modem sales to Russia, the outlet argued.

What a mesh modem does

A mesh modem links drones into one radio network. Each unit relays data for the others, so if one drone is shot down, traffic reroutes through the rest. Information keeps flowing even if nearly 80% of the drones are downed, Ukrainian defense adviser Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov said in November 2025.

Range is the other half of the threat. One XK F-359 holds a line-of-sight link over 100–300 km, The Insider says. In theory, a couple of relay drones could keep a whole attack on Kyiv connected. Operators can then send new commands in flight and steer around air defenses. Russia’s Gerbera drones, first built as cheap decoys, increasingly carry these modems.

Explore further

Russia’s jam-resistant drones run on a Chinese modem no one has sanctioned

A modem from an upgraded Gerbera

To trace the part, The Insider’s correspondent in Ukraine examined an unmarked mesh modem from an upgraded Gerbera with a vertical tail fin, a version that appeared this summer. The outlet identified it as Xingkai’s XK F-359, the part Ukrainian intelligence and earlier reporting, Euromaidan Press included, had logged as the XK-F358. The Insider calls that label a misidentification.

Next, The Insider and the Nordsint investigative project contacted Xingkai on WeChat, posing as a Russian military supplier based in Alabuga. A company employee who introduced himself as “Jack Jiang” confirmed the firm is the model’s sole maker. The Insider identified him as Jiang Qin, Xingkai’s director and owner.

500 modems, three banks

The reporters then ordered 500 units for delivery to Alabuga, home to the plant that makes most of Russia’s long-range drones. Jiang invoiced 19.5 million yuan, which The Insider put at about $2.87 million. He offered two ways to pay: dollars to Xingkai’s DBS Bank account in Hong Kong, or yuan to his personal Ping An Bank account.

A man walks past a mural by Norwegian street artist Toddel depicting a map of Ukraine and US President Donald Trump (L) with Russia's President Vladimir Putin in Krakow on March 6, 2026, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Photo by Sergei GAPON / AFP) / Eastnews)
Explore further

America has sided with Russia against Ukraine. Europe should stop pretending and build a coalition against Russia, China, and even the US

In the chat, the reporters said outright that the end user was a military production facility. Jiang raised no objection, The Insider reported.

Later, after the reporters asked to update the address, Xingkai sent a revised invoice with “Alabuga” spelled in Latin letters. This time, it routed payment to a China Merchants Bank account in the name of a former Xingkai manager. She left a management post at the company in 2025, according to Tesari corporate records cited by The Insider. None of the three banks answered The Insider’s requests for comment.

Jiang also claimed the modem’s programmable chip is made by AMD. Asked for an AMD license, he refused, saying Xingkai buys the chips through a middleman. AMD told The Insider that Xingkai “is not an AMD customer or authorized partner,” and said it had sold the company nothing. AMD added that it bars exports of its products to Russia that violate US export controls and sanctions.

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Volvo plans to cut 2,500 jobs due to China's bruising pricing war

A Volvo Car AB EX30 electric sport utility vehicle during the Beijing Auto Show in Beijing, China, on Thursday, April 25, 2024.
Legacy automakers are struggling to compete in China.

Bloomberg/Getty Images

  • Legacy carmakers continue to report slumping sales in China.
  • Volvo is the latest. It's planning 2,500 global job cuts to save about $530 million.
  • America is a problem, too. Tariffs, crushed EV incentives, and Polestar's exit also hurt.

China's merciless car market is taking a bite out of Volvo.

On Friday, the Swedish luxury automaker said revenue in China fell by almost 50% over the past year. The company said, like many legacy premium automakers, it's facing increasing "hypercompetition" from Chinese competitors.

Volvo plans to cut 2,500 jobs globally in response, it said, including roughly 2,000 in Sweden. That's part of an effort to slash costs by about $530 million.

"We continue to operate in a very tough environment with strong external challenges: de-globalisation, hypercompetition and climate change," CEO Håkan Samuelsson said in a statement.

It's the latest stark example of the increasing pressure on legacy automakers in China. Several big-name car companies — including Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz — have recently reported slowing sales from their Chinese dealerships.

Volvo is majority-owned by Geely Auto Group, a Chinese automaking conglomerate.

The company said the reductions will be made by a combination of ending consultant contracts, natural attrition, and targeted employee exit packages.

China is not Volvo's only problem. The company also said that US tariffs and the loss of Washington's consumer incentives for electrified cars squeezed margins. Volvo previously bet heavily on a rapid consumer transition to electric vehicles, aiming for an all-electric portfolio by 2030. It's since walked back that goal to include plug-in hybrid vehicles.

The automaker also said that Polestar — its EV offshoot that is exiting the US market — also posted losses.

Volvo's answer is to get more local: the automaker said it would introduce two fresh cars tailored specifically for the Chinese market by the middle of next year. Those cars will be developed in close collaboration with Geely and will include a Chinese tech stack and advanced driver-assist technologies "to make them fully competitive in China."

Read the original article on Business Insider

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El dilema de China se ha convertido en el aprieto de Estados Unidos

 Yiğit Saner

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Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su

Estados Unidos se ve arrastrado a su propio «dilema de Malaca»

El sistema de pago que Irán pretende imponer a los buques que atraviesan el estrecho de Ormuz está inspirando también a otros países. Esta fuente de inspiración amenaza no solo los equilibrios de poder regionales, sino también el propio «orden mundial».

Recientemente, Talmiz Ahmad, un diplomático que anteriormente ocupó el cargo de embajador de la India en Arabia Saudí, Omán y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, advirtió de que está aumentando el riesgo de que el estrecho de Malaca se utilice para generar ingresos.

Indonesia, Malasia y Singapur bordean el estrecho de Malaca. Malaca es una ruta comercial tan importante como Hormuz. Aproximadamente dos meses después de que comenzara la guerra de Irán, el ministro de Hacienda de Indonesia propuso cobrar a los buques que atravesaran Malaca. Los ingresos se repartirían entre los tres países ribereños del estrecho.

Singapur rechazó la propuesta, Malasia abogó por un compromiso e Indonesia anunció que, por el momento, no se impondrían tasas de tránsito. Sin embargo, la idea de implantar un sistema de este tipo en Malaca u otros estrechos ha pasado a formar parte del debate mundial.

Se proponen cortar el cordón umbilical de China

Los expertos entrevistados por The Diplomat advierten de que el estrecho de Malaca podría convertirse pronto en un punto donde «se cruzan los intereses comerciales, las preocupaciones de seguridad nacional y la competencia geopolítica». Tienen buenas razones para hacerlo, ya que la cuestión no se limita a la imposición de tasas de tránsito de una u otra forma, sino a la influencia estratégica que podría llegar a tener el estrecho. Las siguientes cifras bastan por sí solas para ilustrar la importancia geopolítica de Malaca:

  • Aproximadamente el 29 % del petróleo transportado por mar y el 24 % de todas las mercancías comerciales pasan por el estrecho de Malaca.
  • Entre el 75 % y el 80 % de las importaciones de petróleo por vía marítima de China se transportan a través de Malaca.

Si bien esta ruta satisface las necesidades de China, la dependencia que genera constituye también una vulnerabilidad estratégica. Esta situación se conoce como el «dilema de Malaca».

Sin embargo, la amenaza no proviene únicamente de la propia dependencia de China. Durante años, los estrategas estadounidenses también han estado debatiendo formas de convertir esta vulnerabilidad en un arma contra Pekín.

Un artículo publicado en el Georgetown Journal of International Affairs en 2023, titulado «El reto de la seguridad económica de China», sostenía que Estados Unidos y sus aliados deberían dificultar que China superara su dilema de Malaca.

Un estudio de 2024 de la Brookings Institution, titulado «After Primacy: US Military Options in Contemporary East Asia» (Tras la primacía: opciones militares de EE. UU. en el Asia Oriental contemporánea), incluía entre las opciones militares disponibles en caso de un conflicto en torno a Taiwán un contra-bloqueo basado en una coalición dirigido al tráfico marítimo comercial de China. Dicho bloqueo podría extenderse a puntos estratégicos clave como Malaca. El análisis también señalaba que tal medida podría acarrear elevados costes para la economía mundial.

De la vulnerabilidad a la ventaja

Según el periodista Andy Browne, ganador del Premio Pulitzer, los estrategas estadounidenses llevan aproximadamente 25 años considerando el bloqueo de las importaciones marítimas de petróleo de China como un arma poderosa contra Pekín. Aunque esta estrategia sigue siendo objeto de debate en la actualidad, la guerra de Irán ha presentado un panorama que pone en tela de juicio las hipótesis en las que se han basado los estrategas estadounidenses:

  • China ha demostrado que puede capear las interrupciones en el suministro de petróleo a través del estrecho de Ormuz sin sufrir daños significativos.
  • Además de utilizar sus reservas de petróleo para aliviar la presión sobre numerosos países, China también contribuyó a evitar que los precios de los combustibles se dispararan aún más fuera de control. Al mismo tiempo, los oleoductos terrestres, las tecnologías de conversión del carbón en productos químicos y la capacidad de energía verde han reforzado la posición estratégica de China.
  • Los aliados de EE. UU. en la región de Asia-Pacífico, incluidos Japón y Filipinas, que se han visto muy afectados por la guerra, siguen lidiando con el aumento de los precios de la gasolina y el gasóleo, la disminución de las reservas estratégicas y la creciente inflación. Los aliados de EE. UU. en Asia Occidental y Europa están sufriendo los mismos efectos.
  • La imagen de Estados Unidos como potencia capaz de proyectar su poderío militar ha sufrido un duro golpe.

A la luz de estas realidades, los expertos estadounidenses reconocen ahora que el cierre del estrecho de Malaca podría dejar a los aliados de EE. UU. en la región sin petróleo antes de que ello afectara de manera significativa a China.

Según Andy Browne, la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta de China se ha convertido en una «medida defensiva», que crea rutas alternativas para eludir un bloqueo energético al tiempo que refuerza las conexiones euroasiáticas.

Pero la cuestión no termina ahí. La guerra de Irán también ha puesto de manifiesto las vulnerabilidades de las bases, los destructores y los portaaviones estadounidenses en la región de Asia-Pacífico. Los misiles hipersónicos, de crucero y balísticos de China podrían alcanzar estos objetivos, del mismo modo que los misiles iraníes han alcanzado activos estadounidenses en Asia Occidental. Las reservas chinas de misiles avanzados son enormes.

Dado que los actores asiáticos también debaten la posibilidad de generar ingresos a partir del estrecho, Washington se ve abocado a su propio «dilema de Malaca».

Una reacción en cadena que trastoca la doctrina estadounidense

La ecuación multidimensional que se está configurando actualmente indica que el objetivo de «controlar la alta mar» y «actuar como garante de la libertad de navegación» —la columna vertebral de la hegemonía estadounidense desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial— se enfrenta a su crisis más grave de la era posterior a la Guerra Fría.

La pérdida efectiva del control de Washington sobre estrechos estratégicos clave como Ormuz y Bab el-Mandeb está desencadenando una reacción en cadena que podría extenderse a la región de Asia-Pacífico y a otros estrechos críticos. A medida que convergen los avances en la tecnología de misiles, las amenazas asimétricas y las reivindicaciones de soberanía e ingresos de los actores locales, la capacidad de proyección de poder a escala mundial en la que Estados Unidos ha confiado durante décadas se está erosionando rápidamente.

El fin de la libertad de navegación garantizada por Washington en algunas regiones, y su creciente vulnerabilidad en otras, representa ahora algo más que un fracaso de la política exterior. Supone una grieta en el pilar marítimo fundamental que sustenta la hegemonía global de Estados Unidos.

Publicado originalmente por   United World International
Traducción:  Geopolítica rugiente

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Putin-Witkoff Talks Expose Broken Western Unity On Ukraine

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Written by Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher

On October 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin met in St. Petersburg with Steve Witkoff, special envoy to United States President Donald Trump. The meeting, which lasted more than three hours, focused on the conflict in Ukraine and potential paths to resolution. Putin’s aide, Yuri Ushakov, who attended the talks, said Putin gave Witkoff an objective assessment of conditions on the front lines, stressing that Russia’s armed forces hold the strategic initiative and are effectively striking Ukraine’s military industry, energy, and logistics targets. Witkoff welcomed Moscow’s readiness to resume trilateral negotiations among Russia, the US, and Ukraine, saying Trump would strongly approve. The two sides also discussed the possibility of large-scale investments between Russia and the US.

The meeting followed a series of public statements by Trump criticizing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for refusing to pursue a negotiated end to the conflict. Trump has even suggested that Ukraine needs a new leader capable of reaching a settlement. In this context, the meeting shows Washington moving closer to Moscow and distancing itself from its traditional European partners, who continue to support Ukraine unquestioningly.

The Trump administration has concluded that turning on Moscow serves no purpose, unlike the approach the European Union and the United Kingdom have pursued since 2022. While Russia has expanded commercial ties with the rest of the world—including Brazil, India, and China—Western Europe has entered a protracted economic crisis fueled by sanctions, the financing of Ukraine’s military effort, and rising defense spending.

Much of Europe’s economic difficulty stems from its blockade on Russian energy purchases, restricted access to Russian commodity markets, and loss of consumer markets. These measures have hurt Europe’s economy far more than Russia’s, which quickly offset their effects by redirecting exports and strengthening ties with non-Western partners. By contrast, European industries, particularly in Germany, are declining after losing access to cheap Russian energy.

Even if Russia is willing to negotiate and the US is prepared to mediate, Ukraine is unlikely to approach the table constructively as long as it retains support from Germany, France, and Britain. Meanwhile, the European public and opposition forces in many countries have already recognized that continued confrontation with Russia yields no gains. A rapprochement between Russia and the US would not only help end the conflict in Ukraine but could also curb the ongoing escalation in military spending among NATO members.

Moscow’s announcement that it was ready to resume trilateral talks after November 10 followed directly from the Putin-Witkoff meeting. During the meeting, Putin also praised American mediation efforts.

Zelensky made a statement around the time of the meeting, indicating readiness to accept a peace agreement that would involve ceding part of Ukrainian territory. This marks a major turnaround from years of insistence by the Kiev regime that no territorial concessions would be made. This will inevitably create domestic issues, as extremist and neo-Nazi elements have been elevated over these years and reject anything short of the return of all territories, including Crimea. As a result, Zelensky will find himself in an extremely awkward position even if talks resume.

Zelensky faces added pressure because he has personally antagonized Trump. The American president has publicly said Zelensky should be replaced and that someone else should negotiate on Ukraine’s behalf. Intelligence sharing has also been visibly disrupted. Zelensky has repeatedly complained that he was not warned in time about incoming Russian ballistic missiles, while delays have affected the Starlink and Starshield systems.

Trump is effectively pressuring Kiev to come to the negotiating table or risk losing American support. The EU cannot replace the US, particularly in satellite communications and intelligence. Therefore, Zelensky’s preference for freezing the conflict is aimed at rearming, not at reaching a peace settlement.

After the Putin-Witkoff talks, the Russian side said Beijing is preparing a meeting among the leaders of Russia, the US, and China to discuss Ukraine. The meeting could take place on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen on November 18–19, and all three leaders have already indicated they will attend. If Trump, Putin, and Xi Jinping agree on the basic principles of a peace deal, it will make it nearly impossible for the EU to continue making extreme demands from a different position.

Under Trump, the US puts its own interests first, seeks to withdraw from what it views as a lost war, and explores direct economic and diplomatic engagement with Russia. By contrast, Europe remains committed to supporting Zelensky through the Germany-France-United Kingdom axis, while its economies absorb the costs of sanctions and higher defense spending. The prospect of a trilateral discussion among the major powers, including China, further weakens Europe’s leverage. The St. Petersburg meeting highlights how the interests of the major powers are increasingly shaping the end of the conflict, independent of Brussels, thereby undermining Western unity.


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The money starts as bags of cash in a Moscow market and ends up clean in China, leaked files show

money starts bags cash moscow market ends up clean china leaked files show · post branch russia’s state defense bank promsvyazbank russian-occupied donetsk ukraine 2023 banko_psb_en_placo_bakuaj_komisaroj_(donecko) news ukrainian reports

Russia's state-backed payment firm A7 took in at least 283 tons of cash rubles, worth more than $14 billion, between November 2024 and July 2025, and turned much of it into payments to China that hide where the money came from, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and Russian investigative outlet Proekt reported on 21 October, citing leaked internal records.

Cut off from Western banks over its war against Ukraine, Russia now moves money the way drug gangs launder theirs: cash goes in, and clean-looking wire transfers come out abroad. The overlap is literal.

Last year, UK investigators found that a network laundering British drug gangs' cash had bought a Kyrgyz bank that was handling payments for Promsvyazbank, Russia's state defense bank. That same bank co-owns A7, which "is also likely to facilitate cash-based money laundering," anti-money-laundering expert George Voloshin told ICIJ. On 1 October, the US Treasury named A7 a "significant transnational criminal organization." Most of the market cash pays Chinese suppliers, and China supplies about 90% of the high-priority Western-restricted items Russia imports for its weapons. Drone makers working for the Russian army are among A7's clients, Proekt found in April.

From market stalls to a defense bank vault

Much of the cash came from Moscow's giant Sadovod market, where broker teams known as "departments" collect bags of rubles from traders, the records show. Vans take the numbered bags to an A7 office, where about 50 cashiers count the money before it is trucked to Promsvyazbank. The bank vaults it and credits A7. At its peak, A7 handled at least 58 tons of cash a month.

Russia's central bank has flagged the problem itself. Money of unknown origin comes "primarily" from Moscow's wholesale and retail markets and from illegal crypto exchanges, a senior Central Bank official said in September, as quoted by ICIJ.

Sadovod market in Moscow, where broker teams later collected cash for the A7 payment firm, Russia, 19 September 2023
Sadovod market in Moscow, where broker teams later collected cash for the A7 payment firm, Russia, 19 September 2023. Photo: Nikita Andreev/Wikimedia Commons

Clean money for Chinese factories

A7 then orders shell companies outside Russia to pay its clients' suppliers, mostly Chinese exporters. The money moves through Kyrgyzstan, largely via the state-owned Trading Company of the Kyrgyz Republic, and the wire transfers carry no trace of cash or of Russia. The records list accounts at ICBC, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, and China Construction Bank. One $287,000 transfer went through Standard Chartered's Hong Kong branch with "Sadovod" recorded as the client.

Chinese banks began refusing Russia-linked payments in December 2023 under the threat of US secondary sanctions. Stripping the funds of their origin makes them easier for Chinese banks to accept, illicit-finance expert Zachary Tvarozna told ICIJ. "The only company that sees everything is A7 itself," Voloshin said.

A7, Promsvyazbank, the Chinese banks, and Kyrgyzstan's economy ministry did not answer ICIJ's questions. A7 has publicly rejected the US accusations, saying it runs "a modern, multi-tiered compliance system."

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US Treasury cracks down on Russia-China-Kyrgyzstan payment network, expands sanctions

Sanctioned, but still moving

A7 launched in late 2024, co-owned by Promsvyazbank and led by Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, a "sanctioned and convicted criminal fraudster," according to the US Treasury. Ukraine sanctioned its network in February, and the UK followed in May. A7 claimed to have moved more than 7.5 trillion rubles, about 13% of Russia's 2025 foreign trade transactions, and its network also helped Iran sell oil and buy weapons, the Treasury said.

Sanctions did hit A7's crypto side. Daily volume of its ruble token A7A5 fell 96% from its peak by June 2026, blockchain analytics firm Elliptic found. The cash channel is harder to touch: Western banks can see where A7's money lands, but not where it starts.

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Why China’s AI triumphs aren’t saving its flagging stock market

TOKYO – When Chinese stocks lose a South Korea-sized sum in five months, Beijing has a problem. The US$2.4 trillion plunge in market value since May sits between Korea’s $2.25 trillion GDP and Canada’s $2.49 trillion. Many factors could explain Chinese shares entering bear market territory, but a major one is a protracted slump in […]

The post Why China’s AI triumphs aren’t saving its flagging stock market appeared first on Asia Times.

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